Some of the comments from the last post, “Defending Taiwan”, led me to believe that not
everyone grasped the purpose of the post.
To be fair, I didn’t spell out the purpose although it’s been ‘spelled
out’ throughout the blog.
The purpose of the post was not to provide a scenario that
people could jump on and criticize (though that’s a favorite sport among
readers of any blog!). The purpose was
to offer a likely scenario (Chinese invasion of Taiwan and US defense against
the invasion) and a means (a strategy) of addressing that scenario (carriers,
subs, locations, strategy, etc.) with the objective of examining the
operational, tactical, and asset requirements to execute the scenario strategy.
The scenario gives us the specific requirements that should
be driving our strategy, military force structure, doctrine, tactics, and
procurement.
This is analogous to my constant harping on CONOPS, CONOPS,
CONOPS which should drive ship design.
In this case, it’s OPERATIONS, OPERATIONS, OPERATIONS which
should drive force structure and capabilities.
OPERATIONS, of course, are derived from STRATEGY, STRATEGY,
STRATEGY.
Isn’t it neat how, if you do this correctly, each step flows
logically from the preceding one? But, I
digress …
With a specific scenario and strategy defined, we can now
proceed to examine force structure by examining the required operations. For example,
And so on.
The Navy’s approach is to build something … anything … and
then try to get it into the hands of the sailors so that they can tell leadership
what the ship can do. This, of course,
is a heaping pile of stupid on a plate.
CONOPS tells you what to design and then you tell the sailors how to use
it, not the other way around. Similarly,
Operations tells us what kind of force structure and capabilities we need.
Thus, scenarios like this give us the basis for intelligent
discussion of force structure. That was
the purpose of the post.
- How many subs do we need? Operations will tell us that.
- What kind of aircraft do we need? Operations will tell us that.
- How big an air wing do we need? Operations will tell us that.
- What kind of ASW effort do we need? Operations will tell us that.
- How many carriers do we need to defend Taiwan? Operations will tell us that.
- How do we logistically support a Taiwan defense fleet? Operations will tell us that.
ComNavOps, let me try explaining the post from some of my land warfare education. It is exactly what you said above, reduced to three ideas. Ends. Ways. Means.
ReplyDeleteEnds (Objective): In this case, Defend Taiwan.
Ways (Strategy): Actions needed to attain this objective.
Means: (Force structure, industrial capability, etc) The resources needed to implement the strategy.
Successful campaigns using the above include World War Two and the Cold War w/ the Soviet Union. Unsuccessful campaigns include Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan. Our reluctance from the national command authority to clearly state our end state (Objective) then back it up with a way to accomplish it (Strategy) and direct our national capabilities (Resources) to execute the strategy is..... well.... insane. We cannot be successful if something as simple as what our end state is supposed to be, is not articulated clearly so the American people understand and support it, so the sacrifice needed to execute the end state is deemed worth the cost.
This blog raises so many of the Means questions it can be hard to keep up. (a valuable thing) All driven by the various Ends questions which in turn force Ways conversations.
More subs, fewer amphibs. More aircraft, fewer Marines.
ReplyDeleteACES & EIGHTS,
ReplyDeleteModify a Freedom - class LCS with mine -laying racks;haul ass (47 knots) into Chinese harbors and likely invasion chokepoints. Lay mines.
Brits had good results with fast minelayers in WW2. Mines were one of the weapons the Allies used that had a very good ratio of devices employed to enemy vessels sunk. Most likely mines would be cheaper per device, than Unmanned Vessels . And so what if the Chinese sink a bunch of LCS’s; they’re cheaper than B-2’s, B-21’s or aircraft carriers. Ties up enemy resources clearing mines and hunting fast minelayers.
MISSION, SHIP, CREW
ACES & EIGHTS
p.s Apologies for re-post, but I believe it’s pertinent
There is nothing in this comment that is logical, factual, practical, or realistic.
DeleteGo research,
-LCS max speed
-distance from 1st island chain to Chinese harbors
-LCS endurance and range
-US attitude towards suicide missions
-LCS survivability
and then try again.
Scenario leads to Strategy leads to Operations leads to Fleet Problems. Always a good idea to try out stuff before the ballon goes up. Right now we go cool toy to tactics to endless deployments.
ReplyDeleteCNO, I know your stated goal of last post is : defend Taiwan. But, is that really your goal? or may I take the liberty to restate your goal as- it should be to neuter PLAN & PLAAF. Because, the scenario you laid out (for defending Taiwan) is almost unreasonable (lay of battlefield disadvantage, and the cost to overcome such disadvantage is almost economic unfeasible in our future unless we go immediately to war footing economy): to stake 3-4 Carrier groups in a small box 3-400 miles from China, no room for submarines to operate in the strait, and no (or lack) air fields for AF to operate from.
ReplyDeleteThe above scenario also bring forward (to me at least) the RU-Ukr war. Though our stated goal is to help Ukr defend against RU invasion, but in reality, we're neutering RU armed forces at the expense of Ukr (and I don't think that's feasible in Taiwan's case-if our purpose is to use Taiwan to neuter PLA, because any China-Taiwan conflict would involve us directly).
So, I'm still trying to second guess why 'Taiwan'.
The past 30 years of US Navy procurement fixated on how specific aspects of a design or capability could be used to drive CONOPS. It's an inversion of how to design an effective fighting force. Essentially, how to use the force stems from what it can do, rather than designing a force to do what you intend.
ReplyDeleteThe Ford class has a theoretically superior ability to generate greater numbers of sorties per day, as compared to the Nimitz class. All other capabilities and possibilities aside, this is the underlying reason for the new carrier design. However, it presently carries fewer aircraft tasked with flying longer duration missions. Since one aircraft can only ever be in one place at one time, there is no actual ability to fly more combat missions per day using fewer embarked aircraft. We spent a lot of time and money to acquire a capability we cannot use without more aircraft or shorter duration missions.
Why were Ford's designers fixated on sortie generation rates?
It's an easily measurable performance metric that would theoretically allow one carrier to perform more missions per day, so fewer carriers would be required, thus fewer carriers needed to be purchased. From their perspective they're putting fewer people in harm's way while still getting the same job done. This seems like a reasonably good idea, if sortie rate was actually limited by the equipment installed on the Nimitz class.
The catapults / arresting gear / weapons elevators were never limiting factors, though. The limiting factors for an aircraft carrier's ability to sustain combat are aircraft availability rates, availability of fuel / spare parts / weapons, and aircrew / maintainer fatigue. There are only so many hours in a day. That was our limitation during OEF. Having more aircraft would've helped a lot, but we didn't have them, so flying more often was not possible, even if the carrier was able to launch and recover at a slightly faster rate.
More of any specific thing (speed, sensors, stealth, range, weapons), apart from total numbers of personnel, ships, and aircraft available for use at any given time and place, is...
1. not a valid measure of combat capability tied to an operational requirement.
Nobody asked if this was practical to do, nor what else would be required to do it.
2. not an operating concept enabler.
Gaining an 20 to 30 extra sorties per day, even if that was an actual option enabled by using the Ford, was not a replacement for a pair of Nimitz class carriers purchased for the same money, because a pair of Nimitz class carriers would still provide almost twice as many sorties per day, if that was required. Ford's cost and numerous catapult / arresting gear / weapons elevator failures was a concept disabler. That's why allowing technology to drive CONOPS was such a bad idea to start with.
3. not usable as part of a strategy for more effectively fighting a war against a similarly capable opponent.
Sustaining an air campaign will always be a numbers game. If you have twice as many carriers and aircraft available for the same money spent, then you at least have the potential for twice as much combat capability.
kbd512
"greater numbers of sorties"
DeleteThe sortie rate claim has been thoroughly debunked by both DOT&E and myself. Avail yourself of the archives and DOT&E reports to come up to speed on the fraud, incompetence, and distortion that is sortie rate.
"Sustaining an air campaign"
There's no such thing as a carrier air campaign during war. That would, by definition, tie a carrier group to a fairly fixed location and result in a sunk carrier (group).
An air campaign, as I suspect you're using the term (like Vietnam), is a peacetime artifact and, in that case, sortie rate is irrelevant, as it was during Vietnam.
Ford was justified on the basis of mostly fraudulent claims.
@CNOpinions: But he agrees with you? That comment isn't a defense of the Ford, it's a criticism of the ideas behind the Ford.
Delete"But he agrees with you?"
DeleteNo. He appears to accept the sortie rate capability claim and is disputing it only on the basis of smaller air wings. In stark contrast, I've demonstrated in the blog that the entire sortie rate claim is false, regardless of air wing size and, further, that the basis for the sortie rate requirement came from an invalid criteria.
" It's an inversion of how to design an effective fighting force. Essentially, how to use the force stems from what it can do, rather than designing a force to do what you intend."
DeleteA succinct and accurate summary!
I disputed the sortie rate claim as a justification for building the Ford class on the basis of its total irrelevance as a limiting factor for the existing Nimitz class, while operating with a full air wing, while launching every mission capable aircraft during OEF for weeks on end.
DeleteA claim that has a false underlying premise will never be valid, but the reduced air wing size, combined with limitations on both human and flying machine endurance, only makes the claim more absurdly false, which I pointed out in detail.
I defined what their stated claim and justification was, then speculated on what their reasoning was for doing what they did, but at no point did I ever indicate that I accepted or agreed with the premise of their claims.
kbd512
"OPERATIONS, of course, are derived from STRATEGY, STRATEGY, STRATEGY."
ReplyDeleteSo, given that the US government does not seem to have an actually coherent strategy regarding China, is the military justified for flailing around in futility?
(No, but still.)
"is the military justified for flailing around "
DeleteNo! There are only two broad strategies:
1. Appeasement - which requires NO military strategy or investment whatsoever.
2. Confrontation - which requires a fairly predictable military strategy and operations regardless of the exact details of the geopolitical strategy. The military has failed to elucidate ANY viable military strategy against the possibility of a China confrontation.
So, no matter how you view it, the military has failed in its responsibility to have viable military strategies ready and exercised.
In this one small area, I give former Commandant Berger the tiniest degree of credit. He had a plan for how the Marines would confront China. Unfortunately, that plan was a stinking hot pile of garbage but at least he attempted to devise a military strategy. That's more than the Army, Navy, and AF have done.
well, that was entirely reasonable!
ReplyDeleteENDS: Sea denial of enemy naval forces/transport vessels.
ReplyDelete(an end which would effectively render a Sino invasion nearly impossible and would also serve a more globally worthy capability goal for our Navy in general)
MEANS: Persistent observation platforms in far space covering the entirety of possibly contested ocean areas (70% of the earths oceans) and with the ability to translay real time, actionable targeting information to near space or atmospheric loitering weapons with reasonable kill probabilities.
So, yes, perhaps a bit pie in the sky. But if money and engineering were no obstacle, the above would be a reasonable starting point.( maybe even an ending point too). But when viewed in light of how much money we have already hosed away on misguided ship procurement....it seems money, at least is not an obstacle. And we have amazing engineers still...... when we are not "equity-ing" them out of the profession.
So a small part of me hopes that we already have this capability in our black Naval programs. It would explain why the Admiral class seems to be acting with such criminal sanguine nonchalance to our rapidly worsening balance of power with China. The other explanations, while maybe more likely, are just too tragic to consider.
Honestly, our current ossified bureaucracy act as if they are compromised by our enemies.
"It would explain why the Admiral class seems to be acting with such criminal sanguine nonchalance to our rapidly worsening balance of power with China."
DeleteThere are two causes of that. The dimmer admirals believe that US defeat is inconceivable. The smarter ones know that defeat has already happened, when the US let China take its manufacturing business, and reversing that defeat is not something they can accomplish. It's a job for politicians and industrial policy.
"reversing that defeat is not something they can accomplish. It's a job for politicians and industrial policy."
DeleteThis is the real battle that we should be fighting right now.
It certainly is. Unfortunately, the US political system is not well-suited to that battle. Its politicians always need money to fight their campaigns; American businesses are happy to give them a small part of the short-term profit they make from outsourcing their manufacturing. The people who suffer are the formerly-skilled workers, and they have been fairly easy to distract.
DeleteLook at German or Japanese industrial policy for alternative methods.
The Taiwan post was a good example of a basic scenario, from which useful information is easy to extract. For me, it made sense of the Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles: they only work for targets in a fairly constrained area, but the combination of geography and aircraft range means that's what they'd be facing.
ReplyDelete"but the combination of geography and aircraft range means that's what they'd be facing."
DeleteSo, having recognized that, we can work on developing doctrine, tactics, training, and equipment to address that. THAT'S the purpose of examining a scenario like that.
Similarly, we should be conducting wargame exercises that model that scenario and see what works and what doesn't. Instead, we conduct worthless group hugs with other countries and practice disaster relief, school building, and parade formation sailing.
"How many subs do we need? Operations will tell us that"
ReplyDeleteFrom your last post, you stated that no more than 2 subs could be used for fear of friendly fire. So... 2 subs. Ok, maybe more because some will be in maintenance, others in other places, etc. But still, sounds like we have more than enough subs already if theyre going to be used in such a limited way.
On the other hand, how many transport ships do we have that could be used during a war? Because taiwan would need a lot of supplies to feed it's people and keep fighting.
-CP
"So... 2 subs. "
DeleteFor that scenario. Of course, there would be dozens of other scenarios playing out simultaneously: Hainan, Philippines, blockades, Guam protection, etc. So, we need many more than just two subs! Plus, we'll lose subs so we attrition replacements.
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-wargames/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2011.08.2021&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief
ReplyDelete6 scenarios for an invasion or blockade of Taiwan. Damned fine reading
As an edit.....I had no idea that Taiwan claims islands that are literally 5 miles from the mainland of China.
DeleteThe scenarios were extremely simplified to the point of losing their value. For example, none of the scenarios examined sustainment/logistics, the role of Guam, US forces in Japan, Japan's involvement, Korea's involvement, Chinese world trade, etc. in any but the most cursory fashion. I would much prefer that they focused on a single scenario and examine it in more detail.
DeleteStill, it was more thinking than the US military seems to be exhibiting, so that's good.
CSIS also looked at scenarios for the defence of Taiwan
Deletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FTyNHQv-6EM
Wondering what ComNavOps assessment is of the quality of the wargame and of their conclusions and recommendations?
Dave
I have no opinion since there are no details to assess. Their discussions are just generic and offer few, if any, actionable specifics. Do you have a different take on it?
DeleteWell, it's a public document designed to inform and get people talking about the topic.
DeleteMore detail:
https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan
As for actionable specifics, they suggest forward basing of aircraft carriers and navy action in the South China Sea too risky.
They go on to state air force bases need to be hardened against missile strikes.
They propose increasing stocks most notably of bomber delivered antiship missiles.
They also assess the USN surface fleet as quite vulnerable to PLA missile attacks suggesting USN task force should engage far out West of Taiwan and aim to roll back PLA forces.
The USN sub force is assessed as more survivable. With more munitions needed.
Increased cooperation with Japan is emphasised with more airbases.
No mention is made of the Philippines which I find odd since the US seems very keen to increase the number of bases there.
All in all, a good starting place for discussion at least.
We're not going to get a comprehensive look at defense plans.
Dave
"They ... "
DeleteThese are just painfully obvious generic considerations that didn't require a wargame to figure out.
"We're not going to get a comprehensive look at defense plans."
Have to disagree to a large extent. CSIS is NOT the US military. CSIS is trying to sell products (their think tank services) to the US military and the public. If you're trying to sell something, you have to provide enough information to the potential customer to allow them to evaluate the product. By releasing the 'results' on YouTube and other public forums, it's clear that they're trying to 'sell' to the public as well as the military.
Further, detailed discussions of the issues, concerns, and challenges are not divulging specific military secrets - they're just identifying problems, defining the scope of the problems, and offering solutions or, at least, the approach to a solution if not the fine details.
Totally lacking from the 'results' is any consideration of overall strategy. For example, the Philippines will play a key role in a Taiwan invasion for both sides. Either the Chinese will control the Philippines and thus secure their southern flank or the US will control the Philippines and thus open an avenue of counter-attack from the south.
There was no more than a cursory mention of logistics which is far more important than weapons and equipment.
And so on.
The 'results' seemed to be no more than a marketing brochure for CSIS think tank services. Without some details, I give it no credence whatsoever.
"We're not going to get a comprehensive look at defense plans."
DeleteYou know who just tried that approach? Marine Commandant Berger! He tried to implement a total makeover of the Marines without giving out any useful information and he encountered nothing but ridicule and resistance. He failed to realize that you can't 'sell' something without giving out information about the product. If CSIS wants to sell their services, they have to give out some information. The readers of this blog are too smart to be taken in by generic 'results' and sound bites.
Well, I would argue that CSIS predicted massive losses on all sides with huge worldwide consequences and therefore avoidance of war through political means and deterrence was desirable. That seems like a fairly sensible grand strategy. A top down approach with a firm political commitment from the US to defend Taiwan. Perhaps then they'll be more likely to implement the porcupine strategy.
DeleteHas anyone else actually posted anything like this before? I have searched but haven't really come up with much.
Agreed it is light on logistics. Most casual observers aren't that concerned. Perhaps politicians too!
But as an overall summary of how things may go, there doesn't seem to be anything else out there. That's why I argue it's not a bad starting place, biases and all.
I realise your blog has repeatedly looked at parts of the problem within the naval sphere, but this document at least ties together naval and air force working together
along with Taiwan and Japan.
Dave
" I would argue that CSIS predicted massive losses on all sides with huge worldwide consequences"
DeleteDid ya really need a wargame to predict massive losses in a major war between the US and China? That's not exactly earth shaking news!
"therefore avoidance of war through political means and deterrence was desirable."
Painfully obvious?
Just something to think about ... Avoidance of war is NOT always the best approach.
You know who avoided war too long? The Allies in WWII. Had they smacked Hitler down earlier, the war might have been a bit less devasting.
Had the West smacked ISIS down early on, they would have caused far less devastation and loss of life.
And so on.
Avoidance of war painfully obvious? Yet in your next sentence question it. If you feel both both views have merit, why the sarcasm?
DeleteAs for your WW2 example, I do agree earlier intervention could have possibly shortened the war. Perhaps a firm commitment to Czechoslovakia would have given Hitler pause.
Do you suggest a pre-emptive strike?
Dave
"Avoidance of war painfully obvious?"
DeleteAs a generic statement, it's a conclusion that is universally accepted as painfully obvious. It's like saying world hunger is bad. Nobody disagrees with it.
"Yet in your next sentence question it."
Because this is the reality that ISN'T painfully obvious to most people. A wargame that would be actually useful would be a series of games taking place at, say, five year intervals for the start of the war and demonstrating (presumably) that the war gets worse and worse, in terms of death and destruction, the longer it gets delayed. Or, maybe it doesn't? That would be informative to game out. Given the military and political trends of both China and the US, I'm pretty sure I know the answer but it's not an answer that most people want to hear.
Currently, the US is playing the part of England and Chamberlain while Hitler/China is annexing the entire S/E China Seas and building a global empire.
We don't need a beginner's level wargame to learn that war is bad. History already proves that. Unless they have some additional detail, this wargame was absolutely bereft of any useful information. Was there anything you learned from this supposed wargame that you didn't already know and hadn't already learned about in far more detail on this blog?
"Do you suggest a pre-emptive strike?"
DeleteNo ... or, at least, not yet. China and the world deserve a chance to avoid war. We need to establish absolute, unchanging limits on what we'll allow China to do and then enforce those limits with total force (military and financial). If China is prepared to go to war then that's their choice and they would have done it eventually anyway. Better to do it sooner, while we still maintain a degree of military superiority, than later when China will have unquestioned superiority.
If, on the other hand, China respects the limits then the world avoids war and contains China until such time as they can learn to be good world neighbors (highly doubtful but theoretically possible).
"Was there anything you learned from this supposed wargame that you didn't already know and hadn't already learned about in far more detail on this blog?"
DeleteSurprised US airbases are not hardened against missile attack and that 90% of aircraft losses are predicted to occur on the ground.
CSIS do not highly rate the survivability of the USN surface fleet. Certainly not forward based but possibly in general. They clearly rate the bomber fleet as the main means of hampering PLAN during the initial invasion.
Your idea of placing the fleet so that it can provide air cover to much of Taiwan strongly suggests you don't share that opinion.
Dave
"Surprised US airbases are not hardened against missile attack and that 90% of aircraft losses are predicted to occur on the ground."
DeleteWe've discussed this many times. We've specifically discussed Guam and the various defensive measures that we need.
"CSIS do not highly rate the survivability of the USN surface fleet. Certainly not forward based but possibly in general. They clearly rate the bomber fleet as the main means of hampering PLAN during the initial invasion."
Discussed many times.
"Your idea of placing the fleet so that it can provide air cover to much of Taiwan strongly suggests you don't share that opinion."
I do not PROVIDED WE EXECUTE AN INTELLIGENT STRATEGY AND SUPPORT IT WITH THE PROPER DOCTRINE, TACTICS, AND EQUIPMENT. For example, it would be stupid to sit off Taiwan and simply see how long we can fend off repeated attacks. The intelligent thing to do would be to develop a strategy of all-out attack against China's air bases to mitigate the attacks against our ships before they even begin. This is an example of the kind of thinking and detail that the supposed wargame seems to have failed to consider.
As a general admonishment, you, the reader, are responsible for being knowledgeable about the content of the archives. Please make use of them!
MikeDC
ReplyDelete"absolute, unchanging limits on what we'll allow China to do and then enforce those limits"
ReplyDeleteThat's a difficult one.
Are you willing to go to war for an island 5 miles off China's coastline?
How about the other island's?
A difficult sell to the American public.
And yet if you leave said islands out of any protection agreement, it green lights China to invade them.
Perhaps a bit of ambiguity isn't such a bad thing?
Dave