In due course, the Navy will publish a report citing the
usual litany of failures to follow established procedures, waivers of safety
requirements, inadequate personnel, inadequate training, etc. and will conclude
with a long list of recommendations, few of which will ever be implemented, and
most of which will be paperwork related.
Nothing will actually change. The
Navy has had many dockside fires (remember the USS Miami fire) and has taken no
significant preventative action before so why should this time be any
different? That sad reality aside, let’s
see what lessons we can glean from this event even now, before the report comes
out.
Manning - This is
why you don’t send ships into combat (or even on peacetime patrols or into
dockside maintenance!) with minimal manning crews. Despite the use of 400 firefighters and the assistance
of the San Diego Fire Department, the fire on the BR remained uncontrolled and
spread widely for well over a day. Had
the ship been at sea with just its crew and no outside assistance, the ship
would have been lost for sure.
The following statement demonstrates the manpower needs for
serious damage control. Note the
statement of 400 sailors involved in the effort and the fire still spread out of control.
Some
400 sailors have been fighting the fire aboard the ship since the fire started
“to make sure we make every effort to save that ship,” he [Rear Adm. Philip
Sobeck, commander of Expeditionary Strike Group 3] added. (2)
Ships are loaded with explosives, fuel, and other highly
combustible materials. Fire is always a
moment away and a full damage control complement is the only thing that can
possibly save a ship. Injury count is up
to around 60 – mostly smoke inhalation and heat exhaustion. Excess bodies are required to fight fires and
replace fallen damage control crew – and there will be fallen damage control
crew (see, "USS Stark, Missile Inbound"). Minimal
manning is a guarantee of lost ships in battle.
Zumwalt, with a minimal manning crew of around 140 will be
unable to perform damage control. A
single fire in combat will mean the loss of the ship.
Automated
Firefighting – Navy ships have extensive automated firefighting
systems. In this case, reports indicate
that the Halon firefighting system was deactivated.
A
fire suppression system was inoperable when a blaze erupted aboard the USS
Bonhomme Richard in San Diego, so sailors fought the blaze with water, a top
Navy official said Monday.
Rear
Adm. Philip Sobeck said the Halon gas system had been turned off because it was
being worked on while the amphibious assault ship was undergoing maintenance
work. (3)
I would expect that there were other fire suppression
systems in addition to Halon and I have heard nothing about their status.
If you’ve deactivated your primary fire suppression system,
you’d damn well better have enhanced conventional firefighting systems on hand
and extra firefighting crews standing by, in the workspaces along with
extensive fire watch observers.
Fire watch, for those unfamiliar with the concept, is a
procedure involving one or more observers whose job is to look for sparks,
smoke, and fire, and is a requirement whenever fire producing activities
occur. These activities include burning,
welding, grinding, and any other activity that can produce sparks, flame, or
sufficient heat to initiate a fire.
Common sense would also suggest,
- If you must shut down a firefighting system, do so only in small sections, leaving the remainder active.
- If you must shut down the entire firefighting system, no ‘hot work’ should be allowed for the duration.
- If you must shut down the entire firefighting system, extensive manpower and firefighting equipment should be on hand and at the immediate location of the work.
Regarding automatic fire suppression systems … they always fail, even when active. The history of industrial disasters has
thoroughly proven this. Industrial fire
suppression systems are every bit as robust and extensive as Navy systems and
yet they, too, always fail.
Combustibles - This
is why you don’t send ships out fitted with combustible crew comforts. War
ships should always be ready for disaster which means they should always be in
a combat-stripped condition with all unnecessary combustibles removed. The implication of this is that we should not
be sending ships on extended cruises that require excessive crew comforts. War, and the Navy, is a combat business not a
military cruise ship operation and there are no days off or safe days, even in
port (Cole) or undergoing maintenance.
According to The Drive / The War Zone website,
The
area where the fire started, which was the lower vehicle storage area, was
filled with cardboard, rags, drywall, and other combustible material. (5)
Drywall?! On a
ship? There’s an incredibly stupid idea. A reader suggested that drywall (a common
household wall covering also known as sheet rock) was actually something called
Tri-Wall. Regardless, combustible wall
coverings have no place on a ship.
Combustibles being stored on a ship? Especially one in maintenance where a LOT of
hot work is occurring? That’s just stupidly
unsafe.
The
fire is believed to have started below those spaces, in the lower cargo hold of
the ship, known as the “Deep V,” Sobeck said.
It
is a “huge open area where you store a lot of (Marine Corps) equipment and
everything else,” he said. “That’s where we believe it was started.” (1)
It would seem unlikely that there was any Marine Corps
equipment stored there considering that the ship was coming out of a two year
maintenance availability. The area was
presumably filled with combustibles associated with the maintenance
activities. Those materials should never
have been stored there. They should have
been brought onto the ship the day they were needed and should have been
removed from the ship the moment they were not needed. Sure, that adds extra cost but the several
thousand dollars that the Navy saved cost them a $4B ship.
This also illustrates that office and berthing items have no
place on a ship beyond the barest of necessities.
Toxicity – As usual,
the Navy’s official communications were less than accurate, to put it politely.
While
the precise cause remained unknown Sunday night, Sobeck [Rear Adm. Philip
Sobeck, commander of Expeditionary Strike Group 3] said there was “nothing
toxic” in the ship, and that the black smoke billowing from the amphib all day
was caused by office and berthing items burning. (1)
“It’s
an ashy fire; there’s nothing toxic in there,” Sobeck said. (4)
Nothing toxic? This
is a blatant lie. Of course the smoke is
filled with toxic chemicals. Most items
on a ship produce toxic gases when burned.
The ship is being totally consumed and that means that plastics,
insulation, composites, paint, solvents, etc. are being burned and all of them
produce toxic gases when burned. As seen
in the photos, much of the smoke is thick and black which is not what smoke
from an office supplies fire looks like.
Either the Admiral is ignorant beyond belief or he’s just plain
lying. Make no mistake … he’s
intentionally lying. I understand that
he’s lying to try to calm people but the way to calm people is to give them
accurate, truthful information that they can then act on as appropriate. Lying just reduces your credibility and leads
to blog articles!
This is an emphatic lesson about why you don’t use plastics
beyond the barest necessity – they’re toxic when burned. We need to stop using plastics for crew
comforts, deck coverings, wall coverings, and the million other
applications. Yes, plastics are
wonderful materials but not on a warship. The Navy needs to get ready to fight and that
means stripping ship. You veteran old
timers know what stripping ship is. We
need to get serious about being ready for combat – or run of the mill disaster.
 |
| Note the collapsed mast. |
One final question: what if this had been a nuclear ship?
(1)Navy Times website, “Admiral: Bonhomme Richard fire
believed to have started in the ‘Deep V’ cargo hold”, David B. Larter and Geoff
Ziezulewicz, 12-Jul-2020,
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/07/12/amphibious-assault-ship-ablaze-in-port-san-diego/
(2)USNI News website, “UPDATED: Fire Fight Intensifies on
USS Bonhomme Richard, 5 Sailors Still Hospitalized”, Sam LaGrone and Gidget
Fuentes, 13-Jul-2020,
https://news.usni.org/2020/07/13/fire-fight-intensifies-on-uss-bonhomme-richard-5-sailors-still-hospitalized
(3)Washington Times website, “Fire suppression system on USS
Bonhomme Richard was inoperable, Navy official says”, Julie Watson / Associated
Press, 13-Jul-2020,
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jul/13/uss-bonhomme-richard-fire-suppression-system-was-i/5)https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/34801/two-decks-are-thought-to-separate-fire-on-uss-bonhomme-richard-from-1m-gallons-of-fuel
The Gypsum in drywall doesn't burn, just the paper on the outside.
ReplyDeleteDrywall has a high initial fire rating, but if a fire burns hot enough and long enough...
Delete"The crystal lattice of raw gypsum (CaSO4.2H2O) contains approximately 21% by weight chemically bound water. When exposed to a high temperature environment, calcium sulphate di-hydrate (CaSO4.2H2O) undergoes two endothermic decomposition reactions during which the chemically bound water dissociates from the crystal lattice and evaporates. This process, known as “gypsum dehydration” (or “calcination”), occurs in the temperature region between 80 °C and 250 °C"
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214398X16300103?via%3Dihub
Yes, anything can burn. Not saying I preference it on a ship. Asbestos didn't burn easily. I don't preference it as a building material either.
DeleteI was surprised when I saw the mention of drywall, I didn't know they used it on ships too.
ReplyDeleteTo me the one that really hurts is just the general feel of sloppiness, gear laying around, garbage, boxes laying around,etc...that's easy to fix and shouldn't be tolerated at all. Messes should be cleaned up once job is over. I'm hearing rumor of a 55 gallon drum laying around that might been near the fire or maybe ignited/blew up and started the fire. If true, that's inadmissible that more precautions and safety measures weren't taken.
I think that was a typo... Triwalls are the heavy duty cardboard pallet-sized boxes used for packaging of materials for transfer, UNREP, storage etc. Im pretty sure theres no drywall use on board navy ships.
DeleteOk. That makes more sense. Was wondering about drywall for ships....
DeleteDrywall, Tri-Wall, whatever, there's no reason for that and the other stuff to be accumulating onboard a naval vessel.
Delete"Drywall, Tri-Wall, whatever, there's no reason for that and the other stuff to be accumulating onboard a naval vessel."
DeleteAnd that's the relevant point!
Thats one of those necessary evils. If for nothing other than collection of garbage and materials to be moved off the ship, those triwalls are the standard "container" since they're collapsible, and having a few pallets of them somewhere is typical. During a yard period there would be more than normal, but their existence/contribution to the situation is truly unknown. The true root of the disaster probably lies with the inability to isolate compartments, set boundaries, and lack of initial manpower to do so. Remember, at some point the ship was evacuated completely amd the fire spread, completely unchecked, and the fireboat/helicopter measures certainly contributed little to slowing the internal fire....
Delete"The true root of the disaster probably lies with the inability to isolate compartments, set boundaries, and lack of initial manpower to do so."
DeleteGotta disagree, here, or at least amplify on your statement. The root of the disaster was in stupidity and greed. Huh? Greed? Yeah, greed.
When the fire suppression system was shut down, all other work should have been halted, all compartments should have had interfering cables and hoses disconnected, all moveable combustibles should have been removed, etc. for the duration of the system shutdown. That was not done because it would have cost additional money and lengthened the maintenance. So, by not taking basic safety precautions the Navy probably managed to save thousands of dollars and all it cost was a $4B ship. Stupidity and greed.
Agree to a point. There are lots of regs about this, and there are supposed to be a multitude of pumps, hoses, and other standalone firefighting gear in place when firemains are offline. There are supposed to be daily inspections of these measures, as well as assessments of any fire or other dangerous conditions.Sure those will be second-best to the installed systems that ships force are trained and familiar with, and no telling how in-compliance the shipyard was, if inspectors found deficiencies not rectified, etc...
DeleteLet me be clear, I'm NOT claiming this is anything but an accident. But what if it isn't? Shouldn't we at least consider the possibility?
ReplyDeleteIt would be a great way to take out an adversary's vital assets, with very high plausible deniability. Kinetic warfare (eg shooting at each other) is just one part of 'adversarial conflict'. Just look at the string of mysterious explosions (and now fires too apparently) happening in Iran this last week. Hard to tell which, if any are accidents or not, and harder to assign blame. Same with port fires; because of the circumstances there's a high risk of accidental fires, with combustibles and accelerants everywhere. How do you prove it's deliberate if a single sigaret at the right place might suffice to cause a conflagration?
As you've pointed out, fires on ships in dock are not uncommon. The Chinese type 075 under construction and the Russian Kuznetsov fell victim too. A coincidence these happen relatively close to each other? Or is there some tit-for-tat going on?
Again, I have no proof, but there too lies the rub. If there was public proof, odds are there'd be a shooting war (the public would be crying for one). But it's a very big 'if' whether any definite proof could be found at all.
R.
Generally speaking, the simplest explanation tends to be the right one.
DeleteCould this be the result of a foreign action?
Sure, in theory. But I don't really think it's particularly likely.
But you're looking at the case as an individual incident. In december a Russian carrier catches fire, in april a Chinese carrier catches fire, in July a US carrier catches fire. This doesn't even include other types of ships, like the French submarine that was effectively destroyed by fire recently. All a coincidence? Maybe, maybe not.
DeleteAnd as I so clearly stated myself at the top of my post, I'm NOT saying this was not an accident. I am saying that in light of other circumstances, including how easy it would be for a foreign actor to start such a fire with almost zero risk of them being exposed, that ignoring both the possibility of this incident being due to foul play, and the possibility of it happening as a result of foul play in the future, is highly negligent.
How many posts has this blog dedicated illustrating how hard it is to take out a carrier? Turns out, all you need is a match or a sigaret. Are you really going to ignore that? Because I'm sure the Chinese, Iranians, North Koreans, etc are paying attention.
R
7 Iranian boats on fire at their nuke plant today.
Delete@CNO While I agree that this DOES call the minimal manning into question, I have to disagree on a major point. If this fire had occured at sea, I believe it wouldnt have been a ship-destroying incident. A full crew aboard, all DC systems available, and an ability to set GQ and proper material conditions would have made the fire a third-page headline and a month of repair time. Ive been through a couple yard periods, and they are absolutely the most dangerous time for a ship. They are the proverbial "accident waiting to happen". There are so many factors that make a fire more likely, and orders of magnitude more difficult to contain and extinguish once started. As a deck plate sailor that worked fire watch details in the yards, and a fire team nozzleman thats seen a fire at sea, Id choose to be in the at-sea scenario every time!!!
ReplyDeleteYou could be right. However, I think you're approaching it from a starting point of a small fire. I was thinking more along the lines of combat where one or more major fires are initiated almost instantaneously (hits/explosions). In that case, automated fire suppression systems always fail and you're left with just raw manpower to fight the fire. In that case, with a limited crew size and limited equipment you'd be facing a losing proposition.
DeleteThats true, i was looking at this case specifically. Multiple hits,fires is a different scenario of course. Somthing else Im not sure of is how much of the ship has automated/halon systems. My experience was (way back when) that only the mainspace was equipped with it, and since evidently the engine rooms have been largely untouched, its an irrelevant talking point. I could be wrong here, I just dont know. Also, with so many compartments unable to be sealed, the halon would be fairly ineffective even if functional. But i will agree that the systems are problem ridden (including the newly installed one on board my ship), and should be counted on to fail in any damage control plans!!
DeleteHeres a comment from a fellow that was a shipyard worker earlier in the BRs availibility...
ReplyDelete"I went on a couple of those walkthroughs on BHR last year. While all or a least almost all cables/hoses/whatever passing through any individual fire barrier had quick-release disconnects, the sheer number of them blocking fire barriers were overwhelming. Thinking back to my days manning a fire boundary, I think it would have taken me a good 20 minutes to close any one of those hatches."
So evidently many of the safety regulations were being followed, but it still speaks to the vulnerabilities, and difficulties of creating/maintaining any kind of damage control boundaries while in the yards. With the almost impossibility of rapidly sealing compartments, a ship in the yards is a veritable playground for fire and/or flooding...
"With the almost impossibility of rapidly sealing compartments, a ship in the yards is a veritable playground for fire and/or flooding..."
DeleteHmm … lots of danger, so … let's shut down the fire suppression system!
Right??? Its almost funny in its ridiculousness!! But reality is that the fire systems are of course salt water,with the commensurate corrosion and damage of pumps, valves, piping etc, so they need lots of maintenance and repair, and what better time than in the yards?? What a horrible catch-22!!
DeleteCNO has a point, you unload the ship for maintenance,
Deletewhy not maintain the fire system then ?
While the ship is as empty as it ever gets, so you soak the minimum amount of stuff, if your fire system goes into attack mode by accident. Then once the fire system is properly maintained, then fill the ship with flammables and start welding.
While in an ideal world, thatd work, its not practical. When major firemain maintenance happens, it could last months. Pumps and valves are sent out for rebuilding. All piping joints are opened, inspected, resealed. Whole sections of pipe may be removed and replaced due to corrosion. The procurement of even replacement piping may take time, because every part for every system isnt sitting on the pier waiting to be needed. Inspections find unknown problems, and then you wait for parts. To do absolutely no other work on board while servicing the fire systems is just not realistic. I feel its not even the biggest contributor to what is likely the total loss of the BR...
DeleteThe Halogen fire system should not need to be replaced because of corrosion but could have been taken off-line for other reasons. The water/fogging systems are connected to salt water and need to be take apart to be inspected and sections of pipe replaced.
DeleteIt does beg the question.
Why is the fire suppression system subject to corrosion?
The exclusive use of titanium would completely eliminate the corrosion of the fire suppression system. Pay double or triple up front for a critical system and never have this problem. If all of the ship's piping was titanium it would likely drive down the initial cost (from current titanium costs) and reduce refit cost, since the piping would be a no maintenance item in the refit.
The fire barrier problem could be solved with paired vestibules placed on either side of the fire barrier. The vestibules could have the penetration points for cables, etc in the walls of the vestibule and having two functional doors that would maintain the fire barrier. A single vestibule would be enough but if you take down the fire control system the double vestibule allows extra margin since you don't know which side of the door the fire will be on.
DeleteThe vestibules could be outfitted with water passages/foggers as well as the construction/repair cabling.
The drywall issue aside, where were the safety officers/inspectors to prevent the piling up of multiple types of combustible materials in the lower vehicle storage area?
ReplyDeleteThis post is as close to my area of expertise as this blog has ever been! I've spent years working in heavy industrial sites, often specifically in procedures around "Hot Work" (the phrase Down Under for welding, grinding, fabrication type work). With the details currently available on this incident, the gaps in controls is unforgivable in my eyes.
ReplyDeleteA ship alongside a pier for an extended maintenance/re-fit period is not terrible far removed from say, construction or major maintenance on a large factory - many of the same risks, challenges and control measures would apply.
Whenever this type of work is being done with an impaired fire suppression system, the basic controls would require constant supervision of the area by a person specifically there ONLY to supervise & observe. Post-work, frequent site inspections would be required for up to 12hrs form work finishing. Any flammable material would be removed from the area of work, or covered or wet-down constantly if they cannot be removed. gaps/holes to other decks would be covered/closed, or have equivalent measures on the other side if they cannot.
The aim of these controls is to prevent any fire starting, and having someone able to respond in seconds if any fire does start. In some situations, it is absolutely forbidden to carry out this type of work with an impaired fire control system.
Despite the content and lessons of this blog, I'm still shocked that several of these controls were clearly missing. If they had been in place then the fire would never have gotten out of control - simple as that. I'm really surprised an operation like this, with such valuable equipment involved, didn't have such systems in place.
Regarding long cruises, crew comforts and flammable material onboard, I would point out this is not a new thing - I have just finished reading Castles of Steel by Robert Massie.
ReplyDeleteIn the early part of this book before conflict breaks out he focusses on the various naval units operating across the pacific, the interactions in various 'colonial-type' ports, long deployments to these regions of the world, and he mentions the preparations made when war broke out.
These included chucking overboard wooden furniture, wall hangings, etc.
His commentary was specifically Royal Navy ships, but from memory also mentioned German ones as well. These ships frequently must have had substantial allowances onboard for these very long deployments far away from home.
I have no opinion in regards to this, only pointing out it is not a recent trend - the history buff in me!
You're quite right that stripping ship is a time honored tradition prior to battle. HOWEVER, with the US Navy's demonstrated inability to avoid giant cargo ships and reefs, along with the ever present threat of terrorism, ships should ALWAYS be a stripped condition. A ship today is never more than seconds away from disaster.
DeleteIn today's environment, it should not be necessary to strip ship. The strippable materials should never get aboard in the first place!
sort of a "if you cant demonstrate responsibility, you cant have nice things" sort of approach? Yes maybe!!
DeleteSome interior pics have been posted online.
ReplyDeletehttps://m.imgur.com/gallery/xup5VBY
Brits do it a bit differently. When a RN ship goes to the yard for major maintenance, it is decommissioned and the crew offloaded and replaced with yard specialists. When it comes out it is recommissioned, and people speak of 1st commission, or 2nd commission, and so forth.
ReplyDeleteBrits also do ships a bit differently. They have a fair amount of wood trim, particularly in wardroom and officers' country. A lot of it is teak, and you get that distinctive teak smell when you go into the wardroom on a lot of RN ships.
ReplyDeleteHard to tell based on the articles I've seen, but it appears that DC crews from other ships weren't brought in until the fire had been going on for some time. Lack of initiative on the part of the other ship captains?
ReplyDeleteIt's been quite disappointing to hear people making excuses for the Navy letting this fire get out of control. Understandable/explainable or not, the Navy is still down a major ship. Glad to finally see someone who's doesn't either ignore the Navy's problems, or attribute them to some vague "cultural" issue that absolves leadership of responsibility. Keep up the good work.
Some more pictures of the inside:
ReplyDeletehttps://twitter.com/Osinttechnical?s=09
In passing, there is a section in Admiral Woodward's book on the Falklands War where he notes all the ships spent considerable time stripping out carpets and assorted linings and other combustibles on the trip south in 1982. This resulted in a decrease in comfort clearly as these sundry linings had some insulating effect.
ReplyDeleteClearly this is a strong example of the difference between a peacetime and wartime navy.
As a further note, quite apart from the references folks are making to drywall, etc, a small effort will find plenty of photos of US Navy ship interiors highlighting the use of drop-ceilings which I fail to understand the need for in a warship.
How came the US navy like now? Still a first class navy? After more then one times of destroy bumped into cargo, getting members with convid19, and now ship burns?
ReplyDeleteThe US Navy is the most powerful in the world. If it's not first class, then nothing is.
DeleteWhile it's obviously terrible that this has happened, it's not like this only happens to the US.
The Chinese Navy had almost the same exact thing happen a few months ago - https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/04/chinas-1st-type-075-lhd-caught-on-fire-during-fitting-out/
It's even the same ship class that it happened to.
The US Navy is clearly still the most powerful in the world. What we on here criticize is that it's not what it could be, and stupid decisions by th people at the top keep causing it to fall shorter and shorter of what it could be.
DeleteSome of us worry that if the Navy keeps making stupid decisions, we will some day lose our position as strongest navy in the world. But despite the stupidity, that hasn't happened yet.
May +2 more things:
DeleteMoney and time waste by LCS and Zumwalt.
Decision of Arleigh Burke 3 building after China 055 appears.
first class = most powerful ? It is interesting to discuss, no matter from HW or SW or both.
DeleteAfter 2 days, there are 2 more ships burned?
DeleteFire breaks out on aircraft carrier under construction at Newport News Shipbuilding
Deletehttps://www.wtkr.com/news/newport-news-shipbuilding-investigate-fire-on-uss-john-f-kennedy
US Navy orders General Dynamics shipyard to stop work after small fire on the warship Kearsarge
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/07/18/us-navy-orders-to-general-dynamics-nassco-to-stop-work-after-fire-on-uss-kearsarge/
Well, about the first class US Navy, Chinese are laughing.
ReplyDeletehttps://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=zh-CN&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Fuser.guancha.cn%2Fmain%2Fcontent%3Fid%3D353867