Once again, we are honored to have a guest post from Carlton Meyer. You may know him as username ‘G2mil’ and the author of many outstanding articles posted on his website at www.g2mil.com. Today’s post is the companion piece to his recent post, “Scrap Two Carriers”. In today’s writing, he proposes an alternate use for the carrier air wings freed up by scrapping two carriers. Enjoy!
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In a past blog post, “Scrap Two Carriers” I argued the US Navy’s fleet has become imbalanced and Admirals should scrap two supercarriers to free manpower and aircraft for the remaining nine carrier strike groups. This would also free billions of dollars each year for other Navy programs. I noted this will probably occur anyway because of the flawed Ford class carrier program. I suggested that two Carrier Air Wings (CAWs) could conduct sea control missions from existing American airbases overseas. This idea was considered in the past, calling them Navy Tactical Support Wings, a term still used for the Navy Reserve air wing. My proposal would incorporate Marine Corps squadrons and call land-based CAWs-- Naval Air Wings (NAW).
During World War II, most naval missions were flown from land bases, not from aircraft carriers. Since then, the US Navy has mostly refused to operate fighter squadrons from land bases, even though it has airbases at key sea control locations like in Sicily and Crete. NAWs will not require an ultra-expensive supercarrier, not require frequent resupply at sea, nor escort ships. On the other hand, large long-range precision guided missiles can blow big holes in fixed runways. However, such missiles cost at least $5 million to construct and require months to produce. If airfields are properly supported by rapid runway repair teams, they can fill a big hole in an hour and top it with gravel for emergency use. When a few hours can be spared, the team can top it off with quick dry concrete that can cure in four hours.
The composition of US Navy CAWs is always changing. The US Navy is short of needed aircraft, which explains today’s F-35C squadrons with just ten aircraft. This is the Navy's goal for future CAWs:
- Two Navy Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadrons with 14 FA-18E/Fs each. Several aircraft are often tasked as refuelers.
- One Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) Squadron with ten F-35Cs.
- One Navy Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadron with ten F-35Cs.
- One Electronic Attack (VAQ) Squadron, with five EA-18G Growlers.
- One Carrier Airborne Early Warning (VAW) Squadron, with four E-2D Hawkeyes
- One Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of eight MH-60S Seahawks
- One Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of eleven MH-60R Seahawks, 3–5 are typically based on other ships of the carrier strike group.
- A Fleet Logistics Support (VRC) Squadron Detachment of two CVM-22 Ospreys.
My proposed land-based NAW would consist of:
- Two Navy Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadrons with 14 FA-18E/Fs each.
- Two Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) Squadrons with 16 F-35Bs each.
- One CONUS based Marine VMGR Aerial Refueler Squadron with 15 KC-130Js tasked with support via rotational deployments, so perhaps four will be in theater to support the NAW with more during wartime.
- One Navy Electronic Attack (VAQ) Squadron, with five EA-18G Growlers.
- One Navy Carrier Airborne Early Warning (VAW) Squadron with four E-2D Hawkeyes
- One Navy Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of eight MH-60S Seahawks based at several locations or aboard surface ships in the region.
- One Navy Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of eleven MH-60R Seahawks based at several locations or aboard surface combatants in the region.
- A CONUS based Marine Fleet Logistics Support (VMM) Squadron of 12 MV-22 Ospreys tasked with support via rotational deployments, so perhaps three will be in theater to support the NAW with more during wartime.
The Marines should support this idea because Marine Aviation lacks a clear purpose in peer wars where amphibious operations will not be viable until the latter stage of a conflict. Marine Air lacks vital electronic warfare aircraft that Navy EA-18Gs provide, and lacks the long-range aerial radar that Navy E-2Ds provide. The Marines recently focused on support for expeditionary airfields during major wars. Supporting forward airfields for dispersed land based naval aircraft as part of NAWs fits perfectly. NAWs also can also support small dispersed units of Marines ashore. Finally, NAW staff will include many Marine Corps personnel and command should rotate between Navy and Marine aviators.
The Marines have provided squadrons to support US Navy carrier deployment for decades and currently provide four, hence the purchase of F-35C (Navy CTOL version) for four Marine VMFA squadrons. NAWs would each include two squadrons of F-35B (VSTOL) that can easily operate from shorter runways or those damaged from missile attacks. Modifying two CAWs into land-based NAWs with four Marine VMFA squadrons frees four Navy VFA squadrons to fill the gaps in other CAWs, or provides half the aircraft needed to form another CAW should the USS Ford finally become ready for a real deployment.
The basic mission of a NAW is sea control. This will involve support of CAW operations wherever possible with both combat aircraft and logistics support. A CAW may embark extra aircraft from a NAW or even an entire squadron. It may choose to swap types of aircraft depending on the threat and mission. The NAW can also supplement or swap aircraft with an LHA/LHD deployed in the region during smaller conflicts. Perhaps moving some helicopters ashore and adding F-35Bs, or the opposite.
NAW aircraft will be based at small Naval Air Facilities that will include medical and maintenance capabilities, thus ideal places to offload damaged CAW aircraft and sailors and acquire replacements. A CAW in combat with China may lose a dozen aircraft in a day! NAWs can instantly provide replacements. On the other hand, a heavily damaged carrier may need to transit stateside for months of repairs so her aircraft can continue to fight ashore as part of a NAW. In the early days of a war with China, cautious Admirals may keep their carriers “east of Guam” and out of range of Chinese submarines, long-range ballistic missiles, and bomber launched cruise missiles. Some of this reluctance is because our Navy will lack escorts for ships that supply underway carrier strike groups.
NAW and USAF airbases in WestPac may have been pummeled with strikes that continue every few days, but their airfields remain usable. The NAW in WestPac has fought varied engagements with the loss of many aircraft. Admirals may choose to use their supercarriers as home bases far from threats, deploying their squadrons forward to NAW airbases for days at a time to fight, then returning to their carrier for rest and replenishment. CAW aircraft may use battered NAW bases or forward Marine expeditionary bases as FAARPs (forward arming and air refueling points) to fly more sorties before returning to their carrier. These bases could also recover damaged aircraft or those low on fuel that can’t reach their carriers.
NAWs do not require the establishment of new airfields. The US military has dozens of airbases at key locations around the world for sea control. NAWs will simply utilize existing airfields to conduct sea control missions and support CAW and Marine Corps operations in theater, although they could utilize wartime expeditionary airfields the Marines are keen to establish. One can criticize the lack of mobility of a NAW compared to a CAW, but it provides the same capabilities without a $15 billion Ford class carrier, without the worry that a carrier might be sunk, without the need for escort ships, and with a half of the support manpower. NAWs will require a few billion dollars to improve and expand existing airbases, but this costs far less than ships needed for a carrier strike group, without the massive annual operating costs for ship fuel and maintenance.
Moreover, overseas presence requires the rotation of three CONUS based aircraft carriers with their three CAWs to match what a single overseas based NAW provides! One can argue that naval aircraft can quickly deploy to overseas bases during wartime as needed, but it takes years to establish support facilities in the form of munitions stockpiles, ground support equipment, and aircraft spare parts blocks. Permanent overseas squadrons with regular peacetime interaction with allied forces will ensure better wartime cooperation. A major war will result in a rapid consumption of anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, and precision strike munitions that the Navy’s supply system cannot quickly replenish. CAW aircraft would soon draw upon the munition stockpiles at NAW bases ashore.
The Marine Corps traditionally publishes a very detailed “Marine Aviation Plan” each year, yet the last one was in 2019[1], probably because changes underway makes it difficult to plan. The Marines tout the value of its forward-deployed MEUs, yet these require support from less than half the squadrons in Marine Aviation. Public literature indicates the Marines are unable to articulate a role for the remainder. The Department of Navy needs to find a role for Marine Air, and NAWs are part of the solution. Ideas for the exact basing of two NAWs will be addressed in a future blog post.
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Carlton Meyer is a former Marine Corps officer whose writings appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette, Naval Proceedings, and the Navy Times. He became irritated when some articles approved by editors never appeared after the Marine Commandant’s office and the CNO’s office began to preview publications and block articles they didn’t like. This explains why their articles have become bland. He began posting his ideas at www.G2mil.com in 2000.
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[1]https://www.aviation.marines.mil/portals/11/2019%20avplan.pdf
"The Marine Corps traditionally publishes a very detailed “Marine Aviation Plan” each year, yet the last one was in 2019[1], probably because changes underway makes it difficult to plan."
ReplyDelete[1]https://www.aviation.marines.mil/portals/11/2019%20avplan.pdf
Slide 12 of that presentation shows an overview of what appears to be a conceptual EABO operation. How long has the EABO been a concept? How many times during that period has anything as extensive as what is shown there been exercised?
I was somewhat involved in this expeditionary airfield concept and the Marines are confused. Most effort is focused on airfield matting and arrested landing systems. But the USA has four civilian airports in the Marianas! If the Philippines supports us, they have over 100 usable civilian airfields.
Deletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_airports_in_the_Philippines
We already have official permission to use five of them. The issue is how to get munitions and airfield support equipment to them, from prepo ships and permission to prepo at certain airports. I'll discuss this in a future article.
As a Filipino, I would not count on Philippine airfields to be open for sea control operations. We have an upcoming presidential election, and the perception is that Marcos Jr. (son of the former dictator) is in the lead. He is literally the Manchurian Candidate for China. If the US has some leverage, it would be wise to use it now and preclude future political problems with Marcos Jr. The best you can do with Philippine airfields are for emergency landing sites. I hope I’m wrong on this.
DeleteNot an aviation guy. I see the potential benefits of shore-based aviation to support the sea control mission. It not an all-or-nothing situation between CAW and NAW and we could utilize both. However,
ReplyDelete1. Airbase vulnerability: I agree that runways can be quickly repaired within a day. But how about all the other supporting facilities? If our adversary has guided munitions, then why not pelter the airbase with hundred of munitions to take out fuel and ammunition depots and other crucial facilities. Are those depots hardened? I understand there will be multiple defenses for the airbase, but it would be prudent to account for the vulnerabilities.
2. Airbase location: Which countries are willing to host a NAW for sea control operations against China? Japan and Taiwan have a good chance to allow it, but I don’t see any of the Southeast Asian nations doing so. If we don’t need airfields in Southeast Asian nations, then this is moot. Would NAW based in Japan, Taiwan, & Guam suffice for sea control?
Shore-based NAW is a very interesting concept. But with any viable concept or paradigm, politics would kill this concept due to either OSD bean counters, rudderless Navy leadership, Congressional parochial interests, and our allies’ domestic politics.
Quick thoughts:
DeleteThe NAW concept could work for constabulary work in some areas of the world, not so much as a true carrier replacement.
Why is the USAF not considered in any discussion involving land-based air power? I reject joint operations for the sake of being 'joint', but war plans and force structures designed to favor one service or another is unacceptable to the average tax player.
I am skeptical about aircraft losses fighting a competent enemy: the USAF (USAAC) lost more men fighting in the skies over Europe during WW2 than the entire USMC. The sortie loss rate for bombers sometimes exceeded 28%, which is comparable to the USN carry sortie loss planning figure of 25% in the first years of WW2.
GAB
I'll address this in a future post, but I mostly agree. First, don't plan on using airbases within range of land-based air power or cheaper short-range missiles (which is the majority). For example, Okinawa is a foolish location that I've written about.
Deletehttp://www.g2mil.com/kadena.htm
We have official access to airfields in Australia, but political issues could suddenly end that like in the Philippines. So using pre-po ships are part of the plan. Load up a few old LSDs with airfield support equipment and munitions and park them in Hawaii. NAW squadrons would be based mostly out of range in Hawaii, Guam and Australia and move to closer austere bases depending on the situation. In other cases, just placing some munitions bunkers is all that is needed, like on Iwo Jima were CAW aircraft often train.
https://skybrary.aero/airports/rjaw
This idea appears to be trying to replicate what the USAF already provides with their Air Expeditionary Forces.
DeleteWhy not instead use the aircraft to beef up the size of the remaining CAWs? Or build a true CVL that could carry them?
Several have asked. The USAF doesn't care about sea control and has no such munitions, although B-52s once carried Harpoons. The USAF has no anti-sub helos. USAF bases ashore have no ship suitable aircraft, spare parts, or munitions to support CAWs. USAF aircraft will support USAF missions first, and not Navy missions. The USAF has no plans to add aircraft to the Pacific region.
DeleteThe Marines have twice more aircraft than ships to carry them. So either get rid of them or have them support naval missions from shore. Finally, the sinking of one CVN would be devastating politically, and discourage their use near the enemy.
Before the decade is out, the Navy will have retired all of their Tico cruisers and Ohio SSGN. Granted, the Navy will recieve a dozen or so Burkes and a few Virigia Bloock V submarines in that time, the loss in the number of VLS cells is still quite negative.
DeleteOne way to offset that loss is to rely on Air Force bombers to deploy cruise missiles and other munitions. A B-1 can carry some 36 JASSMs. A B-52 can conduct maritime surveillance, drop mines, and attack shipping. In a recent test, the Air Force mounted 5 JASSMs on an F-15.
A war in the Pacific will be a highly integrated affair and utitilize the best of what each service has to offer.
Only 45 B-1s left and those are gone by 2032. All wore out doing BS "combat" support in Afghanistan.
Deletehttps://www.airforcemag.com/last-b-1b-bombers-retire-until-b-21-comes-online/
The USAF don't want to spend money to extend their lives. I'm 100% in support of the USN getting these 45 B-1s and extending their life another 30 years! But I don't see that happening, since the USN refuses to operate combat aircraft from land bases.
The USAF supports Joint missions, just like the Navy and the other services.
DeleteThey started LRASM integration with the 76 B-52Hs. Between this, the radar upgrade and the re-engining, these aircraft should be very capable maritime interdictors. Six of them can carry as many LRASMs as your entire NAW.
There's also work to integrate LRASM and JSM with the F-35, though not by the USAF.
ASW from land-based helicopters is a very limited capability. Useful for port defense, maybe. The Navy already has P-8s for the land-based mission.
"NAW squadrons would be based mostly out of range in Hawaii, Guam and Australia and move to closer austere bases depending on the situation. "
Delete"First, don't plan on using airbases within range of land-based air power"
Short of the Phillipines giving basing which isnt likely, where are these short-legged Navy aircraft going to operate from where they will be useful? In the above quote you reference having to stay out of range of land based air, which has more range. It seems only comparable USAF assets can play in this game. And if we're using 'austere' airfields, then they likely wont be fully capable, hardened facilities that can withstand not only air, but cruise missile attacks. So land based naval air is second best. Putting the carrier air wings ashore just doesnt seem to have any benefits besides the money saved by deleting CVNs. In spite if all the hype about carrier killers and the political ramifications of losing a CVN, the CVBG is still the most potent conventional weapons system on the planet. Taking a single component of it and putting it ashore is akin to trading a queen for a pawn. Especially since the aircraft are no longer the true "strike" component of the CVBG, the CGs and DDGs are. Frankly I believe if we go that route, we could be better off scrapping the air wing too, and investing the dollars in extending SSGN lives, building more, or some other useful strike platform, or even giving those dollars to the Air Force.
"Only 45 B-1s left and those are gone by 2032."
DeleteExcept, the B-52s will be flying for another 30 years. And, if we build enough B-21s that will help too.
Eight B-52s can fire just as many Tomahawks as an SSGN and are far more flexible to deploy. After expending the last of their missiles, an SSGN needs many weeks to return to port, reload and refit, and return to sea.
Looking at the huge range difference between USAF and USN aircraft, I dont see the utility of USN aircraft ashore, unless the carriers are all sunk and the USAF is out of planes!!
ReplyDelete"...overseas presence requires the rotation of three CONUS based aircraft carriers with their three CAWs to match what a single overseas based NAW provides!"
Maybe in a peacetime scenario, but during a major conflict, the carriers in the training cycle will get trained up real quick and be headed for combat. Same can be said for those in any yard period except obviously the one in RCOH. But the time required to put together a 3-4 CVN battlegroup from 9, rather than 12 carriers, is too long in my opinion.
"During World War II, most naval missions were flown from land bases, not from aircraft carriers."
ReplyDeleteNot true, yes, it was only in Europe.
In Pacific, it is a totally different stories. We know that most fierce naval battles happened in Pacific between US and Japan during WWII.
Battle of the Java Sea - no carrier aircraft
DeleteBattle of Savo Island - no carrier aircraft
Battle of Leyte Gulf - few Japanese carrier aircraft
Battle of Okinawa - no Japanese carrier aircraft
And the US Army Air Corps had thousands of aircraft flying from a hundred airfields.
Almost all the key WWII events in the Pacific involved significant carrier action-
DeleteCoral Sea
Midway
Solomans/Eastern Solomans
Santa Cruz
Phillipine Sea
Leyte
Tarawa
Phillipines
Okinawa
Sure, Europe was a different war entirely due to geography, but the Pacific was, and I believe, will continue to be, a carrier-centric battleground for some time to come.
Look defence budgets next year and beyond (proposed), you can find cut on procurements of F-35 from all types (A,B,C).
ReplyDeleteRead a recent comment from Pacific Air Force Commander, quite likely, Pentagon has realized F-35 is not good enough for future battle. Pentagon needs to speed up future fighter jets development (i.e., NAGD, etc.). While F-35 project started, Pentagon failed to realize that Chinese military technologies would progress so fast. While he talked about Air Force, this also applies to Navy Air Wing Structure.
https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2022/03/19/us-f-35-and-chinese-j-20-fighter-jets-had-close-encounter-over-east-china-sea-says-us-general
Questions should be
How fast Navy's NAGD will be completed? What kind of fighters?
How many F-35C Navy needs for the time being?
How many F/A-18 for the time being?
Chinese navy's new under development stealthy J-35 should not be a real concern since China won't dispatch their carriers far from its coasts therefore, they can be treated as a simplified J-20.
If it was to be a viable option for a marine/navy air wing to be based on a land-based airfield would you not need Patriot/THAAD batteries to defend the airfield, in effect the carrying out the same role the Aegis Ticos and Burkes to defend the carriers.
ReplyDeleteThe Hawkeyes etc would be required to enable Launch on Remote (LOR) and Engage on Remote (EOR) for the Patriot/THAAD missiles defending airfield from ballistic and hypersonic missiles (the Russians claiming they have twice fired Kinzahl hypersonic/ballistic missiles from MiG 31 attacking strategic sites in Ukraine) its easier to target a fixed site/airfield than a moving target/carrier in the vastness of the ocean, though in near future expect with tens, if not hundreds of nano recon satellites and the Chinese DF 21 & 21 anti-carrier missiles a distinct possibility that advantage will be seriously diminished.
I think this is a useful idea, even without deleting carriers.
ReplyDeleteAn aircraft carrier is very useful, since it's basically just a portable airbase, which is important whenever you can't find a land-based runway where and when you need it, either for geographic (middle of the ocean) or political (no nearby US territory and reluctant neighbors) reasons.
On the other hand, a carrier battle group is probably the most expensive way we have of delivering air power. So if we CAN find a local land based runway, it's probably more cost effective to use it. Especially since, even with 10 carriers (Ford doesn't count, at least not yet), we're having trouble keeping up with maintenance cycles, doing "double pump" deployments, and so on. If we could ease off a bit, it would be really good from a readiness point of view.
For one example, it's not at all clear to me why we would want to have a carrier parked in the Persian Gulf (to bomb ISIS, for example). The gulf is too small to allow the carrier to benefit from the advantage of moving around in the ocean and being hard to find. I'm sure the Iranians know exactly where it is at all times. And we have (or can get) access to a number of land based runways in the surrounding countries. Why not just send a naval air wing to the region, instead of the entire carrier battle group, and leave the carrier at home to catch up with maintenance.
A lot of commentators (and maybe CNO included) criticized the relentless CVN deployments with no solid rationale behind it. I’m curious if the absence of a CVN in the Persian Gulf had affected any military, economic, or political calculus in the region. I haven’t seen any negative blowback yet.
DeleteAs with my earlier post, I agree to utilizing aviation at shore facilities where feasible and supporting the Fleet. However, I think the use of CVNs are becoming more political than practical and why no one in the Navy establishment is even contemplating shore-based aviation. Shore-based aviation just gives more political ammo to its opponents and budget battles with OSD, Air Force, and Congress are the most important to win. First, internally in the Navy, I won’t be surprised the surface and submarine communities would rather say, “gives us bigger ships (for the former) and bigger & better missiles for us to shoot with but we still want air cover!”. Second, the Air Force would say, “just give us more money for B-21, B-52 life extensions, fuel tankers, and better missiles because Navy aviation has short legs!”.
I honestly had no idea that the Navy wasn't significantly utilizing land airfields.
ReplyDeleteMy only contact with naval aviation was when I was in the 101st. We did a SEDRE and flew our helicopters down to Jaxport for loading.
We refueled at the naval air station there and sat in the takeoff queue with the P-3's heading out into the Atlantic (feeling very out of place with our crappy slow scout helicopters).
I just thought that went on all over the place, and I think using fixed airfields is a very good idea.
The problems would seem to be where does naval aviation end and the air force responsibilities begin?
But regardless, when push comes to shove, those branches will figure it out.
I think the aircraft carriers are both expensive and limited. Supplement them with land-based air and have surface ships take over some of the missions that currently fall to the aircraft carriers by default.
Lutefisk