As we’ve thoroughly documented, the Navy is going full speed down the path of networks and data and de-emphasizing firepower. They now want to build smaller, unmanned ships that are significantly weaker than Burkes or even the coming frigate. ComNavOps has repeatedly demonstrated the folly of this approach and suggested that we should, instead, be pursuing firepower.
That said, what kind of firepower should we be pursuing? I’m not posing a question about specific weapons but, rather, a question about general types of firepower. For this post, I’d like to discuss the concept of saturation as it relates to firepower.
There are two general types of saturation firepower as it relates to naval weapons:
- Area bombardment
- Missile attacks (against either land targets or ships)
By definition, saturation attacks overwhelm the enemy’s defenses by presenting the enemy with more attacking munitions than they can defend against in a given moment in time. By implication, this means that even dumb, unguided munitions can be devastatingly effective if we have more of them than the enemy can stop.
It seems blindingly obvious - but remains a mystery to the Navy - that it does no good to have perfect situational awareness about an enemy but insufficient firepower to do anything about it. It doesn’t matter if you know the serial numbers of every piece of enemy equipment, how many missiles they have left, and what each enemy sailor had for breakfast if you can’t overwhelm their defenses and destroy them. There’s no getting around the reality of war that, sooner or later, you have to destroy the enemy’s equipment and kill their soldiers. Right now, we lack the firepower to do that. Consider our current weapons.
Anti-ship Weapons
Harpoon – The Harpoon is obsolete and likely totally ineffective against a Chinese fleet due to its lack of stealth, speed, terminal maneuvering, and penetration electronics. We have Standard missiles that can be used in an anti-ship mode and are faster but their warheads are much smaller and are blast fragmentation rather than high explosive. The SM-6, for example, has a 140 lb warhead versus the 480 lb Harpoon warhead. And, of course, they lack terminal evasive maneuvers and penetration electronic aids. In short, they’re faster than Harpoon but much weaker and no better at penetrating. Worse, Harpoons are limited to 8 missiles per ship on Mk141 launch racks. We would need many dozens of ships to mass enough Harpoons to mount a saturation attack and we simply don’t have the number of ships in any realistic scenario.
Naval Strike Missile (NSM) – The NSM is modern and stealthy with a 276 lb warhead. The problem is that we have very few of them and no plans to acquire significant additional numbers. Given the extremely limited numbers, there is no possibility of mounting saturation attacks.
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) – The LRASM has a large 1000 lb warhead, is stealthy, and has a high sub-sonic speed but, again, we have very few of them and no plans to acquire many more. In addition, it is currently only aerial launch capable. Setting available inventory issues aside, the problem with aerial launch is that each aircraft can carry only two missiles. Assembling even a small saturation attack of, say, 100 missiles would require 50 aircraft which is more than an entire carrier air wing. In practice, it would require around 3 air wings to assemble such an attack force and still provide sufficient tanking, EW, CAP, defensive reserves, etc. While the Navy has discussed plans to make a vertical launch (VLS) version of LRASM, the reality is that our surface ships currently have no LRASM capability and, given current flat budget projections, may not for quite some time. Interestingly, our most advanced anti-ship missile is carried only by the LCS! How’s that for ironically disturbing? Worse, the Navy seems to have abandoned the LRASM in favor of the Tomahawk.
Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile – The Tomahawk is slow, non-stealthy, and lacks modern terminal maneuvering, sensors, and penetration aids although some upgrades have been applied to the missile. Currently, numbers are almost non-existent.
Land Attack Weapons
5” Naval Gun – As we’ve discussed many times, the 5” gun is nearly useless for land attack. It’s very short range requires that the attacking ship approach shore very closely in order to achieve any useful range. The 5” shells are good for soft targets but nearly useless for armored or fortified targets. In the area bombardment role, 5” shells simply don’t have the explosive power to be effective. Worse, the Burke class destroyers have only a single 5” gun each. It would require 5 Burkes to equal the firepower of a single WWII Fletcher class destroyer.
Tomahawk – The cruise missile is slow, non-stealthy, and has no terminal maneuvering or penetration aids. In short, it is unlikely to have an acceptable success rate against a peer defender. Further, at a few million dollars apiece, it is too expensive to use in the area bombardment role although it can be justified for use against high value targets like air or naval bases.
Summary
It is clear that the only weapon we currently have that is capable of mounting a saturation attack is the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and it is obsolete and highly susceptible to modern defenses. The remaining weapons are either too few in number (NSM, LRASM) or have too little density (Harpoon, 5” gun) on ships to mass an effective saturation attack.
Modern enemy defenses, whether land or sea, are not going to be penetrated by a handful of weapons. We’ve grown used to attacking undefended, third world or terrorist targets and, as a result, have become lazy in our operational and tactical thinking. We have developed the mindset that one precision weapon equates to one destroyed target. The reality, however, is that modern defenses are equipped with layered surface to air missile systems, electronic countermeasures, sophisticated decoys, GPS jamming/spoofing, radar directed gun systems, radar stealth, IR masking, obscurants, etc. Small groups of missiles will stand no chance of penetrating such defensive systems. We need to saturate the defenses and overwhelm their ability to cope.
The degree to which we’ve abandoned firepower in favor of networks is truly frightening. I’ll keep repeating this: sooner or later you have to be able to destroy the enemy and networks can’t do that.
Here’s a few implications from this discussion:
- We need large caliber naval guns and not any of this sub-caliber sabot nonsense, either. Sub-caliber means sub-explosive which means ineffective. Not only do we need large caliber naval guns but we need large numbers of them. Quantity has a quality all its own.
- Saturation requires numbers. We need to be able to launch or fire large numbers of weapons. For example, attacking even a moderate size enemy task force will require hundreds of missiles to overwhelm their defenses. Where are we going to get hundreds of missiles for a strike? As noted, we seem to have standardized on around 8 Harpoons/NSM per ship as our offensive firepower. That means we need 12-30+ ships to generate a single anti-ship saturation strike.
- We need to develop saturation tactics. For example, maybe a second wave of high explosives after an initial wave of smaller, saturation weapons intended to deplete an enemy’s defensive magazines and inflict sensor blinding damage and disable weapon launchers.
- We need to develop a cheap, basic, anti-ship / land attack missile that can be procured in large quantity. The key to cheap is simplicity. It doesn’t matter if the missile doesn’t have every bell and whistle if we can procure and employ it in saturation quantities.
- We need to regain our offensive mindset. The Navy has, for far too long, been defensive minded and that has negatively impacted our capacity to conduct offensive operations.
Concept of saturated missile attack started from Soviet Union aiming to attack US ships (include carrier) having basic missile defense. Goal is to launch more missile than US' missile defense system can handle.
ReplyDeleteHowever, key is to hit same target with more missiles than it can handle. What does this mean? It means precision guidance - all missiles fly toward same ship. If these missiles attack an "area", they won't work. Many of them will fall into sea. Even if a missile explode near a battle ship is not useful due to armor of the ship. You need direct hit. Spear and shield.
All missiles are guided. There's no such thing as an area missile. What are you talking about?
DeleteMaybe Anon is thinking of the MLRS with submuniton warhead ? Interesting thought using a submuniton warhead against a modern ship with all those unarmoured sensors and weapon mounts.
Delete"Interesting thought using a submuniton warhead against a modern ship with all those unarmoured sensors and weapon mounts."
DeleteThat's essentially what anti-radiation missiles are although they use fragmentation rather than submunitions. Submunitions are used to cover an area. I'm not sure how effective that would be against a ship. I suspect not many bomblets would hit the target? I don't know enough about sub-munition behavior. Maybe someone has a better understanding?
A Rockeye cluster bomb was used to disable a Libyan Nanuchka-class corvette in '86. I remember reading that people were surprised that a cluster bomb could be effective in this role.
Delete"The degree to which we’ve abandoned firepower in favor of networks is truly frightening. I’ll keep repeating this: sooner or later you have to be able to destroy the enemy and networks can’t do that."
ReplyDeleteWarheads on foreheads are what it's all about, or at least should be.
“We need large caliber naval guns and not any of this sub-caliber sabot nonsense, either. Sub-caliber means sub-explosive which means ineffective. Not only do we need large caliber naval guns but we need large numbers of them. Quantity has a quality all its own."
Which is why both you and I include battleships with 16-inch guns and cruisers with 8-inch guns in our proposed fleet structures. The Navy doesn’t, and misses a large required capability as a result.
"Saturation requires numbers. We need to be able to launch or fire large numbers of weapons. For example, attacking even a moderate size enemy task force will require hundreds of missiles to overwhelm their defenses. Where are we going to get hundreds of missiles for a strike? As noted, we seem to have standardized on around 8 Harpoons/NSM per ship as our offensive firepower. That means we need 12-30+ ships to generate a single anti-ship saturation strike."
That’s why my idea of the FREMM conversion is to make it what FREMM started out as—a GP escort with enhanced ASuW capabilities. I would forego AEGIS (hell when it’s well, but too often sick) and upgrade to a 5-inch gun and 32 VLS forward (I understand that there is a FREMM design for but not with both) and if NSM is the ASuW missile of choice, and works out of a Mk41, replace the canister launchers midships with 16 Mk41 cells port and 16 starboard, and give it a 32-NSM fit.
"We need to develop saturation tactics. For example, maybe a second wave of high explosives after an initial wave of smaller, saturation weapons intended to deplete an enemy’s defensive magazines and inflict sensor blinding damage and disable weapon launchers."
This is one reason why we need something like a Fleet Problem or Springtrain at least annually. Develop some tactics on paper, try them out in realistic exercise scenarios, find out what works and what doesn’t, and adjust accordingly. You can’t do what we need to do with tabletop war games.
"We need to develop a cheap, basic, anti-ship / land attack missile that can be procured in large quantity. The key to cheap is simplicity. It doesn’t matter if the missile doesn’t have every bell and whistle if we can procure and employ it in saturation quantities."
Perfect is the enemy of good enough. I wish I felt comfortable telling my story about this.
"We need to regain our offensive mindset. The Navy has, for far too long, been defensive minded and that has negatively impacted our capacity to conduct offensive operations."
Other than SSBNs, which are a last (and, we hope, never) resort, our whole Navy has pretty much gone defensive. Our most expensive surface ships—carriers, Ticos, and Burkes--are all basically defensive in nature. We need more SSGNs as primary strike threat, Virginia VPMs as secondary strike threat, surface ships as tertiary strike threat, and limited carrier strike as a backup capability.
"FREMM started out as—a GP escort with enhanced ASuW capabilities."
DeleteUnless you intend to load it out as a purely ASuW platform, you can't load many anti-ship missiles and still leave room for SAMs (general purpose, as you stated).
"if NSM is the ASuW missile of choice, and works out of a Mk41"
It is not at all clear that the Navy considers NSM to be the preferred anti-ship missile. I suspect that they intend it only for LCS and, maybe, as a stopgap for other ships until the preferred missile comes along, whatever that might be (TASM?). I'm also not aware that the NSM is Mk41 capable which limits it to rack launchers, as on the LCS. Maybe it could be adapted to the Mk41 but it won't be if it's not the preferred missile. The Navy is kind of all over the map on anti-ship missiles. NSM? LRASM? TASM? Hypersonic? Something else?
"We need more SSGNs as primary strike threat, Virginia VPMs as secondary strike threat, surface ships as tertiary strike threat, and limited carrier strike as a backup capability."
DeleteWhile I agree in broad, general terms (excepting the carrier strike), there's more to it than that. We need not just weapons but an offensive mindset. Supporting that, we need 'riskable'/expendable ships (if you attack, you'll suffer some losses) for attack missions. We need fast, stealthy logistics support vessels to support forward attack operations. We need moderately long range, throwaway UAVs for surveillance/scouting. And so on.
Returning to weapons, you've ID'ed platforms that only attack with Tomahawk (meaning, expensive) missiles and which are only good against known, fixed targets. That's fine but an intelligent enemy is not going to present us with all that many obvious targets and the ones they do will be heavily defended. We also need CHEAP, saturation/area weapons that we can throw in the many hundreds or thousands. Yes, I understand that wasn't your entire blueprint for attack and that you've suggested naval guns but we've need to think beyond even that. Naval guns are short range. We need a longer range, cheap, simple rocket/missile for saturation attacks. Sure, the attrition rate of such a missile would be high but if they're cheap enough, who cares?!
“Unless you intend to load it out as a purely ASuW platform, you can't load many anti-ship missiles and still leave room for SAMs (general purpose, as you stated). … I'm also not aware that the NSM is Mk41 capable which limits it to rack launchers, as on the LCS.”
DeleteThe Italian GP FREMM has a 127mm gun forward and there was a plan (FBNW) to expand the 16-cell VLS to 32. I’m thinking that loadout could be 32 quad-packed ESSM, and 12 each Standard missile and VL-ASROC. Per Wikipedia (not the best source, but what I have), Konigsberg (again not an unbiased source, but it’s what I have) claims that modifying the NSM to fit inside an F35 bomb bay produced a missile that can be fired from a Mk41. Assuming that Konigsberg isn’t lying (why I prefaced my comment with, “If…”) and the NSM actually can work out of a Mk41, I am thinking in terms of putting 16 Mk41 cells on each side where the canisters would be (kind of a Ivor Huitfeldt configuration) and putting the NSMs there. Maybe it’s only 8 each side, for 16 NSMs, or maybe you load that partly with NSMs and partly with Standard or VL-ASROC, depending on the threat. But I think that’s a pretty stout GP loadout, any way you do it. The Italian GP FREMM also has a 76mm gun over the hangar. I would give that up to save weight, maybe replace it with a SeaRAM to save hangar space as well. I’m assuming that going back to EMPAR instead of AEGIS saves some weight (at least that’s what I’ve read several places) and if possible I’d like to pair the EMPAR with a SMART-L over the hangar. So if (and I’m not a naval architect, so I’d leave the actual calculations to them) it all works, my proposed loadout would be 127mm gun, 32 ESSM, 12 Standard, 12 VL-ASROC, 32 NSM, EMPAR/SMART-L, SeaRAM plus 2-4 Phalanx, 2 helos, bow sonar and VDS/towed sonar. If weight and space don’t allow all that on one platform, come up with two or three variants optimized for one mission or another. But if we can get all that on one, I think you’d have a really stout little warship.
“It is not at all clear that the Navy considers NSM to be the preferred anti-ship missile.”
Well, they seem to be pouring a lot of money into it if it’s not going to be their preferred anti-ship missile. I’m thinking it could be the low end of a hi/lo mix where something bigger and faster (supersonic/hypersonic) and longer range would be the higher end.
“While I agree in broad, general terms (excepting the carrier strike), there's more to it than that. We need not just weapons but an offensive mindset.”
DeleteAgree totally on the mindset. I don’t know any way to build that but to have totally (or as much as possible) warlike training exercises with no holds barred. The Navy as become totally risk-averse, and no risks, no rewards.
As far as the carrier strike issue, that’s really, really low on my list of priorities. I don’t ever see us sending a carrier strike force into the heart of Chinese A2/AD country, but I don’t see an invasion of China as the only reason to have a Navy, and I think there are times and places where an airborne strike capability could be useful. I also think spending billions on a carrier plus air wing with no strike capability is a questionable use of resources.
“Returning to weapons, you've ID'ed platforms that only attack with Tomahawk (meaning, expensive) missiles and which are only good against known, fixed targets….We also need CHEAP, saturation/area weapons that we can throw in the many hundreds or thousands”
They only attack with Tomahawks because that’s what we have. I’ve made no secret of the Navy’s need for more and better missiles. Just a guess, but I would expect that if the Navy goes after an advanced supersonic/hypersonic missile (which they need to do), compatibility with Tomahawk launch platforms will be a requirement. We need the missiles first, then work out platforms.
As for the large numbers of cheaper, more expendable platforms and missiles, the Navy has always been reluctant to go there, perhaps figuring that carrier air would do the job. My idea of a FREMM-based GP escort with NSMs would be intended to fill at least part of the need. I would also adopt some of CAPT Wayne Hughes’ coastal/littoral combatant thinking, building a number of corvettes and missile patrol boats that would be cheaper and therefore at least theoretically more expendable, and that could be a large part of a saturation approach.
Your proposed battleship has 3x3 16-inch, 4x2 6”, 2 5”, 12 Phalanx, 8 SeaRAM, 64 Mk41, and 32 large VLS for SRBM/IRBM. The 1980s battlecarrier concept had 2x3 16” and removed the after 16” mount for 320 VLS and a flight deck with ski jump for 10 AV-8 and 10 helos. I’d convert 64 of those VLS to 32 of your large VLS for SRBM/IRBM and also some kind of supersonic/hypersonic anti-ship missile like the Russian Shipwreck. So I’d end up with 2x3 16”, give up the 6” and 5” for your 12 Phalanx and 8 SeaRAM, 32 large VLS for SRBM/IRBM/Shipwreck clone, 256 Mk41 for mix of missiles depending on mission (or we could reduce the number of Mk41s to add more large missiles), and 10 STOVL and 10 helos. Operating far enough out at sea to be away from large numbers of shore-based missiles or aircraft, I think it would be a beast, probably a clear winner in any engagement against any surface unit short of a Nimitz.
I do think this is engaging in a bit of nit-picking around areas where we are, as you note, in broad general agreement.
"32 ESSM, 12 Standard, 12 VL-ASROC, 32 NSM"
DeleteAhh … 64 Mk41 VLS cells on a ship designed for 16 with, possibly, the capacity for expansion to 32? Does that seem realistic?
" CAPT Wayne Hughes’ coastal/littoral combatant thinking, building a number of corvettes and missile patrol boats that would be cheaper and therefore at least theoretically more expendable, and that could be a large part of a saturation approach."
DeleteYou want to be cautious about relying on Hughes. Hughes' concepts have lots of fundamental problems and one of them is the practical aspect of ship range and logistic support. He doesn't account for those factors at all but, instead, merely assumes that the requisite vessels are 'magically' available in his theoretical scenarios.
On a practical basis, how would missile patrol boats and even corvettes get to the forward operating area and how would they sustain themselves?
Another problem with Hughes is detectability and survivability of the vessels as they approach the operating/battle area. Such vessels are simple kills, nearly defenseless, waiting to be defeated in detail. Again, he just assumes they all appear.
Hughes is great for examining some very basic concepts but nothing more than that. Kind of a introductory naval combat 101 for beginners.
"Ahh … 64 Mk41 VLS cells on a ship designed for 16 with, possibly, the capacity for expansion to 32? Does that seem realistic?"
DeleteYes, if we are serious about arming our ships. I know where they could and would go. Maybe have to give up some habitability space when we get through rearranging space to make it work, but so what.
"On a practical basis, how would missile patrol boats and even corvettes get to the forward operating area and how would they sustain themselves?
DeleteAnother problem with Hughes is detectability and survivability of the vessels as they approach the operating/battle area. Such vessels are simple kills, nearly defenseless, waiting to be defeated in detail. Again, he just assumes they all appear."
Well, you were talking about cheaper, more expendable platforms and those came to mind as fitting that description. I don't know another way to get cheap and expendable without going small.
You'd have to forward deploy some. As it presently stands, the most useful place for them in a China war would probably be blockading the Malacca and Sunda Straits to deny China oil and westbound exports. Singapore would work for that, or maybe Sepanggar, if we could get basing rights, and they would be on the outer ranges of China's A2/AD at this time. They might also have some utility island-hopping around the first island chain, or doing some sea denial work in the Indian Ocean, where A2/AD would be a lesser problem.
Other places might be the Persian/Arabian Gulf, where we've had smaller combatants forward based for years, or the eastern Med or Baltic, where there would be NATO bases nearby.
"Yes, if we are serious about arming our ships."
DeleteAs you know, I'm all for greater weapons density on ships. However, the 32 or more VLS cells that you're proposing will consume a LOT of internal ship's volume and require a lot of utilities. That's a lot of existing ship's functions that will have to be eliminated. You sound awfully close to suggesting a reduced level of crew comforts! *gasp!*
It would be interesting to look at a ship's schematic and see what functions would be displaced.
"Well, you were talking about cheaper, more expendable platforms"
DeleteEverything's relative. Yes, I call for simpler, more expendable ships but NOT defenseless ones! I'm thinking more along the lines of a modern Fletcher, not a suicide boat. With a great deal more range (which probably means greater size) this might be a use for a modified Visby type vessel with maximum stealth and reasonable self-defense.
"Singapore"
I can't see any way Singapore is going to enter a war against China for a host of reasons. They'll remain neutral. More generally, no South China Sea country is going to enter a war against China. They have nothing to gain and everything to lose. All the people who blithely talk about us establishing bases all over the region overlook that. No one is going to give us basing rights against China, thereby entering a war with China. So, unless we want to forcibly invade those countries (how would we be different from China if we did that?) we're back to Guam and that's about it. Japan is an unknown but Japanese bases will be consumed with self-defense and won't be able to support any forward deployed US assets even if Japan were to enter a war.
The one place that I might foresee some forcible invasions is your favorite Marine mission, port seizures against some of the String of Pearls ports that China is building around South Asia and Africa (so far).
DeleteI have one other thought. The way I understand that those deals are being done, China is taking back a note in payment, with a lien and right to foreclose upon default. They don't pay and presto, those become Chinese bases. Would it make sense for us to step up on those notes and take over those bases?
"Would it make sense for us to step up on those notes and take over those bases?"
DeleteNow that's a great thought although I'm not sure the countries involved would want to trade one owner for another and I don't know the legalities and financial aspects but it's a great thought and the type of thing we should be looking at.
"You sound awfully close to suggesting a reduced level of crew comforts! *gasp!*"
DeleteYep.
My guess is that the proposed 16 Mk41s port and starboard where the canister launchers now go would take up space probably occupied by CIC. I would relocate CIC lower in the ship, like RN Operations Rooms, which tend to be more safely and securely located. A missile hit to the bridge of many of our ships would also take out CIC, which does not seem useful.
DeleteWhat CIC would displace below decks would almost certainly be some habitability spaces. I can see keeping physical fitness gyms, as life at sea can be pretty devastating to waistlines. But maybe some other stuff needs to go. By the way, didn't the Navy add something like 40 feet to the design length of the FREMMs? That ought to buy a lot of space for something.
Adm Zumwalt prioritized the control of sea lanes second only to the assured nuclear second strike capability “Heavy reliance on sealift is an integral part of the U.S. role as a sea power. It emphasizes the absolute need to be able to control the seas if the nation is to exist.”
ReplyDeleteTo help achieve above CONOPS would like to see the replacement of the old ASROC by a modern day equivalent, mentioned in the FFG(X) future capabilities list, think it should be prioritized for funding over land attack weapon systems:)Don't think it would be that expensive.
PS Thales Australia and Lockheed are currently funding development of a rocket booster for launch of LRASM from a Mk41 VLS cell.
"Naval Strike Missile (NSM) . . . The problem is that we have very few of them and no plans to acquire significant additional numbers."
ReplyDeleteIn January, Breaking Defense reported that the Constellation-class frigates are to be armed with 16 deck-mounted NSMs. The issue then is how many frigates will the Navy procure.
At the same time, couldn't such a missile be backfitted to the Burkes and other ships armed with Harpoons? The missiles are roughly the same size and weight.
As for the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), this might be where the Air Force gets involved as a single B-1 can carry 24 missiles. Though the Navy is planning to integrate the LRASM on the P-8s.
ReplyDelete"Though the Navy is planning to integrate the LRASM on the P-8s."
DeleteThe issue is saturation. While a single aircraft could launch a couple of missiles at a small vessel with some chance of success, we're talking about significant targets requiring saturation attacks. We would need dozens and dozens of P-8s or Hornets or whatever to mass a saturation attack. Chinese fleets now have their own equivalent of Aegis and it will require overwhelming numbers of missiles to penetrate the defenses … assuming the defenses work somewhat as advertised.
A B-1 is great, assuming you can wait hours or days while the Air Force mounts a mission.
The Navy won't be fighting in the Pacific alone. Any kind of large-scale saturation attack will likely be done in coordination with the Air Force. Besides, bombers would be useful to go after targets out of range of surface ships.
DeleteUnfortunately, you don't always get to choose the time and place of your battles. Sometimes the enemy gets to choose and sometimes they just happen. In those cases, having an AF bomber thousands of miles away isn't going to do any good. The Navy needs to be able to attack effectively on its own.
DeleteThe WWII Pacific campaign was all about obtaining bases in useful range of operations and, unfortunately, we currently have no bases in useful range of a Chinese area of operations. While any sporadic AF assistance will be appreciated, the Navy can't count on it. The tyranny of distance is real and harsh.
I would like to point out, the B1s are going to the boneyard as we speak and its replacement wont be ready till near the end of the decade.
Delete"B1s are going to the boneyard as we speak"
DeleteI don't follow AF matters that closely so I hadn't heard that. All of them or just some?
So, we'll be down to around 19 or fewer operational B-2 and the thousand year old B-52s?
I assume B-1 retirements are to help pay for the B-21?
B1s are back on plan to cannibalize themselves for parts. Also moving to high altitude to conserve flight hours. Let the missiles do the work. It just needs to get them there.
Delete"The tyranny of distance is real and harsh."
DeleteTrue, but the Air Force has in the past forward deployed bombers to Diego Garcia and Hawaii. I would think we would do something similar in a war in the Pacific. And, there are air force bases in Japan as well. I guess it depends who is at war with who.
Hmm … At a quick glance, it appears that the AF is retiring the B-1 with 17 scheduled to go this upcoming year and the last will be retired around 2030. As of 2019, Air Force Global Strike Command (whatever that is) reported only 7 of 62 aircraft as fully mission capable.
Delete"forward deployed bombers to Diego Garcia and Hawaii."
DeleteThat's kind of the point. That assures that there won't be any rapid response for naval support. It will require many hours or days for the AF to mount a mission.
Japanese bases will be problematic, at best. They'll likely be engaged full time in self-defense … if Japan even enters a war with us against China.
With regard to China, I think we need to figure out what we really want. I don't think total annihilation of the Chinese state is possible, and maybe it is not even desirable.
DeleteAs far as the South China Sea, if the nations around it don't want us there, it's going to be pretty hard to defend them against China. But if they don't want us there, maybe we don't want to defend them against China.
I would oppose letting China take over the first island chain, but if places like the Philippines and Indonesia and Malaysia and Singapore and Vietnam don't want us there, then there isn't a lot we can do about it. My approach to foreign policy would be to try to make them want us there, but we may have spent too much time and energy burying our heads in the sands of the Mideast for that to be a realistic possibility.
So maybe we need to look at what is our fallback if China does take over the first island chain. I suppose we would still have the Quad--USA, Australia, India, Japan--to fall back on.
The real issue to me is whether China can develop and operate a true blue-water navy that can go toe-to-toe with the USN worldwide. I'm not sure how long it would take PLAN to get that strong. The Soviets obviously never made it. I'm probably more worried about the USN weakening itself down to their level at this point.
"it's going to be pretty hard to defend them against China."
DeleteWhen did it become our job to defend them???? It's our job to defend our own interests. Sometimes defending another country IS in our best interest and sometimes it isn't. What we need to do is formulate a geopolitical strategy for dealing with China. What, if anything, can we allow them to have/do? Trump came the closest to having a strategy and we were making some progress. Setting aside the internal US politics, that progress has been lost and we are now failing again.
"The Soviets obviously never made it."
The Soviets lacked the economic engine. China has that and they will have a global navy in the moderately near future. The question is whether we allow it or whether we contest it aggressively. Currently we are allowing it.
I know you have a vision of containment but that ship has already sailed. The first island chain is already gone although it will take some time, yet, for it to play out. You are correct that you and the US need to come up with a fallback plan. I look forward to hearing what it is. I would offer this thought: no amount of 'presence' in the form of ships sailing around doing nothing will deter China. Deterrence/containment comes only with the use of force. That doesn't mean total war but we have to begin implementing some aggressive measures and we can't be afraid of escalation - China certainly isn't!
It comes down to if they want us to help defend them, and are willing to accept US bases as a consequence, then we can do it. If they don't, then we can't. If the SCS and first island chain are lost, then China is in a stronger position to move into blue water. If not, it's hard but not impossible for them to do so. We have missed the boat on our best opportunity by having our heads buried in the sands of no-win wars in the Mideast.
DeleteI think we need a serious reboot. Either we are willing to step up and contain China at the first island chain, and the countries there are willing to have us do so, or we/they aren't. I'd be willing to do so if they were, because our blue-water job gets a lot harder if China controls the first island chain versus having allies control is. The reach of their A2/AD system extends a lot further, for one thing (of many). I'm not privy to the diplomatic negotiations around that point, so I don't really know what those answers are.
What I do believe is that:
1) We need to build a Navy that can defeat China in blue-water territory worldwide.
2) We need to focus our primary efforts not on military competition but on economic and political.
3) We are not currently on a path that will lead to either of those.
"Either we are willing to step up and contain China at the first island chain, and the countries there are willing to have us do so, or we/they aren't."
DeleteAgain, I'm largely in agreement with your overall comment, however, I would note that our security interests should never depend on someone else's desires or actions (or lack thereof). If we believe it's in our best interests to contain China at the first island chain then whether or not those chain countries want to help is immaterial. We need to find a way regardless of outside assistance. Now, one of the options might be to forcibly and 'illegally' take a base somewhere as the less of evil options (the other, more evil option would be to allow China to continue expanding). I'm not saying we should immediately do this but it shouldn't be off the table as an option. While your initial reaction might be that such an action on our part would be abhorrent, we may feel that we have a larger responsibility to contain China and that doing so would, in the end, benefit the country whose territory we violate. It's something to think about since we have such a mismatch between our 'plans' which call for forward basing and the nearly complete lack of suitable locations for such bases. No easy answers!
The point being that our security can't be dependent on someone else's actions (or refusals).
"and maybe it is not even desirable."
DeleteIn what way would it not be desirable? If we could magically make China vanish, given the extent of evil, illegal actions they engage in, how would that not be desirable? I ask this as an academic exercise. I'm not advocating nuclear genocide.
"In what way would it not be desirable? If we could magically make China vanish, given the extent of evil, illegal actions they engage in, how would that not be desirable? I ask this as an academic exercise. I'm not advocating nuclear genocide."
DeleteI don't think there is any way that we could do that, so I am dismissing it as an alternative. I don't see any way to eliminate China, other than putting pressure on its economy and letting it self-destruct, that does not have more negative than positive consequences.
"The point being that our security can't be dependent on someone else's actions (or refusals)."
DeleteI guess my feeling is that if China somehow takes over the Philippines, that isn't really an existential threat to the USA, but it's not something we want to happen, and at some point Chinese expansion would become a problem. If the Philippines (or Singapore, or whoever) doesn't really want a US presence there, I'm not sure we can sustain one. But I think we could do a lot to make the Philippines (or Singapore, or whoever) WANT a US presence there.
Since we have a consumer economy that imports a lot, and China has a producer economy that does not import much, we can certainly offer them a bigger market for their exports than China can. And I don't think they like the bullying that China does with seizing (or building) islands in their extraterritorial waters and such, but they don't really have the strength to stand up to China, so they might be more receptive to military assistance and presence than you might think. Of course, you are absolutely correct that such military presence is pretty meaningless unless we are willing to shoot at some point. One of the reasons why I think we need to shoot at some of the Iranian patrol boats that harass us is to show the world that yes, we will shoot at some point, and probably better to do it to a nation that can't really hit back with much than to someone who might be able to. I mean, if we let Iran push us around, what are we going to do to China? I've thought about doing things like maybe sending a USV through the Taiwan Strait with a large explosive charge inside. Chinese Navy picks it up, we detonate the charge, sink one of their ships, and they have a hard time arguing that it didn't happen because they were stealing stuff that was not theirs. I'm kind of spitballing here, I really don't know the inside intel, but I think we are 1) wasting a lot of time, resources, and lives and limbs in the Mideast, while 2) not focusing on where the real problem lies.
ComNavOps,
DeleteI think my "contain" strategy is a bit different from the way you have characterized it. I think you see it as a passive approach, whereas what I have in mind is far more active containment. My idea is to do enough militarily to keep China off the first island chain, and then compete economically in ways that cause them to implode sooner or later.
I don't see any way for a military attack on mainland China to succeed, at least not without a massive (and massively expensive) increase in the size and capability of our military forces, and I think that's a non-starter politically. I still think a reprise of the post-WWII Cold War approach—Truman bribed up an alliance to contain Soviet expansion, and later Reagan put pressure on their economy and collapsed the evil empire—has the best chance. It has to be different in the details and execution, but I still think something like that is our best chance.
My approach clearly requires the cooperation of those countries in the first island chain. In our favor for obtaining such cooperation are 1) we are a consumer economy that imports a lot, whereas China is a production economy that imports very little, so we can offer them more economically, and 2) a number of them are already getting angry with China's bullying, but they aren't really strong enough to stop it, whereas we are. We have to overcome that 1) they are a lot closer to China, both geographically and ethnically, and 2) China has already made some inroads. But some of those inroads have tended to anger them rather than win them over, so I don't think it's a lost opportunity yet. But it is fading quickly, while we are far too absorbed in winless wars in the Mideast--of which the primary beneficiary is probably China, to the extent that we are securing their oil supply.
In order for our commitment to be believable, we have to back it up. Instead of a random FONOPS that proves nothing, I think we need a fairly permanent expeditionary presence in the region, including a CVBG, a SAG/HUK group (as I have defined it elsewhere), and an ARG/MEU (again, as I have defined it elsewhere). China had a cow when we put two carriers into the SCS at the same time. Let them get used to that as SOP. And these forces need to be continuously exercising with local forces. Now, that obviously requires some kind of basing arrangements at places like Subic, Sepanggar, or Singapore (where the Brits are creating a base), and if people like Singapore will not play ball with us, then we really can't be about the business of protecting them from China. If a portion of the first island chain falls, then we have to reboot, probably around the Quad--USA, Australia, India, Japan.
Now while we are showing stronger military presence in the region (helped in part by cutting back on our involvement in the Mideast, which also puts pressure on China because they now have to figure out how to secure their oil supply), we have to recognize that is just a diversion, and the real battlefield is economic. We have to counter the Belt and Road and String of Pearls programs. One idea I have is that, as I understand it, those Belt and Road projects are all debt financed, wit China holding liens so they can foreclose when the inevitable defaults occur. I think we could buy a lot of goodwill by stepping up on those notes and paying them off, not to become new creditors, but as aid to the countries where they are located, with some usage rights.
I don't think we are handling it right, or even reasonably well, today. I think we agree on that. I would be interested in knowing what you see as the grand strategy. You seem to be talking a lot about what we would need for a mano a mano peer war including direct attacks on mainland China. I just don't see that as viable, so I'd like to understand better where you see us going.
"My idea is to do enough militarily to keep China off the first island chain"
DeleteThis is where you lose me. You say you want a strong military response but you seem not to want to actually do anything other than just be in the area (which hasn't slowed China one iota, so far). In contrast, throughout this blog, I've offered many ideas for how to confront China in an effective way, militarily, although it would require the possibility (pushing certainty) of isolated instances of combat.
As one example, you'll recall my story about preventing illegal island construction?
On the one hand, you seem to acknowledge that sailing a Burke past an island is useless but on the other hand you seem to think that sailing a carrier around the region will terrify the Chinese into submission. Unfortunately, that's just wishful thinking on your part.
The Chinese built and militarized illegal islands and our response was to sail past them from time to time. Internally, the Chinese have to be laughing their asses off. I can't imagine that sailing a carrier around would do anything other provoke more laughter. The Chinese have a thousand aircraft in the region and a carrier has forty - not exactly a credible threat to China!
The cold, hard truth is that your vision of a strategy has already been proven to be a failure. Simply moving the boundaries of that strategy back to the second island chain and doing it again won't produce a different result.
The only realistic conclusion is that you have no viable effective military strategy in mind. That said, I do agree with you that the economy (and other areas) are where we should be fighting every day … but we aren't and seem to have no desire to do so. So we've lost there, as well.
For your amusement, if we were serious about engaging China, here's some non-military actions we should take:
-expel every Chinese citizen from the US
-close every US university to Chinese students
-nationalize every Chinese company with a presence in the US
-initiate non-stop cyber attacks against China (if we aren't already)
-eliminate our dependence on China for strategic resources such as rare earths
-make any industrial cooperation with China illegal
-remove every US company and presence from China
… and a hundred other actions.
Before you respond that these are too extreme, consider the litany of Chinese actions:
-released COVID on the world (quite likely it was from a lab and possibly intentional)
-seized US military assets
-engages in routine intellectual property theft
-engages in routine cyber attacks and data theft
-routinely violates various country's territorial waters and air
-ignores treaties that they are signatory to
… and so on.
We're at war whether we want to be or not. We just need to get serious and engage.
You act as if I'm saying continue to do what we are doing, and that's not correct. I think your ideas have merit. We have some legal issues with removing US companies from China, but we could certainly implement some incentives to get them to relocate, either back home in the case of essential industries, or to other countries in the region that can provide the same cheap labor (or cheaper, Chinese labor is getting expensive) to do routine tasks, and that could be one of the carrots that we offer the Philippines and Malaysias of the world to get their cooperation.
DeleteI don't see how we can execute any viable military strategy from Guam or Pearl Harbor, so any effective military action requires cooperation from countries around the first island chain. If they don't want to cooperate, I don't know what we can do. But I think we can offer them a good enough deal that they will accept.
At some point we will probably have to shoot something or somebody to show that we are serious. I don't know that we can go blowing up any existing artificial island, but I think we can make it clear to them that we are not going to accept any more, and interfere if they try to do any more.
As far as your non-military ideas, I think we can start to be far more selective about admitting Chinese citizens to the USA or Chinese students to US universities. Nationalizing Chinese countries here could be daunting legally, but again we could restrict their actions, particularly in the intellectual property area. Cyber attacks would be an interesting idea. I don't know if we are doing that now, or not. To eliminate our dependence on China for rare earths requires that we find another source somewhere else. Within limits imposed by WHO we can certainly sanction industrial cooperation with China and US company operations in China.
"We're at war whether we want to be or not. We just need to get serious and engage."
Agree 100%. We seem to disagree on details. You keep dissing my military approach. So what is yours, and how would you implement it?
"This is where you lose me. You say you want a strong military response but you seem not to want to actually do anything other than just be in the area (which hasn't slowed China one iota, so far)."
DeleteWe haven't been in the area historically. A FONOPS here and there is not being in the area. I'm not saying that. I'm saying have a much stronger presence and make it clear to China that crossing certain lines (building more islands, fishing in other countries' economic zones) will bring about consequences that they don't want to deal with--and then make those consequences happen if they try us. I see some distinct differences between what I am proposing and what we are doing now. I get the impression that you don't.
" I don't know that we can go blowing up any existing artificial island"
DeleteWhy not? It would be a perfect mission for a clandestine SEAL action, delivered by submarine. Admittedly, the better time to do it was when they were in the process of building it but better late than never. China released COVID on the world. Is sabotaging an illegal island really a problem for you? That's small thinking. Be bold. Risk a little!
"I don't see how we can execute any viable military strategy from Guam or Pearl Harbor, so any effective military action requires cooperation from countries around the first island chain."
DeleteGood grief, that's limited thinking! We're not formally at war yet so basing out of Japan or Korea is fine. Plus, we can freely sail ships and subs through the area. That's plenty of basing! Think big. Think bold.
" I think we can make it clear to them that we are not going to accept any more, and interfere if they try to do any more."
DeleteAgain, this is where you lose me. How are we going to make it any more clear than before? More strongly worded protests? More complaints to the UN or UNCLOS (which already ruled against them and they ignored it)? Would you sail a carrier past another island?
And what do you propose doing when they ignore your 'clear' warning? Nothing you've proposed so far suggests any actual consequence.
"I think we can start to be far more selective about admitting Chinese citizens"
DeleteAgain, this is timid thinking. You seem to acknowledge that it's a good idea but you want to stop short of fully eliminating Chinese citizens and students. Half measures are no measures.
"Within limits imposed by WHO we can certainly sanction industrial cooperation with China and US company operations in China."
DeleteWhy would you allow our national security to be limited by WHO? There's precedent for passing law preventing commercial interactions with another country. We've done this with Iran, terrorist organizations, and various other countries. We just add China to the list. Think big. Think bold.
"So what is yours, and how would you implement it?"
DeleteI've described many options throughout this blog in the form of stories, posts, and comments. Feel free to review them.
" I see some distinct differences between what I am proposing and what we are doing now. I get the impression that you don't."
DeleteNot a whit!
When - not if - they ignore one of your clear warnings, what specifically will you do? You keep making vague statements about 'consequences'. What consequences? More ships sailing around, doing nothing? This smacks of Obama's meaningless line in the sand. Big threats, no action. What would you do?
"I'm saying have a much stronger presence"
DeleteWe've had destroyers, carriers, P-3/8 aircraft, and various other military assets in the area for decades and China has not been deterred. Is there some magic number of ships/planes you think will suddenly deter them? If we anchor a carrier in the middle of the South China Sea will China suddenly be deterred (or, more likely, they'll seize it!)? I really don't get this nebulous 'sailing around the area' as a deterrent. It hasn't so far and I see no reason why it will in the future.
"I've described many options throughout this blog in the form of stories, posts, and comments. Feel free to review them."
DeleteI'm not ready to start WWIII, and frankly the larger competition as to be economic, not military. The biggest problem I see is that nobody involved on the economic side sees this as a war and China as an enemy.
"We've had destroyers, carriers, P-3/8 aircraft, and various other military assets in the area for decades and China has not been deterred. Is there some magic number of ships/planes you think will suddenly deter them? If we anchor a carrier in the middle of the South China Sea will China suddenly be deterred (or, more likely, they'll seize it!)? I really don't get this nebulous 'sailing around the area' as a deterrent. It hasn't so far and I see no reason why it will in the future."
We've sent one or two at a time, intermittently, yes. But that's nothing. I'm talking about maintaining a credible force on a continuous basis. That will require some cooperation from the first island chain nations, but the approach would be to try to bribe up the kind of alliance that Truman did in western Europe. We can kind of offer the same things to them--a military force to help them oppose Chinese hegemony, access to the USA market, and moving stuff out of China to them.
We could anchor the entire navy in the South China Sea but what would that do besides strain our logistics? We won't fight or do anything that might 'escalate' tensions. You keep calling for military 'consequences' but you refuse to specify any and then turn around and state that you don't want to start WWIII. So, a navy that won't do anything is useless as a deterrent. I'm sorry but lacking the will to do anything, no amount of ships in the region will accomplish anything.
DeleteWe had a carrier in range of the Pueblo and did nothing. We had lots of forces in range of the riverine boats that Iran seized and did nothing. I can go on with examples but it's clear that neither the current navy nor your vision would take any actual, forceful actions.
Your vision won't work and just amounts to more symbolic lines in the sand. Now, your economic view may have validity but even there you hesitated when presented with actions so ...
But you are attributing to me the "do nothing" attitude that prevails in the current Navy and I reject that.
DeleteThe two specific examples you cite, Pueblo and Iran, are both inexcusable. We should have been prepared for both situations, with somebody standing by to interdict, and in both cases that somebody should have been sent in at the first sign of trouble. Another example is Benghazi, which IMO would never have happened if we had an LST with a company of Marines standing just offshore to land at the first sign of trouble.
But having been wusses for decades, we can't just start a shooting war. We have to ratchet up in stages. China doesn't want war with us, but they do want to bully their neighbors. Show them that we will stand up to the bully and both China and those neighbors will change their tunes.
I think the military presence thing is basically a distraction. The real battle is economic. We ned to meet the military with a show of sufficient force to indicate that we will support our allies, but we need to figure out how to win the real battle, which is the economic one.
Regarding Benghazi, to clarify, if trouble had happened, I would have sent the Marines ashore immediately to clear it up, with orders to shoot to kill if necessary.
DeletePresence with an intention to be merely present does nothing. Presence with a clearly understood intention to act if necessary is, at minimum, a deterrent, and if necessary, a corrective activity.
Delete"Show them that we will stand up to the bully"
DeleteOnce again, you speak in platitudes without any specific actions to suggest. You could be any current politician who threaten without the will to back it up. I say this not to be mean but to nudge you to realize that you have no viable military option to offer since there appear to be no military actions that you'd take. If you think I'm misrepresenting your position then offer a specific military action that you would take when China ignores your warnings and ships sailing around the region. Give me a specific example.
I'm with you on the economic battle but, again, you lack specifics. Give me a list of economic actions you'd take that would have an effect. I offered you a list of actions (which you immediately half-measured!).
"Presence with a clearly understood intention to act if necessary"
DeleteAgain, a generality with no specific action or consequence. Are you beginning to see the pattern to your own responses? There appears to be no specific military action you'd be willing to take so why bother with sailing even the entire navy through the region?
Re-read your own comments and note not only the lack of specific actions/consequences but the extreme reluctance to even consider any! There's a pattern to be seen there that should give you some self-feedback on your thought process.
OK, specific actions:
DeletePueblo--I would have sent aircraft to sink the Korean ship and rescue Pueblo, with surface units to follow. (By the way, I worked for Bucher for a couple of months after he returned, and he says that is exactly what he was promised).
Iran--first, I wouldn't have sent the boats without an escort. If the CG cutter could meet them halfway to refuel, then everything could have waited a few hours for the cutter to meet them at the Basra sea buoy and escort them, with orders to shoot anybody who interfered. Given that didn't happen, I would have ordered the sailors to shoot back. What I still cannot get over about this one is the incredible stupidity of sending them out the way they were sent.
Benghazi--At the first sign of trouble, I would have landed those Marines to break it up, with orders to shoot to kill if necessary. Of course, that requires that we had that LST with that company of Marines onboard to begin with, which is one reason why I have proposed my changes to the amphibious fleet. Also, we have pretty much abandoned the 6th Fleet idea, which seems a mistake now that Russia is flexing its muscles a bit.
Had we done those things in those cases, and similar things in other cases, the perception would be very different today. We need to change the perception, but that requires somebody with guts at the top of the chain, and we haven't had that.
One idea, the Chinese like to fish our unmanned vehicles out of the water and capture them. Suppose we loaded one with high explosives, and sent it through the Taiwan Strait. When the Chinese picked it up, we detonated it and sunk their ship. Wonder how many more drones they would pick up after that?
By the way, I've said how I would have handled Pueblo, Iran, and Benghazi. How would you have handled them?
DeleteWe're not talking about actions you would have taken in the past against low level countries. We're talking about what you'll do against China with the risk of escalation ever present. What will you do when they ignore your warnings?
Delete"We have to ratchet up in stages. China doesn't want war with us, but they do want to bully their neighbors. Show them that we will stand up to the bully and both China and those neighbors will change their tunes."
DeleteWhy do you have to go up in stages if you don't mind me asking? This is somewhat a pet peave of mine with Western military thinking where we believe that we could escalate at our own discretion. In the South China Sea, we ARE NOT in control of the narrative. To regain such narrative, you have to be unpredictable and THEN you could dictate the next move.
For instance, when China harass allied fishing boats, you do the same and go one step further, maybe blowing up the fish that they were fishing. You have to intimidate them with actual aggressive action, to respond kindly with force. When China capture a USV, send a missile to blew it up. We don't care if they are caught in a crossfire, it's their fault for capturing our target boat!
If you want to go economic, a problem with Vietnam and Philippines that they are facing is a lack of capable cheap fishing boat to combat China's growing fleet. We could provide these boats by funding our boat industry and selling them for dirt cheap through FMS program. On the other hand, my other economic response would be sending a fishing fleet yourself to compete with Chinese fishing fleet as a FONOPS, maybe sprinkle in some of the harassing equipment like loudspeakers and oil spill to combat them. You increase cooperation with allied countries and simultaneously reduce the viability of Chinese fishing!
"We're not talking about actions you would have taken in the past against low level countries."
DeleteBut we didn't even take those actions. And you are lumping me in with the people who did not take them. And a lot of China's perceptions that we don't act come from our failure to act against egregious violations in the past.
Ipnam, I like your suggestions.
So, yet again, what specific actions would you take against China?
DeleteYour refusal to offer any actions renders your 'strategy' invalid and toothless.
Well, what action I take depends on what they do. I don't think an invasion of mainland China is appropriate or likely to succeed.
DeleteAnd I do think a lot of the SCS stuff is sideshow, and the real action is on the economic side. Things I do are create whatever incentives are necessary to move production out of China--back home for essentials, and to neighboring countries for cheap consumer goods (one of the carrots we use to get them onboard). One thing that would help is a national consumption tax that can be levied on imports and rebated on exports. I like ipnam's suggestions regarding the fishing boats, plus using Navy ships to enforce fishing rights.
I do like the idea of restricting their citizens, and particularly students. I am willing to bet a lot of "students" have overstayed their visas, and I would start by rounding them up and sending them home. I would put severe limits on what technology we allow to go to China, which would discourage a lot of the computer manufacturing that goes on over there now.
Is there a situation where I would launch cruise missiles from SSGNs? Yes, but we are nowhere that now.
I think the response has to depend on the provocation. I like the idea if they are picking up our unmanned vehicles of packing one with high explosives and when the Chinese pick it up, boom, there goes one of their ships.
You want some specific responses, give me some specific situations to respond to.
"You want some specific responses, give me some specific situations to respond to."
DeleteForget about hypothetical scenarios. Here's some real ones:
China currently has a fleet of 200 'fishing' vessels in Philippine waters (and EEZ) at Whitsun Reef. This is real. What do you do about it?
Chinese fishing and 'coast guard' vessels are routinely violating Vietnamese waters and EEZ. This is real. What are you going to do about it.
China continues to develop and further militarize various illegal islands. This is real and on-going. What are you going to do about it?
China currently has 287 militia vessels scattered around the various islands of Kalayaan (Palawan, Philippines). This is real. What are you going to do about it?
That should suffice to see what kind of response policy you'd implement.
First thing I'd do is tell China that we will not tolerate violations of international law. Then I'd make sure we had allies on our side so we could do combined ops.
Delete"China currently has a fleet of 200 'fishing' vessels in Philippine waters (and EEZ) at Whitsun Reef. This is real. What do you do about it?"
Step one, I'd send a USN frigate or corvette out with Philippine navy/coast guard ships to chase them away, and arrest them and impound their boats if they wouldn't leave. Step two, if they come back, sink their boats.
"Chinese fishing and 'coast guard' vessels are routinely violating Vietnamese waters and EEZ. This is real. What are you going to do about it."
Again, send a USN frigate or corvette out with Vietnamese navy or coast guard ships to chase them away, and if they refused to leave arrest them and impound their ships.
"China continues to develop and further militarize various illegal islands. This is real and on-going. What are you going to do about it?"
They need a fairly significant logistics pipeline to build an island. Stop any ship headed for the island and impound it if they refuse to go back.
"China currently has 287 militia vessels scattered around the various islands of Kalayaan (Palawan, Philippines). This is real. What are you going to do about it?"
I'd send a US frigate or corvette (something bigger and with bigger guns) out with Philippine navy or coast guard ships to order them to leave, and seize their vessels if they don't leave.
You will note that I'd do things in conjunction with local forces. We don't have legal authority to do these things, but they do. We're just there to make sure our side has more firepower. This should not only deter China after a few of these incidents, but it gives our allies confidence that they can trust us.
I have some thoughts here!! These situations would have to be dealt with first by diplomacy, where we reach agreements with the afflicted govts. Some sort of defense assistance agreement that allows us to have a legal basis for policing their waters. This is the key to whats otherwise a non-starter... Having gotten that, then we could act. We could start gently by communicating that the fishing bosts are trespassing. If within hours they arent leaving, then a squadron making some low supersonic passes would be next. Considering that it would cause damage, it would be a less gentle message. Hopefully there are some navy/militia/cg vessels among the fishing boats, and they take shots at the fighters. At that point, you kill everything that fired, and "accidently" a few other boats as well. After that if they arent all headed out, then surface ships move in and work to stop, board, and seize them, again hoping that they're fired upon!!
DeleteAs far as the faux islands, partnering with the most-favored nation, in terms of internationally accepted ownership is key. After that, we again troll with aircraft or ships, hoping to be fired upon. If not, a pack-up-and-leave ultimatum is given, and a last-chance missile is sent into an empty beach. After that, missiles are sent until theres no defensive facilities left, and we escort an amphib force from the previously mentioned nation to retake ownership.
Admittedly, I like the idea of shooting last, not first. But having the moral high ground is unfortunately important on todays world stage. Even if we're provacative and its obvious, so be it...
Another thought... "Island showdown"-esque...
DeleteSchedule "exercises" right where the fishing fleets are. Give them warning that theyre in a military exclusion zone. Then, sail a squadron or three of cruisers and destroyers, at flank, right through them. Over and over. Avoid running them down if possible, but create enough wakes to cause damage, or at least make the fishing and habitability of the boats impossible. Of course, the warships should be doing "ASW Testing", and banging away with all the active sonars to chase the fish away also...!!!
Jjabatie, excellent ideas.
DeleteJust summing up my thoughts:
ReplyDelete- JSM just got tested from F-35 in March
- India is integrating NSM on MH-60R
- B-1s are working on adding external mounts to bring their JASSM/LRASM total from 24 to 36.
- P-8 looks on track to mount 4 of whatever it wants.
- I really think NSM is just getting started. Mounting it on LCS is a stoop gap. The real potential is getting it on MH-60s and even AH-1Z potentially.
- Tactical length Mk 41s are a betterr length for quad packing. They could quad pack GMLS-ER and even grow an extended range version of that. Maybe add a seeker for moving targets as the are working on for PRSM. You could also do a 2 stage ESSM-ER and a VLA based on CVLWT. Now 16 cells is 64 rounds for multiple missions.
- 127mm or 155mm still puts ships in playing a ground game for NGFS. I'd rather those guns get assigned to smaller, cheaper, faster platforms if they are for bombardment. otherwise use them to enhance AAW and close in ASuW.
"- I really think NSM is just getting started. Mounting it on LCS is a stoop gap. The real potential is getting it on MH-60s and even AH-1Z potentially."
DeleteWouldn't this still suffer from the same issue mentioned in the post? From all the tests i gathered, there is only 1 NSM attached on MH60 and seemingly 2-4 mounted on AH-1Z. These are, terribly insufficient to saturate at anything. Besides, helicopters are increasingly vulnerable towards anything. Are we sure we want to use them for these one shot strikes?
I think the crux of the issue boils down to a lack of home-front development. Colleges need to teach their students working on a simple Anti-ship missile design that utilize reliable components housed in a stealthy shape and we should be good to go.
I really questioned how hard this would be since essentially we have had some of the designs at several design competitions. We just need to find the right one for our needs.
"JSM just got tested from F-35"
DeleteThe issue is not how many platforms can launch a missile, it's the numbers required to mass an effective strike. For example, a Chinese surface group with several 'Aegis' ships would require hundreds of missiles to overwhelm - assuming their defenses work as well as we claim ours do - and those kinds of missile numbers are not going to come from a helo with a missile or an F-35 with a couple missiles. As the post pointed out, we need to be able to mass hundreds of missiles in a single strike.
"The real potential is getting it on MH-60s"
No, that has potential only against isolated, small vessels. At one missile per helo, you just can't mass a strike.
India will fit 2 per helo.
DeleteWidely used 76mm naval guns are also used for air defense and anti cruise missiles. For instance, Italy made widely used OTO Melara 76 mm gun. Its PFF ammunitions, while explode, discharge 2000+ high speed tungsten balls to destroy cruise missiles. Its fire speed is very high (use sea water for cooling).
ReplyDeleteChina also has a famous 76mm naval gun - H/PJ26, which was derived from Soviet Union's AK-176 but China has developed into a much more sophiscate one. It can also perform anti aircraft and cruise missile missions. Lack money, Russia cannot continue developing to make AK-176 in pal with the two.
Bottom line - naval guns can also be used in anti aircraft and missile defense.
" naval guns can also be used in anti aircraft and missile defense."
DeleteNo one has demonstrated an effective, successful missile defense with a naval gun. Manufacturers make grandiose claims but, to the best of my knowledge, there are no actual, semi-realistic tests of a naval gun in the anti-missile role.
There are news reports on tests. Anti cruise missile ammunitions are expensive. They are not just fly close then explode. They (PFF) are more like a missile (or projectile) which calculate suitable position to explode and emit thousands of tungsten balls. It looks that H/PJ26 is more advanced than OTO Melara in this front but as you mentioned, we cannot just believe advertisements.
DeleteFor frigates which focus more on air defense than land attack, this is a pretty good tool. China's type 054 frigates started with 100mm gun but changed to the 76mm after upgraded to 054A.
I'd be interested to see what a 5"/62 gun could do in anti-missile work.
DeleteAccording to my inside source (wiki), the 5/62 can hold 20 rounds in an autoloader and expend them in 1 minute.
A dual mount should then be able to put 40 rounds in the air in that minute.
Paired with a fire-control radar and using some kind of time-fuzed flechette style round, I'd think that they would be able to put a lot of crap in the path of incoming missiles.
One more layer of defense prior to the CIWS.
I'd be interested for the more knowledgeable to point out what the pitfalls would be.
Lutefisk
"I'd be interested to see what a 5"/62 gun could do in anti-missile work."
DeleteNot even the eternally optimistic US Navy considers the 5"/62 to have a viable anti-missile function. There are a host of problems. For example, while 20 rds/min may seem like fast firing, it's not in the anti-missile world. If you do the math, you find that a missile traveling, say, 600 mph (moderate subsonic) will move a half a mile between 5"/62 shots! That means that there is no hope of 'clustering' shots against the missile. There's a reason why dedicated anti-missile point defense guns typically have rates of fire of hundreds to thousands of rds/min.
Train and elevation rates are another issue. Reload speed after the first 20 rds are an issue. And so on ...
Those are good reasons.
DeleteLutefisk
Off-topic, but I don't know what's going on. I just got a warning from my security system that this is a dangerous site because of phishing going on. I haven't seen anything like that, but ComNavOps I thought you might want to know.
ReplyDeleteI have no idea what that's about. Blogger is very limited as to what the blog owner can do. You can publish a post and that's about it. Rest assured that you have nothing to worry about from me. Let me know if the warnings continue although there is nothing I can do about it that I'm aware of. If anyone knows anything I can do, please chime in.
DeletePhishing, as you know, involves some type of email or other solicitation. I do not, and cannot, send emails, text, or anything else from this site so that should demonstrate it has nothing to do with the blog. Someone may be using the site's URL in phishing emails? Can't really think of anything else.
Yeah, I had it happen on several sites a bit ago and then it went away.
DeleteGone away now.
DeleteComNavOps, I have no idea and certainly saw nothing problematic. My guess is that some outside hacker tried some kind of raid on the site. It might be appropriate to let Blogger know.
DeleteI think the Navy is purposely being weakened. Why would our admirals and generals be any different than many of our elected officials? Many who are obviously workibg against the country instead of for it.
ReplyDeleteIt is a serious problem that we spend more year after year but are only able to purchase less and less weapons.
DeleteF-35s, in theory, could carry as many as six JSMs each. Super Hornets could carry four. Unclear what this would do to combat radius. Even if it was cut in half, the range of JSM permits strikes out to 600 nmi or more flying a Hi-Hi-Lo profile.
ReplyDeleteA squadron of ten F-35s could then deliver 60 JSMs per sortie. Sprinkle in some MALD-N shooting Super Hornets and that would be a very stressing raid for any enemy task force. Two or three rounds of that and they'll be out of SAMs, if leakers didn't kill them first.
According to The Aviationist website, the F-35 can only carry two internal JSM. Their accompanying photo seems to bear that out. Here's the link: F-35 and JSM
DeletePresumably, additional weapons could be carried externally at the cost of stealth, range, and maneuverability.
"Two or three rounds of that and they'll be out of SAMs, if leakers didn't kill them first."
So, I guess the enemy will obligingly cruise slowly in circles waiting for us to sink them? Or … would they use UAVs, helos, and aircraft to search for our launch platforms, attack the launching aircraft, destroy our targeting sensors (what are our targeting sensors?), and launch their own attacks against us? I note that the HQ-9B is claimed to have a range of 300+ km. Even suggesting that we'll be able to leisurely launch 'two or three rounds' of attacks is symptomatic of the kind of thinking pervasive in US military thinking: everything we do will work and the enemy will be totally helpless.
They've done fit checks with JSM on the F-35's external pylons. A "beast mode" JSM load would require more development and testing work, for sure.
DeleteYes, it would sacrifice range and stealth, but with JSM's 300+ nautical miles range, neither would be as necessary.
HQ-9B can't use its max claimed range any more than our SAMs can. An aircraft could be at 15,000ft and still be below the radar horizon at 300km. What's going to target for it? Plus, 300 nautical miles is greater than 300km.
The enemy gets a vote no matter what solution we come up with. My point was only that a single fighter squadron, suitably equipped, can generate a raid large enough to stress even the heaviest defenses. Have the Chinese tested their systems against large, stealthy anti-ship missile raids with MALD jammers? I doubt it. Have they even tested to the degree we have?
The squadron could do it again eight or so hours later. In that time, the enemy could move ~250 nautical miles. But if the first salvo hit anything, they may decide to render assistance rather than running, or split up. Either way, they're weaker.
"JSM's 300+ nautical miles range"
DeleteUh, that is not the normal range. That's the maximum range on a flight profile that would be unusual. As you go on to note, max claimed ranges are not achievable in real world use. The Kongsberg manufacturer's site lists the range as >100 nm. The Air Force Technology site lists 150 nm. I note that you discount the range of the SAMs but maximize the range credit of the JSM! You might want to be consistent!
" What's going to target for it?"
I would pose the same question for the JSM. Again, you're assuming we have total situational awareness and the enemy has none! Are you perchance an active serving General or Admiral?
Your comment is the ultimate in one-sided, over the top optimism! We launch strike after strike (apparently with no casualties!) and the enemy just sits there taking it!
Why would that flight profile be unusual? There's no need to fly at low altitude all the way to the target when it's mostly over open, empty ocean, well below the enemy's radar horizon.
DeleteIf their stealth claims are true, these missiles won't be detected until they are within tens of miles of the target anyway.
Your blog post was on "saturation firepower" not targeting. That's what I was addressing. A squadron of fighters could pose a significant saturation threat to a Chinese task force if they maximized JSM carriage.
I'm a mere commenter. I apologize for not working out the entire kill chain for you in a handful of sentences.
As our friends in Ethiopia and Eritrea discovered in 1999 in duels between MiG-29s and Su-27s, launching missiles at maximum possible range is not conducive to hitting anything.
DeleteIt gives the opponent time to react and launch counter measures and the missile lacks sufficient fuel for any course adjustment.
@Dead1: That engagement needs to be understood in context: it's with fighters firing semi active radar homing missiles at each other, missiles which require the launching fighter to maintain radar lock to guide the missile all the way to target. It's a somewhat different situation from firing cruise missiles at warships.
DeleteAssuming a more modest launch at 300km range, and assuming a notional 48 F-35s in 4 squadrons attacking with 6 JSMs, this generates a salvo of 288 missiles, not counting any other missiles fired from the DDGs and being fed targeting data by the F-35s. (A more reasonable number, I think, would be more like 24 F-35s, resulting in a 144 JSM salvo).
There are some caveats, of course:
- To get JSM to fly 300km, the aircraft would be launching in a high profile, which would reasonably put them at the outer edge of engagement by Chinese SAMs. This is risky, but a commander might well choose to roll the dice here, given that SAMs reaching out to the edge of their range will be flying on ballistic arcs and be short of energy to maneuver.
- External carriage of JSM will increase the RCS of the F-35s, but by how much is unknown - that said, stealth is a sliding scale, not a binary option. That increased RCS might be an acceptable risk given the parameters of a launch at 300km, and the F-35's RCS will decrease once the missiles have been released.
- For the sake of a level playing field for this thought experiment, I'm assuming that both sides can see and target each other at 300km.
- Once the missiles launch, the launching parties will be effectively blind. The F-35s will go evasive, ducking below the radar horizon, and utilising ECM, stealth and evasive maneuvers to defeat the SAMs, which will be at the edge of their performance envelope and low on energy for maneuver. The JSMs will have the radar locks at the time of launch, but by the time they've dropped down to the sea-skimming attack profile they'll be on their own. I'd wager they'd have a better chance of seeing and maneuvering to engage their targets in terminal phase though. To summarise
-- Naval SAM: supersonic, will arrive on target faster, at the edge of its range, losing energy from climbing, flying in a balistic arc, limited energy for maneuvers, single type radar seeker. Target: F-35 which has stealth, ECM and is evasively maneuvering.
--JSM: within range, has gained energy from flying down to the sea surface, has multiple sensor types so less easily defeated by softkill measures. Subsonic seaskimming attack profile cuts both ways against JSM: undetectable till it crosses the radar horizon, larger window of observation to detect and reacquire targets, but also it's blind till it crosses the radar horizon and there is a larger window for defensive engagement by point defenses. Target: Warship which is big, has ECM, cannot maneuver to escape the missile's seeker cone, and has hardkill point defenses.
- The biggest caveat is that the US has to actually commit to buying large numbers of JSM. It's not the UK that only loads dummy Harpoons onto RN warships as a cost cutting measure... but not by much.
As will all things in war, it's a roll of the dice.
Could a worthwhile amount of ECM gear fit in place of a Tomahawk's warhead?
ReplyDeletePerhaps a few ECM Tomahawks could act as escorts for their warhead carrying buddies.
Steal the jamming bits out of a MALD-J for a proof of concept. Buy some time to develop an affordable stealthy cruise missile while extending the useful life of the Tomahawk.
Italy's OTO-Melara 76mm nanavl gun, widely used by many nations, include USA has demonstrated its function on anti-missile and anti-aircraft capabilities. It can only shot down aircrafts fly close to it (like A-10, etc. must fly close to attack, not like F/A-18 which can do BVR attack far away).
ReplyDeleteIts anti-missile function is pretty good on all current US made cruise missiles. Look following link on how they do this. You don't need to shot down a Tomahawk far away, just in the range of the 76mm naval gun. Don't worry, US Navy also has this gun although I don't have firm data on whether Pentagon has purchased PFF or not.
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_3-62_mk75.php
Again, there are NO even remotely realistic anti-missile tests for any naval gun that I'm aware of. If you know of any, please provide a link or reference. All we have are manufacturer's claims that are backed up by nothing.
DeleteAs an example of the futility of believing manufacturer's claims, the LCS Mk110 57mm gun was proclaimed as a near-miracle of weaponry, able to provide anti-surface, anti-air, anti-small boat, and, I wouldn't be surprised, anti-submarine! The reality is that it has performed so poorly that it was dropped from the Zumwalt design in favor of a smaller 30 mm gun. Despite the claims, the gun was an abject failure on the LCS.
Manufacturers will claim anything and everything to make a sale. Reality is always quite different.
"OTO-Melara 76mm nanavl gun, widely used by many nations, include USA"
DeleteThe only use of the 76 mm by the US Navy was the retired Perry and Pegasus classes and that version of the 76 mm was most definitely not an anti-air weapon. I can't think of a class in the US Navy that currently uses the 76 mm.
I wonder if sending along a bunch of decoys might help with the saturation. Maybe a navalized version of the Air Force's MALD device. The current MALD is skinnier and shorter than the Tomahawk, so I suspect several could be launched from a single Mark 41 cell. The original MALD had a diameter of 6 inches and a length of roughly 7 feet. The current one is larger. I couldn't find the diameter, but the length is about 9.5 feet. This suggests that it ought to be possible to build one with a diameter of 10 inches (the same as the ESSM which can be quad packed in the Mark 41 launcher) and stretched to use some of the extra length to give more space for fuel. So with two Mark 41 cells, you could get one Tomahawk (or maybe even an LRASM if we can get the Navy to buy some) plus 4 decoys. Would that make things better?
ReplyDeleteThe British have a similar idea with the SPEAR-EW missile, a complement to the SPEAR 3. As I understand it, the idea is that their F-35s, which can carry up to 24 SPEAR 3s, could fire a brace of SPEAR-EW to aid in penetrating defenses, although given the relatively short range of SPEAR 3 I'm assuming this was meant more at battlefield interdiction of enemy ground forces with organic SHORAD assets.
Delete"Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile – The Tomahawk is slow, non-stealthy, and lacks modern terminal maneuvering, sensors, and penetration aids although some upgrades have been applied to the missile. Currently, numbers are almost non-existent."
DeleteUSNI reported last year that the Navy is planning to upgrade all Block IV Tomahawks (~3500 rounds) to the Block V configuration which includes navigation and communication upgrades to make them more survivable and harder to detect. With the addition of a new seeker, some of these will become the Block Va to attack ships. Some will be armed with a new warhead for hardened and buried target making them the Block Vb. The Navy test fired their first Block V Tomahawk last December.
Army has new hypersonic missile with 1725-mile range.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/amp36421213/army-hypersonic-weapon-1700-mile-range/
That comes with a LOT of caveats, as you undoubtedly realize, beginning with it's a developmental program not a fielded weapon. We've seen a LOT of developmental weapons die in development.
DeleteSetting that aside, consider the giant trailer required to haul/launch it and tell me what you think the tactical impact in the Chinese theater will be.
Agree, and don't have answers to your questions. Just spitballing that Navy should have been looking at something like this 20-30 year ago. Russians obviously were.
Delete"Navy should have been looking at something like this 20-30 year ago. Russians obviously were."
DeleteYou say that but there is a key difference between the Russians/Chinese and us and that is the launch locations. Russian and China would likely be launching from home territories with ready access to roads, logistic support, defenses, etc. In contrast we would be launching from … Guam? And even that doesn't work because it's over 2,000 miles from Guam to the middle of the South China Sea. This suggests the need for ship launched missiles but the pictured size of the missiles suggests we'd need a purpose built, dedicated hypersonic launch ship.
I guess my question is what does a 1700 mile hypersonic missile, as recent articles have suggested, really gain us?
"The two specific examples you cite, Pueblo and Iran, are both inexcusable. We should have been prepared for both situations, with somebody standing by to interdict, and in both cases that somebody should have been sent in at the first sign of trouble."
DeleteEvidence in recent years shows the Pueblo was a secret NSA op to provoke an incident and get captured. It is unclear if Admirals were ordered not to intervene, or were confused since the NSA had not informed them of the specifics of that mission. It was a high risk mission listed as low risk so the Navy was not required to provide protection.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYMl0mz6cSE
Some thought on saturate attack from recent Israel Hamas battles. Israel's Iron Done intercepted most Hamas rockets but not all. Iron Done demonstrated its ability to intercept large number of rockets. These rockets can be considered as some kind of saturated attacks.
ReplyDeleteHowever, up to now, despite tried hard, Israel has not yet sold any Iron Done to other nations. Nations checked this system and none was willing to buy. After read through, I found that key reasons are:
Iron Done has a powerful radar able to detect many coming threats (ironically, few nations actually bought this radar from Israel).
Missiles to perform intercept have very small load (~ 3kg) and designed to explode in one direction (side). Fire power from the missile is good for primitive rockets but not sufficient for most missiles used by advanced nations.
Self detecting range of intercept missiles is very short (less than 1 mile).
Basically, Iron Done is designed for intercept primitive small to mid sized rockets, not sophiscate missiles. Therefore, it has little use in today's land battle field. This is why nations were excited first but after deep exploration, none of them purchased this system, include US.
US Army is developing MHTK missile system for battle field protection (of rockets, artillery shell, etc.). Meanwhile, they use some stop gap measures (modified Hellfire, etc.).
Navy has Sea Ram to protect ships from missiles penetrate through multiple interceptions.