As we discuss the merits of various ships, especially foreign ones, ComNavOps frequently hears the refrain, ‘for … but not with’. For those who might be unfamiliar with the phrase, it refers to the designed-in ability of a ship to take on a capability but doesn’t actually have the capability when the ship is built and delivered. The concept is that at some future date the ship can be given the missing capability. Many naval analysts seem to equate ‘for … but not with’ with actual capability – as if having the theoretical possibility somehow equates to having the actual capability.
Of course, the reality is that the promised future capability almost never happens.
Foreign navies seem to use this approach quite frequently, presumably as a cost savings measure while still being able to claim the missing capability on a presentation. I’m not going to bother listing all the examples of foreign ship classes that have been built ‘for … but not with’. If you’re interested, you can readily find examples on the Internet.
The US Navy seems not to use this approach or, at least, not by that name. The only legitimate example I can think of off the top of my head is the Spruance class which was built for the 8” gun but not with it – 5” guns were installed, instead. On a side note, it is fascinating to ponder the Spruance class, still serving and fully equipped with 8” guns and the best ASW in the world instead of resting on the ocean floor providing homes for crustaceans.
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| Imagine This Mk71 8" Gun on the Spruance Class |
The US Navy’s equivalent to ‘for … but not with’ is to build PowerPoint presentations which list grandiose future equipment and capabilities, most of it non-existent, like lasers and rail guns. Again, none of these future upgrades ever happen.
In a closely related practice, the US Navy has begun building ships ‘for … but not with’ actual finished construction. Ships are being routinely delivered in a partially complete state and then partially finished at a later date using funds that are not counted as part of the ship’s construction cost. This is a brilliantly fraudulent ploy by the Navy to skirt Congressional cost caps and oversight. The Navy even refers to this now standard practice as ‘phased delivery’. The Zumwalt, for example, was delivered to the Navy without its combat system. The LCSes were (still are?) delivered with substantial incomplete construction and unfinished compartments. The LPD-17 was delivered with millions of man-hours of incomplete construction. The Ford was delivered with … well … almost nothing complete.
So what is the point of this post?
Of minor interest is the need to carefully evaluate foreign ship designs with an eye out for the ‘for … but not with’ trap. A ship is only as good as what it actually has. Future, theoretical capabilities are non-existent and almost never happen.
Of larger concern is the US Navy’s increasing tendency to design ships whose value – and, therefore, cost justification - is predicated on non-existent, non-installed future growth like lasers. Anticipated future developments rarely happen and ships never get upgraded even if something were to become available. The Navy ALWAYS goes to Congress and claims that the promised upgrades are no longer cost effective because the ship is, by that time, obsolete, and that it makes more sense (in the Navy’s warped mind) to build a new ship.
So, if that’s the case, why do we build ships with future growth? It never happens and just increases the cost of the ship. Why do we build ships with 40-50 year theoretical life spans when we consistently retire them early?
‘For … but not with’ is just another way of saying, ‘never gonna happen’.
"Why do we build ships with 40-50 year theoretical life spans when we consistently retire them early?"
ReplyDeleteBecause it works as a sales pitch: gotta justify the ridiculous price tag, after all.
The for... But not with seems a credible ideal when used by the coast guards of various countries. In that in war you might need to upgraded them as combatants but don't want to be looking all armed to the teeth in peace time.
ReplyDeleteFor an actual built warship seems like a bad ideal. A good example would appear to the Visiby class. What looks like an otherwise good ship seems to have knee caped by not installing is the intended ASW rocket system and self defense AA missiles (Stealth is cool and all but if some drone is loitering overhead it does not matter).
I don't think there is any point it talking the USN wonder future tech that is always around the corner. On the one hand I have no issue with wonder lasers or what have you being a DARPA thing that are bolted on to a ship to test and what not. But the ideal that you would design a ship for things that don't exist seems well stupid.
Maybe the water system at the Pentagon is contaminated by either military contractors or a foreign rival and mass delusion is a side effect.
To my mind, this post and your immediately previous one about corrosion control go together. If you're. not going to keep them for their life span, why bother to maintain them?
ReplyDeleteIt's a very concerning trend.
As for the FBNW concept that is so prevalent among several of our NATO partners, a lot of that comes about because with very short production runs their R&D costs get amortized over a very small base, and that drives up unit costs. One of my thoughts about adopting FREMM or Horizon designs for the USN has been that if we add a longer production run, the R&D costs per unit go way down, and maybe they can afford to turn some of the FBNW stuff into with stuff.
"with very short production runs their R&D costs get amortized over a very small base, and that drives up unit costs."
DeleteAs a standalone statement, the statement is true. As a specific explanation/excuse for FBNW, it falls a bit flat. For example, in the case of Sweden/Visby:
1. There is no need for second tier countries to try to develop bleeding edge military technology themselves. If they stick with existing equipment then there is no research required. All that is needed is integration of the various individual components. Even the Visby's stealth shaping is nothing new. They just took existing stealth shaping knowledge and applied to the maximum - good for them! Thus, the R&D costs are minimal and limited to integration.
2. Swedish military spending is 1% of GDP. That's minimal by any standard. The Visby cost cutting, to whatever extent that occurred, was driven by choices between social programs and military programs. It was not driven by an inability to exceed some extreme military budget limit. It was a conscious decision to prioritize social over military.
"adopting FREMM or Horizon designs for the USN has been that if we add a longer production run, the R&D costs per unit go way down,"
Why is it our responsibility to lower the costs of other country's military construction programs? We need to do what's best for us. Now, if what's best for us also helps some other country, all the better but that shouldn't be even a minor consideration for us.
If lowering their cost makes them more potent allies, then that helps us. And if we can get ships and equipment without having to run through DoD's design and procurement hurdles, so much the better.
DeleteWe don't need another F-35 fiasco. But that was driven more by our own idea of building one airplane for multiple US purposes than by any foreign demands.
All of Europe is going to tend toward prioritizing social over military. The only way they are going to build military to full potential is by lowering the cost. Amortizing R&D costs over longer productions runs is one way to lower unit cost. And even using off the shelf components, Sweden still had some R&D costs with Visby.
My point is that the FREMM was a perfectly serviceable ship, with a good ASW capability. It was short VLS cells with only 16, but there was a FBNW provision for another 16. In order to get AEGIS onboard, we had to make a bunch of cost and weight tradeoffs, so we left it with one useless gun and other degradations from the original FREMM. Build the FREMM as is, spread the R&D costs out over a longer run, and maybe the French and Italians can add the extra VLS cells.
ComNavOps and Kath, you both mentioned the VIsby. Maybe if we license build about 30-30 of them, we can pay the Swedish Navy and Kockums enough of a license fee that they can afford to put the full suit of armor on all of them. We and they end up with some useful ships.
DeleteVisby has some nice features but would be nearly useless for US Navy needs. Why would we want to buy 30 useless ships so that Sweden can fully equip their ships? We already bought 30 useless ships. They're called LCS.
DeleteIf you're determined to spend US money on improving other country's navies, just give them the money for the missing weapons. It would be immensely cheaper than buying 30 ships!
"If lowering their cost makes them more potent allies, then that helps us."
DeleteBarely. Even a fully equipped Visby is of almost no value to any US war effort. It's a nice peacetime ship and a good home waters defense vessel but it is NOT a global warship that could help the US in, say, a war with China. If gaining a miniscule benefit for an ally costs us a buy of 30 ships that have no value to us, we've not only not gained anything but we've lost a great deal.
You like to talk about opportunity cost. Well, the opportunity cost associated with buying a vessel we have no need for is enormous. Now, as I said, If we can get the ship WE NEED and an ally benefits from that … great. Otherwise, we would be foolish to buy an incredibly expensive ship just so some other country can improve their ship.
That would depend on how the US deploys ships.
DeleteA properly equipped Vispy would a perfectly useful based out of the the Persian gulf. To you know force Iran to spend more than it has and let the USCG go home to do its job. As would also just an upgraded Cyclone class ship in larger numbers.
If you demand everything always be a global ship you always demand an expensive one.
Guam and Japan seem reasonably secure bases. If the fight is with china cheap 'expendable' ASW and Missile ships are useful. Either build more fortified bases or more support ships for them so thay can stay on station.
"If you demand everything always be a global ship you always demand an expensive one."
DeleteTo build ships that can't contribute in a war is a waste of money.
"If you demand everything always be a global ship you always demand an expensive one."
DeleteNot sure that has to be the case... There are lots of comparisons where a a marginally better equipped, larger ship with more "global" range and capability is well worth the expense. Previous studies on medium vs full size carriers being a good example. WWII destroyers like the Fletchers were considered "global" in range and capabilities, but were inexpensive. The costs of todays ships arent truly reflective of their capabilities or range, they're reflective of lots of unseen factors, including broken procurement, lack of industrial base and competition, and lack of forceful oversight and budget control. CNO has mentioned often the inability to explain the cost increases that are often far over and above simple inflation...
This story seems pertinent to some of the above comments:
Delete“Secretary of the Navy Kenneth Braithwaite has raised the possibility of his service running a multi-national frigate program together with allies and partners, in the same general vein as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, a notional effort he dubbed the "Joint Strike Frigate."
“I have a concept in my head is if we created a Joint Strike Fighter that we could share with NATO allies," he added. "Why can’t we create a Joint Strike Frigate? Why can’t we take that same platform and offer it to our allies and partners around the world?"
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37346/navy-boss-talks-joint-strike-frigate-concept-after-calls-to-build-four-frigates-a-year
Yeah, the F-35 was such a resounding financial and schedule success, why not repeat it with ships? Repeating the F-35 and expecting a different result is the definition of insanity.
Delete"To build ships that can't contribute in a war is a waste of money."
DeleteSo all the short range ships in the Persian gulf now that where either carried their or transferred with a tender are useless?
How about all the USN ships that lack fittings for arctic service (they cannot de ice themselves)?
"So all the short range ships in the Persian gulf now that where either carried their or transferred with a tender are useless?"
DeleteI don't know what specific ships you're referring to but, for example, Cyclones have no use in war, MkVI riverines have no use in war, LCS has no use in war … not sure what else there is.
"How about all the USN ships that lack fittings for arctic service"
That's only a problem if we anticipate fighting in the Arctic and I see no compelling reason to do so. There's nothing there that is of national strategic importance to the US.
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DeleteThe problem with the F-35 is not so much making it available to our NATO allies as it is trying to build one airplane for multiple (and sometimes incompatible) US uses. I'm not aware that any of its problems were imposed by foreign requirements.
Delete" Even a fully equipped Visby is of almost no value to any US war effort. It's a nice peacetime ship and a good home waters defense vessel but it is NOT a global warship that could help the US in, say, a war with China. If gaining a miniscule benefit for an ally costs us a buy of 30 ships that have no value to us, we've not only not gained anything but we've lost a great deal.
DeleteYou like to talk about opportunity cost. Well, the opportunity cost associated with buying a vessel we have no need for is enormous. Now, as I said, If we can get the ship WE NEED and an ally benefits from that … great. Otherwise, we would be foolish to buy an incredibly expensive ship just so some other country can improve their ship."
As Kath suggests, the usefulness of a Visby depends on how we go to war. We've had all this talk about littoral warfare, and even spent a ton of money on "Littoral Combat Ships" supposedly designed for that purpose. Well, in any littoral combat scenario, I'd rather be riding a tricked-out Visby that an LCS, and I think you would agree with that. And you can build 4 Visbys for the cost of one LCS, so if there's an opportunity cost it's a bunch lower. Where would we use them? I cam think of a number of littoral areas where we might have to fight--first island chain versus China, eastern Med or Baltic versus Russia, Arabian/Persian Gulf against Iran or another rogue state.
One place that I see a real opportunity to build something that is useful to us and would help our allies build more is the FREMM class. It looks to me like in designing the FFGX what we did is make every sacrifice we needed in terms of cost and weight to get the AEGIS system onboard. My understanding, and feel free to correct me if I'm wrong, is that AEGIS is a lot heavier and more expensive than EMPAR so we had to give up something to get it onboard. Unless we see them as somehow replacing the Burkes (which I hope not), I don't see the virtue. It seems to me that the FFGX is less useful than a FREMM (particularly if we built the FREMM with instead of FBNW the second set of 16 VLS cells). Fore to aft, I'd like to do the FREMM with the 127mm gun forward, the 32 VLS cells, EMPAR, Phalanx P&S, if the NSM really does work out of a Mk41 VLS then in place of the canister launchers put 16 Mk41 cells to bot sides (similar to Iver Huitfeldt), do SMART-L and a SeaRAM on top of the hangar, and double helo hangar. If that all fits (and I don't know why it won't), then I think we have a heck of a warship, instead simply a cheaper and less capable AEGIS platform.
"I'm not aware that any of its problems were imposed by foreign requirements."
DeleteThe largest problem of all was imposed by foreign sales and that is that we couldn't cancel it even when it became obvious that it no longer met our needs!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! We were bound to continue the program so as not to impact our allies. We were forced to act against our own best interests.
"I'd rather be riding a tricked-out Visby that an LCS"
DeleteThat doesn't make it a good choice for war. It just makes it a less bad choice than a stupendously bad choice.
"And you can build 4 Visbys for the cost of one LCS, "
You need to start using better cost numbers. I've covered this before. First, the Visby used govt subsidies, transferred used equipment, and was built 'for but not with'. Second, regardless of the Swedish cost, the US can't build them for that cost no matter how you try to play accounting games. Third, by the time you 'trick out' the Visby, its cost will soar.
So, no, you're absolutely not going build 4 for the cost of 1 LCS. An LCS costs around $600M or so. Divided by 4, that equals $150M which is $34M less than the claimed Visby cost without considering the above factors.
Any remotely realistic cost estimate for a tricked out Visby would have to be in the $400M-$600M range and that ignores the added support costs associated with a new class.
I've got to insist on more realistic cost numbers.
After all that, you'd still have a poor warship - you'd have a good home waters defense vessel but a poor warship for global war. The Visby class lacks useful range/endurance for global operations, lacks a useful -60 size helo, lacks crew for damage control, has very small weapons loads, lacks electronic warfare capability (as far as I know), etc.
You can't even get 2 Visby's for the price of an LCS with mission package. There is also no yard in the US who can build a composite hull that long at present. There might be a need for a composite hull ship, but the Visby is a ton of unique gear.
Delete"An LCS costs around $600M or so."
DeleteNot from what I've seen. Maybe the marginal cost of the last of the production run is down in that range, but that's after a lot of learning from building previous ones, and that's not accounting for absorbing a pro rata share of R&D costs. What I've seen as an average cost is more in the $750MM range. If you fully trick out the Visby, you're probably looking at maybe half that as the upside. I would certainly trade an LCS for two Visbys.
As far as usefulness, that depends on what kind of combat we are talking about. If we are envisioning fighting in the littoral areas, which seems to be the term of art these days, then something like the Visby--small, quick, stealthy, nimble, and bristling with weapons when fully tricked out--would seem to be what is needed. Remember, the war game that led to building the LCSs actually recommended something a lot closer to a Visby than to an LCS.
Of course if you postulate that we are are not going to engage in any form of littoral combat, then neither the Visby nor the LCS makes sense. But that rules out the first island chain, the eastern Med, the Baltic, and the Arabian/Persian Gulf--all places where I think the likelihood of having to fight is fairly high.
"What I've seen as an average cost is more in the $750MM range."
DeleteThe FY2020 Navy SCN budget document shows a FY19 unit cost for 3 LCS as $523M each which appears to include GFE. Modules are not included. They're running around $50M-$80M depending on which one and ignoring that only the ASuW module exists in any kind of semi-finished form. So, that puts the final cost of the LCS at $573M-$580M. There is also the finishing costs which are undocumented. So, the final cost is somewhere right around $600M or so. If you have more accurate costs than the Navy SCN budget, please share!
"Of course if you postulate that we are are not going to engage in any form of littoral combat, then neither the Visby nor the LCS makes sense."
I don't see that type of combat. We've discussed this so I won't belabor it. I would simply note that if I'm wrong, a heavier force structure can deal with littoral combat just fine. If you're wrong and I'm right, the reverse is not true - a lighter force cannot deal with high end, open ocean combat. Something to think about.
" If you have more accurate costs than the Navy SCN budget, please share!"
DeleteThe SCN budget would include only the marginal costs of one additional unit. Two things:
1) They have already built a number of units by now, and I would marginal cost of a new unit to go down as production continues and the learning curve allows them to build cheaper. If you look over the whole life of the program, I would expect to see marginal costs starting in the $700MM range, dropping into the $600MMs and then down to around $600MM as we move up the learning curve.
2) Marginal cost does not include any amortization of R&D costs. I would expect for this class, which was such a departure from prior designs, these costs would be significant.
Based on those two factors, I would still expect the average cost to be in the $750MM range.
Similarly, with the Visbys, I believe the $184MM cost is an average cost for a class of 5 ($920MM), so that would presumably include amortization of all R&D costs. Haven't really read anything definitive on this, but what seems to happen with a lot of the European classes is that the R&D costs run a lot higher than expected, so they end up building fewer numbers with a lot of FBNW stuff. A longer production run would permit amortizing the front end cost over more units, lower the average cost, and permit at least some of the FBNW to become "with."
Although I am a CPA, I don't really have access to sufficiently detailed numbers to substantiate these comments, but from what I have read I do expect that's where the chips would fall.
We obviously disagree on the importance of a littoral/amphibious capability. I believe that simply pressing heavier forces into littoral service likely involves much less stealthy platforms than the Visbys, and that stealth is a major component in littoral success. Remember, the war game upon which the Navy based the LCSs started out as identifying the need for something like a Visby, and in the Navy's arms that grew into the LCSs.
You are engaged in some serious selective application of cost figures. By your own admission, you have nothing definitive to back up your assumption but you assume that the Visby costs include R&D.
DeleteIf you want to compare 'like to like', the Wiki costs for each ship are $184M for the Visby and $362 for the Freedom class LCS. If you want to disbelieve the LCS costs (for very good reasons!) then you need to disbelieve the Visby costs, as well, for the reasons I've outlined and you've ignored. You can't put absolute faith in one and not the other. The Visby cost reference is completely undefined - I know because I tried to trace the source and couldn't find it. There is absolutely no indication that R&D costs are included in the cited figure.
The main point is that unless you have actual, defined costs, you should drop the cost comparisons. If you want to engage in speculative costs and clearly identify them as such, that's fine although even those should have some underlying basis in fact, to the extent possible.
I note that you're putting out a lot of cost comparison numbers and 'savings' that appear to be selectively using marginal and overall costs to suit your needs. I'd like you to be consistent and realistic with whatever methodology you choose.
In no conceivable case is one going to produce 4 Visbys for 1 LCS so I think it's time to drop that line of discussion and move on.
"the war game upon which the Navy based the LCSs started out as identifying the need for something like a Visby, "
Not really. As discussed in the post on the LCS conceptual origins, the conceptual LCS would have had a main function of counterbattery (missile) fire and suppressive fire with a robust anti-air capability for survival. Stealth was not mentioned. A large crew size (or, more accurately, a 'not small' crew size) was considered desirable for damage control and survival.
The original LCS would have been a truly unique vessel among modern navies. Its closest conceptual comparison would have been a monitor without the armor although even that somewhat fails to capture the counterbattery aspect. As I say, truly unique.
"You are engaged in some serious selective application of cost figures."
DeleteI'm using the only cost numbers I can find. What I've seen pretty consistently is the LCS in the $700-750MM range and the Visby always at the $184MM number. None of us knows exactly what is or is not included in either number.
"If you want to compare 'like to like', the Wiki costs for each ship are $184M for the Visby and $362 for the Freedom class LCS. If you want to disbelieve the LCS costs (for very good reasons!) then you need to disbelieve the Visby costs, as well, for the reasons I've outlined and you've ignored."
I haven't ignored them at all. I have no way to know what they are, and apparently, neither does anyone else. But let's assume you are correctly asserting the "like to like" costs in the above statement. Then the cost ratio is basically 2 Visbys to 1 LCS. The $184MM number for the Visby is clearly not fully kitted. But the USN LCS "fully kitted" still has no worthwhile kit. I would prefer 1 Visby to 1 LCS, as is, and I doubt there is any basis on which a Visby is more expensive than an LCS, so I would clearly prefer 2 Visbys to 1 LCS.
"Not really."
My understanding was that the "Streetfighter" concept was the the first thing to come out of the war gaming. If that's wrong, then I admit I was wrong. But "Streetfighter" looks to me a lot more like Visby than like what we ended up with for the LCS. From https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/streetfighter.htm:
"As of mid-2001 the Office of Naval Research was considering construction of a Littoral Combat Ship with a displacement of 500 to 600 tons. The LCS would have a draft of about three meters, an operational range of 4,000 nautical miles, and a maximum speed of 50-60 knots. The cost per ship might be at least $90 million.
"The Streetfighter would be a smaller, very fast ship (part of the more general Streetfighter concept), that could compete successfully with the enemy for control of coasts and littoral waters. These ships are envisioned as costing less than 10% as much as current Battle Force ships, while comprising more than 25% of the total number of surface combatants [that is at least 25 but no more than 50 units].
"The President of the Naval War College, Admiral Art Cebrowski, and others such as Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, have advocated the deployment of larger numbers of smaller ships to operate in "harm's way" in littoral waters. Cebrowski and Hughes talk of "tactical instability," where a navy is unwilling to risk its ships because the fleet is constituted principally of small numbers of expensive ships. They propose "re-balancing the fleet" by supplementing the currently planned large surface combatants with the procurement of smaller ships."
Or if you quote Robert Work at
Deletehttps://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a594372.pdf:
"War games, fleet experiments, and analyses conducted throughout the 1990s suggested the need for a new generation of small combatants able to penetrate a contested littoral and scout for and eliminate threats hidden in coastal clutter.5 Two distinct concepts emerged from this work. The first was a heavily armed 2,200 to 2,600-ton “multi-warfare capable ship” with a composite superstructure, medium caliber gun, medium-range air defense and antiship missiles, armed helicopters (preferably two), armed unmanned aerial systems, and land attack missiles to strike shore based missile batteries. The second, more widely publicized concept was a family of small, fast, and stealthy littoral combatants known as Streetfighters, championed by the Naval War College."
Streetfighter was the child of Hughes' general concept about small craft combat (salvo theory) and Cebrowski's specific small vessel concept. Hughes' concepts came about from his own research. I've been unable to determine exactly where Cebrowski's idea came from but it appears not to have come from any specific war games.
DeleteLCS, on the other hand, came from a specific set of war games, as I've described in the conceptual origins post.
The LCS and Streetfighter are often conflated, incorrectly, I believe. As best I can tell, they shared no commonalities and any seeming links between them are simply hindsight revealing a few common aspects and an appealing origin story that is unfounded. Again, the origins post describes a very different concept than the Streetfighter.
"Robert Work"
DeleteMr. Work is well known for rewriting history and this is an example. In his 'history' of the LCS (which may be what you're referencing?) he claims that the Navy got the ship it wanted, at the price it wanted. Not even the LCS' biggest promoters make that claim!
Mr. Work's 'history' of the LCS was revisionist writing taken to the extreme.
I have looked many times and have never found any link between streetfighter and LCS. I lived through the period and never noted any link.
"Then the cost ratio is basically 2 Visbys to 1 LCS. "
DeleteYour statement is numerically correct using the Wiki costs, as is. Your concept that the US could build 2 Visbys for the cost of one LCS is not even remotely accurate for all the reasons I've listed.
The JHSV (Spearhead), which is the closest Navy ship in size to the Visby, is listed in the 2012 GAO Annual Report as costing $204M (total R&D was listed as 3.5% of the total program cost) per vessel in 2010 which is $243M in 2020. JHSV is an aluminum commercial ferry with no sensors, no weapons, no stealth, no electronics beyond basic navigation, no EW, no … well, you get the idea. That stripped down ferry cost the Navy $243M in today's dollars. A US tricked out Visby would cost far more than a JHSV. I would guess around $500M and that's likely optimistic.
I've demonstrated that it is not possible to get 2/3/4 Visbys to one LCS. Please stop suggesting it. It's just plain wrong and I cannot allow it to stand.
Well. maybe I just paid too much attention to Hughes, but I always thought Streetfighter was what the LCS should have been..
DeleteI think we both agree that the LCSs as built are colossal expensive disasters.
The rest of this is sort of turning into name-calling that I don't really see as worth pursuing.
I think we need a viable littoral and amphibious capability. I don't know that you and I will ever agree on that. I think your proposed fleet without those could come up unprepared for certain necessary actions, and I think you think that my inclusion of those ships is a waste of money. I would argue that, at worst, it's not a worse waste of money than the Fords, Zumwalts, LCSs, and LHAs/LHDs. I think whatever amphibious capability we have needs to reside in smaller and cheaper ships than LHAs/LHDs.
We've gone back and forth about the Visbys, but if I had my way what I would really like to see is something about twice its size, in the. 1200-1500T range. That would enable a real helicopter facility and would also allow room to spread out the armaments. I almost think a fully tricked out Visby has so much crammed into too small a space, so that one weapon can get in the way of the other.
Delete"what I would really like to see is something about twice its size, in the. 1200-1500T range."
DeleteThis is where the problem starts. If you double the 'size' of the Visby, the length goes to 478 ft which is 100 ft longer than the LCS and just 18 ft shorter than the FFG(X) Constellation! Now you've lost the main characteristic of the Visby which is the small, stealthy patrol vessel. Plus, if you pile more equipment on it, you increase the displacement and worsen the stealth signature with protrusions. Of course, for a ship that much bigger and heavier, you now need bigger engines. All those weapons, sensors, engines, etc. mean more crew, more berthing, more food and water storage, bigger galleys, more heads, etc. You've created a frigate. If you've got a frigate size ship, you kind of have to have frigate size weapons which probably means even more weapons and bigger better sensors. And the cycle continues and you've now got a billion dollar ship.
Now, you mention doubling the size in terms of displacement. I don't know what length you think that will result in but I would note that displacement and length don't scale linearly. For the kinds of additions you've cited, you're probably right back to the preceding.
The overall point is that this is how ship designs rapidly get out of hand and costs run away. You (the generic you) take a good, focused, small design and in a desire to make it even better you turn it into an unfocused, big, expensive, do-everything ship. Why not just let the Visby be what it was designed to be: a small, cheap, home waters patrol vessel. It's a very good design for that purpose. Alternatively, pick one function that you'd like it to do and do well and design for that - not for every capability you can imagine.
Consider the FFG(X) Constellation. The US Navy had a chance to make it a focused ASW ship but, instead, they couldn't resist the temptation to make it a do-everything ship and, as a result, it's going to be very expensive and not very good at any one thing. It's likely going to be 80% of the cost of the Burke with 50% of the capability. Why? Because we couldn't be satisfied with just being very good at one thing. Instead, we just had to make it a do-everything ship.
"Well. maybe I just paid too much attention to Hughes"
DeleteHughes is an interesting case. He's obsessed with his salvo concept which led him to postulate large numbers of small craft to best take advantage of what the math tells him about his salvo model. The problem is that the model ignores a whole lot of reality like range, endurance, sensor range, survivability of dispersed units, the role of aircraft, and so on. The model completely falls apart into inapplicable uselessness when those factors are included (plus, it gets quite complicated!).
For whatever reason, Hughes has garnered quite a following but it's a following based on people who, I can only conclude, haven't really read his model or, if they have, didn't really grasp the limits and applicability of the model.
Don't get me wrong, Hughes has contributed a noteworthy piece of thought to naval theory but it's at the level of Navy 101, not graduate level. It's a great place to start one's understanding of naval theory but a very poor place to stop - which is what so many have done.
The Australian Anzacs were a German design called the MEKO 200.
DeleteI have often wondered why there aren't more of those modular type ships around. The basic hull was set up so you could drop your choice of weapons into multiple slots. So, you could choose between about 6 different 2 - 3" guns with another weapon station directly behind the gun, room for various VLS designs between the funnels and another weapons station at the rear which could take CWIS/RAM etc.
Or something like that anyway, we went ahead and totally botched it by putting in a 5" gun, cracking the keels, overloading the weapons stations....
Point being, the USN could once have taken the lead and designed a frigate with a 5" mount on the front, a weapon station behind that that could take Mk41 or the English version, then have side mounts for 20 - 30mm remote weapons stations and a hanger with a CIWS/RAM sitting on top.
Then the USN in house team would help integrate various sonars/radars and combat management systems, but the inhouse design teams of the USN are a thing of the past I believe and no other navy is going to do it. Seems like a massive missed opportunity.
"This is where the problem starts. If you double the 'size' of the Visby, the length goes to 478 ft which is 100 ft longer than the LCS and just 18 ft shorter than the FFG(X) Constellation"
DeleteNo, no, no.
"Now, you mention doubling the size in terms of displacement. I don't know what length you think that will result in but I would note that displacement and length don't scale linearly."
1200-1500T would be about the size of the Dealys, which were 315 feet long. That's probably about the size that a Visby would be if you added a real helo capability and your counter battery system, plus allowing a little room to spread out the various weapon systems for easier maintenance and to avoid possible conflict between systems. And it would be big enough to deploy under its own power, instead of having to be transported on a heavy lift ship. A tricked out Visby is fairly bristling weapons, which I like a lot, but I wonder if it isn't packed too tightly with them for optimum operation and maintenance.
I do see a need for both a littoral and an amphibious capability. For the littorals, I think it's useful to have a super stealthy Visby patrol boat, and a slightly bigger corvette, both heavily armed. I like your idea of a shore bombardment/NGFS frigate to accompany amphibious groups. This would be a bit larger than the corvette (3000T), pack 2 155mm guns, counter battery, and extensive rocket launch capability, kind of conceptually a frigate-sized LSMR.
"The overall point is that this is how ship designs rapidly get out of hand and costs run away."
I think you know me well enough to know that this is not the way I roll. My application of Zumwalt's high/low concept includes some top-of-the-line multi-purpose ships, filling out the numbers with cheaper single-purpose ships. I've posted my proposed fleet structure and it contains more (relatively) cheap, single-purpose ships than either the Navy (by a wide margin) or you are proposing.
As far as the FFGX, I'm on record with my own thoughts. I think the Navy decided to force it to be an AEGIS platform (cheaper and less capable replacement for Ticos?) and ended up making too many tradeoffs to achieve that. I think the original FREMM was a better ship, particularly with a few changes I proposed.
For my escort fleet, I've proposed a mix of:
Inner ring-cruisers, enlarged Ticos wit 8 inch guns, more VLS cells, and a UAV/USV/UUV capability
2nd ring-AAW destroyers, could be Burkes
3rd ring-GP escorts, could be FREMMs with my proposed changes
Outer ring-ASW frigates, basically your ASW escorts
"For whatever reason, Hughes has garnered quite a following but it's a following based on people who, I can only conclude, haven't really read his model or, if they have, didn't really grasp the limits and applicability of the model."
I think Hughes goes too far to overplay what can be accomplished with what are little more than war canoes. Maybe he overplays what the small boy tin cans were able to accomplish in WWII. But I do think he raises some points worth considering.
"I don't see that type of combat. We've discussed this so I won't belabor it. I would simply note that if I'm wrong, a heavier force structure can deal with littoral combat just fine. If you're wrong and I'm right, the reverse is not true - a lighter force cannot deal with high end, open ocean combat."
DeleteI agree that you wouldn't send a Visby out to mid-Pacific to take on a carrier task force. But I also think that with 12 two-carrier CVBGs (6 four-carrier CTFs), 8 SAG/HUK groups headed by battleships, 200 surface escorts, and 92 SSNs/SSGNs/SSBNs, the blue water combat fleet I have proposed is plenty well able to take on that task. That’s one place where I disagree with Hughes; I think he is so dependent on small ships that he would end up having to have some patrol boat take on a CTF in mid-ocean. Where I don't agree with is your idea that a heavier force can deal with littoral combat just fine. I think Millennium 2002 raises some serious questions about whether that's true. I think the Navy makes the assumption that bigger (and more expensive) is always better, and I think there are cases where that just doesn’t work. I don't see how an LCS is of much use in either scenario, and I think we agree on that.
In your proposed fleet, you include the following ship types:
- 40 ASW Corvettes – Provides ASW for shallow water, choke point, harbor defense, and convoy escort. This is not a battle carrier or surface group escort.
- 8 Assault Support Ships – This ship stands close in to provide ground troops with very close range fire support and counter-rocket/artillery/mortar protection.
In Hughes’s Green Water fleet (USNI Proceedings, June 2018), he proposes the following ship types:
- 12 Gunfire Support Ships ($400MM) – 3,000T, 2-155mm guns to take the NGFS mission from DDGs.
- 12 Coastal ASW ($150MM) – like Singaporean Victory class
- 16 Submarines ($200MM) – diesel-electric
- 12 MCM Vessels ($100MM) – 200T, 18 crew, like Swedish Styrso
- 120 Coastal Combatants ($80MM) – USS Minuteman
- 200 Inshore Patrol ($12MM) – like Mark VI patrol vessel
- 12 Fast Delivery Ship ($50MM) – second generation HSV
- 8 CVL ($3B) – 20 F-35, helos, UAVs
- 2 Tenders ($600MM) – for when coastal combatants cannot be supported ashore
- Total 394 vessels, $48.8B, annual SCN $1.94B/year
I think Hughes’s coastal combatants and inshore patrol vessels are basically war canoes, and I don’t have any of them in my proposed fleet. I think his cost estimates are low. I would get carriers, troop transports, and tenders from other parts of the fleet.
My littoral component is kind of a combination of yours and Hughes’s, including:
- 10 NGFS/land attack frigates ($500MM) – operate with ARGs, combination of your Assault Support Ships and Hughes’s Gunfire Support Ships – 3,000T, 2-155mm, enlarged LSMR-type rocket deck, counter battery, helo platform, ability to launch RHIBS to deliver swimmers
- 30 corvettes ($350MM) – combination of your ASW corvettes and Hughes’s Coastal ASW
- 30 patrol vessels ($250MM) – like SW Visbys
- 30 AIP SSKs ($750MM) – like JP Soryu or IS Dolphin or SW Blekinge
- 30 MCM Vessels ($300MM) – half mother ships for helo and drone sweeps, half MHCs
- Total 130 ships, $55B, annual SCN $1.83B/year (based on 30-year lives)
I think our differences come down primarily to my wanting to have a littoral/amphibious force and your belief that such a force not needed. If you contemplate littoral/amphibious operations, then I think my littoral force would meet that need effectively. If not, then I agree we don’t need it. But I go back to what an instructor in COIN school told me many years ago, “What kind of war will the next war be? The one we don’t prepare for.”
"Where I don't agree with is your idea that a heavier force can deal with littoral combat just fine. I think Millennium 2002 raises some serious questions about whether that's true."
DeleteI really wish I had more details on M2002 because I'd love to do a post on it. Unfortunately, all we have are bits and pieces and anecdotal stories.
I think what M2002 demonstrated was the utter stupidity of our naval leaders and the total absence of a combat mindset. For example, I guarantee (100%, absolute certainty, no doubt whatsoever, take it to the bank … you get the idea that I'm confident about what I'm about to say) that if I were commanding the M2002 friendly force, the force would have suffered no damage (none, nata, zero, zilch … again, you get the idea) because I would have assumed that, being in a combat situation, I would destroy ANYTHING that entered a 50 mile zone around my force. If civilians were dumb enough to ignore war warnings then tough luck for them. I would have also preemptively saturated attacked any worthwhile military target within my reach long before it could even theoretically do anything to me. That's what war is. If you're not in it to win it, don't get in it. THAT'S WHAT LARGE, POWERFUL UNITS ALLOW YOU TO DO - KILL ANYTHING AND EVERYTHING AROUND YOU. A handful of Visbys aren't going to do that.
M2002 demonstrated stupidity, a lack of combat mindset, and professional incompetence.
“What kind of war will the next war be? The one we don’t prepare for.”
Absolutely false or true only if one's professional warriors are complete incompetents. My proof is history. We knew EXACTLY what kind of war the Pacific war with Japan would be. We knew the tactics both sides would use, the strategic goals of both sides, the individual operations needed, and the sequence of events.
We knew EXACTLY what kind of war the war with Germany would be.
We knew EXACTLY how a war with the Soviet Union would have played out (fortunately, we never had to demonstrate it). Post-collapse Soviet documents proved the validity of our planning.
And so on.
I've laid out the course of events in a China war and that's without the benefit of any classified information and intel. Professional warriors should be able to very accurately predict such a war.
Even the Global War On Terrorism was no surprise. We had plenty of warning, we knew who the enemy was, we knew what their tactics were … what we didn't do was pay attention to, and act on, the information we had. That's incompetence.
Take a foreign example - the Falklands war. The UK had all the information they needed to know a war was likely. They simply chose to ignore it. It wasn't that they couldn't have predicted and prepared for the war, they simply chose not to believe it and remained, therefore, willfully unprepared.
“I really wish I had more details on M2002 because I'd love to do a post on it. Unfortunately, all we have are bits and pieces and anecdotal stories.
DeleteI think what M2002 demonstrated was the utter stupidity of our naval leaders and the total absence of a combat mindset.”
I think that a large part of the problem was that they fell into the trap of saying, hey, we’ve got this ton of capability, we can destroy anything in our path, so we don’t worry about it. You ALWAYS worry about it. What it showed is that if you don’t take the approach of blowing stuff away before it harms you, you become very vulnerable to what on paper are inferior forces.
“If you're not in it to win it, don't get in it. THAT'S WHAT LARGE, POWERFUL UNITS ALLOW YOU TO DO - KILL ANYTHING AND EVERYTHING AROUND YOU. A handful of Visbys aren't going to do that.”
Agree 110%. But you seem to be responding as if I am proposing Visbys INSTEAD OF large powerful units, when I’m not. I’m proposing them as supplements to them. A Visby can’t go toe-to-toe with a CTF. But there are places that a super stealthy Visby can go that you can’t or don’t want to send a carrier. And if a Visby can go in there and kick some serious butt, you are way ahead of the game. The problem with the LCS is that it can’t kick serious butt because it doesn’t have the firepower, and it can’t be risked in those places because one hit and it’s done. The Visbys are only useful if you have the large, powerful force that can back them up. But if you have that force, then Visbys can take on certain missions to save the big boys for the bigger problems. It’s like the argument you make on ASW. Would you rather have a $2B Burke chasing subs around or a $500MM ASW frigate? One makes more sense than the other.
Again, I think we need to be careful of assuming incorrectly that because we have all these carriers and SSBNs and can basically destroy you 10 times over, that means we can respond to anyting lesser.
“M2002 demonstrated stupidity, a lack of combat mindset, and professional incompetence.
“‘What kind of war will the next war be? The one we don’t prepare for.’
“Absolutely false or true only if one's professional warriors are complete incompetents.”
So it’s false unless they’re incompetent, but you just said that they are basically incompetent.
Another point. I said the one we don’t prepare for, not the one we don’t know about. Your example is wars that we (or the Brits) knew about, some of which we (and they) did not prepare for, even knowing what was coming.
Looking at your examples, I see a pattern. We knew how Japan was going to fight WWII, and we prepared for it and rehearsed it and were able to execute it. We knew how war with Germany would go, and we prepared for it and rehearsed it and executed it. We knew how war with the Soviets would go, and we prepared for it and rehearsed it. We knew about Vietnam and the War on Terror but didn’t prepare and got burned. Same for the Brits and the Falklands.
"Where I don't agree with is your idea that a heavier force can deal with littoral combat just fine."
DeleteWhat littoral combat task is there that a heavier force can't do?
"some of which we (and they) did not prepare for, even knowing what was coming."
DeleteSure, if one's military is so stupid they know a war is coming but choose not to prepare for it, they'll be in trouble. There's no getting around abject stupidity.
The comment, “What kind of war will the next war be? The one we don’t prepare for”, implies that we CAN'T know what kind of war will come next. The implication of that being that we need every kind of asset, an infinite amount of personnel, and every capability known to man because we CAN'T predict what the next war will look like. I've demonstrated that the opposite is true. There are no 'surprise' wars. There may be wars that we stupidly and inexplicably choose not to prepare for but that's a choice, not an inability to predict the next war. We perfectly predicted the attack on Pearl Harbor (almost to the exact date!) but, inexplicably, chose not to prepare a viable defense against it.
That means that using the supposed inability to predict the next war as the justification for buying every capability there is, is just plain wrong.
The solution to choosing not to prepare for a predictable war is not to buy every kind of capability, it's to fire the people in charge.
"The implication of that being that we need every kind of asset, an infinite amount of personnel, and every capability known to man because we CAN'T predict what the next war will look like. I've demonstrated that the opposite is true."
DeleteI'm certainly not proposing every kind of asset or infinite numbers of personnel. I wouldn’t do $4B LHAs/LHDs, or $2B LPDs, or $3B Zumwalts, for a few examples. I'm saying that we have a finite, or nearly so, amount of resources, and within that constraint we have to figure out the best way to get more bang for the buck. If we can foresee a need for a certain capability, then obtain it in the most cost-effective manner possible. Take carriers. If a Ford costs $14B and a Nimitz costs $9B, and a Nimitz has 95% the capability of a Ford (don’t know the real number, but given the problems that the Fords have had, the Nimitz might have greater capability), then building a Nimitz instead of a Ford gives us 95% of the Ford's capability plus $5B to spend on other things to address other areas. And I'm quite certain the $5B spent wisely can buy more than the 5% capability difference. Or subs, say an SSK is useful only for choke points or harbor defense, both missions that an SSN can also perform. But is an SSN does it, then it's not available for the blue-water missions where it excels. If we let an SSK handle the choke point, then we free up the SSN for a lot less money than second SSN would cost. Or the ASW example, does it make sense to send a $2B Burke to chase subs, or to have a $500MM ASW frigate do that, so the Burke is free to do AAW?
"That means that using the supposed inability to predict the next war as the justification for buying every capability there is, is just plain wrong."
I agree with that. But I'm making a different point. I think there is a very real chance that we will have to fight in constricted, restricted, littoral waters, in any of several places--first island chain, Malacca, Sunda, Hormuz, Arabian/Persian Gulf, eastern Med, Baltic come quickly to mind. And I think that a stealthy Visby or similar could be as effective, or even more so, than a larger, less stealth ship in those environments.
I do sort of feel like I’m being asked to defend positions that I am not taking.
"That means that using the supposed inability to predict the next war as the justification for buying every capability there is, is just plain wrong."
DeleteAnd that's not what I am proposing. I think we need to prepare for three basic scenarios:
1) Peer war with China
2) Peer war with Russia
3) Fighting rogue nation or terrorist group
Scenario 1) is basically a Navy/Air Force operation. I don't see an overland war in China. Scenario 2) is basically an Army operation, with Air Force supporting and Navy covering the flanks. Scenario 3) is the one that we don't seem to have a clue about, based on current and past performance. Step one to developing an approach would be to fight to win and rule out any fight-to-tie "limited war."
I think our current military leadership is more interested in shiny objects and cute toys than in assembling a force to fight any one of those three scenarios. I'd give 1) to the Army to plan, 2) to the Navy and Air Force to plan, and 3) to the Marines.
"The solution to choosing not to prepare for a predictable war is not to buy every kind of capability, it's to fire the people in charge."
I agree that the people in charge need to be fired for any number of reasons.
Let me be very clear what I am saying. I'm not letting cost drive strategy. What I'm saying is that there is smart money and stupid money, and we've been spending a lot of stupid money. The fascination with extremely expensive platforms using unproved technology means that we are leaving certain functions--ASW, NGFS, mine warfare come quickly to mind--totally unattended. What I'm saying is this. Instead of spending $14B on a Ford, spend $9B on a Nimitz, and use the $5B savings to address some areas that are currently being ignored--build conventional carriers to double the carrier fleet, buy some escorts, or buy some true littoral combatants. Instead of spending $5.5B on the Virginia replacement and $7B on new SSGNs, spend $3-3.5B on more Virginias and VPMs and maybe $5B on an Ohio-variant SSGN, and use the savings of $2B per boat to buy some smaller SSNs and some SSKs. Use the cheaper boats for things that they can do, like choke point control or harbor defense, and free up the Virginias and VPMs for the big boy jobs. I know an SSN can do choke point control, but does it make more sense to tie up a Virginia doing that or to farm it out to a smaller SSN or an SSK, and free up the Virginia for the open ocean? Instead of spending $120MM on an F-35 that we are trying to use for 3 different and somewhat incompatible missions, recognize the need for three different aircraft--an interceptor fighter with long-range sensors and weapons, and speed and maneuverability and visibility in case it gets in a dogfight; a strike/attack aircraft with long legs, stealth, and a big bomb load; and a "Marine A-10" that is durable and reliable, handles well at low speed, carries a big bomb load, and can operate off a carrier and preferably off short and/or unprepared strips so it can go ashore with the assault and operate close to the front-- and build the best one for each job, probably saving $20-40MM per aircraft due to focus instead of tradeoffs. We've already wasted the money on the Zumwalts and LCSs, unfortunately. The best idea I've seen for the Zumwalts is to send one to the Med and one to WestPac as flagships for 6th and 7th Fleets, and send the third to San Diego as a weapons. test platform. The best idea I can come up with for the LCSs is offer them to USCG, if they don't want them (and they won't) offer them to allies, if they don't want them (and they won't) then SINKEX. If only we could get a Perry or Sprucan back for each LCS we SINKEX.
Build and keep the best blue water fleet in the world, but send intelligently to do so, and use the savings to cover those areas that currently go lacking.
I read an article about Russian amphibious forces (sorry, don't have the link and can't seem to find it) which said something that I found interesting.
DeleteAccording to this article, the Russians see the function of amphibious forces as providing reinforcements to land troops. Given their focus on overland warfare, this makes sense. Basically, a Russian amphibious landing would occur in friendly territory, 50-100 miles behind a front, and the troops would be rushed to the front as reinforcements as quickly as possible. This suggests to me that in the North Sea, Baltic, and Med, we should focus on preventing those amphib forces from getting to the vicinity of any fronts.
I think the purpose of China's amphib forces is clear--support an invasion of Taiwan. They don't seem to have enough lift capability to make that a reality at this point, but they do seem to be trying to get there. After Taiwan, their mission would probably shift to intimidating the smaller countries around their flanks--Vietnam, maybe South Korea, maybe Philippines, maybe Thailand. Again I think that makes it pretty clear that our mission in the SCS should focus on preventing their doing so. I don't see how they are a viable threat to invade Taiwan amphibiously at this point, so we have time to craft a response, but as they continue to build more amphibs, that clock is clearly ticking.
" They don't seem to have enough lift capability to make that a reality at this point,"
DeleteThey have far more than enough! True, if you ONLY look at their actual, gray-painted amphibious ships, they likely come up short. HOWEVER, every commercial ship they build, they build to semi-military standards with quick conversion to full military use built in. In essence, their entire merchant fleet IS an amphibious force! Most people don't realize that or appreciate the potential impact of that. In terms of transporting their personnel and materiel across the strait, they have more than enough lift. The actual ship-to-shore situation is less clear as I have not found much information about how they envision accomplishing that. I would assume, in typical Chinese thorough and methodical fashion, that they have a plan in mind.
As best I can tell, they have everything they need for a Taiwan amphibious assault. What they're doing now, is further improving the situation and building typical Chinese overkill capability.
We forget just how intimately tied together the entire Chinese system is. There is no difference between their commercial and military segments - they're all, ultimately, built to military purpose even if they may be temporarily engaged in commercial work. We forget this at our own peril.
"Again I think that makes it pretty clear that our mission in the SCS should focus on preventing their doing so."
DeleteThis is my main problem with your strategy. China is already in the process of seizing all the surrounding territories. The Philippines is being assimilated via diplomacy and emigration. Vietnam is being intimidated and encroached. And so on. We've already lost the surrounding territories just as we lost the E/S China Seas in a fait accompli.
Your strategy has already been rendered moot. At best, we can 'fight' a losing rear guard political action to try to slow down the annexation but it can't/won't prevent it. It's already happened. Go through the list of surrounding countries and look closely at their relationships with China and you'll see we've already lost.
Your strategy would have been viable 20 years ago but it is irrelevant and moot today. You insist on wanting to fight a battle that is already lost. What we/you need to do is come up with a new strategy that starts from a more realistic point: that China owns the E/S China Seas and surrounding territories. Even the territories that are not yet outright annexed will be disinclined to side with the US in any conflict.
You obviously see things differently but you're gearing up to fight a 'war' that's already over!
China is working at surrounding Taiwan rather than invading it. Once Taiwan is surrounded (seize the E/S China Seas (done), build or seize islands in the Seas (done), annex Philippines (in process), seize Japanese islands (begun)) and isolated, China can simply announce that they're taking over Taiwan and there's nothing Taiwan or the US can do.
DeleteChina's amphibious capability, while potentially useful against Taiwan, is aimed more at seizing the 'reluctant' surrounding territories and for use in Africa, SAmerica, and elsewhere.
"Your strategy would have been viable 20 years ago but it is irrelevant and moot today. You insist on wanting to fight a battle that is already lost."
DeleteIt's not lost if we start fighting it. But so far we haven't and our continued failure to do so would make it a fait accompli.
What you might want to consider is what strategy we can use from a starting point of China owning or having under its sphere of influence most/all of the E/S China Seas and surrounding territories. THAT'S the likely starting point for a war.
DeleteThat being the case, what victory condition do you envision and what strategy do you see to achieve the victory condition?
Even if you don't believe this situation could arise, a little 'just in case' planning is still a good thing!
"What you might want to consider is what strategy we can use from a starting point of China owning or having under its sphere of influence most/all of the E/S China Seas and surrounding territories. THAT'S the likely starting point for a war.
Delete"That being the case, what victory condition do you envision and what strategy do you see to achieve the victory condition?
"Even if you don't believe this situation could arise, a little 'just in case' planning is still a good thing!"
I believe that situation is inevitable if we don't take steps to stop it now.
So yes, we better start figuring out what our strategy would be to achieve victory under that circumstance. Even bigger, China has started to expand its economic sphere of influence greatly, trough South Asia, Africa, and now Latin America.
I've mentioned it before, but Ross Perot said something in 1992 that I ad been thinking for some time and still believe today, "In the post-Cold-War era, economic power will be more important than military power." We have been trying to impose our will militarily through a series of no-win wars in the Mideast, while China has been outflanking us economically. Their Belt and Road strategy has paid off.
If this is getting too political, I apologize. But I think we need to get out of the Mideast, at least militarily, and focus on combatting China economically. We still have one huge plum to offer that China doesn't--access to the huge US consumer market. China has an export economy, and thus can't offer that. I think we can make better deals with te countries that China is trying to exploit than China can. And if China doesn't have the US keeping a lid on the Mideast, their situation becomes a lot more perilous. A fleet designed to assault and/or intimidate its neighbors is not well-equipped to convoy oil tankers thousands of miles.
As far as what I'd see us doing in an all-out war is cutting off all of China's seaborne commerce--oil in and consumer goods out. We don't have to deal with their A2/AD system to do that, and they don't have the fleet to stop us. And very quickly they can't survive. I don't see us attacking the Chinese mainland directly, and I don't see us having to. If they can't import oil and they can't export, then their economy craters and their people starve. And they can't last long like that.
"economic power will be more important than military power." We have been trying to impose our will militarily through a series of no-win wars in the Mideast, while China has been outflanking us economically."
DeleteNot quite … or, rather, there's more to it than that. China has been using economics to achieve their goals BUT it's been done with the implicit (and sometimes overt!) threat of military action and 'reprisal' should the target not accept the 'friendly' economic overtures.
China is not beating us with just economics but with the combination of economics and military coercion.
For example, Vietnam is being economically wooed while, at the same time, their fishing waters are being annexed and their territorial claims are being negated by military presence and coercion.
While the end result is the same, it is important to recognize the dual nature of the methodology. Recognizing that, we should realize that we can't successfully compete on just the economic level. We need to negate China's military threat towards other countries and we've shown no stomach for that, thus far. Of course, we haven't done much economically, either!
"What you might want to consider is what strategy we can use from a starting point of China owning or having under its sphere of influence most/all of the E/S China Seas and surrounding territories. THAT'S the likely starting point for a war."
DeleteI think my point is that a strategy under those circumstances is much more difficult than a strategy the does not have to address those circumstances. You may be right, it may be too late. But it seems to me that given the relative difficulty of the two situations, it is worth the effort to try to prevent things coming to that.
China is not this all-powerful monolith. China has significant weaknesses, but internal and external. Put them under some pressure and those weaknesses will manifest themselves. If they can't keep their people too busy to revolt, they could very easily have massive insurrections that could tear them apart. Yes, they can put Hong Kong down. But if they have that in every city, they have major problems just holding it together.
Let's offer US companies significant tax breaks and subsidies to leave China. Let's offer those businesses to places like the Philippines and Indonesia and Malaysia if they agree to join our side. Let's come up with some forms of economic assistance to offset the Belt and Road program. Let's make it clear to China that there are some lines they cannot cross. Let's play hardball now rater than later.
"Let's make it clear to China that there are some lines they cannot cross."
DeleteOr what? What will we do? The US makes lots of empty threats and China has learned this only too well which is why the idea that Navy ships sailing around the region will provide any kind of deterrent is pure wishful thinking.
What do you propose doing, specifically, when China crosses the line?
Of course, they've already crossed many lines by seizing disputed islands, illegally building artificial islands, militarizing those islands, declaring illegal exclusion zones, seizing US military assets, etc. … … … and we've done nothing.
What do you propose doing when they cross the next line?
We have a few options open to us. But they can't come out of the blue. We have to make it pretty clear to China that these things are unacceptable, and tell them how we will respond. Then respond in the way that we told them.
DeleteMaybe forbid the import of certain goods from China or slap punitive tariffs on them. Maybe seize an oil tanker or two headed to China and divert it to Japan or somewhere else.
"Maybe forbid the import of certain goods from China or slap punitive tariffs on them. Maybe seize an oil tanker or two headed to China and divert it to Japan or somewhere else. "
DeleteSo … start a trade war (we've already done that and it accomplished little) or start a tit-for-tat seizure of merchant shipping (obviously, if we seize a Chinese tanker, they'll seize our ships).
Those are not really viable options unless you're willing to accept massive escalation.
That's the problem with your concept of ships in the region - there's nothing they can actually do unless we're willing to escalate and you just made clear that you aren't willing to do that. Tariffs on a few goods is a really weak response and seizing a Chinese ship is a non-starter unless you're ready for actual combat. Are you ready to initiate combat?
I'm not picking on you. 'Crossing lines' is a very difficult proposition to deal with. There's not really any good penalties unless one is ready to back it up with force.
Want to tie all this in with your preferred (but too late) strategy? Make an agreement with, say, Vietnam that we will guarantee their territorial sovereignty and send US ships to patrol their waters and shoot any Chinese vessel, commercial or military, that violates those waters. There's your political alliance as well as a line in the sand backed by military force. The escalation, if any, would be 100% China's choice and they'd be 100% in the wrong on the world geopolitical stage. Of course, all that would require some political fortitude which we don't have.
Delete"Want to tie all this in with your preferred (but too late) strategy? Make an agreement with, say, Vietnam that we will guarantee their territorial sovereignty and send US ships to patrol their waters and shoot any Chinese vessel, commercial or military, that violates those waters. There's your political alliance as well as a line in the sand backed by military force. The escalation, if any, would be 100% China's choice and they'd be 100% in the wrong on the world geopolitical stage. Of course, all that would require some political fortitude which we don't have."
I'm fine with that. That's basically what I've been suggesting. I think that's what we have to do to implement our alliance strategy. Two things: 1) we will defend your sovereignty, and 2) we will move manufacturing to you and buy all the goods you make. And I think we can do that if we just DO it. But so far under various administrations from various parties, we haven't done that. I still think having our head down in the Mideast and ignoring China has caused a lot of our problems.
Basically the same bribe we used on Eastern Europe in 1945.
"'Where I don't agree with is your idea that a heavier force can deal with littoral combat just fine.'
DeleteWhat littoral combat task is there that a heavier force can't do?"
Being somewhere else that needs their capabilities more than the littorals. Seriously, why tie up a Burke in a littoral mission, and subject it to greater risk, if you have a Visby or something similar that can do that mission and free the Burke up to go provide AAW protection for a task force. Use low-end ships (Visbys) to do the jobs they can, and save the high-end ships (Burkes) for the jobs that need a high-end approach
The one thing I think we do have to do is make it abundantly clear to China precisely where are drawing lines in the sand, and exactly what are the consequences of crossing them. And then we need to be unreluctant to make appropriate response.
DeleteFrom what I understand, Vietnam and the Philippines, in particular, are extremely unhappy with China's islands and other expansion in the SCS, but they are basically powerless to stop further encroachment. If we can offer them a deal that 1) we will actively oppose any further encroachment, and 2) we will move enough manufacturing out of China to give them a 5-10% growth bump in their economies, I think we can get them onboard. The hard part with that is going to be actually living up to our commitments.
"Being somewhere else that needs their capabilities more than the littorals."
DeleteThis is one of those generic statements that I don't think is all that valid. Everyone talks about freeing up other assets but no one ever says what, specifically, we'd be freeing them up to do.
Sure, we don't want to waste an Aegis ship patrolling some backwater that has a 0.01% chance of ever seeing the enemy but, then, we wouldn't want to waste a Visby on that, either. A combat canoe would work perfectly well. Frankly, I'm hard pressed to specify what this littoral area is that requires a Visby but not a Burke. Honestly, it would be a very unlikely scenario. It would have to be a place where the enemy has a reasonable chance of appearing but with just enough force that a Visby could handle it but no more than that. That seems very unlikely. The entire 'littoral' scenario seems contrived to justify a pre-determined force structure. This is how navy wargames get started: "We want Visbys so let's construct a wargame that proves we need them."
We have 80 some Aegis ships. I'm not sure we need to do all that much 'freeing up'. We've got plenty unless we want to assemble a D-Day invasion force in which case our entire navy isn't enough.
"Frankly, I'm hard pressed to specify what this littoral area is that requires a Visby but not a Burke."
DeleteI'm not postulating something that requires a Visby but not a Burke. I'm making the same argument that you make about having an ASW frigates and not sending Burkes to chase subs. Use the asset that fits the job. I can think of missions that a Visby could handle that a Burke would be overkill. And I'd rather save the Burkes for their intended mission--AAW for a task force.
I'm kind of confused. You are big on wanting to use ships for their intended purpose, but seem perfectly content to send a Burke on a mission that something smaller could do.
And we keep talking Visby back and forth. Visby is just an example. It doesn't have to be a Visby, although that seems a pretty good choice on paper. But I do think we need a smaller combatant to do things in a littoral environment, and save our major combatants for the big stuff in the open ocean.
"seem perfectly content to send a Burke on a mission that something smaller could do."
DeleteNo, not at all. I'm failing to see ANY mission for a Burke in a littoral setting. What's more, I don't see a littoral zone, period. I've posted on this. Littoral is a made up concept that the Navy used to try to justify itself after the Cold War when they didn't think they had a mission. Kind of like the Marines making up this ship and sub killing mission.
There's no such thing as littoral warfare - as if it's somehow different than warfare in general. Ships have been fighting near shore, when necessary, for as long as there have been ships. Littoral warfare is not something that just came about and requires some kind of specialized littoral ship. If there's a mission near shore that requires a Burke then we'll send a Burke. If not, there won't be anything there. If there's some minor mission then we'll send some minor asset. To create a class of ships on the off chance that the perfect mission will come along is the tail wagging the dog.
"If there's some minor mission then we'll send some minor asset."
DeleteBut what will that minor asset be?
All I'm doing is proposing the Visby (or something similar) as the answer to that question.
Cheap (or relatively so), stealthy, and pretty well armed (if we do the tricked out version). If the tricked out version costs too much, do something else.
"But what will that minor asset be?
DeleteAll I'm doing is proposing the Visby (or something similar) as the answer to that question."
Two thoughts:
1. Minor assets might well be helos, aircraft, patrol boats, UAVs, or coastwatchers. There is no absolute requirement for ships.
2. I asked this before, what specific mission might there be in a littoral scenario? Your only answer was that a Visby would free up a Burke for something more valuable. This is the problem: there are very few specific, actual missions that require a 'littoral' ship.
One possible answer would be ASW monitoring and, if that were necessary, I'd fall back on my ASW corvette or helos or patrol aircraft or permanent listening arrays (mini-SOSUS), among other possible solutions. Beyond ASW, I can't really come up with any 'littoral' mission. That being the case, why would we want to build a class of littoral warship? This is where you lose me. There is no mission because there is no such thing as littoral warfare.
On a somewhat related note, what is a Visby going to do for Sweden if Russia were to attack? There's, what, four of them or so? They're very lightly armed. The very best they could hope to achieve would be to damage a single Russian ship or maybe sink one to two small Russian patrol or cargo ships. Far more likely, the Russians would dispatch a few aircraft to sink the Visbys at their leisure since the ships have no AAW to speak of. One can't help but wonder what Sweden thinks those few Visbys would accomplish in a war. I have no idea what Sweden envisions but it's interesting to contemplate and maybe the answer, if there is one, would help inform your own concepts.
Let's forget about the specifics of Visby. I don't know what War Plan Orange for China is, or quite frankly whether we even have one. If we I do, Visby might or might not be a fit for any of the Plan missions. But what I do know are the following:
Delete1) There are a lot of strategic littoral/choke point areas that would most likely become important in a peer war or an action against a rogue nation or terror group. These include the first island chain, the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, the eastern Med, the Baltic, Bad el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Arabian/Persian Gulf.
2) These areas are characterized generally by shallow waters, restricted maneuverability, and high risk due to close proximity to (presumably enemy-held) land.
3) In a littoral context in Millennium 2002, Orange forces destroyed Blue forces including carriers, Ticos, Burkes, and other combatants with a barrage of missiles from small missile boats.
1) suggests the littorals are important, 2) suggests that they require different capabilities for which Burkes are not good fits, and 3) suggests that we could be in a world of major hurt there. I am not aware that we have really done anything significant to deal with the Millennium 2002 problem, but it seems to me that we need something small, highly maneuverable, and stealthy that can deliver that kind of saturation attack against an enemy and/or destroy an enemy's ability to mount such an attack against us.
I'm not sure whether Visby is or is not that platform, so I really don't want to go too far debating its specific merits. But it sure seems to me that, Visby or not, we need something, and Visby seems at least a good start toward that.
You have recognized the need for shallow water ASW with your proposed ASW corvette. I would build a bunch of those too, my idea being that they would be about a Dealey-sized vessel (1200-1500T). Maybe they could handle the whole littoral mission, but I think we also need something more focused on AAW and SUW. That's where I get to Visby. As built "with," it's not really ready for that, but add the "for" and it could be. Maybe it's not the right answer, maybe it doesn't have the right mix. That takes a lot more and deeper analysis than I have time for on a blogspot.
But yes, I see a need. You don't. The Navy does (which may or may not be a point in my favor) but they have taken the wrong approach.
"1) suggests the littorals are important, 2) suggests that they require different capabilities for which Burkes are not good fits, and 3) suggests that we could be in a world of major hurt there."
DeleteNo!
1) This may be semantics but the littorals (meaning, shallow waters near land) are no more or less important than anywhere else. What IS important is what enemy assets and activity are there. Littorals with no enemy assets or activity are unimportant. Littorals with enemy assets or activity are important. Deep water with enemy assets or activity are important. The logic concludes that deep water and littorals are identical in their importance (or lack thereof).
2) Nothing about shallow water implies the unsuitability of a Burke. In fact, the Burke's greater electronic warfare capabilities, signals intel, larger weapons load, bigger gun, etc. suggest a better suitability compared to a Visby-ish ship!
3) I've already explained that the M2002 was a product of sheer stupidity. In a war, neither we nor the Chinese are going to allow unknown boats anywhere within 200 miles of our forces. M2002 was a one-off example of incompetent stupidity, nothing more.
"I think we also need something more focused on AAW and SUW. That's where I get to Visby."
NO … that's where you should get to Burke. If you can anticipate a need for AAW and SuW then you want to win overwhelmingly - that's a Burke. In war, you don't want to fight fair and give the enemy an equal chance, you overwhelm them.
In war, a Visby's only use is to patrol peripheral locations that no one really thinks will have enemy forces but are worth patrolling against that one in a thousand chance that something surprising might show up. Then, the Visby's only purpose is to survive long enough to send a warning message back to command.
Even a group of Visby-ishes have little value because they have no long range surveillance and, if you can anticipate needing a group of Visby-ishes then you ought to have Burkes there instead.
You don't take a gun to a gunfight - that's giving the other guy a fair chance - you take a tank to a gunfight!
Think about it … if some chokepoint, or whatever, is important enough to the enemy to have assets and activity there, are they going to allow a small, underarmed, unarmored, short ranged vessel to survive there for more than an hour? Of course not! And, if it's important to the enemy and we want to contest it then we need much, much bigger forces. On the other hand, if it's unimportant to the enemy then why would we need Visby-ishes there?
You seem to think that critical (critical to the Chinese war effort) littoral areas are going to be left undefended and uncontested by the Chinese to the point that a few Visby-ishes can control them. Does that really seem logical to you? If they're critical, the Chinese will devote significant forces to securing and defending the areas and that's no place for a Visby-ish!
All right, I've beaten this one to death. If you still see a littoral need then there's nothing more I can say to alter your thinking.
Agre on beaten to death, but would like to summarize.
DeleteI think comes down to two questions.
1) Is there a littoral need?
2) Is the Visby an appropriate solution?
My answers are yes, and I'm not sure but it holds promise. Your answers are no, and either no or it's irrelevant.
As long as we disagree about 1), then 2) is pretty moot.
"Your answers are no, and either no or it's irrelevant."
DeleteIf you haven't already, you might want to read this post:
Littoral Warfare
ComNavOps,
DeleteI read your post, and I've revised slightly. I see three questions:
1) Will we ever have to fight in the littoral areas?
2) Can we fight in the littorals with existing blue-water ships like Burkes and SSNs?
3) Is that the best use of assets such as Burkes and SSNs?
My answers are yes, probably, and probably not.
I say yes to 1) because I think any peer war, depending on the peer, would likely involve operations around the first island chain, the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, and the South China and Java Seas (if China is the peer), or in the eastern Med and Baltic (if Russia is the, admittedly less likely at this point, peer). Alternatively, action against a rogue nation or terror group would very likely involve operations in the Straits of Hormuz and/or Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, and/or the Arabian/Persian Gulf. I would note that China and Russia clearly appear to be preparing to fight somebody in the littorals, and if not us, then whom?
As far as 2), yes, Burkes can operate in the littorals, and probably be effective in that role, although they aren’t exactly designed for it. The Kockums commentary about the Visby mentions that there are two approaches in the littorals--overpowering or stealth. Burkes would be the overpowering approach, although I question whether it has the optimum sensor/weapons mix for the littorals. But if we had to fight in the littorals tomorrow, would I send Burkes? Absolutely, way before I’d trust the mission to an LCS.
Number 3) is my real issue, and I’m not sure we ever got to that. A Burke that is poking around in the littorals is not performing its main mission, which is to provide AAW to a task force. I find this analogous to the argument you have made that we need ASW frigates because we don't want the Burkes chasing subs. Same concept as using SSKs for choke points to fee up SSNs to work in the open ocean. If all we have is Burkes, then we use Burkes for everything. But if we can build something that is more tailored to unique littoral areas (proximity to land, restricted maneuverability, shallow water ASW), and let Burkes provide AAW coverage for the fleet, then I think we are better off.
I regret that this discussion got so sidetracked on the Visby, because I really don’t know whether it is the right platform or not. I don’t see it as a viable MCM platform, and I’m not sold on Umkhontos (which are currently one of those FBNY things) for AAW. I know the Navy’s LCS isn’t the right platform, and I think we agree on that.
Overall, I think you and I will just have to agree to disagree respectfully on this issue. I see your position, and I hope you see mine, although we disagree. On that basis, I’m through.
"would likely involve operations around the first island chain"
DeleteMost certainly! BUT - and this is the big but - that doesn't mean actually having ships sitting in shallow water trying to do something. For example, standing a thousand miles off and launching Tomahawk salvoes at an artificial island is an operation in the first island chain but does not require any physical presence in shallow water near shore. Or, blocking a chokepoint so the Chinese cannot pass through doesn't require ships sitting in shallow water near shore, it just requires some mines, or subs, or air patrols/strikes, or listening arrays. And so on.
"I would note that China and Russia clearly appear to be preparing to fight somebody in the littorals, and if not us, then whom?"
Whom, indeed? What is in the first island chain that we care enough about to want to physically occupy? The artificial islands are of no military value (too exposed and fixed targets). Chokepoints don't require a physical presence. There's not really any military reason for us to want to be there. That being the case, there's no military reason for China to be there, either!
"Can we fight in the littorals with existing blue-water ships like Burkes and SSNs?"
Of course we can! Moreover - and more importantly - we can fight in open ocean with Burkes. Burkes can fight anywhere! The reverse is not true. Visby-ishes cannot fight effectively in open ocean, high intensity, peer warfare. With Burkes, you don't need Visbys but with Visbys you still need all the Burkes. That seems to be a cost-ineffective fleet composition.
"A Burke that is poking around in the littorals"
Why would they be there, doing that? As I said in the preceding thoughts, there's no real reason to be there. Aside from there being no reason to be there, a Burke can still stand a thousand miles off and strike land targets. It can stand a couple hundred miles off and strike ships with LRASM (assuming they get installed). It can stand a hundred miles off and conduct helo surveillance. It can stand a hundred miles off and conduct electronic surveillance and signals intercepts. It can stand 20-50 miles off and conduct passive ASW monitoring. It can stand a hundred miles off and conduct ASW with passive sonar and helos. And so on.
You seem to have a vision of ships actually having to be a hundred feet offshore to conduct 'littoral' operations. That's not even remotely correct. The only thing that needs to be 'in' the littorals is the desired effect and those are supplied by Burkes (and aircraft and listening arrays, and mines, and …) standing a long ways off.
OK, this is getting silly. I think you are attributing to me some positions that I haven't taken, for no reason that I can discern except for the sake of winning an argument.
DeleteI think the bottom line is pretty clear. You don't see a need for littoral or amphibious operations. Having been on sweeps, PGs, and amphibs, I have a different perspective. You're not going to convince me, and I'm not going to convince you, so let's just agree that the LCS is a disaster and go from there.
Here's the crux of the problem. You see a mission, although you can't elucidate what it would be, whereas I don't see a mission, period. Debating a Visby over a Burke to fulfill a non-existent mission is silly.
DeleteThe only mission you've identified is amphibious assault and then you won't be using any kind of small patrol vessel, you'll be using your entire fleet.
You've also kind of identified (maybe?) blockading? If that's the case, that Chinese shipping is critical to them, they're not going to send ships one at a time to be sunk by small patrol vessels - they'll send large convoys escorted by significant naval forces, with subs sent ahead to clear the route, and heavy air cover from land bases (we'll be fighting in their backyard). A few small patrol vessels aren't going to stop that - they'll just get quickly sunk.
What am I missing? What mission is there that a small patrol type vessel can accomplish?
The only thing silly is the thought that individual, small vessels can hang around an active war zone and survive to accomplish anything. When you think about it, this is a form of distributed lethality which we've demonstrated to be flawed or German commerce raiding which WWII proved was flawed.
Feel free to tell me what I'm missing or, if you prefer, we can drop it altogether.
I think our disagreement over littoral and amphibious missions is the major difference, and everything else flows from that. I think we will just have to agree to disagree about the existence of littoral and amphibious missions, and without agreement on that point there is no common ground.
DeleteFair enough!
DeleteI beleive we will have 8 dazzlers of one type on destroyers by end of next year. 1 laser on the LPD, 1 or 2 on destroyers. I'm more interested on what we think a future platform whould look like. In my head, Zumwalt might not be so far off. I'd lower the bacck of the hangar by a decck and move the aft main gun all the way aft. Deck below should still allow the MFTA and Nixie just like CG-47s. Move the boats into davits below the remaining flight deck and rearrange compartments using the magazine space abandoned by the moved main gun. Now add 2 point defense weapons forward where the main gun had been. You can have guns catty-corner to one another and the same with lasers on the other 2 mounts. Clearly the main guns either need to be a version of what we have that we commit to, or something new. Either way, I want a design ready for a 360 degree threat.
ReplyDelete"Either way, I want a design ready for a 360 degree threat."
DeleteThis is an interesting thought. Isn't the F-35 goes somewhat along this line but what is really the use case? Let's even examine F-35 use case, it has very good frontal aspect stealth and radar so it would be 45 degrees and very rarely 60 degrees in front. If it's coming from anywhere else, I highly doubt that the pilot could see it and fire the missiel.
This is just a small snippet from Northrop Gunmann website about the 360 sensor system.
"The DAS surrounds the aircraft with a protective sphere of situational awareness. It warns the pilot of incoming aircraft and missile threats as well as providing day/night vision, fire control capability and precision tracking of wingmen/friendly aircraft for tactical maneuvering."
So no indication of finding/tracking enemy aircraft? Do we really need 360 sensor then if our radar can only detect 45-60(90?) degrees in front?
I actually don't know if this applies to ship 360 degrees coverage? The destroyer radar coverage is only 45 degrees in front, right? So possibly we probably should mount more CIWS systems? I am not sure about this so would love to hear someone's opinion.
"The destroyer radar coverage is only 45 degrees in front, right? "
Delete?????? Ship radars provide 360 degree coverage. Mechanical rotating radars rotate through 360 deg and fixed arrays are arranged on multiple facets of the superstructure so as to provide 360 deg coverage.
Ah that's my mistake! I actually reread the "Escorts" post but you were referring to the 45 degrees sector, not 45 degrees coverage.
DeleteWhat are the differences between mechanical rotating radars and fixed arrays? Do they operate on different frequencies? Or one is more capable than the other?
That reminds me, you should do a Radar for dummies post. The knowledge is pretty complicated that it's difficult to understand being an outsider. Thanks!
Delete"What are the differences between mechanical rotating radars and fixed arrays? "
DeleteEvery radar has its own frequency(s) and operating characteristics. I guess I'd say the main difference is that rotating radars provide intermittent coverage as they rotate. Crudely, the radar face provides 180 deg coverage so, at any given moment, half the 'circle' is uncovered. Of course, depending on the rotation rate, full coverage is achieved every few seconds. For most purposes, that's adequate. Still, it does create momentary blind spots. In contrast, a fixed array provides continuous 360 deg coverage.
From Wikipedia - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anzac-class_frigate
ReplyDelete"In 1992, work started on the frigates; 3,600-tonne (3,500-long-ton) ships capable of a 27-knot (50 km/h; 31 mph) top speed, and a range of 6,000 nautical miles (11,000 km; 6,900 mi) at 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph). The armament initially consisted of a single 5-inch gun and a point-defence missile system, supported by a missile-armed helicopter. In addition, the ships were fitted for but not with a torpedo system, anti-ship missiles, and a close-in weapons system. The last ship of the class entered service in 2006; by this point, the RAN and RNZN had embarked on separate projects to improve the frigates' capabilities by fitting the additional weapons, along with updates to other systems and equipment."
They are now fitted with.
This FFBNW is a way of buying ships that is politically palatable. Buying basically unarmed ships was not palatable in NZ.
It also makes ships affordable now, and you add the weapons later hiding the true cost.
And last point - introducing a new weapon often means an enormous investment supporting it. Weapons can be delayed so the ship is waiting for the system to become available.
At a quick glance, it appears that the Anzacs were fitted for but not with a second Mk41 VLS, torpedoes, CIWS of some type, and Harpoons. It appears that the Harpoons and torpedoes were eventually installed but the VLS and CIWS were not.
DeleteI'm not an Australian navy expert so you may have more accurate information.
They've a pair of 25mm (?) Auto cannon in a stabilised remote control mount with very limited capability against missiles. The guy telling me this said you might as well try but seemed far from convinced.
DeleteI believe there is a weight stability problem with a CIWS installed. They have 5" gun, 8 harpoons, 32 ESSM, 2 x 3 torpedo launcher, and a MH60R.
ReplyDeleteIn the RAN CIWS are allocated as needed or at least that how it used to be. So they move from ship to ship.
"In the RAN CIWS are allocated as needed or at least that how it used to be. So they move from ship to ship."
DeleteWhich is another problem. Once upon a time, a ship was safe if the ship's country was not actively at war. Today, with terrorists everywhere, a ship can find itself suddenly in combat anytime, anywhere. Having ships deployed - or even sitting at home, pierside - without their full complement of weapons is just a disaster waiting to happen.
The concept that warships can exist in a state of 'less than ready for combat' is folly. The US has paid the price for this many times although the US failing is not so much equipment that is missing but the mentality. Despite recurring disasters, we refuse to adopt a combat-ready mentality. We lost two riverine boats to the Iranians because we weren't ready to fight. The Stark took two Exocet missiles because it wasn't mentally ready to fight. The Antietam took a drone hit because it wasn't ready to fight. We lost an EP-3 because the crew and their command wasn't ready to fight. We lost a UUV because the crew and their command wasn't ready to fight. And so on ...
From my perspective, the RNZN got a reasonable deal buying a pair of frigates either to RAN-standard or close to it. We transferred Phalanx and Type 32 Torpedo tubes (from the earlier Leander-class) shortly after acquiring them. My understanding is that our pair of Phalanxs are permanently mounted. We upgraded from Sea Sparrow to Sea Ceptor this year at a reasonable cost via international tender. If Sea Ceptor performs anywhere close to as-advertised it gives a useful capability, else the fitout (eg the hull sonar) has always been austere by US standards but suitable for our purposes.
DeleteI would argue that FFBNW is a useful concept, if you execute it in a way that separates buying the relatively simple hull from the expensive systems as above. If the majority of a cost of a warship is systems rather than steel, then why are modern navies sitting still and letting themselves be price gouged by shipBUILDERS? The Danish Navy installed their own weapons on their most recent frigates, and even the little old Royal NZ Navy managed to install their own torpedo tubes. I am aware that modern navies lack the in-house capability to install and debug their own systems, but the potential cost savings look like they might easily cover the cost of doing so.
"If the majority of a cost of a warship is systems rather than steel,"
DeleteThis is a false statement and I've disproved it in past posts. I'll offer yet another example to, again, disprove it. From the US Navy's SCN budget submission, here are broad category costs for the construction of a Burke destroyer (the terminology is the budget terminology). The dollar totals are for 3 ships in FY2020, not one, but it illustrates the relative amounts among the various categories:
Plan Costs $76 M
Basic Construction $2,919 M
Change Orders $86 M
Electronics $607 M
Hull, Mech, & Elec $226 M
Ordnance $1467 M
Other $81 M
Total $5463 M
Note: Aegis radar and software are included in Ordnance.
Note: Despite the category name, Hull/Mech/Elec refers to the propulsion system, mainly. The actual hull construction is in the Basic Construction category.
What this tells us is that the basic hull is the major cost of a ship, NOT THE ELECTRONICS, SENSORS, AND WEAPONS.
Steel is NOT cheap and air is NOT free.
Let's all keep this firmly in mind for future reference.
I stand corrected. Then that implies that ships are expensive regardless of what we do, and we should make sure we get a ship that is effective in exchange.
Delete" implies that ships are expensive regardless of what we do, and we should make sure we get a ship that is effective in exchange."
DeleteCorrect. As best I can tell, the major portion of the hull cost is labor. Labor costs dwarf the actual material costs. That's not surprising. For example, the cost of an automobile is not the materials, its labor and overhead. Same with a ship.
So many people nonchalantly talk about adding fifty or a hundred feet to a ship for some additional weapons or whatever and assume the added length will have no impact on cost. That's not even remotely correct and now you can see why.
This also points us to the areas we should be focusing on if we want to reduce costs.
"Steel is NOT cheap and air is NOT free."
DeleteI had read and heard that the ship was the cheap part for years and from many sources. One of the reasons for my wanting armor was to protect the expensive parts! I was shocked to learn from you that this was a myth.
"I was shocked to learn from you that this was a myth."
DeleteOne of the reasons I do this blog is to dispel and correct the many myths about naval matters. My approach is to go find actual data and see whether it supports or refutes a given belief. More often than not, the accepted beliefs turn out to be incorrect.
You'll want to look at the post I did on the Burke class cost breakdown:
Burke Class Cost Breakdown
But how much of that hull cost is MOUNTING the equipment.
DeleteThis is from of ESSM upgrade and its per ship. First para list the work and the second the cost.
"The upgrades would incorporate:
- the leading‑edge CEA phased array radar
- the Sagem Vampir NG infrared search and track system.
- Kelvin Hughes Sharpeye navigation radar system
- upgraded SAAB 9LV Mk 3E combat management
system."
"About 250 tradespeople as well as more than 30 subcontractors were now involved in the project, as each ship required about 600,000 hours of work. The material involved in each vessel included 28,000 metres of cable, 4,000 square metres of steel and alloy sheet and 375 kilometres of welding wire. Some 9 tonnes of lead ingots would be fitted as ballast, while 28 tonnes of old paint would be removed and 14 tonnes of new paint applied." [Note re corrosion control]
Also from that report is this interesting snippert
Mal Wise says: There were more F‑18Fs than I’d ever seen before. We wanted to do a supersonic test against a realistic threat. We were all thinking sea‑skimming missiles, but of course the RAAF said if you fly an F‑18 down at sea level it can only go at whatever speed. But if you get it up at 20,000 feet it can go much faster.
"So, we said, ‘We really want it up there.’ But Ian Croser and the radar team said the radar doesn’t look up there; we designed it to look down there, which normally you’d think would be a show stopper. But Ian being Ian (and given the flexibility of the radar), he said, ‘Give me half an hour and I’ll get it to look up there.’ And that’s what he did. He even told us the range at which we’d see it."
Reconfiguring a major sensor to do what it wasn't designed to in ½ an hour. Incredible.
PS I've posted the link before https://www.aspi.org.au/report/rearming-anzacs
DeleteCNO re Constellation figures would seem to support your conclusion
DeleteIf my calculations based the Navy estimates for FFG(X) taken from the CBO report are anywhere near accurate for ships 2 to 10 the breakdown is ~ $555M/66% for shipyard and ~$280M/ 34%for GFE for the total cost per the Navy estimate for an average of $835M per ship. Figures need to be treated with caution as no detail breakdown of what is in the shipyard costs or GFE.
Taking the SCN Burke figures it is to be remembered that the Navy does not fund 100% of Aegis, MDA partially funds Aegis, have no figures. If you take figures given, Plan Costs, Basic Construction, Change Orders, HME and Other total 62%, both Electronics and Ordnance depend on mission.
Thou as David Candy writes "But how much of that hull cost is MOUNTING the equipment." which muddies the waters considerably and as Burke is a very dense ship due all the additional hardware that added over the last 30 years driving those mounting costs up, understand with latest Flight III they have had to move one accommodation block to the weapons deck to make space available for larger SPY-6 support hardware.
"the Navy does not fund 100% of Aegis"
DeleteNeed to be very careful with statements about this. My very vague understanding is that MDA funds the ballistic missile defense software development efforts and the Aegis Ashore effort. I think the Navy fully funds the physical installations onboard ships.
Let me repeat, I'm very unsure about this and have been unable to find anything definitive on the subject.
FWIW your interpretation maybe correct
DeleteInsideDefense Nov 2
Oct. 30, the MDA awarded Lockheed Martin a $724 million contract to upgrade Aegis to improve Navy cruisers' and destroyers' ability to detect, track, and defeat new intermediate-range threats as well as track and report on maneuvering hypersonic threats.
Did I mention how I love the reference to 8in gunned Spruances?? The nonlinear shell weight vs mount size/weight curve hits a sweet spot at 8in. The Navy sure missed the boat by not pursuing that program, and even today it seems like somthing to be revisited...!!!
ReplyDelete5" guns are installed for Naval Gunfire Support. If you don't want that Navies tend to install 3" guns. Except the USN that likes 1 and ¼" guns.
DeleteThing being...the 5in is a popgun. While odds are we'll never see a major caliber gun go to sea again, the 8in is a massive step up from the 5in, and doesnt even need a fresh design!! The prototype still exists. Its weight and footprint isnt significantly larger. It would be a relatively simple upgrade!!!
DeleteYou cannot deliver on what you claimed, as described in this article, reflect serious problem in US R&D capabilities and defense industry's management.
ReplyDeleteSadly but a fact, less and less smart high school graduates choose STEM. This trend has been going on for many years. Many STEM students in US are foreigners. There are actually many scholarships to encourage US citizens to study STEM but ... Ah! Bottom line - study STEM doesn't make much money, being a lawyer to tear the society down makes $$$$$. As I read that F-22's R&D team's average age was upper 50 while China's J-20 R$&D team was slightly below 40. What do you then expect down the road? not to mention, recently, each year, China graduate near 10 TIMES of STEM students of US.
Lack of commercial competition, defense industry's management have become worse and worse. How can a leading tech company under heavy competition allows employee to boast a product but fail to deliver after spend tons of R&D money?
All defense companies have to do are making Congress and politically appointed Pentagon leadership happy. They boast something to make general public high .... but in deliver? ...Ah!
"...being a lawyer to tear the society down..."
Delete167 Members of the House (37.8% of the House) and 55 Senators (55% of the Senate) hold law degrees.
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44762.pdf
Former Pres. Obama is a lawyer. Vice Pres. Biden, also a lawyer. Most of the people making decisions for our country are lawyers. So, it shouldn't be surprising that young people feel encouraged to become lawyers.
This isn't meant to be political, just to point out that many of the good and bad decisions made for the Navy have been made by lawyers.
Let's not stray too far into non-naval matters!
Delete"Most of the people making decisions for our country are lawyers."
DeleteAs the results show, one could argue.
As a lawyer (and CPA) I take no offense at these comments. In fact, I quite agree.
DeleteCdr Chip. At least you don't have marketing qualifications. Look on your positives.
DeleteIssue is not lawyer but STEM are not top choices among smart students. Without new input, soon, US will run out accumulations - tech accumulated previously. This is how you see -- despite US leads in many technologies, China catches up fast (many scientists and engineers) and in some fields, China has surpassed US (i.e. hypersonic missiles). More and more will happen.
DeleteUnless people see pathways to make more money in tech fields, fewer and fewer will choose them as their careers.
In respect to R&D and engineering careers it is also worth noting that the DOD "product cycle" is rapidly reaching the level of NASA in which an engineering grad can spend an entire career working for a company and never see something that they worked on go into service, fly, sail, etc.
DeleteThis is hardly likely to encourage folks to pursue that career path.
This loops back into the issue where all of the platforms we are operating are still 70s and 80s designs, at best.
"This loops back into the issue where all of the platforms we are operating are still 70s and 80s designs, at best."
DeleteThe issue with is that it's kinda expected. When the Soviet Union collapses, it kinda killed our warrior mentality as well. We deliver on the promise that peace is finally here, drastically reducing funding. The issue is the focus was lost as well, star wars program gained prominent instead of critically need defense programs. Well to be fair, by their standards, critically needed are years ahead. This is similar to the end of WW2 and WW1 where the end of a conflict, military scale down drastically and adoptingaa reap the benefits mentality/ experimental goes overboard.
"Cdr Chip. At least you don't have marketing qualifications. Look on your positives."
Hey, don't shoot the messenger. They have a hard time trying to sell the negatives into positive as well. Hate the leaders that should have been a professional but not!
Just read an article from a few days ago written by Peter Navarro (Assist. to the Pres. & Dir. of the Ofc of Trade and Mfg. Policy) and he echoed a lot of what I have read on this here.
ReplyDelete"American shipbuilding: An anchor for economic and national security"
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/10/30/american-shipbuilding-an-anchor-for-economic-and-national-security/
"Our shipbuilding industry was once a bulwark of American manufacturing, but decades of neglect, ambivalence to predatory foreign markets and sequestration have caused it to take on water. If we don’t begin patching the holes now, it won’t be just an industry that sinks."
DeleteThat was some seriously good pun from Peter. Now on the other hand, this is the kind of rhetoric that has been said for the past few years but nothing has been done. He clearly pointed out the problem, I will give him props on that, but he still doesn't show any efforts or even initiative in any kinds of development in this field. He literally just copied a CNO article and repost it online. That's the kind of development our professional officials have been doing. Really? The worse problem is that they should have seen and stopped it in the first place. No, they wait and let it bite them in the ass, and then they issue a awaken article and an apology.
I feel like at this point, whenever they want to stay relevant or be in the news, they just take out a widely known but unadmitted issue from the playbook and then talk about it like they figured it out just yesterday. And people will support and keep them in position because they find issue once per year. Industry is happy that defense business isn't severely damaged. A win for everyone but America.
US should learn from Japan. Suffered high labor cost but can still maintain the world's 3rd largest civilian ship builder. Even China (no. 1) and S. Korea (no. 2) are not low labor cost builders any more, although their labor costs still less than US.
DeleteBrazil once had a prosper ship building industry but fizzled out despite its labor cost is low.
The United States could make ship construction in the US more appealing to potential buyers.
DeleteCommercial ships need to have multiple inspections every 5 years to maintain their certificates so they take on cargo and be insured. The US Coast Guard or other agency could provide the inspections free of charge to US built ships for 20 years after construction.
A special retirement plan similar to the Railroad retirement plan could be funded by the government for crews of US built and flagged vessels reducing the cost to the ship owners.
The health insurance for Mariners serving on US flagged and built ships could be paid for by the US Government.
Training for Mariners could be fully reimbursed for crews on US flagged and built ships.
Profit from US built and flagged vessels could have a 0% tax rate.
Ships with designs that could be used by MARAD for the National Defense Reserve Fleet could have a guaranteed purchase agreement with MARAD that would allow the ship owners to sell their ships at above market values.
Mariners on US flagged vessels could also be automatically qualified to be in the USN reserves and get paid as reservists in addition to their merchant mariner pay.
International/domestic shipbuilders will open up shop/expand in the USA and produce all the ships we could ever want if the incentives are good enough.
This is a recent satellite image of China's 3rd aircraft carrier under construction as they put sections built together. Next to it is a cargo ship longer than the aircraft carrier. When will US civilian ship building come back?
Deletehttps://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/images/cv003-20200909-image02.jpg|||CVA%20002%20aircraft%20carrier
Like a company makes announcement that it will develop a product which will change the world with XYZ feature. People lured to buy its stocks with high hope. After spend tons of money, stocks rise through roof, management cashed in their stock options, then, bad news announced that all investment end up with a product poorly accepted by the market. Angry shareholders demand a fix. CEO says that he will "take responsibility" and resign. He then retires with tons of cash (sold his stocks before general public know the shipwreck).
ReplyDeletePentagon is doing the same?
"China's President has told thousands of exporters that Beijing does not want to hurt other economies, as state media reports a ban on seven key Australian products is imminent."
ReplyDeletehttps://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/xi-says-it-s-ill-advised-to-hurt-others-interests-as-australia-braces-for-6-billion-hit-20201105-p56btq.html
This is after all the other ones. Every 2 weeks or so.
President Xi is turning everyone in Australia with financial interest in China against them.
It's like he is helping us to disengage without any political cost to our Government.
Also in news today;
"The 65-year-old Melbourne man who has become the first person charged in Australia under foreign interference laws is a prominent member of Victoria's South-East Asian Chinese community and belongs to groups connected to China's overseas influence efforts.
Key points:
"The 65-year-old man is the president of an organisation affiliated with the Chinese Government"
"Mr Duong was charged under the new laws on Thursday after a year-long investigation"
"Parliament passed the foreign interference laws in 2018"
We used to execute people for that....
DeleteBut now we would have to start with the politicians.