Tankers

Here’s a bit of news from the LNG World News website (1) that ought to have some bearing on Navy planning during a time of severely constrained budgets.  Aker Philadelphia Shipyard, Inc., and Crowley Maritime Corporation have contracted to build four product tankers with options for four more.  The contract value for the first four tankers is $500M or $125M each.

The ships are 50,000 dwt and incorporate numerous fuel efficiency features, flexible cargo capability, and the latest regulatory requirements according to the article.

What’s the relevance to the Navy?  In previous posts and comments, we’ve discussed that many of the Navy’s cargo and personnel transport needs could be met with commercial ships as opposed to amphibious ships or other specialized military vessels.  Further, we’ve noted that modified commercial ships could possibly be used for offshore basing of Army aviation units, SOF operations, MCM motherships, LCS motherships, and a host of other functions.  When one looks at the price of the base ship and considers the functionality they could provide, this seems like a very viable option.  Of course, the required functionality might increase the cost somewhat but none of these functions are that exotic and expensive and certainly would come nowhere near the multi-billion dollar costs for new amphibious ships.

We’ve already seen a bit of this occurring with the MLP builds.  The use of commercial vessels should be expanded.

As a side note, the LCS was originally built to largely commercial standards and even now is being built to semi-commercial standards.  One can’t help but wonder how a 50,000 dwt ship can be built for $125M while the 3,000 ton LCS base hull without government furnished equipment, weapons, sensors, electronics, and modules costs $350M - $400M.

(1) http://www.lngworldnews.com/usa-aker-philadelphia-shipyard-to-build-up-to-eight-product-tankers-for-crowley/

A-10 Scrapping Justification Exposed

This is a Navy blog but I just can’t pass on the following Air Force item especially since it indirectly impacts Marine and Navy CAS.

DoD Buzz website quotes Air Force Gen. Mark Welsh as saying that scrapping the A-10 will save $4.2B over five years (1).  This apparently is the Air Force's justification for letting the A-10 go.  Of course, the real justification is preserving the Air Force’s buy of F-35’s.  Be that as it may …

Let’s check that cost savings number out, shall we?  Since the purpose behind letting the A-10 go is to preserve the F-35 purchase, let’s do the math and see how many additional F-35’s we can purchase (or save from cuts) for $4.2B.

At the moment, a reasonable cost for an F-35A is $150M.  I know there are some of you who believe that the F-35 will eventually cost $9.95 each once we reach super-serial production buoyed by an upswell of foreign buyers.  Well, a check of the actual budget requests shows a much higher cost.  Will the cost come down someday?  Perhaps, but we’ll deal in the here and now.

So,    $4.2B / $150M = 28

There you have it.  Scrapping 300 A-10’s will buy (or save from cuts) 28 F-35’s.

That’s probably worth repeating.  Scrapping 300 A-10’s will gain us 28 F-35’s.

Does that seem like a worthwhile trade?

And I thought the Navy was screwed up!  I’m going to have to write the Navy a letter of apology.

Note:  For you absolute diehard JSF fanboys, if you won’t accept real costs, go ahead and make up any number you want and run the arithmetic.  It doesn’t change the conclusion.

(1) http://www.dodbuzz.com/2014/04/23/welsh-defends-plan-to-scrap-a-10-as-logical/

"Idled" Cruisers

As previously noted, the Navy has announced plans to idle 11 of the 22 Aegis cruisers.  The publicly stated plan is that the cruisers will, over time, be modernized and returned to the fleet.  Great!  So, that puts us back to 22 Aegis cruisers and they’ll be extensively modernized.  That’s a win in anybody’s book, huh?

Well, not so fast.  Let’s back the drydock up and look at this a bit closer.  When you check out the details, you see that the Navy’s plan is actually for the idled/modernized cruisers to rejoin the fleet as one-for-one replacements for retiring cruisers.  Thus, we’ll never see 22 cruisers again – we’ll only ever see 11.  Yeah, the Navy hasn’t exactly been striving to make that point clear.

Next, does anyone think the idled cruisers will ever be modernized?  The Navy isn’t modernizing its active ships to any great extent.  Why would they divert funds into modernizing idled ships when they could, instead, use the funds for new construction.  Can you picture the Navy someday saying, sure, let’s build one less brand new Burke Flt III so that we can modernize a Ticonderoga class cruiser that’s been sitting idle for several years?  Not going to happen.

Not sure I’m right about this?  Consider the case of the Avenger MCM vessels.  The Navy had the LCS coming along so they allowed the Avengers to sit and rot, literally.  Does it seem likely that the Navy will carefully maintain the idled Ticos with the new Burke Flt IIIs coming?  In fact, the more suspicious among us might think that allowing the idled Ticos to sit and rot would be exactly what the Navy would do so as to eliminate any possible alternative to the Burke Flt III from consideration.  The Navy eliminated the Spruances to avoid competition with Aegis.  They eliminated the Perrys and Avengers to avoid competition with the LCS.  It now appears that they’re eliminating the Ticos to avoid competition with the Burke Flt III.

The Navy wanted to early retire the cruisers, Congress balked and ordered the Navy to keep the cruisers, and now the Navy has found a way around Congress by “idling” and “modernizing” the cruisers.  The Navy’s ploy could not be more transparent.  Whether you agree or disagree with the Navy’s desire to retire the cruisers and Congress’ desire to keep them, the Navy has a duty and responsibility to comply with Congress’ intent.  It is reprehensible and shameful to pull this kind of maneuver which flagrantly disregards Congress’ direction.  If the Navy feels the cruisers must be retired then they need to make the case for it and accept the decision of Congress whether they agree or not.

The irony is that there might be a valid case to be made for idling ships (as long as they’re properly maintained) in this period of budget challenges.  Of course, there would be many difficulties involved in doing this properly but that’s a topic for another time.

Wave good-bye to the “idled” Ticos.  You’ll never see them again.

Flt III VLS

Military.com News website has an article (1) about the Zumwalt.  It’s just a sales brochure fluff piece but it did mention an interesting point.

Wade Knudson, Raytheon DDG 1000 program manager, had this to say about the Zumwalt’s Mk57 Peripheral VLS system.

“The ship is also built with a new kind of vertical launch tubes that are engineered into the hull near the perimeter of the ship. Called the Peripheral Vertical Launch System, the tubes are integrated with the hull around the ship's periphery in order to ensure that weapons can keep firing should the ship be damaged. Instead of having all of the launch tubes in succession or near one another, the DDG 1000 has spread them out in order to mitigate risk in the event [of] attack, Knudson said.

‘This divides the weapons up so if you take a hit, you don't lose all your weapons. This is a survivability enhancement,’ he added.”

I’m not at all sure that the Mk57’s placement was a survivability issue but let’s assume it was.  That begs the question why would the Navy consider moving forward with the Burke Flt III which will form the backbone of the fleet for the next four decades and carries the traditional clustered VLS system.  If the Mk41 VLS clustering has been deemed a sufficient survivability weakness to justify a radical VLS relocation in the Zumwalt, wouldn’t it also justify a redesign of the forthcoming Burke Flt III’s?  I understand that it would be nearly impossible to rework existing Burkes but the Flt III’s are new construction and are going to be extensively reworked anyway.

When you consider that the Flt III has been deemed by the Navy as unable to meet the full AMDR performance specs due to the inability to carry the full size AMDR and you combine that limitation with the survivability issue of clustered VLS, you really have to wonder why the Navy insists on moving ahead with a clearly sub-optimal Flt III rather than a new design.



Mk41 VLS - Unsafe?



Of course, the reason is obvious.  By calling the Flt III a modification to an existing design, the Navy hopes to avoid a great deal of oversight and scrutiny that would come with an officially new design.  By being unwilling to stand up a new design, take it to Congress, and justify it, the Navy is knowingly saddling itself with a sub-optimal vessel with no growth margin.  That’s just sad.

(1) http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/04/08/ddg1000-christening-pioneers-new-technology.html

LCS Replacement Process

As you know, the Navy has been directed to terminate the LCS program and evaluate a follow on, more lethal and survivable small combatant vessel.  One would assume that would mean carefully analyzing the role of the follow on vessel in the context of the overall fleet structure and the strategies and missions under which the vessel will operate.  What gaps do we have in the current force structure that need to be filled by the vessel?

For example, we’re in the midst of a Pacific Pivot.  Setting aside the wisdom or even the reality of that movement, how will the follow on vessel fit into a Pacific Pivot and what roles and tasks will it be expected to perform?  Having determined the requirements, the actual conceptual design becomes a relatively straightforward exercise.

Is a corvette/frigate type vessel even needed?  Most of us would think so but it would be nice to see such a conclusion supported by an actual analysis.  For instance, it could be easily argued that a dedicated MCM vessel to replace the Avenger class is a far more pressing need.  One could also make a good argument that a simple, dedicated shallow water ASW vessel to combat diesel subs is a more pressing need.  Perhaps a focused ASuW vessel to act in concert with the AAW Burkes is what’s needed, given the Navy’s lack of anti-surface warfare outside of the carrier airwing.  The point is that an analysis of needs is the first, logical step.

Unfortunately, the Navy appears to have skipped right over the needs, roles, and missions analysis and leapt straight into the design of an LCS replacement.  The lack of a rationale and developed concept of operations was the major failing of the LCS and the Navy appears set on repeating history.  I’m being as polite as I can when I say that the collective wisdom of Navy leadership is at an all time low, at least during my lifetime.

Alright, it’s obvious that the Navy is going to approach this thing ass backwards.  So be it.  We can still salvage something useful.  The next step is to at least make sure that the ship fits the requirements rather than forcing the requirements to fit the ship.  This means that you design the ship to be the size and shape that the requirements dictate rather than pre-selecting a ship and then seeing how many of the requirements you can fit on the ship.  Again, unfortunately, the Navy is going to choose the LCS as the follow on to the LCS.  This is simple, idiotic Navy logic.  They want hulls in the water as fast as possible and with as little oversight and justification as possible.  That means selecting the LCS with its pre-existing production line and pre-existing Congressional justification.  The Navy is going to add a bigger gun and some VLS cells to the existing LCS and call it done.  We will not build the ship around the requirements; instead, the Navy will attempt to force the requirements onto the LCS hull.

Yet another opportunity wasted. 

I really hope that someday I can write an apology piece stating that I was wrong about this. 

Moratorium

I’ve said this before but it’s becoming ever more true with each passing day:  a ten year moratorium on new construction of ships and aircraft wouldn’t be a bad thing.  In fact, at this point, it would be highly beneficial.

Wait, you say, we can’t do that!  We’d fall behind our enemies!  The shipbuilding and aircraft industries would fail and we’d lose our industrial base!  Our technical expertise would vanish!  Crops would wither and die!  The world would end!  ComNavOps has really lost it this time!

Well, the last part might be true but the rest is completely false.

Consider where we’re at right now.  We’re procuring our little hearts out which is exactly what your initial reaction says we should be doing and what do we have to show for it? 

• We have a JSF that is going to deliver a limited capability aircraft (relative to the current threats and needed missions) that is going to be borderline obsolete by the time it reaches squadron service.

• We have a fleet that is steadily shrinking.

• We have a Burke Flt III coming that even the Navy says can only meet a portion of the required AMDR performance spec and will have no growth margin.

• We have a looming SSBN construction program that will cripple Navy shipbuilding budgets for a decade.

• We have a fleet that is hollow and getting worse every day due to systematic deferred maintenance so that funding can go to new construction.

• We have an LCS that has no combat capability but will make up a third of the combat fleet.

• We have an LCS replacement that will likely be just an upgunned LCS with all the same inherent structural flaws.

• We have a fleet that has lost any semblance of tactical training.

And so on …

Is this really what we want to keep going?  It’s not even debatable that the fleet is becoming smaller and less capable relative to the current and future threats.  Alright, so the current system isn’t perfect but what are the benefits to stopping new construction and what about the problems associated with stopping?

Let’s look at the benefits, first. 

The most obvious benefit is that stopping new construction would free up enormous sums of money, $15B per year from the shipbuilding budget alone.  This money then becomes available for the deferred maintenance that is crippling and hollowing the fleet.  We simply can’t build new ships as fast as the existing ones are being allowed to fall into disrepair and subsequent early retirement.  We absolutely must reverse this decline in the physical state of our ships and aircraft.

Existing ships can be upgraded.  While upgrades are not cheap they are still far cheaper than new construction.  A good example is the Australian’s upgrade of the Perrys.  If you think the US is poor at program management, we look positively efficient next to the Australians – no offense, down there.  Even so, the upgrade cost $100M or so and they obtained a modernized, capable frigate.  Compare that to the $1B or so cost for a new frigate.  We could upgrade ten frigates for the cost of a single new one.

Existing aircraft can also be upgraded, rewinged, refuselaged, or whatever is necessary to maintain a competent aviation component during the moratorium.  Even without new construction aircraft, we can apply many of the Advanced Super Hornet features (conformal fuel tanks, stealth weapon pods, advanced avionics, etc.) to existing Hornets via upgrades.

A break in new construction would allow us to go back to the drawing board and work on carefully thought out designs for our next ships and aircraft.  We wouldn’t be under the gun to rush something out.  Does anyone think the Navy is carefully evaluating LCS alternatives right now?  Of course not.  They’re going to recommend the quickest option that can make it into production regardless of whether it’s a useful design or not.  That’s why it’s a near certainty that the LCS replacement will be an LCS!

We’re talking about a Pacific Pivot to deal with the coming Chinese threat although the Navy won’t speak the name out loud.  A break would allow us to pivot on paper first.  Let’s take the time to game out what strategies we would use and what capabilities we would need to implement those strategies.  Then, and only then, should we proceed to the design and procurement phases.  A moratorium would give us the unpressured time to do our homework and lay the proper foundation for the next ship and aircraft designs.

A moratorium would allow us to focus on training so that we can maximize the potential of the weapons and systems we have instead of constantly moving on to the next system coming down the line before we’ve mastered the current one.  We have Burkes that rarely practice ASW, a Marine Corps that’s re-inventing the amphibious assault wheel, an Aegis system that is seriously degraded fleetwide due to the lack of highly trained technicians (and parts!), and so on.  Our command element is woefully untrained in battle tactics – that’s the Navy’s opinion, not mine, though I agree fully.  We could come out of the moratorium fully trained up and battle ready, unlike our current state.

A moratorium would allow us to complete some of the advanced technologies that we’re currently attempting to include in new construction despite the fact that they don’t exist in a functional form.  We can develop unmanned vehicles of all types to a more mature level, complete a Harpoon replacement, develop a Tomahawk replacement, and dozens of other programs that desperately need to mature before being rushed into the fleet in an incomplete and only marginally functional state.

We see, then, that the benefits of a moratorium are many and profound.  What about the potential drawbacks, though?

The most commonly cited argument against a reduced construction pace (or moratorium, in this case) is the impact on the industrial base.  The logic of this argument insists that the need to maintain the base outweighs any other concern.  It’s why proponents say we must accept sub-standard products like the JSF, LCS, and LPD.  Well, you just read the proposed benefits.  They would include massive upgrades and maintenance of all ships and aircraft.  The industrial base would be kept fully occupied, fully funded, and fully employed filling this need.  Aircraft carriers would still need nuclear refueling and overhauls.  Designers would be fully occupied developing the next round of new designs but at a pace that would allow them to actually do it right.  Thus, industry would not lose any funding, capacity, or expertise.  In fact, they might well have to expand to meet the demand!

Naysayers would argue that we would fall behind our enemies.  The reality is that that’s happening now.  Our enemies have intermediate range ballistic missiles, highly advanced supersonic anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, fleets of brand new ships packed with modern missiles, huge inventories of mines, etc. while we’re building ships and aircraft that are being outpaced even before they’re completed.  The fact is that a moratorium would not cause us to drop any further behind than we are and it would allow us to come out of it with brand new, well thought out designs based on actual proven technology.

By the way, this moratorium would include a moratorium on new Admirals until such time as we reduce the number from the current 350 or so to around 50.

Of course, the entire premise of a moratorium depends on doing the things I’ve outlined and doing them correctly.  Could the Navy institute a moratorium and totally bungle the execution?  Of course, they could.  They’re the same Navy and same leadership we have now.  However, one of the major aspects of a moratorium is that it would relieve current leadership from the pressure of having to produce new ships and planes no matter how badly flawed and no matter what the negative impact on other programs.  It would be a chance for naval leadership to catch their breath, relax, and start over, so to speak, without that pressure to provide instant short term results to the detriment of long term gains.  Hey, what we’re doing now isn’t working.  Isn’t it worth trying something else?

... Master of None

ComNavOps just finished reading yet another article extolling the versatility of a weapon system.  It doesn’t matter which one – the idea’s the same regardless.  The system is able to be adapted to perform a seemingly infinite variety of tasks according to the manufacturer.  So what’s the problem?  Who wouldn’t want a versatile system?  That’s cost effective, isn’t it?

Yes, it is, as long as maximum performance isn’t required. 

Consider the example of a car that’s designed for ultimate versatility.  It would have a large cargo bed, good mileage, moderate speed, decent handling and it would get utterly destroyed in a race against dedicated race cars.  It’s not optimized for anything.  It can do a lot but nothing well.  You know the saying for this:  jack of all trades, master of none.  If you want to win a race, you design a dedicated, optimized race car whose every feature and characteristic is focused on racing.

If you want to win an ASW engagement, you design a dedicated, optimized platform (helo, surface ship, submarine, fixed wing aircraft – doesn’t matter, the concept is the same) whose every feature and characteristic is focused on ASW.  This means that every nut, bolt, rivet, and weld is carefully evaluated for quieting, every sensor is tuned to anti-submarine use, the engines are carefully selected for the perfect combination of required speed and quieting, the hull is shaped to minimize self-noise and maximize maneuverability, and so on.  A generic, semi-commercial design that has an ASW module tucked in the modular cargo area is going to be marginally effective, at best, and sunk, more likely, because it will be a sub-optimal platform going up against a specialized enemy submarine that is optimized to kill it.

This doesn’t just apply to ASW.  The same concept holds true for any weapon system or mission.  Asking a generalized, combination strike fighter to go up against a purpose built, single function, optimized, air supremacy fighter is simply going to get the strike fighter killed.  For example, the JSF is badly overmatched against an F-22 or the enemy’s equivalent of an F-22.

Despite understanding this simple concept, the Navy is insisting on building non-optimized, multi-function ships that will someday have to go up against specialized enemy vessels.  China, for example, is building some specialized, lethal warships.  The Zumwalt has been given the versatility of an ASW capability but is not optimized for the mission and will become a multi-billion dollar target if it tries to play tag with modern submarines.

Having said all that, there is a role and a need for versatile platforms and systems.  The Perry class FFGs were a great example of a versatile platform (though they were reasonably specialized for ASW) that was adequate at multiple things but not outstanding at anything.  The JHSV looks to be adequate at generic transport of equipment and personnel but not optimized for any particular transport function.

If one thinks carefully about the platforms and systems that are acceptable as versatile but non-optimized versus highly specific specialized ones, it quickly becomes apparent that the quality of versatility is most acceptable in non-combat roles.  A platform or system that engages in combat against a technologically advanced enemy must either be optimized or it will be destroyed.

Versatility is fine for tasks that don’t require maximum, optimized performance.  A platform, whether sea or air, that swings between cargo, personnel transport, humanitarian assistance, anti-piracy, show-the-flag, international training exercises, etc. is perfectly acceptable because none of those tasks require maximum performance.  In fact, such a platform may well prove to be a cost effective way to carry out multiple tasks. 

Let’s recognize, though, that while the majority of the Navy’s time is spent on peacetime, non-critical tasks, the reason the Navy exists is combat.  For that, nothing less than perfectly optimized systems are acceptable.  Anything less is a recipe for defeat.

We know that the Navy is in the process of defining the replacement for the cancelled LCS.  [ Of course, it will be a revised LCS rather than a true frigate but that’s another topic ]  The salient point is that the Navy is probably about to design a versatile, master-of-none vessel that will be make up a significant portion of the combat fleet and will be expected to engage in combat against some pretty lethal threats.  We need to think very carefully about what degree of non-optimization we’re willing to accept.