Defending Taiwan

Let’s assume China makes an invasion of Taiwan part of whatever war they initiate.  In fact, this is an absolute certainty since they can’t allow an enemy base of operations to exist just a hundred miles off their mainland.  Let’s further assume that the US opts to defend Taiwan (by no means a certainty).  How would the defense play out from a US Navy perspective?
 

 
Carrier Activity
 
The main function of a carrier group would be to provide air cover for Taiwan.  Basically, this becomes a large scale battle for air superiority to relieve Taiwan’s forces from the threat of aerial bombardment and missile attack … an ambitious and exceedingly challenging effort!
 
The main invasion effort will likely be along the southern beaches due to Taiwan’s geography.  That dictates our carrier defensive location.  With aircraft only having, at best, a two hundred mile or so combat radius (remember, you have to include sufficient loiter/combat time!), our carriers will have to operate within two hundred miles or so  radius of the midpoint of the Taiwan Strait at the southern end of the strait.
 
Unfortunately, this ‘anchors’ the carrier group to a fairly fixed location.  Yes, the group would sail back and forth a bit but the necessities and constraints of aircraft range and endurance (loitering and combat time) dictate that the carrier remain in a very limited and predictable location.  A carrier constrained to a limited and predictable location is a good way to get a sunk carrier due to cruise/ballistic missiles and enemy subs.
 
The scale of air superiority action would demand all the carrier’s aircraft to operate in the air-to-air role.  There would be few, if any, available for ground support.
 
 
Surface Ship Activity
 
Aegis ships will be quite active – and one hopes successful – providing an anti-air ‘umbrella’ over the strait.  Standard SM-2/6 missiles are credited with ranges of 150-200 miles which, unfortunately, would suffice to cover, if barely, the strait from the eastern (seaward) side of Taiwan.  In conjunction with carrier aircraft, this would help establish local air superiority.
 
One should also note that the mountainous geography poses radar problems for ships operating on the eastern side of Taiwan and trying to exert anti-air influence over the strait and the western side of the island.
 
 
Submarine Activity
 
Offense – Our subs will attempt to attack Chinese naval forces at the northern and, most especially, the southern end of the Taiwan Strait.  Unfortunately, the strait is only a hundred miles wide or so which greatly restricts the submarine operations.  Only a single sub can operate at each end at a time without risking blue-on-blue engagement.  Thus, our large submarine force will be limited by geography to a minimal combat presence. 
 
Defense – As noted above, our carrier groups will be tied to a fairly fixed location and this will attract enemy subs.  Thus, one of the main functions of our submarine force will be to act as distant screens for the carrier group to intercept Chinese subs/ships approaching from around the southern tip of Taiwan or north from Philippines.  Again, though, only a relative few subs can operate in the area at a time before the crowding of subs becomes counterproductive.
 
It is obvious that the blue-on-blue concern will be a huge factor.  As described, that concern will severely limit the number of subs we can effectively employ in the fairly restricted Taiwan operating area.  We could have a thousand subs but if we can only safely and effectively employ four in the operating area, the remaining 996 are useless except as attrition replacements.  We need to begin addressing ways to safely and effectively operate more subs in the restricted area.  I cannot offer any specific thoughts on how to do that but I can and do raise the issue.  To be fair, this is an issue dating back to WWI and no one has satisfactorily solved it.
 
 
Philippines
 
The importance of the Philippines cannot be overstated.  For the Chinese, control of the Philippines provides protection for the southern invasion force.  For the US, the Philippines provides the approach from which a counterattack can be staged and launched against the southern invasion force.  The key question, therefore, is which side will seize and control Luzon and surrounding air and seas?
 
 
Amphibious Landing
 
While not an opposed landing, per se, landing troop reinforcements from the eastern side of the island would be a likely scenario.  This would require Aegis ships to move very close to shore to provide anti-air protection for amphibious ships during the landing/unloading process.
 
 
Guam
 
We can’t even begin to successfully defend Taiwan without a functional Guam so defending Guam is part of the Taiwan defense.  Guam’s defense is, however, a separate topic so I’ll leave it at that.  Just be aware of the vital role Guam will play in terms of logistics, basing, staging, repair, etc.
 
 
 
Issues
 
ASW - Chinese subs will be a major threat and we lack effective ASW.  Large, slow, non-stealthy, defenseless, fixed wing P-8 ASW aircraft will be unable to survivably operate in the area.  Helos will be unable to operate at any great distance from their host ships due to survivability concerns.  Possibly, Burke/helo hunter-killer units could be effective, however, that places a multi-billion dollar, high value, Aegis vessel squarely in the enemy submarine operating area.  We lack a dedicated, expendable (cheap) ASW ship.
 
Aircraft – We have no useful airbases near Taiwan unless Japanese bases are viable.  This would require Japan to enter the war, offer the use of their bases, and be able to defend those bases well enough to keep them effectively operating – no sure thing!  This leaves only carriers as a source of aircraft.  Unfortunately, our carrier fleet is shrinking in numbers and our air wings are half the size they once were.
 
Further, the F-18 is not a state of the art fighter and will be hard pressed to hold its own.
 
Ground Support – We will have few, if any, carrier aircraft available for ground support.  The Air Force won’t have any bases within useful distance to provide support.  We might be able to base Air Force aircraft on Taiwan bases but the likelihood of Taiwan bases remaining operational is not good.
 
This might be a scenario where big deck amphibious ships, configured for pure ground support (maximize the F-35Bs), could be effective assuming we can establish local air superiority. I assume attack helos would be non-survivable due to Chinese anti-air weapons and contested skies.
 

Conclusion
 
Why is it important to understand how a Taiwan conflict will play out?  It’s because that will determine what capabilities and, therefore, what platforms and weapons we need.  Currently, the Navy designs ships in a complete vacuum with no consideration for strategic and operational requirements (CONOPS).  We need to stop this ‘blind’ design practice and begin designing to our specific needs. 
 
Consider the Navy’s obsession with unmanned assets.  Do we need unmanned assets?  Well, it all depends on how we intend to fight a war with China.  Unmanned assets may be useful or they may not.  We don’t know because we don’t have a war plan.
 
I’m offering this brief outline of how a defense of Taiwan will play out.  You can agree or disagree with my vision but it offers a concrete set of operational requirements which, in turn, allows us to design assets that will directly and effectively support the plan instead of designing assets that we just cross our fingers and hope can somehow prove useful but we’re not sure.