Surface Drone Swarm

Russia just lost another landing ship to a Ukrainian drone swarm.[1]  The mind simply boggles at the degree of ineptitude being exhibited by the Russians.  Let’s use this incident to examine the use of surface drone swarms.
 
Let’s start by looking at the drones Ukraine is using and see how deadly they really are.
 
 
Magura V5
 
The commonly reported Ukrainian drone craft is the Magura V5.  There have been different versions produced so the specs vary, depending on the source and the referenced variant.  The drone is a relatively small craft (5.5 m long) with a low silhouette which would make them difficult to spot visually, however, at speed they leave a very visible wake.  Their shape is not notably radar stealthy although they are smooth and relatively free of protrusions so they may be somewhat radar stealthy.  Propulsion is said to be an electric motor or hybrid (gas-electric?) of some sort.  Presumably, the craft are readily visible in the infrared and should be easily detectable at the horizon, some 12 miles distant or so, depending on the height of the EO/IR sensor.  Range is variously reported to be 250-500 miles.  Control is via optical sensor and satellite (Starlink?) communication.  Drone weight is 1000 kg (2200 lb) with a payload variously reported as 300-400 lbs explosive.  Cruising speed is 20 mph with a terminal burst speed about twice that.
 

Magura V5 Drone

Magura V5 Drone

Acoustically, an electric motor running at high speed and a craft sailing at high speed should generate significant noise and be readily detectable at 10-25 miles, using passive sonar.  I would imagine the sound would be similar to that of a torpedo at speed.
 
I would assume that, like all weapons with a range, the reported range is much greater than the effective operational range.  Thus, the operational range is likely 50-100 miles but that’s just informed speculation on my part.  It does, however, greatly impact the overall effectiveness of the drone since it impacts the launch distance from the target.
 
This is a surface running torpedo, for all intents and purposes.  Like a torpedo, it can be deadly if not treated appropriately.  Unlike a torpedo which can be decoyed but cannot be destroyed, these drones are easily destroyed with appropriate weapons.
 
Now, let’s look at the Russian landing ship.
 
 
Ropuch Amphibious Ship
 
The Ropucha class landing ship is a medium size (369 ft long, 4080 tons displacement), lightly armed LST with either 2x 57mm dual guns (Ropucha I) or 1x 76mm gun and 2x AK-630 30mm CIWS (Ropucha II).  Either way, that’s not a lot of armament!
 
The ship has multiple fire control, search, and navigation radars.  I assume it has EO/IR sensors but that’s speculation.
 
Crew size is around 90.
 
 
Now, let’s consider some of the relevant operational factors.
 
 
Operational Factors
 
Launch Site.  The drone can be launched from shore or from a host vessel.  Either way, the drones must be close enough to the target to be within the range of the drone.  It’s not as if the drone can be safely launched from a thousand miles away.  One would think that a host vessel, meaning, potentially, any unidentified vessel within 500 miles, would be easily spotted and sunk before it could launch the drones.
 
Alternatively, if launched from shore, the launch operation would require trucks and handling equipment given the overall drone weight of a ton or more.  This is not something that one tucks into a backpack.  It’s a fairly major operation to transport, handle, and launch the craft.  One would think that surveillance of the likely launch areas and access roads would be effective in spotting and preventing launches.
 
Detection.  As noted, there are multiple modes of detection including visual, infrared, acoustic, and radar.  A semi-alert defender should have no trouble detecting the drones at a distance.  The use of swarms of multiple drones further increases the chance of detection.
 
Satellites.  Satellites (reportedly Starlink) are, apparently, being used to control the drones.  I assume Russia is attempting to disrupt the satellite communications although given the demonstrated degree of incompetence, this may not be true.  Satellite vulnerabilities include physical destruction in space, local signal disruption, cyber attacks at various points of the satellite system (ground control, master communications, local receivers, etc.).  If Starlink involvement is confirmed, Russia would be within their rights to conduct physical sabotage of Starlink facilities even in the US.
 
If Russia is attempting any of these actions, they appear to be having little or no success.
 
Targeting.  Targeting information is likely being gathered via satellites and UAVs, probably from Ukrainian-allied countries like the US.  Again, if confirmed, Russia could conduct attacks on the targeting assets with minimal risk of escalation.  The last several years have demonstrated that the US is highly unlikely to respond beyond speeches and warnings that are never acted on.
 
Lethality.  The drones reportedly carry around three hundred pounds of explosive which is a reasonably substantial amount of explosive.  However, it should be noted that the explosive is a non-penetrating effect as compared to a shell, bomb, or missile.  This lessons the extent of damage relative to the nominal weight of explosive since a significant amount of the explosive force is directed away from the ship.  A similar phenomenon occurred in the attack on the USS Cole.
 
Proximity.  The Ukrainian drones benefit greatly from the unique geography of this situation.  The operating area is a fairly small, constrained area as opposed to the open ocean that the US Navy would operate in during a war with China.  Of course, if the Navy opted to do something stupid, like operate near land with inadequately armed and sensored ships, as the Russians are doing, then the result could well be similar.
 
Damage Control.  The Russians appear to have had very little success in applying damage control to ships that have been struck.  Obviously, hard data on this is difficult to come by.
 
 
 
Analysis
 
To sum up the preceding, the drones are potentially damaging with a few hundred pounds of explosive but they are also small, highly vulnerable to destruction, and easily detected.  So, why are they having some success? 
 
Note:  We hear about the successes but we do not hear about the failures, if any, and I assume there are many.  For example, it could be that only one in a hundred drones succeed.  While that wouldn’t change the overall end result, it would certainly change the assessment of the efficiency of the drones.
 
There is simply no getting around the staggering degree of Russian ineptitude.  They are sending ill-equipped ships, unescorted, into known dangerous waters with, apparently, no aviation surveillance support such as helos or UAVs.  A handful of small, simple escorts with suitable sensors and weapons would end the drone threat.  Even submarines ought to be able to provide detection of drones, interdiction of host ships, if any (most hints suggest shore launches), and covert surveillance of possible shore launch sites..  Russia supposedly has seven Kilo class subs in the Black Sea and their sonars should be able to detect drones and provide early warning.
 
The operational stupidity is compounded by the lack of long range interdiction of the launch points and ships/trucks that are used to transport and launch the drones.  Russia should have air, land, and sea patrols dedicated to finding and destroying the transport/launch vehicles or ships.
 
If we consider the kill chain concept, there are several links in the chain where the Russians could take effective action to disrupt the chain (production facilities, storage facilities, transport, launch event, local detection, and local destruction).  Bafflingly, the Russians seem to be unwilling or unable to break the chain at any of those points.
 
In the hints we get from videos, the Russians appear unable to kill many (any?) drones with the weapons they do have.  This speaks volumes about the overhyped claims of Russian weapon performance (as we’ve seen throughout history and covering ALL Russian weapon systems) and/or the woeful state of Russian training.
 
Compounding all this is the Russian’s unwillingness to seek out and destroy targeting platforms.  The Russians could, simply, declare suitably large exclusion zones and then destroy any foreign (US) aircraft in the area.  Similar actions could be taken against satellite surveillance if, indeed, that is a source of targeting information.
 
As with all other aspects of this war, Russia is conducting the drone defense operations in the most inept manner imaginable. 
 
The Ukraine success is due almost exclusively to Russian ineptitude rather than any inherent capabilities of the drones which, as we’ve discussed, are not particularly formidable on paper.
 
 
Conclusion
 
So many naval observers want to jump on the drone bandwagon because of Ukraine’s handful of successful attacks but is this enthusiasm justified? 
 
An objective analysis suggests that drones are not a threat to an alert, suitably equipped defender who counters the threat with intelligent operations, doctrine and tactics.  The ineptitude of the Russians cannot be ignored and, therefore, trying to derive universal lessons from this is an exercise in futility if not downright misleading.
 
Like any threat, if one fails to treat the threat with the respect it deserves, it can be lethal.  The US needs to be aware of drone threats and train and equip to counter them but they are not, inherently, a serious threat.
 
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Russia Loses Large Landing Ship to Ukrainian Drone Swarm”, streiff, 14-Feb-2024,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/02/14/russia-loses-large-landing-ship-to-ukrainian-drone-swarm-n2170101