This is the companion piece
to the previous LCS incompetence post (see, “More [Unbelievable] LCS Incompetence”). We discussed the blatant
incompetence being demonstrated by Navy leadership and noted that professional
warriors should already know what they have, what they need, what’s out there,
and so on, without the need for endless study groups. So, what’s wrong with our professional
warriors? The answer is simple. We don’t have any professional naval
warriors. Here’s the reason …
Lately, the Navy has been
dithering over many issues. Do we need
an LCS? Should we have a frigate? If so, what type? What kind of over-the-horizon (OTH) missile
do we need? What kind of radar should an
LCS “frigate” have? Do we need F-35Cs or
Advanced Super Hornets? Should an
anti-ship missile be supersonic or subsonic?
Should the America class LHA have a well deck or not?
What kind of uniform should sailors wear? What size fleet do we need? Should we retire the Ticonderoga class? Is
distributed lethality a good idea? And
so on.
The Navy’s response to all
these questions has been to form myriad study groups, committees,
Admiral-chaired panels, and the like.
All have the common attribute of delaying critical decisions. These systematic delays reflect Navy leadership’s
chronic inability to make decisions. For
example, the Navy just announced yet another delay, this time in the LCS
“frigate” program.
“The Navy has slowed its frigate procurement
timeline, looking at awarding a detail design and construction contract in
Fiscal Year 2020 to allow more time to understand what it needs the ship to do
and how it might affordably meet those requirements.” (1)
Another example of the
inability to make decisions is the apparently constantly changing
specifications for the OTH missile program (2).
Wouldn’t you think that a
professional warrior would understand their craft well enough to be able to
make timely and correct decisions without needing to resort to endless study
groups of various types?
Consider another type of
professional – a professional athlete.
The professional athlete practices his craft all day, every day. The practice takes the form of film study of himself
and opponents, physical skills practice, general physical training, scrimmaging
(practice contests), and games against other athletes. This regimen ensures that the professional
athlete is the master of his craft. If
you ask the athlete about a new item of sports apparel or a new
bat/ball/glove/whatever, he can tell you instantly whether it is any good
because he thoroughly understands what is required and he has tried out every
conceivable variation over the course of his career. He has no need to conduct endless studies
prior to answering.
Should not the professional
warrior be the same? Should not the
professional warrior be able to define the characteristics of a new
missile? Should not the professional be
able to evaluate a new doctrine or tactic without endless study? Should not a professional warrior have
developed an innate understanding of what characteristics make a good ship or
aircraft? Should not the professional
warrior thoroughly understand the relationship between tactics and technology?
And yet, our professional
warriors seem incapable of making such decisions. Why is that?
Well, the answer is simple –
our warriors are not professional. In
fact, they are the farthest thing from it – bordering on amateur.
Recall what we just said a
professional does with his life – he studies his craft all day, every day, and
practices it daily. Now, what do our
naval leaders do with their days? They
attend seminars on sensitivity, diversity, leadership, alcohol and substance
abuse, ethics, gender respect, sexual assault, etc. They process endless amounts of paperwork,
mostly useless. They strive to achieve
ecologically friendly “green” initiatives.
They attempt to increase retention rates. They host visitors and provide tours. They perform humanitarian missions. They build schools. They frantically cross deck equipment for
meaningless inspections.
How is any of that building
up their warrior capabilities?
What they should be doing is
conducting daily operational and tactical wargaming, conducting daily live
tactical drills, engaging in frequent live wargames, studying friendly and
enemy ship and weapon designs, conducting simulations of weapon performances,
exercising live fire weapon system drills, etc.
If they did that, they’d know exactly what works and what doesn’t, what
weapon system characteristics are desirable and what aren’t, what tactics work
and what don’t, and what our gaps and needs are. There would be no need for endless and
unproductive study groups and delayed decisions.
Every day we see the end
result of the lack of warrior focus.
Clearly, the sailors who allowed a vastly inferior Iranian “force” to
capture them and seize their boats had not trained to be warriors. The Captain of the Aegis cruiser that allowed
an unknown and unresponsive fishing boat to ram it was not ready as a
warrior. The entire Navy leadership that
keeps flip-flopping over the LCS direction are clearly not professional
warriors. And so on.
Do you recall my post
calling for a dual path of Administrators and Warriors (see, "Promoting Warriors")? Now you begin to understand the need for it.
We need professional naval
warriors and we currently don’t have any.
We’d better start developing them or we're going to wind up with more LCS's, more Zumwalts, more Fords, and more F-35's and nobody but the Navy wants that!
__________________________________
(1)USNI News website, “Navy
Slowing Frigate Procurement To Allow Careful Requirements Talks; Contract Award
Set for FY2020”, Megan Eckstein, 3-May-2017 ,
(2)Defense News website,
“Boeing Pulls Harpoon From US Navy Missile Competition”, Christopher Cavas, 2-May-2017 ,
The war on Terror and fall of the Soviet Union hasn't helped.
ReplyDeleteAnyone who dares say we need a peer fleet is accused of "cold war thinking" and ignoring "modern threats" like piracy and terrorism.
The LCS was an obvious "hey we can do low intensity conflicts too" with its patrol boat armament and shallow draft. And anyone who dared say "Russia is still a potential threat" is dismissed as "cold war mentality".
But the Cold War fleet with its "out date thinking" was also a better fleet for dealing with all the things the Navy now says we may or may not need the LCS, Etc for with including terrorism and piracy.
Terrorists blew up the embassy in Lebanon and then had to face being attacked by 16" battleship guns and Tomahawks From the Iowa class. Cold warriors sent F-14 tomcats to intercept a hijacked airliner over Egypt. The 1980's air attack on Libya in retaliation for the Lockerbie bombing was the first step in getting Libya out of supporting terrorism..."Modern thinking" now has Libya supporting ISIL.
Perrys were straight up ASW but were also fine for anti-piracy duties and can carry a helo full of Seals just fine. The Stark survived two Excocet missiles, and the Sam B. Roberts survived a mine that should have sunk her (great crew). Compare that to the LCS which the Navy didn't even ask to be survivable.
The Burkes the Navy cant stop building are the result of Cold War thinking.
Present thinking lets gunboats get captured by Iranian gunboats. Cold Warriors in 1988 were attacked by Iranian gunboat Jushan and responded by sinking said Iranian gunboat with missles and gunfire from now early retired Perry class vessels. Not bad for a ship meant for ASW.
The current admirals need to sit down, shut up, and take notes from those outdated thinking cold warriors.
PS...what are they teaching at Annapolis anyway? I can maybe excuse this current thinking form some NROTC candidate from some politically correct college that wont teach anything of real history, but what about the Academy? Are they teaching the same anti-warrior thinking? It's a genuine question, not a criticism.
USNA is far worse than most big name universities.
Delete"USNA is far worse than most big name universities."
DeleteWhat are you basing that on? I'm neither agreeing nor disagreeing. This site is based on facts. What is your source for that statement?
Cold Warriors would have never let a USN boat out of range of immediate NGS or air support in the Persian Gulf.
DeleteBig picture I think the major failing was at the end of the Cold War. Instead of maintaining (and expanding) existing capabilities and shrinking the overall size of the Navy to meet needs, we just started effectively writing off capabilities (MCM & NGS for example) as unnecessary.
Adding to the problem is the revolving door for people leaving military service and going directly into 6-figure jobs in the defense industry to sell new junk to the services because we "need" it. Sadly that is a problem across the board with the government currently, not just the military & defense industry.
The 1988 action wasnt an isolated incident , but Operation praying Mantis, the largest major US navy single action since WW2.
DeleteIt was clearly a planned and excuted using major fleet units, not just a couple of harbour defence launches ( not thats an excuse|)
1 aircraft carrier,
1 amphibious transport dock
4 destroyers
1 guided missile cruiser
3 frigates
Spot on CNO!
ReplyDeleteFor your reading pleasure: http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/military/sd-me-navy-witties-20170515-story.html
ReplyDeleteSeems like a good step towards what you have been advocating
It seems this very same way of thinking is also installed on NATO navies accross Europe. Wargaming, Warfighting training is being replaced by seminars on gender equality and prevention on occupational hazards... We need a conventional war (one we can win and survive, something like the Falklands) so we start focusing again on what a Navy and its officers and crews are supposed to provide: the ability to control the sea by winning naval battles.
ReplyDelete