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Thursday, February 15, 2024

Quantity Revisited

We all know the old saying,  “Quantity has a quality all its own.”
 
Unfortunately, our military has forgotten (or chosen to ignore) that pearl of wisdom.  We’ve made the conscious decision to opt for exquisite quality and have ceded quantity to the enemy.  Worse, as it’s turned out, the enemy’s quality is, arguably, as good or better than ours so that they now possess both quantity and quality advantages over us.
 
It is past time to revisit quantity.
 
Consider just a few examples of recent quantity limitations which, contrary to our hopes and beliefs, were not offset by quality:
 
  • Ukraine weapons/munitions supply has been woefully insufficient to meet military needs and the quality of the weapons we’ve provided has not compensated for the limited quantities.
  • The 2011 Libyan intervention saw weapons/munitions depletion occur in a matter of weeks with no compensating success due to quality.
  • Air wings have been steadily downsized with no compensating improvement in quality.
  • The LCAC is being replaced in smaller numbers despite the landing craft being virtually identical to the original.  Smaller quantity and identical quality.
  • We currently have more VLS cells than missiles in our inventory and our strike and anti-ship missiles are fading rapidly in quality due to obsolescence.  Our quantities are limited and our quality is stagnant.
 
 
Quality also comes with a penalty in terms of cost.  Quality is expensive.  It’s a simple fact.  As we speak, the Navy is using multi-million dollar missiles to shoot down thousand dollar Houthi drones.  What shipboard missile in the Navy inventory costs less than $1M? 
 
The SPY-6 radar on our latest Burkes cost $180M according to the 2024 Navy budget documentation.  The TRS-3D radar costs around $10M.  Quality is expensive.
 
Additionally, quality equals complexity and complexity equals unreliability.  Our exquisite aircraft struggle to attain 50% full mission readiness rates.  Aegis is permanently degraded, fleet wide.  And so on.  Dumb artillery shells, on the other hand, have 100% readiness.  Sure, there may be an occasional dud but when you’re firing thousands of shells, who cares?  We have hundreds of Aegis technicians laboring daily to keep it running.  How many artillery shell maintenance techs are there?  That’s right … none.
 
 
Conclusion
 
We’ve consciously ceded quantity to the enemy and have failed to achieve any overarching quality advantage.  That leaves us at an overall disadvantage compared to China.  We need to rethink the role that quantity plays on the battlefield.
 
Quality has to be pretty substantial to compensate for quantity and our quality is not substantially superior to our enemy’s.
 
If we can’t achieve a quality overmatch, that brings us full circle back to quantity.  Quantity is easily achievable, affordable, easily mass produced during war, reliable, and brutally effective.  What’s not to like?
 
Germany and Japan entered WWII with quality advantages and were beaten by overwhelming quantity, especially as their quality advantages faded as the war progressed.  There’s a lesson there for us.
 
We need reasonable quality in overwhelming quantities.

52 comments:

  1. Ask NATO countries how all that western equipment they sent to Ukraine is doing. A lot of it has taken a real beating. Operators were not given the time to properly train on it to be sure, but overall western equipment is to technical and hard to maintain that they can't use it the way it should be. The weather and terrain seems to wreak havoc on western equipment also, while the good old Russian made equipment soldiers on. It's hard for a eastern army used to minimum maintenance practices to keep all the high tech western equipment properly running. They simply don't have the technical support western nations do. (tooth to tail).
    We need a cheap warship design using cheaper electronics like TRS-3. Let the Aegis equipped ships be the squadron leader type ships. (the old DLG concept, Coontz Class).

    ReplyDelete
  2. Look at the example of 155mm artillery shells.

    Ukraine is firing far, far less of these than an American force would be. Yet we still can't keep up with production.

    We have very limited production facilities for these. It seems that we manufacture basically making enough to cover what we use at the firing ranges each year.

    We should ramp up our production massively, with multiple production facilities, until the Ukrainians have all the shells they can use, our storage is full, and our allies have all they need.

    When that is done, we should then pack the machinery and tooling for making these in grease, ready to be put back in service the next time we have a crisis.

    Is this really that hard?

    Lutefisk

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. It's not very hard, but it has a serious drawback in the current political system. The money spent on it will mostly go on buildings, machine tools, materials, wages and storage. Not very much of it will be available for defence consultants, management fads and political contributions.

      Those are the way to impress politicians and get them to vote for budgets. They like having high-powered consultants treat them with deference, being told that the management techniques and the technology are world-beating, and being able to get re-elected. They have largely lost sight of national interests outside of their own advantage, being so heavily involved with minute-by-minute political battles on TV and social media.

      Buying ten million artillery shells doesn't impress many people. Videos with renderings of the next decade's ships and aircraft get more traction, even though they are far less useful.

      Delete
    2. "Ukraine is firing far, far less of these than an American force would be"

      Even US cannot fire numbers which you think. Even after increase production, whole US 155mm shell productions are far less than Russia. Just surf web to find yourself.

      Delete
  3. Its worrisome how much we've forgotten about the quantity/quality relationship. I recently saw that TLAM procurement, for example, was 55 last year!!! We've expended more than that in Yemen over the last week. This year, planned new procurement should be up to a couple hundred, right?? But...its: NONE!!! Instead, a number of existing missiles well be rebuilt into the antiship configuration. While obviously the Tomahawk is quite old and needs replaced, its still our go-to weapon, and there should be massive warehouses stuffed full of them. I understand theyre expensive, but shouldnt yearly production be somthing closer to what we'd actually expect to expend in a year?? Isnt it just common sense to have more munitions than we think we'd ever need?? The pivot west and the supposed new urgency is a sham at best. All the Admiralty speeches and platitudes are just that. Theres no real numbers that show any renewed urgency. I think decades of not having a peer enemy, and institutional amnesia of what a real war requires, have let the hubris of tech overmatch and 3-day conflicts permeate the DOD, and we're likely going to pay dearly for it.

    ReplyDelete
  4. An old remark in "Augestines Laws" noted that the more expensive a weapons system is, the less it is tested. A pistol is accepted only after thousands of rounds fired. A missile after one or two tests.

    ReplyDelete
  5. Well said. I fully agree.

    I wonder if our military strategists have become a little too obsessed with "force-multipliers?" Sometimes that idea makes sense. But when you take it too far, it just becomes ridiculous. You still need some basic quantity to multiply.

    Then again, it might not be their fault. Much of this was set in motion back in the 80s, when the US economy shifted away from manufacturing and into finance and IT. Great way to make money... not so great a way to make military hardware.

    I wonder if we can find a solution by working with our allies? South Korea and Japan still have great shipbuilding capacity. We should find a way where we can pay them to build stuff for us, or at least partner with us, instead of trying to go it alone 100%.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. RE: Forced multipliers

      Note that, mathematically, ANY multiplier times 0 is still 0!

      Delete
  6. How can then, China has both quality and quantity? They built type 055 and their missiles YJ-18, YJ-21, YJ-12, ... at very high speed.

    It is productivity issue.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "It is productivity issue."

      No. It's a willpower and laziness issue. We adopted a lazy mindset and weren't willing to do the hard work of military dominance. We wanted a no-effort, quick superiority (the Holy Grail of the 3rd Offset) and failed miserably.

      Delete
  7. With respect to AEGIS, it is hell when it's well but too often sick. It's also probably the most expensive alternative. What I would like to see is some mix of radars, from cheapest to most expensive, Having multiple types would presumably also make jamming harder. Something like this night make sense:

    Cruisers and AAW destroyers - AEGIS/AMDR
    Carriers, battleships (yes, I'd build some), and frigates - TRS-3D/4D
    GP escorts (what I would do with FREMM design) - combination of SMART-L/S1850 and SAMSON/EMPAR/APAR

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Before Burke 3, Ageis use PESA radar. Burke 3's SPY-6 is AESA radar, which is a big improvement. However, some boasted functions are still lacking - no dual band, etc.

      Comparing with advanced Chinese radar, it still falls behind. China has installed many DAR while SPY-6 today is still AESA, only has DBR (convert received signal to digital data for analysis). China's DAR uses DDS to emit signal, no phase shifters as in SPY-6. Phase shifters not only reduce signal strength but also generate lots of heat. Therefore, SPY-6 requires lots of electricity and cooling.

      In aircraft, it is even more troublesome as you would have heard F-35's electricity and cooling issue but J-20 has no this issue.

      Delete
    2. I have no idea what radar you're talking about and any Chinese claims are worthless. China is renowned for its dishonesty, exaggerations, and lack of integrity so I give no credence to any claims.

      If you have a reference for this, please post it. Otherwise, I'm inclined to delete the comment.

      Delete
    3. The Type 055 destroyer uses a Type 346 S-band radar with a claimed 400 km range (as with all radars, range claims are, undoubtedly, for large, non-stealthy objects under ideal conditions). There is no dual band radar system although a smaller X-band has reportedly been tested.

      Delete
    4. 055 destroyer's radar is 346B, S and X dual bands:

      https://navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2020/october/9095-chinese-type-055-destroyer-has-anti-stealth-and-anti-satellite-capabilities.html

      https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/more-details-emerge-about-detection-capabilities-of-type-055-destroyers-radar

      Delete
    5. The 055 has two separate radars. One is a four array S-band and the second is a small four array X-band. Both have average capabilities similar to the Burke.

      Delete
    6. Place two radars together (dual band) has to overcome EM and signal interferences.

      The only US Navy dual band radar is the on installed on USS Ford, not even for 2nd and 3rd Ford Class carriers. There should have some issues not fully resolved otherwise, they should be installed on other Ford class carriers.

      Delete
    7. China's 346 radars are ones installed on 052C destroyers, 346A installed on 052D destroyers, and 346B on 055 destroyers.

      Delete
    8. You seem to be suggesting that dual radar bands are some new, miraculous Chinese development and this is not the case. The US Navy has used a dual band approach for decades, almost as long as there have been radars!

      Delete
    9. All Burkes use a combination of two radars, an SPY-x S-band and a SPQ-9B X-band which gives them dual band radar, depending on your terminology.

      I believe all the amphibs use a similar dual band arrangement with the SPS-48E and SPQ-9B.

      Delete
  8. "We need reasonable quality in overwhelming quantities."

    Again, I like the Zumwalt high/low mix concept. Build some top-end multipupose ships like the USN likes, but build out the numbers with simpler and cheaper single-purpose ships. A couple of examples:

    - Instead of Burkes and mini-Burkes, keep about 40 Burkes and build about 80 ASW specialist frigates.
    - Instead of $15B Fords, build $8-9B nuclear Nimitzes and $5-6B conventional Kitty Hawk/Midway combinations.
    - Instead of $4B LHAs/LHDs and $2B+ LPD-17s, build an amphibious fleet of smaller, more traditionsl amphibs (LPH, LPD, LSD, LST, LPA/LKA).

    ReplyDelete
  9. The USA has historically won wars because its manufacturing sector produced far more weapons and logistics than the enemy. That was certainly the case in the Civil War/War Between the States and in World Wars I and II.

    Today, it looks very much like the USA industrial sector would lack the ability to do that again. Rebuilding that capability would thus seem to be a primary objective from a defense and national security standpoint. So how to do that? Several steps come to mind:

    1) Get rid of tax and regualtory problems that currently drive industry offshore. We need a more consisten and reliable regulatory structure, and a tax structure more favorable to industry. A value-added or other consumption tax would have some significant protection impact, since imports must pay the tax upon landing.
    2) Improve education, particularly vocational education, to provide a capable work force. I would favor tracking students (gifted/advanced, college prep, vocational) starting in junior high, and adding work/study apprenticeship programs for voacational education.
    3) Improve infrastructure, After WWII the USA was way ahead of the rest of the world in infrastructure. Because of insufficient investment over the last 80 years, the USA is now behind in many areas.

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  10. Fully agree with all of the above.

    Nevertheless what type of quantity are we talking about? Do we talk about having more complex systems in our inventory or, replacing complex system by much more simpler systems, which implies another way to wage wars?

    For the former, a country needs to explain its citizen that the FINANCIAL burden of defense will have to increase. Not great , but possible.

    For the latter, I am afraid it is not as simple, since it implies a total change of attitude of society towards war, the fact of serving its country and dying.

    It is striking to see how, in less than a century, the mindset towards war has changed in the West. I can not even picture how - for instance - Europeans societies have been able to put SO MUCH of everything in the first world war. Quantity of materials but above all quantity of men that died in the name of their countries. [As a reminder Germany loses 2 millions soldiers, France 1,4 Millions.. so more than 4 or 5 times the US losses in WW2]. This is also what quantity means. If you ever visit France, and have time to wander in the countryside, you will see that every little village has its own war memorial.. on it you be struck by the huge level of names names displayed.. you will see whole families giving their sons & fathers, uncle and cousins.. some communities losing 25% of their adult male population on combat duty (Same for Germany I guess).

    As of today, Russia (in Ukraine) is demonstrating that their "country" is ready to sacrifice much more than was excepted in the West. And paradoxically Ukraine seems politically unable to raise the mobilization level.
    It was also the trap of the "body count" mentality of the US during Vietnam war : projecting on the ennemy the reaction that our own society will have in front of a given level of loss, and underestimating the resolve and resilience of the ennemy.

    I really hope that more of TLAM will do^^ But let's not forget that war are above fought by men & women, and that the first quantity that counts is often the number of men & women available to sacrifice their lives for a cause :(

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "a country needs to explain its citizen that the FINANCIAL burden of defense will have to increase"

      Not necessarily. As has been thoroughly documented on these pages, we have more than enough budget to accomplish anything IF WE WOULD SPEND IT WISELY.

      Take just a few examples ... if we built more Nimitzes (or Kitty Hawks) instead of Fords, we'd save around $8B per carrier. If we had not built the pointless Zumwalts, we'd have saved $25B (and counting!). If we had not built the LCS, we'd have saved some $25B. Those three, alone, add up to something on the order of $80B in a handful of years. We have all the money we need for the most complex technology imaginable, if we wanted to go that misguided route.

      "quantity of men that died"

      This is an interesting discussion point. To be clear, you understand that my call for a renewed emphasis on quantity has no relationship or link to quantity of men? It is purely a firepower quantity.

      Further, there is no reason to believe that a return to increased quantities of weapons would entail an increase in own casualties. Somewhat simpler, more numerous weapons do not preclude maneuver warfare and all the other doctrinal and tactical machinations that aim to reduce casualties while still achieving objectives. The days of Civil War standing in lines and exchanging volleys or WWI trench warfare attack/counterattack are long gone. A better model is the WWII armor maneuver warfare. Localized massed firepower is still the goal and is the best way to avoid needless casualties.

      That said, your point about society's awareness of the price of combat in terms of deaths is pertinent. We have led the populace to believe that wars can be fought cleanly and delicately and nothing could be further from the truth. We need to re-educate the populace. This also links to recruitment, which we have badly broken, but that's a separate topic.

      Delete
    2. [Above comment is a mistake sorry]

      [I fully agree with the needs to have sufficient ammo stock, and efficient platforms to shoot them, nothing to add]

      My point about "men dying" was not clear enough.
      To me, LCS or the very high cost of the Fords do not really exemplify the "Quantity" vs "Quality" debate, but rather procurement and construction malpractice.

      In the "Quantity" vs "Quality", we have to consider having the same amount of ressource, and chosing to devote them either to a) a small number of very high performance product, or b) a high number of "as low as reasonnably performing product". Both products have good value for their price (an optimum). If we say, "but why not having high performance product in high numbers", I will say the debate is flawed : either you just have devoted more ressources to Defense, or you have just corrected a very inefficient procurement process (which shall be the priority, but, it is another debate).

      Let's take artillery and an imaginary US army. The US army can choose a very performing - very expensive product (let's say, an alternate reality where the XM2001 Crusader performs as expected). They will order 500 of them, spend 15B£ doing so, and thus they need 10 000 very well trained soldiers to service and maintain them.
      Or the US can chose a low -cost version of the M777. In this case they can order 10 time more..and thus you need 10 time more troops, and 10 time more shells (otherwise you have guns but not enough shells, it is a stupid choice). To recruit all those troops you will need to draft (as recruitment is such a challenge) and to produce all those shells you need "wartime industry mentality". This model exists (for artillery) : Finland for instance has 700 low cost howitzer in its inventory, and the large stockpiles of shells to service them (for only 5 million people).
      But let's continue : since your "high quantity" artillery does not shoot very far, and is not very mobile, you will experience high losses from counter-battery. Thus a lot of draftee will die.
      I oversimplify it greatly for the sake of the argument but my point was : once you have eliminated all the inefficiencies quantity vs quality is not only a "ressource allocation" problem, it is also a choice of society.

      Delete
    3. You seem to have a different concept of quantity-quality than is commonly accepted. The Q-Q debate is simplify a question of whether we want a few Tiger tanks or a bunch of Shermans? Do we want a few million dollar LRLAP shells (assuming the Zumwalt gun had worked) or hundreds of thousands of dumb, heavy caliber naval gun shells? Do we want one Ford or four Kitty Hawks? Do we want a few exquisite B-2 bombers or a thousand average bombers? Do we want a few smart missiles that can do anything and everything or thousands of 'dumb' missiles that just go from point A to point B and explode?

      Procurement problems can exacerbate the acquisition problems of whatever we choose to buy but they don't really impact the Q-Q issue.

      You seem to have a unique perspective that you're trying to convey but I'm not quite understanding it. Similarly, I'm not grasping your 'men' issue. People die in war. I'm not sure how you see that connecting to the Q-Q issue. You man to the level you need to operate the equipment. In a war, you draft. No problem. Whatever your personnel concern is, I'm not getting it.

      Delete
  11. Barring a significant technological gap as we have seen historically in colonial wars, how often has quality beaten quantity?

    Given the same approximate technology I can't recall many conflicts in which 'good enough' hasn't defeated quality. Usually the side that goes down the quality route has to shift gears and start producing less capable but more producible weapons systems. Germany attempted to simplify vehicle production, the US replaced the Thompson with the Grease Gun, etc. The US could have produced a fully tracked troop carrier but the half-track was cheaper, more easily produced and could be manufactured in existing truck plants. The wiser choice was obvious.

    War is friction and you will always lose equipment and you have to be able to afford that, and to produce replacements in time to make a difference.

    Brushfire wars don't reveal this problem as readily as combat against a peer opponent and the greed factor plays a large part in ignoring such lessons.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "how often has quality beaten quantity?"

      Well, it didn't help us in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, ISIS, or the Middle East in general.

      Delete
  12. #ComNavOps
    can you write a post on Allied Logistic Efforts in Pacific Theater during WW2

    How many and what type of Ship Composition were used during various operations
    important Islands which were use as Staging area or acted as Maintenance/Logistics depos
    How Allied Commanders rotated Soldiers, Arms and Ammunition in and out of Pacific Theater

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "can you write a post on Allied Logistic Efforts in Pacific Theater during WW2"

      Goodness, no! That would be a book! Besides, the history of the Pacific logistics effort is readily available in many books, websites, and other resources.

      When I write about historical subjects it's always with a particular, limited aspect in mind that I want to analyze. That's the only way to keep the subject to post length.

      Is there a specific aspect of the logistics effort you'd like to see analyzed? That's something I might be able to do.

      Delete
    2. "That would be a book! " Indeed. If someone wants to write it, here's a starting point, see _The Quartermaster Corps:
      Operations in the War Against Japan_ https://history.army.mil/html/books/010/10-14/index.html

      Delete
    3. I'd seen that before but could not recall the name or site. Great link! Highly recommended for anyone interested in Pacific logistics. Thanks!

      Delete
    4. "Is there a specific aspect of the logistics effort you'd like to see analyzed? That's something I might be able to do."
      How Allied Commanders rotated Soldiers, Ships, Arms and Ammunition in and out of Pacific Theater ?
      this question please

      Delete
    5. "How Allied Commanders rotated Soldiers, Ships, Arms and Ammunition in and out of Pacific Theater ?"

      The answer is simple. Everything and everyone was assigned where needed. There was no formal rotation. Units came and went as needed and as maintenance, training, and cadre needs dictated.

      I'm not sure what you're really asking?

      Delete
    6. "can you write a post on Allied Logistic Efforts in Pacific Theater during WW2"

      A detailed book in US Navy history is available on-line that I read years ago, I don't have a link. I recall an Admiral saying that every proposed operation required ensuring it could be supported logistically, and most could not in 1942.

      Delete
    7. You're likely thinking of the book length report, "The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan" which John Dallman cited in his comment above. Here's the link:
      https://history.army.mil/html/books/010/10-14/index.html

      Delete
    8. This has great stuff "The amphibians came to conquer" and is on-line:
      https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ACTC/index.html

      Delete
  13. In the UK the former Sec. State for Defence has recently pointed out that in the UK politicians have concentrated on platforms whilst neglecting to provide appropriate weapons for those platforms. What we see are shiny new aircraft or large ships with very little to throw at an enemy. The Defence committee said“When ships do get to sea they act like porcupines – well-defended herbivores with limited offensive capabilities”. An additional problem in stark relief now is how hard it is proving to restock weapons and ammunition, having sent so much to the Ukraine, when the supply lines are simply not there. Not quite the same problem as with the US quality over quantity but it does have overlaps.

    ReplyDelete
  14. What's crazy is that after 2 YEARS NOW with Russia Ukraine war is that our politicians and general public still don't get that we don't have the production facilities in place to rapidly increase buys of all these fancy weapons....another related news, Ukraine minister of foreign affairs remarked that 2 problems exist apart from not enough of Western 155mm artillery shells: quality isn't always the best, my guess and news is that we sending old stock which probably doesn't fire or blow up BUT ALSO and this is somewhat concerning, the 155mm that's supposed to be compatible throughout NATO 155mm guns, well, its not compatible. Even though all the guns are 155mm, they can't switch rounds around the different countries 155mm that have been sent, this is crazy since all this stuff is supposedly NATO compatible and something "simple" like a 155mm can't be made to be fired from any other 155mm artillery gun?!? So much for NATO compatible and we all have the same standards!!!

    Makes you wonder about all these exercises that we all train together and NO ONE noticed this?!? What the hell are we doing then??? If after all this time about NATO, something so "basic" isn't compatible, makes you doubt that's there much to anything compatible throughout NATO, if this is true from Ukraine MoFA, NATO been around for decades and not getting this right is beyond disappointing. It does raise a bunch of questions....

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. " not compatible"

      Where did you get this information? I've not heard it before. Do you have a link or reference?

      Delete
    2. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/ukraine-s-foreign-minister-says-era-of-peace-in-europe-is-over/3140714

      Can't find the same speech with the translation where he specifically mentioned NATO 155mm, damn it , hate when I can't retrieve the right article....

      Delete
    3. There's nothing in the linked article that mentions 155 mm artillery issues. While I'm not focused on land combat, I pay enough attention that I think I would have noticed claims that the 155 mm shells are not compatible. I'm inclined to think you may be mis-remembering something. However, if you find a reference, post a link. It would be eye-opening information.

      Delete
    4. Both NATO and the US have very recently awarded 155 mm artillery shell production contracts to various manufacturers who will supply various countries. It seems highly unlikely that would be the case if the shells were specific to a limited number of users due to incompatibilities. Again, I suspect you're mis-remembering something.

      Delete
    5. I know that the 155mm gun that the Navy put on the Zumwalt class was not compatible with Army 155mm ammunition. That strikes me as incredibly stupid.

      Delete
    6. "155mm gun that the Navy put on the Zumwalt class was not compatible with Army 155mm ammunition."

      Bear in mind that the Zumwalt 'gun' was not - and was never intended to be - a shell firing gun. It was a rocket launcher, in essence. Whether that requirement precluded compatibility with standard 155mm shells, I've never heard. Perhaps someone knows?

      Delete
    7. What would you guess is the likelihood that the Zumwalt 155mm gun could have been designed to accommodate standard 155mm projectiles, but some tinkering to add maybe 5-10% capability to the LRLAP rocket round rendered the two incompatible, so the USN ended up with 6 guns on 3 ships that could fire only rounds costing $800K-1MM, basically rendering them useless.

      Delete
    8. Here are two articles by Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nato-pushes-common-standards-tackle-shortfalls-artillery-munitions-2023-06-13/
      https://www.reuters.com/world/nato-urges-common-standards-curbs-protectionism-boost-artillery-output-2023-10-24/

      Delete
    9. "14 different types of 155 millimetre ammunition."
      But why? This sounds idiotic.

      Delete
    10. "Here are two articles"

      If you wish to provide links, please provide some commentary or value-added analysis to go with them. I discourage isolated links. Thank you.

      Delete
    11. The caliber is the same but the shells may have different ballistic characteristics (weight, metallurgy, composition and volume of bursting charge etc.). Similarly guns differ significantly according to manufacturer, design and purpose. The French self-propelled Caesar is a heavier weapon than eg the British M777 which was designed to be transportable by helo. Larger breech, heavier propellant charge, longer range, steel construction rather than titanium, etc..
      That’s part of the answer but also - just like the guys who sell you a printer - after the initial purchase, the manufacturers want you to buy their toner cartridges (or shells) and not use a generic, so they make it harder than it should be.
      Makes total sense when you remember that the MIC is all about shareholders’ profits and not really about national defense.

      Delete
    12. "14 different types of 155 millimetre ammunition."
      But why? This sounds idiotic."

      Different meaning HE, smoke, flare, GPS-guided, cluster ect. As best I know any 155mm gun can fire any 155mm shell, but depending who made them and how old and the gun, each performs slightly different, which really matters when firing close to friendlies.

      Delete
    13. "Different meaning HE"

      The article seemed to mean variances in powder, composition, etc. that would produce variations in flight and, therefore, accuracy.

      Delete

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