However, the LRASM is only half of a weapon system. The other half is sensors. As we’ve noted many times, the longest ranged
weapon in the world is useless unless you can find a target from the same range
as your weapon.
 |
| Hornet and LRASM |
The LRASM is reported to have a range of 200-500 miles
depending on what source you want to believe.
Currently, the Navy has very few sensors (none?) capable of survivably
detecting targets at that range.
As a brief reminder, the LRASM is a stealthy anti-ship
cruise missile based on the AGM-158B
JASSM-ER. The missile has a
1000 lb penetrating (whatever that means) blast fragmentation warhead. It uses multiple sensors and modes to find
targets which gives it reduced dependence on GPS guidance.
LRASM
is designed to detect and destroy specific targets within groups of ships by
employing advanced technologies that reduce dependence on intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, network links and GPS
navigation in electronic warfare environments. (1)
So, this is some good news but now the Navy needs to put
some work into developing a long range sensor system that can effectively and
survivably operate in enemy controlled or contested air space. Only with such a sensor system can we get the
maximum benefit of the LRASM.
(1)USNI News website, “Next-Generation Anti-Ship Missile
Achieves Operational Capability with Super Hornets”, Xavier
Vavasseur, 19-Dec-2019,
https://news.usni.org/2019/12/19/next-generation-anti-ship-missile-achieves-operational-capability-with-super-hornets
Or you declare a exclusion zone and just shoot at anything you vaguely think is a ship assuming it has self targeting wonder magic just like the Chinese CV killing ballistic missile (that won't possibly be mistaken for a nuke).
ReplyDeleteBut fair point.
A stealthy companion device with very short range hard to jam communications link to make the AI call on abort or attack that brings its sensors on line at the lase point of no return? Loaded with sensors and no attack package.
Still have to point the salvo in the right direction, and a fail/false positive is a lot of money in the drink.
I'd like to think that the "penetrating" market hype means the missile has the ability to sense that it's punched through a ship hull and explode before it punches out the other side, similar to the "floor counter" feature in some bunker buster munitions.
ReplyDeleteSo technically it would be an anti-over-penetration warhead. But that would confuzzle all the lawmakers and civilians who don't know that modern warships are even more deserving of the "Tin Can" moniker than their WW2 fore-bears ever were.
"(and decreases the need for stealth? - what do you say to that, F-35?)"
ReplyDelete@ComNavOps: The obvious argument is that the F-35's stealth and internal carriage of JSM should allow it to better penetrate hostile airspace that is less permissive to non-stealth aircraft. :V As you noted, the weakness of LRASM at present is that while the missile itself is physically capable of long range attack, it's hampered by a lack of sensor cueing at that range. The smaller JSM has shorter range than LRASM, that's less of an issue given it's meant to be cued by the launching F-35. Assuming everything works, of course.
(Ironically, the JASDF appears on-track to be the first operator to employ JSM with the F-35, instead of the USAF, or even Norway. I'm not even convinced that the USN will eventually buy JSM; it seems like a no-brainer, but well. USN procurement. :V)
It will be interesting to continue to observe how things pan out with LRASM - the USAF has reportedly allocated funding for B-52 integration, which suggests that they may want to move the bomber force into the maritime strike, in addition to the naval mining mission, as part of the AirSea Battle pivot. Certainly the USAF has a vested interest in appearing relevant in all potential future conflicts.
The penetrating blast frag warhead is nothing new - it's just essentially a blast fragmentation warhead that's on a delay, so that it explodes inside whatever it hits. It's nothing exotic - Maverick and Harpoon have had similar warheads.
LRASM too long to fit in F-35 internal weapons bay as the Norwegian Kongsberg Joint Strike Missile variant of the ship launched NSM specifically sized to fit the F-35A weapons bay at 3.95 m whereas the LRASM ~ 4.3 m
ReplyDeleteLRASM not yet the finished article? - insidedefence/aviationweek
LRASM 1.1 update
"The USAF awarded Lockheed a $175 million contract on July 3 to pay for “updates” to the AGM-158C. // The USAF also announced plans on July 3 to buy up to 50 AGM-158Cs in Lot 4."
The upgrades includes changes to the shape of the wing for better range, to meet “objective” performance requirements set by the Navy, new wing derived from JASSM-D program.
"LRASM’s additional sensor dramatically reduces maximum range // The AGM-158C is advertised with a maximum range exceeding 500 nm, versus more than 200 nm for the AGM-158B // The update also upgrading the fuze and enhancing the data link. The 1.1 version is expected to be ready to enter production after 2022 as part of Lot 4 of low-rate initial production."
September 13 "Senate lawmakers reject Navy's apparent backtrack on LRASM 1.1 upgrades" LRASM is a USN program , 1.1 upgrade needs funding by USN
With regards to firing beyond local sensor systems, I hear a lot of talk about shooting based on other sensor systems data…think of it as a forward operating platform having an “unlimited magazine” as it can cue other remote systems. In fact…now, don’t laugh, but I thought the concept of the MUX was to be able to designate a target and cue the weapon systems of other ships and aircraft in the area (within its comms ranges). NOTE: Not fire the weapon but communicate with these systems through digital interoperability to ‘cue’ (or guide) the weapons onto their designated targets.
ReplyDeleteI assume you're referring to the Marine MUX. That aircraft not only doesn't exist, yet, but it doesn't even have a solid set of requirements, to the best of my knowledge. It's currently a poster child for unrestrained fantasy wish lists that are totally divorced from reality.
DeleteOn top of that, the aircraft, as pictured in artist concept drawings, is decidedly non-stealthy which makes it non-survivable in a forward targeting role.
Further, the MUX has been largely 'silent' of late and it is quite questionable that it will even become an actual acquisition program.
Having said all that, a focused, stealthy targeting UAV is precisely what is needed.
Yes, the Marine MUX is exactly what I was referring to and I know it does not exist nor have solid requirements (hence my "don't laugh but" statement. But as you deduced, I was using it as an example of a stealthy, targeting UAV...
Delete"I was using it as an example of a stealthy, targeting UAV..."
DeleteOkay. Now, the next step is where/what is this stealthy, targeting UAV going to operate from? In order to get very far forward targeting, it will need to have significant endurance/loiter/range which means it will have to be large. The Marine MUX, for example, is up around the Global Hawk end of the UAV size spectrum. That limits the number of places/ships it can operate from and the number that can operate (to say nothing of cost!). What operating base/ship do you see it working from?
I imagine two separate types.
DeleteType 1 would be a flying wing or a cranked-kite, as large as can possibly still fit on a carrier elevator. It should team with MQ-25. Considering the shrinkage of the air wing numbers, deck and hangar space are available. We must re-learn how to operate 90-100 aircraft air wings. This type could also conceivably operate from various land bases.
Type 2 would be something perhaps along the lines of the Lockheed VARIOUS, and be sized for the remainder of the surface fleet.
"Type 1 would be a flying wing "
DeleteHow many do you see being needed to provide EFFECTIVE surveillance and targeting for a carrier group?
With only a maximum of a few carrier groups, do you see whatever number in an air wing being able to provide regional surveillance coverage? Again, how many aircraft would be required to provide the coverage?
Navy UCLASS documentation called for 4-6 aircraft with a mission duration of 11-14 hours, able to operate 1800 km from the carrier.
Deletehttps://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/uclass.htm
Any better analysis would need to done by people with access to official forms of information.
Regional coverage is going to be much more severe challenge. While I doubt it would ever happen, I’d try to pry some of the USAF’s unacknowledged RQ-180 surveillance drones free and get them dedicated to that Naval Integrated Fire mission. Jointness, right?
For what it may be worth, the LRASM promotional video shows the “Red Surface Action Group” being detected and targeted with only a single satellite. I can’t speak to how realistic versus how optimistic that might be.
"promotional video shows the “Red Surface Action Group” being detected and targeted with only a single satellite."
DeleteA promotional video that shows a fantastically successful system? What's not to believe about that?
No doubt. The super-simple acquisition and targeting in the video is no good, hence the need for the UAV.
Delete@JoeTaxpayer: detection and targeting with only a single satellite is a pipe dream. Satellites are the weakest link in the maritime surveillance network, because they have to trade sensor resolution for field of view, and they don't have persistence, because a satellite is always in motion. The Russians have tried it, the Chinese have tried it... it's telling that the Chinese are instead building AWACS, MPA drones, and carrier air wings.
DeleteI’m on board with ya’ll.
DeleteHere’s the link to the LockMart video:
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=h449oIjg2kY
"targeted with only a single satellite"
DeleteMocking of a promotional video aside, the reality is that a satellite is not the instantaneous targeting asset that so many people believe it is. A satellite collects images (optical, radar, IR, whatever) that must be disbursed to the right people/organization for interpretation and analysis. That interpretation/analysis must then go to commanders for prioritization. Based on that prioritization, the information must then be converted into operational assignments. Decisions must be made about which assets, if any, can be dedicated to prosecuting the target. Orders must be transmitted. The operational assets must ready the weapons and move into range, if not already, fortuitously, positioned. Finally, a strike on the target can be launched.
This is not an instantaneous process. Not even close. All the while, the target has been moving.
Computers can help at certain points in the process but it's still a time-consuming process. You've undoubtedly seen how the hierarchy of an organization works. The command layers of the military are no better, maybe worse.
The short of it is that satellites are not, generally targeting assets. The popular misconception that a strike will be launched milliseconds after a satellite obtains an image is pure fantasy. Satellites will be useful for developing overall situational awareness (there's an enemy fleet operating several hundred miles north of the island, for example), assuming any survive the opening days of a war, but that's it.
Further, any surviving satellites will be tasked with much higher priority assignments (like monitoring an enemy's strategic weapons!) than looking for a ship in the middle of the ocean.
This talks a little about LRASM but a whole lot more on merging LUSV and a corvette that sounds a lot more like what you have talked about on here recently. I think there are several good ideas in it and some of the usual things I notice they tend to generally get wrong mostly in terms of cost estimate and what ship to adopt in filling their concept. https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Taking_Back_the_Seas_WEB.pdf
ReplyDeleteGive some specifics and some analysis.
DeleteFrom my skim of the executive summary, I'm skeptical that a shift of strategy from attrition to 'maneuverability' is a viable strategy. It sounds like unproven tactical gymnastics to excuse (and double down on) the USN's lack of ship-killing capability.
DeleteDownloaded the pdf for more reading...
"attrition to 'maneuverability'"
DeleteUltimately, war IS attrition. Maneuverability, properly applied, with firepower to back it up, can assist in that attrition but cannot, by itself, achieve anything.
Let me know what you conclude/analyze from your reading.
30 million for the MUSV feels light. The LUSV at 300 million sounds about right. Using the large surface combatant for the power plant and directed energy weapons and leave the LUSV/Corvette to carry and ferry most of the missiles. My concern is they still act like the LUSV/Corvette should be based on an OSV design and I think a fast ferry is the way to go.
ReplyDeleteLRASM may be stealthy/intelligent enough to avoid outer defenses, but isn't any 'high subsonic' missile vulnerable to CIWS in the final approach?
ReplyDeleteAny missile, regardless of speed, is vulnerable to point defense in the terminal approach. Speed simply reduces the time the point defense has to achieve a kill.
Delete@ComNavOps right, but that reduction in available time seems like it would significantly improve the offs of the missile hitting.
DeleteOf course!
Delete@MorningLightMountain: it's a question pf which vulnerability to defenses, softkill or hardkill, that you want to gamble on.
DeleteGoing supersonic, hardkill had the smaller engagement window, sub-30 seconds at Mach 3. But you're potentially more vulnerable to softkill defense, because if the ECM decoyz you away, you might not have enough time to reacquire, and most supersonic AShM don't have IIR as a backup seeker.
Ofc the answer to this is "fire a salvo of missiles"; fire enough missiles and you will overwhelm the softkill and hardkill defenses. Even if the hardkill has 100% accuraccy it still takes time to engage and verify a hit.
This is assuming pure engagement with point defense and no interceptor missiles are used, btw.
Not an expert but I believe the missile is designed to approach the target so that the target cannot use the CIWS without hitting another ship.
ReplyDeleteThat's one I hadn't heard before!
DeleteNo, it's not really possible to design such an approach. The missile is, presumably, designed to perform terminal evasion maneuvers to make it harder for a point defense weapon to achieve a kill but that doesn't confer any kind of magical immunity - it just improves the chances of getting through somewhat.
Hmmm...hard to believe that would prevent the use of CIWS to avoid a 1000 lb warhead strike, especially considering how far away friendly ships would likely be.
DeleteLockMark claims that it's possible to program LRASM's brain with ship recognition images so that when the IIR sensor sees the target, it can not only verify that this is a valid target (i.e. warship), but also choose the optimal point to attack said warship.
DeleteI'll believe it when I see it; image recognition by computers is pretty laughably not working.
MorningLightMountain - USS Jarret hit the Missouri with Phalanx rounds whilst trying to destroy an incoming Silkworm missile (February 1991).
Delete@Dave
DeleteFair enough. Those rounds would be much less damaging than a missile strike though.
If you use RAM, you can engage from 4 times the max range of Phalanx, so there's.less chance of this sort of problem happening.
DeleteThe biggest problem I see with sensor cueing is that in order to have a persistent sensor (surface or aviation), you have to have some size to it (i.e. Predator). Then you run into the same issue we had when we started using Predators to hunt terrorists. Why not just take the shot from the sensor?
ReplyDeleteAs far as the extra range on the missile it can be useful even without external sensors forward. It acts as a gentle reminder not to broadcast or radiate for the enemy.
"As far as the extra range on the missile it can be useful even without external sensors forward. It acts as a gentle reminder not to broadcast or radiate for the enemy."
DeleteIf you're suggesting blind firing on the off chance you'll hit something or as a means of suppressing enemy sensors, that's an awfully expensive way to run a war at $3M per missile!
What I was suggesting is that those foolish enough to run around with their radars turned on 24/7 will be providing their own targeting data and should promptly be on the receiving end of an attack. Unfortunately this would also happen to our AAW ships.
DeleteBearing but no range. You still need triangulation, so self-seeking becomes a multi-unit passtime needing comm coordination and more expense.
DeleteOr to get multiple bearing change heading to right angles to the contact bearing.
Delete"those foolish enough to run around with their radars turned on"
DeleteWe've forgotten what war is and how to fight it. In WWII, transmissions were minimized or eliminated to avoid radio direction finding. In the Cold War, we routinely operated in Emissions Control (EMCON) which meant no emissions. Anyone who thinks the next war will have ships and aircraft running around with radars on just doesn't understand combat. No one - us or the enemy - is going to be operating radars on other than rare, momentary occasions, for the reason you described.
"Bearing but no range."
DeleteBearing only launches have been a recognized, though not preferred, tactic for many years.
Couldnt an E-2 be used at high altitude, paired with low altitude F-18s(to avoid enemy detection) pushed forward be effective?? Let it look beyond/over the fighters horizon... At 30k feet, the horizon is over 200 miles away. At the first sign of the enemy, it could firm up the contact and then run, after giving the fighters that are half the distance from the target a bearing to shoot at. Of course this puts the LRASM well under its potential range, but its all done with shipboard assets. Obviously if we still had satellite surveillance then other options might be easier more effective, but i generally think about these battles as being fought relatively blind, because thats probably how things will go...
ReplyDeleteThe problem is that high power radars are missile magnets. An E-2 is a prop job and prop jobs aren't likely to out run a missile.
DeleteIf you'll recall, the Chinese and Russians both have Very Long Range Air to Air Missiles with hundreds of miles range and multi-mach/hypersonic speed. A forward-pushed E-2 will be a dead E-2.
DeleteI'm curious: how do you evaluate these claims of VLRAAMs as credible? As you've said before, Russians and Chinese make all sorts of claims...
DeleteAlso, it's interesting that the Russians have hypersonic AAMs - I was led to believe that hypersonic (Mach 5+) missiles were still a ways off for all players.
To my knowledge none of the other players (US, EU, Japan) are pursuing hypersonic AAMs, the hypersonic missile projects in the works are AShM and ALCM, but maybe they want the technology to mature first before trying to shrink it for an AAM?
"how do you evaluate these claims of VLRAAMs as credible?"
DeleteShort of obtaining a missile and testing it, we can't evaluate the claims objectively. What we can do is examine the component technologies that make up the overall product. If all the component technologies are proven then it's likely that the overall product is viable.
For example, we know that missile-sized hypersonic engines exist. We know that suitable seeker heads exist. We know that suitable guidance packages exist. We know that aircraft missile launches are a proven technology. So, adding all that up, it seems more likely than not that the overall hypersonic air-to-air missile is probably viable. That doesn't mean that the missile will not and does not have issues to overcome, as any weapon system does, but it's reasonable to assume that the overall product is viable.
I wonder if an E2 could be protected from these long range missiles by AAW ships. While the launching Chinese or Russian aircraft may be stealthy, long range AA missiles are going to be large and radiate a lot of heat.
Delete