As I keep saying, we can’t draw any conclusions from the
Ukraine-Russia war … and yet military observers continue to try to
do so. The latest batch of supposed lessons
involves a burst of ‘naval war’ analyses following recent claims of a
successful suicide attack by a Ukrainian unmanned surface vessel against a Russian
Ropucha I LST landing ship.[1]
Previous reports claimed successful attacks on 29-Oct-2022
by USVs (and possibly UAVs) against a Russian Admiral Grigorovich class frigate
and a mine countermeasure (MCM) ship. It
is also possible that the sinking of the missile cruiser Moskva was due to a
USV as the apparent damage would be consistent with a waterline explosion
caused by a USV. There is also the
24-Mar-2022 sinking of a Russian Alligator class amphibious landing ship while docked
in Berdyansk (see, “Port Seizure Example”). The method of attack was never identified and
a USV strike would fit the facts as well or better than artillery or missile
strikes.
In addition to the successful attacks, there have been
multiple reports of failed attacks.
From this, observers have concluded that the Ukraine-Russia
naval war – to the extent there actually is one – is an asymmetric conflict
between Ukrainian unmanned assets and conventional Russian ships. Observers believe that the Ukrainians have
demonstrated that the future of naval warfare involves small, unmanned assets
and that large ships are no longer viable.
This is utterly incorrect but that’s not really the point of this post.
While we cannot draw any definitive conclusions from the
Ukraine-Russia conflict, we can discuss certain aspects that have become
apparent.
Lethality/Effectiveness
– One of the common misunderstandings is that unmanned assets are incredibly
effective. That is false or, at best,
only semi-true.
The actual sink rate for Ukrainian USVs against Russian
ships is zero, as far as I know (excepting the possibility that Moskva and
Alligator were sunk by a USV). A few
ships have, apparently, been damaged with the extent of damage unknown.
So, while the reported attacks have caused damage they have not
been fatal (unless the Moskva or Alligator was a USV attack). Thus, a single drone strike appears
insufficient to sink a ship. This is
analogous to missile attacks which are not, generally, instantly fatal from a
single hit.
The apparent effectiveness of the USVs (they have hit
multiple ships) seems equally due to the appalling lack of awareness and
tactical ineptitude of the Russians as to whatever effectiveness the Ukrainian
USVs might have. The Russians seem
oblivious to, or incapable of, detecting USVs and seem to lack any organized
defensive effort.
USV Detection
Why have Russian sensors failed to detect the USVs in time
for effective countermeasures? We claim
to be able to detect periscopes at hundreds of miles. This may reinforce one of ComNavOps recurring
themes that all manufacturer’s/Navy claims are vastly overblown. Unless one believes that Russian sensors are
vastly inferior to those of the US, it would seem that sensors cannot reliably
detect even speedboat size objects on the water. Of course, it may well be that Russian
sensors are vastly inferior or that Russian operators are insufficiently
trained to use their sensors effectively.
Proximity – The attacks
all seem to have occurred in port or very close to land which is understandable
given the short legs and limited seaworthiness of an unmanned speedboat. There are reports of some USVs attacking the
Crimea bridge from a significant distance.
Of course, since we have no confirmed USV launch points, it’s impossible
to say what the various attack distances were.
Regardless, relative to open ocean distances in, say, the Pacific
theater, the attacks are limited to near land.
This suggests that USV speedboat type attacks are not a threat to ships
operating in the open ocean.
Defense
There have been reports of successful defenses by the
Russians against the USV drones. This
suggests that individual USVs are easily defeated – not surprising since they
have no defensive weapons, whatsoever.
Reports also suggest that the drones have been used in bunches – a
‘swarm’ of sorts – which would increase the chances of one/some getting through
the defenses. Bear in mind that the
defense has to be 100% effective whereas the USVs, due to their cheapness -
only need an occasional success to be effective.
This suggests that effective defenses must be numerous,
lethal, and rapidly responsive. Small
missiles, guided rockets, or CIWS-type weapons would be appropriate. It also suggests that the defensive weapons
ought to be harbor-based, controlled, and operated by a central harbor defense
rather than depending on the individual ships to provide their own
defense. In other words, once a ship
enters a port, the defense should be the responsibility of the port forces
instead of the ship. Ships come and go
from a port but the port’s defenses ought to be consistent and on-going. This provides continuity and consistency of
defense regardless of the comings and goings of individual ships. Sensors and weapons ought to be sited at the
various approaches to the port and ought to be layered with multiple sensing
and engagement zones.
Conclusion
There is no escaping the fact that the Russians appear
utterly incapable or inept (or both) of detecting and defending against
USVs. They seem to lack any tactical
doctrine for defense. Given that, it is
worse than pointless to draw conclusions.
This conflict seems almost totally inapplicable to a China-US war. There is no more reason to believe that the
naval aspects of this war offer valid lessons than do the ground combat
aspects.
_______________________________
https://news.yahoo.com/ukrainian-drone-boat-scores-direct-093744246.html
I would say there is one lesson, some of us are screaming about but our Western DoDs isnt learning is our complete lack of FLEXIBILITY.
ReplyDeleteBeen close to a year and half now of conflict, before you know it, it will be 2 years and news out from Ukraine is that our military is training Ukraine infantry in terrorism and urban combat, Ukrainians are like:"apart from the basic training stuff, your training doesn't match our combat situation which is tons closer to WW1 than Afghanistan!" Come on, this isnt this hard to figure out but DoD is fighting AGAIN the last war.....
My guess is same would go with drones, we probably getting ready to award billion dollar contracts to MIC for some fancy eye watering technological marvel and Ukrainians are going to be saying:
"we figured it out and will spend 1 penny for your $1000 gizmo that doesn't work but thanks for trying...."
I want Ukraine to win, but the constant blame on anyone but the Ukrainians for any failures they suffer is strange to me.
DeleteModern combined arms warfare is an "o-ring" affair. If any of the parts isn't doing its job then the entire system degrades to attrition warfare. They clearly lack the ability to coordinate land attacks with artillery, engineering, infantry, armor, etc. Russian aircraft mostly stay behind their own lines and the Ukrainians can launch JDAM, HARM, and Storm shadows from their aircraft. And we have given them the parts and maintenance help to keep the Migs and Sukhois running. So I don't buy the lack of air power argument, either. They can't put it all together.
The main lesson I would take away is that on land if we don't want to be involved directly then we should assume it will devolve into attrition and we should have inexpensive towed tube artillery with basic digital fire control and tens of millions rounds of 155mm ready to give to our partners. Forget the fancy M777 and bring back something like a M198. And we know they won't be very effective with unitary explosives so those millions of rounds need to have lots of submunitions. One of the most popular vehicles over there is the M117, the barest of armor will work in these attritional fights. Production of simple APCs, like M117, should suffice.
At the most basic level our interests are simply to degrade Russian capability and make it so that future attacks will be expensive for them. It is purely up to the Ukrainians if throwing away Ukrainian lives is worth a small strip of land. We can't magically turn them into a premier army with any amount of training, certainly not a few weeks worth.
I haven't thought about the equivalent attritional war at sea much. Clearly land-based threats keep the Russian Navy away from the Ukrainian coast. But I don't see how you can defend grain ships with drones or anti-ship missiles. So it is probably up to the US and its allies to keep sea lanes open if that is what we want to do.
Meant M113, but apparently we have sent M1117s, too.
DeleteWhat about Ukraine begging for tanks as shown below:
Deletehttps://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/tanks-finally-after-months-of-begging-ukraine-to-get-90-tanks-as-kherson-counteroffensive-looms
You know, the all stuff the U.S. Marines have gotten rid of... Maybe, just maybe below was not such a good idea after all....
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/03/22/goodbye-tanks-how-the-marine-corps-will-change-and-what-it-will-lose-by-ditching-its-armor/
Yes, they begged for the tanks then were unable to properly use them in most cases. If you’ve followed more recent news they are mostly fighting in small units where APCs/IFVs drop off a platoon that draws fire and exposes Russian positions to drones which the artillery uses to correct fire. This is a strategy that limits the need for coordination and training.
DeleteTanks are wonderful if used properly but have limited value if you can’t incorporate them in a combined arms manner.
Might I ask what source Austin Vernon used to have learned that Ukraine has been unable to used their tanks? All I have found and been reading is that Ukraine has been begging for more and more tanks and getting them as show by like below
Deletehttps://www.dw.com/en/unnamed-european-country-buys-leopard-1-tanks-for-ukraine/a-66481810
Which would seem to suggest that Ukraine knows how to use tanks, and even if they did not, they would after they get their M1 Abrams as show below where they are being trained to do so
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3395940/ukrainian-tank-crews-maintainers-to-begin-training-on-us-m1-abrams-in-germany-s/
Note, that I am not doubting you Austin Vernon (ok, I am but I could always be wrong) I just want to know how you know, maybe you used a different search engine, some unknown (to me) blog or website? I don't know, but most news I read seem to suggest Ukraine knows how to use tanks and are begging for more, like below where Ukraine seems to know how to use tanks:
Deletehttps://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/08/11/ukrainian-tanks-are-in-urozhaine-and-inching-toward-mariupol/
For those of you who do not want to to go to the Forbes website it basically says Ukraine used air support with their tanks in the form of modified
Delete" Mikoyan MiG-29 fighters to carry the GPS-guided JDAM-Extended Range bombs. By flying low then angling up right before releasing a JDAM-ER, a MiG pilot can both avoid detection by Russian air-defenses and extend the range of the 500-pound or 1,000-pound out to 50 miles or so."
to support their tanks against the Russians
I watch too many Telegram videos but if you want a mainstream source this was a good article a few days ago:
Deletehttps://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-uses-small-unit-tactics-to-retake-captured-territory-from-russia-d9ef32a3
Any sign of improvement is a good thing but if they are just going to use 2-3 tanks at a time it doesn’t seem like something we need to worry about. We can dust off a few M60s if need be.
"Which would seem to suggest that Ukraine knows how to use tanks"
DeleteEvery bit of news I've seen confirms that Ukraine has no idea about proper tank doctrine. This is not a land combat blog and I don't have the time or space to go into detail about the proper use of armor but, if you're interested, there are numerous books, articles, and resources that describe armor doctrine.
"they would after they get their M1 Abrams"
I got a chuckle out of that one! You can teach someone how to steer a tank or fire its gun in a short period. Teaching actual combined arms, integrated armor/air/infantry/artillery doctrine is a lifelong effort involving endless study of history, research of the enemy's doctrine and tactics, wargaming, exercises, etc. to eventually understand how to integrate armor into an overall battle plan. Suffice it to say that sending tanks or other armored vehicles out in ones and twos, as Ukraine seems to be doing, is not how you effectively utilize tanks.
You need to conduct some serious research about armor utilization and come up to speed on this.
"news I read seem to suggest Ukraine knows how to use tanks"
DeleteI say this as gently as I can ... you clearly do not have a grasp of armor doctrine. You need to research proper armor doctrine and tactics and, when you do, you'll quickly realize that Ukraine is not effectively using their armor.
I'll add that like, as in all wars. You can assume your assumptions are wrong once the shooting starts and you'll have to adapt too survive.
ReplyDeleteSilloquist
"You can assume your assumptions are wrong"
DeleteThat being the case, why is the US military (and global military observers!) so set on trying to draw lessons/assumptions from this highly atypical conflict?
". . . why is the US military . . . so set on trying to draw lessons/assumptions from this highly atypical conflict?"
DeleteCognitive biases. Politicians have a terrible tendency to assume that anything that works and is on TV is The Answer! They also prefer advisors who agree with their opinions. So analysis converges on politician-style decision-making.
The analyses of naval historians tend to be much better, but they're dealing with the past, rather than the future, and know what didn't work out in the longer term.
As a person who values objectivity, an open and honest mind (theorizing on this style of war) an object and open minded person would use this conflict as a way to test assumptions and counter assumptions.
DeleteWhat the military is doing is using this to confirm long held beliefs or to uphold existing doctrines. The Brass like the Battleship admirals just don't want to change they're minds and are stuck in old style doctrine thinking (Jutland for WW2 anyone).
One assumption that should rethought is near shore/in shore conflict. This conflict has shown that mines/UAV's/USV's and who knows what else make high value ships giant targets of opportunity and are under constant surveillance and near constant threat of attack.
Silloquist
"This conflict has shown that mines/UAV's/USV's and who knows what else make high value ships giant targets of opportunity and are under constant surveillance and near constant threat of attack."
DeleteYou completely missed the point of the post and are doing exactly what the US military and observers are doing which is drawing conclusions from a woefully atypical and inept pair of combatants.
There is zero evidence that an alert, competent naval force (the opposite of the Russians, apparently) would find UAVs and USVs anything but a mild annoyance. Global incidents have shown that unmanned assets are totally non-survivable against an active and proactive defense.
If you value objectivity, as you claim, the first observation that should be apparent to you is just how atypical this conflict is and how inept both sides are. That blindingly obvious reality should then hugely impact every subsequent attempt to draw lessons from the conflict.
I suspect you think all competent military forces will be alert 24/7 and able to defeat these types of attacks.
DeleteIf that was true then PT 109 wouldn't have been cut in half unexpectedly by a destroyer. no one ever stated that PT109 didn't have a competent crew and commander and yet they were still caught unawares
I assume there will be lapses in both judgement and competence in all forces which will lead to unforeseen consequences for both sides.
Silloquist
"I suspect you think all competent military forces will be alert 24/7 and able to defeat these types of attacks."
DeleteIn an actual war, YES!!!! As an example, during WWII, every ship went to battle stations at dawn and dusk precisely to be ready during the periods of anticipated danger. They continued this practice every day they were at sea.
Now, that doesn't mean that an enemy can't, occasionally, succeed. After all, they, too, are smart and trying their best.
"If that was true then PT 109 wouldn't have been cut in half "
That had nothing to do with lack of alertness. It had to do with operating in the dark without useful sensors. It was a CALCULATED RISK. Sometimes that risk paid off for the PT boats and sometimes it didn't. Don't confuse a lack of alertness with the normal risks of war.
"able to defeat these types of attacks."
DeleteFor an alert naval force, consider the large array of options for dealing with, say, USVs: helicopters, 20/25/30 mm guns, high end jamming of USV control signals, 57/76 mm guns, ?lasers?, aircraft (strafing or missiles), etc. An alert naval force has little to fear from USVs.
Also, assuming we're operating in open ocean, USVs can't reach us and any USV transport/mothership would be easily seen and sunk before it could do any harm.
This just isn't an issue.
I think western countries are trying to hard to learn leswonw from this atypical conflict. While both sides try and usually fail in combined warfare, both sides are disregarding one basic aspect of warfare, both sides are not using smoke effectively on the battlefield. If the enemy can't see the chances of getting hit are much lower. But no both sides are not using it when advancing in the open.
ReplyDeleteWhile unmanned systems are relevant, they don't use countermeasures and fall litterally like flies.
A serious use of USV against a warship would imply a coordinated attack and the launch o chaff and decoys by the USV in the terminal attack phase.
The current function of the Black Sea Fleet seems largely to resupply forward locations. They're loading up supplies in places rear areas like Novorossiysk and taking them to forward locations like Berdanysk (for example).
ReplyDeleteMaybe a lesson is that the rear areas aren't as safe as they appear. Ukraine's USVs seem to be extending their range. Novorossiysk is a long way from Ukraine. Did the Ukrainians just drop a few USVs off a "civilian" cargo ship? If they can drop a few, why couldn't the Chinese drop a lot, and target both Naval and civilian ports along the West Coast.
"Did the Ukrainians just drop a few USVs off a "civilian" cargo ship? If they can drop a few, why couldn't the Chinese drop a lot, and target both Naval and civilian ports along the West Coast."
DeleteWell, this is one of the [many] atypical behaviors by both sides in this war. In a 'real' war, all civilian shipping would be banned/excluded/routed away from the combat area and any that remained would be sunk by one side or the other. So, that's why China couldn't do that to us. ANY merchant ship we see approaching our coast that isn't readily identifiable as ours would be sunk out of hand. Consider WWII, every merchant ship was a target by one side or the other and the rule was that if you couldn't identify it as yours, you sank it.
So if the US doesn’t treat it like a ‘real’ war, or China initiates hostilities unannounced, they very well could do that to us?
Delete"they very well could do that to us?"
DeleteI suppose so but it would be nearly pointless. It would be, at best, a one-time event that might damage a ship or two. In the grand scheme of things that's almost insignificant.
It would also be difficult to do. Wars don't happen spontaneously. There's ALWAYS a significant lead up to war. In that run up, we'd be very suspicious of a Chinese merchant ship trying to approach our ships or harbors.
There are far more effective 'Pearl Harbors' that the Chinese could do.
I think there are valid lessons. 1. Don't expect even a total war to be near total. Trade may continue. The stronger side will tend to have other interests it must maintain while exerting pressure over a smaller opponent. It will be like water and wind, eroding the adversary.
ReplyDelete"Unless one believes that Russian sensors are vastly inferior to those of the US, it would seem that sensors cannot reliably detect even speedboat size objects on the water."
ReplyDeleteTo an extent, that would depend on your perspective. In a helicopter at 6,000 feet, the horizon is 95 miles away. For a shipborne sensor, say 60 feet above sea level, the horizon is only 9.5 miles away.
It's understandable that if the water is choppy, it would be difficult to detect a small boat from a ship out towards the horizon. You can't attack what you can't reliably target.
Maybe a lesson learned could be, "Expect the unexpected".
ReplyDeleteLutefisk
One interesting lesion drawn can be made and I believe it its very valid. The lesion is in regards to the new USMC. This lesion would then be valid in all cases but have extra weight the closer to the enemy basing. This is something that was also proven during WW2.
ReplyDeleteDuring the early stages of the was a group of Ukrainian soldiers were stationed on a small island of the coast. The island is called snake island. First the UA-soldiers had to surrender or die to a RU ship when they could not get support and was subjected to “large caliber” fire from the ship.
Then the RU forces occupied the island to stop all ships going to and from the Odesa region. However now the UA forces could fire upon the island and most importantly. The UA could interdict the supply runs. The situation became impossible and the RU forces withdrew.
This shows that isolated troops with limited supply will always be pointless. This would render the USMC force design invalid.
Side note, two other lesions can be drawn I believe. First lesion could be that when fighting close to shore a ship must be able to withstand the enemy land based anti-ship weapons. Otherwise the navy will have to stay outside the range of the land based weapons.
Third lesion, always protect the basing area.
/W
Other than using "lesion" when the word "lesson" is obviously more appropriate, this is well-argued.
DeleteThe wrong words- a mistake commonly seen with Google's spellcheck and autocorrect programs- also demonstrate AI is still too technologically immature to trust with human lives, e.g., granting combat drones the ability to shoot without a "man-in-the-loop" first granting them permission.
"isolated troops with limited supply will always be pointless."
DeleteLet me expand slightly on that. Isolated troops with limited SUPPORT will be ineffective. The support must be continuing naval, air, and land combat support (of course, that also includes resupply). In other words, a small force needs carriers, aircraft, and other troops supporting its flanks. We did this in WWII. Each island we invaded pushed our TOTAL combat forces forward, AS AN OVERALL FORCE not as isolated units. We also saw this at Normandy with the glider troops who were isolated and needed to be 'connected' to the supporting force from the beach within 24-48 hrs or they would have been wiped out regardless of their supply situation.
"a ship must be able to withstand the enemy land based anti-ship weapons"
You accomplish two ways:
1. You have armored ships with strong defensive weapons
2. You apply saturation area bombardment against enemy launch sites and artillery to prevent their attacks on your ships. This is why we used to have large caliber naval guns. In the age of long range missiles, we need area attacks against remote launch sites as well as the closer sites.
"protect the basing area."
You're not using the exact words but what you're essentially saying is that we need to be able to interdict enemy counterattacks. In WWII, this is what the fleet carrier groups did during an island invasion. They roamed far from the island to interdict Japanese air and sea counterattacks. We've completely forgotten the role of carriers in assault interdiction.
" AI is still too technologically immature to trust with human lives, e.g., granting combat drones the ability to shoot without a "man-in-the-loop" first granting them permission."
DeleteThat's an admirable caution and philosophy on your part. Now, how do you reconcile it with enemies who are almost certainly going to endow unmanned assets with total authority to attack at will against us? China, Russia, Iran, and NKorea do not seem the type to worry about unintended casualties and collateral damage if they can gain a combat advantage. Will you deprive us of similar combat advantages? If so, how will you compensate for the one-sided advantage to our enemies? If not, will you abandon your philosophy if our enemies use unconstrained unmanned assets? And, if that's the case, do you advocate developing unconstrained AI programming so that we're prepared for it when the situation arises?
Your simple statement is admirable but ignores a LOT of practical problems that you need to address. I look forward to your thoughts.
"AI is still too technologically immature to trust with human lives, e.g., granting combat drones the ability to shoot without a "man-in-the-loop" first granting them permission."
DeleteThe Turks are already doing this - there was a publicised sensasionalist article a few years ago about how a Turkish loitering munition autonomously hunted down a fleeing insurgent and killed him.
My read of what happened is that the zone was designated a free fire area, where anybody in it was a valid target, the weapon recognised the insurgent's silhouette as a human shape, and attacked because it'd been given weapon release authority.
Legally it's no different from a machinegunner being told his sector is a free fire zone and therefore dumping rounds at anybody he sees there.
One lesson that still holds true: training, training and more training. And make it realistic as possible and current to most possible scenarios.
ReplyDeleteEverything I hear about Ukraine ground forces is the difficulty of them getting to terms with combined arms. It could be historical, their customs, past way of doing things just interferes, not appropriate or relevant, simple inertia, they in the middle of a war! etcetera but once the ball drops, you go to war with the training you got. Its too little too late then to realize that you didn't do your homework.
You need commanders with combined arms experience who can put together a battle plan that incorporates air, artillery, armor, and infantry. That means commanders who have operated and planned LARGE unit operations. In the US military, our last few decades have all been SMALL unit operations. We have few/no commanders with large unit, combined arms planning experience. That's a weakness for us and one that we seem to be making little effort to correct. In fact, just the opposite. We seem to be going further down the small unit rabbit hole. The Marines are planning in terms of platoon size, missile shooting units. The Navy is trying to split large ships and task forces into small ships, unmanned ships, distributed lethality, and small task forces. The Air Force is trying to convert to unmanned 'wingmen' instead of big, dominating fighter aircraft. The Army is moving from tanks and armor to glorified jeeps scooting around the battlefield with a mounted machine gun or anti-tank rocket/missile launcher. And so on.
DeleteWe've lost our way.
There's a scene in the movie "Moneyball" where Billy Beane, the General Manager of the Oakland A's, is trying to convince a player that moving from catcher to first base is an easy transition. He turns to his coach and says, "...it's easy, right Ron?". Ron Washington replies, "It's incredibly difficult."
DeleteSwitching from playing catcher to first base is incredibly difficult.
Now think of all the things that go into mastering combined arms ground fighting.
The communications, the fire support plan, the unit coordination between armor, infantry, engineers, artillery, helicopters, close air support.
And, oh by the way, there's an enemy out there who is doing everything in their power to screw up your efforts and end your life.
Catcher to first base?
Child's play in comparison.
Lutefisk
"The Army is moving from tanks and armor to glorified jeeps scooting around the battlefield with a mounted machine gun"
DeleteI don;t see what the issue is here, you've argued before that scout should just be jeep mounted, instead of IFV mounted like the Cav Scout Bradley.
Anyway I'd hardly say that the Army is moving away from armor - Abrams is still in inventory and is not decreasing, and we're getting the MPF assault guns to fill the assault gun role for our inf brigades so we can keep our tanks concentrated for the breakthrough role, instead of having to split them up to play assault gun direct fire support for the infantry (even if that's a bread and butter role for the tank dating back to the ETO - Shermans and TDs fired more rounds for infantry support than they ever did in tank battles).
We could easily have a couple of postings about the army, its force structure, and its choice of vehicles.
DeleteLutefisk
Sure, and Big Army has failed a whole host of procurement and development programs, but to say that Big Army is cutting tanks strikes me as incorrect when Abrams isn't going anywhere, and we're buying armored assault guns for infantry support - in the absolute, the armored tonnage is increasing, not decreasing. Sure, there's a lot of talk about JLTV but that's a Hummvee replacement, and anyway we've had jeeps in the army for 80 years now, we're never getting away from a jeep of some kind.
DeleteI just think it's weird because CNOpinions ideal scout is a jeep with a machinegun, and then he seems to be decrying jeeps with machineguns....
Over the last few decades, the Army has downsized and reduced the number of armored units. This is simple fact, not an opinion. Around 2013, the Army reduced from 45 BCT to 31 with a current mix of 13 IBCTs, 11 ABCTs, and 7 SBCTs. ABCTs were reduced from around 16 to the current 11.
DeleteI don't closely follow Army matters so I could be off slightly on some number(s).
Here's nice summary from a ausa.org article:
"In 2022, only 11 of the Army’s 31 active maneuver brigades are heavy brigades.8 Thirteen of the Army’s maneuver brigades are light infantry formations, ill-equipped to contend with Russian, Chinese or North Korean heavy forces and massed artillery. While cheaper and easier to deploy, the Army’s many light units cannot realistically compete with today’s threat (in fact, the Russian army has no light infantry for just this reason; even its airborne formations are fully mechanized).
Seven active Army maneuver brigades are Stryker formations, originally called the “interim armored vehicle” and intended to serve as a bridge until the future combat system could be fielded. From conception, Stryker units have suffered from doctrinal and conceptual confusion.9 Stryker units are wheeled, not tracked, and they carry more dismounts than Bradley units, which are intended to fight primarily mounted. But they have poor off-road mobility, are vulnerable to hand-held antiarmor systems, feature towed rather than self-propelled artillery, and they cannot survive when employed against armor, as shown in repeated National Training Center rotations."
Small, light vehicles (jeep-like) are fine for scouting but not when they attempt to take on the role of APC, HAPC, anti-tank, or assault. Don't be obtuse.
This is not a ground combat blog so we'll end this discussion at this point.
Well one lesson we can learn is that LAMs are extremely vulnerable to both SAMs and to EW.
ReplyDeleteOur current strategy with regard to a potential conflict with China, in so far as I can understand it, is to sail a CSG or two to a point around 1,000 miles from the place we intend to hit, launch a few hundred Tomahawks, cross our fingers and get the heck out of Dodge.
Okay, well that wasn’t much of a plan to start with IMO, but if post-Ukraine we now understand that most of those slow and clunky 1980s-vintage Tomahawks are going to play the Japanese role in the great Marianas Turkey Shoot, we need to seriously reconsider our strategy (and I’m using that word very kindly, generously and loosely indeed).
When I look at the current state of our preparedness for the highly likely circumstance of an existential conflict with China in the not too distant future, I think that the English language urgently needs a new word that bridges the gap between ‘emergency’ and ‘catastrophe’.
"Why have Russian sensors failed to detect the USVs in time for effective countermeasures? We claim to be able to detect periscopes at hundreds of miles."
ReplyDeleteDo we claim this, in the present tense?
IN the past, the S-3 had a radar with modes and signal processing equipment for finding periscopes at range, but the S-3 was retired years ago and (unless I'm mistaken) the periscope-finding gear got retired along with the MAD gear some years before the airframe itself was put out to pasture, as the Navy in their infinite wisdom decided there were no more submarine threats. The LAMPS helos have a system with a more limited range. I don't think anything else could plausibly do it - a periscope (or a speedboat-esque USV) is going to get filtered out by the doppler notch in PD modes, and in dedicated surface search/ASuW modes I don't think the alternative filters that try to pick out surface ships from waves without using doppler shift/velocity are going to see a periscope in anything but the calmest sea states.
Incidentally, what are the Russians even flying over the Black Sea right now? Obviously they've scrambled Flankers against our drones a few times, but are they willing to risk helos and AEW aircraft that are much less able to defeat a SAM?
I somehow forgot to mention airframes not integral to the US CVBG or foreign naval groups in my prior post, like the P-3 and P-8 on the US side or the Bear-F on the Russian side. I don't think the Russians have Bears flying over the Black Sea right now, and I am skeptical that we would be willing or able to deploy P-8s for very long in the prospective fight in the ECS/SCS that we'd like to learn lessons for if possible.
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ReplyDelete"This suggests that effective defenses must be numerous, lethal, and rapidly responsive. . . . It also suggests that the defensive weapons ought to be harbor-based, controlled, . . ."
Agreed. But, your harbor defenses should extend far our to sea through the use of manned (i.e., ships, fixed-wing, and rotary-wing aircraft) and unmanned (USVs and UAVs) platforms that can detect and defeat a threat before that get too close. Aggressive patrolling is your best defense.