Thursday, June 18, 2020

Navy Aerial Refueling

As you know, the Navy is struggling with aerial refueling and some time ago made the unbelievably stupid decision to use its newest, most capable, front line strikefighter as a tanker.  This decision has resulted in several F-18E/F’s in each air wing being removed from combat service and the aircraft being prematurely worn out due to the greatly extended flight hours of a tanker.

This idiocy prompts us to look back at the history of Navy aerial refueling.

Surprisingly, the history of Navy aerial refueling is fairly short.  As best I can tell, here’s a chronological list of the dedicated tanker aircraft that the Navy has used over the years.  Various other aircraft have been used for occasional buddy tanking but these are the dedicated tankers even if they weren’t purpose built for the task.



Operating Period
Deliverable Fuela
KA-3B Skywarrior
1967- mid 1970s
29,000 lb
KA-6D Intruder
early 1970s – late 1990s
20,000 lb
S-3 Viking
late 1970s – late 2000s
16,000 lb
F/A-18E/F Super Hornetb
early 2000s - current
14,000 lb
MQ-25 Stingray
2024? - ?
14,000 lb

a Deliverable fuel is a highly variable number which depends on the distance the tanker has to fly to reach the refueling point and how much, if any, of the tanker’s internal fuel is available for off-load.  The figures presented are approximate estimates under typical conditions.

b The Super Hornet is sometimes cited as being able to carry around 29,000 lb of fuel but that includes both internal fuel and all five external fuel tanks.  Under actual conditions, the Hornet cannot deliver all of its internal fuel and the Navy no longer operates the Hornet with all five fuel tanks due to increased stress and wear on the aircraft.  Thus, the actual deliverable fuel is much less.



Here’s some interesting tidbits of information about the various tankers.

KA-3B Skywarrior
  • 85 A-3B bombers were refitted in 1967 for the tanker role
  • The KA-3 could deliever 29,000 lb of fuel at 460 miles (1)
Skywarrior Refueling Intruder


KA-6D Intruder
  • 90 A-6As and A-6Es were converted for use as tanker aircraft
  • Could deliver half the load of the KA-3B Skywarrior (1)
  • Could deliver a maximum of around 3000 gal (20,000 lb) (5)
  • Could carry 5 external fuel tanks (4 wing + 1 centerline) and dispensed fuel from buddy tanks or a centerline hose/drum refueling basket which could transfer fuel from the external tanks or the aircraft’s internal tanks
  • First demonstrated in 1966.
KA-6D Intruder


S-3 Viking
  • A single KS-3A prototype was developed and tested but the program was cancelled
  • The original proposed KS-3A Viking tanker would have added a conformal weapons bay fuel tank to supplement standard external buddy tanks which would have allowed the aircraft to carry 30,000 lb of fuel (2)
  • S-3 Vikings were used as dedicated buddy tankers able to deliver around 16,000 lb of fuel (2)
S-3 Viking Tanker


F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
  • Older A-D model Hornets were not equipped for tanking so only the more modern E-F models were used
  • Anywhere from 25 to 30 percent of Super Hornet sorties are used for refueling missions (4)
  • The Hornet Aerial Refueling System includes an external 330 gallon tank with hose reel on the centerline along with four external 480 gallon tanks and internal tanks for a total of 29,000 pounds of fuel on the aircraft, however, the Navy has had to reduce the number of external fuel tanks in the tanking role due to excessive wear on the airframes (6) and this reduces the deliverable fuel which, in turn, requires more Super Hornets to be used as tankers to dispense the same amount of fuel
F-18F Tanker


MQ-25 Stingray
  • Refueling specification is to offload 14,000lbs of gas at a distance of 500 miles
  • IOC won’t occur until 2024 and that target is subject to up to a three year delay due to carrier test ship modernization delays (3)
  • Navy plans to buy around 70 production aircraft
  • The 2020 GAO annual report cites a unit cost (includes procurement and development) of $146M per aircraft and notes that costs could rise substantially if carrier modernization is delayed
  • Eisenhower (CVN-69) and Bush (CVN-77) have been designated to be the first two carriers to test and operate the MQ-25 but each requires modernization and installation of unmanned aircraft control stations, data links, and maintenance facilities.  If the upgrade schedule cannot be met – and it’s currently in doubt – the MQ-25 introduction faces a several year delay.
MQ-25 Stingray



Here’s a few general bits of information:

Aerial refueling dates back to the 1920’s beginning with early attempts to refuel biplanes.

In 1934, Sir Alan Cobham had founded Flight Refuelling Ltd which began refining the probe-and-drogue system commonly used by the Navy, today.

The Intruder and Super Hornet provide tactical refueling capability in that they are capable of accompanying strike groups rather than having to meet them at designated locations.

The KS-3A Viking original proposal would have provided significant refueling capacity (up to 30,000 lb) and, if implemented, could have saved the Hornets from being forced into tanker duty.  Even today, some 90 S-3 Vikings are still available in long term storage and most have used only around half of the lifetime flight hours.  They could still be converted into KS-3 Viking tankers for much less than the cost of developing the new MQ-25 Stingray, one supposes.

Here’s an example of typical tanker usage:  During Vietnam, strike forces launched from aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin were accompanied by tankers for a final refueling before they went to the target. Tankers were held in standby orbits for attackers returning from the target, and a tanker was always in orbit over the aircraft carrier in the event a returning airplane, almost out of fuel, missed its "trap" and had to circle for a second attempt at landing.(1)

The future of Navy aerial refueling, assuming the MQ-25 Stingray pans out, is mediocre, at best.  The MQ-25 deliverable fuel is at the lower end of the historical capability spectrum which means that more aircraft will be required to deliver the required quantity of fuel.  Of course, given that air wings have shrunk to nearly half their original size, there is plenty of room on the carriers for extra aircraft.  Whether the MQ-25 can operate tactically with strike groups or will have to establish refueling locations remains to be seen.  The MQ-25 seems to be a decidedly average capability.  If the aircraft can be procured at sufficiently cheap prices and the operating costs are not excessive then the mediocre capability is acceptable.  Unfortunately, the $146M unit cost is extremely high and costs always increase so this is looking to be poor value for the dollar.

That’s it.  Other than the obvious conclusion that the Navy chose the absolute worst path for aerial refueling (not surprising), this is primarily just an informational post to help us understand what our aerial refueling situation is, how we got there, and what our future prospects look like.




_________________________________

(1)Global Security website, “KA-3B / EKA-3B”,
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/ka-3b.htm

(2)The Drive website, “The Compelling Case For Turning S-3 Vikings Into The Navy's New MQ-25 Tanker Drone”, Tyler Rogoway, 6-Apr-2018,
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/19789/the-insanely-logical-case-for-turning-s-3-vikings-into-the-navys-new-mq-25-tanker-drone

(3)Defense News website, “If the US Navy isn’t careful, its new unmanned tanker drone could face a 3-year delay”, David B. Larter, 11-Jun-2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/06/10/if-the-us-navy-isnt-careful-its-new-unmanned-tanker-drone-could-face-a-3-year-delay/

(4)USNI News website, “Navy Has Picked the First Two Carriers to Fly MQ-25A Stingray Unmanned Aerial Refueling Tankers”, Sam LaGrone, 12-Jun-2017,
https://news.usni.org/2017/06/12/navy-has-picked-the-first-two-carriers-to-fly-mq-25a-stingray-unmanned-aerial-refueling-tankers

(5)A-6 Intruder, Detail and Scale, Vol.24, Bert Kinzey, 1987, p.58

(6)USNI News website, “Navy Getting ‘Smarter’ About Tanking Mission As Super Hornets Approach 6,000 Hours”, Megan Eckstein, 12-Aug-2015,
https://news.usni.org/2015/08/12/navy-getting-smarter-about-tanking-mission-as-super-hornets-approach-6000-hours

35 comments:

  1. You can rely on the airforce...if we can ever iron out the bugs in the KC-46s... And nothing happens to ground large portions of the decrepit KC-135 fleet...and bean counters don't retire the entire KC-10 fleet to buy a left aeleron washer for an F-35....

    ReplyDelete
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    1. How often are KC-10's used? with only 60 built compared to the hundreds of KC-135's still in service are they reaching the end of life for there air-frames faster?

      Delete
    2. I know it might not completely help USN but with so many large civilian airliners being grounded, you think replacing the aging KC10s would be pretty easy and relatively cheap for USAF and USN could buy some ground based refuelers. Wouldn't completely replace the carrier based refuelers but could it relief some of the pressure on them?

      USN always crying about money but refurbished civilian airliners has been done numerous times and is pretty straightforward, compared to using high end top of line jets or $140 million MQ25, a few ground based refuelers would go a long way...

      It was such a stupid decision to get rid of S-3 and KA-6s...funny how we always here that's it so expensive to dig them out of storage but USN can find billions for MQ program....

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    3. "How often are KC-10's used?"

      Air Force tankers are not generally relevant for carrier group operations during combat. Only in a Desert Storm type scenario would they be useful. For naval combat at sea, a carrier needs its own tanking.

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    4. "relief some of the pressure on them? "

      No, not really. For naval combat at sea, a carrier group is far from any land base and land based tankers would not be useful. A carrier needs its own organic tankers.

      For a Desert Storm type scenario, land based tankers would be useful but the AF can supply those in that case.

      Delete
  2. During Vietnam, the A-7 was occasionally used as a tanker.

    Until the MQ-25 is ready, the simple solution is adding another 8-10 Super Hornets to each carrier aiw wing and use them as tankers.

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  3. May be I'm being simplistic (I often am). The Navy has committed to buying a number of F35's (that I perceive they are less than fully enthusiastic about). Why not develop an AAR variant. It could have the bomb bay re-configured as a tank, would be stealthy, would go the same speed as other F35's, would use most of the same spare / maintenance and the Navy could reduce the number of fighty F35's before they move onto their new 6th generation plane.
    Once it has been developed and working it could be developed into un-manned aircraft system (as this seems "essential" for the Navy. This can be developed at a sensible speed and phased in when ready (ie working). As there would be a working system in place (ie manned F35's) the switch to un-manned can be phased and non time critical.

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    Replies
    1. I disagree with this assessment. The F-35 is already cost prohibitive as it is. Adding another variant with fuel tanks would make it even less useful and how much fuel is that? maybe 14000lbs-17000lbs max and we are losing another combat-oriented air frame for such a simple mission. And saying the F-35 a working system in place is unfortunately too optimistic with some of its major issues still haven't been ironed out. What we need is a dedicated aircraft from a common air-frame (preferably refitted common aircraft) to keep the costs down and longetivity.

      Delete
    2. "bomb bay re-configured as a tank, would be stealthy"

      It's an interesting idea, however, unless you use external fuel tanks, the amount of deliverable fuel from just a tank in the bomb bay is pretty minimal, I would think. 5,000 - 10,000 lb of fuel? Just guessing. Internal fuel capacity of a Super Hornet is 14,000 lb so enough to partially refuel one or two aircraft. Is that worth losing a front line combat aircraft?

      If you add external tanks then you lose the stealth.



      Delete
    3. Its insanity to spend billions of SH and F35 tankers! Why so much capability for single mission task that doesn't require most of what your spending the money on like AESA, internal bays,etc...ok, LO is nice but probably unnecessary for 90% of the missions?

      There's a reason why when USN was rational and smart that they used old airframes....

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    4. "LO is nice but probably unnecessary for 90% of the missions?"

      Just recall the post about the Chinese/Russian Very Long Range Air to Air Missiles (VLRAAM). A non-stealthy tanker is a duck in a shooting gallery to an enemy from a couple hundred miles away. Eliminate the tankers and you eliminate the effectiveness of the entire air wing.

      Delete
  4. Here's my idea for a carrier air wing:

    24 F/A-18 (2 squadrons)
    24 F-35 (2 squadrons)
    12 S-3 (6 ASW patrol, 5 tanker, 1 COD)
    6 EA-18
    5 E-2
    10 helos
    6 MQ-25 (when ready)

    87 aircraft, which should work since the Nimitzes used to carry 90. If we have only 90 or so usable S-3s in the boneyard, that would not be enough to meet these numbers, so we either trim back the numbers or reopen the production line.

    I think one of the first things we will learn in either combat or truly realistic training is that retiring the S-3s was one of the dumbest of a long line of dumb decisions made by the Navy. We need a long-range ASW capability to go into harm's way, and we also need the refueling capability that a fully tricked-out KS-3 could provide.

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    Replies
    1. Is there anything wrong with the S-3 other than that they were old?

      Did the design become obsolete?

      Delete
    2. "Is there anything wrong with the S-3 other than that they were old?"

      No. They were fine and, as a fleet, were only around half way through their life span so they weren't even that old. For a tanker, their design would be perfectly acceptable. The S-3 Viking was one of the best, most versatile aircraft we've developed!

      Delete
  5. I wish we had more basic numbers on the MQ-25. With the engine selection, it isn't very promising. I'd have rather seen 1 platform that could evolve into a strike platform too. If you play with the numbers, a UAV the size of Super Hornet or F-35C could get around on an engine the size of what's being considered for B-52 replacement and could carry gas like the Whale or internal payload reasonably greater than the F-35. It would get us out of these anemic production numbers which is a huge part of the overall cost on these small, slow production runs. Plus they should start with evaluating the opportunity cost of bringing back the S-3. I feel like it too is like the B-52 re-engine. An idea with a strong business case, that never happens.

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  6. According to airvectors about 50 examples of the AJ Savage were converted to single-point hose-&-drogue tankers in the 50s.

    There was also a drop in single-point hose-&-drogue kit that fit into the bombbay of the A3D-2/A-3B Skywarrier. These were in use before any if the Skywarriers were permanently converted into KA-3Bs.

    Tommy Thomason over at (https://thanlont.blogspot.com/2013/10/texaco.html) says that the Skyraider was the preferred tanker in the 50's. The smaller plane was just easier to handle. I also remember hearing somewhere that the AD-6/A-1H and AD-7/A-1J both came factory standard with the plumbing to refuel jets and that the older AD-4B was modified to the same standard.

    The A-7 Corsair replaced the Skyraider as a fuel truck. Seems like attack aircraft were often used as tankers.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Good reminder about the AJ-2 Savage as a tanker. I'd missed that one.

      I know Skyraider, along with lots of other aircraft, were used occasionally as buddy tankers. I thought about including it in the listing but I'm not sure how extensively it was used as a tanker.

      Delete
  7. So, one thing I note in the description of the MQ-25, which has bugged me for a while. Why doesn't the US Navy operate a dedicated test and training carrier?

    Obviously part of the problem is one of limited numbers, etc, but this seems like it would be a useful role for a retiring front-line carrier. Clearly there is a minimum number of crew required to operate a carrier but I can't imagine it needs to be a full complement of 5,000 for this role. and if it does for some reason, well that would not necessarily be a bad thing as it would give you a venue for provided advanced training before sending folks out to the fleet.

    Quite apart from freeing up the active fleet carriers from doing more basic tasks like maintaining currency, or giving new pilots basic carrier-landing training etc.

    In addition this owuld be a great opportunity to work out the kinks on something like the MQ-25 without having to worry about interfering with normal operational cycles for active frontline carriers.

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    Replies
    1. Could not agree more! One of the old conventionally powered carriers (USS Kennedy CV-67, for example) would have been ideal for this.

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    2. As the Navy seems to be moving toward retiring Nimitz would it be worthwhile considering that ship for the same purpose when the time comes. I'm going to make the massive presumption that nuclear carriers have remaining life in their reactors when they retire. Even if that life is not necessarily sufficient to sustain another twenty years of active service, it might be enough to provide a period of useful service in the somewhat different context of a test and training ship.

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    3. As a possible reference point, the Navy has converted several nuclear submarines into Moored Training Ships (MTS) to train sailors in the operation and maintenance of submarine nuclear reactors.

      Delete
    4. "nuclear submarines into Moored Training Ships"

      Good reminder!

      Delete
    5. They should turn all the LCS into BNTS (Basic Navigation Training Ships) and kill two birds with one stone.

      Delete
    6. Use the Ford as a training ship, just like LCS 1-4.

      Practice repairing the new tech which doesn't work.

      Andrew

      Delete
  8. For the price of a MQ-25 or two you could convert/build an oil tanker with a flat top and fly KC-130s for the aerial tanker role.

    KC-130J 47,903 lbs of fuel for aerial refueling.

    Maybe a new class of oilers with a flat top big enough to handle KC-130s could pick up some of the slack during normal operations.

    NeoPanamax tankers are up to 1201 ft in length, which would be plenty of runway and still able to transit the Panama Canal.

    http://www.codeonemagazine.com/c130_article.html?item_id=148

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  9. What's the solution here?

    Bringing back refurbished S-3s without building new ones, is a stopgap solution that is good for about 10-12 years. And, we would have the same problem if we brought back refurbished A-6s. Plus, bringing back the S-3s in the tanker role does nothing to fill the need for a fixed-wing, carrier-based ASW platform either.

    Super Hornets are less than half the cost of MQ-25 and can deliver as much, if not more fuel, than an MQ-25. And, the Super Hornet doesn't need additional development or testing and is readily available.

    The other options are modifying the MV-22 or E-2 into a tanker or put something like the S-3 back into production. Is it time for another go at a Common Support Aircraft?

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    Replies
    1. "Is it time for another go at a Common Support Aircraft?"

      This would be the tempting, initial solution with an S-3-ish airframe. However, in today's battlefield with two hundred mile+ range A2A weapons (recall the post?), soon to be available hypersonic weapons, stealth hunter-aircraft, etc., a 'common' airframe that is not stealthy, maneuverable, and fast is going to have a very short combat life.

      I once posted on the possibility of a B-2 Hawkeye for these very reasons and the same reasoning applies to a tanker. An ASW aircraft might get away with being a bit more 'pedestrian' but not a lot. So, if we're going to design a Common Support Aircraft, it will have to be stealthy, fast, and maneuverable. That immediately rules out the MV-22 and E-2. The Super Hornet and F-35 are too small and you don't want to take away combat aircraft to perform support functions. The MQ-25 is too small, is limited in functionality by virtue of being unmanned, and is too slow and of questionable stealth. Much as I like the S-3, it doesn't meet the criteria, either. The B-2 is the only aircraft that even begins to meet the criteria and it's not really suited because it's not shaped and sized to support multiple functions. That leaves only a new design.

      Delete
    2. Navy completed its AoA a year ago for the new generation F-14, the F/A-XX / Next Generation Air Dominance fighter with necessary higher speed speed and longer range, and unless the Navy can spell out to Congress why it needs it there will be a high probability it will end up with Congress funding additional warmed over F-35s, F-18s and MQ-25s

      If the NGAD did become a reality would it not be able to create the necessary 200+ mile safe zone to obviate the need for a very expensive B-2 type Hawkeye/tanker and allow contined use of current Hawkeye/S-3 with necessary soft kill defensive aids saving many $billions?

      Delete
    3. "If the NGAD did become a reality would it not be able to create the necessary 200+ mile safe zone to obviate the need for a very expensive B-2 type Hawkeye/tanker and allow contined use of current Hawkeye/S-3"

      For tasks in the immediate vicinity of the carrier, it likely could. However, tankers typically deploy along with the strike package, well out from the carrier. Unless we want to dedicate a dozen or more fighters to establishing remote 200+ mile protective zones around tankers and ASW aircraft, we can't provide that kind of protection away from the carrier and we simply don't have big enough air wings to dedicate that many fighters to HVU-CAP.

      Recall, also, that enemy aircraft will be more and more stealth types in the near future so establishing a 200+ mile safe zone will be nearly impossible. We think our F-22/35 can easily penetrate enemy defenses so why wouldn't enemy stealth aircraft be able to penetrate our attempts at 200+ mile defenses? It has to work both ways.

      Delete
    4. A few thoughts
      As the 72 MQ-25 budgeted at $10+billion, would not be surprised if a B-2 size S-3 would be cost nearer $30 billion?, don't think the funding will be available if NGAD has to funded in similar time period.

      Think the era dating back more than 20 years when stealth F-22/35 could easily penetrate enemy defenses now over as tech well understood by Chinese and Russians and how to counter it with new tech long wave band radars (the F-117 first flew nearly forty years ago). Stealth to work you need a larger aircraft as the B-21 to counter the longer wave band radars.

      Maximum fuel usage on take off when heavy with weapons and fuel using max power get to operating height, why need 400/500 mile radius of tankers required reflects the very limited fuel capacity of the F/A-18.

      Would expect uture development effort put into soft kill mass decoys and towed, active jammers and if understand Air Force looking at small anti-kill missiles.

      Delete
  10. The MQ-25 really needs to be an operational mock-up/concept tester for a similar aircraft about 2-3 times its' size and capacity.

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    Replies
    1. Why? I'm asking about CONOPS. How do you see a tanker being used?

      If it's going to accompany strikes on thousand mile, deep penetration attacks then that dictates a different tanker than if it's going to be used as an overhead recovery tanker. And so on. This gets to the underlying question which is what is the role of carrier aviation? Answer that and you'll know what kind of tanker you need.

      Right now, the Navy is proceeding along the tanker path without a CONOPS for the air wing and, therefore, without a CONOPS for the tanker. They're acquiring a tanker just to have one and to free up some Hornets. That's not a CONOPS.

      Show me that you're better than the Navy and tell me your coherent plan for the air wing in combat and how a tanker will support that?!

      Delete
  11. Your fundamental question about carrier based aviation (CBA) CONOPS deserves a lot of thinking. My two cents regarding tankers are bellow.

    Given following arguments:
    -CBA is an order of magnitude more expensive than land based aviation (LBA).
    -CBA is an order of magnitude less capable than LBA.
    -Threats that CBA face are the same as the LBA, in contested airspace over land.

    The conclusion is that CBA shouldn't compete for the same mission as LBA. Long range strike against contested airspace over land, is typical LBA mission.

    On the other hand long range strike against naval/coastal/island targets should be typical CBA mission, and for that the Super Hornet tanker is enough. In other words, if you think you need sustained long range range CBA strike, you are planning to use your CBA ineffectively.

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    1. "The conclusion is that CBA shouldn't compete for the same mission as LBA. Long range strike against contested airspace over land, is typical LBA mission."

      I mean, that makes some sense, but we're talking about China, and available bases are few and distant.

      Delete
    2. "The conclusion is that CBA shouldn't compete for the same mission as LBA. Long range strike against contested airspace over land, is typical LBA mission."

      Of course, this assumes that you have LBA within effective range of the targets! The advantage to CBA being that it can move to change its range.

      That said, I completely agree that trying to use CBA for a sustained land strike campaign is a misuse of CBA.

      Good comment.

      Delete

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