LCS Aviation

In a discussion awhile back, a commenter stated that the helo and hangar might be the only thing the LCS got right.  My first reaction was that the statement might be right but the more I thought about it, the more I think the opposite is true.

Before we go any further, let’s set the record straight on the aviation capabilities of the LCS.  Most people think the large flight decks (and they do have that!) mean fairly extensive aviation capabilities:  the ability to operate several helos of any type, the ability to act as a lily pad for any number of any type of helos, and, possibly, the ability to operate MV-22s.  The reality, however, is quite a bit less.  Ignoring UAVs, here’s what the LCS can handle.

LCS-1 – (1)SH-60 (hangar)

LCS-2 – (2)SH-60 (hangar) or (1)H-53 (flight deck only)

As a lily pad, the LCS can, presumably, accommodate any helo up to the weight of an SH-60 or SH-60/H-53, depending on the LCS class.  That’s tempered, though, by the fact that the flight decks are structurally weak.  I’ve never seen actual data on the flight deck weight limits or total capacity but LCS program engineers I’ve spoken to suggest that the structural weakness greatly limits the flight deck capacity.  My best assessment is that the flight deck can’t handle much more than the one or two helos the ship’s are credited with operating.

Thus, the LCS-1 class can operate a single helo and the LCS-2 class can operate one or two helos.  That’s not a lot.  Add to that the maxim that if you have one helo, you have none, in recognition of the helo’s extensive maintenance requirements and you begin to recognize that the helo is not as useful in practice as it would seem on paper.  Further, unlike, say, a ship’s gun which is ready 24 hours a day, a helo can only be used for several hours, at most, before it must return to the ship to rearm and refuel – a lengthy process even assuming a relief crew is available and, given the high maintenance requirements, the helo is only available for several hours out of 24.

Assuming it’s mechanically “up”, what can a helo contribute to the ship’s three main missions of ASW, MCM, and ASuW? 

ASW is the helo’s forte and the MH-60R is well suited for it.  The only drawback is the lack of numbers and limited endurance.  A single LCS can only operate one or two helos which provides pretty spotty coverage.  A helo can only operate for a few hours before it must return to the ship to rearm and refuel – a lengthy process that leaves gaps in the ASW coverage.

MCM was intended to be performed in large measure by helo towed or mounted MCM equipment.  Unfortunately, apparently no one checked to see whether the the -60 helo could safely tow the equipment.  As it turned out, it can’t.  Further, some of the helo mounted MCM systems have failed to pan out.  It looks like the helo is going to operate the Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) which uses a remote controlled (fiber optic link) “torpedo” (Archerfish or similar) with a camera and explosive charge to relocate a target mine and destroy it.  It appears that a helo can neutralize up to four mines before returning to the ship to rearm.  Thus, a maximum of four mines can be neutralized over the course of several  hours, at best.  Further, unlike the MH-53E, the MH-60S cannot conduct MCM operations at night and has less endurance.  Overall, the helo is going to play a much smaller MCM role than originally intended. 

ASuW is a potentially useful role for the helo armed with up to 8 Hellfires, however, operational constraints greatly decrease the usefulness.  Aside from the spotty availability, the helo will only be useful if it happens to be airborne and armed with the proper weapons at the exact moment of an attack.  Given the probable short range and short warning of engagements, the odds of getting a helo into action are not great.  Add to that the vulnerability of the helo to Stinger-type missiles and the ASuW role begins to look a bit suspect.

Some of the LCS’s aviation limitations could possibly be alleviated by operating the ships in squadrons so that they can pool their helos.  Of course, that requires that the ships stay in fairly close proximity so as to maximize mission time.  If that’s the case, it would probably make more sense to simply operate a single amphibious ASW or MCM mothership, at least from a helo operations and support point of view.

So far, the discussion has been straightforward and the conclusion is that helos on the LCS are of much more limited usefulness than would appear on paper.  Add to that the fact that each LCS has to be its own helo support and maintenance center and it quickly becomes apparent that LCS helos are somewhat useful, though limited, and inefficient to operate. 

Now, let’s go a step further.  Recognizing both the potential usefulness of helos and operational inefficiency of the LCS, what about deleting aviation capability from the LCS and, instead, operate non-aviation LCS squadrons centered around amphibious motherships (retired Tarawas, for example)?  The LCS, now much cheaper to build and operate, and suitably modified for this new role, would provide the ASuW and AAW protection for the mothership, extended reach for MCM and ASW remote underwater vehicles (assuming they ever pan out), and extended area patrol, boarding, and other “peacetime” activities.  In addition to being able to operate more helos than a squadron of LCS’s, the mothership would provide the centralized support and maintenance that would allow for more efficient helo operation, a degree of materiel and maintenance support for the LCS squadron, and centralized command and control.

So, quite the opposite from the helo/hangar/flight deck being the one thing the LCS got right, I submit that it’s a serious failing in the ship design and concept of operations.  That’s not surprising, really, since the Navy, by their own admission, never had a concept of operations in place when the LCS was designed.  The proposed concept of operations offers the opportunity to salvage a degree of usefulness from the LCS while enhancing MCM and ASW capabilities in the fleet.

R&D Production

R&D Production

Huh?!?  What does that title mean?  Aren’t R&D (Research and Development) and Production two separate, if not mutually exclusive, terms?  Isn’t R&D something you do separate from, and generally prior to, Production?  Doesn’t R&D mean the investigation and development of something that isn’t mature enough for production – something that may or may not eventually pan out?  Doesn’t Production mean the routine building of a known commodity?

You say your old rifle isn’t good enough anymore?  Well, you initiate an R&D program and when you have a proven design for a new rifle with the major kinks worked out of it then you begin production of that new rifle.  Seems simple, straightforward, and obvious - so obvious, in fact, that I’m beginning to bore you, right?  Talk about stating and belaboring the obvious!

Well, despite the obviousness, the Navy (and, to be fair, the military in general) seems totally unable to grasp the concept and has begun using Production as a means of implementing R&D.

The most obvious example is the LCS.  We’re producing hulls that have no purpose or capability so that we can justify an enormous and long term R&D program attempting to develop unmanned vehicles of various types as well as other far future technologies.  The Navy terms this practice “concurrent” production and design.  More accurately, it’s concurrent production and R&D.

The JSF is another good example.  We’re building an aircraft while simultaneously conducting an R&D program to develop an integrated, 360 degree sensor solution tied into a magic helmet.  We have no idea whether it will ultimately work.  It hasn’t so far and it’s unlikely to be operational for several more years, at least, yet we’re building the aircraft.

The Zumwalt is a floating R&D laboratory though the degree of R&D risk is, perhaps, a bit less than some other programs.  The very shape of the ship may or may not prove seaworthy and yet production is well underway.  The ship contains a host of developmental technologies that are not yet proven.

The Ford is intended to use radars that are still in the developmental stage even though the ship is already built.  The EMALS and AAG systems are still developmental.

The problems with this approach are many.  We’re wasting enormous sums of money building platforms and systems that, at best, will have to be extensively reworked as the designs mature and, at worst, may never pan out and will be discarded.  We risk our future combat capability with bets on technology that may not succeed.  Consider the LCS – if we can’t develop useful modules, and so far we have none despite a decade or more of R&D efforts, we may well wind up with a third of our battle fleet consisting of Coast Guard cutters.  If the Zumwalt proves unseaworthy, and the Navy is already writing guidelines to address the dangers of sailing a tumblehome hull in certain seas, we may wind up with a cruiser size, $4B ship that can’t leave calm waters.  If the JSF technologies don’t pan out we’ll have a $300B program that will have produced a near obsolete aircraft by the time it enters squadron service.

The sequence of R&D followed by Production is a time-tested and proven concept.  Concurrent R&D and Production is one more example of the endless string of very poor decisions and practices implemented by uniformed leadership over the last few decades.  The military desperately needs a return to common sense and time-tested procedures.

Industry In Charge

In an interview (1) with Real Clear Defense (RCD), CNO Greenert expressed concern about the Navy’s lack of anti-ship weaponry.  As RCD reported,

“Greenert said that while he is comfortable now, it’s “reasonably fair” to say there is a real long-term concern about being out-sticked in the future. “I’m not dissatisfied, let’s just say impatient in the near term to get something out there with what we have. Industry can come up with some pretty interesting payloads pretty quickly, and I’d like to see what they’re going to do in the nearer term. “

The Navy chief emphasized that the military does not “think of things like, ship-to-ship, air-to-air,” but rather places emphasis on systems. But he acknowledged “the need is there to deliver something from the ship.” “

Greenert’s statement demonstrates exactly the point I’ve been hammering on for some time, now, with regard to the Navy’s lack of in-house expertise.  He notes that “Industry can come up with some pretty interesting payloads …” and wants “… to see what they’re going to do in the nearer term.”

The Navy wants to see what industry is going to do about our national defense and about the Navy’s capabilities!?!  Not only does the Navy no longer have the expertise to design weapons and systems in-house but they don’t even have enough grasp of strategy, tactics, and requirements to come up with a list of requirements to present to industry for development.  The Navy should be telling industry what to build not waiting to see what industry comes up with and hoping it meets a need.

Aside from my absolute disgust with Navy leadership, we also can see a system that is ingrained with an industry-first bias.  A company is going to propose and develop the products that it can make a larger profit on and that enhance and support its existing product lines rather than developing weapons and systems that are actually needed.  That’s understandable.  That’s why industry exists – to make a profit.  That’s also why, when you approach industry, you tell them what YOU want rather than having them tell you what THEY will give you.  If a company can’t deliver what you want you go to another company that can.

This is incompetence and irresponsibility on a scale that makes our naval forefathers roll over in their graves.  This CNO hasn’t got a clue how to run a Navy.

(1) Real Clear Defense, Justin Walker, 19-Nov-2013, “Navy Chief Impatient To Avoid Being Out-Sticked”,

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/11/19/navy_chief_impatient_to_avoid_being_out-sticked_106966.html

Shallow Draft

As regular readers know, I’m often critical of the Navy and for good reason.  However, there’s one thing the Navy is exceedingly good at and that’s selling a project.  The Navy will use whatever spin, made-up stories, distorted facts, and creative accounting is needed.  The corollary to this is the old saying that if you repeat a lie long enough it becomes the truth.  Let’s look at the littoral combat ship and, specifically, the myth about the need for shallow draft.

We all know that the Navy can’t operate near shore or in littoral waters because of the extreme danger from enemy actions.  How do we know this?  Because the Navy has told us this over and over.  The fact that an incoming anti-ship missile doesn’t really care what the depth of the ocean is under it is kind of glossed over.  Be that as it may, even if we ignored the immediate combat threat, we know that Navy ships can’t operate in shallow waters simply due to their extreme draft.  Only a specialized vessel like the LCS can even go in shallow water.  That alone is justification for the LCS program.  How do we know this?  Because the Navy has told us this over and over.

Let me pose this question:  How close do you want to be to the shore?  That’s another way of asking, what activity can a ship perform in 10 ft of water that it can’t perform in 20 ft?  What activity can it perform in 50 ft of water that it can’t perform in 100 ft?  The entire “argument” about draft presupposes that there is some worthwhile activity that can only occur in very shallow water. 

Let’s think about this, for a minute.  A typical shore drops off fairly steadily and quickly from 0 ft to 100+ ft within a few hundred yards to, say, half a mile or so.  Is there some beach, somewhere on Earth where the depth is only 6 ft a mile out from shore?  Probably but that’s hardly typical.

Now, let’s do a quick check of some actual naval vessel drafts.

Nimitz Class – 40 ft

Burke Class – 30 ft

LCS Class – 14 ft

Well, that’s interesting.  Referring back to our notional shore profile, and even allowing for a depth of twice the draft for operating safety, a Nimitz could stand to within a few hundred yards to a half mile or so off a beach.

Now think about that.  What needed function is there that would require a ship to get closer to shore than a few hundred yards or a half mile or so?  Because that’s exactly what the Navy sold us on – that there was some function that only a shallow draft ship could perform and therefore the LCS program was needed.  What is that function?  Chasing a guy in a motorboat? – I guess so but that hardly justifies a $500M+ LCS and the LCS can still only operate within 28 ft of depth so it can’t “run down” a motorboat in shallow water anyway.  Neutralizing near-shore mines?  Yeah!  No, wait.  Now that I think about it, the LCS is meant to stand well off from mines so shallow draft isn’t needed.  Shallow water ASW?  No, even diesel subs require a hundred plus feet of water to operate in and, besides, the LCS can’t perform ASW in shallow water – the towed arrays can’t deploy.  Gun support for troops ashore?  Burkes can get within a few hundred yards to a half mile.  Would an extra hundred yards of inland range make any difference?  Besides, the LCS isn’t a gun support ship anyway.

You get my point.  I can’t think of a naval ship function that is required in the 28 ft – 80 ft depth that can’t be performed in 60 ft - 80+ ft which is what a Nimitz or Burke can do.

People have bought into the shallow draft story because the Navy has repeated it so long and so often that it has become “truth”.  With a little common sense thinking, we now know better and we see that a major portion of the LCS justification was based on an invalid assumption.  Shallow draft gains us little or nothing.

Freedom To The Rescue!

The USS Freedom (LCS-1) is being dispatched to the Philippines, laden with 10 pallets of supplies.  That’s right, a 3000 ton vessel carrying a whopping 10 pallets!  I guess every little bit helps in a disaster but that’s the definition of a little bit. 

Is it just me or does this smack of a PR ploy?  The mighty LCS rushing to save the day with enough supplies to feed a family of four for a couple of days? 

Setting aside my absolute disgust over this transparent stunt, has the Navy considered what will happen if Freedom experiences another one of its all too frequent mechanical failures?  Unlike the Singapore deployment where no one really cared or kept too close a track on the ship’s activities, a failure during this operation, with international press keeping a close watch, would be an enormous embarrassment for the LCS program.  You’ve got to believe there will be some Admirals keeping nervous fingers crossed for the duration of this PR operation.

USS Chancellorsville Hit By Drone

The Navy has reported that a BQM-74 target drone went out of control and hit the USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) on 16-Nov while the ship was conducting air defense and radar tracking exercises.  The hit left a two or three foot hole in the port side of the ship.  The Information Dissemination (ID) website reports that the ship and crew attempted to defend the ship but failed.

I have no independent confirmation that the ship attempted to defend itself, however, I also have no reason to disbelieve the ID report as their reports are generally factual and true.

ID correctly notes that the issue is not the loss of control of the drone but, rather, the failure of the ship’s defensive systems.  I’ll be watching this one closely to see what the Navy offers in the way of an explanation.

Here’s a link, below, to the ID article.  They have an extensive writeup and cover all the points I would make so I won’t bother repeating their efforts.  I encourage you to follow the link and read the article.  Plus, they have a great photo of the damage.

http://www.informationdissemination.net/2013/11/uss-chancellorsville-new-details-tell.html

LCS Report Card

As reported by the Wall Street Journal online site (1), the Navy has received an early report on the performance of the USS Freedom, LCS-1, Singapore deployment.  As we’ve discussed on this blog, Freedom has suffered from generator failures, blackouts, power outages, leaking piping, flooding, propulsion, and steering problems among other lowlights.  The ship has had to routinely carry several tech reps to assist with maintenance.  From the article,

“When Navy leaders were given an expedited assessment on the ship's performance last week, they found the scope of those problems to be "a little stunning," says Rear Adm. Tom Rowden, the Navy's director of surface warfare.”

As the demonstrated shortcomings of the LCS are becoming more apparent, Navy officials continue to ratchet down the expectations and offer revisionist history.  Again, from the article,

“Some Navy officials have distanced themselves from one original selling point: the ability to shift between missions in 72 hours.  "I'm not sure that I ever bought into that concept at all," says Vice Adm. Richard Hunt, who led a council created last year to review the littoral-ship program.”

You never bought into it.  Sure ...  I believe you.

Another issue that has surfaced is the automated maintenance reporting system.  The ship collects large amounts of data on a continuous basis with the data being automatically communicated back to the shore based support facility so as to facilitate the needed maintenance and repairs when the ship returns to port.  However, the maintenance reporting system has suffered from bandwidth issues causing data reporting to be delayed for many days or more.

As the evidence mounts against the LCS, the Navy’s public support for the program seems to increase proportionally.  The Navy seems determined to ride this program right to the bitter end.

(1)http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303460004579191950780107222