I love doing positive posts. It was not my intent to be particularly critical when I started this blog but as I researched the topics it became clear that there was a great deal wrong with the Navy. I simply write what's there, good or bad. Unfortunately, the bad is far too prevalent.
The role of Britains colonies in naval contributions (thinking specifically WW1 & 2 here) have always been rather interesting to me (disclaimer: I live in New Zealand!). I recently found out that when the ANZAC force sailed for Gallipoli, they were actually escorted part way by the Japanese (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_battlecruiser_Ibuki). A historical quirk if ever there was one, but perhaps you know of other interesting tales involving NZ or Australian naval forces in these conflicts? I dont know if that would count as positive, but I would imagine there is some interesting stories to be told.
The Japanese 2nd Special squadron escorted Allied troopships in the Eastern Med so as to release UK warships for other areas. Indeed, a Japanese destroyer was torpedoed by an Austro-Hungarian submarine.
Sticking with naval subjects, I'd offer "Neptune's Inferno" by James Hornfischer. It illustrates the raw carnage of modern naval warfare - something we've forgotten as we design our current frail and overly expensive ships.
(Don McCollor) Another book might be "To Rule The Waves - How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World" by Arthur Herman (1974) [as well as telling of the rise and fall of the British Navy].
How about the amount of hits a modern warship can take from missiles or guns as compared with the prescribed loadout of anti-ship missiles versus anti-missile capacity to get a clearer idea of How many shots fired equal a disabled/sink enemy. This in turn might paint a much more from picture of how effective our ships might actually perform in combat. Are we simply sailing with enough missiles to try to stay alive defensively or can we field an offensive force that can kill and survive to come home
Wayne Hughes book, "Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat", presents a table of hits required to kill ships of various sizes. We've referenced this in several posts and comments. We've also discussed defensive missile requirements. Here's a couple of posts to get started:
On a technical note, I see that China just flight tested its new seaplane, the AG600. This thing is a beast. Long range, lots of transport, sensor and weapons capacity.Would be great to have something like this here. Great for picking up survivors from LCS and such. With all the DL talk and austere bases, this would be a great connector as well as a patrol and ASW platform.
Given its size and complete lack of stealth, it would be 'visible' for hundreds of miles. In the forward replenishment role, it could be easily tracked to the forward base thus pinpointing its location. As a patrol plane, it would be totally susceptible to the Chinese very long range air to air missiles that we posted about. See "Goodbye Poseidon and Hawkeye"
It would be useful for a rear area supply plane but in the rear area, a cargo ship would be more effective and carry a much larger load. This aircraft would be a niche capability - useful in certain circumstances but hard to justify the cost relative to the usefulness.
I have not commented other than minor points in passing. I simply have no knowledge base from which to comment intelligently. In particular, I lack an understanding of what Germany sees as the role for its navy so I can't evaluate the navy against that role.
What are your thoughts about it? Is there some specific aspect you'd like to see us examine?
Just nosy how you might seen it, since I am in the german navy reserve and following your blog for quite a while ... Personally, I am still not sure how to evaluate a so called frigate F 125. Basically, the German Navy regards itself as an alliance navy with focus on humanitarian aid, and on the other hand is willing to be well prepared for border defense.
My concern with the German Navy is that it does not seem to be focused on combat but, as you point out, more focused on humanitarian aid and other non-combat activities.
"Personally, I am still not sure how to evaluate a so called frigate F 125."
I really have a hard time understanding why you spend close to US$1 billion on a destroyer/frigate with virtually zero ASW capability--no ASW sonar and no ASW weapons. The only ASW capability is what the helos provide.
"My concern with the German Navy is that it does not seem to be focused on combat but, as you point out, more focused on humanitarian aid and other non-combat activities."
Exactly. Really not fit for a war, particularly if there are submarines around.
Well, as stated earlier in a comments post - I quite like F125. Anti-piracy and stabilisation simply is a job that needs doing, so why not have a specialized ship for it and free the rest of the navy up for training. As for the navy per se - I would argue that apart from F125-missions, you van simply not evaluate it atm. The clearly definded NATO cold-war jobs (hunting Subs/protecting convois, clearing mines and shutting down the baltic) are over, and a new szenario simply has not yet emerged. So I guess all there is is to evaluate is If we are principally able to develop and field new ships or are also running into the US' problems discussed here. But even though recent EU ship designs had delays and problems enough, they are swimming now, albeit 'only' with evolutionary designs. So I am still a bit optimistic
I always enjoy when you revisit old WW2 battles. Could we get a WW1 naval battle or even past that? Is it possible to learn something from Trafalgar or even older naval engagements? Or are we just to far removed and tech is so different, those ancient battles dont apply anymore? Just curious.
Always curious to hear about what CNO and others are reading. Nothing naval right now for me, just aviation. Did go on a Falkland war binge in Sept/Oct. Getting ready to read about Iran-Iraq war series of Helion book, usually pretty good. Did read a book that talked about Iraqi EXOCET operations against Iran in the 80s.
"Could we get a WW1 naval battle or even past that?"
I like it! I will most definitely look into that. Why don't you think about it and give me a suggestion for one that you think has some lessons for us?
An entertaining book of modern naval fiction is David Poyer's "The Gulf". It describes a battle by a Perry class frigate. A good read.
long time lurker, first time poster here :) I'd be interested in going back even further - the design, actions & development of the early dreadnoughts, or even the ironside-type ships from the US Civil war are pretty interesting. Some of the battles they were involved in must have been such a change for those on board, because I would imagine many of them had begun their careers on sail-type naval ships; what a change they would have been!
(Don McCollor) I just finished "Russia and Japan" by Frederic Unger (1904) including the decisive naval battles that Japan won [my own hard copy]. For old books, after a century the copyright expires and several organizations scan them and have them for free download at https://archive.org/index.php. I found two about a Brit who first served in the Confederate Army and then commanded a blockade runner in the Civil War.
"sail-type naval ships; what a change they would have been!"
The revolution in naval warfare brought about by aircraft and the aircraft carrier must have been similarly disruptive for sailors 'raised' on battleships. It's interesting how radical change is always resisted before its embraced.
@ CNO. Been thinking about going wayyyy back like Peloponnesian wars. Just too busy right now to go into further detail to study what could apply to today...
"Been thinking about going wayyyy back like Peloponnesian wars."
Hmmm … Is there a point at which technology has so changed naval operations that there are no useful lessons to be learned? Is that too far back to be useful to us, today? I don't know. I'll have to look into that.
I dont know either. My initial thought was it's so far removed probably not but it was a land power (Sparta) vs a naval power (Athens)...could there be some parallels to today? Maybe the technology has changed but problems remain like bad weather,fog of war, logistics,etc...I dont know.
Even that question could be a good one, at what technological point or break does past battles or war stop aplying?!? Is our tech so different, there's a cutoff date to learn past lessons???
My other thought for topic was about the future. So looking at past, we went from oars and sails to coal, then oil, from wood structures to metal, from regular navy ships to Dreadnought,etc...but every time, at the end of a war or battle, there was the birth of the new tech....thinking BBs were the queens of the oceans and carriers and subs were the babies and emerge in the next war as the queens. Today queens are the AC and the sub, hopefully no massive war in the next year or 24 hours, what are the babies today that will be tomorrow queens? Lasers, unmanned, space warfare, hacking, etc...are new platforms just evolutionary rather than revolutionary? Or is there some new platform like UAV or USW just waiting in the wings to take over old queens? Something else or combination? Can we spot it today before the next war?
"Maybe the technology has changed but problems remain"
Exactly so! Without a doubt there are geopolitical lessons to be learned but those are, generally, outside the scope of this blog. Whether there are military operational and tactical lessons is the open question. I'm going to dig in to some of this and see.
History suggests not! New technologies and paradigm shifts are only recognized by a few and are generally denied by the majority. Almost by definition, we can't see the next revolution. Or can we be among the few who see? Do you see the next revolution? Personally, I'd put my money on AI.
I think the Battle of Coronel and the subsequent Battle of the Falklands are very interesting, with lots of subtle cause/effect parts... Interesting, and also timely since they just recently found Scharnhorst....
A post on what kind of fleet could be formed from the museum ships and reserve fleet. What would that fleet look like combined with the current fleet and what would be the weaknesses of the resulting combined fleet? What do we really need to build right now for an effective fighting force if we include what we already have or could pull from reserves.
Iowa class battleships USS Salem Oliver Perry class Frigates. etc....
The Des Moines pic dangles a fav topic for me of hybrid new tech/old hull design!!! Since I revamped the Cleveland a while back, Ive continued finding old technical info on old ships as a new side hobby, and trying to meld the new and old is a fun exercise(that should be seeing integration into reality!!). I love your fiction, and the ideas and scenarios are very thought provoking. Another of those is always welcome!!
"broad, sweeping fictional China conflict, using your proposed fleet structure and components?"
Given the constraints of a several paragraph post length, that's just not possible. The most I could do would be a very tiny, single incident. That said, even a single incident with my proposed fleet is an interesting idea. I'll give it some serious thought and see if I can come up with a concept. I somewhat did this with the "Return of the Broadside" story but there are many other possibilities.
Sure, I know its a challenge!! I recall the alternate Pearl Harbor scenario being a pretty perfect mix of detail and overall veiw. I appreciate you entertaining the notion!! I just thought itd be interesting to put the notional fleet to the test and see how it does...
Hmm, yes … That was less a story and more of a outline but, yes, I could possibly do something of that nature. I will definitely give that some thought.
Had the Belgrano found the British fleet? Of course, the Belgrano was barely seaworthy and crewed by nearly untrained personnel so that would have to be what-if'ed but what if, indeed, a WWII cruiser had engaged the British fleet? Hmmm ...
What would have happened if instead of Sheffield being hit, Argies get really lucky and knock out Invincible? Maybe if Argie had better coordinated their initial attacks, could Belgrano and escorts got in closer? If Argies wait another month or 2 with so many UK ships up for disposal, could UK have tried to recapture Falklands with just Hermes? Hermes vs Belgrano!
I am always interested in your points regarding Quality versus Quantity. Where is the balance, Is "Gold plating" justified etc. It is an interesting debate.
That's a great question - the key question, really. I'll have to give some thought as to how to answer that. My initial response would be that the balance is the point at which your technology is effective, reliable, and repairable in a combat context and the point at which you have enough assets to fight effectively, compensate for attrition, and keep fighting. I'll think more on this!
I would argue that peace time is the time for gold plating and trying out stuff, you can afford failure. Cost-effective and proven is for the arms race before a looming conflict.
"Cost-effective and proven is for the arms race before a looming conflict."
A very good argument can be made that we are facing a looming conflict with China. China is certainly engaged in an arms race. The US and the West seems to be merely watching, at the moment.
When assuming that China will try something before 2049, Taiwan most likely, hulls build today (Ford) would still be around. So I guess even when this is not a race, but catching up by China atm, I would argue that the door on Gold plating closes in the next 10 years or so and it is time to get our shit together
A relevant point regards gold-plating might be - what can a regular crew support? Having contractors on board would be rather odd. Any system has to be "user usable", when one looks at Cold War Soviet ships there seems to be duplication of the same systems, I wonder if that was a maintainability issue.
Oh...and one more thing lol. Been meaning to ask this for a long time. Your notional battleship. You spec'd it with 4 twin 6" mounts, and 2 single 5" guns. Can you explain the rationale there? It seems akin to the days before dual purpose secondaries, and was wondering about the value of having two different yet nearly identical guns aboard.
Yeah, that's a debatable point. My thought was that the 6" mounts offer a significant improvement over 5" and would constitute a good land bombardment capability when 16" wasn't required. The 5" would be for anti-ship, anti-smaller boat, miscellaneous type work.
This is one of those things that I could be persuaded to standardize on one or the other if I had access to detailed information on explosive effects of the two calibers and it showed that they were similar enough.
There's a reason why WWII cruisers had 6" guns rather than 5".
When I get in a naval discussion IRL I like to mention that the US Navy actually has many more carriers than the elevenish we 'have'. I count the Japanese helicopter/carriers like the Izumo class as effectively ours. Since General Atomics is offering to convert the Izumo class to have catapults ete. Could you comment on this subject?
"US Navy actually has many more carriers than the elevenish we 'have'. I count the Japanese helicopter/carriers like the Izumo class as effectively ours."
There are two levels of answer to this:
1. The Izumo and those like it are helo carriers that can, potentially, operate a handful of F-35B/Harrier type aircraft, perhaps 12-20 or so. Just from a numbers perspective, 12-20 more aircraft are of very little use especially when they are of limited range and payload as STOVL aircraft are. Operationally and tactically, 12-20 more aircraft don't add much and come at the cost of having to protect the ship with more escorts and more aircraft. In essence, they barely have enough aircraft to maintain an effective CAP/defense for themselves and have nothing left for offense.
2. Operational control is an even larger issue. Japan is a home water defense force, by constitutional decree. So, they are of no use to the US in any but a Chinese war and there is no guarantee that they would join in a Chinese war although I suspect they would. Further, they would likely be completely tied up defending their own territory and would be unable to join any US naval operation and if they did join, see 1. above.
So, no, I don't see allied helo carriers as usefully augmenting US carrier forces. Do you see it differently? If so, you'll have to explain how 12-20 aircraft will make a significant difference.
I Japan's case I can see them as a training (stepping) up to larger QEII type carriers in future with fixed wimg aviation capabilities a very real possibility
"carriers in future with fixed wimg aviation capabilities a very real possibility"
Given Japan's constitutional home water defense limit, does a fixed wing carrier really help Japan? They have lots of land bases. What does a fixed wing carrier with 20 or so aircraft get them?
Interesting question as for the constitution can be changed and if history is any judge people change remember that in WW I Japan was allied with The Colonial British and France in the years following allegiance changed through various treaties,political,governments to what we ended up with for WW II not saying it will happen just that its certainly a possibility
"Japan was allied with The Colonial British and France"
I'm not an expert on culture and political relations of that period but my impression is that while Japan may have been allied at that point, they were never allies in any true sense. Japan always viewed the West as outsiders and barbarians. Any temporary alliance was just that: a temporary expediency. They never shared any common beliefs.
It's kind of like being allied with Russia in WWII. We were allies only because of a temporary common enemy. Russia never shared any culture, values, or beliefs with the rest of the allies.
Has anyone heard about the Huntington Ingalls submission for ffgx at all? And with this Navsecs comments about a 355 ship navy does anyone think they will stop at just 20 of them
Thanks again for your blog! I always appreciate your thoughtful and challenging analysis, as well as a place to bounce around ideas.
Lately, I have been considering our assumptions about carrier air defense, and specifically, detection assets. I can’t help but think there needs to be a serious shift in the resources required to protect a carrier from air attack because of stealth aircraft.
Traditionally, our carrier defense plans have assumed one slow and long-loitering airborne aircraft (the E-2) will ensure a minimum 250 mile buffer of detection for the carrier group. Four per carrier ensured you could have one airborne at all times. It was also assumed these aircraft would be difficult to destroy since they could see the enemy coming from so far away.
Because of the development of legitimate stealth platforms by adversaries (and super-long range AAW missiles), shouldn’t we reassess our basic assumptions about enemy detection? Without the (E-2), and with the number of fighters we have on carriers, what is the range we can expect to detect stealth aircraft approaching the carrier? 100 miles? (gulp) 50 miles?
When I do that, it paints a really ugly picture of our ability to defend carriers with our current air wings and suggests we need to drastically rethink our force structure.
There is a bright spot here. The E-2D uses a UHF-band radar. Fighter-sized stealth aircraft are not usually optimized for UHF-band stealth. So we may still detection enemy stealth fighters at useful ranges.
"I have been considering our assumptions about carrier air defense,"
You raise several good questions. The short answer is, yes, we absolutely need to rethink our carrier defense concept.
We gave up the very long range interceptor (F-14/Phoenix) and we need to regain that. We may need to 'break' our E-2s into multiple, somewhat less individually capable sensor platforms. We absolutely need to augment the E-2 with cheap, expendable UAVs to form a (100 mile?) layer in the defense. We need many more escort ships - true destroyers, not Burkes.
This also raises the issue of excessive cost as it relates to risk aversion and expendability. Instead of $15B+ Fords, we need the lesser, less expensive carriers I've been calling for (Midway/Forrestal size and cost) so that we can lose some without crippling the war effort.
" Instead of $15B+ Fords, we need the lesser, less expensive carriers I've been calling for (Midway/Forrestal size and cost) so that we can lose some without crippling the war effort."
My only response is to ask exactly how losing a Ford would cripple a war effort. I mean, we lose catapults and arresting gear and weapons lifts that don't work, and we have surviving sailors available for other ships, plus any airplanes that were able to land somewhere else. I don't see that as a great loss.
You know that I agree with you about cheaper carriers, and am willing to go even cheaper than you are, but I think that's the conversation to be had. There is a presentation on YouTube, by the guy who headed up the Ford planning team, about some of the decisions they made. First, they appear to have assumed that the new technologies would all work, without considering the teething difficulties. Second, their comparative analyses were all made comparing one Ford to one Nimitz or one Forrestal, without considering that for the cost of one Ford they could have almost two Nimitzes or maybe 3 Forrestals.
I agree with everything you suggested, especially escort/picket ships. Ironically, I think the advancement of stealth mostly serves to cancel out the advancement in radar. If that is true, WW3 carrier battles might look an awful lot like WW2.
The other thing I think that could be very helpful is the development of a carrier-based “pocket” fighter. It would be an absolute knife-fighter, optimized by EM theory like the F-16 or F-5. It has to be small, so small that when you fold the wings you can fit two in the same deck space as one F-35 or F-18 with folded wings. It would keep weight down by only carrying two AMRAAM missiles and 2-4 sidewinders. It would have the smallest possible radar to detect aircraft out to 75 miles (though stealth aircraft would be less than this).
This would allow you to keep a larger CAP airborne and maximize the points of detection. It also allows your detection assets to put their attacker at risk as well as gives them a fighting chance to dodge incoming missiles.
"This would allow you to keep a larger CAP airborne and maximize the points of detection."
If all you want the carrier to do is defend itself (the self-licking ice cream cone) then yes. However, the carrier exists to exert influence far from itself - as in, several hundred miles away. You need a very long range aircraft for that. Small, close in, defensive fighters don't really support the carrier's reason for existence.
That is not ALL I want it to do, but at current I am not sure it can even do that. I am not suggesting this become the only aircraft on carriers, just that it take the place of some larger multi-role aircraft. This is why it is so essential to take up less deck space. Otherwise, every defensive fighter you add removes an aircraft trying to carry out the offensive capability of the carrier.
A couple of thoughts. As has been bounced around for a long time, it's sound doctrine that anything that radiates, dies. Rapidly. This has been an absolute top priority development path in long-range high-speed air to air missiles.
"Goodbye Poseidon and Hawkeye" as has been mentioned.
There is a lot of development effort being put into UHF/VHF radars for fighter-sized aircraft. If you take a look at the capabilities section of this link, its definitely food for thought.
https://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2009-06.html
"Tikhomirov NIIP in Moscow are developing an L-band AESA radar system intended for embedding in the leading edges of fighter wings. A demonstrator of the L-band AESA subsystem was publicly displayed at MAKS2009.
This paper analyses the operational potential of this design, and performs a range of performance estimates based on manufacturer disclosures and known design features.
The design has clear potential to provide a genuine “shared multi-function aperture” with applications including:
Search, track and missile mid-course guidance against low signature aircraft. Identification Friend Foe / Secondary Surveillance Radar. Passive angle tracking and geolocation of JTIDS/MIDS/Link-16 emitters at long ranges. Passive angle tracking and geolocation of L-band AEW&C/AWACS and surface based search radars at long ranges. Passive angle tracking and geolocation of hostile (i.e. Western) IFF and SSR transponders at long ranges. High power active jamming of JTIDS/MIDS/Link-16 emitters. High power active jamming of satellite navigation receivers over large areas. High power active jamming of L-band AEW&C/AWACS and surface based search radars at long ranges. High power active jamming of guided munition command datalinks over large areas.
Performance modelling for a range of feasible configurations indicates the radar will deliver tactically credible search range performance.
The Tikhomirov NIIP L-band AESA is an important strategic development, and a technology which, once fully matured and deployed in useful numbers, will render narrowband stealth designs like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and some UAVs, highly vulnerable to Flanker variants equipped with such radars."
"will render narrowband stealth designs like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and some UAVs, highly vulnerable to Flanker variants equipped with such radars."
Stealth was always destined to be a relatively short term military advantage, lasting only as long as took to develop detection capabilities. Where does that leave us? It leaves us with traditional force considerations such as sufficient numbers (quantity has a quality all its own), firepower, payloads, adaptable electronic support (EA-18G Growlers), etc. In other words, all the things our military has abandoned and that China is emphasizing.
"Stealth was always destined to be a relatively short term military advantage, lasting only as long as took to develop detection capabilities."
It has taken 30 years and counting right? I continue to hear how stealth is a party trick at best, but where is the proof? Why have China and Russia worked so hard to develop similar aircraft? Why are countries continuing to buy additional F-35s when alternatives exist?
"Why have China and Russia worked so hard to develop similar aircraft?"
Because it works! The point was not that stealth didn't work but that it was not going to be a permanent advantage. It's value is fading as we speak due to developments in radar, IRST, etc. However, stealth has now become the minimum entry requirement to the modern battlefield. It may no longer convey an advantage but it is now the standard, minimum requirement because without it, an asset has a very short life expectancy on the battlefield.
"Why are countries continuing to buy additional F-35s when alternatives exist?"
Because, if you believe the manufacturer and US military's claims, the value of the F-35 lies not in its stealth but in its sensor fusion - its ability to 'quarterback' and direct and enhance the abilities of other aircraft. I'm extremely dubious about those claims but that's what other countries are hearing and why they're buying.
My understanding is that its partially deployed in the fleet. The wing slat antennas have a limited view vertically, so you have to steer the aircraft to look up and down when you get close to a target.
I also believe it uses the same processors as the main radar, and L-band is mainly a secondary search radar. This makes a lot of sense.
It was just a matter of time for stealth to become less important.
"Because, if you believe the manufacturer and US military's claims, the value of the F-35 lies not in its stealth but in its sensor fusion - its ability to 'quarterback' and direct and enhance the abilities of other aircraft. I'm extremely dubious about those claims but that's what other countries are hearing and why they're buying."
If you look at the claims for the L-band radar, one of the more interesting is the claimed ability to jam "High power active jamming of JTIDS/MIDS/Link-16 emitters. High power active jamming of satellite navigation receivers over large areas."
I don't necessarily believe it without some proof, but its not unthinkable technically.
"Tikhomirov NIIP in Moscow are developing an L-band AESA radar system "
Fascinating article of which I managed to follow only the most basic aspects! I noted, however, that the estimated detection ranges were 40-70 nm for a 1 sq.m. target. For the 0.1-0.01 type of RCS claimed for stealth aircraft, the calculated detection ranges fall to 3-15 nm or so which is not really tactically useful. By then, you're already dead.
So, while this is fascinating, it does not yet appear to be the ultimate stealth killer.
Ha Ha. Everybody makes grandiose claims. The US Navy is perhaps even worse than the Ruskies in recent times.
Some of the stuff being discussed is logical. Engineering a successful solution is of course another story, so I am definitely a skeptic. That isn't a synonym for ostrich though.
The other thing to watch is that RCS is not a constant as you vary the frequency. The RCS to a MK I eyeball is the visual image of the plane. In IR its similar to the visual image of the plane. Its only in S/X band that the RCS has been "tuned" to be nearly invisible.
When you get down to UHF/VHF that tuned advantage is gone on a smaller aircraft. Once you have a wavelength longer than the reflective surface, the impact of stealth is minimized.
Could you repost your L-band link please, it didn't come through.
The actual sea fighter was designed for 4000@20 same as a frigate. Same with HSV-2 Swift. The EPF underperforms design making 4018@23 unloaded. Per the last SAR report LCS-2 is good for 6040@14. LCS are getting their stores updated for 21 days with the added crew. I wish they'd repos the interface control doc as it outlines some of the sensor performance needed also. Yes LCS-1 range and the modules are a problem, but fast ferry designs do seem to have the range covered when compared to other ships of the same displacement.
The comment/question was about streetfighter. Sea Fighter was a completely different Navy program. Streetfighter was the precursor/alternative to the LCS and was envisioned to be a much smaller vessel than the LCS and would operate in squadrons/swarms in the coastal combat role.
Something that I have played with on other sites is design your own fleet. You have $X to play with and maximize the fleet with that. Because there are disputes as to what various ships actually cost, maybe assign nominal cost values to each, IE Ford carrier $15B, Nimitz carrier $9B, SSBN $9B, and so forth.
I don't do that because the budget aspect is unrealistic. For example, in my vision, the shipbuilding budget is not the $18B the Navy has but, rather, the $18B plus all the savings from all the other things I'd change. So, designing a fleet based on the Navy's actual budget is pointless, for me.
"I don't do that because the budget aspect is unrealistic."
Understand. We've had this conversation before, in several other contexts.
"What other sites?"
There used to be a couple. The first was a warship cost site, and had a rather lengthy list of blog posts responding, some with some very interesting ideas. There was another one that had a number of Excel spreadsheets with different fleet configursations, some of which I still have. But they don't seem to be around any more. That's one reason why I thought of it.
That site does not appear to have had any action in 5 years, and the cost data for their model are a bit out of line. For example, they show the cost of a Ford at $9 billion, whereas that is closer to the cost of a new Nimitz, and Fords are probably more like $15 billion. But as I said, it hasn't been updated in a while.
I had another question regarding Anti ship missiles. I am under the impression that much of the expense of ASMs is in the systems that allow the missile to satisfy tight rules of engagement and to not randomly hit the wrong ship. The Atlantic Conveyer for example. This seems suitable for peace but surely in a peer war larger numbers of cheaper less intelligent missiles have greater potential for killing enemy ships. I do not mean dumb missiles, just not aim point selection and high resolution imaging sensors for example. Is this valid or have modern countermeasures truly made less sophisticated missiles useless?
Several aspects to this. Discriminating sensors allow certain ships to be selected. For example, you wouldn't want to waste a volley of ASM on a cargo ship or corvette. So, sensor sophistication is good in that sense. On the other hand, a hit anywhere on a modern, weakly built warship is pretty serious and there's no real need to try to pinpoint the exact impact point (which won't happen in combat anyway!). So, yes, there is a very good argument for cheap and plentiful.
CNO, love this blog. I feel like I've really learned a lot by frequenting this site.
I strongly agree in having tough, armored modern ships with 8" and bigger guns. I'd like to see them deployed in battle groups, screened by new Tico's built on Cleveland hulls and new Perry type frigates for ASW.
I'd like to throw one of my crazy ideas out there to be looked at, and critiqued.
I'd like those 'surface battle groups' to have some more capability, some longer ranged eyes and strike abilities. To accomplish this I'd like to build a small flat-top out of a Des Moines (or maybe a little bigger) hull. It would need to be armored and have plenty of CIWS as it would be accompanying the battle group in 'harm's way'.
The primary role would be fulfilled by some kind of drone with a search radar, partially taking the role of the E2 (but of course with much reduced capability compared to the manned Hawkeye). As they wouldn't have a crew they would be somewhat expendable and I'd like to have 5-6 of them available (assuming losses).
I'd also like to put on board 10-12 strike drones. Something like a stealthy version of the X-47B. If my extensive wikipedia research (haha) is correct it should be capable of being designed to carry 4 HARM/Maverick, 2 Harpoon, or one MK48 type torpedo.
To minimize the impact of jamming, they wouldn't be controlled from the ship but would have pre-programmed missions. These would either be to fly to a spot and launch missiles (like at a bridge or other known and fixed object), or to be put on a loiter mission like hanging off the coast with HARM missiles and waiting for a radar to get turned on or loitering at an area in the ocean waiting for a target of opportunity.
This would give the surface group some added capabilities.
I might consider ASW helicopters and/or S3 Viking ASW assets, but that might get into too much mission creep.
"small flat-top out of a Des Moines ... some kind of drone"
We've often discussed a UAV carrier which, I think, is what you're describing. Nothing wrong with that idea.
"stealthy version of the X-47B."
The problem with a long range, penetrating, stealthy strike aircraft is that it's hideously expensive. It would be a longer range, more stealthy F-35 and we know how expensive that is. The unmanned aspect doesn't save any money to speak of.
I don't believe that a small handful of F-35s can accomplish anything significant in combat and could not survive 'loitering' off an enemy's coast. That being the case, an unmanned aircraft couldn't accomplish much or survive, either.
In a modern combat scenario, even stealth aircraft are going to need electronic warfare assistance (EA-18G Growlers) and tanking. A small UAV carrier would have neither of those.
I'm all for a UAV carrier to operate small-mid size, cheap, surveillance UAVs but trying to add a few strike UAVs is not likely to be productive. Consider that when we struck the Syrian airfield a while back, in a limited fashion, we still used around 70 Tomahawks. With that in mind, what can a 10-12 UAVs with some Mavericks or Harpoons accomplish? Even in the anti-ship role, 20-24 Harpoons is not an effective strike against Aegis level defenses (which is what China now has). It would be effective against an isolated ship or merchant ships but now you're into very limited uses for a pretty expensive capability.
Is anyone aware of any research or data to better understand the survivability of single engine turboprop planes verse modern AAW missiles? I have often wondered if their superior maneuverability to jets could make up for their lack of speed in air combat.
Your thinking on the cost of the drone aircraft and the utility of the numbers makes a lot of sense. I wonder if it's worth having a dedicated ship for drones? Maybe.
What do you think of the drone version of an airborne radar? Valuable, or valueless?
"What do you think of the drone version of an airborne radar?"
Check the archives. I've written a few posts on small, cheap UAV sensor drones. If you're talking about replacing, say, an E-2 Hawkeye with an unmanned UAV, that can't happen because the E-2 does so much more than just act as a sensor.
I have another idea while we're having open-mic night.
I would love the idea of the updated Des Moines heavy cruiser. I would also like to update the actual Iowa class ships, since we already exist. But I would rotate them through reduced peace-time deployments so as to not wear them out.
To fill the gap I'd be interested in building something like an Alaska class battle cruiser. My friends at wikipedia (where I stumbled across this ship) say that it had some design flaws, but since we'd be building new ones those problems could be ironed out.
I'd be interested in putting 16" guns on it, but I question if the structure of the ship could handle that size. The originals had 12" guns, which would be a nice size but would also complicate logistics as I'd now have 8", 12", and 16" barrels and munitions. Maybe that would be OK.
The layout would be similar to that of the Des Moines cruiser. A pair of three-tun turrets, one fore and one aft. At least 96 VLS, two double 5" turrets on the center-line of the ship (one fore and one aft of the superstructure. Two fixed-panel TRS-4D radars in armored enclosures. Four SeaRam CIWS, eight Phalanx CIWS, and a Goalkeeper CIWS on both the bow and stern.
OK, last question (before you file a restraining order).
If you were suddenly the Sec of the Navy, would you be able to build your fleet that you have listed in the fleet structure within reasonable budget constraints?
How long do you think it would take to get the fleet to look like that one?
" would you be able to build your fleet that you have listed in the fleet structure within reasonable budget constraints?"
Of course! However, I'd have much more money to use than the current budget because I'd be doing other things, as well, that would save enormous amounts of money. I've discussed those things at length but to ever so briefly refresh: eliminate 200 Admirals and staffs, terminate the F-35, missions over deployments, end all 'sensitivity' training, eliminate gender integration, halt early ship retirements, eliminate concurrency, etc. That would give me twice the current budget!
It would take a decade before the new fleet would begin to look the one I want.
Good day, CNO! Avid reader here from Philippines. Just hypothetical... If you are to lead PN with a limited budget of $30B, what would be your choices of equipment and corresponding number of units to conduct assymetric warfare against a superpower? Thanks!
Welcome! Philippines cannot, by itself, fight China so there's no point trying to build a navy for that purpose. What Philippines should do is align itself with the US and slot into US military capabilities.
With that in mind, Philippines should be structuring to confront Chinese peacetime incursions. This means a strong patrol vessel navy with vessels built for confrontation: strong hulls (collisions), guns, reasonable speed, decent endurance, short range missiles (Hellfire type), and SeaRAM/CIWS. The navy should also build several diesel subs. Nothing gives an enemy pause like a submarine threat. Finally, a robust mine inventory and minelayers to enable Philippines to seal off contested waters from Chinese incursion, if necessary.
CNO: indeed, RP cannot fight China by itself but needs to align with US. And, mind you, majority here are pro-US and Anti-China. And considering that China has lots of warships for its disposal, I can only think of something assymetrical or guerilla type of warfare can check Chinese expansion: a few of AWD frigates (3x Huitfeldt type), 6x Jose Rizal Class (HDF-2600), 12x Fassmer OPV-86 (German coast guard version with ASW capability), 24x Hanjin's PKG-A 63m FMAC for ASUW, 48x Israel Shipyard's Spike NLOS carrying Shaldag Mk5, and the same number of XSMG's XSR-19 composite craft with Thales sonar and LMM for units with offensive punches. To address mine threats, I would include 12x SwiftShips' 35-meter coastal minehunters. Meanwhile, to prosecute ASW, I would like to have Kaman's SH-2G Seasprites and 6x Airbus CN-295 Persuaders. I believe these units, along with various support vessels, can be procured affordably, and can face China effectively with smart admiralship.
None of the south east asian nations are going to align with the US while foreign policy is in such a mess due to the current commander in chief. US is increasingly seen as an unreliable allied.
maybe you can help me out here with something that's been bugging me. You see, i can't for the life of me figure out how on earth a carrier equipped solely with F35's as combat aircraft can operate effectively as an offensive force in a war against a (near) peer.
The aircraft are the main offensive weapon of the carrier. If you can't use those to strike at the enemy when and where you need to, there's not much point to the carrier is there?
And from what I know about the F35, it seems to me it is very easy for an opponent to neutralise (which does NOT mean shoot them down or anything like that) their offensive capability.
On a carrier equipped only with F35's as combat aircraft, they'll also need to provide fighter cover for the carrier battle group. And there's the rub. An F35 used for CAP or to scare off/intercept enemy aircraft can't be used for offensive missions. Not for another two weeks or so. That at least how long it takes for them to be ready for the next flight. Even if they manage to cut this in half (how likely is that btw?), that still means it's a week before it is usable again.
With about 48 F35's on a carrier and 4 F35's on CAP per day, you run out of F35's after 12 days. At that point the first four are still a couple of days away from being ready again. If (big if btw) they can achieve a standard turn around of one week, that still means that with a CAP of 4 F35's per day, you'll have to dedicate 28 of your aircraft to CAP's leaving just 20 for other missions.
That begs several questions, is four aircraft per day as CAP enough? I don't know what the normal procedures are but I doubt that's enough for 24 hour per day cover.
And all of this is assuming a minimal CAP without any actual enemy interference. What happens when the enemy starts harassing the fleet with aircraft or drones that stay out of SAM range? Can you afford not to send additional fighters after them? No you can't as they may be relaying targeting information for long ranged anti ship missiles (be they based on land, ship, or other aircraft). So what happens when you're still trying to get close enough to the shore to launch your strike but every couple of hours new drones/aircraft appear, bearing on you from different compass headings, and your CAP can't handle them on their own? You'll be forced to spend dozens of F35's on missions per day, just to drive away those handful of harassing drones and spotters.
So doesn't that mean that all you'd need to do to neutralise the carrier's offensive strike capability is to force them to spend all of their F35's on intercepts, making each of them unavailable for strikes for the next two weeks?
Even if you score not a single hit on a US ship or even against a F35, you can still achieve a mission kill for the carrier this way. And by the time the F35's are deployable again, the war might already be lost.
Maybe it's just me, but isn't it utterly insane to rely on an aircraft with a turn around time of two weeks for air defence missions?
Requirement does not equal actual capability. F35A's are widely reported as needing about two weeks of maintenance between missions. If that's any different for the naval versions, it'll be news to me. In fact, I'm not sure any current US combat jet can fly multiple missions per day, at least not consistently.
F-35s reportedly need about 50 maintenance hours per flying hour. Obviously not two weeks after a 90 minute mission, but that's still quite a bit of work.
It would be interesting to see how the service work breaks down. Is it evenly distributed per mission, or is it small amounts per mission then a major downtime after say ten missions?
"F-35s reportedly need about 50 maintenance hours per flying hour."
The link you gave talks about requested maintenance hours for the cumulative F35 fleet world wide per year. It simply divides that total by the expected flight hours per F35 per year (250 hours) to reach that number of 50 hours of maintenance.
These are not actual maintenance requirements but projected numbers for the future. Those projections would be based on the F35 project's declared maintenance needs for the aircraft (which if I remember correctly were rather optimistic) and based on projected (not actual) capabilities of aircraft and supporting systems (such as ALIS).
The aircraft in question would be flying in peace time conditions under (near) perfect conditions most of the time.
It also assumes the planes fly 250 hours per year. The abysmal availability numbers of the aircraft overt those same years cast doubt over that.
There are a lot of assumptions behind the 50 man-hour maintenance per flight hour in that article. It also leaves out the issue of spare parts and their availability (and how often spare parts are needed).
Still, even with 50 man-hours per flight hour it's huge. If you send 30 F35's on a strike and each spends 4 hours in the air that's a cumulative 1500 hours of maintenance needed.
The term man-hours also implies you can shorten it by assigning more men to the task which isn't the case. There is a maximum number of people that can work at an aircraft at a given time and some tasks simply need to run their course. It doesn't address the question of how much time the aircraft needs.
Whoa! Let's back the maintenance truck up a bit. I'm not a fan of the F-35 but it's clearly demonstrated that it can fly multiple sorties in a short time frame when needed. This has been demonstrated in Red Flag exercises and the like. As with any other aircraft, that sustained sortie rate can't be maintained indefinitely but it certainly can in the short term.
You've become mired in a distorted numerical vision that doesn't match reality. Here's a hypothetical example: If an aircraft flies 200 hours per year and once a year an engine has to be overhauled and it takes 1000 man-hours to do, the numerical average is 5 man-hours per flight hour but that all came in one shot. The rest of the time, the aircraft didn't need any maintenance (hypothetical, not real). Even then, we swap out a new engine while we work on the old and the maintenance hours become divorced from flight hours.
The point is that the simplistic maintenance numbers are not a match to the reality of what is required to turn an aircraft around for the next sortie. Yes, there are some tasks that must be performed but it's hardly two weeks worth of maintenance.
The maintenance hours requirement which was used to derive the 50 hour per flight hour number is based not on maintenance hours but on SUPPORT hours which include all kinds of non-flight maintenance work. From the supplied link, here's a list of the SUPPORT work included in the figure:
"design, development and systems upgrade; system certification; technical support; pre-positioned technical support; supply support; systems engineering; systems development support, systems test and evaluations; software support; operational software development and maintenance support; test support software development and maintenance; production engineering support; overhaul and restoration program support; program management support; and quality assurance and system safety."
Very little of that is direct flight maintenance support. In fact, the linked article references DIRECT flight maintenance hours as opposed to support hours.
You don't understand maintenance. An f35 lands . On average 10 maintenance crew have the f35 back flying in five hours which equals 50 hours. In reality it is less than that, as shown by ComNavOps as it includes all sorts of support that is not carried out on the carrier.
Scenario: China attacks Taiwan. The U.S. honors our commitments and declares war on China. The Phillipines declares neutrality. Question: Regarding the islands that the Phillipines claim, but China currently occupies. If the Phillipines turns a blind eye, aren't they violating neutrality by allowing belligerent troops on their territory? If the U.S. picks off those islands, then what? Why give them to the parties that sat out the war? Do we say China actually did have the claim and just keep them? Do we force neutral countries to "make business or get off the pot"? I would like to see us roll those islands up and have the Allied claimants garrison them. Thoughts?
I'm surprised they are trying to repair it after it was damaged in the dry dock sinking. I suspect the fire was intentionally set to collect the insurance money!
It's a matter of national pride, they must have a carrier like any proper superpower does. Of course, said carrier has zero actual usefulness in war, but hey.
Plus, who would be willing to insure the poor Kuz?
I've addressed this, at least in the form of cautionary questions. I'll address it further as specifics about Berger's plans become available. I have to say, though, that I am not a supporter, at the moment. His vision is badly flawed.
The Long range fire support mission could be addressed by building a ship based around the Rheinmetal 155 L52 gun . This gun is already being used with the pzh 2000. The gun could be navalised and automated to be placed on a frigate sized ship. It provides accurate fire to 40-60km. As there is already plentiful ammunition for this gun including guided ammunition there is no need to recreate a costly system as they did with the zumwalt. I would keep the ships simple with three guns; two forward, one aft in turrets, a close in weapons system and sea ram, with a fire control radar.
The standard shell for the 155mm is 43 kg. with a range of 40km as compared to the 127mm mk45 which fires 32kg to 24km.
Nothing wrong with that idea, however, navalizing a gun is more of a challenge than most people realize and it has rarely been successfully accomplished. The Germans tried to do it somewhat recently with one of their guns (the name escapes me, at the moment) and failed.
I think the root cause is actually industrial policy over many generations.
This has resulted in decimation of US industrial capacity.
The creation of monopolies in the defence sector, resulting in extremely poor value for money.
Lastly human issues. That is the promotion of flashy shallow presenters with high emotional intelligence at the expense of logical, critical thinkers whom actually make a difference. As a result; poor decisions lead to expensive mistakes with no accountability as the leadership are clones of each other.
The problems are what this blog is all about. The root cause is incompetent leadership, again, as thoroughly documented in this blog. The Navy has all the money and resources it needs. What it hasn't got is competent leadership. It really is that simple.
The quality of the "human material" in US armed forces (not just the Navy) has plummeted in the latest decades, that is the core problem. Fix that, and you'll fix everything else fairly easily.
Of course, I can't see how that can be accomplished by democratic means.
I get that the whole blog is focused on the issue, but I'm essentially getting at the need for a summary. Something like that could be used to reach a broader audience, perhaps with policymakers.
I also want to dig into what's behind the leadership incompetence. What's the mixture of true incompetence, misaligned incentives, and actual corruption? How much of each from congress vs. Navy brass?
To be fair, there are also underlying economic forces that have led to too few shipyards and military contractors in general. What can be done about this?
"I also want to dig into what's behind the leadership incompetence."
Bill Gates (Microsoft) summed up the leadership issue quite nicely. He said, "A's hire A's, B's hire C's."
After WWII, we had all A's. Our leaders were combat experienced and proven and they knew what a combat organization needed. Inevitably, lesser quality people, the B's, got promoted and those people, in turn, promoted even lesser quality people, the C's. Now, we have nothing but C's. They have no combat experience and, worse, are too incompetent to realize that they're incompetent. The proof is in all the issues I've documented in these pages.
I don't think corruption is a major factor although it's certainly present to some degree. I think the major factor/problem is pure, unadulterated incompetence. That incompetence is what leads to poor policies, poor acquisition decisions, poor organizational structure, etc.
Congress is at fault only to the extent that they have failed to exercise more oversight than they have. They are not professional warriors and have to depend on the recommendations of our Admirals and Generals and those professional warriors have betrayed (through incompetence) their trust.
While the US has, indeed, created a poor situation regarding shipbuilding, the lack of shipyards is not the problem. The Navy is not complaining that they have money and want to build more ships but that industry can't handle the workload. Instead, the shipyards have shrunk as the Navy's workload has shrunk - not the other way around. The Navy's requested new construction is on the order of around 8 ships per year. Industry has shrunk to match that low demand.
"The quality of the "human material" in US armed forces (not just the Navy) has plummeted in the latest decades, that is the core problem."
No, the core problem is that our leadership has gone along with the idea that the armed forces are a social organization rather than a combat organization.
I agree that the quality of recruits has declined in concert with society's decline - it could not be otherwise. However, had the military held firm, those recruits could have been torn down and rebuilt into high quality soldiers (that's what boot camp has traditionally done). Instead, our military leadership opted to get along and go along with the pressure to implement gender equity, sensitivity, and the myriad other idiotic and useless non-combat activities. We've dumbed down basic training to female levels, lowered physical fitness standards, taken away drill instructor's ability to demand performance, accepted altered appearance standards, and on and on. It's no wonder our soldiers and sailors are not the quality they once were. Witness the deplorable incident of the seizure of our Riverine boats by Iran. Our sailors did nothing to resist and some broke down crying.
"I agree that the quality of recruits has declined in concert with society's decline"
Society has been decline for as long as people have able to write about it or have had bards.
I not sure a see the Iran incidence as a result of the decline of society or recruits. They were it would appear not well trained, and part of a fairly murky political mission. We are enforcing sanctions on a couple different fronts but have no particular political appetite to escalate. Also I see the navy managed to disciple several officers and crew but I have to wonder if the USN has really bothered to spend on training and maintenance for the type of ship it hates and one that was likely woefully undreamed for its mission. After all if the USN can't be bothered to train its small boat operators so they don't accidentally kill their passengers what makes you think it ever tried to train or maintain riverine craft? In any case what would have had them do - shoot - to what end? I take it you would say Marchand should have opened fire on Kitchener to prove French manhood (thus getting his command obliterated and starting a war that was not really part of the plan).
I would agree the Navy needs to a better job of training and maintaining the stuff and people it has put that is hardly a new issue. Your team A was rather poorly ready to face a proxy war in Korea, and it still had a man who should have been before a court-martial back in WW2 as a commander.
The Iran small boat incident is probably a downfall based in multiple issues... societal attitude and decline, lack of training, clear ROE, etc. But clearly, regardless of what side of a map line it occured on, no vessel flying a US flag should have been "taken", and could have been prevented. So while I wouldnt want to see loss of life, warning shots, agressive maneuvering, following orders, etc are all things that should of happened as a precursor to a firefight, which if it couldnt have been avoided, should have happened. There was no Navy or national pride that day, and clearly any warriors present were either disobeyed or dormant. So while we celebrate that no lives were lost, this incident is a stain on the US, its Navys honor, and the Naval communitys training and personnel. I feel that multiple court-martials should have resulted. To think that those junior sailors will someday be responsible for bigger decisions is disturbing at best...
"But clearly, regardless of what side of a map line it occured on, no vessel flying a US flag should have been "taken""
Interesting point. Why exactly? If they did in fact drift into somebodies territorial waters are you suggesting the US has some additional unilateral rights? They were small craft the kind that drifts into the expendable category in a war. Are we the British now to enforces impressment or anti slavery (or a modern version) as we see fit. That is tricky now since we very much don't want China do to the same. So we cant really claim impunity in one sea and demand rule following elsewhere. Let's remember also a fairly murky not much of threat led to the chain of events that saw a US ship blow away a civilian airliner in the very same sea.
Also got to say don't like the term warrior. Warriors are not soldiers or sailors. The latter fight or do not fight for their country as ordered, warriors fight for themselves. Hector may have lost to Achilles but he was the better man any day. Achilles was a warrior (practically the trope) but how many of his own men did he kill?
"If they did in fact drift into somebodies territorial waters are you suggesting the US has some additional unilateral rights?"
No, the US has the same rights as every other country that observes the UNCLOS. Foreign warships have the right of Innocent Passage. The US riverine boats were conducting Innocent Passage, albeit unintentionally, and were, therefore, immune to being stopped, boarded, and seized. I really get tired of repeating this. Go back and read UNCLOS and the various posts on the subject.
If an Iranian warship entered our waters off New York, we'd have absolutely no right to stop, board, and seize them. We could sail alongside as they made passage, if we wished, but we could not interfere as long as they obeyed the requirements laid out in UNCLOS.
We can pass through Chinese territorial waters under Innocent Passage and there's nothing they can do about it because we have the right to do so. China and Russia have both passed through US territorial waters off Alaska, by the way, and we didn't sink them, board them, or seize them. We simply observed and did nothing as required by UNCLOS.
Add The US clearly was not following the UNCLOS rules during Ivy bells. Maybe the Russians missed her surfaced and flying a flag while she tapped Russian communications.
Have you done any research, at all, on this subject? It would appear not since you failed to note that UNCLOS was not in effect during the time period of the program you cite. UNCLOS took effect in 1994.
And you since than US subs have always adhered to article 20. That was a sort of joke, but whatever. In any case Article 19 remains and looks easy enough to enforce of suspicion of intent.
My point was a general one, and it being that those small boat crews should Have been in "repel boarders" mode. There was no reason to meekly allow it!! From my rough recollection, at least initially they werent outgunned, and warning shots, maneuvering etc could have disuaded the Iranians. Orders were disobeyed which contributed to the capture!! I use the warrior term to mean someone willing to fight, or be aggressive enough to deter an escalation. And thats a quality clearly lacked that day...!!! CNO has covered the legalities of the issue repeatedly. But in my mind, one functional boat should have done whatever necessary to protect the broken one, and avoid its capture, as well as its own. And if shots needed to be fired so be it. I dont think we should be hypocritical in our application of international law, treaties, etc... But if "repelling boarders" at sea creates an international incident or complaint by Iran, and keeps egg off our face, then frankly I could care less!!!
"I dont think we should be hypocritical in our application of international law"
Hypocritical? Absolutely not. We should demand the same rights that every other country gets. Russia and China have conducted Innocent Passage through our territorial waters off Alaska. We should conduct Innocent Passage through Chinese territorial waters. Iran has the right to pass through our territorial waters off Virginia without being stopped, boarded, or seized. We should expect and demand, under penalty of force, the same right to pass through Iranian waters.
Hypocritical? No! We should not be above international law but neither should we be below it.
You're completely wrong about Innocent Passage and Iran was completely wrong. The US had every right to conduct a passage through Iranian territorial waters. Learn something and move on. I will not allow any more incorrect statements.
When we are down to just one provider of military equipment not sure if the private industry model works as well as it does in econ 101/2 theory anymore.
In the years between the world wars, the navy and congress were fed up with bid manipulation by the civilian shipyards like New York Ship and Newport News and moved started moving new construction into navy yards, starting with cruisers.
By the way, I don't have a set schedule although, yes, I do tend to release posts on Mon. Originally, when I started this blog, I had a 'set' of material that I wanted to disseminate and I figured I'd be done in one year, maybe two. But, as it turns out, new topics seem to just leap out at me on a non-stop basis. Who knew?
A post on the Iver Huitfeldt class frigates since everyone seems to want to build a ship based upon it. The type 31e (arrowhead 140) being the UK version.
The Iver Huitfeldt is almost a baby Burke and it appears that it will be used for anti Air with some capability for anti surface and anti submarine warfare. The Arrohead 140 appears to be designed with coastal patrol in mind. Basic radar with self defense missiles, 57 mm gun, four boat bays and a Helicopter hanger.
The cost is the most noteworthy aspect of the Arrowhead 140 variant of the ship(~$350 million). You could buy almost two Arrowhead 140 ships for the price of a Legend class cutter. The cost of the Iver Huitfeldt is difficult to know with precision. The Arrowhead 140 compares favorably to both the Legend class and Heritage class cutters for the Coast Guard and has design margin to carry vertically launched weapons if called on to do so. I could see a need for the Coast Guard cutters being pressed into military duty and it would be nice to have a ship that was designed from the start to be more heavily armed.
How about a post about the potential for diesel-electric submarines for the US Navy.
I propose something like 9 on the US east coast and Gulf, 9 on the west coast/Hawaii, 4 at Okinawa, 6 at Subic Bay, 4 at Cam Rahn Bay, 4 out of Singapore and 6 working between Diego Garcia and Bahrain.
All with hardened sub shelters accessible without surfacing.
What would these do? I'm not arguing or disagreeing, just trying to understand your thinking on this. For instance, 9 SSKs on the US east coast - to do what?
Others scattered around the Pacific and Middle East - again, to do what?
If you have a clear concept of operations and these subs are needed at those locations then great. If it's just a vague desire for SSKs then we need to work on why and how they can actually help.
Well thay don't make a lot of sense out of the USA. You have to really harden US owned facilities Guam and Diego Garcia as fall backs. Second if you want to forward base you need to really solidly line up US security arrangements with Japan and the rest. If its China you are looking to deter or fight you need to confident Japan is not going to do a Turkey on you up to the point of shooting at least.
If you could sustain a hi tempo rate of deployment in large numbers. Then it would be useful in terms of China facing a large sub war even in some supper surprise attack aimed a goal before the US could respond and consolidate it force s and work through China area defenses. Subs would neutralize the whole ballistic missile threat. It would force China to spend on a whole new area of defense. And given thay seem to slowing their claims/production about CVs that might be useful.
"Bahrain"
Presumably this means intimidating Iran?
I would think just really investing in a real multi faceted air/missile defense for our bases with gulf 'friends' combined with missiles and planes would be better than dragging the navy into the gulf too much.
One obvious role for a force of SSKs would be the current role that Japan foresees for her Soryu class subs - interdiction and control of the approaches through the first island chain. A fleet of SSKs based out of Guam, Japan, possibly the Phillipines and Singapore would theoretically be able to stifle all shipping to and from Chinese ports. Bear in mind that China is heavily reliant on sea borne imports for the majority of her industrial needs. In addition, such a force could deter any Chinese forays beyond the first island chain. The subs would act as a stopper to contain China within the South China, East China and Yellow Seas.
"interdiction and control of the approaches through the first island chain."
Yes, that would be an appropriate use of SSKs. I note, however, that of the possible bases you list, only Guam and maybe Japan would be available to us in the event of war. Singapore would almost certainly opt to remain neutral thus denying us basing rights in war. The Philippines will not be giving the US basing rights in any foreseeable future. Japan, while possible available as a base, might be too close to China and too subject to attack to be a useful base. This is our problem in the Pacific - we simply have no good basing options.
It's an interesting problem. Australian is building a class of SSKs with massive range so they can base out of Aus and interdict into the South/East China Seas but the issue is that it comes with an inflated price tag - at that point it takes away from one of the main advantages of SSKs (their theoretical cheapness). Another answer would be to build properly hardened and fortified sub bases in Guam or Japan. If war with China is a serious possibility, then the US should prepare for it by hardening their bases and potentially building new bases in islands like the Marshal chain.
Do you think the territorial disagreements between China and the Phillipines could be leveraged for basing? It seems to me that in the event of a US/China confrontation, wed need the Phillipines. While looking at basing for the notional middle boat squadrons, Japan and Guam had multiple drawbacks, but the Phillipines were a happy medium. Maybe itd be a case of having to throw money at them??
"Maybe itd be a case of having to throw money at them??"
At the moment, Philippines leader is not disposed towards the US. Until he's replaced, nothing can happen regarding basing. In fact, he's more likely to offer basing rights to China!
Thanks for your response. My thoughts on these diesel-electrics are that they would be a good way to put a survivable presence into the South China Sea. This would give the US the opportunity to start contesting for that area, as we seem to not be doing that very well right now.
It would also afford the US the vehicle with which to start building relationships with some of the countries that we want to ally with to encircle China.
The use of diesel-electrics would be to take some of the pressure off of the blue-water attack subs, and we would be using subs that are presumably very quiet and effective.
The numbers are a bit arbitrary because, frankly, when it comes to patrolling with submarines I don't know what it takes to be effective.
The subs on the coasts of the US would be to defend our ports and home waters.
Basically what I'm thinking is to replace nuclear attack subs with diesel-electric types whenever the patrolling areas are somewhat 'local'.
"This would give the US the opportunity to start contesting for that area, as we seem to not be doing that very well right now."
Again, doing what? Contesting how? What, specifically, can a sub (SSK) do to contest the S China Sea?
"The subs on the coasts of the US would be to defend our ports and home waters."
I'm good with that. The US has gotten used to thinking that our ports are out of reach of enemies and that's no longer true. China has a small but growing fleet of SSNs that can reach the US.
When I was thinking of contesting for the South China Sea, I just kind of assumed that their presence would be something that the Chinese would need to be aware of and try and counter.
This would make them focus there, instead of being able to expend all their resources on power projection.
"I just kind of assumed that their presence would be something that the Chinese would need to be aware of and try and counter."
Why? They know won't actually take any action. If we didn't take action when China forced down our EP-3 and seized it or when they seized our UUV drong or when the Iranians seized our riverine boats and crews, why would the Chinese feel they have to worry about some SSKs roaming around?
We send carrier groups and Burkes through the South China Sea regularly and the Chinese don't seem to have slowed their power projection efforts noticeably. Why would a few more SSKs make any difference?
Presumably (I hope!) we have SSNs patrolling the South China Sea now. Why would a few more SSKs make any difference?
I'm sorry, it sounds like I'm jumping on you and that's not my intent at all. I just want you to clearly understand what some SSKs could AND COULD NOT accomplish before you call for them. Too many people call for various weapon systems in isolation without considering what, if anything, they can actually accomplish. You're a good reader/commenter and I want you to clearly think this through. If you can come up with a specific task that the SSKs can do that would actually have some beneficial impact on the China situation then I'm all for it. If you would, think about it a bit more and let me know what your thoughts are.
Does anybody mind reading - http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.com/2019/10/royal-navy-strikes-back.html It is an interesting view of the UK RN and it's new carriers. The relevance to the USofA becomes apparent.
I don't mind links as long as you offer some analysis to go with it. So, what's your take on the article?
And no, the relevance to the US is not readily apparent! Feel free to explain where/how you see the relevance.
My general reaction to the article is that it is a flag-waving, unrealistic look at UK's naval aspirations. It ignores the capabilities of the UK's carriers as they relate to the realities of combat (no AEW, no EW support, no tankers, too few aircraft, insufficient escorts, etc.).
The RN built what they could given their funding constraints. It's a shame they didn't get the extra pounds to do cats and traps--although with gas/electric drive, there's no steam so the cats would have to be EMALS, and we know what a disaster that is. They might be better off with a ski-jump.
They have recognized the AEW problem (they do have the Falklands in their experience locker) and have addressed it at least partly with Merlin Crowsnest helos. They don't have the EW support, although we keep being told that the F-35s somehow magically can do it themselves and don't need it. They don't really have a solution to the tanker problem, and the resulting limited combat radius. Too few aircraft and escorts are obvious financial constraints.
Would they have been better off to build one, make it CATOBAR (or at least STOBAR), and spend the savings to provide a proper air wing and escorts? Quite possibly.
But I think the implication for the US is this. We have one ally (France) and no potential opponents with nuclear CATOBAR carriers. We own that space for the near future. We do have a number of allies (UK, Italy, Spain, possibly India) with conventional STOVL or STOBAR carriers. We may want or need to develop a CONOPS for employing those carriers alongside our big carriers in future operations against a common enemy, kind of like how we used CVLs/CVEs in WWII. That wasn't as big a consideration when we had a 600-ship navy, but with our numbers down to where they are now, the only way we get anywhere near 600 ships is by counting our allies.
I know ComNavOps doesn't like my idea about converting LHAs/LHDs to "Lightning Carriers," but one of my thoughts (aside from the fact that they are basically useless for conducting amphibious assaults) is that we could us them to develop strategies and tactics that would be useful operating with allied STOVL carriers like HMS QE/PW or the Italian Cavour or Spanish Juan Carlos, or even Japanese Hyuga or Aussie Canberra.
We simply are not going to spend the bucks to build a navy that can police the world. We need help, and that means allies. Like it or not, there just isn't another way to do it. So if that's what they're going to build, then we need to figure out if we can use them, and how.
"the implication for the US is this. We have one ally (France) and no potential opponents with nuclear CATOBAR carriers. We own that space for the near future."
I keep hearing variations on this theme - that we have full fledged carriers and none of our enemies do so aren't we great and don't we have the advantage. The reality is that completely misses the operational point. China, for example, doesn't need carriers for any of their near to medium term ambitions. Taiwan, Vietnam, the Malaysian area, Philippines, etc. are all well within reach of land based air. In a war with the US, China will sit behind the first island chain and be happy to duke it out with us since they have the resources of an entire country (nearly continent) to draw on. A carrier is just about the last thing they need.
So, comparing our carriers to theirs ignores the operational needs of the two countries. We have simply got to stop thinking in these one-versus-one pieces of equipment mode. We have to think operationally. What does China want to accomplish and what do they need to do it? Carriers are not on their list.
The carrier capability they're trying to build is for the distant future when they've seized the first island chain and want to move on the second and seize Pearl Harbor, Midway, etc. along with Africa.
"They have recognized the AEW problem (they do have the Falklands in their experience locker) and have addressed it at least partly with Merlin Crowsnest helos."
I know you said 'partly' but do you recognize just how limited the Crowsnest approach is? Consider the size of the E-2 Hawkeye radar and the size of the aircraft and the number of operators in the aircraft. Do you really think a small, bolt on radar on the side of a helo even begins to approach an E-2 radar capability? Further, the E-2 is not just a target detection radar like Crowsnest but a complete aerial battle management system which requires several highly trained operators. I could go on detailing the differences but I'll stop there. Crowsnest is not even remotely comparable and is NOT an effective carrier E-2 Hawkeye type AEW/battle management system.
Again, I know you said 'partly' but I keep hearing people talk about this as if its equivalent to an E-2. I'm sorry for the UK readers because it will upset them but their carrier is not an effective combat asset in a high end war because their air wing is not an effective combat instrument.
I keep hearing how big carriers like Ford and Nimitz are none survivable or in serious danger from a few different publications and readers so the solution is "generally" to go smaller....so with no AEW, no EW, no tankers, fewer escorts,etc...the smaller carriers are now more survivable? I have to admit, I'm dubious a smaller carrier is survivable in a peer or near peer war. Now, if we are talking Somalia or Yemen scenario, sure, small carrier is probably better and cheaper...
"dubious a smaller carrier is survivable in a peer or near peer war."
The issue is not survivability. That's a red herring. No ship is survivable if hit with enough weapons. The issue is combat effectiveness. What can it accomplish before it's sunk.
The USS Hornet of WWII wasn't survivable, in that it was sunk. However, it was effective while it was afloat.
Combat effectiveness is a function of the air wing and escorts. Today's shrunken, short-legged, small payload air wings are less combat effective than ever before which is why it's mandatory that carriers operate in groups of 4.
Anyone who suggests that smaller carriers with even smaller air wings are somehow more survivable or more combat effective is just ignorant of the realities. The only thing a smaller carrier has going for it is that it costs less to replace it on a like for like basis.
Escort carriers filled an important role in WW2. Their main roles were ASW and CAP. They freed up the fleet carriers for offensive action during amphib assaults by providing CAP over the amphibious shipping and some limited CAS. They did sterling service escorting convoys. The same could also be true for the smaller carriers operated by allied countries in a future war. Are they goign to be able to operate as fleet carriers, in a AsuW role? No, not likely. But there's other roles they can fill.
"Again, I know you said 'partly' but I keep hearing people talk about this as if its equivalent to an E-2."
Well, I have no illusions that a Crowsnest is anything remotely approaching an E-2. That's why I said partly.
And the QE and PW are very much less capable than a Nimitz. Would they have been better served to have built one big carrier with cats and traps and a proper air wing? Arguably so, but that isn't what they built. They're going to have to make do with what they have, and given the professionalism of the RN officers and sailors, I expect them to get the most out of what they have.
And given our future navy shipbuilding plans, I expect that we are going to have to rely on them to fill in some of our gaps. If we operate together, obviously we have E-2 and tanker assets that can help them out. But we need to develop a CONOPS, figure out roles, and train and practice executing the plans. They might turn out to be next to useless, or they might be able to provide some significant assistance.
"The same could also be true for the smaller carriers operated by allied countries in a future war."
Quite right! The problem is that those are very expensive ships to act as escort carriers. A true, purpose built escort carrier would be much more austere and much cheaper. But, hey, if another country wants to donate a very expensive carrier to escort duty, that's fine.
"...the Malaysian area, Philippines, etc. are all well within reach of land based air."
@ComNavOps: Not exactly. Even if they were staging out of the Woody and Paracels airbases, their Flankers have barely enough fuel to make it to Malaysia or Singapore, let alone the Phillipines - the distance just doesn't work in their favor. Bombers and MPA could possibly reach us - assuming Woody and Paracels can support bombers - but those are easy pickings for fighters.
The way I see it, if China wants to flex on Malaysia, they're going to need a serious carrier (more likely 3, for the 1:1:1 deployed/workup/refit ratio). Even a USN-style 44-48 fighter air wing will concentrate more fighters locally than RMAF can put up. Optimistically, best case, we can throw up 25 fighters - 18 Su-30MKM Flankers and 7 F/A-18D Hornets - for the entire country, which just goes to show how badly run our military is.
Let's say this for the US. For all the inefficiency and idiocy of the US procurement system, you've never had the President literally embezzle the DoD budget to line his bank accounts like our previous Prime Minister did.
"Quite right! The problem is that those are very expensive ships to act as escort carriers. A true, purpose built escort carrier would be much more austere and much cheaper. But, hey, if another country wants to donate a very expensive carrier to escort duty, that's fine."
That's true, but convoys are extremely important. I could absolutely see the RN using their carriers in that role. They could also form the centre of hunter killer groups to preform ASW. Additionally they could act as supplemental carriers within Fleet groups to provide additional CAP - which is something escort carriers did throughout WW2. An additional force of F-35Bs in the CAP role can't hurt - it would free up some of the F/A-18s for strike roles for example.
Another function would be providing additional CAP and CAS for an amphibious assault - again a primary role of escort carriers in WW2.
Of course, you're right that they are very expensive escort carriers. But they exist, and there are plenty of useful roles they could fill - fleet carrier isn't one of them of course.
As an aside, it would be interesting to think about what a modern, cheap escort carrier might look like. Might be worth a post in the future. What role would they fill (as above, likely they would serve as ASW, escort duty, CAP, some CAS etc.) Commercial design like most WW2 escort carriers? What aircraft? SVTOL etc?
"The problem is that those are very expensive ships to act as escort carriers."
Right now they are very cheap, in fact free, because they already exist. Of course, the politics involved in getting those other countries to give them up might not be so cheap, but that's a different issue. You don't go to war with the military you want, you go with the military you have, and right now they are what an allied navy has. I'm not sure they can achieve maximum effectiveness in ASW without S-3s, but then again the whole Navy is now operating without S-3s.
This is a big part of my thinking about turning the LHAs/LHDs into light carriers. We have them, we've spent a bunch of money on them (but that's sunk costs), and they aren't really useful as amphibs because there's no viable CONOPS for using them as such. Are they as good as a Nimitz? No (but right now neither is a Ford, and for a whole lot more money). They can haul certain airplanes around, and operate them, in moderate numbers. If you got rid of the well deck and troop spaces, they could haul a few more. That's all. But that's more than nothing. And right now they have no viable way to conduct an effective amphibious assault.
"We" are all part of whatever we put together - be it NATO or other coalition. Each of us cannot all aspire to the same, as such we provide what is within our means and contribute accordingly. What the piece did say was that we endeavour to provide something (tangible), and that sometimes having what might be effectively described as a sea-control ship is useful in it's own right even if only to release other assets. The UK could never provide a worthwhile CV/CVN all of the time (how useful is the French carrier when in dock?) The UK experience in the Falklands showed that an E2 type platform is NEEDED. At what point do you decline to deploy because you do not have what is needed? Just about every commander in history would have walked away. One final point, there was a comment (I didn't keep a reference unfortunately) that the CV HMS Ark Royal could not have flown F4s or Gannets for significant periods because of the sea states in the Falklands campaign. At no point were the Harriers incapable of flying because of sea states. It would be interesting if there was some data about ships of the QE or USN CVN size being able to fly aircraft conventional aircraft in the North (or South) Atlantic. Thank you all for bothering to comment.
Also, I did consider - what if we had built three Cavour sized vessels with a more air orientation? Well, the QE class were designed in part for a significant sortie rate,perhaps more than two Cavour. As such there ought to be situations where this is applicable (I hope so). For example, it would be dull to deploy a USN CVN close(ish) to shore to support a landing (I appreciate your attitude to contested landings, the UK agreed during the Falklands). A QE might be considered more useful to provide closer support with the CVN behind covering (it is reasonable to consider a QE more expendable in the grand scheme).
"USN CVN close(ish) to shore to support a landing"
Fleet carriers do not directly support landings. Their job is to interdict threat axes hundreds of miles away from the landing site. In WWII, escort carriers provided the direct ground support and modern US Navy doctrine calls for LHA/LHD to provide the ground support. Tying a CVN to a static location is how you lose carriers.
A QE could reasonably provide ground support but, again, that's an incredibly expensive version of a very basic ground support requirement.
"QE class were designed in part for a significant sortie rate"
It is very difficult to imagine a scenario in which sortie rate is important. Carriers simply don't fight that way. We've covered this in posts. The only scenario I can evenly vaguely imagine where sortie rate might be important is a low end, limited engagement (probably 'peacetime') where some light infantry were in trouble and needed support. Of course, if you've got light infantry engaged to the point of needing aerial support, you've already screwed up big time since light infantry, by definition, are not capable of significant combat on their own. Sortie rate is a useless red herring.
I'm of the opinion that sortie rate in the USN is a holdover from Vietnam-era influence. Recall all the time US carriers spent at Yankee Station, launching strikes into North Vietnam - they were able to remain on station until running out of ammo because the North Vietnamese didn't have any ability to threaten US carriers.
You may be right that sortie rate might not be as relevant in peer war for carriers - Andy Pico's writeup of the NORPAC 82 experience certainly suggests that quite strongly - but it may possibly be more relevant for land-based air, since airbases, unlike carriers, don't move. Reportedly the Israelis put a premium on turnaround time and sortie rate. But that's an Air Force problem, not a Navy problem.
"I'm not sure they can achieve maximum effectiveness in ASW without S-3s" In an ASW role,they would host primarily helos, with just enough F-35s to preform a CAP role.
@Ocean: I recall Forrestal returning to Guam to stock up on weapons, which lead to the flight deck fire, but I'm willing to accept that might have been an extremis case.
"I recall Forrestal returning to Guam to stock up on weapons, which lead to the flight deck fire"
Forrestal's bombs were restocked at sea, on Yankee Station, by USS Diamond Head the day before the conflagration. Over a dozen of the bombs were 1000 lb bombs that were old and had been improperly stored resulting in the bombs becoming unstable. A shortage of conventional bombs led to them being used despite being visually identifiable as unsafe.
Unfortunately, that's one suggestion I have to decline. I want no part of Twitter, Facebook, or any similar platform. Too many issues for too little gain. Good suggestion but, sorry!
All you can do is post a link to a blog post and reaching a bigger audience there are many naval pages on twitter with interesting things like this ones for example
I've said this before, but going to a forum platform offers wider discussion possibilities than merely the blog's comment pages. What other sites will do is that the content goes up into the blogpost, a link to the post's discusssion thread in the forums is left below, and the comment section on the blog is locked down. It has the benefit of keeping the posting neat and tidy, and containing discussion and any other flaming to a seperate venue. A forum also has more robust moderation tools for the owner, beyond manually deleting posts - depending on your forum software, threadbans, subforum bans and total forum bans are tools at one's disposal.
My current dream- Indy Class LCS upgunned with another 16-32 NSM on the flight deck, and another 3-5 SeaRam for defence. Then send them out in groups. They'll become longer range missile boats. Just sail them close to any fleets and unleash the fury. You can tell from my words that I'm largely dreaming, but this is the sort of thing I believe an bare LCS can equipped with. Flight deck might need some reinforcing.
"Just sail them close to any fleets and unleash the fury."
That's inspiring. Of course, you realize that if the LCS is in range of the enemy then the enemy is in range of the LCS. It works both ways. Since the LCS has very limited defensive capability, few would survive an engagement.
This illustrates the naval maxim (paraphrased!) that the winner is the side the launches effectively first. This, in turn, illustrates the immense importance of sensors and targeting.
Now, consider that your LCS-missile boat is 418 ft long. The purpose built Chinese missile boat, the Type 022, is 139 ft long and looks to be quite stealthy. Which side is going to see the other first, do you think?
Yes, it's best used as a first strike. As for defense, that's why I wanted several more SeaRam installed, since it's relatively easier than trying to have Mk41 cells installed.
But if they can, somehow , act as missile trucks, that'd be a thing of beauty to see.
A post about the use of bombers in naval warfare. Would there be any use to emulate Russian tactics with a naval version of the B-21 Raider and stealth cruise missiles in a naval conflict with China? At $550 million per plane it is less expensive than a Littoral Combat ship.
Airforce is working on LRASM integration with B-52s. It's potentially a future possibility - bombers staging out of Guam or Changi or Kadena acting as an additional threat vector.
Any chance of a positive post (this is not a criticism) just to cheer us up as it is near Christmas.
ReplyDeleteAny topic suggestions?
DeleteI love doing positive posts. It was not my intent to be particularly critical when I started this blog but as I researched the topics it became clear that there was a great deal wrong with the Navy. I simply write what's there, good or bad. Unfortunately, the bad is far too prevalent.
So, yes, give me a topic suggestion!
The role of Britains colonies in naval contributions (thinking specifically WW1 & 2 here) have always been rather interesting to me (disclaimer: I live in New Zealand!).
DeleteI recently found out that when the ANZAC force sailed for Gallipoli, they were actually escorted part way by the Japanese (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_battlecruiser_Ibuki).
A historical quirk if ever there was one, but perhaps you know of other interesting tales involving NZ or Australian naval forces in these conflicts? I dont know if that would count as positive, but I would imagine there is some interesting stories to be told.
"when the ANZAC force sailed for Gallipoli, they were actually escorted part way by the Japanese"
DeleteDid not know that. I'll have to come up to speed!
(Don McCollor)...Yes, in WW1, Japan was an ally of Britain and other nations against Germany. Their naval capabilities were highly respected.
DeleteThe Japanese 2nd Special squadron escorted Allied troopships in the Eastern Med so as to release UK warships for other areas.
DeleteIndeed, a Japanese destroyer was torpedoed by an Austro-Hungarian submarine.
War with China starts tomorrow. What would be your first decissions package?
ReplyDelete"decissions package?"
DeleteYou lost me. Are you asking what would be the first actions to take?
Xmas books for the NM reader ?
ReplyDeleteI'll put in
Archer Jones, "The Art of War in the Western World"
George Orwell, "Homage to Catalonia"
Sticking with naval subjects, I'd offer "Neptune's Inferno" by James Hornfischer. It illustrates the raw carnage of modern naval warfare - something we've forgotten as we design our current frail and overly expensive ships.
Delete(Don McCollor) Another book might be "To Rule The Waves - How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World" by Arthur Herman (1974) [as well as telling of the rise and fall of the British Navy].
DeleteHow about the amount of hits a modern warship can take from missiles or guns as compared with the prescribed loadout of anti-ship missiles versus anti-missile capacity to get a clearer idea of How many shots fired equal a disabled/sink enemy. This in turn might paint a much more from picture of how effective our ships might actually perform in combat. Are we simply sailing with enough missiles to try to stay alive defensively or can we field an offensive force that can kill and survive to come home
ReplyDeleteWayne Hughes book, "Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat", presents a table of hits required to kill ships of various sizes. We've referenced this in several posts and comments. We've also discussed defensive missile requirements. Here's a couple of posts to get started:
DeleteAAW - Hard or Soft Kill
Cruise Missile Characteristics
On a technical note, I see that China just flight tested its new seaplane, the AG600. This thing is a beast. Long range, lots of transport, sensor and weapons capacity.Would be great to have something like this here. Great for picking up survivors from LCS and such. With all the DL talk and austere bases, this would be a great connector as well as a patrol and ASW platform.
ReplyDeleteGiven its size and complete lack of stealth, it would be 'visible' for hundreds of miles. In the forward replenishment role, it could be easily tracked to the forward base thus pinpointing its location. As a patrol plane, it would be totally susceptible to the Chinese very long range air to air missiles that we posted about. See "Goodbye Poseidon and Hawkeye"
DeleteIt would be useful for a rear area supply plane but in the rear area, a cargo ship would be more effective and carry a much larger load. This aircraft would be a niche capability - useful in certain circumstances but hard to justify the cost relative to the usefulness.
Have you ever made a comment on the Germany Navy? I'd wonder how it is regarded from abroad, especially from your (critical) point of view ...
ReplyDeleteI have not commented other than minor points in passing. I simply have no knowledge base from which to comment intelligently. In particular, I lack an understanding of what Germany sees as the role for its navy so I can't evaluate the navy against that role.
DeleteWhat are your thoughts about it? Is there some specific aspect you'd like to see us examine?
Just nosy how you might seen it, since I am in the german navy reserve and following your blog for quite a while ...
DeletePersonally, I am still not sure how to evaluate a so called frigate F 125.
Basically, the German Navy regards itself as an alliance navy with focus on humanitarian aid, and on the other hand is willing to be well prepared for border defense.
My concern with the German Navy is that it does not seem to be focused on combat but, as you point out, more focused on humanitarian aid and other non-combat activities.
Delete"Personally, I am still not sure how to evaluate a so called frigate F 125."
DeleteI really have a hard time understanding why you spend close to US$1 billion on a destroyer/frigate with virtually zero ASW capability--no ASW sonar and no ASW weapons. The only ASW capability is what the helos provide.
"My concern with the German Navy is that it does not seem to be focused on combat but, as you point out, more focused on humanitarian aid and other non-combat activities."
Exactly. Really not fit for a war, particularly if there are submarines around.
Well, as stated earlier in a comments post - I quite like F125. Anti-piracy and stabilisation simply is a job that needs doing, so why not have a specialized ship for it and free the rest of the navy up for training.
DeleteAs for the navy per se - I would argue that apart from F125-missions, you van simply not evaluate it atm. The clearly definded NATO cold-war jobs (hunting Subs/protecting convois, clearing mines and shutting down the baltic) are over, and a new szenario simply has not yet emerged.
So I guess all there is is to evaluate is If we are principally able to develop and field new ships or are also running into the US' problems discussed here. But even though recent EU ship designs had delays and problems enough, they are swimming now, albeit 'only' with evolutionary designs. So I am still a bit optimistic
I always enjoy when you revisit old WW2 battles. Could we get a WW1 naval battle or even past that? Is it possible to learn something from Trafalgar or even older naval engagements? Or are we just to far removed and tech is so different, those ancient battles dont apply anymore? Just curious.
ReplyDeleteAlways curious to hear about what CNO and others are reading. Nothing naval right now for me, just aviation. Did go on a Falkland war binge in Sept/Oct. Getting ready to read about Iran-Iraq war series of Helion book, usually pretty good. Did read a book that talked about Iraqi EXOCET operations against Iran in the 80s.
"Could we get a WW1 naval battle or even past that?"
DeleteI like it! I will most definitely look into that. Why don't you think about it and give me a suggestion for one that you think has some lessons for us?
An entertaining book of modern naval fiction is David Poyer's "The Gulf". It describes a battle by a Perry class frigate. A good read.
long time lurker, first time poster here :)
DeleteI'd be interested in going back even further - the design, actions & development of the early dreadnoughts, or even the ironside-type ships from the US Civil war are pretty interesting. Some of the battles they were involved in must have been such a change for those on board, because I would imagine many of them had begun their careers on sail-type naval ships; what a change they would have been!
(Don McCollor) I just finished "Russia and Japan" by Frederic Unger (1904) including the decisive naval battles that Japan won [my own hard copy]. For old books, after a century the copyright expires and several organizations scan them and have them for free download at https://archive.org/index.php. I found two about a Brit who first served in the Confederate Army and then commanded a blockade runner in the Civil War.
Delete"sail-type naval ships; what a change they would have been!"
DeleteThe revolution in naval warfare brought about by aircraft and the aircraft carrier must have been similarly disruptive for sailors 'raised' on battleships. It's interesting how radical change is always resisted before its embraced.
I hadnt thought about the change from battleships to carriers in that way - good point!
Delete@ CNO. Been thinking about going wayyyy back like Peloponnesian wars. Just too busy right now to go into further detail to study what could apply to today...
Delete"Been thinking about going wayyyy back like Peloponnesian wars."
DeleteHmmm … Is there a point at which technology has so changed naval operations that there are no useful lessons to be learned? Is that too far back to be useful to us, today? I don't know. I'll have to look into that.
I dont know either. My initial thought was it's so far removed probably not but it was a land power (Sparta) vs a naval power (Athens)...could there be some parallels to today? Maybe the technology has changed but problems remain like bad weather,fog of war, logistics,etc...I dont know.
DeleteEven that question could be a good one, at what technological point or break does past battles or war stop aplying?!? Is our tech so different, there's a cutoff date to learn past lessons???
My other thought for topic was about the future. So looking at past, we went from oars and sails to coal, then oil, from wood structures to metal, from regular navy ships to Dreadnought,etc...but every time, at the end of a war or battle, there was the birth of the new tech....thinking BBs were the queens of the oceans and carriers and subs were the babies and emerge in the next war as the queens. Today queens are the AC and the sub, hopefully no massive war in the next year or 24 hours, what are the babies today that will be tomorrow queens? Lasers, unmanned, space warfare, hacking, etc...are new platforms just evolutionary rather than revolutionary? Or is there some new platform like UAV or USW just waiting in the wings to take over old queens? Something else or combination? Can we spot it today before the next war?
"Maybe the technology has changed but problems remain"
DeleteExactly so! Without a doubt there are geopolitical lessons to be learned but those are, generally, outside the scope of this blog. Whether there are military operational and tactical lessons is the open question. I'm going to dig in to some of this and see.
"Can we spot it today before the next war?"
DeleteHistory suggests not! New technologies and paradigm shifts are only recognized by a few and are generally denied by the majority. Almost by definition, we can't see the next revolution. Or can we be among the few who see? Do you see the next revolution? Personally, I'd put my money on AI.
I think the Battle of Coronel and the subsequent Battle of the Falklands are very interesting, with lots of subtle cause/effect parts... Interesting, and also timely since they just recently found Scharnhorst....
DeleteA post on what kind of fleet could be formed from the museum ships and reserve fleet. What would that fleet look like combined with the current fleet and what would be the weaknesses of the resulting combined fleet? What do we really need to build right now for an effective fighting force if we include what we already have or could pull from reserves.
ReplyDeleteIowa class battleships
USS Salem
Oliver Perry class Frigates.
etc....
We have no reserve fleet! See, "What Reserve Fleet?"
DeleteThe Des Moines pic dangles a fav topic for me of hybrid new tech/old hull design!!! Since I revamped the Cleveland a while back, Ive continued finding old technical info on old ships as a new side hobby, and trying to meld the new and old is a fun exercise(that should be seeing integration into reality!!).
ReplyDeleteI love your fiction, and the ideas and scenarios are very thought provoking. Another of those is always welcome!!
Having said that, how about a broad, sweeping fictional China conflict, using your proposed fleet structure and components?
Delete"broad, sweeping fictional China conflict, using your proposed fleet structure and components?"
DeleteGiven the constraints of a several paragraph post length, that's just not possible. The most I could do would be a very tiny, single incident. That said, even a single incident with my proposed fleet is an interesting idea. I'll give it some serious thought and see if I can come up with a concept. I somewhat did this with the "Return of the Broadside" story but there are many other possibilities.
Sure, I know its a challenge!! I recall the alternate Pearl Harbor scenario being a pretty perfect mix of detail and overall veiw. I appreciate you entertaining the notion!! I just thought itd be interesting to put the notional fleet to the test and see how it does...
Delete" alternate Pearl Harbor scenario"
DeleteHmm, yes … That was less a story and more of a outline but, yes, I could possibly do something of that nature. I will definitely give that some thought.
Alternate scenarios to play with: Midway, Guadalcanal come to mind. Maybe alternate WW2 Uboat scenario?
DeleteAlternate Falkland war ending? That would rile up the UK readers!
Delete"Alternate Falkland war ending?"
DeleteHad the Belgrano found the British fleet? Of course, the Belgrano was barely seaworthy and crewed by nearly untrained personnel so that would have to be what-if'ed but what if, indeed, a WWII cruiser had engaged the British fleet? Hmmm ...
What would have happened if instead of Sheffield being hit, Argies get really lucky and knock out Invincible? Maybe if Argie had better coordinated their initial attacks, could Belgrano and escorts got in closer? If Argies wait another month or 2 with so many UK ships up for disposal, could UK have tried to recapture Falklands with just Hermes? Hermes vs Belgrano!
DeleteI am always interested in your points regarding Quality versus Quantity. Where is the balance, Is "Gold plating" justified etc. It is an interesting debate.
ReplyDelete"Where is the balance,"
DeleteThat's a great question - the key question, really. I'll have to give some thought as to how to answer that. My initial response would be that the balance is the point at which your technology is effective, reliable, and repairable in a combat context and the point at which you have enough assets to fight effectively, compensate for attrition, and keep fighting. I'll think more on this!
I would argue that peace time is the time for gold plating and trying out stuff, you can afford failure.
DeleteCost-effective and proven is for the arms race before a looming conflict.
"Cost-effective and proven is for the arms race before a looming conflict."
DeleteA very good argument can be made that we are facing a looming conflict with China. China is certainly engaged in an arms race. The US and the West seems to be merely watching, at the moment.
When assuming that China will try something before 2049, Taiwan most likely, hulls build today (Ford) would still be around.
DeleteSo I guess even when this is not a race, but catching up by China atm, I would argue that the door on Gold plating closes in the next 10 years or so and it is time to get our shit together
A relevant point regards gold-plating might be - what can a regular crew support? Having contractors on board would be rather odd.
DeleteAny system has to be "user usable", when one looks at Cold War Soviet ships there seems to be duplication of the same systems, I wonder if that was a maintainability issue.
Oh...and one more thing lol. Been meaning to ask this for a long time. Your notional battleship. You spec'd it with 4 twin 6" mounts, and 2 single 5" guns. Can you explain the rationale there? It seems akin to the days before dual purpose secondaries, and was wondering about the value of having two different yet nearly identical guns aboard.
ReplyDelete"4 twin 6" mounts, and 2 single 5" guns."
DeleteYeah, that's a debatable point. My thought was that the 6" mounts offer a significant improvement over 5" and would constitute a good land bombardment capability when 16" wasn't required. The 5" would be for anti-ship, anti-smaller boat, miscellaneous type work.
This is one of those things that I could be persuaded to standardize on one or the other if I had access to detailed information on explosive effects of the two calibers and it showed that they were similar enough.
There's a reason why WWII cruisers had 6" guns rather than 5".
When I get in a naval discussion IRL I like to mention that the US Navy actually has many more carriers than the elevenish we 'have'.
ReplyDeleteI count the Japanese helicopter/carriers like the Izumo class as effectively ours. Since General Atomics is offering to convert the Izumo class to have catapults ete. Could you comment on this subject?
"US Navy actually has many more carriers than the elevenish we 'have'.
DeleteI count the Japanese helicopter/carriers like the Izumo class as effectively ours."
There are two levels of answer to this:
1. The Izumo and those like it are helo carriers that can, potentially, operate a handful of F-35B/Harrier type aircraft, perhaps 12-20 or so. Just from a numbers perspective, 12-20 more aircraft are of very little use especially when they are of limited range and payload as STOVL aircraft are. Operationally and tactically, 12-20 more aircraft don't add much and come at the cost of having to protect the ship with more escorts and more aircraft. In essence, they barely have enough aircraft to maintain an effective CAP/defense for themselves and have nothing left for offense.
2. Operational control is an even larger issue. Japan is a home water defense force, by constitutional decree. So, they are of no use to the US in any but a Chinese war and there is no guarantee that they would join in a Chinese war although I suspect they would. Further, they would likely be completely tied up defending their own territory and would be unable to join any US naval operation and if they did join, see 1. above.
So, no, I don't see allied helo carriers as usefully augmenting US carrier forces. Do you see it differently? If so, you'll have to explain how 12-20 aircraft will make a significant difference.
I Japan's case I can see them as a training (stepping) up to larger QEII type carriers in future with fixed wimg aviation capabilities a very real possibility
Delete"carriers in future with fixed wimg aviation capabilities a very real possibility"
DeleteGiven Japan's constitutional home water defense limit, does a fixed wing carrier really help Japan? They have lots of land bases. What does a fixed wing carrier with 20 or so aircraft get them?
Interesting question as for the constitution can be changed and if history is any judge people change remember that in WW I Japan was allied with The Colonial British and France in the years following allegiance changed through various treaties,political,governments to what we ended up with for WW II not saying it will happen just that its certainly a possibility
Delete"Japan was allied with The Colonial British and France"
DeleteI'm not an expert on culture and political relations of that period but my impression is that while Japan may have been allied at that point, they were never allies in any true sense. Japan always viewed the West as outsiders and barbarians. Any temporary alliance was just that: a temporary expediency. They never shared any common beliefs.
It's kind of like being allied with Russia in WWII. We were allies only because of a temporary common enemy. Russia never shared any culture, values, or beliefs with the rest of the allies.
Has anyone heard about the Huntington Ingalls submission for ffgx at all? And with this Navsecs comments about a 355 ship navy does anyone think they will stop at just 20 of them
ReplyDeleteThanks again for your blog! I always appreciate your thoughtful and challenging analysis, as well as a place to bounce around ideas.
ReplyDeleteLately, I have been considering our assumptions about carrier air defense, and specifically, detection assets. I can’t help but think there needs to be a serious shift in the resources required to protect a carrier from air attack because of stealth aircraft.
Traditionally, our carrier defense plans have assumed one slow and long-loitering airborne aircraft (the E-2) will ensure a minimum 250 mile buffer of detection for the carrier group. Four per carrier ensured you could have one airborne at all times. It was also assumed these aircraft would be difficult to destroy since they could see the enemy coming from so far away.
Because of the development of legitimate stealth platforms by adversaries (and super-long range AAW missiles), shouldn’t we reassess our basic assumptions about enemy detection? Without the (E-2), and with the number of fighters we have on carriers, what is the range we can expect to detect stealth aircraft approaching the carrier? 100 miles? (gulp) 50 miles?
When I do that, it paints a really ugly picture of our ability to defend carriers with our current air wings and suggests we need to drastically rethink our force structure.
Thoughts?
There is a bright spot here. The E-2D uses a UHF-band radar. Fighter-sized stealth aircraft are not usually optimized for UHF-band stealth. So we may still detection enemy stealth fighters at useful ranges.
Delete"I have been considering our assumptions about carrier air defense,"
DeleteYou raise several good questions. The short answer is, yes, we absolutely need to rethink our carrier defense concept.
We gave up the very long range interceptor (F-14/Phoenix) and we need to regain that. We may need to 'break' our E-2s into multiple, somewhat less individually capable sensor platforms. We absolutely need to augment the E-2 with cheap, expendable UAVs to form a (100 mile?) layer in the defense. We need many more escort ships - true destroyers, not Burkes.
This also raises the issue of excessive cost as it relates to risk aversion and expendability. Instead of $15B+ Fords, we need the lesser, less expensive carriers I've been calling for (Midway/Forrestal size and cost) so that we can lose some without crippling the war effort.
What measures do you think we need?
"So we may still detection enemy stealth fighters at useful ranges. "
DeleteA vital question that we have no answer for.
" Instead of $15B+ Fords, we need the lesser, less expensive carriers I've been calling for (Midway/Forrestal size and cost) so that we can lose some without crippling the war effort."
DeleteMy only response is to ask exactly how losing a Ford would cripple a war effort. I mean, we lose catapults and arresting gear and weapons lifts that don't work, and we have surviving sailors available for other ships, plus any airplanes that were able to land somewhere else. I don't see that as a great loss.
You know that I agree with you about cheaper carriers, and am willing to go even cheaper than you are, but I think that's the conversation to be had. There is a presentation on YouTube, by the guy who headed up the Ford planning team, about some of the decisions they made. First, they appear to have assumed that the new technologies would all work, without considering the teething difficulties. Second, their comparative analyses were all made comparing one Ford to one Nimitz or one Forrestal, without considering that for the cost of one Ford they could have almost two Nimitzes or maybe 3 Forrestals.
I agree with everything you suggested, especially escort/picket ships. Ironically, I think the advancement of stealth mostly serves to cancel out the advancement in radar. If that is true, WW3 carrier battles might look an awful lot like WW2.
DeleteThe other thing I think that could be very helpful is the development of a carrier-based “pocket” fighter. It would be an absolute knife-fighter, optimized by EM theory like the F-16 or F-5. It has to be small, so small that when you fold the wings you can fit two in the same deck space as one F-35 or F-18 with folded wings. It would keep weight down by only carrying two AMRAAM missiles and 2-4 sidewinders. It would have the smallest possible radar to detect aircraft out to 75 miles (though stealth aircraft would be less than this).
This would allow you to keep a larger CAP airborne and maximize the points of detection. It also allows your detection assets to put their attacker at risk as well as gives them a fighting chance to dodge incoming missiles.
"This would allow you to keep a larger CAP airborne and maximize the points of detection."
DeleteIf all you want the carrier to do is defend itself (the self-licking ice cream cone) then yes. However, the carrier exists to exert influence far from itself - as in, several hundred miles away. You need a very long range aircraft for that. Small, close in, defensive fighters don't really support the carrier's reason for existence.
That is not ALL I want it to do, but at current I am not sure it can even do that. I am not suggesting this become the only aircraft on carriers, just that it take the place of some larger multi-role aircraft. This is why it is so essential to take up less deck space. Otherwise, every defensive fighter you add removes an aircraft trying to carry out the offensive capability of the carrier.
DeleteA couple of thoughts. As has been bounced around for a long time, it's sound doctrine that anything that radiates, dies. Rapidly. This has been an absolute top priority development path in long-range high-speed air to air missiles.
Delete"Goodbye Poseidon and Hawkeye" as has been mentioned.
There is a lot of development effort being put into UHF/VHF radars for fighter-sized aircraft. If you take a look at the capabilities section of this link, its definitely food for thought.
https://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2009-06.html
"Tikhomirov NIIP in Moscow are developing an L-band AESA radar system intended for embedding in the leading edges of fighter wings. A demonstrator of the L-band AESA subsystem was publicly displayed at MAKS2009.
This paper analyses the operational potential of this design, and performs a range of performance estimates based on manufacturer disclosures and known design features.
The design has clear potential to provide a genuine “shared multi-function aperture” with applications including:
Search, track and missile mid-course guidance against low signature aircraft.
Identification Friend Foe / Secondary Surveillance Radar.
Passive angle tracking and geolocation of JTIDS/MIDS/Link-16 emitters at long ranges.
Passive angle tracking and geolocation of L-band AEW&C/AWACS and surface based search radars at long ranges.
Passive angle tracking and geolocation of hostile (i.e. Western) IFF and SSR transponders at long ranges.
High power active jamming of JTIDS/MIDS/Link-16 emitters.
High power active jamming of satellite navigation receivers over large areas.
High power active jamming of L-band AEW&C/AWACS and surface based search radars at long ranges.
High power active jamming of guided munition command datalinks over large areas.
Performance modelling for a range of feasible configurations indicates the radar will deliver tactically credible search range performance.
The Tikhomirov NIIP L-band AESA is an important strategic development, and a technology which, once fully matured and deployed in useful numbers, will render narrowband stealth designs like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and some UAVs, highly vulnerable to Flanker variants equipped with such radars."
That's interesting George. It does seem more like a hope than a reality. Any update on the status of the development?
Delete"will render narrowband stealth designs like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and some UAVs, highly vulnerable to Flanker variants equipped with such radars."
DeleteStealth was always destined to be a relatively short term military advantage, lasting only as long as took to develop detection capabilities. Where does that leave us? It leaves us with traditional force considerations such as sufficient numbers (quantity has a quality all its own), firepower, payloads, adaptable electronic support (EA-18G Growlers), etc. In other words, all the things our military has abandoned and that China is emphasizing.
"Stealth was always destined to be a relatively short term military advantage, lasting only as long as took to develop detection capabilities."
DeleteIt has taken 30 years and counting right? I continue to hear how stealth is a party trick at best, but where is the proof? Why have China and Russia worked so hard to develop similar aircraft? Why are countries continuing to buy additional F-35s when alternatives exist?
"Why have China and Russia worked so hard to develop similar aircraft?"
DeleteBecause it works! The point was not that stealth didn't work but that it was not going to be a permanent advantage. It's value is fading as we speak due to developments in radar, IRST, etc. However, stealth has now become the minimum entry requirement to the modern battlefield. It may no longer convey an advantage but it is now the standard, minimum requirement because without it, an asset has a very short life expectancy on the battlefield.
"Why are countries continuing to buy additional F-35s when alternatives exist?"
Because, if you believe the manufacturer and US military's claims, the value of the F-35 lies not in its stealth but in its sensor fusion - its ability to 'quarterback' and direct and enhance the abilities of other aircraft. I'm extremely dubious about those claims but that's what other countries are hearing and why they're buying.
My understanding is that its partially deployed in the fleet. The wing slat antennas have a limited view vertically, so you have to steer the aircraft to look up and down when you get close to a target.
DeleteI also believe it uses the same processors as the main radar, and L-band is mainly a secondary search radar. This makes a lot of sense.
It was just a matter of time for stealth to become less important.
"Because, if you believe the manufacturer and US military's claims, the value of the F-35 lies not in its stealth but in its sensor fusion - its ability to 'quarterback' and direct and enhance the abilities of other aircraft. I'm extremely dubious about those claims but that's what other countries are hearing and why they're buying."
DeleteIf you look at the claims for the L-band radar, one of the more interesting is the claimed ability to jam "High power active jamming of JTIDS/MIDS/Link-16 emitters.
High power active jamming of satellite navigation receivers over large areas."
I don't necessarily believe it without some proof, but its not unthinkable technically.
"Tikhomirov NIIP in Moscow are developing an L-band AESA radar system "
DeleteFascinating article of which I managed to follow only the most basic aspects! I noted, however, that the estimated detection ranges were 40-70 nm for a 1 sq.m. target. For the 0.1-0.01 type of RCS claimed for stealth aircraft, the calculated detection ranges fall to 3-15 nm or so which is not really tactically useful. By then, you're already dead.
So, while this is fascinating, it does not yet appear to be the ultimate stealth killer.
Am I misinterpreting this?
"the claims for the L-band radar"
DeleteThe list of claims was impressively broad! I would remind us of two things:
1. Claims never pan out.
2. Russia always makes grandiose claims.
Combining 1. and 2., one would have to conclude that the claims are heavy on wishful thinking/fantasy and light on potential reality.
Ha Ha. Everybody makes grandiose claims. The US Navy is perhaps even worse than the Ruskies in recent times.
DeleteSome of the stuff being discussed is logical. Engineering a successful solution is of course another story, so I am definitely a skeptic. That isn't a synonym for ostrich though.
The other thing to watch is that RCS is not a constant as you vary the frequency. The RCS to a MK I eyeball is the visual image of the plane. In IR its similar to the visual image of the plane. Its only in S/X band that the RCS has been "tuned" to be nearly invisible.
When you get down to UHF/VHF that tuned advantage is gone on a smaller aircraft. Once you have a wavelength longer than the reflective surface, the impact of stealth is minimized.
Could you repost your L-band link please, it didn't come through.
http://www.deagel.com/Sensor-Systems/Byelka_a002797001.aspx
On a B-2 OTOH you still retain a virtually invisible RCS because the reflecting surfaces are so long.
I've heard of the "street fighter" ship concept. What is your opinion of the concept and do you see any ships that exist today that fill that role?
ReplyDeleteThe concept has two major weaknesses:
Delete1. Limited sensor range
2. Short range/endurance
There are ships that fill the role but they're not US ships. The Chinese Type 22 somewhat fills that role, for example.
The actual sea fighter was designed for 4000@20 same as a frigate. Same with HSV-2 Swift. The EPF underperforms design making 4018@23 unloaded. Per the last SAR report LCS-2 is good for 6040@14. LCS are getting their stores updated for 21 days with the added crew. I wish they'd repos the interface control doc as it outlines some of the sensor performance needed also. Yes LCS-1 range and the modules are a problem, but fast ferry designs do seem to have the range covered when compared to other ships of the same displacement.
Delete"The actual sea fighter was designed for "
DeleteThe comment/question was about streetfighter. Sea Fighter was a completely different Navy program. Streetfighter was the precursor/alternative to the LCS and was envisioned to be a much smaller vessel than the LCS and would operate in squadrons/swarms in the coastal combat role.
Same origin. https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2004.02.18-Littoral-Combat-Ship.pdf
DeleteAt a quick glance, I see no mention of Sea Fighter in that reference.
DeleteSomething that I have played with on other sites is design your own fleet. You have $X to play with and maximize the fleet with that. Because there are disputes as to what various ships actually cost, maybe assign nominal cost values to each, IE Ford carrier $15B, Nimitz carrier $9B, SSBN $9B, and so forth.
ReplyDeleteI don't do that because the budget aspect is unrealistic. For example, in my vision, the shipbuilding budget is not the $18B the Navy has but, rather, the $18B plus all the savings from all the other things I'd change. So, designing a fleet based on the Navy's actual budget is pointless, for me.
DeleteCDR Chip said, "Something that I have played with on other sites is design your own fleet."
DeleteWhat other sites?
"I don't do that because the budget aspect is unrealistic."
DeleteUnderstand. We've had this conversation before, in several other contexts.
"What other sites?"
There used to be a couple. The first was a warship cost site, and had a rather lengthy list of blog posts responding, some with some very interesting ideas. There was another one that had a number of Excel spreadsheets with different fleet configursations, some of which I still have. But they don't seem to be around any more. That's one reason why I thought of it.
Actually I just found one of them.
Deletehttps://newwars.wordpress.com/build-your-own-navy/
Don't know where the other one is.
That site does not appear to have had any action in 5 years, and the cost data for their model are a bit out of line. For example, they show the cost of a Ford at $9 billion, whereas that is closer to the cost of a new Nimitz, and Fords are probably more like $15 billion. But as I said, it hasn't been updated in a while.
DeleteI had another question regarding Anti ship missiles. I am under the impression that much of the expense of ASMs is in the systems that allow the missile to satisfy tight rules of engagement and to not randomly hit the wrong ship. The Atlantic Conveyer for example. This seems suitable for peace but surely in a peer war larger numbers of cheaper less intelligent missiles have greater potential for killing enemy ships. I do not mean dumb missiles, just not aim point selection and high resolution imaging sensors for example. Is this valid or have modern countermeasures truly made less sophisticated missiles useless?
ReplyDeleteSeveral aspects to this. Discriminating sensors allow certain ships to be selected. For example, you wouldn't want to waste a volley of ASM on a cargo ship or corvette. So, sensor sophistication is good in that sense. On the other hand, a hit anywhere on a modern, weakly built warship is pretty serious and there's no real need to try to pinpoint the exact impact point (which won't happen in combat anyway!). So, yes, there is a very good argument for cheap and plentiful.
DeleteCNO, love this blog. I feel like I've really learned a lot by frequenting this site.
ReplyDeleteI strongly agree in having tough, armored modern ships with 8" and bigger guns.
I'd like to see them deployed in battle groups, screened by new Tico's built on Cleveland hulls and new Perry type frigates for ASW.
I'd like to throw one of my crazy ideas out there to be looked at, and critiqued.
I'd like those 'surface battle groups' to have some more capability, some longer ranged eyes and strike abilities. To accomplish this I'd like to build a small flat-top out of a Des Moines (or maybe a little bigger) hull. It would need to be armored and have plenty of CIWS as it would be accompanying the battle group in 'harm's way'.
The primary role would be fulfilled by some kind of drone with a search radar, partially taking the role of the E2 (but of course with much reduced capability compared to the manned Hawkeye). As they wouldn't have a crew they would be somewhat expendable and I'd like to have 5-6 of them available (assuming losses).
I'd also like to put on board 10-12 strike drones. Something like a stealthy version of the X-47B. If my extensive wikipedia research (haha) is correct it should be capable of being designed to carry 4 HARM/Maverick, 2 Harpoon, or one MK48 type torpedo.
To minimize the impact of jamming, they wouldn't be controlled from the ship but would have pre-programmed missions. These would either be to fly to a spot and launch missiles (like at a bridge or other known and fixed object), or to be put on a loiter mission like hanging off the coast with HARM missiles and waiting for a radar to get turned on or loitering at an area in the ocean waiting for a target of opportunity.
This would give the surface group some added capabilities.
I might consider ASW helicopters and/or S3 Viking ASW assets, but that might get into too much mission creep.
What do you think, is this just too crazy?
"small flat-top out of a Des Moines ... some kind of drone"
DeleteWe've often discussed a UAV carrier which, I think, is what you're describing. Nothing wrong with that idea.
"stealthy version of the X-47B."
The problem with a long range, penetrating, stealthy strike aircraft is that it's hideously expensive. It would be a longer range, more stealthy F-35 and we know how expensive that is. The unmanned aspect doesn't save any money to speak of.
I don't believe that a small handful of F-35s can accomplish anything significant in combat and could not survive 'loitering' off an enemy's coast. That being the case, an unmanned aircraft couldn't accomplish much or survive, either.
In a modern combat scenario, even stealth aircraft are going to need electronic warfare assistance (EA-18G Growlers) and tanking. A small UAV carrier would have neither of those.
I'm all for a UAV carrier to operate small-mid size, cheap, surveillance UAVs but trying to add a few strike UAVs is not likely to be productive. Consider that when we struck the Syrian airfield a while back, in a limited fashion, we still used around 70 Tomahawks. With that in mind, what can a 10-12 UAVs with some Mavericks or Harpoons accomplish? Even in the anti-ship role, 20-24 Harpoons is not an effective strike against Aegis level defenses (which is what China now has). It would be effective against an isolated ship or merchant ships but now you're into very limited uses for a pretty expensive capability.
What do you think?
Is anyone aware of any research or data to better understand the survivability of single engine turboprop planes verse modern AAW missiles? I have often wondered if their superior maneuverability to jets could make up for their lack of speed in air combat.
ReplyDeleteYour thinking on the cost of the drone aircraft and the utility of the numbers makes a lot of sense.
ReplyDeleteI wonder if it's worth having a dedicated ship for drones? Maybe.
What do you think of the drone version of an airborne radar?
Valuable, or valueless?
"What do you think of the drone version of an airborne radar?"
DeleteCheck the archives. I've written a few posts on small, cheap UAV sensor drones. If you're talking about replacing, say, an E-2 Hawkeye with an unmanned UAV, that can't happen because the E-2 does so much more than just act as a sensor.
I have another idea while we're having open-mic night.
ReplyDeleteI would love the idea of the updated Des Moines heavy cruiser. I would also like to update the actual Iowa class ships, since we already exist. But I would rotate them through reduced peace-time deployments so as to not wear them out.
To fill the gap I'd be interested in building something like an Alaska class battle cruiser. My friends at wikipedia (where I stumbled across this ship) say that it had some design flaws, but since we'd be building new ones those problems could be ironed out.
I'd be interested in putting 16" guns on it, but I question if the structure of the ship could handle that size. The originals had 12" guns, which would be a nice size but would also complicate logistics as I'd now have 8", 12", and 16" barrels and munitions. Maybe that would be OK.
The layout would be similar to that of the Des Moines cruiser. A pair of three-tun turrets, one fore and one aft. At least 96 VLS, two double 5" turrets on the center-line of the ship (one fore and one aft of the superstructure. Two fixed-panel TRS-4D radars in armored enclosures. Four SeaRam CIWS, eight Phalanx CIWS, and a Goalkeeper CIWS on both the bow and stern.
Are you willing to buy these for your fleet?
Apologies, I almost forgot to mention that the Alaska class had 5"-9" of belt armor and 4" of deck armor and had a top end speed of 33 knots.
DeleteOK, last question (before you file a restraining order).
ReplyDeleteIf you were suddenly the Sec of the Navy, would you be able to build your fleet that you have listed in the fleet structure within reasonable budget constraints?
How long do you think it would take to get the fleet to look like that one?
" would you be able to build your fleet that you have listed in the fleet structure within reasonable budget constraints?"
DeleteOf course! However, I'd have much more money to use than the current budget because I'd be doing other things, as well, that would save enormous amounts of money. I've discussed those things at length but to ever so briefly refresh: eliminate 200 Admirals and staffs, terminate the F-35, missions over deployments, end all 'sensitivity' training, eliminate gender integration, halt early ship retirements, eliminate concurrency, etc. That would give me twice the current budget!
It would take a decade before the new fleet would begin to look the one I want.
Good day, CNO! Avid reader here from Philippines. Just hypothetical... If you are to lead PN with a limited budget of $30B, what would be your choices of equipment and corresponding number of units to conduct assymetric warfare against a superpower? Thanks!
ReplyDeleteWelcome! Philippines cannot, by itself, fight China so there's no point trying to build a navy for that purpose. What Philippines should do is align itself with the US and slot into US military capabilities.
DeleteWith that in mind, Philippines should be structuring to confront Chinese peacetime incursions. This means a strong patrol vessel navy with vessels built for confrontation: strong hulls (collisions), guns, reasonable speed, decent endurance, short range missiles (Hellfire type), and SeaRAM/CIWS. The navy should also build several diesel subs. Nothing gives an enemy pause like a submarine threat. Finally, a robust mine inventory and minelayers to enable Philippines to seal off contested waters from Chinese incursion, if necessary.
What's your thoughts? What would you build?
CNO: indeed, RP cannot fight China by itself but needs to align with US. And, mind you, majority here are pro-US and Anti-China. And considering that China has lots of warships for its disposal, I can only think of something assymetrical or guerilla type of warfare can check Chinese expansion: a few of AWD frigates (3x Huitfeldt type), 6x Jose Rizal Class (HDF-2600), 12x Fassmer OPV-86 (German coast guard version with ASW capability), 24x Hanjin's PKG-A 63m FMAC for ASUW, 48x Israel Shipyard's Spike NLOS carrying Shaldag Mk5, and the same number of XSMG's XSR-19 composite craft with Thales sonar and LMM for units with offensive punches. To address mine threats, I would include 12x SwiftShips' 35-meter coastal minehunters. Meanwhile, to prosecute ASW, I would like to have Kaman's SH-2G Seasprites and 6x Airbus CN-295 Persuaders. I believe these units, along with various support vessels, can be procured affordably, and can face China effectively with smart admiralship.
DeleteNone of the south east asian nations are going to align with the US while foreign policy is in such a mess due to the current commander in chief. US is increasingly seen as an unreliable allied.
Delete"commander in chief."
DeleteThis is not a political blog.
Semi-serious answer: how much mine-laying capability can you buy with thirty billion dollars? Do that.
Delete"how much mine-laying capability can you buy with thirty billion dollars?"
DeleteVery much. Mine-laying is just a subspect of mine warfare. Thailand, Vietnam and India showed that mine warfare is affordably possible.
Hi,
ReplyDeletemaybe you can help me out here with something that's been bugging me. You see, i can't for the life of me figure out how on earth a carrier equipped solely with F35's as combat aircraft can operate effectively as an offensive force in a war against a (near) peer.
The aircraft are the main offensive weapon of the carrier. If you can't use those to strike at the enemy when and where you need to, there's not much point to the carrier is there?
And from what I know about the F35, it seems to me it is very easy for an opponent to neutralise (which does NOT mean shoot them down or anything like that) their offensive capability.
On a carrier equipped only with F35's as combat aircraft, they'll also need to provide fighter cover for the carrier battle group. And there's the rub. An F35 used for CAP or to scare off/intercept enemy aircraft can't be used for offensive missions. Not for another two weeks or so. That at least how long it takes for them to be ready for the next flight. Even if they manage to cut this in half (how likely is that btw?), that still means it's a week before it is usable again.
With about 48 F35's on a carrier and 4 F35's on CAP per day, you run out of F35's after 12 days. At that point the first four are still a couple of days away from being ready again. If (big if btw) they can achieve a standard turn around of one week, that still means that with a CAP of 4 F35's per day, you'll have to dedicate 28 of your aircraft to CAP's leaving just 20 for other missions.
That begs several questions, is four aircraft per day as CAP enough? I don't know what the normal procedures are but I doubt that's enough for 24 hour per day cover.
And all of this is assuming a minimal CAP without any actual enemy interference. What happens when the enemy starts harassing the fleet with aircraft or drones that stay out of SAM range? Can you afford not to send additional fighters after them? No you can't as they may be relaying targeting information for long ranged anti ship missiles (be they based on land, ship, or other aircraft). So what happens when you're still trying to get close enough to the shore to launch your strike but every couple of hours new drones/aircraft appear, bearing on you from different compass headings, and your CAP can't handle them on their own? You'll be forced to spend dozens of F35's on missions per day, just to drive away those handful of harassing drones and spotters.
So doesn't that mean that all you'd need to do to neutralise the carrier's offensive strike capability is to force them to spend all of their F35's on intercepts, making each of them unavailable for strikes for the next two weeks?
Even if you score not a single hit on a US ship or even against a F35, you can still achieve a mission kill for the carrier this way.
And by the time the F35's are deployable again, the war might already be lost.
Maybe it's just me, but isn't it utterly insane to rely on an aircraft with a turn around time of two weeks for air defence missions?
R.
Where did you get the two weeks from? The requirements are to be able to fly multiple stories per day per aircraft.
DeleteRequirement does not equal actual capability.
DeleteF35A's are widely reported as needing about two weeks of maintenance between missions. If that's any different for the naval versions, it'll be news to me. In fact, I'm not sure any current US combat jet can fly multiple missions per day, at least not consistently.
R.
F-35s reportedly need about 50 maintenance hours per flying hour. Obviously not two weeks after a 90 minute mission, but that's still quite a bit of work.
DeleteIt would be interesting to see how the service work breaks down. Is it evenly distributed per mission, or is it small amounts per mission then a major downtime after say ten missions?
A reference for maintenance hours needed can be found here:
Deletehttps://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/5/179243/navair-projects-f_35-to-need-50-maintenance-hours-per-flight-hour.html
"F-35s reportedly need about 50 maintenance hours per flying hour."
DeleteThe link you gave talks about requested maintenance hours for the cumulative F35 fleet world wide per year. It simply divides that total by the expected flight hours per F35 per year (250 hours) to reach that number of 50 hours of maintenance.
These are not actual maintenance requirements but projected numbers for the future. Those projections would be based on the F35 project's declared maintenance needs for the aircraft (which if I remember correctly were rather optimistic) and based on projected (not actual) capabilities of aircraft and supporting systems (such as ALIS).
The aircraft in question would be flying in peace time conditions under (near) perfect conditions most of the time.
It also assumes the planes fly 250 hours per year. The abysmal availability numbers of the aircraft overt those same years cast doubt over that.
There are a lot of assumptions behind the 50 man-hour maintenance per flight hour in that article. It also leaves out the issue of spare parts and their availability (and how often spare parts are needed).
Still, even with 50 man-hours per flight hour it's huge. If you send 30 F35's on a strike and each spends 4 hours in the air that's a cumulative 1500 hours of maintenance needed.
The term man-hours also implies you can shorten it by assigning more men to the task which isn't the case. There is a maximum number of people that can work at an aircraft at a given time and some tasks simply need to run their course. It doesn't address the question of how much time the aircraft needs.
R.
Whoa! Let's back the maintenance truck up a bit. I'm not a fan of the F-35 but it's clearly demonstrated that it can fly multiple sorties in a short time frame when needed. This has been demonstrated in Red Flag exercises and the like. As with any other aircraft, that sustained sortie rate can't be maintained indefinitely but it certainly can in the short term.
DeleteYou've become mired in a distorted numerical vision that doesn't match reality. Here's a hypothetical example: If an aircraft flies 200 hours per year and once a year an engine has to be overhauled and it takes 1000 man-hours to do, the numerical average is 5 man-hours per flight hour but that all came in one shot. The rest of the time, the aircraft didn't need any maintenance (hypothetical, not real). Even then, we swap out a new engine while we work on the old and the maintenance hours become divorced from flight hours.
The point is that the simplistic maintenance numbers are not a match to the reality of what is required to turn an aircraft around for the next sortie. Yes, there are some tasks that must be performed but it's hardly two weeks worth of maintenance.
The maintenance hours requirement which was used to derive the 50 hour per flight hour number is based not on maintenance hours but on SUPPORT hours which include all kinds of non-flight maintenance work. From the supplied link, here's a list of the SUPPORT work included in the figure:
Delete"design, development and systems upgrade; system certification; technical support; pre-positioned technical support; supply support; systems engineering; systems development support, systems test and evaluations; software support; operational software development and maintenance support; test support software development and maintenance; production engineering support; overhaul and restoration program support; program management support; and quality assurance and system safety."
Very little of that is direct flight maintenance support. In fact, the linked article references DIRECT flight maintenance hours as opposed to support hours.
You don't understand maintenance. An f35 lands . On average 10 maintenance crew have the f35 back flying in five hours which equals 50 hours. In reality it is less than that, as shown by ComNavOps as it includes all sorts of support that is not carried out on the carrier.
DeleteScenario: China attacks Taiwan. The U.S. honors our commitments and declares war on China. The Phillipines declares neutrality.
ReplyDeleteQuestion: Regarding the islands that the Phillipines claim, but China currently occupies. If the Phillipines turns a blind eye, aren't they violating neutrality by allowing belligerent troops on their territory? If the U.S. picks off those islands, then what? Why give them to the parties that sat out the war? Do we say China actually did have the claim and just keep them? Do we force neutral countries to "make business or get off the pot"?
I would like to see us roll those islands up and have the Allied claimants garrison them. Thoughts?
The Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetsov has caught fire while under repair.
ReplyDeletehttps://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/12/europe/russian-carrier-fire-intl/index.html
I'm surprised they are trying to repair it after it was damaged in the dry dock sinking. I suspect the fire was intentionally set to collect the insurance money!
DeleteIt's a matter of national pride, they must have a carrier like any proper superpower does.
DeleteOf course, said carrier has zero actual usefulness in war, but hey.
Plus, who would be willing to insure the poor Kuz?
How about redesigning the USMC.
ReplyDeletehttps://warontherocks.com/2019/12/notes-on-designing-the-marine-corps-of-the-future/
I've addressed this, at least in the form of cautionary questions. I'll address it further as specifics about Berger's plans become available. I have to say, though, that I am not a supporter, at the moment. His vision is badly flawed.
DeleteThe Long range fire support mission could be addressed by building a ship based around the Rheinmetal 155 L52 gun . This gun is already being used with the pzh 2000. The gun could be navalised and automated to be placed on a frigate sized ship. It provides accurate fire to 40-60km. As there is already plentiful ammunition for this gun including guided ammunition there is no need to recreate a costly system as they did with the zumwalt. I would keep the ships simple with three guns; two forward, one aft in turrets, a close in weapons system and sea ram, with a fire control radar.
ReplyDeleteThe standard shell for the 155mm is 43 kg. with a range of 40km as compared to the 127mm mk45 which fires 32kg to 24km.
Nothing wrong with that idea, however, navalizing a gun is more of a challenge than most people realize and it has rarely been successfully accomplished. The Germans tried to do it somewhat recently with one of their guns (the name escapes me, at the moment) and failed.
DeleteMONARC
Deletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MONARC
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNGER_61-52_MONARC.php
Newer version of the gun.
DeleteArtillery Gun Module (AGM)
https://www.kmweg.com/home/artillery/autonomous-howitzer/agm/product-information.html
I'd like to see a post that attempts to aggregate the problems facing the navy's ability to fight a peer war and to look for root causes.
ReplyDeleteI think the root cause is actually industrial policy over many generations.
DeleteThis has resulted in decimation of US industrial capacity.
The creation of monopolies in the defence sector, resulting in extremely poor value for money.
Lastly human issues. That is the promotion of flashy shallow presenters with high emotional intelligence at the expense of logical, critical thinkers whom actually make a difference. As a result; poor decisions lead to expensive mistakes with no accountability as the leadership are clones of each other.
How about that one.
The problems are what this blog is all about. The root cause is incompetent leadership, again, as thoroughly documented in this blog. The Navy has all the money and resources it needs. What it hasn't got is competent leadership. It really is that simple.
DeleteThe quality of the "human material" in US armed forces (not just the Navy) has plummeted in the latest decades, that is the core problem.
DeleteFix that, and you'll fix everything else fairly easily.
Of course, I can't see how that can be accomplished by democratic means.
I get that the whole blog is focused on the issue, but I'm essentially getting at the need for a summary. Something like that could be used to reach a broader audience, perhaps with policymakers.
DeleteI also want to dig into what's behind the leadership incompetence. What's the mixture of true incompetence, misaligned incentives, and actual corruption? How much of each from congress vs. Navy brass?
DeleteTo be fair, there are also underlying economic forces that have led to too few shipyards and military contractors in general. What can be done about this?
"I also want to dig into what's behind the leadership incompetence."
DeleteBill Gates (Microsoft) summed up the leadership issue quite nicely. He said, "A's hire A's, B's hire C's."
After WWII, we had all A's. Our leaders were combat experienced and proven and they knew what a combat organization needed. Inevitably, lesser quality people, the B's, got promoted and those people, in turn, promoted even lesser quality people, the C's. Now, we have nothing but C's. They have no combat experience and, worse, are too incompetent to realize that they're incompetent. The proof is in all the issues I've documented in these pages.
I don't think corruption is a major factor although it's certainly present to some degree. I think the major factor/problem is pure, unadulterated incompetence. That incompetence is what leads to poor policies, poor acquisition decisions, poor organizational structure, etc.
Congress is at fault only to the extent that they have failed to exercise more oversight than they have. They are not professional warriors and have to depend on the recommendations of our Admirals and Generals and those professional warriors have betrayed (through incompetence) their trust.
While the US has, indeed, created a poor situation regarding shipbuilding, the lack of shipyards is not the problem. The Navy is not complaining that they have money and want to build more ships but that industry can't handle the workload. Instead, the shipyards have shrunk as the Navy's workload has shrunk - not the other way around. The Navy's requested new construction is on the order of around 8 ships per year. Industry has shrunk to match that low demand.
"The quality of the "human material" in US armed forces (not just the Navy) has plummeted in the latest decades, that is the core problem."
DeleteNo, the core problem is that our leadership has gone along with the idea that the armed forces are a social organization rather than a combat organization.
I agree that the quality of recruits has declined in concert with society's decline - it could not be otherwise. However, had the military held firm, those recruits could have been torn down and rebuilt into high quality soldiers (that's what boot camp has traditionally done). Instead, our military leadership opted to get along and go along with the pressure to implement gender equity, sensitivity, and the myriad other idiotic and useless non-combat activities. We've dumbed down basic training to female levels, lowered physical fitness standards, taken away drill instructor's ability to demand performance, accepted altered appearance standards, and on and on. It's no wonder our soldiers and sailors are not the quality they once were. Witness the deplorable incident of the seizure of our Riverine boats by Iran. Our sailors did nothing to resist and some broke down crying.
Personally, I think ComNav should write a book based off this blog...
ReplyDelete"I agree that the quality of recruits has declined in concert with society's decline"
ReplyDeleteSociety has been decline for as long as people have able to write about it or have had bards.
I not sure a see the Iran incidence as a result of the decline of society or recruits. They were it would appear not well trained, and part of a fairly murky political mission. We are enforcing sanctions on a couple different fronts but have no particular political appetite to escalate. Also I see the navy managed to disciple several officers and crew but I have to wonder if the USN has really bothered to spend on training and maintenance for the type of ship it hates and one that was likely woefully undreamed for its mission. After all if the USN can't be bothered to train its small boat operators so they don't accidentally kill their passengers what makes you think it ever tried to train or maintain riverine craft? In any case what would have had them do - shoot - to what end? I take it you would say Marchand should have opened fire on Kitchener to prove French manhood (thus getting his command obliterated and starting a war that was not really part of the plan).
I would agree the Navy needs to a better job of training and maintaining the stuff and people it has put that is hardly a new issue. Your team A was rather poorly ready to face a proxy war in Korea, and it still had a man who should have been before a court-martial back in WW2 as a commander.
The Iran small boat incident is probably a downfall based in multiple issues... societal attitude and decline, lack of training, clear ROE, etc.
DeleteBut clearly, regardless of what side of a map line it occured on, no vessel flying a US flag should have been "taken", and could have been prevented. So while I wouldnt want to see loss of life, warning shots, agressive maneuvering, following orders, etc are all things that should of happened as a precursor to a firefight, which if it couldnt have been avoided, should have happened. There was no Navy or national pride that day, and clearly any warriors present were either disobeyed or dormant. So while we celebrate that no lives were lost, this incident is a stain on the US, its Navys honor, and the Naval communitys training and personnel. I feel that multiple court-martials should have resulted. To think that those junior sailors will someday be responsible for bigger decisions is disturbing at best...
"But clearly, regardless of what side of a map line it occured on, no vessel flying a US flag should have been "taken""
DeleteInteresting point. Why exactly? If they did in fact drift into somebodies territorial waters are you suggesting the US has some additional unilateral rights? They were small craft the kind that drifts into the expendable category in a war. Are we the British now to enforces impressment or anti slavery (or a modern version) as we see fit. That is tricky now since we very much don't want China do to the same. So we cant really claim impunity in one sea and demand rule following elsewhere. Let's remember also a fairly murky not much of threat led to the chain of events that saw a US ship blow away a civilian airliner in the very same sea.
Also got to say don't like the term warrior. Warriors are not soldiers or sailors. The latter fight or do not fight for their country as ordered, warriors fight for themselves. Hector may have lost to Achilles but he was the better man any day. Achilles was a warrior (practically the trope) but how many of his own men did he kill?
"If they did in fact drift into somebodies territorial waters are you suggesting the US has some additional unilateral rights?"
DeleteNo, the US has the same rights as every other country that observes the UNCLOS. Foreign warships have the right of Innocent Passage. The US riverine boats were conducting Innocent Passage, albeit unintentionally, and were, therefore, immune to being stopped, boarded, and seized. I really get tired of repeating this. Go back and read UNCLOS and the various posts on the subject.
If an Iranian warship entered our waters off New York, we'd have absolutely no right to stop, board, and seize them. We could sail alongside as they made passage, if we wished, but we could not interfere as long as they obeyed the requirements laid out in UNCLOS.
We can pass through Chinese territorial waters under Innocent Passage and there's nothing they can do about it because we have the right to do so. China and Russia have both passed through US territorial waters off Alaska, by the way, and we didn't sink them, board them, or seize them. We simply observed and did nothing as required by UNCLOS.
I'm tired of repeating this.
Add The US clearly was not following the UNCLOS rules during Ivy bells. Maybe the Russians missed her surfaced and flying a flag while she tapped Russian communications.
DeleteHave you done any research, at all, on this subject? It would appear not since you failed to note that UNCLOS was not in effect during the time period of the program you cite. UNCLOS took effect in 1994.
DeleteAnd you since than US subs have always adhered to article 20. That was a sort of joke, but whatever.
DeleteIn any case Article 19 remains and looks easy enough to enforce of suspicion of intent.
My point was a general one, and it being that those small boat crews should Have been in "repel boarders" mode. There was no reason to meekly allow it!! From my rough recollection, at least initially they werent outgunned, and warning shots, maneuvering etc could have disuaded the Iranians. Orders were disobeyed which contributed to the capture!! I use the warrior term to mean someone willing to fight, or be aggressive enough to deter an escalation. And thats a quality clearly lacked that day...!!! CNO has covered the legalities of the issue repeatedly. But in my mind, one functional boat should have done whatever necessary to protect the broken one, and avoid its capture, as well as its own. And if shots needed to be fired so be it. I dont think we should be hypocritical in our application of international law, treaties, etc... But if "repelling boarders" at sea creates an international incident or complaint by Iran, and keeps egg off our face, then frankly I could care less!!!
Delete"I dont think we should be hypocritical in our application of international law"
DeleteHypocritical? Absolutely not. We should demand the same rights that every other country gets. Russia and China have conducted Innocent Passage through our territorial waters off Alaska. We should conduct Innocent Passage through Chinese territorial waters. Iran has the right to pass through our territorial waters off Virginia without being stopped, boarded, or seized. We should expect and demand, under penalty of force, the same right to pass through Iranian waters.
Hypocritical? No! We should not be above international law but neither should we be below it.
" suspicion of intent. "
DeleteYou're completely wrong about Innocent Passage and Iran was completely wrong. The US had every right to conduct a passage through Iranian territorial waters. Learn something and move on. I will not allow any more incorrect statements.
Stepping away from the above. Not sure how this plays but seems the Pentagon and Lockheed can't decide who owns IP
ReplyDeletehttps://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/f-35-stealth-fighter-might-have-another-problem-103142
When we are down to just one provider of military equipment not sure if the private industry model works as well as it does in econ 101/2 theory anymore.
In the years between the world wars, the navy and congress were fed up with bid manipulation by the civilian shipyards like New York Ship and Newport News and moved started moving new construction into navy yards, starting with cruisers.
DeleteAlso interesting
ReplyDeleteSo who failed to navigate/drive(sail?)?
https://news.usni.org/2019/12/06/navy-coast-guard-officials-investigating-alaska-small-boat-collision
By relation going to have to root for the home team and think special ops USN types were not paying attention.
Am I the only one that cant wait for Mondays when CNO puts up a new post?!?
ReplyDeleteNo pressure, right?
DeleteBy the way, I don't have a set schedule although, yes, I do tend to release posts on Mon. Originally, when I started this blog, I had a 'set' of material that I wanted to disseminate and I figured I'd be done in one year, maybe two. But, as it turns out, new topics seem to just leap out at me on a non-stop basis. Who knew?
Just wanted to post it, I'm always looking forward to them!
DeleteA post on the Iver Huitfeldt class frigates since everyone seems to want to build a ship based upon it. The type 31e (arrowhead 140) being the UK version.
ReplyDeleteI'd love to do a post but the problem is that I have no access to any information that isn't already well documented in Wiki. I have nothing to add.
DeleteAs with all ships, the evaluation of its worth depends entirely on its intended use and, again, I have no idea what its intended use is.
Is there some aspect about the ship that strikes you as being noteworthy?
The Iver Huitfeldt is almost a baby Burke and it appears that it will be used for anti Air with some capability for anti surface and anti submarine warfare.
DeleteThe Arrohead 140 appears to be designed with coastal patrol in mind. Basic radar with self defense missiles, 57 mm gun, four boat bays and a Helicopter hanger.
The cost is the most noteworthy aspect of the Arrowhead 140 variant of the ship(~$350 million). You could buy almost two Arrowhead 140 ships for the price of a Legend class cutter. The cost of the Iver Huitfeldt is difficult to know with precision.
The Arrowhead 140 compares favorably to both the Legend class and Heritage class cutters for the Coast Guard and has design margin to carry vertically launched weapons if called on to do so.
I could see a need for the Coast Guard cutters being pressed into military duty and it would be nice to have a ship that was designed from the start to be more heavily armed.
How about a post about the potential for diesel-electric submarines for the US Navy.
ReplyDeleteI propose something like 9 on the US east coast and Gulf, 9 on the west coast/Hawaii, 4 at Okinawa, 6 at Subic Bay, 4 at Cam Rahn Bay, 4 out of Singapore and 6 working between Diego Garcia and Bahrain.
All with hardened sub shelters accessible without surfacing.
That should put some pressure on the Chinese.
What would these do? I'm not arguing or disagreeing, just trying to understand your thinking on this. For instance, 9 SSKs on the US east coast - to do what?
DeleteOthers scattered around the Pacific and Middle East - again, to do what?
If you have a clear concept of operations and these subs are needed at those locations then great. If it's just a vague desire for SSKs then we need to work on why and how they can actually help.
Let me know what you're thinking.
Well thay don't make a lot of sense out of the USA. You have to really harden US owned facilities Guam and Diego Garcia as fall backs. Second if you want to forward base you need to really solidly line up US security arrangements with Japan and the rest. If its China you are looking to deter or fight you need to confident Japan is not going to do a Turkey on you up to the point of shooting at least.
DeleteIf you could sustain a hi tempo rate of deployment in large numbers. Then it would be useful in terms of China facing a large sub war even in some supper surprise attack aimed a goal before the US could respond and consolidate it force s and work through China area defenses. Subs would neutralize the whole ballistic missile threat. It would force China to spend on a whole new area of defense. And given thay seem to slowing their claims/production about CVs that might be useful.
"Bahrain"
Presumably this means intimidating Iran?
I would think just really investing in a real multi faceted air/missile defense for our bases with gulf 'friends' combined with missiles and planes would be better than dragging the navy into the gulf too much.
One obvious role for a force of SSKs would be the current role that Japan foresees for her Soryu class subs - interdiction and control of the approaches through the first island chain.
DeleteA fleet of SSKs based out of Guam, Japan, possibly the Phillipines and Singapore would theoretically be able to stifle all shipping to and from Chinese ports. Bear in mind that China is heavily reliant on sea borne imports for the majority of her industrial needs.
In addition, such a force could deter any Chinese forays beyond the first island chain. The subs would act as a stopper to contain China within the South China, East China and Yellow Seas.
"interdiction and control of the approaches through the first island chain."
DeleteYes, that would be an appropriate use of SSKs. I note, however, that of the possible bases you list, only Guam and maybe Japan would be available to us in the event of war. Singapore would almost certainly opt to remain neutral thus denying us basing rights in war. The Philippines will not be giving the US basing rights in any foreseeable future. Japan, while possible available as a base, might be too close to China and too subject to attack to be a useful base. This is our problem in the Pacific - we simply have no good basing options.
It's an interesting problem.
DeleteAustralian is building a class of SSKs with massive range so they can base out of Aus and interdict into the South/East China Seas but the issue is that it comes with an inflated price tag - at that point it takes away from one of the main advantages of SSKs (their theoretical cheapness).
Another answer would be to build properly hardened and fortified sub bases in Guam or Japan.
If war with China is a serious possibility, then the US should prepare for it by hardening their bases and potentially building new bases in islands like the Marshal chain.
Do you think the territorial disagreements between China and the Phillipines could be leveraged for basing? It seems to me that in the event of a US/China confrontation, wed need the Phillipines. While looking at basing for the notional middle boat squadrons, Japan and Guam had multiple drawbacks, but the Phillipines were a happy medium. Maybe itd be a case of having to throw money at them??
Delete"Maybe itd be a case of having to throw money at them??"
DeleteAt the moment, Philippines leader is not disposed towards the US. Until he's replaced, nothing can happen regarding basing. In fact, he's more likely to offer basing rights to China!
Thanks for your response.
DeleteMy thoughts on these diesel-electrics are that they would be a good way to put a survivable presence into the South China Sea.
This would give the US the opportunity to start contesting for that area, as we seem to not be doing that very well right now.
It would also afford the US the vehicle with which to start building relationships with some of the countries that we want to ally with to encircle China.
The use of diesel-electrics would be to take some of the pressure off of the blue-water attack subs, and we would be using subs that are presumably very quiet and effective.
The numbers are a bit arbitrary because, frankly, when it comes to patrolling with submarines I don't know what it takes to be effective.
The subs on the coasts of the US would be to defend our ports and home waters.
Basically what I'm thinking is to replace nuclear attack subs with diesel-electric types whenever the patrolling areas are somewhat 'local'.
"This would give the US the opportunity to start contesting for that area, as we seem to not be doing that very well right now."
DeleteAgain, doing what? Contesting how? What, specifically, can a sub (SSK) do to contest the S China Sea?
"The subs on the coasts of the US would be to defend our ports and home waters."
I'm good with that. The US has gotten used to thinking that our ports are out of reach of enemies and that's no longer true. China has a small but growing fleet of SSNs that can reach the US.
When I was thinking of contesting for the South China Sea, I just kind of assumed that their presence would be something that the Chinese would need to be aware of and try and counter.
DeleteThis would make them focus there, instead of being able to expend all their resources on power projection.
"I just kind of assumed that their presence would be something that the Chinese would need to be aware of and try and counter."
DeleteWhy? They know won't actually take any action. If we didn't take action when China forced down our EP-3 and seized it or when they seized our UUV drong or when the Iranians seized our riverine boats and crews, why would the Chinese feel they have to worry about some SSKs roaming around?
We send carrier groups and Burkes through the South China Sea regularly and the Chinese don't seem to have slowed their power projection efforts noticeably. Why would a few more SSKs make any difference?
Presumably (I hope!) we have SSNs patrolling the South China Sea now. Why would a few more SSKs make any difference?
I'm sorry, it sounds like I'm jumping on you and that's not my intent at all. I just want you to clearly understand what some SSKs could AND COULD NOT accomplish before you call for them. Too many people call for various weapon systems in isolation without considering what, if anything, they can actually accomplish. You're a good reader/commenter and I want you to clearly think this through. If you can come up with a specific task that the SSKs can do that would actually have some beneficial impact on the China situation then I'm all for it. If you would, think about it a bit more and let me know what your thoughts are.
Does anybody mind reading - http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.com/2019/10/royal-navy-strikes-back.html
ReplyDeleteIt is an interesting view of the UK RN and it's new carriers.
The relevance to the USofA becomes apparent.
I don't mind links as long as you offer some analysis to go with it. So, what's your take on the article?
DeleteAnd no, the relevance to the US is not readily apparent! Feel free to explain where/how you see the relevance.
My general reaction to the article is that it is a flag-waving, unrealistic look at UK's naval aspirations. It ignores the capabilities of the UK's carriers as they relate to the realities of combat (no AEW, no EW support, no tankers, too few aircraft, insufficient escorts, etc.).
So, give me your analysis, good or bad.
The RN built what they could given their funding constraints. It's a shame they didn't get the extra pounds to do cats and traps--although with gas/electric drive, there's no steam so the cats would have to be EMALS, and we know what a disaster that is. They might be better off with a ski-jump.
DeleteThey have recognized the AEW problem (they do have the Falklands in their experience locker) and have addressed it at least partly with Merlin Crowsnest helos. They don't have the EW support, although we keep being told that the F-35s somehow magically can do it themselves and don't need it. They don't really have a solution to the tanker problem, and the resulting limited combat radius. Too few aircraft and escorts are obvious financial constraints.
Would they have been better off to build one, make it CATOBAR (or at least STOBAR), and spend the savings to provide a proper air wing and escorts? Quite possibly.
But I think the implication for the US is this. We have one ally (France) and no potential opponents with nuclear CATOBAR carriers. We own that space for the near future. We do have a number of allies (UK, Italy, Spain, possibly India) with conventional STOVL or STOBAR carriers. We may want or need to develop a CONOPS for employing those carriers alongside our big carriers in future operations against a common enemy, kind of like how we used CVLs/CVEs in WWII. That wasn't as big a consideration when we had a 600-ship navy, but with our numbers down to where they are now, the only way we get anywhere near 600 ships is by counting our allies.
I know ComNavOps doesn't like my idea about converting LHAs/LHDs to "Lightning Carriers," but one of my thoughts (aside from the fact that they are basically useless for conducting amphibious assaults) is that we could us them to develop strategies and tactics that would be useful operating with allied STOVL carriers like HMS QE/PW or the Italian Cavour or Spanish Juan Carlos, or even Japanese Hyuga or Aussie Canberra.
We simply are not going to spend the bucks to build a navy that can police the world. We need help, and that means allies. Like it or not, there just isn't another way to do it. So if that's what they're going to build, then we need to figure out if we can use them, and how.
Correction: I think it is actually the Izumos, not the smaller Hyugas, that the Japanese are looking to operate F-35B's off.
Delete"the implication for the US is this. We have one ally (France) and no potential opponents with nuclear CATOBAR carriers. We own that space for the near future."
DeleteI keep hearing variations on this theme - that we have full fledged carriers and none of our enemies do so aren't we great and don't we have the advantage. The reality is that completely misses the operational point. China, for example, doesn't need carriers for any of their near to medium term ambitions. Taiwan, Vietnam, the Malaysian area, Philippines, etc. are all well within reach of land based air. In a war with the US, China will sit behind the first island chain and be happy to duke it out with us since they have the resources of an entire country (nearly continent) to draw on. A carrier is just about the last thing they need.
So, comparing our carriers to theirs ignores the operational needs of the two countries. We have simply got to stop thinking in these one-versus-one pieces of equipment mode. We have to think operationally. What does China want to accomplish and what do they need to do it? Carriers are not on their list.
The carrier capability they're trying to build is for the distant future when they've seized the first island chain and want to move on the second and seize Pearl Harbor, Midway, etc. along with Africa.
"They have recognized the AEW problem (they do have the Falklands in their experience locker) and have addressed it at least partly with Merlin Crowsnest helos."
DeleteI know you said 'partly' but do you recognize just how limited the Crowsnest approach is? Consider the size of the E-2 Hawkeye radar and the size of the aircraft and the number of operators in the aircraft. Do you really think a small, bolt on radar on the side of a helo even begins to approach an E-2 radar capability? Further, the E-2 is not just a target detection radar like Crowsnest but a complete aerial battle management system which requires several highly trained operators. I could go on detailing the differences but I'll stop there. Crowsnest is not even remotely comparable and is NOT an effective carrier E-2 Hawkeye type AEW/battle management system.
Again, I know you said 'partly' but I keep hearing people talk about this as if its equivalent to an E-2. I'm sorry for the UK readers because it will upset them but their carrier is not an effective combat asset in a high end war because their air wing is not an effective combat instrument.
I keep hearing how big carriers like Ford and Nimitz are none survivable or in serious danger from a few different publications and readers so the solution is "generally" to go smaller....so with no AEW, no EW, no tankers, fewer escorts,etc...the smaller carriers are now more survivable? I have to admit, I'm dubious a smaller carrier is survivable in a peer or near peer war. Now, if we are talking Somalia or Yemen scenario, sure, small carrier is probably better and cheaper...
Delete"dubious a smaller carrier is survivable in a peer or near peer war."
DeleteThe issue is not survivability. That's a red herring. No ship is survivable if hit with enough weapons. The issue is combat effectiveness. What can it accomplish before it's sunk.
The USS Hornet of WWII wasn't survivable, in that it was sunk. However, it was effective while it was afloat.
Combat effectiveness is a function of the air wing and escorts. Today's shrunken, short-legged, small payload air wings are less combat effective than ever before which is why it's mandatory that carriers operate in groups of 4.
Anyone who suggests that smaller carriers with even smaller air wings are somehow more survivable or more combat effective is just ignorant of the realities. The only thing a smaller carrier has going for it is that it costs less to replace it on a like for like basis.
Escort carriers filled an important role in WW2. Their main roles were ASW and CAP. They freed up the fleet carriers for offensive action during amphib assaults by providing CAP over the amphibious shipping and some limited CAS. They did sterling service escorting convoys.
DeleteThe same could also be true for the smaller carriers operated by allied countries in a future war.
Are they goign to be able to operate as fleet carriers, in a AsuW role? No, not likely. But there's other roles they can fill.
"Again, I know you said 'partly' but I keep hearing people talk about this as if its equivalent to an E-2."
DeleteWell, I have no illusions that a Crowsnest is anything remotely approaching an E-2. That's why I said partly.
And the QE and PW are very much less capable than a Nimitz. Would they have been better served to have built one big carrier with cats and traps and a proper air wing? Arguably so, but that isn't what they built. They're going to have to make do with what they have, and given the professionalism of the RN officers and sailors, I expect them to get the most out of what they have.
And given our future navy shipbuilding plans, I expect that we are going to have to rely on them to fill in some of our gaps. If we operate together, obviously we have E-2 and tanker assets that can help them out. But we need to develop a CONOPS, figure out roles, and train and practice executing the plans. They might turn out to be next to useless, or they might be able to provide some significant assistance.
"The same could also be true for the smaller carriers operated by allied countries in a future war."
DeleteQuite right! The problem is that those are very expensive ships to act as escort carriers. A true, purpose built escort carrier would be much more austere and much cheaper. But, hey, if another country wants to donate a very expensive carrier to escort duty, that's fine.
"...the Malaysian area, Philippines, etc. are all well within reach of land based air."
Delete@ComNavOps: Not exactly. Even if they were staging out of the Woody and Paracels airbases, their Flankers have barely enough fuel to make it to Malaysia or Singapore, let alone the Phillipines - the distance just doesn't work in their favor. Bombers and MPA could possibly reach us - assuming Woody and Paracels can support bombers - but those are easy pickings for fighters.
The way I see it, if China wants to flex on Malaysia, they're going to need a serious carrier (more likely 3, for the 1:1:1 deployed/workup/refit ratio). Even a USN-style 44-48 fighter air wing will concentrate more fighters locally than RMAF can put up. Optimistically, best case, we can throw up 25 fighters - 18 Su-30MKM Flankers and 7 F/A-18D Hornets - for the entire country, which just goes to show how badly run our military is.
Let's say this for the US. For all the inefficiency and idiocy of the US procurement system, you've never had the President literally embezzle the DoD budget to line his bank accounts like our previous Prime Minister did.
"Quite right! The problem is that those are very expensive ships to act as escort carriers. A true, purpose built escort carrier would be much more austere and much cheaper. But, hey, if another country wants to donate a very expensive carrier to escort duty, that's fine."
DeleteThat's true, but convoys are extremely important. I could absolutely see the RN using their carriers in that role. They could also form the centre of hunter killer groups to preform ASW.
Additionally they could act as supplemental carriers within Fleet groups to provide additional CAP - which is something escort carriers did throughout WW2. An additional force of F-35Bs in the CAP role can't hurt - it would free up some of the F/A-18s for strike roles for example.
Another function would be providing additional CAP and CAS for an amphibious assault - again a primary role of escort carriers in WW2.
Of course, you're right that they are very expensive escort carriers. But they exist, and there are plenty of useful roles they could fill - fleet carrier isn't one of them of course.
As an aside, it would be interesting to think about what a modern, cheap escort carrier might look like.
Might be worth a post in the future.
What role would they fill (as above, likely they would serve as ASW, escort duty, CAP, some CAS etc.)
Commercial design like most WW2 escort carriers?
What aircraft? SVTOL etc?
"The problem is that those are very expensive ships to act as escort carriers."
DeleteRight now they are very cheap, in fact free, because they already exist. Of course, the politics involved in getting those other countries to give them up might not be so cheap, but that's a different issue. You don't go to war with the military you want, you go with the military you have, and right now they are what an allied navy has. I'm not sure they can achieve maximum effectiveness in ASW without S-3s, but then again the whole Navy is now operating without S-3s.
This is a big part of my thinking about turning the LHAs/LHDs into light carriers. We have them, we've spent a bunch of money on them (but that's sunk costs), and they aren't really useful as amphibs because there's no viable CONOPS for using them as such. Are they as good as a Nimitz? No (but right now neither is a Ford, and for a whole lot more money). They can haul certain airplanes around, and operate them, in moderate numbers. If you got rid of the well deck and troop spaces, they could haul a few more. That's all. But that's more than nothing. And right now they have no viable way to conduct an effective amphibious assault.
"We" are all part of whatever we put together - be it NATO or other coalition.
DeleteEach of us cannot all aspire to the same, as such we provide what is within our means and contribute accordingly. What the piece did say was that we endeavour to provide something (tangible), and that sometimes having what might be effectively described as a sea-control ship is useful in it's own right even if only to release other assets. The UK could never provide a worthwhile CV/CVN all of the time (how useful is the French carrier when in dock?)
The UK experience in the Falklands showed that an E2 type platform is NEEDED. At what point do you decline to deploy because you do not have what is needed? Just about every commander in history would have walked away.
One final point, there was a comment (I didn't keep a reference unfortunately) that the CV HMS Ark Royal could not have flown F4s or Gannets for significant periods because of the sea states in the Falklands campaign. At no point were the Harriers incapable of flying because of sea states. It would be interesting if there was some data about ships of the QE or USN CVN size being able to fly aircraft conventional aircraft in the North (or South) Atlantic.
Thank you all for bothering to comment.
Also, I did consider - what if we had built three Cavour sized vessels with a more air orientation?
DeleteWell, the QE class were designed in part for a significant sortie rate,perhaps more than two Cavour. As such there ought to be situations where this is applicable (I hope so).
For example, it would be dull to deploy a USN CVN close(ish) to shore to support a landing (I appreciate your attitude to contested landings, the UK agreed during the Falklands). A QE might be considered more useful to provide closer support with the CVN behind covering (it is reasonable to consider a QE more expendable in the grand scheme).
"USN CVN close(ish) to shore to support a landing"
DeleteFleet carriers do not directly support landings. Their job is to interdict threat axes hundreds of miles away from the landing site. In WWII, escort carriers provided the direct ground support and modern US Navy doctrine calls for LHA/LHD to provide the ground support. Tying a CVN to a static location is how you lose carriers.
A QE could reasonably provide ground support but, again, that's an incredibly expensive version of a very basic ground support requirement.
"QE class were designed in part for a significant sortie rate"
It is very difficult to imagine a scenario in which sortie rate is important. Carriers simply don't fight that way. We've covered this in posts. The only scenario I can evenly vaguely imagine where sortie rate might be important is a low end, limited engagement (probably 'peacetime') where some light infantry were in trouble and needed support. Of course, if you've got light infantry engaged to the point of needing aerial support, you've already screwed up big time since light infantry, by definition, are not capable of significant combat on their own. Sortie rate is a useless red herring.
@ComNavOps:
DeleteI'm of the opinion that sortie rate in the USN is a holdover from Vietnam-era influence. Recall all the time US carriers spent at Yankee Station, launching strikes into North Vietnam - they were able to remain on station until running out of ammo because the North Vietnamese didn't have any ability to threaten US carriers.
You may be right that sortie rate might not be as relevant in peer war for carriers - Andy Pico's writeup of the NORPAC 82 experience certainly suggests that quite strongly - but it may possibly be more relevant for land-based air, since airbases, unlike carriers, don't move. Reportedly the Israelis put a premium on turnaround time and sortie rate. But that's an Air Force problem, not a Navy problem.
Yankee Station carriers never ran out of ammo. They were replenished at sea every three days. MK-82 500lb bombs.
Delete"I'm not sure they can achieve maximum effectiveness in ASW without S-3s"
DeleteIn an ASW role,they would host primarily helos, with just enough F-35s to preform a CAP role.
@Ocean: I recall Forrestal returning to Guam to stock up on weapons, which lead to the flight deck fire, but I'm willing to accept that might have been an extremis case.
Delete"I recall Forrestal returning to Guam to stock up on weapons, which lead to the flight deck fire"
DeleteForrestal's bombs were restocked at sea, on Yankee Station, by USS Diamond Head the day before the conflagration. Over a dozen of the bombs were 1000 lb bombs that were old and had been improperly stored resulting in the bombs becoming unstable. A shortage of conventional bombs led to them being used despite being visually identifiable as unsafe.
Huh, so it was. Must have conflated that with a different thing I'd read. I stand corrected.
DeleteCNO, start running a Twitter page you will reach a far larger audience, seriously.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately, that's one suggestion I have to decline. I want no part of Twitter, Facebook, or any similar platform. Too many issues for too little gain. Good suggestion but, sorry!
DeleteThe other problem with Twitter is that it's impossible to get into an issue in any depth.
DeleteYou don't have to tweet to use twitter.
DeleteAll you can do is post a link to a blog post and reaching a bigger audience there are many naval pages on twitter with interesting things like this ones for example
https://twitter.com/RussianSubmarin
https://twitter.com/CovertShores
I've said this before, but going to a forum platform offers wider discussion possibilities than merely the blog's comment pages. What other sites will do is that the content goes up into the blogpost, a link to the post's discusssion thread in the forums is left below, and the comment section on the blog is locked down. It has the benefit of keeping the posting neat and tidy, and containing discussion and any other flaming to a seperate venue. A forum also has more robust moderation tools for the owner, beyond manually deleting posts - depending on your forum software, threadbans, subforum bans and total forum bans are tools at one's disposal.
ReplyDeleteMy current dream- Indy Class LCS upgunned with another 16-32 NSM on the flight deck, and another 3-5 SeaRam for defence. Then send them out in groups. They'll become longer range missile boats. Just sail them close to any fleets and unleash the fury. You can tell from my words that I'm largely dreaming, but this is the sort of thing I believe an bare LCS can equipped with. Flight deck might need some reinforcing.
ReplyDeleteAndrew
My dream is to watch them ho away just Go Away
Delete"Just sail them close to any fleets and unleash the fury."
DeleteThat's inspiring. Of course, you realize that if the LCS is in range of the enemy then the enemy is in range of the LCS. It works both ways. Since the LCS has very limited defensive capability, few would survive an engagement.
This illustrates the naval maxim (paraphrased!) that the winner is the side the launches effectively first. This, in turn, illustrates the immense importance of sensors and targeting.
Now, consider that your LCS-missile boat is 418 ft long. The purpose built Chinese missile boat, the Type 022, is 139 ft long and looks to be quite stealthy. Which side is going to see the other first, do you think?
Hi CNO,
DeleteYes, it's best used as a first strike. As for defense, that's why I wanted several more SeaRam installed, since it's relatively easier than trying to have Mk41 cells installed.
But if they can, somehow , act as missile trucks, that'd be a thing of beauty to see.
Andrew
Andrew
A post about the use of bombers in naval warfare. Would there be any use to emulate Russian tactics with a naval version of the B-21 Raider and stealth cruise missiles in a naval conflict with China? At $550 million per plane it is less expensive than a Littoral Combat ship.
ReplyDeleteAirforce is working on LRASM integration with B-52s. It's potentially a future possibility - bombers staging out of Guam or Changi or Kadena acting as an additional threat vector.
Delete