Foundational Principles of Geopolitical Strategy

In an open post, several people suggested enhanced discussions of geopolitical strategies.  This blog is not a political blog and such a discussion walks the fine line between military matters and politics.  Nonetheless, geopolitical strategy is the basis from which military strategy is derived so such a discussion is not out of bounds.  Of course, geopolitical strategy is a subject that can easily encompass a book or series of books!  With that in mind, we need to break any discussion down into bite-size, post-size, chunks. 

What I’d like to address first is the theoretical foundation of a geopolitical strategy.  There are certain guiding principles that should enter into any rational discussion of geopolitical strategy.  Let’s examine them.

Principle #1 - Natural (God given) Rights.  This is the very foundation of our country - that we are blessed by our creator with certain rights that do not derive from any government.  In fact, the job of the government is to secure, respect, and protect those rights.  The same holds true for every person and every country in the world.  Those countries that have governments that do not protect and respect those rights are, by definition, evil and must, in the due course of history, be eliminated.

This leads us to directly recognize the second principle.

Principle #2 – Not all countries are equal.  There are good countries and there are bad countries.  This immediately establishes that there are behaviors which we, as a country, should aspire to and others which we should be avoiding.  We must hold other countries to these same standards of behavior.  This also immediately eliminates the misguided notion that all countries are equal and deserve to be treated on equal footing.  They are not all equal and they do not all deserve to be treated equally.

Recognizing this reality, we now need to understand why it matters.  It matters because there is an ideal world which we are striving for.  This leads us directly to the third principle.

Principle #3 – The ultimate goal is a cooperative, mutually beneficial, world community.  Those countries who will not abide by the community rules must be prevented from acting in, and negatively affecting, the rest of the world community.  This establishes our right to act against those countries.  A simple analogy is a neighborhood community that sees a criminal gang attempting to move in.  The community is striving for a peaceful, cooperative environment and the means to do so is by adhering to standards of behavior, both legal and moral (mainly moral;  the legal flows from the moral).  A criminal gang flouts those standards and, in so doing, degrades the effort and results of the community.  Therefore, the community has the right to reject the gang and act against them.   Similarly, countries that do not follow the rules and standards of the world community are, by definition, immature and/or evil and we have the right, indeed obligation, to act against them and correct their behavior.

The challenge is how to change an immature/evil country’s behavior and this is what a strategy does.  It provides the methodological blueprint for affecting that change.  This leads us to the fourth principle.

Principle #4 - Minimal time period of immaturity.  There is no need or requirement for the rest of the world to suffer while waiting for a country to mature.

The idea of not waiting around for a country to mature is incredibly important.  The world waited for Hitler and Germany to mature.  They never did and a world war resulted.  How many more people died because we, and the world, waited instead of acting?  We’ve waited for NKorea to mature and, as a result, we’ve spent the last several decades watching and allowing their citizens to suffer ruthless oppression, allowing NKorea to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and tying up vast military resources on the Korea peninsula to guard against the various threats.  How many more NKorean people have suffered and died because we, and the world, have held off acting?  

The hard truth is that there are times when it is a mistake to try to avoid war.  Now, that's not to say we should leap straight to all out war at the first sign of a country performing some act that we find objectionable.  We should begin with politics, discussions, requests, warnings, and so on and then escalate, eventually, to more forceful actions such as sanctions, blockades, financial penalties, and so forth.  However, we must recognize when those actions are producing no benefits and then move to war, if necessary.  This is also where the Tomahawk diplomacy comes in (see, "The Daily Threat" for a bit more discussion of this concept).  

We don’t allow a child to occupy a co-equal place in society with adults.  Why?  Because they simply aren’t ready to make wise and responsible decisions.  When the child has sufficiently matured and demonstrated that maturity via a series of responsible actions (high school graduation, driver license, voting, job skill, paying taxes, etc.) then they are welcomed into society and are accorded the right to participate fully in society’s activities and benefits.  Some children never mature and wind up in jail where their societal rights are curtailed.  This is just common sense and we all instinctively understand that this is how a successful society must function.  Despite this common sense understanding we fail to apply it to the world community.  Instead, we accommodate and appease immature countries out of some misguided sense of equality.  The reality is that this isn’t equality, it’s moral cowardice.  For example, we’re afraid to call Iran the immature child that it is and correct it the way we should.  We’re afraid to identify China as the evil country that it is as it conducts illicit territorial seizures and ignores the rulings of tribunals established by treaties that it is a signatory to.  And so on.

With these few, simple principles well understood and firmly in hand, we can formulate a specific geopolitical strategy.  These principles give us our ultimate and short term goals, our justification for action, the definition of our relationships with other countries, and the imperative to act.  In fact, with these principles in mind, formulating a strategy becomes a fairly easy, straightforward task and the strategy should be fairly obvious to all.  The methods selected to achieve the strategy may be somewhat debatable but the fundamental principles eliminate most debate over the goals of the strategy itself.

Base Defense

We’ve recently discussed forward bases and noted the two contradictory desires regarding base location:

1. The desire to be as close as possible to the next or ultimate objective in order to maximize sortie rate and to minimize response time and ship and aircraft transit times to and from the objective operational area.

2. The desire to be as far away as possible from the enemy’s defenses, typically cruise and ballistic missiles but also including bombers, submarines, and surface ships.

The existence of ballistic missiles with a few to several thousand mile ranges and submarines with cruise missiles effectively puts any base within range of enemy attack.  This compares somewhat unfavorably with our own attack ranges from a forward base.  Thus, if we place a base at a useful strike range, then we’re automatically placing it well within enemy attack range.  This leads to the inexorable conclusion that if we want to operate a forward base we’ll have to conduct a robust and continuous base defense – something we haven’t done since Guadalcanal.

Forward bases, even if we fight for them, can only survive if we harden them.  Hardening, for purposes of this discussion, is the process of making a base difficult to damage and permanently destroy.  Hardening measures can take many forms.  Let’s take a closer look at some of the means to harden and defend forward bases.

Anti-ballistic Missile Defense – A land base is a fixed target which is ideal for ballistic missiles.  We need an effective ballistic missile defense (BMD).  Of course, the best BMD is to destroy the enemy’s ballistic missile launchers before they can launch.  Failing that, ship based BMD out along the path of the missile adds additional opportunities for intercepts.  Rather than tie up multi-functional, expensive Burkes doing BMD, a dedicated, cheaper, single function BMD vessel is preferred.  Finally, land based BMD at the base constitutes ‘point defense’. 

Anti-Cruise Missile Defense – Cruise missiles can be launched from aircraft, surface ships, and submarines.  We need cruise missile defense similar to the BMD described above.  Ships, submarines, and aircraft need to patrol in layers extending out to the theoretical maximum enemy missile ranges which is several hundred miles.

Anti-Submarine – Submarines present multiple threats to a forward base including mine laying to prevent base resupply, cruise missile attacks, and anti-surface attacks against our own ships.  To counter the submarine threat we need a layered defense (layers, again - are you sensing a theme, yet?) consisting of our own submarines, surface ships, and aircraft.  As always, the best ASW defense is to attack the enemy’s submarines in their own ports and destroy their bases.  The Chinese underground submarine pens in Hainan will prove challenging to incapacitate and we should take a lesson from them.  Failing that we need long range interdiction of enemy submarines by our own subs.  Ideally, this would occur just outside the enemy’s bases as their subs head out on missions.  Closer to our base, dedicated hunter-killer ASW groups (a helo mothership and four ASW corvettes, for example) could prove useful.  We also need relatively high speed, high endurance, fixed wing ASW aircraft for long range search and prosecution.  An S-3 Viking-ish aircraft would be good in this role.  We also need a SOSUS type listening array to assist in the search phase.

Physical Hardening – We need to physically harden hangars, fuel storage, repair facilities, munitions storage, etc.  We could take a lesson from the Chinese who routinely do this with their bases.  The point is not to make facilities immune to damage – that’s not possible – but to make them less susceptible to easy destruction and make the enemy work harder to destroy them.

Underground – We should give serious thought to constructing underground facilities to the extent possible.  Again, this won’t make them immune but it will make the enemy expend more munitions, larger munitions, and more expensive munitions to accomplish their destruction.

Repair – An overlooked aspect of base defense is a robust repair capability and capacity.  The base that can recover from damage quickly is one that can stay in the fight longer and that the enemy will have to expend more effort against.  We should assume that everything will get damaged and destroyed and be prepared to rebuild and replace them.  We need large stocks of dispersed parts and repair equipment.

Fuel Dispersal and Protection – Fuel is the most important feature of a base.  Without it, no ship sails and no aircraft flies.  We need to disperse the fuel storage and protect the fuel storage by placing it underground in reinforced spaces.

ECM – Historical data proves that electronic countermeasures (ECM) are the most effective anti-missile defense there is.  To be fair, there is very little active missile defense data and almost none from any US system so this conclusion could change.  Regardless, ECM is highly effective, easily upgraded or adapted to changing conditions and easily replace if damaged or destroyed.  We need robust ECM defenses with hugely redundant and widely dispersed sensors and transmitters so that ECM can continue even in the face of anti-radiation missile attacks.

Fighter Defense – Long range, high endurance, layered (there’s that layering, again) fighter aircraft defense is vital to allow engagement of enemy strike assets far enough out to prevent weapon launches.  We need to recognize that attrition, both from combat and from maintenance stresses due to combat, will severely reduce aircraft availability rates so we need several times more aircraft than we think are needed.

Simplification – Any forward base is going to be constantly under attack, chronically short of spare parts and replacement assets, woefully lacking in maintenance, undermanned due to combat casualties, and reduced to a much cruder level of operation than we are currently used to.  With that reality in mind, weapon systems such as the F-35 are simply too complex to maintain, operate, and repair.  Similarly, sensors such as Aegis are too complex to maintain and repair in combat.  We need to simplify all of our combat systems to the extent reasonably possible.  It’s a balancing act to simplify without giving up too much capability. 

Instead of F-22/35 aircraft that can’t be kept operational in combat, we need advanced F-16-ish aircraft that are simpler, cheaper to replace, and easier to repair and maintain.  We need electro-optical sensors and basic, mechanical, rotating radars that are easy to maintain, replace, and repair.  This doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t have Aegis radars, for example, but when the initial Aegis radar fails we need reliable systems to fall back on.  Similarly, we can start a war with F-22/35s but when they inevitably are all grounded we need lots of far more robust aircraft to fall back on.

In fact, we need a purpose designed, basic (F-16-ish) interceptor specifically for forward base defense.

Afloat Radar – Ship-mounted radar is far more survivable than fixed, land-based radar.  We need multiple, dedicated radar vessels whose only function is radar sensing.  These can be simple commercial ships with a radar system installed.  They don’t have to be – and should not be – multi-billion dollar warships.  They just need to be mobile, afloat radar barges.

Resupply – The final aspect of base hardening is resupply.  Logistics!  A base that can quickly and reliably replace its fuel, munitions, weapons, and sensors is a base that can continue fighting.  Arguably (actually, definitely!), this is the most important aspect of base hardening.

For forward bases in the Pacific theatre, resupply translates to convoys.  China knows this and convoys will be high priority targets.  Losses will be alarmingly high.  Unwisely, the US has put no effort into developing the numbers of cargo and escort ships needed, the type of dedicated escort vessels needed, or the tactics for operating and defending convoys.  Our initial attempts at resupply convoys will likely be disastrous.

As a historical note, the Japanese were unable to successfully and reliably resupply their forward base at Guadalcanal and had to eventually withdraw.  The US was also hard pressed to resupply but were just successful enough to eventually win out though at an enormous cost.  We would do well to study this example in great detail as we formulate our plans to operate Guam or any other forward base.

Conclusion - Base hardening goes well beyond physical hardening.  All of the above measures serve to harden the base against damage and make the base easier to repair and more resilient to the inevitable damage it will sustain.

The reality of forward bases is that, by definition, we’ll be attempting to operate in the enemy’s “home” territory and at the very long end of our own supply chain.  Currently, the US has almost no realistic base defense capability and certainly no comprehensive base defense system (layers!) and plan.  The US seems to believe that we can operate forward bases with some sort of magical immunity to enemy attack.  This belief is utter nonsense.  We need to begin planning for a robust defense, acquiring specialized equipment, developing defensive strategies, and practicing for wholesale damage recovery.

If we address the items listed and discussed above we can mount a credible defense of a forward base.  If we continue to keep our heads buried in the sand and deny the reality of forward base challenges we’ll find ourselves unable to sustain any forward bases.

Praise the Gods of Acquisition!

In a totally unexpected development, Lockheed has announced that it is dropping out of the competition to build the Navy’s frigate.(1)  That leaves Huntington Ingalls Industries, Austal, Fincantieri, and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works.

The decision to drop out of the competition is quite surprising because ComNavOps had believed that the competition was heavily slanted to favor the Lockheed Freedom class LCS ‘frigate’ and that the LCS ‘frigate’ was a lock to be selected. 

One can only speculate on the reason for the decision but a hint comes from the USNI News article.

…the company told the service it felt the Freedom design would be stretched too far to accommodate all the capabilities required, one source told USNI News. (1)

This suggests and sort of confirms what we have been saying all along, that the Freedom LCS variant has severe, inherent limitations as a ship that can’t be fixed even by stretching the design in length.  Issues such as non-existent weight growth margins, weak structural construction, excessive vibration due to the weak structural design, self-noise issues, compartmentation issues, badly designed internal layouts, aluminum structure cracking, meta-centric height deficiencies (stability problems), etc. are ‘baked in’ to the design and can’t be corrected by lengthening the ship or adding a few extra weapons.

With all the LCS problems in mind, this is tremendous news and can only be considered a good thing as it removes a very poor option from the frigate candidate pool.  That leaves one exceptionally poor competitor, the Austal ‘frigate’ which, like the Lockheed, is just a version of the Independence variant LCS.  Like the Lockheed Freedom variant ‘frigate’, the Austal Independence LCS ‘frigate’ has built in flaws and weaknesses that simply adding a few more weapons can’t overcome.  We need to get the Austal entry removed, now.  The remaining three options are, at least, acceptable frigates although ComNavOps still sees no need for a frigate, at all.

This is some of the best news ComNavOps has seen in recent times.  Praise the Gods of Acquisition!

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(1)USNI News website, “Lockheed Martin Won’t Submit Freedom LCS Design for FFG(X) Contest”, Sam LaGrone, 29-May-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/05/28/lockheed-martin-wont-submit-freedom-lcs-design-for-ffgx-contest

New CNO Approved

Adm. Bill Moran has been confirmed by the Senate as the next Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).  Here’s a bit of background.

He assumed duties as the Navy’s 57th chief of naval personnel, Aug. 2, 2013. Serving concurrently as the deputy chief of naval operations (Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education) (N1), he is responsible for the planning and programming of all manpower, personnel, training and education resources for the U.S. Navy. …  His responsibilities include overseeing Navy Recruiting Command, Navy Personnel Command, and Naval Education and Training Command. (2)

Here’s some bio information per the official Navy website.

As a flag officer, he has served as commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Group; director, Air Warfare (N98) on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations; and most recently as the 57th chief of naval personnel.

His operational tours spanned both coasts, commanding Patrol Squadron (VP) 46 and Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 2. He served as an instructor pilot in two tours with VP-30 and as a staff member for Commander, Carrier Group 6 aboard USS Forrestal (CVA 59).

Ashore, he served as executive assistant to the chief of naval operations; executive assistant to Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; deputy director, Navy staff; and assistant Washington placement officer and assistant flag officer detailer in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Moran assumed duties as the Navy’s 39th vice chief of naval operations, May 31, 2016. (1)

Patrol squadron, staff, personnel, executive assistant, recruiting, education, placement officer, detailer …  What about this resume screams warrior?  Where’s the strategic and tactical expertise?  Where’s the hands on command of ships, carriers, and combat aircraft? 

He sounds like a staff guy with a heavy emphasis in personnel organizations.

Now, I don’t, for a moment believe that the only way a coach can be good is if he was a former player – but it’s gotta help! – and I don’t believe that a good CNO must have been a fighter pilot or ship commander – but it’s gotta help!  The thing is, out of the entire Navy, is this the best we could come up with?  What about him jumps out to make someone say this is the guy to be CNO of a warfighting organization?  This is the guy to lead a combat organization?  I’m not seeing it.

We couldn’t find a warrior?

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(1)https://www.navy.mil/navydata/bios/navybio.asp?bioID=483

(2)https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS02/20140325/101943/HHRG-113-AS02-Bio-MoranW-20140325.pdf

A Useful Amphibious Exercise

The Marines/Navy conduct virtually worthless amphibious exercises.  Neat rows of AAVs swim to shore from a ship perched just offshore (what happened to the 25-50 mile standoff that doctrine calls for?).  With parade like precision they leave the water and proceed, unimpeded (other than by cameramen for photo ops), to an assembly point for more photos and then, perhaps, simulate a humanitarian mission or, possibly, a raid on a small village to rescue hostages.  Does that sound like a realistic exercise?  It sounds about as worthless as it gets.

Does This Look Like A Realistic, Useful Exercise?

Here’s what a useful amphibious exercise should be …

The exercise should start only if significant, adverse weather is present.  That’s probably how it will be in a real war so let’s start dealing with waves, rain, and wind.

An actual and significant opposing force (OpFor) should contest every second of the exercise including the approach into the area.  Let’s involve the Air Force and give them free reign to try to stop the amphibious force using any tactics they can think of.  Interservice rivalry and pride should provide all the realism and creativity we need.  Let’s include manned aircraft simulating cruise missiles (since we don’t have enough drones to do anything worthwhile).  Let’s give them free reign to begin attacking as far out to sea as they can detect the amphibious force (there’s your 25-50 mile stand off !).  Let’s have them conduct attacks on any forces that land and see how we perform anti-air defense (hint: we don’t have anti-air capability!).

Let’s include an opposing submarine force and see if they can penetrate and sink the amphibious ships.

Then, let’s set up a division size OpFor (yeah, good practice for the defenders, too, in commanding and controlling a large unit – something we don’t practice at all, anymore) to defend the beach and, again, give them free reign to devise their own tactics.  Let’s give them engineering units to construct obstacles, trenches to be crossed, and fortifications (good practice for combat applications of engineering instead of building schools in third world countries) and see how the amphibious force deals with them (I bet they won’t have a clue).

Let’s emplace extensive simulated minefields and make the assaulting force deal with them (what a cluster* that will be!).

Let’s give the defending force a full complement of electronic warfare capabilities.  Let them jam, decoy, disable GPS, cyber attack, and any other tactic they can think of and make the assaulting force operate in a degraded electronic environment.  Let’s see what (and who!) can work under those conditions and what can’t.

Let’s have referees permanently remove ‘dead’ ships, aircraft, and personnel from the exercise – no ‘reanimations’.  We can, and should, repeat the exercise, in its entirety, as often as necessary to ensure that all units can participate start to finish.  Those that keep getting killed and can’t participate are either trying to execute flawed tactics or they have incompetent commanders.  Either way, it’s something we should identify as opposed to our current practice of reanimating dead units over and over again with no penalty.  If they’re consistently dying, that’s telling us something!

With the above defensive efforts, we should have a lot of induced confusion (What do you mean, my MLP sea base is sunk?!  I’ve only got one!  What am I supposed to do now??) but let’s not stop there.  Let’s add additional layers of confusion and chaos.

Let’s apply lots of smoke.  There will be lots of smoke from explosions and burning equipment in a real war so let’s get used to our vision and our sensors being degraded.

Let’s use lots of flash-bang explosives.  A real war is going to be incredibly noisy so let’s start learning how to communicate when you have to scream into the radio.

Let’s have referees arbitrarily misdirect landing vehicles to the wrong areas – you know, just like will happen in a real assault – and see how units recover and reorient.

Let’s have ‘dead’ vehicles and equipment get left where they are, constituting additional obstacles for subsequent units.

Let’s have referees arbitrarily insert incorrect orders into communications - you know, just like will happen in a real assault – and see whether the receiving units can figure out for themselves what to do.

Let’s remove half of all the supplies delivered to the beach to simulate actual combat usage which is always 2x-5x the predicted rate and see how we deal with ammo and supply shortages.

All right, that’s enough to get us started.  Seriously, what do you think would happen if we did this?  I know exactly what would happen.  We’d immediately find out that most of our doctrine is unexecutable.  Most of our tactics will be seen as flawed.  None of our plans will work.  We’ll have great difficulty loading, launching, and coordinating AAVs due to the weather.  Most of our equipment will be found susceptible to electronic warfare effects.  Our communications will be compromised.  All of our commanders will be confused and begin issuing contradictory orders.  We’ll find that we lack all kinds of useful equipment.  None of our equipment will work as advertised – some will be useless and some will be less effective but still somewhat useful.  

This Is What We Should Be Simulating

In short, the exercise would be a total debacle … exactly what we want!  That’s how you find out what really works and what doesn’t.  That’s how you learn.

Let’s do it, let’s fail, and let’s get better.

V-280 Low Speed Agility Demonstration

I just watched a YouTube video of the Bell V-280 tiltrotor conducting some kind of low speed agility demonstration.  The V-280 is being developed as a possibility for the Army’s Future Vertical Lift program and is sized to carry 14 infantry troops.  This is of interest because the Marines may latch on to this, as well.  Like the V-22 Osprey, the V-280 is capable of both level and vertical flight.

Take a look at the video of the agility test.

The aircraft can rock back and forth and roll side to side.  That’s nice, I guess.  However, what I want to see is combat related flight and maneuvers.  Like the old Vietnam era Hueys that came plummeting out of the sky, flaring just before crashing into the ground, disgorged their troops in seconds, and popped off the ground to vanish again, all in about 30 seconds or less, I want to see a V-22 or V-280 perform a similar combat-useful maneuver.  Then, and only then, will I be impressed.  Until then, the V-22 or V-280 is just a technological curiosity, not a combat asset.

That’s the problem with the V-22.  It’s a technological wonder – so say its supporters – that has little combat capability.  I’ve seen videos of V-22s conducting ‘combat’ landings and they are a total farce.  They hover, high and exposed, very slowly settle down, and seem to take forever to unload troops.  For those of us who witnessed Vietnam helicopter assaults, this is a recipe for disaster.

Here's a video of a Vietnam helo assault.

Note how the first helo never even completely touches down.  Note how the helo is popping back into the air before the last troop hits the ground.  Note how the troops unload in seconds.  Note the flare and touch maneuver.  By comparison, watching a V-22 landing exercise is like watching in slow motion with a lot of still shots thrown in!

Hey, I get it … Bell is trying to sell aircraft, not develop a combat aircraft.  They’re hoping the technology, itself, will sufficiently impress the military to result in sales – and they may be right given that we’ve substituted technology for strategy.  I’m sorry but slowly rocking back and forth might be a technological achievement – I have no idea – but it’s not, by itself, a combat useful capability. Hovering in one spot and rocking is not going to accomplish anything in combat.  It won’t dodge a rocket, missile, or gunfire.  It won’t put troops on the ground more efficiently.  It won’t do anything useful.  We've become enamored with the technology and forgotten the combat.  

Bell, do you want to sell me on the V-280?  Then show me combat maneuvers.  Translate that little rocking demonstration into an actual, useful combat maneuver.  Show me a vertical assault maneuver that will work in combat.

We buy too much stuff on the lure and glitz of technology without considering the combat usefulness (Ford CVN, I’m looking at you).  We perform too many tests that are completely divorced from any combat reality.

Show me combat!

The Great White Elephant

President Theodore Roosevelt sent a Navy fleet on an around-the-world tour during 1908 as a public relations tour and a sort of coming-out announcement and celebration for the nation and the Navy on to the world stage.  The fleet, and the event, was dubbed the Great White Fleet.

Now, something similar is happening on a smaller scale.  The USS Zumwalt is on its first operational voyage which appears to be a public relations tour and an attempt to introduce the Zumwalt to the world.

Here’s the Zumwalt’s mini-tour, thus far.

8-Mar-2019        Departed San Diego

11-Mar-2019      Esquimalt, British Columbia, Canada
23-Mar-2019      Ketchikan, Alaska
4-Apr-2019        Pearl Harbor

Zumwalt is, presumably, conducting live fire exercises at the naval range in Hawaii.

As a reminder, the total Zumwalt program cost is $8.4B per ship and continuing to climb as the remaining two ships work to complete construction and fitting out of combat systems.  The ship’s reason for being, the Advanced Gun System (AGS), has been rendered non-functional due to the Navy cancelling the Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), the only munition the gun is capable of firing.  Absent the AGS, the only other significant weapon system on the ship is the 80x Mk57 VLS which can launch ESSM, Tomahawk, Standards, and the like.

The problem is that the 16,000 t, $8.4B ship, without the AGS, brings very little to the fleet in terms of combat capability.  Despite these problems, the Navy seems determined to operate the ship as if it were a useful asset.  The reality, though, is that the ship has no Concept of Operations (CONOPS), offers little combat capability, and contributes little to the fleet.  That being the case, one has to wonder why the Navy wants to operate the ship.  Why not park the ships and leave them idle pending the onset of a major war?  The Navy is constantly whining about the cost of operating ships and yet they’re pouring budget money into these marginally useful vessels that appear to be an evolutionary dead end.  Park the ships and save operating budget as well as wear and tear on the ships.

From Wiki, a white elephant is a possession which its owner cannot dispose of and whose cost, particularly that of maintenance, is out of proportion to its usefulness. In modern usage, it is an object, building project, scheme, business venture, facility, etc., considered expensive but without use or value.

Zumwalt’s publicity tour isn’t the Great White Fleet, it’s the Great White Elephant.