Israeli Air Defense

As you know, Israel has established its multi-tier Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 2/3 defense systems for defending against incoming rockets and missiles.  Official claims have put the success rate somewhere in the 90+% range. However, based on careful consideration of photos and reading between the lines of various attack news stories (mostly Iron Dome) over the years, ComNavOps places the success rate at something closer to 40%-50%.  Now, with the latest hostilities between Iran and Israel, we are accumulating a new, extensive set of data with seemingly much less public relations spin applied.
 
A Breaking Defense article states,
 

As of this report, the IDF said Iran had managed to launch at least 400 missiles in 17 salvos since Israel’s strike on Iran last week, in addition to 1,000 drones.
 
The drones do not appear to have penetrated Israel’s defenses, but more than 20 of the ballistic missiles have, killing more than two dozen people.[1]

As of Monday morning, Israel reported 24 dead and 500 injured which gives an indication of the degree of penetration of Iranian missiles through the Israeli defenses.
 
So, what does all this tell us about the effectiveness of the Israeli defense system?  The numbers we have suggest a success rate of 95%, on the face of it, however, my understanding is that many missiles are not even engaged due to being assessed as not a threat.  Iranian missiles are not exactly renowned for accuracy.  Thus, if 400 missiles have been fired at Israel, only a fraction of them were actual threats and had to be engaged.  Here, now, is where we have no basis, whatsoever, to further judge effectiveness.  However, for the sake of illustration, if only, say, 30% of the Iranian missiles were actual threats then the defensive success rate would drop to something on the order of 80%.  You can plug in whatever numbers you wish and calculate resulting defensive success rates, if you’re so inclined.
 
The takeaway from this is that the state of the art Israeli defense system, matched against some pretty low capability Iranian missiles, still allowed, perhaps, something on the order of 20% of attacking missiles to get through.  What does this mean to us?  Well, consider what will happen when Aegis faces modern, highly capable Chinese missiles.  What will the defensive success rate of our ships be?  Who can say, but this is just another data point that leads ComNavOps to conclude that Aegis will be nowhere near as effective as we hope.  This, in turn, strongly suggests that we need to mount many more short range and close in weapons on our ships.  Combine this with the analyses we’ve done about engagement windows and it paints a pretty bleak picture – one that Navy leadership is ignoring instead of preparing for.
 
 
 
___________________________________

 
[1] Breaking Defense website, “Left of boom: Israeli strikes concentrate on Iranian missile threat”, Seth J. Frantzman, 18-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/left-of-boom-israeli-strikes-concentrate-on-iranian-missile-threat/

DOT&E Reductions and a New Director

As you know, ComNavOps is not yet an enthusiastic supporter of SecDef Hegseth.  He says the right things but his actions, thus far, have been lacking and only sporadically beneficial.  He hasn’t done anything horribly wrong but he’s also not implemented the kind of wholesale changes needed.  Changes around the periphery are not going to improve the Department of Defense.
 
We now get notice of what is possibly his first blatant mistake:  cutting the Director, Operation Test & Evaluation (DOT&E).  If you’ve followed the blog for any length of time, you know that ComNavOps has been a big fan of DOT&E’s work, believing that they are the only force keeping the Navy (and military, in general) from committing wholesale, blatant fraud when it comes to weapon system testing.  Indeed, the Navy (and military, in general) has been highly critical of DOT&E which tells me that DOT&E is on the right path.
 
Now, SecDef Hegseth is proposing cuts to DOT&E.
 

In a bid to save what he estimated as $300 million per year, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has laid out a plan to reshape the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation by eliminating positions and layoff contractors supporting the team.[1]

Is saving $300M per year – and almost free sum of money by Pentagon standards – really worth possibly impeding the only Pentagon related organization that seems to function well?
 
A memo from Hegseth stated,
 

“A comprehensive internal review has identified redundant, non-essential, non-statutory functions within ODOT&E that do not support operational agility or resource efficiency, affecting our ability to rapidly and effectively deploy the best systems to the warfighter.”[1]

This sounds suspiciously like buzzword bingo, the affliction of the Pentagon.  I hope this is not happening to SecDef Hegseth.
 
In a fairly major change included with the manning cuts announcement, SecDef is also assigning a new acting Director.
 

Hegseth said he has appointed Carroll Quade to perform the duties of the Director of DOT&E. Quade is currently serving as the Navy’s deputy for Test and Evaluation for the Navy.[1]

I have no problem with this as the last few Directors were significant steps back from Dr. J. Michael Gilmore, who set the standard for DOT&E.  Recent Directors have virtually eliminated public oversight and information under the excuse of secrecy.  While truly classified information should not be made public, if you expect public support – in the form of taxes – you must provide some degree of feedback and information to the public.
 
To be fair, I have no knowledge about the inner workings of DOT&E.  Perhaps the group had become bureaucratically bloated and needs trimming.  However, note that the group only has 94 people (82 civilians, 12 military members).  SecDef proposes reducing that staffing to 30 civilians, 15 military personnel, and one senior leader.  Given that the group is responsible for testing every US military weapon, sensor, and system, this seems like a foolhardy reduction.
 
I fear that SecDef Hegseth is in over his head and is making changes almost randomly.  Time will tell.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Hegseth reshaping Pentagon’s weapons testing oversight office, cutting staff positions”, Ashley Roque, 28-May-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/hegseth-reshaping-pentagons-weapons-testing-oversight-office-cutting-staff-positions/

China Defeats US in Trade Deal

News has just come out that Trump has reached a trade deal with China and, at first glance, it appears to be a strategic defeat for the US.
 
Note:  We’re not going to discuss the political or financial aspects of the deal, only the military implications.
 
With regard to the military, the two key elements of the deal are:
 
1. US will continue to receive magnets and rare earths
2. US will continue to accept Chinese students
 
The magnets and rare earths aspect only furthers our vulnerability to this strategically vital resource.  China has never met a treaty or deal that it wasn’t willing to break (UNCLOS tribunal, for example) when it suited them so why would we think that China won’t threaten to cut off our supply the next time some disagreement or crisis arises?  We are continuing our dependency on our enemy.  That’s insane.  It would be far better to quit, cold turkey, and initiate a crash program to produce our own materials.
 
If this deal were just a stopgap while we frantically established our own strategic materials supply, I might be able to accept it but I see no evidence that we’re engaged in any massively accelerated program to do so.  Human nature, being what it is, we’ll just continue to depend on China without really addressing our vulnerability in any useful time frame.
 
We should be waiving every permit and review requirement in order to establish our supply as quickly as possible.  If necessary, we should be subsidizing construction and production;  after all, it’s a strategic necessity!
 
Every Chinese student we educate is both a technological spy and a future scientific asset to be used against us.  We are educating our enemy and giving them a look at cutting edge university research.  That’s insane.
 
From a military perspective, I can’t understand what Trump was thinking.  If I’m China, I’m extremely happy with the deal.

The Military is not a Business

ComNavOps continues to see examples of the military-as-as-business mindset and this is horribly wrong.  The military is not a business.  It’s not subject to business case studies.  Because it’s not a business, there are [many] times when it will be run inefficiently and that must be accepted.  For example, a business study of ship manning would point to the minimum number of sailors necessary to operate the ship.  Combat, however, demands excess crew for damage control, casualties, etc.  Inefficient but necessary.
 
It seems that the higher up the officer, the more likely they are to approach the military as a business case.  I guess this is because so many officers pursue degrees in business related studies.  By the time an officer gets to flag rank, they’re damn near accountants instead of professional warriors!
 
The military is a combat case, not a business case.  Understand it.  Accept it.  Embrace it.
 
Here’s yet another example.  This one is from a retired admiral, VAdm (Ret.) Jeff Trussler, arguing for restructuring the submarine Navy as a service provider.
 
Note:  The phrase ‘as a service’ refers to a business model where a product or service is offered on a subscription basis rather than being owned outright by the customer.
 
He points out, correctly but with zero understanding of the real issue, that the submarine fleet is overworked.
 

The U.S. submarine industrial base that builds and sustains our existing fleet is not keeping pace with operational demands. Combatant Commanders’ requests for submarine capability in theater go unfulfilled.[1]

He then sets out to offer a business solution instead of recognizing the real problem is the Combatant Commander’s incessant and unjustified requests for submarines when, in reality, the submarines need to be undergoing maintenance and intensive combat training not answering useless requests from the Combatant Commanders so that they can increase the public perception of the importance of their little fiefdom.
 
Trussler suggests a ‘service’ model for submarines.
 

The “as-a-service” model—already proven in air and space—could offer a solution by using conventionally powered submarines to improve the readiness, lethality, and availability of our fast-attack SSN fleet. The goal is not to replace nuclear-powered SSNs but to ensure they remain focused on their most critical missions while using diesel-electric submarines for two key roles:
 
Providing platforms for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of new undersea technologies. This would reduce the risk and cost of fielding new capabilities by thoroughly testing their performance and tactical applicability before pulling an SSN offline for months of installation, testing at sea, and removal.
 
Expanding training opportunities. U.S.-trained civilian crews operating conventionally powered submarines could act as adversary forces in exercises, helping undersea, surface, and air forces refine their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) skills. These platforms could also support personnel training and qualification pipelines, ensuring crews receive adequate at-sea experience before deploying on SSNs.[1]

And, of course, he makes the usual bogus claim that this will free up nuclear subs for more important tasks.
 

… by freeing SSNs for high-end missions.[1]

We’ve already debunked this mythical claim (see, “Free Up Ships for More Important Duties”).
 
He then goes on to make a cost comparison claim (without any reference or link and the claim is highly suspect).
 

According to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates, operating a Virginia-class SSN costs approximately $1.6 million per operational day. In contrast, a conventionally powered diesel-electric submarine can operate at a significantly lower daily cost—approximately 40% less than an SSN.[1]

He also proposes operating these non-nuclear subs with civilian crews.
 

By offloading lower-risk missions to commercially operated submarines with Navy-trained civilian crews, uniformed personnel can stay focused on high-end warfighting while maintaining operational proficiency.[1]

 
Discussion
 
There are several questionable aspects to this entire concept of submarines as a service.
 
For starters, no references are provided for any of the claims made in the article which makes verification and understanding of the claims difficult or impossible.  As an example, the claimed operating cost for a Virginia class submarine of $1.6M per day seems unbelievable under any reasonable assumptions.  Nuclear subs have no daily fuel costs so that pretty much leaves the crew salaries as the major operating cost.  Salaries for a crew of 135 would be something on the order of $55,000 per day.  Food would be, what, several hundred dollars a day?  So, where does the rest of the $1.6M per day come from?  My guess would be that someone is piling occasional maintenance and overhaul/refit costs onto the operating cost and perhaps other not-really-operational costs like nuclear fuel/reactor disposal costs, base facility costs, etc.  Without an itemized breakdown, I have no idea but $1.6M seems ridiculous.  This is one of those cases where you can make the number anything you want by manipulating what you choose to include or exclude in the category of operating costs.
 
Another example of unsubstantiated claims is,
 

… improve the readiness, lethality, and availability of our fast-attack SSN fleet.[1]

There is absolutely no documentation or logic to support the idea that operating a few non-nuclear subs will increase fleet readiness, improve lethality, or increase SSN availability.  Logic would suggest there is no relationship, at all, between a few non-nuclear subs and the SSN fleet.
 
Civilian submarine crews are a suspect idea.  How do we handle secrecy and security with civilians?  We don’t even share our submarine technology with our military allies so it’s hard to imagine sharing it with a civilian crew regardless of how many non-disclosure agreements you make them sign.
 
How does the chain of command work with civilians?
 
The entire premise that non-nuclear subs would free up SSNs for more important tasks is completely bogus.  Aside from having previously demonstrated that there are no ‘more important’ tasks sitting around for lack of a sub, the harsh reality is that we have more than enough subs already.  Heck, we’ve got a dozen or more subs sitting idle, pierside, just waiting for their turn at maintenance.  As an example, the Los Angeles class submarine, USS Boise, has been waiting, idle, for over eight years for maintenance.  If we think we need more subs, the solution is to our idled fleet back in service.
 
Another fallacy is that non-nuclear subs can be used to test equipment and develop tactics for nuclear subs.  They’re two different beasts.  They operate differently.  They have different noise levels, different speeds, different endurance, different dive depths, different sizes, different maneuverability, and so on.  Sure, if you want to test a new coffee maker, a non-nuclear sub is fine but if you want to test, say, a new sonar, you need the platform it will actually be installed on to get realistic and applicable results.  We already do far too much simulation testing and we’ve seen the flaws in that when we sent weapons to Ukraine and most failed or had significant flaws.
 
Having said all that, there’s nothing wrong with buying a foreign non-nuclear sub for adversary training but to embark on an entire new type of submarine because Combatant Commanders whine is stupidity on a plate.
 
We need to stop approaching the military as a business case and start viewing it as the often intentionally inefficient warfighting organization it is.
 
 

Reporting for Duty!

 
_______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Submarines “As-a-Service” Will Get More Players on the Field Today”, VAdm (Ret.) Jeff Trussler, 7-Jun-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/06/submarines-as-a-service-will-get-more-players-on-the-field-today/

Strategic Petroleum Reserve

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is a reserve inventory of crude oil intended for use in the event of war or extreme emergencies.  Oil is stored in 62 salt caverns at four sites along the Gulf of Mexico and holds a total of 714 million barrels of crude oil.  In the event of war, the reserve could be used not only for direct military oil needs but also to supply defense industries.  To give an idea of the practical impact of the SPR, as of Jan 2022, the SPR represented around 1450 days of total U.S. petroleum net imports at the usage rates at that time.[1]
 
As an emergency supply, the importance of maintaining the supply at full capacity is self-evident.  Unfortunately, President Biden drew down the storage levels for political gain in violation of the intent of the reserve.  From Wikipedia,
 

On March 31, 2022, President Joe Biden announced that his administration would release 1 million barrels of oil per day from the reserve for the next 180 days …   The 2022 release became the largest ever SPR sale and lowered the SPR to its lowest levels in 40 years.  …  The Biden administration continued to release reserves in 2023, selling off 45% of the SPR by September 2023.[2]

Again from Wikipedia,
 

As of March 7, 2025, the inventory was 395.3 million barrels … [ed. 55% of capacity]).[2]

The SPR is a military safety net in the event of war and should not be manipulated for political purposes.  Even using it to mitigate occasional gasoline shortages, as other Presidents have done in the past, is wrong.
 
The Trump administration is refilling the reserve at the maximum rate the facilities can accept which is around 3 million barrels per month.  At that rate, it will take quite a while to completely refill the reserve – I calculate 120 months.  If correct, this is staggeringly slow and emphasizes why the reserve should never be tapped for anything other than a war or major disaster.
 
Redstate website has an interesting article on the status of the SPR.[3]  Energy Secretary Chris Wright said,
 

We are refilling the Reserve now and we will continue to refill the Reserve the whole time I'm in office.[3]

Discussing Biden’s actions, Wright noted,
 

You know, that was just such an irreponsible action to drain that reserve so quickly for electoral reasons, and in fact it was drained so fast, it did some damage to the facilities. So right now we can only fill two of the four major salt caverns that we have. So, we're doing repair work on the other two, we're slowly filling the other two … [3]

So, not only was the Biden action irresponsible, it apparently caused structural damage of some sort.  Even when the damage is repaired, given the apparent refill rate, we will be years refilling Biden’s drawdowns.
 
____________________________ 
 
 
Note:  For anyone who might be tempted to argue that the President can draw from the SPR for non-emergency reasons because it’s been done before, here is the relevant law governing drawdowns from the SPR.  Nothing in the law allows the President to draw from the SPR just because gas prices have increased a bit before an election.
 
 
42 U.S. Code § 6234 - Strategic Petroleum Reserve

(f)(1)The drawdown and distribution of petroleum products from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is authorized only under section 6241 of this title, and drawdown and distribution of petroleum products for purposes other than those described in section 6241 of this title shall be prohibited.
 
42 U.S. Code § 6241 - Drawdown and sale of petroleum products
 
(1)Drawdown and sale of petroleum products from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve may not be made unless the President has found drawdown and sale are required by a severe energy supply interruption or by obligations of the United States under the international energy program.
 
(2)For purposes of this section, in addition to the circumstances set forth in section 6202(8) of this title, a severe energy supply interruption shall be deemed to exist if the President determines that—
 
(A)an emergency situation exists and there is a significant reduction in supply which is of significant scope and duration;
 
(B)a severe increase in the price of petroleum products has resulted from such emergency situation; and
 
(C)such price increase is likely to cause a major adverse impact on the national economy.
 
 

_____________________________

 
[1]https://www.energy.gov/ceser/spr-quick-facts
 
[2]Wikipedia, “Strategic Petroleum Reserve (United_States)”,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Petroleum_Reserve_(United_States)
 
[3]Redstate website, “Energy Secretary Chris Wright on Strategic Petroleum Reserve: 'We're Filling It Right Now'”, Ward Clark, 28-Apr-2025,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2025/04/28/energy-secretary-chris-wright-on-strategic-petroleum-reserve-were-filling-it-right-now-n2188445

Unmanned Nonsense

China is cranking out high end warships at an impressive rate … at least compared to our anemic shipbuilding effort.  That means they’re cranking out serious, high level firepower in various forms.  We, on the other hand, seem hell bent on ditching our high end firepower in favor of ever less lethal unmanned toys.  The latest idea I came across is Naval News website speculating about cancelling the Constellation program and replacing it with small, unmanned vessels.
 

With a price tag approaching $1.1 billion to $1.2 billion dollars each for the USS Constellation (FFG-62) frigate, Naval News asked RAND and CSIS if the Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV) and the DARPA No Manning Required Ship (NOMARS) can replace the troubled FFG-62 frigate program.
 
… can MUSVs and NOMARS substitute for the FFG-62 frigates in terms of missions, roles, weapons coverage, and functionalities?[1]

As repeatedly documented on this blog, the Constellation is a poor excuse for a WARship but it is still worlds better than any unmanned asset.
 
The key point in the Naval News article is the following.
 

While the U.S. Navy, Congress, and the Department of Defense debate over whether to continue the FFG-62 program with government cost-cutting and downsizing …[1]
 
Mark Cancian, retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel, and Senior Advisor to CSIS’s Defense and Security Department answered this question via email to Naval News in March 2025. Cancian wrote, “Yes, the [FFG-62] Constellation program is a mess, and the Navy is reviewing it, along with other troubled shipbuilding programs.[1]

To be honest, this is the first I’ve heard of the Constellation being directly considered for termination.  I know that all programs are being reassessed by the new administration but this is somewhat ominous given the Constellation program’s stunningly poor performance to date.
 
That aside, let’s examine the Naval News question – with its implied answer of yes – and see whether unmanned assets can replace the Constellation.
 
 
Mission
 
Most missions require manned interaction, interpretation, and decision making.  No unmanned asset can even begin to approach that level of automated action.  The recent example of an unmanned automobile backing over and dragging an injured person after an auto accident thoroughly demonstrates this point.  We are nowhere near Terminator level artificial intelligence.
 
Most missions, peace or war, require human presence and reasoning:  managed response to provocative moves – such as close approaches by another vessel, foreign exercises, port visits, boarding (VBSS), rescue and salvage, ASW, tactical improvisation, etc.
 
As the article points out,
 

[Unmanned assets] work better as remote sensors and shooters connected to the fleet.[1]

 
Weapons
 
Let’s start with the simplest comparison which is VLS cells since those are the main weapon of any warship.  The Constellation will have 32 Mark 41 VLS cells for Tomahawk cruise missiles, ESSM, and Standard SM-6 missiles.  In comparison, the MUSV, which is the patrol boat size ISR vessel as opposed to the LUSV which is the corvette size missile barge, has no weapons provision at all, at the moment, and is too small to fit VLS cells even if we wanted to.
 
In addition, the Constellation will carry 16 rack mounted, small anti-ship missiles, presumably the Naval Strike Missile (NSM).  The MUSV, given its small size, might be able to carry some kind of rack mounted anti-ship missile system such as the NSM.  That would likely be 4-8 missiles, depending on how many racks could fit on the boat.
 
Constellation also has a Mk110 57 mm gun.  The MUSV could not mount any comparable gun.
 
Finally, the Constellation has a RAM anti-air weapon which probably could be mounted on a MUSV.
 
NOMARS, as exemplified by the USX-1 Defiant unmanned vessel, is claimed to have the capacity for 4-6 VLS, however, this is just a wish, not a reality, at the moment.  Further, if defense weapons and sensors are added, such as SeaRAM or CIWS, the space available for larger, more offensive weapons such as VLS, markedly decreases.
 

USX-1 Defiant / NOMARS

Seizure
 
We’ve already seen that China and Iran will not hesitate to seize unmanned assets so there is no reason to believe they wouldn’t seize an MUSV or NOMARS vessel.  The article also notes,
 

In peacetime, international law considers uncrewed vessels as derelict and subject to salvage.[1]

Repair
 
The following statement from the article says it all.
 

In wartime, it would be difficult to repair or retrieve such a vessel with a mechanical breakdown.[1]

Conclusion
 
It is, frankly, disappointing that anyone would even momentarily ask whether small, unmanned vessels can replace a frigate.  The lack of weapons and absence of human judgment as well as obvious maintenance issues unequivocally dictates the conclusion that unmanned vessels cannot replace a manned frigate, however flawed that frigate might be.  Unmanned vessels are, potentially, suited for ISR and acting as a very small weapons barge (mini-arsenal ship) if someone can come up with a secure communications system and a viable CONOPS.
 
What no one in the military seems to understand is that our emphasis on unmanned toys is the equivalent of asking whether an infantryman, armed with a knife, can replace an Abrams tank.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Can Unmanned MUSVs and NOMARS Replace the Troubled FFG-62 Frigate Program?”, Peter Ong, 20-May-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/05/can-unmanned-musvs-and-nomars-replace-the-troubled-ffg-62-frigate-program/