Commonly referred to as a ‘battlecruiser’, the Kirov would be
classified as a battleship by today’s standards, with its very heavy offensive
capability, but would not be a battleship by conventional standards as it lacks
anything approaching the armor and ruggedness – the ability to stand and fight
and keep fighting while taking damage – of a traditional battleship. It more closely approximates a PT boat than a
battleship – a heavy hitter that cannot, itself, take a hit.
Here’s is Frunze’s (2nd ship of the class)
armament, as built:
Function
|
No.
|
Designation
|
||
ASuW
|
20
|
SS-N-19 Shipwreck (P-700
Granit)
|
||
ASuW
|
1
|
AK-130 dual 130mm
|
||
AAW / SAM
|
96
|
SA-N-6 Grumble (S-300F)
|
||
AAW / SAM
|
44
|
SA-N-4 Gecko
|
||
AAW / SAM
|
128
|
SA-N-9 Gauntlet (3K95 Kinzhal)
|
||
AAW / Point Defense
|
8
|
AK-630 30 mm
|
||
ASW / ASuW
|
10
|
533 Torpedoes
|
||
ASW
|
2
|
RBU-1000
|
||
ASW
|
1
|
RBU-6000
|
||
For comparison, here is the updated Velikiy’s (4th
ship of the class) armament:
Function
|
No.
|
Designation
|
||
ASuW
|
20
|
SS-N-19 Shipwreck (P-700
Granit)
|
||
ASuW
|
1
|
AK-130 dual 130mm
|
||
AAW / SAM
|
48
|
SA-N-20 (S-300FM)
|
||
AAW / SAM
|
48
|
SA-N-6 Grumble
|
||
AAW / SAM
|
64
|
SA-N-9 Gauntlet (3K95 Kinzhal)
|
||
AAW / Point Defense
|
6
|
CADS-N-1
|
||
ASW / ASuW
|
10
|
533 Torpedoes
|
||
ASW
|
2
|
RBU-1000
|
||
ASW
|
2
|
RBU-12000
|
||
Let’s take a look at some characteristics of the Kirov class
and, ultimately, how those characteristics relate to today’s naval force
structure and ship design.
Mission. Any discussion must begin with an
understanding of its mission. What was/is
its mission? What was/is its purpose? Well, no one knows exactly what the Soviets
had in mind when they built the ship but, by most accounts, its mission was to
sink US carriers. For this, it had 20
SS-N-19 Shipwreck missiles. These were
15,000 lb, 33 ft long, Mach 1.6-2.5, ship killers with 1650 lb warheads.
 |
| SS-N-19 Shipwreck |
Presumably, the Kirovs were intended to operate together, as
a group. Four Kirov class cruisers,
operating together and able to generate a salvo of 80 Shipwrecks, would have
been a frightening and nearly unstoppable force especially in the days prior to
the widespread appearance of Aegis. The
first Aegis ship, the USS Ticonderoga entered service a few years after Kirov.
As a carrier-killer, the Kirovs would have had no choice but
to encounter American carrier aircraft and the Soviets, therefore, provided the
Kirovs with massive anti-air capability with around 160 SAMs of varying ranges
plus multiple point defense weapons. The
Kirovs were well protected!
Considering their mission – to sink US carriers – and their
incredible degree of AAW protection, the Kirovs were quite similar to WWII
battleships in the sense that they were built to stand and fight. Whereas the WWII battleship depended on armor
for much of its protection, the Kirovs depended on massive AAW protection to
prevent taking hits. On the other hand,
the Kirovs had no great armor protection that I’m aware of and if they did take
hits they would have quickly been put out of action. We see in this the difference in design
philosophy between the WWII ship designer who believed in armor versus the
modern ship designer who believes in AAW defense.
It is also possible that the Soviets intended the Kirovs to
be battleship killers. At the time, the
US still maintained and operated battleships and persistent rumors suggest that
the Soviets feared our battleships more than our carriers.
Balance of Armament. The Kirov represented the epitome of the ‘all
or nothing’ philosophy of combat.
Alternatively, one could call it the ‘one shot’ philosophy. Kirov had a massively heavy offensive punch
but it was a punch that was very limited in number and good only for one
shot. There were no other anti-ship
weapons other than the guns and there were no reloads for the anti-ship
missiles. Kirov would have one shot at
the enemy, albeit a very heavy one, and then would be impotent as far as
offensive capability was concerned. This
was not a balanced weapons load with a variety of offensive weapons and varying
size/range missiles. This was the
equivalent of betting ‘all in’ in poker – one shot and you either succeeded
brilliantly or you were finished as a threat.
The Kirovs were built for offense. They were built to strike and strike hard,
unlike the US Navy today which is mostly defensive in nature.
Sensors. An interesting aspect of the Kirov design is
the density and redundancy of sensors on the ship which goes far beyond Western
ship designs. While likely intended as
compensation for reliability and construction quality issues, the sensors do
provide a significant degree of battle resilience (assuming they work!) in the
face of damage – an outstanding quality for any warship.
As the Kirov class entered service, the US was beginning to
build Aegis ships. It is interesting to
speculate what a Kirov could have been with its enormous AAW capability coupled
to an Aegis type system. Such a ship
would have been even more impressive than it already was and would have been as
close to invulnerable to aerial threats as it was possible to be!
Arsenal Ship. One could look at the Kirov class as arsenal
ships, in a sense. They contained a very
heavy anti-ship missile load, much as the arsenal ship would have although the
Kirov’s ‘heaviness’ stemmed from the size of the missiles more so than numbers. The major difference between the Kirovs and
the arsenal ship is that the Kirovs were capable of independent operations and
self-defense whereas the arsenal ship was intended to be a missile ‘barge’,
incapable of independent operation and requiring AAW protection from escort
ships.
Armor. This is the key aspect of the Kirov’s
design. As far as I know, the Kirovs had
no particularly noteworthy degree of armor.
For a ship that was nearly as big as an Iowa class battleship and
carried a massive amount of weapons and sensors, the lack of armor is striking
and is what prevents the class from being classified as a battleship. The Kirov’s displacement of 28,000 tons
versus the Iowa’s 58,000 tons amply demonstrates the lack of armor. One can’t help but wonder if placing the
concentration of weapons that the Kirovs had into an unarmored hull was a wise
decision. As we noted, the Kirovs were a
‘one shot’ design. If the enemy happened
to get the first shot in, it is quite likely that the Kirovs would be rendered
at least a mission kill, if not worse.
Thus, the lack of armor would prevent the Kirovs from taking a hit and
continuing to fight. Like the LCS of
today, the Kirovs would likely have been a one-hit mission kill. The Kirovs represented a lot of weapons,
sensors, and money in an unprotected hull.
This potential vulnerability was exacerbated by the lack of aircraft
carriers to provide an additional layer of protection. US ships were, and still are, unarmored but
have the benefit of carrier aircraft to provide additional defense.
The lack of armor strikes me as the key weakness in the
Kirov design.
Modern Assessment. For Russia, one Kirov is a relatively small
threat when going up against Aegis or Aegis-equivalent AAW ships. Aegis was designed to handle saturation
missile attacks and one presumes that 20 Shipwreck missiles would not
constitute a major threat. It would
require a group of at least four Kirovs to have any realistic hope of
accomplishing anything significant. On
the other hand, a Kirov represents a dire threat to any non-Aegis type ship and
there are a great many of those in the world!
So, what does Russia’s modernized Kirov, the Velikiy, do for
the Russian navy? Honestly, beyond
prestige, not a lot. While it’s a threat
to small ships, it’s not a serious threat to the US Navy. For the cost, Russia could have several
smaller frigates/destroyers which would be much more useful.
All of this raises the obvious question, is there any need
for a Kirov-like battlecruiser in the US Navy?
A Kirov-like ship would be attractive for one reason only:
its heavy anti-ship missile capability.
The SS-N-19 Shipwreck is aptly named and the US Navy has nothing even
remotely like it. The rest of the ship
offers nothing of value and nothing we don’t already have. It’s a big ship that cannot stand in a fight
and take damage while continuing to operate.
That’s simply too much money invested in a ship that is too fragile.
The missile, however, is well worth duplicating and would
fit nicely into the US Navy’s offensive, anti-ship weapon portfolio which
currently lacks a big, fast, hard hitting missile. Of course, we currently have no ship that
could launch such a missile but if we’d develop the missile, the launcher
wouldn’t be all that difficult.
Having rejected a Kirov-type ship, other than its Shipwreck
missile, one could easily imagine a use for a modified Kirov equipped with
enough armor to stand and fight. This
would have to include armor on the order of a WWII battleship. Such a ship, with a massive, supersonic
anti-ship missile would be a formidable threat, indeed. Unfortunately, the Navy seems to have totally
rejected the very idea of armor. Still,
one can dream and hope.
That isn't a picture of the P-700 Granits fitted. The Admiral Nakhimov upgrade replaces the 20 cells with 80 for Kalibr. I'd say land attack enters their wheelhouse at that point as would a saturation attack. By your reasoning each ship is now the entire 4 in one ship.
ReplyDeleteOops. Wrong cut/paste. Corrected.
Delete"The Admiral Nakhimov upgrade replaces the 20 cells with 80 for Kalibr."
DeleteI have no information confirming that. Do you have a reference? I've seen a report that the SS-N-19 will be replaced with the P-800 Oniks.
same launcher for both. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/15608/delivery-of-russias-refit-nuclear-battlecruiser-delayed-but-progress-looks-impressive
DeleteThe article has no references cited and I'm unaware that the author has any inside information on the subject. He might be right but, at the moment, the information is unconfirmed.
DeleteAlso, note the wording he uses: he refers to missiles 'such as', and then he lists a couple possibilities. This suggests that he's speculating.
Lacking any citations, we'll just have to wait and see, assuming Nakhimov ever completes its refit!
I've seen quite a few claims that the Zircon is designed to use the same UKSK/3S14 launcher as the Kalibr. I've also seen claims that the P-800 can also fit in 3S14 - which might explain this.
DeleteAlso, they are making this 4 for 1 swap on some Oscars too.
ReplyDeleteI would assume that they would have the same limitations with AAW missiles that the US does, in that you have a radar horizon and shoot-shoot-look.
ReplyDeleteThis means that the Kirov's CIWS would come into play.
Even if the CIWS successfully engages the missiles, wouldn't the close-in explosions and high speed missile debris highlight the lack of armor to protect the ship?
All correct.
DeleteOne possible, additional factor in AAW is that the Kirovs carry three helos. I don't know what the Soviet/Russian tactics are but I would suspect that the helos would be used as a sort of localized airborne radar to extend the engagement horizon. Pure speculation on my part.
"same limitations with AAW missiles"
DeleteBear in mind, however, that in the time frame that the Kirov was designed and built, the air threat was, in a sense, less severe than today. The US, at that time, did not possess a supersonic, heavy anti-ship missile. We only had the Harpoon and, for a time, the anti-ship Tomahawk. Our carrier aircraft would have had to close with the Kirov to hit it. Thus, the Kirov's AAW would have been more effective then, than we would assess it today.
Your ship reviews are some of your best posts: You start with the design and work back to the conops. Then you assess it's strengths and weaknesses in carrying out it's mission. And from there you distill the lessons that apply to today. I love it!
ReplyDeleteYou make it look easy. And it makes it even more painful to watch the Navy miss the mark by so much today.
Glad you enjoy it. Is there any other ship class you think would make a useful case study with lessons for us, today?
Delete"And it makes it even more painful to watch the Navy miss the mark by so much today."
DeleteThis is the part I don't fully understand. History is screaming its lessons at us if we'll only listen. Why the Navy seems to have absolutely no interest in history's lessons is beyond me. Our arrogance in thinking that we know better than history is bafflingly disappointing. I would think that this kind of study of naval history would be mandatory and extensive - but it's not.
For example, while I see (and saw at the time) no need for the Zumwalt, if we were determined to build a very large cruiser type ship, I would think we would have studied the Kirov class, among others, and tried to apply the lessons to the Zumwalt. Of course, one of the very likely, logical lessons would have been not to build the Zumwalt and that would have defeated the Navy's main reason for existing, in their minds, which is to put hulls in the water regardless of whether they're useful or not, so as to preserve the Navy's budget slice. *sigh*
They have no incentive to actually produce useful ships, and risk nothing even from utter failures.
DeleteThen again, this isn't just an issue with the Navy but with the military as a whole.
Two thoughts off the top of my head for topics that could produce some lessons from history:
Delete- DASH helicopter drones in the 60's (yes, we had drone helicopters 50 years before Fire Scouts)
- Crew quarters and comfort levels: WWII (Sumner level?) vs. today (Burke or FREMM?) How much space/cost is dedicated to hotel facilities for long deployments? What would a modern ship look like (in terms of size and cost) with the spartan accommodations of WWII? I'd be curious.
Thanks!
"DASH helicopter drones"
DeleteThat's an excellent topic! I'll do it. Be patient, though. I have lots of topics in the works so it may be some time before it gets printed but it will come. Thanks!
"Crew quarters and comfort levels"
I love this as a topic and I've addressed it frequently during ship design and cost discussions. Unfortunately, I can find no specific cost data related to crew comforts so there's not much I can say about it beyond just general thoughts.
As far as what a modern ship would look like with WWII accommodations, just picture a Fletcher with modern weapons!
One of the biggest cost drivers for modern ships is the aviation element. The flight deck adds around a hundred feet of length to the ship plus an additional seventy feet or so for a hangar and then add in all the additional maintenance spaces, berthing, spares storage, fuel storage, and additional weapons magazine space and you can see that we pay a heavy price for aviation.
My wild guess is that crew comfort adds 10% cost over a WWII design.
The year dash first flew the most powerful computer in the world weighed 250 tons and used 3MW of power to do less than my Texas Instruments calculator from high school in the 90s. Dash was a remote controlled airplane.
DeleteThe Russians designated the Kirov-class as heavy nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers. The battlecruiser designation is Western interpretation. But, based on its size and displacement, the Kirov's are more akin to the Alaska-class large cruisers, which were also referred to as battlecruisers.
ReplyDeleteWhile they carried an unusually large load of anti-aircraft missiles, about three times what a Burke destroyer would carry, they only carried 20 antiship missiles. An arsenal ship implies a large loadout of antiship and land attack missiles. And, though powerful by any standard, the Kirov's carried a fraction of the antiship missiles that an arsenal ship would carry. Now, if they carried 60+ Shipwreck missiles, she certainly would have more than one-shot at any enemy.
But, the Russians are currently outfitting many of their corvettes with eight Kaliber/Oniks cruise missiles which approach their targets at supersonic speeds. A handful of those could deliver a similar level of firepower as the Kirov's could. With enough ships and the ability to target the missiles, that would be a threat to our Navy.
"With enough ships and the ability to target the missiles, that would be a threat to our Navy."
DeleteYes and no. Certainly, if we allowed a group of such ships to reach launch range with valid targeting then, yes, they'd be a threat. However, barring gross incompetence (which I can't rule out given what the Navy demonstrates on a daily basis!), a handful of corvettes does not have long range targeting capability and no external/remote targeting platforms ought to be able to get valid target data. Further, while the corvettes were trying to 'find' us, we ought to have long since found and destroyed them. So, no, they present little threat unless we're totally incompetent.
This is the problem with distributed lethality. The individual units are only marginally capable and easily detected and defeated. Only in combination with a vast, regional sensing and command and control network are the distributed units a threat. I don't think we have any hope of operating such a network successfully and I'm absolutely certain the Russians don't, either.
As far as the Kirov and its weapon load of 'only' 20 Shipwrecks, you have to understand the operational concept. The Soviets were perfectly willing to trade a Kirov for a US carrier so the fact that the Kirov would only get one shot was perfectly acceptable as long as it resulted in a kill of a US carrier.
Also, the Soviets were always of the operational philosophy of 'close to home'. Their's was not a wide ranging navy (submarines excepted). They planned to fight relatively close to home and then 'scoot' for cover and reloads so, again, the lack of numbers of missiles was not seen as a major shortcoming.
In addition, given the AAW defenses of the time, 20 Shipwrecks were assessed by the Soviets as capable of inflicting a LOT of damage to a US task force. With today's defenses, we don't view 20 missiles as a major threat (although we've never tested ourselves against advanced supersonic missiles under realistic conditions, so who knows?) but, at the time, they absolutely were a major threat.
You need to assess the ship for the time and conditions it was built for. This is what makes the Russian decisions to continue operating the Kirov class a bit puzzling because now we have to assess it under today's conditions and it doesn't hold up as well.
Finally, the missiles were HUGE! There was simply no way to substantially increase the numbers without doubling the size of the ship. It just wasn't practical.
Great post, Cold War sure was a strange and scary time! I had to go back and look at the dates, yeah, not quite what I remembered. It really looks like was a tic for tat, Kirov was laid down in the 70s, far earlier than I thought, (my recollection was Kirov was more late 80s to 90s) I think it really pushed the USN to reactivate the IOWAs and put some incentive on AEGIS TICO class CGs.
ReplyDeleteLooks like Pyotr Velikiy is still operational with Admiral Nakhimov being modernization taking forever, Wiki states now a 2022 in operation? Will be interesting to see what Russian Navy does, they are good looking ships, great for prestige but heavy on manpower and costs...some of the Russian articles I could find seem to point that Russians wonder if they are worth the expense.
AS for armor, only quote from Wiki was 3 inches around nuke reactor and light splinter protection but wasn't that Soviet Navy philosophy during the Cold War, hit hard with everything you got in the first strike and not worry about what happens afterwards? Soviets never seemed to care too much about crew comfort, endurance,etc...it sure seemed at the time that it was all about hitting fast and hard first time and rest be damned.
"it sure seemed at the time that it was all about hitting fast and hard first time"
DeleteThe Soviet philosophy of the time was that a trade of a Kirov for a US carrier was one they would happily make. The Soviets did not have the same concern for survivability of the ship or crew if they could achieve their mission while dying.
The same applied to the bomber regiments. They knew those regiments would be devastated in an attack against a US carrier group but they were perfectly wiling to accept the loss of an entire regiment of aircraft if they could sink a carrier.
This willingness to accept losses (attrition warfare) is one of the blind spots that Western militaries have today in assessing Russia, China, NKorea, and Iran. We think there's certain things they won't do because we wouldn't do them and that's misguided. For example, we think maneuver warfare will win out but if the enemy is determined to engage in attrition warfare, you have no choice but to do so also. When a human wave attack is coming at you, you're engaged in attrition warfare whether you want to be or not.
Our pursuit of data and networks fails to recognize that, ultimately, it comes down to firepower. Sooner or later you have to actually kill the enemy. Human wave attacks don't care whether you have all the data on the attack. If you haven't got the firepower to stop the attack, you die - well informed, perhaps, but still dead.
Agree, thinking about the Soviets and Kirov, how they would have gladly exchanged a Kirov for a US carrier (remembering that Russians are master chess players) I'm afraid you're right, that we might find ourselves in a attrition war after China uses up all our fancy high tech, they won't be afraid to lose hundreds of fighters to take out an AWACS or some HAWKEYES, which really has me wondering, we worry so much about the carriers, amphibs and the fleet,etc...what happens the day China throws everything and the kitchen sink to shoot down an AWACS OR HAWKEYEs? The headline won't be that USAF shot down 100 Chinese fighters J-whatevers, it will be that CHINA got thru and SHOT DOWN AN AWACS!!! How many of these can USAF or USN LOSE BEFORE WE GO: "NO MAS"?
DeleteSeriously, China shoots one down, ok, we change tactics, they shoot down another one a few days later...can USAF realistically really lose more than 2 or 3 AWACS? I don't think so, tankers we might lose a few more before you have issues but AWACS or HAWKEYES? I don't know, I don't think mentally USAF, USN and USA public could lose many of them before we call it quits...USAF is so used to having the big eye in the sky, working against an enemy willing to sacrifice hundreds of fighters to shoot a few AWACS down might be enough to unnerve us, it's easy to say let's change tactics or just carry on without AWACS but it's kind of like GPS and other fancy tech, USA military has gotten so used to the fancy stuff, I'm not sure we know how to operate without it anymore.....that's something you don't want to improvise (or rediscover!) in the middle of a war.
"an enemy willing to sacrifice hundreds of fighters to shoot a few AWACS"
DeleteSeems like a bargain, after the enemy have lost several hundred fighters we may not need awacs. The skies would be essentially clear.
China has less fighters than the US does.
DeleteThe Chinese army might want to fight attrition style, though they have been moving away from that. for the last 30 years.
The Chinese air force though only has about 600 modern fighters. They aren't going to trade dozens of them to shoot down a couple of AWACs of hawkeyes.
They spend a lot less than the US does on their air force. That's why they are so focussed on building enormous numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles.
It's cheaper and more efficient than building hundreds of modern fighter jets.
Also, their fighters are mostly not that modern. They're mostly basic SU-27 derivatives. A lot of them lack long range missile integration. There's also an understanding within the PLAAF that their training is sub-standard for modern air combat. Their pilots apparently demonstrate poor situational awareness, both because of a lack of realistic training and some technological limitations like a lack of a decent HUD helmet.
Anyway, point is, they are not going to throw in waves of fighters in an attritional style. They don't have a big enough air force for that.
Late to the party but...
DeleteIn regards to attrition, how many of our airframes can we bring to fight vs China's?
We might have 5k aircraft but if we can only base 1k, our numbers advantage is significantly reduced.
If no airfields survive a initial missile/air attack, we're relying on our CVs until they're repaired, which gives us around 600 aircraft.
600 vs 600 modern aircraft and probably a few hundred outdated airframes that still can carry modern ordance is alot fairer fight then I would like...
"gives us around 600 aircraft."
Delete??? We have 9 air wings. Each air wing has around 44 combat aircraft (Hornets) which gives us 396 combat aircraft. The remaining aircraft in the wing add an extra 20 or so per wing which include Growlers, Hawkeyes, and helos. Growlers and Hawkeyes are very important but they're combat enablers not combat aircraft.
Of course, the above numbers assume that every carrier and air wing will be available which is never the case, even in war. So, we'll be lucky to muster 4-6 carriers at a time which gives us 176-264 combat aircraft available at any given moment (or less!).
One thing that is not mentioned is that the SS-N-19 could (and did) carry a nuclear warhead. During the Cold War it was widely accepted that the rules on nukes at sea were different and it was expected that nuclear depth charges would be used from Day 1 and an anti-ship nuclear strike was not seen as the same as one on land. It may well be that the Soviets did not value armor as they expected a nuclear-tipped torpedo or missile in response and believed it would be pointless. My personal view is that there is evidence to suggest that an armored vessel might well physically survive a near miss by a nuke of that time. EMP protection standards were much higher than they are today too and the ability now to generate EMP pulses without using a nuke might also indicate that armor would be valuable for its shielding effect as well as ballistic protection.
ReplyDelete"it was widely accepted that the rules on nukes at sea were different"
DeleteThis is a commonly repeated belief, however, I've seen no definitive documentation that such was the case. From what I can tell, this is a revisionist philosophy that we're applying, today, to events of a past time. I know that both sides carried tactical nuclear weapons but I've been unable to find any evidence of a first use philosophy. If you have any evidence to support this view, I'd love to see it.
It certainly is not! Back in the 80's it was quite clear that the only realistic way to take out an Alfa was the use of a nuclear depth bomb as the torpedoes weren't fast enough. There was also considerable question about the ability to sink Typhoons without multiple heavyweight torpedoes. We were in no doubt that if the time came nuclear depth charges would be used from the off and we were briefed that the Soviets knew this and they 'didn't count' as nuclear escalation. Equally we expected anti-ship nukes to be fired at the carriers and the intel was that these were normally carried, at least in some tubes on each ship by the Soviets.
DeleteI will refer you to John Wingate's trilogy about the Royal Navy - Frigate/Carrier/Submarine. This is almost exactly what we expected at the time and is in no way 'revisionist'.
I repeat, do you have a linkable reference?
DeleteI know nothing about this ?book? and I have no idea what was actually stated or what level of authority it had, if any.
What you say may be true but, over the years, I've been unable to find any supporting documentation. I'm hoping you can provide some.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Frigate-John-Wingate/dp/0297776738/ref=sr_1_3?dchild=1&keywords=John+Wingate&qid=1594421900&sr=8-3
DeleteSuprised you haven't read this trilogy! You are not going to get unclassified documents on this - I suggest you speak to a few of the people who were actually there if you want to verify.
I just checked. The book is FICTION!!!!
DeleteComNavOps, I know you don't like my multi-purpose ships, but I’m going to give you one more to shoot at. I still think the Navy needs a few of them on the high end, and fill out the numbers with cheaper, single-purpose ships on the low end. One idea that has interested me is the 1980s proposal for a battle-carrier, basically a battleship front end with a Kiev back end. Or In Russian terms, a Kirov front end and a Kiev back end. I tend to like the battleship front end, because the 16-inch guns pack a big punch a whole lot cheaper than missiles, but there would still be plenty of room to add missiles. See https://warisboring.com/the-battlecarrier-was-part-battleship-part-aircraft-carrier/ for discussion and diagram. That concept included port-and-starboard ski jump flight decks, and still had room for a large missile battery (looks like 64-80 VLS cells from the drawing). If we go with more the Kiev concept and offset the superstructure to starboard, there should be room for an even larger missile battery, plus the flight deck can extend further forward for better aircraft operation.
ReplyDeleteI would modify the battleship in your proposed fleet structure as follows:
Battleship – The battleship has a heavy 16” gun fit and massive armor for protection from missiles and torpedoes. They would have two primary purposes, 1) sea control including anti-ship air patrol, and 2) land attack including infantry gun support, long distance Tomahawk and short and intermediate range conventional ballistic missile (SRBM/IRBM) strike, and close air support (CAS). Naval and air base destruction would be prime missions.
· 2x 16” triple mount (A and B positions)
· No 6” or 5” in order to make weight and room for air ops and missile tubes
· Replace after 16” mount with air strip including ski-ramp (something Kiev did not have)
· Kiev carried 12 YAK-38 and 16 helos, so shoot for 12 AV-8 or 10 F-35 and 16 helos
· 12x Phalanx CIWS
· 8x SeaRAM
· 64x Mk 41 VLS (ESSM, Tomahawk, LRASM), more if there is room
· 32x SRBM/IRBM
· TRS-3D/4D radar
· SPQ-9B
· EO/IR 360 deg
I would propose to build 8 of them. Replacing steam power plant with modern gas turbines would permit a significant reduction in crew size, maybe 500 ship’s crew and 300 air wing, total 800. I don’t think the 6” and 5” really add much for NGFS when you have the 16” guns and a lot of missiles. And I think the SeaRAM/Phalanx combination is more effective for close range air/missile defense than those guns. So I’d trade the weight and space for missiles and aircraft.
I would operate them in company with an ASW helo carrier (like Japanese Hyuga) as the center of 8 surface action/hunter-killer (SAG/HUK) groups, with appropriate escorts. These would patrol the open ocean, generally out of range of land-based air, so the small AV-8/F-35 complement should be sufficient to provide what CAP they might need. In the sea control mode they would carry primarily fighter/interceptor aircraft, in the land attack mode they would receive air cover from carriers and would carry primarily CAS attack aircraft.
I would generally have one SAG/HUK group somewhere around the GI/UK gap patrolling for Russian submarines, one in the Mid-Pac area doing the same for Russian and Chinese submarines, and one in the Indian Ocean doing pirate patrol and general sea control.
I think these plus my Des Moines cruiser concept, plus doubling the size of the carrier fleet by going with a high/low mix there, would give us a huge power projection capability. Add increased numbers of submarines, escorts, and amphibs by going with the high/low mix in those areas, and building enough UNREP/RAS ships to support them, would take us to about a 600-ship fleet for less than what the Navy is looking to spend to get to 355 (yes, the CPA does pay attention to the cost numbers).
"I know you don't like my multi-purpose ships
Delete1) sea control including anti-ship air patrol
2) land attack"
The problem with this ship just jumps off the page! Sea control, by definition, is a lower end, patrol type mission and you're proposing to devote an incredibly powerful (by your assessment, not mine :) ) and incredibly expensive, high end ship to the task? That's a huge waste of resources! That's my problem with it.
Similarly, you're proposing using it for gun support except that it's a 'crippled' version of a gun support ship with only two gun mounts and an incredibly expensive one, at that!
Do you see what you've done by combining multiple functions? You've produced a design that's not great at either listed task and is FAR too expensive for either task. I (or you!) could design a dedicated monitor-type gun support ship for a tiny fraction of the cost of this hybrid ship and we could design a purpose built sea control ship, again for a tiny fraction of the cost that would carry more aircraft. After all, it's the aircraft that are the key to sea control, not guns or even missiles.
Multi-function is ALWAYS less effective and more expensive. That's my fundamental objection to ANY multi-function ship design. You pretty much just proved it!
Tell me, honestly, that you couldn't design a much cheaper and much more effective ship to do either of your listed tasks?
"sea control"
DeleteThis is one of my pet peeves! It's one of those things that sounds neat so everyone wants to do it but no one can lay out an actual case for it.
Where is this sea that you would want to control?
What would be in this sea that would need controlling?
This is the difference between a theoretical capability and an actual need.
Consider this example. If China attacked Taiwan, you certainly wouldn't be sending a light, sea control force to Taiwan; you'd send your entire Navy and AF! So, where would you send your sea control group? Would China conduct an assault on Taiwan and send some extra ships to float around, say, Malaysia so that we'd need to do sea control? I don't think so!
So, describe a possible, realistic sea control scenario for me.
I think you've kind of got a tunnel focus on a war with China. I think we can beat China like we beat the Soviets, without fighting them, if we do it right.
DeleteSI'll tell you what sea control means to me. it means the bad guys can't tis the oceans. If we have a force that can deny the enemy the use of the seas, we have accomplished a lot, particularly when that enemy is as dependent on seaborne commerce as China is.
In case things get tense with China pull the MidPac SAG/HUK group between Taiwan and the Philippines and the Indian Ocean SAG/HUK group around the Straits of Malacca and Sunda Strait areas. That is a threat to China's economic survival. They would have no choice but to put some kind of task force out there. And there would go all the warships that PLAN needs to secure an invasion of Taiwan..
This thread talks about what a threat the Krivak would have been if it had armor. I'm basically armoring a Krivak and adding a not insignificant air component. Yes, I need development to come through on a couple of missiles to realize full potential, but it's still pretty salty as is.
I think a lot of our differences are differences in strategic concept. I think we can beat China the way we beat Russia. Truman bribed up an alliance to contain them and then Reagan put pressure on their economy and let their internal problems tear them apart. I would certainly oppose a Chinese invasion of Taiwan with everything I had, and I would let both China and Taiwan know that in no uncertain terms. I don't think we send that message today, to either side, and every day that we don't, China gets closer to invading Taiwan.
Yes, it's an expensive ship. But nowhere near as expensive as a Ford, and not really that much more than a Zumwalt. For one thing, it's pretty much based on existing technology, and would be pretty formidable even if the unproved stuff fails. And I think we need some high-end ships, and then flesh out numbers with cheaper single-purpose ships based on proved technology.
China is a land power that is dependent on seaborne commerce--oil in, and exports out. The Soviets were not as dependent on the sea as China is, but our ability to deny them the free use of the seas was a problem for them, one that they never really solved. I don't see why we can't beat China the same way. But we have to DO IT, and right now we aren't.
“Where is this sea that you would want to control?”
DeleteBasically, passages through the first island chain. The choke points to the south are Straits of Malacca and Sunda. A SAG/HUK group could effectively shut them both down to shipping between China and points south and west. A second group in the gap between Taiwan and the Philippines could seriously impair Chinese shipping to the rest of the world.
“What would be in this sea that would need controlling?”
Any shipping bound to/from China. To the extent that we can stop, divert, or delay any such shipping, we create a major economic threat to China. They would have to respond in some way. If they have to escort oil tanker convoys from the Mideast, that pretty much exhausts PLAN’s current capability.
“Consider this example. If China attacked Taiwan, you certainly wouldn't be sending a light, sea control force to Taiwan; you'd send your entire Navy and AF! So, where would you send your sea control group? Would China conduct an assault on Taiwan and send some extra ships to float around, say, Malaysia so that we'd need to do sea control? I don't think so!”
In the event of an attack by China on Taiwan, or any ally, assuming we wanted to oppose it, then the battleships and cruisers would be redirected to their land attack role, in support of Taiwanese or any US troops devoted to the defense of Taiwan. Two CVBGs, each with 2 carriers and 140-160 aircraft, along with 2 battleships pulled in from sea control, plus 4-6 cruisers, plus escorts, should be sufficient to cause PLAN significant difficulty in prosecuting any attack. In much the same way, US battleships and cruisers were employed in sea control missions throughout the Pacific in WWII, and directed to support island-hopping assaults across the Pacific as needed. As the Japanese fleet was decimated by US Navy ships and aircraft, and as the tempo of island-hopping increased, NGFS became their primary mission. But in this case there would still be a major sea control mission. In fact it might take on even greater importance then, as the goal would be not merely to threaten, but to interdict and stop, all Chinese origin/destination shipping. The SAG/HUK groups would still have the ASW helo carrier and escorts for this purpose. Against unarmed merchants, that should be sufficient, and at that point PLAN assets should probably all be directed at Taiwan. The bottom line is that PLAN does not have enough assets both to attack Taiwan (or anywhere else in the first island chain) and defend its essential merchant shipping. They have to make a choice. Without exports, it lacks funds to prosecute a war, and without imports of oil it cannot sustain its economy. And without both, it quickly encounters massive insurrection internally. My expectation is that if we put them under enough pressure, they fold. But we’ve got to call and raise first.
Like China, the Soviets were a land power. Their economy was less dependent on the sea than China’s is. But our sea control still bothered them, to the extent that they built the Kirovs to contest that. That was the original point of this thread. China doesn’t have Kirovs—yet. They are building a force to intimidate their neighbors, not to go against the US. If we step up big-time on the side of those neighbors, China’s problem gets a lot more complicated. Do they 1) build up a force to try to fight us, or 2) give up intimidating their neighbors? Like the Soviets I don’t think they can do 1), and 2) is a happy result.
Well … all I can say is you have your view of a war with China and I have mine. Hopefully, we'll never find out whose is more realistic.
DeleteAnd I think that's where we differ. I plan to be prepared for what I think is your war, because I think that is an essential part of being ready for mine.
Delete@CNO. Actually would like to see China develop their own version (not some copy but what China feels they need) of a modern Kirov 2020/2030 to fight USN, maybe it would wake up the USN!!!
DeleteAnd another place I think we differ is that I see a need for some multiple-mission ships because ships sometimes have to go into places where they may face multiple threats, so they have to be ready for anything. Yes, you can send one of these and one of those, but sometimes you need a mission performed and you don't have one of those handy.
DeleteWhere I differ from the Navy is that the Navy seems to want to build every ship that way, and I think you have a hard time building numbers that way. So I go the high/low route, where you have some top of the line ships that have some ability across the board, and other cheaper single-purpose ships. My active duty time coincided almost exactly with the Zumwalt era, and while I didn't agree with everything he did (the enlisted uniform changes were absolutely nuts) I became sold on the high/low concept. I thought the Knoxes and Perrys were way underpowered and undergunned, and they would have been in trouble alone in a multi-threat environment. But they turned out to be good ASW platforms, and the threat that they posed to Soviet subs was a big factor in winning the Cold War. At the same time on the high end we built the Nimitzes and Spruances and Ticonderogas, and in the 1980s brought the battleships out of mothballs. We never built Zumwalt's sea control STOVL carrier, but Spain did and got a lot of use out of it. Overall, I think it was a sound concept, largely because the low end ships turned out to be better than expected.
I think we agree on a lot, including the need for a specialized ASW frigate (the modern incarnation of the Knoxes and Perrys), the need for two-carrier CVBGs and enough carriers to have 12 of them, the need for big gun cruisers and battleships to provide effective NGFS, among others. I think we also agree that the Navy is totally on the wrong foot with the Fords, the LCSs, and the Zumwalts, and I think we agree that the LHAs/LHDs are not useful for their stated purpose.
Wow it's like you read my history! I was reading your "Independent Cruiser" post some years ago and i have some questions regarding the same issues. Do you still see the need for an independent cruiser (even in the absent of a CONOPS)?
ReplyDeleteHere and i quote the missions that you envision such a cruiser would do in that post: "War time missions would include strike, anti-shipping, ASuW, harbor/base attack, and the like." For the strike and harbor/base attack mission, do you think it is still possible for a cruiser to "shoot and scoot" in the face of hotly contested areas? Would it be more beneficial to deploy submarines instead in term of costs? Assuming that it's a yes to all these questions, how many cruisers you think is necessary to lock down the SCS shipping lanes and perform raids like this? Another issue i find interesting is how much ammo is this cruiser will be deployed with? Are you leaning more towards having an amoured Kirov where it uses all of its offensive weaponry and then retreat to minimize exposure, returning to a friendly port to recharge? Or are you leaning more towards having a battleship with the current offensive weapon where it is designed to stay in the fight with massive ammo storage in preparation for a prolonged operation? If it's the second choice, do you envision escort ships to provide the cruiser with ASW defense? Originally the cruiser is designed as a forward scout to provide information for the main invasion fleet. Do you think that with current day radar technologies, such a role could be revived for the cruiser?
"Peace time missions would include freedom of navigation, high risk intelligence collection, enemy ship monitoring, and “territorial dispute resolution”. Examples would be shadowing the various new Chinese ships, discouraging N. Korean missile shoots in international waters, “disputing” fraudulent Chinese territorial grab attempts, and providing high visibility presence off Iran." Here, i have an issue with some concepts. What do you mean by "discouraging N. Korean missile shoots in international waters"? Assuming that we have this massive cruiser off the coast of North Korea, what are we there to do apart of doing things like a FON? Are we gonna shoot down their test missiles to express a disagreement with their development? Are we gonna collect their missiles if it reached international waters? I would love to hear you expand on this idea. How do you think a cruiser could be used to “'disputing' fraudulent Chinese territorial grab attempts"? Are you proposing physically blocking the island expansion? What else do you think we could do with a cruiser that it is possible to intimidate the Chinese efforts?
Great post, as always!
" Do you still see the need for an independent cruiser"
DeleteYes, because I see two trends:
1. A steadily declining carrier fleet. We're down to 9 right now because that's how many air wings we have.
2. Related to 1., we'll be fighting under enemy controlled skies or, at best, contested skies so we need ships that can operate under those conditions.
"do you think it is still possible for a cruiser to "shoot and scoot" in the face of hotly contested areas?"
DeleteUnderstand that the independent cruiser is NOT intended to sail straight into the teeth of the full Chinese military and single-handedly stand and fight a war by itself. So, no, it can't sail up to a 'hotly contested' area by itself.
The cruiser is intended to relieve some of the pressure from our main naval force which is the carrier group. Thus, the cruiser would operate around the margins in less contested areas (less intense areas is probably a better way to say it). Thus, critical raids and the like would be a prime mission. The Enterprise's early missions in WWII would be a good model for these operations.
"Would it be more beneficial to deploy submarines instead in term of costs?"
DeleteA sub will be busy doing anti-shipping and Tomahawk strikes. Plus, subs have a very limited 'magazine'. A cruiser group would have an impressive magazine of explosives and could sustain attacks whereas a sub would have to make a small strike and leave.
"do you envision escort ships to provide the cruiser with ASW defense?"
DeleteThe independent cruiser operates independent of carrier air cover. It does not operate on its own! It forms the nucleus of a group with additional cruisers and several escort Burkes.
"Peace time missions"
DeleteThese missions would be decidedly aggressive and somewhat risky. For example, discouraging NKorean missile shoots would entail shooting down their missiles as a threat to international waters and safety and then daring NKorea to do something about it. NK has been lobbing missiles into international waters (and Japanese territorial waters!) and that should be emphatically discouraged.
The same reasoning and aggressiveness applies to the other missions.
Article on the Granits getting swapped for smaller missiles to the tune of 3:1 in an Oscar.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/07/10/powerful-russian-submarine-seen-entering-baltic-sea/#41523e4142c5
I note the that the author qualifies his statement:
Delete"... reportedly been upgraded to carry P-800 Oniks missiles, replacing the original P-700 Granit anti-ship missiles."
He uses the word 'reportedly' and offers no source. The author's speculation may well be correct but it is far from definitive!
Accuracy of the report aside, what do you think about a swap of P-700 for more numerous P-800?
The P-700 has a much larger warhead (750 kg) versus the P-800 (300 kg) and a higher top speed. That's giving up a lot of explosive power to gain numbers. Is it worth it?
It could be!! Maybe this is a return to the Soviet ideas of quantity over quality(?) Or an internal admittance that they doubt the accuracy or survivability(??) At 3 to 1, its an improvement at any success rate.
DeleteBut each success (hit) produces a smaller amount of damage. Is it still worth it? Taken to its logical conclusion, thousands of rifle bullets are better than a giant missile. Is that right? Or, is there a sweet spot on the number/power curve and, if so, where/what is it?
DeleteSomewhat tough to call, but a nearly 700lb charge hitting any US ship anywhere but the extreme ends is awful likely to cause at least mission kill. The 1700lb-er will do the same with more certainty, but not necessarily sink it. So what do the other two smaller missles add?? Hit probability. So many missiles, as well as defenses, are truly untested, that admittedly its all speculation. But my gut feeling is that Id rather have the ability to put three missiles in the air than one, reasonably expecting ANY hit to at least take the target ship off the board for at least a few days, if not weeks, or the duration of the conflict.
DeleteId note that the 700lb warhead is twice that of the Exocet, which has caused significant damage in its history. So assuming a relatively high chance of mission kill at minimum with 700lbs is pretty reasonable...
DeleteSomething to consider is that at a 1:3 ratio for Granit to Oniks, you're trading 1x700kg warhead for 3x300kg warheads, so according to the math that's actually more warhead hitting the target. Even if you're rolling with the 200kg HE warhead on the export options, that's still a 440 lbs warhead, which is only 40 lbs short of Harpoon's warhead.
DeleteThis is more like dropping four 500 lbs Mark 82 bombs instead of a single 2000 lbs Mark 84 bomb. In that, I'm in agreement with Jjabatie: it's a way to stretch how long th boats can stay out before returning for reload, and generating larger missile salvoes to get past interception fire.
Thats why the 3:1 seems a perfect upgrade statistically-
DeleteWith air defenses probably performing at 25% or less, and giving one of three missiles launched a 50% chance of internal malfunction, you still get a hit, which as I said, even with a smaller warhead, likely takes the target ship out of the fight. So in the explosive size vs missile count balance, I'd choose the 3 smaller ones. If thats in fact what they did, I think its the wise choice....
"1x700kg warhead for 3x300kg warheads"
DeleteThat's a ridiculous arithmetic comparison that assumes every missile hits. It also totally ignores the fact that smaller warheads do less proportional damage.
If you factor in the risk of missiles missing, aren't many smaller ones a safer choices?
DeleteThere's a balance between smaller and more numerous versus more powerful. An analogy would be 5" guns versus 16" guns. You can fire a lot more 5" rounds at your target and, likely, get more hits but a single 16" shell does far more damage than many 5" ones.
DeleteTaken to the extreme, the 'smaller' logic would dictate lots of Hellfires so that you can get lots of hits but we know they won't sink a ship. You need more powerful missiles to sink a ship. Again, there's a balance and it lies toward the more powerful end of the spectrum but exactly where, I don't know. This is the kind of research the Navy should be doing but seems to have no interest in.
Old guy cranks up the way back machine again: in the early 1970’s - 1971-72- one of the favorite things to do on mid-watch, as we cruised across the middle of nowhere central Pacific, was to break out the pubs on the Soviet Navy. We were impressed. Their ships were covered in weapons of all kinds and we knew we didn’t want to get in a fight with one on our own. It would have been over for us in a hurry, what with our one 5 inch mount and a couple of machine guns. We had tracked Soviet subs and knew they were really noisy and I always thought we could take one on with another destroyer with a P3 or helo up and our ASROC. By the way, how did they get those photos of Soviet ships inside harbors from water level?
ReplyDelete"The missile, however, is well worth duplicating and would fit nicely into the US Navy’s offensive, anti-ship weapon portfolio which currently lacks a big, fast, hard hitting missile."
ReplyDelete@ComNavOps: I'm of the opinion that the USN hasn't been enarmoured of big fast missiles because big fast missiles are kinda overkill for the bulk of warships being constructed by everyone else*, and the physics means that you can pick up a big fast missile easier than a small slow missile, since all things being equal, it's got the larger radar cross section.
*No point building a big carrier killer missile if your enemy doesn't have carriers, afterall.
Looking at the reports of the European and Japanese hypersonic AShM programs, it seems that they're looking for fairly smaller missiles than Granit - the Japanese program wants the missile to fit into the Mark 41 launcher, which I think makes some sense, since there are more corvettes, frigates, destroyers and cruisers in the water than there are carriers.
Plus Russia assumes they are playing a home game. Who cares about reloading away from home.
DeleteA bit of news. They revamped a Udaloy. Now with 8 ASM in canister, 16 in VLS. Keeps the AA and ASW loadout, swaps remaining 100mm for the newer mount.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bH9aMKml9GM New life at age 35. The smoke and tugs as per usual.
"big fast missiles are kinda overkill for the bulk of warships being constructed by everyone else"
DeleteThis is a fallacy. The Chinese are engaged in an all-out program to build large supercarriers. In addition, they are currently building the very large Type 055 cruiser which is nearly the same size as a Zumwalt or a WWII Cleveland class cruiser. They are also building Type 071 amphibious ships which are 25,000 ton, 700 ft long and Type 075 LHAs which are 40,000 tons.
They are most certainly building very large ships that will require very large missiles to kill them.
In addition, warships are not the only target. China has a vast fleet of VERY large merchant ships that will need to be sunk.
A large, heavyweight, supersonic missile is hardly overkill. It should not be the only weapon in the fleet but it is most certainly a necessary one that the USN lacks. There are a LOT of very large targets out there.
@ComNavOps: I was thinking more about the historical context in which Harpoon was developed, and the last five decades of warship shipbuilding globally. Viewed in that context, China's shipbuilding efforts are a relatively recent and limited phenomenon - the biggest warships most other nations have been building are frigates, with the occasional destroyer or assault ship. If we look at the Soviet Navy, which was the main opponent in the USN's eyes, the Kirovs were very much an aberration - much of their surface fleet could well enough be serviced with Harpoon.
DeleteOf course, things have changed, and there is a strong argument that USN has been slow to realise that change.
"A large, heavyweight, supersonic missile is hardly overkill. It should not be the only weapon in the fleet but it is most certainly a necessary one that the USN lacks."
Sure, Granit and Oniks aren't overkill when used against carriers and LHDs, but if you can sucker your enemy into wasting his carrier killers on smaller ships... I really wouldn't want to trade a limited supply of carrier killers on frigates, let alone corvettes. DDGs might be a worthwhile target tho, especially in the context of a China-Japan throwdown, where Japan has only 8 AAW DDGs.
That said, I do find it interesting that the biggest driver of hypersonic missiles in the US has been not the Navy, but the Air Force, with the Arrow and Hacksaw programs. I also find it interesting that USAF cancelled Hacksaw, which was supposedly a hypersonic missile carried by tactical aircraft, in favor of Arrow, which is a bomber-launched missile. Perhaps it's a reflection of how the Air Force's easiest way to surge firepower to an Air Sea Battle against China is going to be the bomber force. Definitely something worth looking at, I suppose.
Understand Navy developing a classified fast/hypersonic AShM, the Sea Dragon, sounds Chinese :) in association with the Air Force, so don't expect it to be that big if launched from aircraft? Wondering if sized to launch from a Mk 41 VLS.
DeleteRemember, the next SM-6 version ups the ante to a 21" second stage. We're talking a missile topping out over 4600lb. A kinetic hit of the weight involved at that mach number, probably delivered from a ballistic angle will make a heck of a mess even without a warhead.
Delete"I was thinking more about the historical context in which Harpoon was developed"
DeleteAnd if the US Navy was going to fight an historical enemy, that would be appropriate. However, we face current enemies who DO have large ships and lots of them.
"Soviet Navy, … much of their surface fleet could well enough be serviced with Harpoon."
Do I need to cite lengths and displacements of the Kuznetzov class, the Moskva class, the Kiev class, the Kirov class, the Slava class, the Kara class, the Rogov class, as well as the many large merchant ships. There is also the 25,000 ton Typhoon class submarine which, if surfaced, would require a very powerful missile to deal with.
"China's shipbuilding efforts are a relatively recent and limited phenomenon - the biggest warships most other nations have been building are frigates, with the occasional destroyer or assault ship."
'Most other nations' are not our enemy. China is.
You made an incorrect and ill-considered statement about ship size. It happens. Acknowledge it and move on.
"A kinetic hit of the weight involved at that mach number, probably delivered from a ballistic angle will make a heck of a mess even without a warhead."
DeletePeople tend to think that the kinetic energy associated with high speed is like a nuclear explosion but it rarely is. We looked at the kinetic energy (KE) for a supercavitating torpedo which everyone assumed would sink a ship from the KE alone and it turned out to be insignificant.
In this case, using your weight number and a velocity of Mach 3,
KE= 1/2 x m x v2
KE= 0.5 x 2086 kg x (1019 m/s x 1019 m/s)
KE= 1,083,010,523 J
The kinetic energy released by a kg of TNT, as a comparison, is 4,184,000 J
Thus the equivalent TNT, in this case, is,
1,083,010,523 J / 4,184,000 J = 259 kg TNT = 570 lb TNT
That's not an insignificant amount but it's not nuclear vaporization, either. It's on the order of a Harpoon missile warhead. However, kinetic energy is not released instantaneously and explosively, like a warhead explosion. It's converted to heat over a long period of time (long, relative to an instantaneous explosion). Thus, it would have far less effect than a warhead.
The Standard missile warhead is fairly small with a ?140? lb blast fragmentation warhead. Again, fragmentation is less damaging than, say, an HE warhead/shell.
This is not to say that a ship can laugh off a SM-6 hit but it's no likely to be an instant sinking, either. I'm particularly dubious about the fragmentation warhead effect. I hope someone has tested it out against a real ship.
My old ship, Rathburne, was used in a SINKEX in 2002. It was hit with a Harpoon and refused to sink. The ship did sink after being torpedoed by a sub.
DeleteWith regard to merchant shipping, it is a surprise that nobody has actually tried to SINKEX a merchant ship to determine how much punishment they can handle. The Falklands experience of Atlantic Conveyor suggests that merchant ships could potentially be quite vulnerable to antiship missiles: Atlantic Conveyor burnt up and sank after being hit with two Exocets - although to be fair, it was carrying fuel and ammunition at the time.
Delete"surprise that nobody has actually tried to SINKEX a merchant ship to determine how much punishment they can handle."
DeleteThere's lots of data on merchant ship damage resistance. Aside from the many hundreds of examples of merchant ships being sunk in WWII from all manner of weapons, there's the extensive data from the Iran-Iraq war, lots of mining damage data, the data presented in Hughes fleet tactics book, etc. There's no shortage of merchant ship damage resistance data.
"There's lots of data on merchant ship damage resistance."
DeletePerhaps that might make a worthwhile topic for discussion, particularly given opinions I've heard that the USN has no interest in protecting american merchant shipping in a peer war, preferring instead to try and commerce raid the opponent faster than they can commerce raid American shipping.
I have no opinions on that either way, but it would be an interesting topic for discussion (and an agregation of all that data you have would be more than educational to the reading public).
Anybody else watching news right now? USS Bonhomme Richard on fire. Looks bad.
ReplyDelete"The missile, however, is well worth duplicating and would fit nicely into the US Navy’s offensive, anti-ship weapon portfolio which currently lacks a big, fast, hard hitting missile. Of course, we currently have no ship that could launch such a missile but if we’d develop the missile, the launcher wouldn’t be all that difficult."
ReplyDeleteActually, the Zumwalt's and the Ohio SSGN's might be able to accomodate such a missile. The Zumwalt's Mk 57 VLS cells can handle a missile in the 6,000 lb range with higher thrust levels at launch compared to the Mk 41 VLS. The Ohio's launch tubes, originally designed to launch a 130,000 lb SLBM, would have less, if any, restrictions relative to size and weight.
A missile common to both types of ships would have to fit in a Mk 57 VLS cell, the new missile might be a little shorter with somewhat less range than its Russian equivalent, but such a missile would "fit nicely into the US Navy’s offensive, anti-ship weapon portfolio."
But, for the Zumwalt with only 80 cells, that mean carrying fewer Tomahawks, Standard Missiles, and the like. If an Ohio launch tube to accept 4-5 of the new missiles compared to the current 7 Tomahawks, tradeoff would have less of an effect. Except, after the Ohio's are retired, that just leaves the Zumwalt's as a launch platform.
And, any new large antiship missile should be compatible with our bomber fleet.
Good thought about the Mk57 and Ohio. The Mk57, however, is still kind of small for such a missile. It's 26 ft deep and has a cell diameter of 28 in. The SS-N-19 Shipwreck would be too big to fit in the Mk57 although a smaller version of the missile might be possible. Of course, a smaller missile negates the goal of a big, fast, heavy, powerful missile.
DeleteThe Ohio might be an option but I'd hate to take away from our already limited SSGN fleet and, as you point out, they won't be around for much longer, anyway.
Compatibility with bombers is of no importance. In a peer war, our very limited bomber fleets ought to be busy with far more important targets than ships.
Not dimensionally, but weight wise a Mk57 can handle Talos, Klub/Kalibre, Brahmos/Oniks, or it would seem Iskander. My understanding is the internal dimesion of Mk57 is 25" to allow for a mk 41 canister in the new slot. I'd like that to apply to the next generation and allow the internal dimension of 28" and also allow for 32' length. Basically something the size of Talos with greater weight. Any more than that and you never gett he numbers needed. Plus you could quad pack a 13.5" diameter missile, SM-2.
DeleteI was trying to make use of what is already in service, albietly, in limited quanities. But, some antiship missiles, like Russia's Kalibr with a 440 lb. warhead, fly out subsonically then sprint to Mach 2+ in its terminal approach to the target. This would make for a smaller missile compared to the larger Shipwreck and something that should fit a Mk 57 cell.
DeleteBut, say we built a Shipwreck like missile, what platform would it be compatible with? A Columbia-based SSGN wouldn't be available until the 2040-2045 timeframe and they would only carry 64, maybe 80 missiles if you can fit 5 in a launch tube. Your vision of a battleship would work by replacing the 32 SRBM/IRBM's with a similar number, maybe slightly more, of the Shipwreck-like missiles.
@Fighting Irish: There have been open source reports of a Navy hypersonic missile being developed for the Ohio and Columbia SSBN platforms, but the impression I'm getting is that it's a replacement SLBM, not a tactical SLCM.
Deletehttps://images.app.goo.gl/rkmH2pVguhHa4Vng8
ReplyDeleteTalking about the Kirov being a one shot wonder makes me wonder what current warships will do once missiles are all used up.
ReplyDeleteIf you remember the post by a former called Takao on defensetalk, after 6 months in a big conflict, the high tech munitions will be gone.
That leaves ships with guns. Maybe all torpedoes will be used up by then too.
What functions will ships have?
Anti sub? Escort? Amphibious assault? No more heavy land attack.
I do wonder because 5 inch guns can't really sink ships (not boats) , though they can possibly damage engines and sensor towers.
( I read Chuck Hills 2011 analysis on how 92 ww2 ships were sunk, with sinkex updates til 2018. Takes a lot!)
Andrew
You would hope that the Navy would rapidly and as a priority massivley increase the production of missiles.
DeleteThey will increase production, of course. The problem is that, unlike WWII 'dumb' shells, production takes far longer, requires exotic materials that may not be readily available (rare earths and other elements), requires advanced electronics, and requires more complex manufacturing techniques. In other words, it's still going to take far longer to make a ship or missile than a WWII ship or shell.
DeleteThere's also the issue that a lot of our manufacturing facilities have moved overseas and are not available for conversion to war production.
I appreciate that. Be interesting to see a wargame focussed the munitions logistics of a full scale war from the perspective of the US.
DeleteFor whatever reason, the US Navy has never been big on anti-ship missiles. When I was on active duty, the Russians had several, the French had Exocet, but we had no ship-to-ship or surface-to-surface missile.
ReplyDeleteSo our ships went without a ship-to-ship or surface-to-surface missile for many years while the Soviets had them. Steaming around pawing the dirt with them in the eastern Med during the Yom Kippur War was not a comfortable feeling
I read that Royal Navy doctrine was that carrier aircraft and Submariens constituted the primary anti shipping platforms. When the Russians developed the Sverdlov class cruiser, the Britiah developed the Blackburn Bucaneer rather than a ship class to match. It was only after the cancellation of the CV-01 project that the RN started hanging Exocets off the front of everything they could manage. Was the USN the same doctrine wise? Aircraft and subs for anti shipping, escorts as primarily defensive units...
Delete"USN the same doctrine wise?"
DeleteI'm not sure we actually had a doctrine, although the Navy was clearly dominated strongly by the aviation and submarine communities, at least until Zumwalt bucked the trend a bit. We eventually developed Harpoon and Tomahawk, which leads me to believe that the doctrine may have been, "Hey, I've got a cushy job lined up after retirement at MDD or LockMart or Northrup Grumman (or whatever their predecessors were called at the time) and I'm not going to go buy some off-the-shelf weapon from somebody else and cut off my gravy train."
"I'm not sure we actually had a doctrine"
DeleteAnd that just summarized the Navy! :)
From an outsider's perspective, it appears that way as well. For dedicated AShM firepower, there's just two Harpoon quads on the back of an Arleigh, and those were cut in later flights.
DeleteIt imo is a holdover of the cold war, where the point of the DDs was to protect the Carrier. The original point of a destroyer was to protect a BB by destroying torpedo boats, hence the name.
In this way, it destroys guided missiles, so I guess that checks out. It does have modded Tomahawks for AShM work I guess.
Great post. Admiral Nachimov is due to undergo sea tests from the end of 2020.P 800,Kalibr and Tsirkon can all be launched from UDKSK-M Cell. Tbere should be at least 80Oniks are also land attack capable. Regarding SAM, about 200 are expected. Torpedos in the Kirov class were 30.,And 110 RBU. Shipwreck and Granit were launched in a salvo, with missiles comunicating with eacj other. A Single Kirov was intended to handle a CBG. 4 kirovs, 4 fleet.
ReplyDeleteKirov reportedly has at least some armor plate. Well ai say plate. It's more like vital spaces protection. Magazines for missiles are armored with 80-100mm of aramid I think, the entire fore magazine of S300F missiles encased in a large block.
ReplyDelete