Berger's Amphibious Ships

Marine Commandant Gen. Berger has all but stated that the Marines are out of the large scale amphibious assault business.  However, he has also stated that he sees a future where the Marines will conduct small unit amphibious landings.  Note the use of the term ‘landing’ rather than ‘assault’.  An assault is, by definition, an opposed landing and requires a huge amount of support in the form of ships, aircraft, mine clearance, bombardment, and so on.  A landing, as Berger uses the term, refers to a clandestine penetration of a small amphibious ship to a remote location and the disembarkation of troops and supplies in an unopposed landing.

Setting aside the utterly ridiculous aspects of the Commandant’s vision (see, "Hidden Bases"), let’s focus instead on the amphibious ships (now called Light Amphibious Warship – LAW) that he envisions and has ordered the Navy to procure.  Breaking Defense website gives us the first glimpse at what these ships might look like.(1)

In briefing slides presented to the defense industry last month, the Navy said it plans to begin buying the 200- 400 ft. Light Amphibious Warships  ships in 2023, and it is looking for mature commercial designs that can carry a crew of 30 and travel 3,500 nautical miles. (1)

Hmm …   A 200-400 ft amphibious ship?  That sounds a bit small.  Just for fun, I’ve assembled a silhouette comparison of various amphibious ships set to a common scale so that I can visualize where this 200-400 ft amphibious ship fits in the amphibious world.  For comparison, I’ve represented the 200 ft and the 400 ft ships as just a generic RO/RO ship, scaled appropriately.  Take a look.

Wow!  I thought that amphibious ship sounded small but when you actually see it next to other amphibious ships you instantly realize that we’re talking really small !  At this point you begin to see just how small Commandant Berger’s dispersed units will have to be.  We’re talking not much more than platoon size and with very little accompanying equipment.  Go ahead, take another look at the graphic and really soak in the size differential between real amphibious ships and Berger’s ships.

The Drive website provides a few more specs on what is now being called the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW).(2)  Note that these values are minimum rather than maximum values but, realistically, they’re not going to increase much.

• Transit Speed  14 kts
• Troop Capacity 75

Unloading will, apparently, be by ramp, over the beach, as opposed to landing craft.

All right, let’s consider some of the aspects of this ship and concept that haven’t really been discussed by the Marines or in the press, to date.

Stealth.  In order to have any chance of penetrating into enemy territory and surviving, the ship needs to be stealthy to the maximum extent possible.  This is completely at odds with the Navy’s desire to acquire an existing design since none are sufficiently stealthy.  This concept requires stealth on the order of the Swedish Visby.  How that’s accomplished while still mounting many large cranes, ramps, and deck cargo handling equipment is a mystery.

Speed.  One of the keys to Berger’s concept is the ability to penetrate enemy territory very quickly.  Let’s face it, every minute spent near or in enemy territory is more chance to be spotted.  This dictates speed, speed, and more speed.  Again, this is the antithesis of traditional amphibious ship design and utterly at odds with the 14 kt transit speed specification.  Apparently, the enemy is going to be blind to this vessel so that it can make leisurely 14 kt cruises in and out of enemy controlled waters.  This represents and absolutely amazing  degree of self-delusion about the enemy’s complicity in their own destruction.

Range.  This should be an obvious requirement.  If we’re talking about penetrating into enemy controlled waters we need great endurance and range.  For example, the distance from Guam to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is around 2300 miles or 4600 miles for the round trip.  Considering that the concept is for the small, secret sea control units to be able to quickly relocate, at a moment’s notice, it is obvious that the LAW has to remain with the land unit which requires extended endurance and range.

Obliviousness.  In order for this concept to succeed, the LAW has to remain with the land unit so that it can assist with instant relocations, as we just discussed.  This assumes that the enemy has zero ability to spot a non-stealthy amphibious vessel hanging around islands in enemy controlled territory.  The degree of obliviousness that the enemy must demonstrate for this concept to work is breathtaking.

Self-Defense.  An amphibious vessel sailing on a 14 kt leisure cruise through enemy waters just might have to defend itself (repeatedly) during the course of its cruise.  For example, the leisure cruise from Guam to the Spratly Islands will require 6 days during which it will be subject to detection and attack.  Unless we provide substantial Aegis (Burke) escorts, the likelihood of surviving the trip is nil.  Of course, this creates a vicious circle of logic.  The more escorts, the more likely the group is to be spotted but the fewer the escorts, the less likely the vessel is to survive the slow motion transit.

Since there has been no mention of escorts in this concept, as yet, we’ll assume that the vessel will be self-escorting which suggests a need for substantial self-defense such as ESSM, RAM/SeaRAM, and CIWS.

Conclusion

Even a cursory examination of this concept reveals that it has not been well thought out.  Well, actually, it hasn’t been thought out at all.  As I’ve repeatedly pointed out, the degree of cooperation by the enemy required to make this concept work is staggering and possible only in a world of total fantasy.

Commandant Berger would have us believe that a small, undefended, painfully slow, non-stealthy vessel is going to be able to penetrate deep into enemy waters to land very small units that will exert total maritime dominance for hundreds of miles around – all while totally undetected.  This is not a concept anchored in reality.  I don’t know what wargames the Commandant has been playing that lead him to believe this concept can work but it’s clear that Dungeons and Dragons has a firmer basis in reality than whatever games the Commandant has been playing.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Marine Commandant: Less A Second Land Army, More Light Amphib Ships”, Paul McLeary, 3-Apr-2020,

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/marine-commandant-less-a-second-land-army-more-light-amphib-ships/?_ga=2.202751505.1458028291.1585949453-1757035925.1542652267

(2)The Drive website, “Navy Wants To Buy 30 New Light Amphibious Warships To Support Radical Shift In Marine Ops”, Joseph Trevithick, 5-May-2020,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33299/navy-wants-to-buy-30-new-light-amphibious-warships-to-support-radical-shift-in-marine-ops

Feelings Over Facts

I don’t, generally, like to critically comment on other people’s opinion articles because they have no chance to respond.  Sometimes, however, an article so perfectly illustrates a point that I simply have to do it.  Such an article was just authored by Jerry Hendrix, a well known retired Navy Captain and prolific author of naval commentary.  The opinions presented in his article are so illustrative of what’s wrong with our officer corps – our so-called professional warriors – that I simply have to point them out.  Below is a list of statements lifted from the article (1) along with my observations about what’s wrong with them.

The general theme is that the Captain’s statements are mostly wishful thinking that is entirely unsupported by fact.

The selection of the FREMM design suggests that the U.S. government intends to remain engaged in the world.

This is a completely unsupported statement.  Nothing about the selection implies that US government intends to remain engaged in the world.  For starters, this was a Navy decision, not a US government decision and the choice was based on design criteria, not some nebulous global engagement criteria.  This is just some kind of feelings-based, wishful thinking.

Selecting the FREMM should actually make it easier for other U.S. manufacturers to sell their systems abroad.

Nothing about this selection automatically makes it easier for ‘other US manufacturers’ to sell abroad.  The US systems that were selected for installation on the frigate have already been on the international market for some time and have been installed on other classes of US ships.  Installation of these systems on an additional handful of US ships makes no difference one way or the other.

… by selecting Fincantieri, one of the largest shipbuilders in the world (with shipyards in seven countries), as the builder, the Navy will have the opportunity to benefit from an innovative design.

There has been nothing presented about this design that is innovative.  The ship hull is pretty typical of modern ship designs.  The innovative opportunities come from the equipment and systems that will be installed and they are all existing systems that are considered typical, not innovative.

U.S. shipbuilders will get the opportunity to learn design and construction “best practices” from Europe’s leading shipyards.

The ship is going to be built in the existing Wisconsin shipyard which builds the Freedom class LCS.  The Freedom class LCS construction effort has been a disappointment, to say the least, with excessively long delivery times and notably poor completeness and quality.  Unless Fincantieri opts to build a brand new shipyard with nothing but European standards and practices, there is nothing to be learned.  The shipyard and its ‘practices’ already exist and are in place and have performed poorly.

…by operating a design already in use in several other navies, the U.S. Navy will demonstrate its commitment to true interoperability.

This is utterly ridiculous.  Unless the Navy is going to allow foreign crews to take over and operate US frigates, this program does not in any way, shape, or form represent any interoperability.  In fact, the only resemblance of this frigate to the internationally existing FREMM frigates is the shape of the hull.  Every significant system and piece of equipment on the ship will be US Navy standard, existing systems and equipment.  There is not a thing about this that suggests interoperability.

By purchasing frigates of the FREMM design but equipping them with the latest in U.S. sensors and missiles, the U.S. Navy will maintain its technical standards while operating ships that are similar to those used by its operational partners.

To repeat, the only resemblance of this frigate to the internationally existing FREMM frigates is the shape of the hull.  Every significant system and piece of equipment on the ship will be US Navy standard, existing systems and equipment.  Nothing about it will be ‘similar to those used by its operational partners’.  This is pure marketing spin.

… because the new frigate is expected to cost $850 million or less, which is half the cost of the Navy’s next larger ship, the Arleigh Burke–class destroyer, it will be cheap enough to be purchased in larger numbers.

History suggests, with 100% certainty, that the frigate program will wind up being overbudget and by a significant amount.  This is pure wishful thinking.

… because the new design is smaller than the U.S. Navy’s larger cruisers and destroyers, future frigates will be able to make calls into smaller ports that have gone unvisited in recent years …

Can anyone name a single port that this ship can enter that a Burke could not?  Based on existing FREMM frigate specs, the draft of the frigate will be around 29 ft.  The Burke class draft is 30.5 ft.  How does a difference of 1.5 feet of draft open up new ports?  The FREMM length is 470 ft versus the Burke at 509 ft.  Again, how does that difference open up new ports?  This isn’t even wishful thinking – it’s just made up blather.

Port calls even in the era of COVID-19 remain vital no matter how many (or few) sailors actually depart the vessel.

So, a port call where no one leaves the ship is vital?  There has been zero historical evidence that port calls accomplish anything in the realm of international political relations and, in fact, there is much evidence that suggests that US ships sailing around the world aggravate international tensions.  Our presence in the E/S China Seas, for example, exacerbate relations with China, without a doubt.  Similarly, our presence anywhere near Iran or Russia contribute to international tensions.

Conclusion

These kinds of statements that are based on nothing but wishful thinking, feelings, and incorrect data are symptomatic of the type of officer being produced by the US Navy.  This failure or inability to recognize and acknowledge reality is why the Navy makes such consistently poor decisions.  Of course, the cynical among us might also note that Captain Hendrix’s current business position(s) are such that good relations with the Navy are important to his success and this article seems to be a public relations piece intended to promote his business ventures. 

By the way, did you notice what was missing from the Captain's discussion?  That's right … any mention of firepower.  The entire commentary was based on feelings about nebulous benefits.  That's another problem with our officer corps.  They're focused on everything but the one thing they should be focused on: combat capability.  It's a WARship, not an international symbol of a group hug.

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Jerry Hendrix is a vice president with the Telemus Group, a retired U.S. Navy Captain, and a consultant to the Defense Science Board.

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(1)National Review website, “FREMM Selection Signals U.S. Engagement”, Jerry Hendrix, 6-May-2020,

https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/05/us-navy-fremm-frigate-design-selection-signals-engagement/

Data Is The Enemy Of Action

There’s an old saying that ‘perfect is the enemy of good’.  This especially haunts the US military as we strive for perfect solutions, perfect weapons, and perfect platforms instead of just good, solid, effective ones.  Our drive for perfection results in runaway costs and huge schedule overruns.

Well, ComNavOps would like to offer a new saying, ‘data is the enemy of action’.  In our modern military we are almost paralyzed by our desire for data at the expense of effective action.  Rather than act in a timely and effective manner – but with a chance of error – we hesitate and wait and gather more data.  All the while, our opportunity for effective action slips away.

No one is suggesting that we run off half-cocked, like lunatics, based on nothing but rumors and guesses.  Intel is necessary and good.  However, when our desire for perfect data prevents effective action, we’ve gone too far.

Think about it.  What kind of war fighting systems are we focused on today?  It’s all about data.  Perfect data.  Perfect battlefield knowledge.  Total awareness.  That’s what we’re pursuing. 

What are we leaving out?  What are we forgetting?  Firepower and action!  It does no good to have perfect data after the opportunity to act has passed.

Why are we so focused on data?  Well, it has to do with our zero-defect mentality.  Our military leaders are so scared of being wrong and making a mistake that can cost them their command and career that they’d rather not act and, instead, wait for more data than to take a chance on being wrong.

We need to lose our zero-defect mentality and embrace mistakes as the price of learning and the price of boldness.  In other words, we need to start developing and embracing a war mentality.

Did you run your ship aground?  Okay, that’s unfortunate but are you an otherwise good officer?  Yes?  Then learn a lesson and get back out there!  No penalty.  After your tenth grounding then, sure, we should probably check you for competency but in the meantime, learn and act boldly.

Data is the enemy of action!

Atlas Mine Countermeasures System

The Navy’s efforts to develop an effective mine countermeasure (MCM) module for the LCS have been problem plagued, to say the least, and a dismal failure to put it more accurately. 

Just for some comparative perspective, let’s take a look at another MCM system, this one from Atlas Elektronik which is developing a system to equip the new Belgian-Dutch vessels that are planned.  The two countries are teaming up to build replacement MCM ships and frigates.  Belgium is in charge of MCM vessel procurement and the Netherlands is responsible for the frigate. (1)  The new ships will replace the existing Tripartite class minehunters and the command and support ship BNS Godetia.

Atlas MCM System

Following the current trend towards ‘families of capabilities’ and ‘systems of systems’, the Atlas system components include:

Atlas Remote Capability Integrated Mission System (ARCIMS) Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) – The USV is 33 ft long, weighs 13,200 lbs, and has a payload capacity of 6,600 lbs.  It can accommodate a power module and magnetic, acoustic, and electric sweeps.  The boat’s max speed is 40 kts but the towing speed is only 8 kts. (2)  While perfectly adequate for non-time critical mine clearance during peacetime, this is woefully inadequate for combat mine clearance.

Atlas USV

SeaCat Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) – The AUV is a small, torpedo shaped unmanned, underwater vehicle that weighs around 150 lbs and has a payload capacity of around 60 lbs.  It is equipped with a dual frequency side scan sonar and has a max speed of 6 kts. (3)  It can operate autonomously or via remote control using a 1000 m fiber optic cable.  Optional payloads include a multibeam echosounder, imaging sonar, sub-bottom profiler, conductivity/temperature/pressure (CTD), or a camera.

Seacat UUV

Towed Synthetic Aperture Sonar – The sunspecified sonar is towed by the AUV and provides mine detection and classification capability.  Again, the max speed is 6 kts.

Mine-sweeping – Sweeping is provided by the ARCIMS USV and includes magnetic, acoustic, and electric sweeps.

Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTOL) – I have no idea what effective use this would provide.

Mine Avoidance Sonar – This is a hull-mounted sonar for the MCM host ship.

The Belgian Navy will spend 1.1 billion euros on the entire MCM project which envisions a range of unmanned systems including unmanned surface, aerial and underwater vehicles alongside towed sonars and mine identification and neutralization ROVs.

Does all of this sound familiar?  This is, more or less, what the US Navy has been trying to develop for the MCM version of the LCS.

What assessment can we make of the system and how does it compare to the LCS MCM module?

Speed.  As we noted, the speed of the components is very slow (6-8 kts) and is suited only for non- combat scenarios.  For rapid combat clearance operations the system is entirely unsuited.  The same is true for the LCS whose components have an effective clearance rate of 2 mines per hour, at best.  In both cases, the slow speed can be compensated for by sheer numbers of additional units but the numbers required would be staggering and far beyond any imaginable acquisition program.  Further, such numbers would require a degree of asset co-ordination that is also unimaginable.

Transit Time.  The low speeds of the various components mean that the transit time to and from the mothership, which stands well off from the suspected minefield, will be quite lengthy thereby contributing to an extremely slow overall clearance rate.  Again, the same applies to the LCS module components.

It is clear that the high tech, individual component approach to mine clearance is inherently slow and combat ineffective which leads one to wonder why it is even being pursued.  In fact, one could make a reasonable case that the ‘why’ is related to either the fixation by modern militaries on automation and unmanned for its own sake or the desire of commercial companies to offer products which enhance their corporate profits but do little for the customer’s combat capabilities coupled with the Navy's inability to recognize that and specify products that would actually be effective.

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(1)navaltoday.com website, “Atlas pitches MCM toolbox for new Belgian, Dutch minehunters”, 1-Feb-2019,

https://navaltoday.com/2019/02/01/atlas-pitches-mcm-toolbox-for-new-belgian-dutch-minehunters/

(2)Naval Technology website,

https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/atlas-remote-combined-influence-minesweeping-system-arcims/

(3)Geo-matching website,

https://geo-matching.com/auvs-autonomous-underwater-vehicles/seacat

Navy Selects Fincantieri FREMM Frigate

The Navy awarded a partial contract to Fincantieri for the design and construction of the new frigate.  The $795M contract is for the basic hull.  Extensive Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) will be paid for separately and includes Baseline 10 Aegis Combat System, Mk 41 VLS, Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar, command and control electronics, decoy systems, Mk110 57mm gun, RAM point defense launcher, Naval Strike Missile launcher, SEWIP Blk II … basically everything that isn’t the hull.

The lead ship will cost $1.281 billion, with $795 million of that covering the shipbuilder’s detail design and construction costs and the rest covering the GFE, including the combat systems, radar, launchers, command and control systems, decoys and more. (1)

Fincantieri Frigate

Let’s take a look at some aspects of the Navy’s new frigate.

Selection Assessment.  Setting aside the fact that the Navy doesn’t need a frigate, I’ve got to admit to being surprised by the Navy’s choice.  I was 100% sure that the Navy would select the Freedom class LCS as the new frigate until, of course, they dropped out of the competition.  My ranking of the remaining contenders was:

1. Fincantieri FREMM
2. Huntington Ingalls
3. Navantia F-100
4. Austal LCS

Lo and behold, the Navy made the best choice!  How often do I get to say that? 

Now, recognize that the selection of the Fincantieri ship does not necessarily constitute a good selection, just the best of what was offered.  To put it in perspective, the Austal LCS was a joke which was why I rated it last.  The Navantia F-100 had serious design flaws as graphically demonstrated in the sinking of the Norwegian frigate from what should have been minor and recoverable damage.  The Huntington Ingalls ship was an unknown with almost no publicly released information and the underlying ship was likely the National Security Cutter which is not a warship, per se, and is a bit small for the frigate the Navy envisions.  That left only the Fincantieri offering so, by default, it got my top ranking.  Whether it’s actually a good design is unknown.  It may simply be the best of the worst.

Cost.  Let’s firmly keep in mind that the GFE portion of this program is extensive and expensive.  Publicly released contract figures are NOT the total construction cost even though the Navy will attempt to portray it that way.  Let’s also acknowledge that no Navy shipbuilding program has come in on time/cost in recent history so the claimed costs are going to increase, without a doubt.

That said, the choice of an existing hull and equipment should, theoretically, limit the extent of cost growth.  The hull and components are known quantities with existing, open production lines and proven performance.  If ever there was an opportunity for a Navy shipbuilding program to meet its cost goals, this is it.  A significant failure, here, would be most disheartening.

ASW.  The Navy doesn’t see it this way but the main purpose/function of the frigate ought to be ASW.  What concerns me in the ASW role is that the ship appears not to be designed for ASW but, rather, follows a modular construction scheme with some ASW equipment as an option.  As evidence, the FREMM frigates are offered and have been sold as user selectable general purpose, ASW, and anti-air versions.  This implies that the hull is generalized for any role rather than optimized for one.  As we’ve extensively discussed, no generalized asset is as good as an optimized one and ASW is one role where exquisite optimization is demanded.  The alternative is a resting place on the bottom of the sea.  I’ve seen no discussion of specialized quieting of the ship’s equipment, specialized shaping of the hull to decrease the acoustic signature, installation of a Prairie/Masker type system, selection of propulsion equipment specialized for quiet operation, etc. 

The ship will, apparently, operate a single helo.  For an ASW frigate, this is a significant limitation.  As the saying goes, if you have one helo, you have none. 

The ship has no close in RBU-type anti-torpedo and anti-submarine system – again, a serious deficiency in an ASW frigate. 

Oddly, the ship will not support the Vertical Launch ASROC anti-submarine torpedo (VL-ASROC).(2)  This is listed as a future capability but we all know that future capabilities are rarely implemented.  Again, a serious deficiency in an ASW frigate.

It is also interesting to note that the Navy capabilities graphic does not specify a hull mounted sonar although it does include a multi-function towed array and a variable depth sonar (CAPTAS).

Finally, the cost, at what is likely to be well over $1B per ship,  is too much for an ASW frigate that is going to be exposed to one of the most dangerous tasks in naval warfare.

In the ASW role, the ship appears to be significantly less than optimized.

Strike.  At the moment, it is unknown whether the VLS will be the strike length cells.  If not, the ship will have no Tomahawk capability.  Interestingly, the Navy’s capabilities graphic does not specify Tomahawk cruise missile capability.  The only offensive weapon of note is the Over-The-Horizon missile which is the Naval Strike Missile.

Gun.  The continued selection of the small caliber 57 mm gun, especially after it was rejected by the Zumwalt program in favor of the smaller 30 mm gun, is absolutely baffling.  If not a 5” gun, there are very good 76 mm guns available.  The Mk110 57 mm gun is decidedly non-lethal and has encountered persistent problems in use with the LCS.

SEWIP.  The SEWIP upgrade to the venerable and now obsolete SLQ-32 electronic warfare system is most welcome.  Currently, only the SEWIP Block II is specified but there are indications that a scaled down version of the Blk III may be planned although, again, future improvements are, historically, unlikely.  

Stealth.  The Fincantieri design appears decidedly mediocre in terms of stealth when compared to ships like the Visby and others that have clearly made a determined effort to embrace stealth.  The Fincantieri ship does have slanted sides but, beyond that, there is little effort at stealth.  The ship is covered with exposed equipment, masts, sensors, radars, and hull and deck fittings.  Even the slanted sides are only slightly slanted and would appear nearly vertical from an aircraft radar.

Summary.  While there is no need for a generalized, mini-Burke frigate in the US Navy, at least the Navy made the best choice of what appeared to be a poor stable of contenders.  The Fincantieri FREMM frigate represents a proven design, assuming it’s not too heavily modified for the US Navy, which, one hopes, will at least offer trouble free basic performance. 

As a mini-Burke, the design appears solid and somewhat useful, if not outstanding, with specified equipment that already exists and has largely been debugged.  All that remains is to integrate the various components. 

I still can't help but wish the Navy had put the money it will spend on this mini-Burke towards dedicated ASW corvettes, MCM ships, logistic support ships, etc.

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(1)USNI News website, “Fincantieri Wins $795M Contract for Navy Frigate Program”, Megan Eckstein, 30-Apr-2020,

https://news.usni.org/2020/04/30/fincantieri-wins-795m-contract-for-navy-frigate-program

(2)The Drive website, “The Navy’s Future Frigates Are Shaping Up To Be More Lethal And Capable, As Well As Cheaper”, Joseph Trevithick, 29-Jan-2020,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26217/the-navys-future-frigates-are-shaping-up-to-be-more-lethal-and-capable-as-well-as-cheaper

The Taiwan Opportunity

What do we need to counter China?  Well, lots of things but one of the major things is allies – not just any allies but, ideally, militarily and economically strong allies.  We need the kind of allies that will give China pause and make them reconsider their unbridled expansionist policies.

Japan is one such ally.  They have a strong military and robust economy.  With their strength and their proximity to China, they are a significant impediment for China.  India could be another ally if we can build better relations with them.  South Korea might be a qualified ally although their willingness to side with the US outside of the North Korean threat is suspect.

Yet another potentially strong ally is Taiwan.  They have a small, though competent, military and a reasonably strong economy.  What they lack on the military side of things is access to the latest US technology and support.

US support for Taiwan has always been a hesitant proposition, at best.  Successive US governments have refrained from demonstrating outright support and recognition in an attempt to curry favor (or at least prevent worsening relations) with China.  Well, that ship has sailed.  China has placed itself on a direct collision course with the US by flaunting international laws and treaties, conducting an expansionist territorial grab of the entire East and South China Seas and beyond, routinely trespassing into the territorial waters of neighboring countries, engaging in massive intellectual property theft, engaging in blatant currency manipulation, seizing US military assets, conducting cyber espionage, etc.  There is no need to placate China because there is no longer anything to be gained by doing so, if there ever was.

Just as the termination of the INF treaty with Russia has freed the US to pursue intermediate range ballistic missiles (as China has been doing for many years), so too does China’s now public and clearly acknowledged anti-US stance free us to pursue geopolitical strategies that were formerly off limits due to our naïve and forlorn hopes for peaceful accommodation.  Strengthening our relations with Taiwan is now a viable (it always was – we were just too timid to pursue it) course of action.

Consider what a greatly militarily strengthened Taiwan could do in containing China. 

Given the physical proximity of Taiwan to China, China would have no choice but to refocus a significant portion of their political and military resources away from expansion and towards containment and countering the threat of Taiwan.  This refocus would allow us the opportunity to push back against China’s recent expansions and incursions while China is otherwise occupied closer to home.

A militarily stronger Taiwan complicates China’s war plans by forcing them to allocate more resources to Taiwan which absolutely must by the first Chinese move in any war.

I know there are many ‘Chicken Little’ Chinese observers who are terrified that any strengthening of Taiwan by the US would instantly lead to total nuclear war but that’s simply fear-inspired garbage reasoning.  China has as much or more to fear and lose from a war with a Taiwan-US partnership (with, likely, Japan and others joining in against China) than we do.  China can bluster all they want but the reality of their military and economic position is that there’s not really anything they can do about it.  China has zero chance to win a war against the US (at the moment) let alone an alliance of the US, Taiwan, Japan, and others. 

Taiwan also provides a very strong counter to, and penetration of, China’s territorial claims.  Taiwan’s territorial claims and their associated Economic Exclusion Zone (defined as 200 miles by the UNCLOS treaty of which China is a signatory) provide the prefect legal justification for a Taiwan-US partnership to push back with military force, if needed, against China’s illegal expansionist activities.

Again, there are the same ‘Chicken Little’ fear mongers who believe that if we even strongly protest an illegal Chinese action we’ll instantly spark a nuclear war.  The reality is that China is using their military (their Coast Guard and fishing fleets are thinly disguised extensions of their military) to intimidate neighboring countries as they seek to execute de facto seizures of territory.  There is no reason we shouldn’t use our military to equally aggressively push back against these territorial seizures and partnering with Taiwan provides the necessary legal and international standing to do so by ‘assisting’ Taiwan at their behest.

So, how, specifically, should we support and strengthen Taiwan?

The answer is military subsidies.  Let’s outright give Taiwan ships, aircraft, weapons, equipment and logistical support.  It’s easily justified as an investment in our own security.  All Taiwan has to supply is the manpower to operate the equipment. 

Where would all this equipment come from?  Well, for one thing, it would help if we would stop SinkEx’ing our perfectly good ships.  Imagine what dozens of Spruances could do for Taiwan’s naval power.  We early retired the Tarawa class, if those would be of use to Taiwan.  Let’s give them F-35s and make China account for stealth aircraft right in their own backyard.  Supposedly, we’ve got thousands of M1 Abrams sitting in parking lots.  Why not give them good homes in Taiwan?  The LCS is of no use to us.  Let’s give them the entire LCS fleet.  The range, endurance, and maintenance problems that make them nearly useless to us would be greatly mitigated by operating in Taiwan’s home waters where those factors are not significant drawbacks.

Hey, if we can get some partial payments for the equipment, so much the better but let’s keep firmly in mind that the equipment transfers are for our benefit – payment is not required.  If it helps, think of these ships and aircraft as unmanned (by Americans) vehicles.

Right now, China is focused well outside the East and South China Seas - well beyond the first island chain to Africa, the Middle East, South America, etc.  Why not give China some serious problems to deal with right in their own backyard?  Let’s blur their global focus and make them refocus on their own backyard.  That can only help slow their global activities and give us opportunities to strengthen our own global positions.

In addition to providing equipment and support, let’s start conducting ‘port visits’ to Taiwan with occasional ships and aircraft and then, over time, with more and more ships and aircraft with longer and longer stays until, eventually, we’ve established a de facto permanent presence and base.  Does this kind of slow, incremental, creeping, reach sound familiar?  It should.  It’s the Chinese playbook!  Why shouldn’t we use it for ourselves?

Taiwan is an opportunity waiting to be grasped and all we need to do is demonstrate some fortitude to make it happen.

Of course, all of this depends on Taiwan being willing to cooperate and the key to that is demonstrating that such a course is in their own best interests as well as ours.

An Ill-Fated Voyage

An Ill-Fated Voyage

The proud US Navy fleet left San Diego amid much publicity and ebullient speeches from naval spokesmen.  It seemed that every Admiral in the Navy claimed to have played a key role in developing and fielding this new fleet which was, by this voyage, ushering in a new era of naval power.  Press conferences sprang up like mushrooms.  You couldn’t spit without hitting another Admiral touting the wonders of this new naval concept.

The fleet was to be the first large scale demonstration of the wonders and magnificence of the manned/unmanned partnering that would define the Navy’s new fleet structure of the future.  The USS Ford, a Burke, a large displacement unmanned surface vessel (LDUSV), and five medium displacement unmanned surface vessels (MDUSV) were to sail from San Diego to the South China Sea where one of the MDUSVs would perform a publicly announced and greatly hyped unmanned Freedom of Navigation (FONOPS)  passage near one of the many illegal Chinese artificial island bases.  The voyage would not only usher in a new era of naval power but also send a clear message to China that the US Navy was still leading the way in naval technology.

In a nod to President Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet, whose voyage had introduced the world to American naval power, the press had taken to referring to the fleet as the Great White Unmanned Fleet and the more supportive of the media were given MH-60 helicopter rides to take photos of the fleet as it pulled out of port.

As with the earlier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), the unmanned vessels hadn’t been thoroughly tested.  The Navy had opted to ignore the DOT&E test protocols in their haste to get the ships into the fleet and avoid any budget reductions that a somewhat skittish Congress might impose if the vessels were found to have significant problems.  Still, this wasn’t a combat action, just a demonstration voyage and Navy leadership was quite confident that the unmanned vessels were up to the task.

Five days into the eighteen day voyage to the South China Sea, the unmanned vessel control systems on the Ford suddenly displayed an alarm.  One of the MDUSVs was registering water accumulation in the hull.  An inspection/repair crew was ferried to the vessel and discovered that the aluminum hull had developed a 6 inch long crack, presumably from the stress of prolonged wave action, that was leaking steadily.  Because the vessel had not been designed for manned operation, physical access was difficult and limited.  The repair crew was unable to reach the crack with sufficient access to effect repairs.  The decision was made to send a ‘prize crew’ of 18 sailors from the Ford to the unmanned vessel to sail it back to San Diego for permanent repairs.  With four other MDUSVs in the group, the loss of one vessel was not a problem.

Three days later, during group refueling operations, the third MUSV was found to be unable to take on fuel.  Again, an inspection/repair crew was dispatched and eventually concluded that a sticking check valve was the culprit.  While this would normally be a simple shipboard repair, the unmanned vessel had no spares and the limited physical access again prevented any effective repair.  As before, a ‘prize crew’ was detailed to sail the MDUSV to rendezvous with a fleet tug which would tow them to Pearl Harbor for repairs.

On day twelve, one of the remaining MDUSV automated monitoring systems reported seawater in the lube oil system.  Once again, this necessitated a ‘prize crew’ to sail the offending vessel to Guam for repairs.  Navy spokesmen noted that water in the lube oil was not unique to the MDUSV and was the same problem that had sidelined several LCS and the Zumwalt during its voyage from the east coast to its homeport on the west coast.

The following day, one of the two remaining MDUSVs suddenly veered out of formation.  Telemetry determined that the vessel had lost communications and was executing a failsafe return to base.

At this point, the fleet was down to the Ford, the Burke, the LDUSV, and one MDUSV.  Navy leadership determined that despite the run of bad luck the group was still more than adequate to perform a simple FONOPS and the decision was made to continue.

On day seventeen, having passed through the first island chain and entered the South China Sea, the group encountered heavy GPS jamming and spoofing.  While not overly affecting the manned vessels that could take manual fixes, the USVs kept wandering off course.  Not unduly worried, the decision was made to instruct the USVs to switch to inertial navigation (INS).  Unfortunately, and unbeknownst to the group commander, the USV’s INS systems were one of the things that had not been tested despite DOT&E warnings.  The MDUSV responded properly but the LDUSV veered off in a seemingly random direction.  Inside the South China Sea, this could not be allowed and the Burke was dispatched to collect the LDUSV and take it under tow back to Guam.

The group, now reduced to the Ford and the one remaining MDUSV opted to go ahead with the FONOPS given that they had essentially arrived at their destination, anyway.

The next morning, the MDUSV began its passage about ten miles off from the designated artificial island.  As the vessel drew abreast of the island, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel approached the MDUSV and a Chinese boarding party proceeded to board and take control of the vessel.  

The US reaction was one of instant anger and condemnation from the Ford with demands that the Chinese return the vessel immediately.  The Chinese reply was that the unmanned vessel presented a hazard to navigation within Chinese territorial waters and had been seized as a matter of safety.

The President’s National Security Council and the Navy met in emergency session with the President calling for the use of force to secure the return of the MDUSV.  However, the Navy pointed out that the Ford was without escort support and her weapon elevators were only partially and sporadically functioning.  Given the situation, the Ford would be unable to mount an operation with any reasonable chance of success and, if things escalated, might even be subject to seizure or sinking, itself!  Further, the precedent had been set in the Middle East that captured or destroyed unmanned assets were not worth taking military action over.  All things considered, the President reluctantly ordered the Navy to abandon the MDUSV and have the Ford retire from the area.

An ill-fated voyage, indeed.

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This story is not meant to present any meaningful simulation of the Navy’s manned/unmanned group concept nor is it meant to imply that the rate of unmanned failures in the story is to be expected on a routine basis (although readers may recall that the first several LCS to put to sea ALL experienced major mechanical failures that terminated their voyages!).  The story is intended only to highlight the types of failures that could afflict unmanned vessels and how those failures might impact group operations.   More importantly, writing the story amused me.

The story also points out the danger in not fully testing new ships.  Readers might recall that DOT&E has been quite vocal about the Navy shortcutting tests and trying to skip shock tests, among other testing related issues.