Thursday, May 2, 2013

Manned-Unmanned Helo Squadron

A Navy Times website article today (Julie Watson, 2-May-13) announces the establishment of a combined manned and unmanned helicopter squadron, HSL-35, which will operate 8 unspecified Seahawk type helos and 10 MQ-8B Fire Scouts from the LCS.  This is fine.  UAVs have a role to play.  However, the claims for UAVs far exceed any reasonable real world performance.  For example, the article states,

“… the Fire Scout can hover over an enemy target, maintaining contact …”
 
The Fire Scout, for any who may not be familiar with it, is simply an unmanned helo: not very stealthy and not very fast.  An enemy target is going to allow it to hover over its position?  Maybe if we’re fighting some third world idiots armed with BB guns.  An actual enemy with a real military would simply shoot down the Fire Scout in short order.

Again, I have no problem with UAVs but the abilities claimed for them are far too often simply ridiculous. 

Sunday, April 28, 2013

Stealth for Dummies

Continuing the highly acclaimed (according to ComNavOps' brother-in-law) “Dummies” series, we turn our attention to stealth in warship design.  Just as there was (there isn’t now since they’ve all read the Armor for Dummies post and have been educated !) a group of people who, misguidedly, believed that armor was pointless because it couldn’t totally stop every weapon in existence, so too, there is a group of people (probably the same group) who believes that stealth is pointless since it can’t make a warship completely invisible.  Such a belief could not be more wrong and we’ll now see why.

Most people believe that the purpose of stealth is to conceal the location of a ship – if you can’t find it you can’t attack it.  That’s great except that the naysayers will point out, correctly, that it’s not possible to completely hide a ship with stealth measures.  You can reduce the radar (or visible, or infrared, or electromagnetic) signature to some degree but any ship can be detected.  Let’s face it, we can’t completely mask aircraft and ships are many times larger.  Further, some aspects of ship design just don’t lend themselves to enhanced stealth.  The hull just plain has to be a big vertical chunk of metal.  We can slope the sides somewhat but the hull is still a big radar return.  The same goes for the superstructure.  The various sensors and weapons offer large radar returns and their signatures can’t really be reduced all that much without adversely impacting their function.  Ships need cranes, boats, and deck gear all of which increases the ship’s signature.  So, there’s no getting around the fact that a ship can’t be made invisible.

So, why do we even bother with stealth?  Well, we can reduce the ship’s signature and every bit of reduction makes the ship just that much harder to find.  For a ship attempting to penetrate an enemy A2/AD zone, every hour it can avoid detection is an hour less time the enemy has to attack it or reposition assets to deal with it.  Every hour undetected is an hour of safety making it more likely that the ship will be able to carry out its mission. 

Further, in order to overcome stealth, the enemy will be forced to employ more subs, patrol boats, AEW, and search assets in attempt to increase the density of their search coverage.  This soaks up assets that might otherwise be employed offensively.  So, stealth requires the enemy to assume a larger, more defensive posture than they would prefer.


Enough of a Good Thing or Too Much?

Sooner or later, though, the ship will be found.  What then?  Well, this is where stealth serves its second purpose - a purpose most people overlook.  When a ship is found, what is required to attack it?  The location is, by definition, now known but modern weapons require more than that.  They require a target lock for terminal guidance of the weapon.  That lock may take the form of radar returns, infrared, or whatever.  If the weapon can’t achieve a lock, it won’t strike its target.  It’s that simple.  We could park a ship ten miles off an enemy’s coast, broadcast its location, and, if the stealth measures were good enough, the ship would be invulnerable because the enemy weapons couldn’t lock on.

Is warship stealth that good?  Not hardly! 

So, again, what’s the point of stealth if we can’t totally prevent target lock?  Consider a group of missiles launched towards our ship whose location is reasonably accurately known.  The missiles will be spread out and some will approach the ship on the fringe of the missile’s detection radius.  Stealth reduces that detection radius so that some of the missiles that might otherwise have locked on will miss, never having seen a target.  Of course, some of the missiles will approach dead on and will achieve target lock.  Bad day to be on our ship, huh?  Not necessarily.  Even those missiles that achieve a target lock will have the strength of that lock reduced due to the ship’s stealth.  That allows the ship’s passive defenses such as chaff, flares, and ECM to be more effective.  In other words, a missile with a weak lock is more susceptible to being decoyed than one with a strong lock.  Of course, some missiles will still maintain a sufficient lock for a terminal attack and that’s why ships carry point defense weapons.  Nothing, including stealth, is perfect!

We see, then, that stealth serves not one, but two purposes:  making detection more difficult and degrading weapon locks.  It’s the second purpose, degrading weapon locks, that strikes me as the more important.  In combat, ships will be found.  It’s what happens after that that really matters.  Will the ship survive the inevitable combat to carry out its mission and, hopefully, return home?  Stealth increases the chances of survival.  The notion that stealth must completely hide a ship in order to be worthwhile is just as silly as the idea that armor must completely stop all weapons. 

Like armor, which carries a weight penalty, stealth carries a cost penalty.  Stealth designs are more complex, a bit harder to build, require some additional equipment, and, most significantly, reduce available deck space (look at any stealth warship and compare it to a WWII conventional ship and you’ll see what I mean – the LCS is an extreme example of a stealthy ship that has very little horizontal deck space for mounting weapons, sensors, and gear).  Still, the penalties are well worth it and can be compensated for.  Of course, there’s a balance point in the stealth cost-benefit relationship.  Where that point is, I don’t know.  Has the Zumwalt gone too far?  Only time will tell.

Clearly, stealth enhances the survivability of warships and does so at relatively little cost.  Hey, throw in some armor and you’re on your way to a good ship design!

Friday, April 26, 2013

Stormy Weather for Carriers

The latest CRS report on the Ford class carriers (1) reveals that the construction schedule for new carriers, historically one every five years, is being stretched.  In the data below, the first date listed for each carrier is the procurement date, the second is the actual or projected delivery date, the years from procurement to construction is shown, and, as an interesting sidelight, the final number is the construction cost.  CVN-78 is, of course, the USS Ford, the first of the new Ford class.  CVN-77, the last of the Nimitz class is listed for comparison.


CVN-77  2001  2006  5 yrs
CVN-78  2008  2015  7 yrs  $12.8B+
CVN-79  2013  2022  9 yrs  $11.4
CVN-80  2018  2027  9 yrs  $13.9

Costs are in FY13 dollars

We see that while the procurement frequency is still scheduled for every five years, the delivery dates are going to be stretched out to nine years.  With that in mind, there is almost no chance that the procurement frequency will remain at five years.  It’s just a matter of time, and soon, before the procurement dates are stretched out, as well.

We’ve discussed before that, for a 50 year lifespan, we need to build a new carrier every 4.5 years to maintain the Congressionally mandated level of 11 carriers.  Even the 5 year procurement frequency only gives a force level of 10 carriers.  If the procurement frequency gets stretched out to more closely match the announced delivery frequency, the carrier level will shrink to only 6 (for a nine year frequency).  How this would be reconciled with the Congressionally mandated force level remains to be seen. 

Rough Seas Ahead for Carriers?

 As a reminder, the current carrier force level is 10, one less than the mandated level, due to the retirement of Enterprise and the construction delays for the Ford.  The Navy obtained a waiver from Congress specifically for this situation and the waiver will remain in effect until the Ford enters service in 2015 or 2016.

What is the rationale for stretching out the delivery times, you ask?  Well, as anyone who has ever financed a home or automobile knows, the longer you stretch out the payment time, the lower the payments.  Of course, the longer the payment period, the greater the total payment, in the end.  As best I can tell, the Navy's accounting structure doesn't care about total costs, only yearly budgeted costs.  Hence, the push to stretch out the delivery time.

Now, on to the cost figures.  We see that there is no economy of scale for carrier construction.  Taking into account the first of class one-off expenditures, it’s clear that each succeeding Ford class carrier will increase in cost (dollars are constant FY13 so inflation is accounted for).  Compare the magnitude of the construction cost, around $12B, to the Navy’s entire annual shipbuilding budget of $15B.  When a carrier is built, almost an entire year’s shipbuilding budget is consumed by one ship.  No wonder the fleet size is shrinking!  Regardless of the value of the carrier, they are simply becoming unaffordable and that’s reflected in the stretching out of the delivery dates and why the procurement dates are sure to be stretched out, as well.

Proponents and detractors of carriers can argue all they want but the simple fact is that the carrier is pricing itself out of existence.

Despite this, the Navy is embarked on a logically inconsistent path.  Air wings are approaching half the size they were when we started building supercarriers which would seem to suggest that somewhat smaller carriers would suffice and, yet, the Navy is building the Ford class which is even bigger than the Nimitz class.  Huh??  How does that make sense?  Logically, the Ford class should have been closer to the modernized Midway in size.  This is just like the new SSBN which, despite carrying several fewer missile tubes, will be bigger than the Ohios.

The Navy is embarked on an unsustainable carrier construction path.  Something is going to have to change and soon.  I think we’re going to see the carrier force level drop to around 8 in the fairly near future.  I predict that one of the next couple of upcoming carrier mid-life nuclear refuelings is going to be cancelled and the ship is going to be pre-maturely retired.  Time will tell.

(1) Congressional Research Service, “Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier
Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O'Rourke, March 13, 2013

Wednesday, April 24, 2013

30 Year Shipbuilding Plan

The Navy has released data tables from its FY2014 long range, 30 year, building plan.  There are plenty of interesting bits of information contained therein. 

The construction/retirement numbers by class are revealing.  The “+” numbers are new construction and the “-“ numbers are retirements.  The number following that is the net change over the period, either positive or negative.

CVN  +6 / -6 ; 0

DDG/CG  +70 / -61 ; +9

LXX (amphibs)  +19 / -20 ; -1

LCS/FFG  +66 / -50 ; +16

SSN  +47 / -52 ; -5

SSBN  +12 / -14 ; -2

SSGN  +0 / -4 ; -4

We see that major surface combatants, DDGs and CGs will increase by 9.  All other classes of ship except the LCS/FFG will either remain unchanged or decrease.  Discounting the LCS which has no credible combat capability, the net change across all ship classes is -3.  The Navy is banking heavily on the LCS to maintain ship numbers.  What that means is that Ticos and Burkes will be retired and replaced, numerically, by the LCS.  That seems like a reasonable swap, doesn’t it?

Another noteworthy item is that over the next two years, FY14 and FY15, the Navy proposes to build 16 ships of all types and retire 31 for a net change of -15.  Yikes!  That will drop the fleet size from the current level of about 285 to 270.

The Navy is saying that over the next couple years when we have a pretty solid idea of what budgets and costs will be, the fleet will shrink significantly due to lack of construction funds.  During the out years in the 2020’s and beyond, when we have no idea what budgets and costs will be, the Navy rosily forecasts growth from 270 ships back to around 306.  Hey, Navy, as long as you’re making stuff up, why not forecast growth to 400 or 500 ships?  You won’t have to actually do it and it will sound way more impressive for public relations and political purposes.

We’ve already demonstrated that the Navy’s 30 year shipbuilding plan isn’t even remotely achievable, financially.  Indeed, the next two years, which most accurately reflect the fiscal realities, clearly show that the fleet will shrink significantly.  The Navy is, at best, engaging in wishful thinking with the 30 year plan and, more realistically, is engaging in misinformation, misdirection, and fraud.

Sunday, April 21, 2013

New Modules for the LCS !!

Inspired by a comment from Anon in the last post, ComNavOps is offering the following module concepts for the Navy’s consideration.  Unlike the worthless ASW, MCM, and ASuW modules the Navy is pursuing, these modules will truly be useful.  Enjoy!

To deal with the lack of food storage capacity, the Fishing Module is the first truly useful mission module for the LCS!  A remote operated semi-submersible vehicle tows a fishing net and is guided by the vehicle's on-board fishfinder sonar.  Finally, a mission worthy of the LCS!!!

Given that the LCS has been deemed not survivable in a hostile environment, the Post Combat Abandoment Module (PCAM) acknowledges the inevitable result of combat by mounting a combination life raft/personnel cannon in the former NLOS pits.  The cannon will shoot life rafts off the ship at 12 rpm (rafts per minute).  After the rafts have been deployed, the ship’s on board radar sensor suite (with automatic EO backup) will precision launch crew members from the cannon (think circus!) onto the rafts until the ship has been completely abandoned.  Once abandoned, the automated system will issue a Navy Public Relations message to all wire services describing the heroic actions of the ship and crew and stressing that the ship exceeded all mission parameters and that a further 55 vessels are needed.

Due to the lack of a weapon with sufficient range to deal with the small boat and swarm scenarios, the LCS now has an Anti-Swarm Swarm (ASS) module.  The module will offer much greater engagement ranges by launching a squadron of one-man combat kayaks.  Each combat kayak will mount a prototype slingshot powered rail gun and a bag of rocks with moderately sharp edges.  The kayak squadron will swarm toward the enemy swarm and engage at a greater distance than the Griffon missile is capable of.  In addition, each rock is estimated to have about 2X the hitting force of a Griffon warhead.

Saturday, April 20, 2013

Don’t Join For The Food

Here's an interesting tidbit.  From the most recent CRS report (1), we note that the LCS was designed to be able to deploy for at least 21 days, however, the ship only has food storage for 14 days.  Assuming a few days sailing to and from the area of operation, the functional deployment of the LCS is limited to around 8-10 days.  Of course, a mothership or replenishment ship could always tag along with the LCS and replenish it every few days but that seems highly inefficient.

One of the aspects of operating small vessels that seems not to have been understood by the Navy or by  proponents of small vessels when they look at foreign navies and their small vessels is that most (all) foreign navies operate their small vessels in home waters where ports are just hours away.  Trying to operate small vessels half way around the world, as the U.S. Navy does, presents significant logistical challenges.  As I just said, the LCS is either limited to very short deployments or must have a replenishment ship tagging along at all times.

Of course, ComNavOps notes that the 14 day food storage capacity was for the original crew size.  The Navy has since increased the core crew size by 20 berths (50% increase) which drops the food storage to around 10 days or less!

(1)Congressional Research Service, “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O'Rourke, April 5, 2013, p. 21

Friday, April 19, 2013

I Feel The Need, The Need For Speed !

ComNavOps continually analyzes naval performance and the features and characteristics of the Navy’s ships and planes.  One of the characteristics I’ve long wondered about is the requirement for high speed in our surface combatants.  As best I can tell, our requirement for 30+ kts came from the operating doctrine developed for fleet carriers during WWII.  Carriers would make a night run-in towards a target (a Japanese island), launch a dawn strike, recover, and vanish before an effective counter-strike could launch.  This was an effective tactic because long range radar (both land and airborne) and satellite surveillance did not exist.

Later, high speed was found to be necessary to assist in the launching of planes.

All other ships had to be capable of 30+ kts in order to keep up with the carriers.

Now, however, we can launch planes from a motionless ship even with today's steam catapults.  Also, the existence of AEW, SOSUS-like arrays, satellites, etc. all provide long range detection and would generally negate the run-in tactic.  So, what is the tactical usefulness of 30+ kts of speed?  It won't let you outrun or outmaneuver a missile.  It won't even let you outrun an Iranian speedboat.  Now don't get me wrong.  I think speed is one of those things that's always nice to have.  It's just that I'm not able to come up with many tactical scenarios where 30+ kts provides a significant advantage over, say, 25 kts.  I assume most of you know what the power curve is like.  Once you get past 20 kts, each additional knot comes with a hefty power/weight/equipment cost.  I just wonder if 30+ kts is still worth the cost in weight/internal machinery volume/dollars/maintenance/fuel capacity?

The extreme example of this is the LCS which has a ton of speed but had to sacrifice enormous weight and volume margins to achieve it and it apparently has no tactical relevance that anyone has been able to elucidate.

The only scenario that seems even moderately plausible is attempting to outrun a torpedo.  Now, modern torpedoes are capable of well over 30+ kts (40-60 kts) so actually outrunning one isn’t an option, however, the ability to maintain a dwindling lead over a torpedo long enough for countermeasures to work or for the torpedo to run out of fuel is valid, if unlikely.  And, to be fair, maybe this scenario alone justifies the speed built into all surface combatants.  I just wonder, though, if we aren’t holding on to a requirement from the past that has only marginal usefulness today.  Could some of that weight and volume that's dedicated to generating the last few knots be put to better use, like armor, weapons, or electronics?

In short, I have mixed feelings about this.  Anyone want to make a strong argument for or against speed?