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Thursday, June 19, 2025

Israeli Air Defense

As you know, Israel has established its multi-tier Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 2/3 defense systems for defending against incoming rockets and missiles.  Official claims have put the success rate somewhere in the 90+% range. However, based on careful consideration of photos and reading between the lines of various attack news stories (mostly Iron Dome) over the years, ComNavOps places the success rate at something closer to 40%-50%.  Now, with the latest hostilities between Iran and Israel, we are accumulating a new, extensive set of data with seemingly much less public relations spin applied.
 
A Breaking Defense article states,
 
As of this report, the IDF said Iran had managed to launch at least 400 missiles in 17 salvos since Israel’s strike on Iran last week, in addition to 1,000 drones.
 
The drones do not appear to have penetrated Israel’s defenses, but more than 20 of the ballistic missiles have, killing more than two dozen people.[1]

As of Monday morning, Israel reported 24 dead and 500 injured which gives an indication of the degree of penetration of Iranian missiles through the Israeli defenses.
 
So, what does all this tell us about the effectiveness of the Israeli defense system?  The numbers we have suggest a success rate of 95%, on the face of it, however, my understanding is that many missiles are not even engaged due to being assessed as not a threat.  Iranian missiles are not exactly renowned for accuracy.  Thus, if 400 missiles have been fired at Israel, only a fraction of them were actual threats and had to be engaged.  Here, now, is where we have no basis, whatsoever, to further judge effectiveness.  However, for the sake of illustration, if only, say, 30% of the Iranian missiles were actual threats then the defensive success rate would drop to something on the order of 80%.  You can plug in whatever numbers you wish and calculate resulting defensive success rates, if you’re so inclined.
 
The takeaway from this is that the state of the art Israeli defense system, matched against some pretty low capability Iranian missiles, still allowed, perhaps, something on the order of 20% of attacking missiles to get through.  What does this mean to us?  Well, consider what will happen when Aegis faces modern, highly capable Chinese missiles.  What will the defensive success rate of our ships be?  Who can say, but this is just another data point that leads ComNavOps to conclude that Aegis will be nowhere near as effective as we hope.  This, in turn, strongly suggests that we need to mount many more short range and close in weapons on our ships.  Combine this with the analyses we’ve done about engagement windows and it paints a pretty bleak picture – one that Navy leadership is ignoring instead of preparing for.
 
 
 
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[1] Breaking Defense website, “Left of boom: Israeli strikes concentrate on Iranian missile threat”, Seth J. Frantzman, 18-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/left-of-boom-israeli-strikes-concentrate-on-iranian-missile-threat/

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39 comments:

  1. BA 1959June 19, 2025 at 7:57 AM

    How hard literally is it to mount additional CIWS guns on ships? Run power to them and add an ammunition locker? When ships are retired are those systems scrapped, or available to refurbish and use again? This just doesn't look that hard.

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    1. ComNavOpsJune 19, 2025 at 11:53 AM

      "refurbish and use again"

      That's a great question that I have no answer for. I've never actually heard of the USN reusing units from retired ships but I'd hate to think we scrap old CIWS units. As you say, refurbish and reuse! It's got to be cheaper than new builds. Going further, I'd like to think that a retired ship is stripped of all reusable equipment but, again, I've never heard of that being done. We could refurbish and reuse pumps, motors, valves, weapons, sensors, tanks, anchors and chains, galley equipment and, well, the list is almost endless. How about it? Does anyone know if the Navy strips and reuses equipment from retired ships?

      Delete
    2. G2milJune 19, 2025 at 12:54 PM

      The biggest problem is they can only fire 7 seconds of continuous Brrrrp, then it takes 30-mins to reload. They need to add more to the ammo bin or find a faster way to reload. A snap in magazine system would work, like some belt-fed machine guns.

      Delete
    3. AnonymousJune 19, 2025 at 3:37 PM

      Navy likes Sea RAM more than Phalanx CIWS.

      Delete
    4. Trondude 5952June 19, 2025 at 4:58 PM

      " As you say, refurbish and reuse!"

      A better idea than immediately using them on new ships would be to refurb and store them so we have a rainy day stock . Since they are on the outside of the ship, when combat happens they're probably going to be damaged like crazy. Which leads me to my other point.

      "The biggest problem is they can only fire 7 seconds of continuous Brrrrp, then it takes 30-mins to reload. They need to add more to the ammo bin or find a faster way to reload. A snap in magazine system would work, like some belt-fed machine guns."

      Improving reload speed is always a good, but they still need lots of friends. On land we always use units of infantry to back each other up. It's the same here.

      Delete
    5. Trondude 5952June 19, 2025 at 5:03 PM

      "Navy likes Sea RAM more than Phalanx CIWS."

      Variety is the spice of life, and something that can keep you from getting into to much trouble when things go wrong. the more effective ways to deal with a problem the better. Better to find that one keeps on doing the intercepts rather than finding out the only one have doesn't.

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    6. Bob NageleJune 19, 2025 at 6:44 PM

      Anyone know if the Navy reuses stuff from retired ships?

      Well, they do at least some of this. For example, here's something from the Wikipedia entry for the Perry Class Frigates:

      "The U.S. Coast Guard harvested weapons systems components from decommissioned Navy Perry-class frigates to save money. Harvesting components from four decommissioned frigates resulted in more than $24 million in cost savings, which increases with parts from more decommissioned frigates. Equipment including Mk 75 76 mm/62 caliber gun mounts, gun control panels, barrels, launchers, junction boxes, and other components was returned to service aboard Famous-class cutters to extend their service lives into the 2030s.[20]"

      They didn't mention pumps, anchor chains, sensors, and all that other stuff, but at least it's a start!

      Delete
    7. Martin SJune 20, 2025 at 6:59 AM

      I'm not sure about USN practice, but the Royal Navy / Royal Fleet Auxiliary certainly transfer them - and remove them from ships in refit or reserve and move them to ships going back into service. Of course this may be partly because they didn't buy enough in the first place...

      Delete
    8. ComNavOpsJune 20, 2025 at 7:53 AM

      "need to add more to the ammo bin or find a faster way to reload."

      Well, that's two options but there is a third that would be even more effective and that's to simply add many more mounts to a ship. Not only does that address the number of engagements before reloading, it also provides redundancy in the event of battle damage or even simple mechanical failure.

      Delete
    9. ComNavOpsJune 20, 2025 at 7:54 AM

      "Navy likes Sea RAM more than Phalanx CIWS."

      A wise Navy would like both.

      Delete
    10. ComNavOpsJune 20, 2025 at 8:18 AM

      "Well, they do at least some of this. "

      That's all Coast Guard stuff. Are you aware of any Navy reuse effort?

      Delete
  2. G2milJune 19, 2025 at 8:02 AM

    This may rightly kill Trump's "Golden Dome" boondoggle. We've spent a trillion dollars over the past 40 years trying to build a national defense system and are not even close to a solution.

    Iran launched its older missiles the first few days to use up Israeli defense missiles and most experts think Israel will run out of missiles before Iran, which started using his hypersonic missiles yesterday. One must rely on news from India to get good accounts of attacks due to media self-censorship in the USA/Israel.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DovLMk2kX_w

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    1. ComNavOpsJune 19, 2025 at 11:48 AM

      "This may rightly kill Trump's "Golden Dome"

      It doesn't necessarily need to kill it but it should add a layer of realistic expectations. No system is foolproof. What's needed is to accept that and make adjustments to the system to compensate for the expected lack of 100% perfection. I've done posts about the acceptance of failure on the battlefield and how we need to build failure into our systems.

      That said, I don't know any details about this Golden Dome idea beyond the very basic, broad strokes outline. Whether the details warrant such a system, whether the system has a chance of meeting the objective, whether a space-based system is survivable and viable in the face of current anti-satellite threats, and whether we have the existing technology to file something in a useful time frame is all unknown - at least to me - so I have no definitive opinion to offer.

      Delete
    2. ComNavOpsJune 19, 2025 at 11:57 AM

      "We've spent a trillion dollars over the past 40 years trying to build a national defense system"

      This seems a bit harsh of an assessment. What are you lumping into that category that has cost a trillion dollars? I'm guessing you may be referring to things like the DEW system, NORAD, and so forth? Other than those kinds of efforts, I've never heard of any actual attempt at a national defense system. Enlighten me!

      Delete
  3. AnonymousJune 19, 2025 at 2:30 PM

    "strongly suggests that we need to mount many more short range and close in weapons on our ships. "

    US ships' close-in defenses - Sea RAM and Phalanx CIWS Block 1B (20mm, 4,500 rounds/minute). Previous development of increase firing rate failed, and project cancelled.

    Chinese ships' close-in defense - HQ10 missile, type 730(30mm, 5,800 rounds/minute, phasing out) and type 1130 CIWS (30mm, 11,000 rounds/minute). Chinese studies found type 730 are insufficient to supersonic anti-ship missiles such as Taiwan's SF-3, etc. Chinese Air Force use type 730 on land but its Army doesn't like it. Instead, its Army developed type 625 CIWS mount on 8X8 armored vehicles (25mm, 4,000 round/minute). Its export version was showed in 2024's Zhuhai Air Show. The export version also has 4 FB-10 missiles mount on the 8x8 with 625 CIWS.

    Suggest Army and Marine to develop one like type 625 to use on land as last defense for mid-sized drones and missiles.

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  4. AnonymousJune 19, 2025 at 4:55 PM

    "Well, consider what will happen when Aegis faces modern, highly capable Chinese missiles."
    I don't have data on the capabilities of Chinese missiles, but I do have data on Russian missiles against the Patriot, according to the Kiel Institute:
    "Sample interception rates for commonly used Russian missiles in 2024: 50% for the older Kalibr sub-
    sonic cruise missiles, 22% for modern subsonic cruise missiles (e.g. Kh-69), 4% for modern ballistic mis-
    siles (e.g. Iskander-M), 0.6% for S-300/400 supersonic long-range SAM, and 0.55% for the Kh-22 super-
    sonic anti-ship missile. Data on interception rates of hypersonic missiles is scarce: Ukraine claims a 25%
    interception rate for hypersonic Kinzhal and Zircon missiles, but Ukrainian sources also indicate such
    interceptions require salvo firing all 32 launchers in a US-style Patriot battery to have any chance to
    shoot down a single hypersonic missile. By comparison, German Patriot batteries have 16 launchers,
    and Germany has 72 launchers in total."
    Geovani14

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    1. ComNavOpsJune 20, 2025 at 7:58 AM

      "I do have data on Russian missiles against the Patriot, according to the Kiel Institute:"

      What is the source of this data? I'm highly skeptical that anyone outside the military would have such data.

      Kiel Institute is an economic monitoring organization. It is hard to believe that they would have what is, undoubtedly, classified data. Please provide a link.

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    2. AnonymousJune 20, 2025 at 11:18 AM

      Link: https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/1f9c7f5f-15d2-45c4-8b85-9bb550cd449d-Kiel_Report_no1.pdf

      On page 25 you will find the text I quoted. The text in question begins on page 20, and was written by Alexandr Burilkov, Assistant Director for Research, GLOBSEC GeoTech Center.

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsJune 20, 2025 at 11:44 AM

      "written by Alexandr Burilkov"

      Several problems with this reference:

      1. There is no referenced source for the data and it seems highly unlikely that either Ukraine or Russia is providing this company with actual combat performance data. Thus, this falls to the level of rumor.

      2. If you read carefully, the footnote which you quoted does NOT claim that the interception rates are against Patriot. In fact, it says, "Ukrainian air defence has an overall interception rate of 30% for missiles". That is non-specific and I interpret that to mean interception rates against ALL defenses which, presumably, would include machine guns, short range missiles, Patriots, and whatever else. Missiles against guns, for example, would not be expected to have a very successful interception rate.

      3. It is far from clear that the cited numbers even pertain to engagements. It seems equally valid to interpret the data as the number of missiles that were stopped out of the number fired rather than the number of missiles stopped per engagement attempt.

      In short, the data is pretty much meaningless without an authoritative source and well defined parameters.

      Ask yourself, what is the likelihood that a civilian, non-combat company has access to actual battlefield performance data? Highly unlikely. I strongly suspect that someone has taken the small amount of public information (which is mostly propaganda) and made some sweeping assumptions to concoct these numbers.

      Delete
  5. G2milJune 19, 2025 at 6:25 PM

    The Bofors 40mm was key to World War II ships and is needed today. It has twice the range as the CIWS and exploding projectiles that are needed against drones too. Luckily, BAE/Bofors just developed a new version. They should at least replace the stupid 30mm chain guns on the LPDs and LCSs and be added to other ships.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfRTuBONZTk

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    1. ComNavOpsJune 20, 2025 at 8:14 AM

      From Navy Outlook website,

      "It has a maximum range of 12,500m, effective to about 10,000m. It is only sufficiently accurate in the CIWS role to engage missile targets at around 2.5km. It has a variable rate of fire but the maximum is 300 rounds/min with a barrel life of 5,000 rounds."

      In comparison, the Phalanx CIWS has a max firing range of 5500 m and effective firing range of 1500 m. Thus, the Mk4 has a longer effective range (2500 m) than the CIWS (1500 m) but not hugely more.

      The Mk4 has some serious drawbacks such as a low rate of fire and the requirement to be fully integrated into the ship's combat system and sensors as opposed to the CIWS which is independent - independence is a major advantage in the face of battle damage. Mk 4 also requires deck penetration and a magazine feed/reload system. There is an option to be non-penetrating but then it requires manual reloads as does the CIWS.

      I'm unaware of any realistic test of the Mk4 against a missile threat. Do you have a reference?

      In short, for the moment, the Mk4 is unproven and I don't see any advantage to justify replacing the CIWS. Both have strengths and weaknesses. Personally, I value the independence of the CIWS over the somewhat longer range of the Mk4.

      Delete
    2. G2milJune 20, 2025 at 10:02 AM

      I didn't suggest the Mk4 should replace CIWS, but augment it since it has more range and useful against other targets. Our WWII fleet had both 20mm and 40mm guns on the same ships.

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsJune 20, 2025 at 10:51 AM

      "augment it"

      Fair enough! However, that then leads to the question, if we're going to augment the CIWS/SeaRAM, is the 40 mm the best choice or is the 40 mm too close to the 20 mm to be all that different? Would, say, a 57mm or 76mm be a better augment? The answer to that probably depends on whether you think a weapon larger than 20mm with very high rates of fire can actually be effective in the anti-air role. As I noted, there have been no semi-realistic tests of a 40/57/76 mm gun in the anti-air role. I suspect the lack of testing is because the Navy/manuf already know that those guns wouldn't be effective but who knows? If they wouldn't be effective in the anti-air role, that means the augment would be for the anti-surface role, in which case, the larger the gun, the better, as a general thought.

      What do you think?

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    4. G2milJune 20, 2025 at 3:05 PM

      We saw the new era off Yemen. We need cheaper anti-air methods against swarms of small, cheap drones and missiles. Auto guns can fill that role, not multi-million dollar missiles.

      Delete
    5. ComNavOpsJune 20, 2025 at 4:44 PM

      "We saw the new era off Yemen."

      I'd be very cautious with that conclusion. We saw one, very low end, unlikely form of combat. There is no reasonable scenario where that happens in a China war or any other high end combat. The Yemen scenario is valid only if we stupidly choose to stand in close to a defenseless enemy and allow him to lob missiles and drones at us. That's tactical/operational stupidity on a plate. In a China war, for example, we'll be thousands of miles out from any Chinese coast so that completely eliminates the threat of drones and nearly eliminates the threat of cruise/ballistic missiles. Only as we begin to approach an enemy do missiles come into play and that assumes we stupidly allow the enemy to detect/target us. Even so, if that happens, we will face high end, sophisticated, missile swarms not the occasional drone or low end missile as with Yemen. The open ocean combat scenario requires a different take on ship defense. Guns will play a role as close in, anti-air weapons of last resort but will have no anti-surface use.

      Delete
  6. Bob NageleJune 19, 2025 at 6:33 PM

    "many more short range and close in weapons"

    I assume this means things like the Phalanx and SeaRam.

    I agree completely that this is important and should be done, particularly to deal with lower flying cruise missiles. But are these weapons really likely to be effective against ballistic missiles flying at mach 12 or so, or hypersonic missiles?

    I'd suggest also putting a lot more effort into electronic warfare techniques to mess with the sensors on the missiles, and perhaps also decoys. For example, if the missiles are radar-guided, perhaps we could use something like the Air Force's MALD decoy, perhaps mounted on a drone to better match the speed of the ships (and also potentially allow recovery and reuse). The MALD can make the decoy look like any aircraft in our fleet to typical radars. Perhaps an enhancement could even make the decoy look like an aircraft carrier! Perhaps an infrared decoy would also be possible, although I'm not sure how to fool imaging detectors. Maybe someone smarter than me has a suggestion?

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    1. ComNavOpsJune 20, 2025 at 8:18 AM

      "I assume this means things like the Phalanx and SeaRam."

      I was actually referring to ESSM and SeaRAM/CIWS. Sorry I didn't make that clear.

      "are these weapons really likely to be effective against ballistic missiles flying at mach 12 or so, or hypersonic missiles?"

      Who knows? Until the Navy decides to conduct realistic testing, we won't know.

      "more effort into electronic warfare techniques "

      Of course! We already have all kinds of multi-spectral obscurants and decoys. How effective they are is unknown. I've not heard of any realistic testing by the Navy.

      Delete
  7. Scott B.June 19, 2025 at 7:05 PM

    You asked if the Navy recovers usable materials from inactive ships. As a "Recycling" Superintendent at PSNS & IMF I can speak from experience that literally everything is removed, sorted and checked. There are extensive lists by ship class of items to remove and sent to be refurbished or used to fill canabalization requests. This includes circuit cards to pumps, motors and valves. It's very manpower intensive but some of this material is in fact almost priceless due to OEM unavailability.

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    1. ComNavOpsJune 20, 2025 at 8:20 AM

      "sent to be refurbished"

      Outstanding! Do you know if any of it goes to fitting out new construction or is it all used on existing ships as part of the supply chain?

      "almost priceless due to OEM unavailability."

      Great point!

      Delete
    2. AnonymousJune 20, 2025 at 12:18 PM

      It's used on existing ships. It could be sent to a builder as Government Furnished Material (GFM) but most builders don't like the refurbished material since they quote different "specs" and they get no markup for the cost. They'd say it costs more to fit in the GFM.
      The biggest issue is the refurbished. In some cases this is originally installed equipment on a 20 to 30 year old ship.

      Delete
  8. Fighting IrishJune 19, 2025 at 10:06 PM

    Its not just the Israeli air defenses to consider here as the US Navy has been actively in countering Iran's missile barrages. And, it would interesting to know how well they have performed.

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    1. ComNavOpsJune 20, 2025 at 8:21 AM

      "US Navy has been actively in countering Iran's missile barrages."

      I've not seen a single word of this. Do you have a reference?

      Delete
    2. JjabatieJune 20, 2025 at 5:34 PM

      Ive read the same in past days, but unsure where. There is a brief third-hand mention of a DDG intercepting Iranian missile(s?) in this USNI article...
      https://news.usni.org/2025/06/20/5-u-s-ballistic-missile-defense-destroyers-now-in-the-mediterranean-sea

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsJune 20, 2025 at 6:26 PM

      "brief third-hand mention of a DDG"

      Here is the relevant quote from the article you cite:

      "Israeli press reported that within the last week, an unspecified U.S. destroyer intercepted a ballistic missile launched from Iran"

      Even if true, a single intercept hardly constitutes an active part in the defense of Israel. Indeed, the same article strongly implies that US destroyers have NOT been actively involved as demonstrated by this quote:

      "The repositioning of the destroyers comes as Iranian forces continue to fire ballistic missiles at Israeli targets"

      This indicates that the destroyers have just now (article date 20-Jun) been repositioned and have not, before this time, been involved.

      Delete
  9. AnonymousJune 20, 2025 at 3:48 PM

    This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.

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    1. NickJune 21, 2025 at 3:24 AM

      Golden Dome - To defend US against ICBMs leakers (as currently occurring in Israel against Iranian IRBMs) from the new long range Northrop Grumman NGI and due to the high Mach speed of the attacking ballistic missiles you need your defending short range ABMs placed very close to the target e.g. with Patriot did see claim of 100 mile range against 'conventional' target but against the relatively slow SRBMs maybe range drops to only 15 miles?, against an ICBM whose RV could reach Mach 24 Sprint was developed in the '70's with phenomenal performance and max range of 25 miles to achieve an interception in the few seconds before the thermonuclear warhead RV reached its target, Sprint could accelerate at 100g to Mach 10 in 5 seconds, cancelled due to the cost as it quickly became unaffordable for the numbers of batteries required.
      Will be interesting to see if new tech can bring cost down from hundreds of $billions but think unlikely.

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sprint_(missile)

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    2. AnonymousJune 21, 2025 at 4:50 AM

      Cost is not major problem. Biggest problem is technical challenge. Trump acted without consult military tech experts. You can defend a small area (i.e. a ship or a base) to certain degree (still not guarantee 100%, especially face saturated attack), but not to cover a very large area.

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsJune 21, 2025 at 5:38 AM

      "You can defend a small area ... but not to cover a very large area."

      Have you actually read the concept for Golden Dome? I'm pretty sure you haven't. It's not a land based, missile-based system as I'm pretty sure you're thinking. It's a space based constellation of platforms that is ideally suited to cover immense areas, if not the entire globe!

      "Cost is not major problem."

      Cost is a huge problem. It would entail mega-billions.

      "Trump acted without consult military tech experts."

      Have you read any statement indicating that's true? I'm pretty sure you haven't. He's never said he didn't consult anyone and the concept seems way beyond anything he would come up with on his own.

      "Biggest problem is technical challenge."

      This is the only true statement you made.

      Go do some research before you comment again.

      Delete
    4. ComNavOpsJune 21, 2025 at 5:41 AM

      Golden Dome is a brilliant concept that is likely beyond our capabilities technologically. Cost may be prohibitive although if we would spend wisely throughout the military, we'd likely be able to afford it.

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