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Friday, March 18, 2022

Lessons From Ukraine

What are the combat lessons from Ukraine?  There are no lessons from Ukraine!  Huh???

 

I didn’t want to do this post but the analysis from military observers is getting out of hand and we’re being fed a bunch of invalid conclusions and lessons that are beginning to take hold and that’s got to stop.  Everyone is spouting lessons they think they see from the Ukraine-Russia conflict but there are no valid lessons to be had.  Commenters on this blog have offered conclusions about the efficacy of UAVs, the demise of armor, and so on.  Now, the Marine Commandant seems to be doing the same thing.  From an interview he did,

 

The success of Ukrainian forces in countering Russian armored vehicle columns with missiles and rockets in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine shows the vulnerability of tanks to missile-armed infantry, the Marine Corps commandant said, and seemed to reinforce his decision to shed tanks from the Corps as part of his Force Design 2030 concept.[1] 

 

Unless Berger has inside information direct from both Ukraine (unlikely but possible) and Russia (impossible), then he’s just speculating on largely public domain news bits just like the rest of us and, just like the rest of us, he’s lost sight of what that public information is.  It’s propaganda!  Whichever side is offering it, it’s propaganda.  As yet, there is absolutely no authoritative combat information in the public domain, that I’m aware of.  That being the case, how can he, or anyone, draw any valid conclusions?  Attempting to do so is a classic example of garbage in, garbage out!  Invalid information in, invalid conclusions out.

 

Here’s an example … I just watched a video on YouTube purporting to be a Ukrainian attack on a lone Russian tank.  The video showed an isolated tank with not another Russian unit visible within the quarter mile radius or so of the scene.  The tank was meandering along a road, in the open, by itself and it was hit by some weapon and blew up.  A tremendous individual victory for Ukraine and proof that tanks can no longer survive on the modern battlefield in the face of individual soldiers with anti-tank weapons.          Or is it? 

 

How do I know that the video wasn’t staged by Ukraine using a captured Russian tank and was intended as propaganda?  The mere fact that there was someone with a video camera in this remote, isolated area, in perfect position to capture this event clearly and cleanly on film strongly suggests that it was, in fact, staged.  So, now what’s the conclusion?  There isn’t any!  There’s no conclusion and no lesson to be had from this because it isn’t authoritative and verifiable.

 

In addition to the total lack of authoritative information, it also seems as if this is a very atypical ‘war’ for the following reasons:

 

  • Initially, Russia appears to have significantly restrained their firepower, presumably to avoid angering the populace that they hoped to eventually rule.
  • Multiple reports suggest that many Russian units did not even know they were in a combat situation and believed it was all part of an exercise.
  • Reports suggest that some Russian units have refused to fight.

 

Note:  Bear in mind my own warning:  these reports may or may not be accurate.  I’m looking at the pattern of the totality of reporting to discern broad truths but, again, they may or may not be correct.

 

 

All those videos showing Ukraine UAVs roaming freely over the battlefield and raining destruction on the Russians clearly demonstrates the power of UAVs and the ineffectualness of Russian anti-air systems, right?   Wrong.  For a variety of reasons, it is likely that the Russians weren’t even trying to operate anti-air systems during the period those UAV videos were made.  Again, no valid conclusion or lesson can come from that.

 

The atypical nature of the Russian’s conduct of the war was acknowledged by Commandant Berger:

 

During a live-streamed conversation with Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, Gen. David Berger said the Russian forces seemed to be ineffective in using a combined arms approach in that they were not using “maneuver to bolster your fires or using fires to set up your forces for maneuver. In both cases, one without the other … is very ineffective.”[1] 

 

So, Berger acknowledges that Russian forces were not using maneuver or firepower in a supporting manner as any semi-competent military would.  This lends credence to the reports that the Russians were initially restraining themselves to avoid civilian casualties and civil facilities destruction.  Despite this recognition of the atypical behavior of the Russian forces by Berger, he then proceeds to draw conclusions!

 

What other atypical indicators does Berger recognize?

 

Berger also said Ukrainian forces seemed to be effective at causing confusion among Russian forces by stripping away Russian reconnaissance — which he said parenthetically that U.S. Marines “were very, very good at.”[1]  

 

So, another atypical behavior by the Russians in that they apparently didn’t conduct reconnaissance in force or in a supportive manner and did not, apparently, operate screens or counter-recon forces.  Despite this recognition of the atypical behavior of the Russian forces by Berger, he then proceeds to draw conclusions!

 

Is there more atypical behavior?

 

The commandant also noted Russian forces seemed to have planned for a very short war and lost momentum with poor logistics planning. He said the Ukrainian forces seemed to be able to strike at the Russian “logistics backside.”[1]  

 

So, acknowledging that Russia seemed to have planned for a very short conflict and did not bring the necessary logistic support, he then proceeds to draw conclusions!

 

Berger’s invalid conclusions are not limited to the Ukraine war.

 

“Instead of tank-on-tank formations, I would say if you look at Armenia and Azerbaijan, Lebanon, or even right now in Ukraine, it’s pretty clear the top-down missile attacks on the top side of heavy armor makes [tanks] pretty vulnerable,” he said.[1]  

 

None of those regions saw armor deployed in doctrinally correct fashion.  Every report I’ve seen indicates that tanks were deployed piecemeal and unsupported by air or infantry.  The only valid conclusion is that stupidity is a good way to die on the battlefield.  I’m pretty sure China isn’t going to be that stupid.

 

As best I can tell from very questionable reports, Russia attempted to half-ass a war with Ukraine in an attempt to pre-emptively placate a populace that they would eventually control and want to have good (or at least not fanatically hostile) relations with when the fighting ended.  If true, that’s theoretically laudable but realistically stupid.  As we’ve harped on in this blog, ‘in it to win it, or don’t get in it’.  You can’t half-ass a war.

 

As far as attempting to draw conclusions and lessons, I’m pretty sure China is not going to half-ass a war with us like Russia seems to be doing in Ukraine so why are Berger and the rest of us drawing conclusions from an atypical war?

 

My fear and suspicion is that Berger is doing the same thing with the secret war games he claims to be using to reshape the Marine Corps.  I suspect that he’s generating invalid war games and, therefore, drawing invalid conclusions.  If he’s clearly doing it with the Ukraine lessons, why wouldn’t he do the same with his war games?

 

For the rest of us, be patient and withhold your judgment.  Lessons will eventually come from the Ukraine war but not yet.

 

 

 

__________________________________

 

Though not relevant to this post, Berger did make one baffling statement:

 

Berger noted that amphibious operations are very complex and the Russian forces seemed to unnecessarily delay their limited amphibious operations. He said amphibious operations remain very much the core mission of the Corps.[1]    

 

So, despite publicly and repeatedly stating that the Marines are out of the frontal amphibious assault business and saying that large deck amphibious ships were of limited value, Berger is now saying that amphibious ‘operations’ (he didn’t use the word assault but what other significant amphibious operation is there for Marines?) are the core mission of the Corps.  Wait, now.  I thought small unit, missile shooting was the core mission?  How many core missions do the Marines have?  By definition, you can only have one core mission.  That’s what the word, ‘core’, means!  Okay, Berger, which is it?  What is the Marine’s single, core mission?  If amphibious ‘operations’ is the core mission, why have the Marines shed their tanks and reduced their artillery? 

 

Does this guy have any idea what he’s doing?  It doesn’t seem like it.  He seems to be floundering and flinging everything he can think of at the budget wall to see what sticks and can get funded.

 

 

 

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[1]Seapower Magazine, “Berger: Ukraine War Demonstrates Vulnerability of Tanks to Missile-Armed Infantry”, Richard Burgess, 16-Mar-2022,

https://seapowermagazine.org/berger-ukraine-war-demonstrates-vulnerability-of-tanks-to-missile-armed-infantry/


72 comments:

  1. To see which side is losing in a war, we watch which side keeps doing desperate acts. Looks like Ukraine keeps doing desperate acts. For people with basic military knowledge, despite sympathy toward Ukraine, cannot believe most Ukrainian side stories.

    Their Turkish UVA TB-2, basically, not useful. Russian troops were hit initially but once they became serious, then, all we saw were TB-2 been down. In reality, this kind slow speed low mobility (large wing span as to stay air long), low capability on anti electronic signal jamming are not very useful to counter a competent army with even mid range anti aircraft weapons. They could perform well against militia lack of sophiscate anti aircraft weapons.

    There are only two nations have capability to control UAV through satellite chain. Russia is not one. They are US and China. Ukraine has to operate their TB-2 not too far from front line. Russia can track and attack their operating center 100 miles away easily.

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    1. You've seen documentation of more than the 1 TB2 downing>

      Delete
  2. I think there are 2 lessons USN/UMSC can draw from Ukraine War already:

    1. Training!!!!Sorry but there's too many videos, some even from Russian sources! (next point)showing how disorganized their forces are. Or their troops are running around with their hair on fire or just standing around waiting,waiting,waiting.....Im not sure what they waiting for? To get picked off by a sniper or UAV? Tanks and fuel trucks, the same, just parked for what looks like hours and in single file....it would be a massacre if Ukraine had just a little more air support. I really think this does show a lack of general training, lack of initiative and lack of general sense of mission: all relevant points to USN!!!

    2. Other serious lesson: this one probably more for USMC: everybody has a SMARTPHONE!!! HELLOOOOO!!!!! You know what they do with their SMARTPHONES? They post their day on FB, YOUTUBE, TIKTOK, INSTAGRAM,etc....whatever the kids will use tomorrow, they will film it and post it!!! This is a serious issues folks! Mark my words, already just us plain Jane civilians we Geo-locate these posts AND LOCATIONS, how long you think it will be before (I believe they are working on the technology already!)military take these vidoes,photos and in a matter of minutes will get a GRID SQUARE NUMBER to drop some rounds of artillery down range?!?! This will happen, COMSEC from what I hearing from Russian forces is just terrible BUT NOW you add their own troops giving off their own LOCATIONS?!?! This is a problem for USMC. You need good COMSEC AND what and how you get the SMARTPHONES to stay OFF?!?


    Latest are more rumors but agree with CNO, there's some interesting tidbits of info coming out about A2A combat and SAM employment but too early to draw conclusions yet. We need to know more details and more time to draw some lessons from those....

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    1. "everybody has a SMARTPHONE!!!"

      One would think the importance of not carrying an always-on transponder that broadcasts multiple types of information including a unique identifier, in a known data format, on known frequencies, would be widely understood by modern-day military personnel. Alas, human nature being what it is, I can well believe they don't.

      Although this is a low-quality source, at least this issue is getting some playtime in the public consciousness.

      https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10629125/Russian-spies-tracking-British-former-special-forces-teams-mobile-numbers.html

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  3. I think the lessons are more from what Russia did wrong which is pretty much everything:

    - Air superiority & SEAD
    - Combined Arms
    - ISTAR and C2. Rissian soldiers have beem usong cheap civilian radios instead of secure military grade comms. Russian forces seem to be largely blind with reconnaissance being recon by force but then very little to back up initial contact.
    - ability to initiate precision fires in timely manner
    - air and ground cooperation.
    - flank qnd rear echelon security/defence
    -logistics
    -problems of top down command approach coupled with dismal unsecured comms.
    -Importance of having well trained officers and NCOs (Russian armies have never had competent NCOs and junior officers).
    -Concentration of force.

    The only thing the Russians can do well is precision strikes on fixed targets (and in a world of cheap GPS even Iranians manage this).

    Basically the war simply shows that the same uncoordinated approaches used in Spanish Civil War and against Finland or by the Syrians in 1973 or 1982 are still stupid.

    I think the Nagorni Karabakh War was far more relevant in terms of discerning future trends


    Also the Russian A2/AD is clearly a myth - the Ukrainian air force continues to exist as a fighting force and the Russians are unable to intercept solitary Ukrainian Tochka ballistic missiles despite deploying S400s. We already knew this from Syria but this just confirms this.

    Given China's A2/AD is largely based on Russian tech then it's capabilities Re also probably also questionable especially against a force with considerable stealth, EW and SEAD capabilities.

    I think the war justifies the current US approach to developing its forces in terms of land conflict -stealth aircraft, precision strike, ISTAR, networked warfare as well as obvious advantages in leaders.

    The Russian focused on basically heavily armed Batallion Tactical Groups with each small infantry batallion (200 men in 3 companies) supported by 10-20 tanks and 12-18 artillery pieces was completely wrong. Seems these BTGs are completely blind (no real ISTAR), unable to sustain casualties and very poorly integrated both within themselves and at higher levels



    I don't think it justifies the Marines island fighting concept. If the Russians and Iranians can hit stationary targets accurately then so can Chinese.

    From a naval perspective we can see that

    1. Russian style air defences struggle with even 1980s vintage jets with limited/non existent EW/SEAD support.

    USN does SEAD well thanks to EA-18G.

    Proliferation of stealth aircraft ie F-35 further undermines Russian dtyle air defences.

    2. Importance of ISTAR - Even a 100 Type 055s are worthless if they are blind.

    Here the US currently has advantage and will for some time thanks to geeater number of subs, better sensors, more AWACs, more maritime patrol aircraft and large patrol drones than PLA.

    However PLA is making inroads and also benefits from land based radars including large Over The Horizon radars.

    3. Importance of logsitics - US logistics capabilities are in decline due to the decline of the US merchant fleet.

    But also US ability to protect logistics has decreased due to loss of large number of submarines, ASW frigates and MCM capability.

    The humble ASW corvette and minesweeper were two of the most important ships in WW2.

    Clearly US needs to reintroduce cheap ASW and MCM capabilities.

    One wonders if there is a role for the Gator navy to function as ASW carriers for convoy protection with drones and choppers?




    ReplyDelete
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    1. You've completely missed - or chosen to ignore - the point of the post. There is ever reason to believe (or at least suspect) that what we're seeing from the Russians is not typical and yet you're buying into it 100%.

      You're also ignoring the post warning that what we're hearing is purely propaganda from the Ukrainian side and, despite that, you're buying into it 100%.

      Oh well.

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  4. Dead1 has a good list above. I think there are some items postulated now proven out.

    - Plenty of the globe and plenty fo the year will allow a main battle tank to roam free. Not everywhere nor all the time. Ground pressure matters. Plan ahead.
    - Where is there version of Trophy? Has the balance of weight alotted for defense shifted decisively t active measures to defeat being hit?
    - The biggest item I see is the ability to get useful information in to the hands of shooters to exploit a situation. If you can't see the power of networks at work here you are missing the whole thing. Articcle on USNI today bringing too much attention to that frankly.
    - Proxy war is alive.
    - Gray zone matters and doesn't.
    - The ability to throw up a citizen defense is alive and well.
    - war in one place effects us all. can't deny it. can't avoid it.
    - We have seen what a little bit of UAV can do. We are about to see what a little loitering munition can do.
    - The Marines plan aren't wrong, but they aren't right either. They appear to be great for a war that isn't the one they are planning to fight.

    I'll probably have more tomorrow.

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    1. See my reply to Dead1 above. You, too, are totally ignoring the warnings in the post.

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    2. Not at all. You picked a topic. We have another vantage point. Would this war resembler Taiwan or anything in the Pacific? Certainly not. Are there aspects that could be applied there? Absolutely. For one, look at the tanking capacity used merely to patrol NATOs border. We are going to need lots of gas.

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    3. "You picked a topic."

      Yeah, the topic was not to speculate about lessons when there is no validated information! Which you promptly ignored.

      You're doing exactly what the post warned against. You're drawing conclusions with no authoritative information.

      You're free to do so but your conclusions are invalid. That doesn't necessarily mean they're wrong but they are invalid from this data set because the data is not authoritative. That said, feel free to speculate, if you wish.

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  5. There are a couple of basic principles that seem to be supported by Russian behavior and the results.

    (1) A number of commentators have suggested that the reason the Russians started their invasion the way they did was that they bought into their own pre-war propaganda that the Ukrainian government would immediately collapse and the Ukrainian people would welcome the Russian soldiers as liberators. This suggestion might even be true. At least it's consistent with their behavior.

    Basic principle: Plans should be based on reality, not on wishful thinking.

    (2) There's a lot of evidence (for example, the 40 mile traffic jam north of Kiyev that can be seen from space) that the Russians are having logistical problems.

    Basic principle: logistics matters. A lot !!

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    1. If the Russians really believed reason #1 then they would not have amassed such a large force around Ukraine or had a 40 mile supply convoy.

      Far more likely its #2, so the high level planning has probably been correct but the execution, so far, has left a lot to be desired. There's quite possibly a number of incompetent or corrupt officers (as in siphoned off resources for profit etc) who are now in jail or worse.

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    2. This is just speculation but, maybe, just maybe Russia amassed just such a large force (if it is reason #1) was so they can parade their tanks when the Ukrainians welcome them in open arms(which didn't happen), and this seems supported by the fact there seems to no "elite" units (most of the tanks seen in combat seems to be older T-72 models)

      So maybe the big force was originally intended for propaganda purposes like, say, the below from Nazi Germany in World War 2

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neubaufahrzeug

      Of course I could always be wrong....

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    3. I'll agree with that, you are always wrong! :)

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    4. "so they can parade their tanks when the Ukrainians welcome them in open arms(which didn't happen)"

      That's as good a speculation as any and is likely true to at least some degree, if not completely. I suspect Russia was shocked at the intensity of the Ukraine reaction and now they're scrambling to adjust.

      The Russians may well have thought that assembling a massive force on the border would have intimidated the Ukrainians into collapsing.

      I agree that the apparent absence of top line equipment and units likely suggests that the Russians were holding back for one or more of the various reasons postulated.

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    5. One could connect that dot to their crew showing up to the ISS in Gold and Blue. Still, could they be so ignorant of history? Even landing in Vichy territory in Operation Torch was hardly casualty free.

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  6. There is one lesson that can be drawn: the will to fight is key.

    The Ukranians are willing to fight for their nation; the Russians are unwilling to fight the Ukranians. That's part of how the Ukranians are still holding on, three weeks into a conflict that was expected to last three days.

    Will the American populace have the same willingness to fight as the Ukranian populace? Will the American people willingly accept deprivation and hardship in their daily lives to secure victory?

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    1. Yes, i think every nation would if the aggressor is an external attacker. The question for the Ukranians & any attacked nation, assuming the aggressor get its act together, is how much of their country are they prepared to have destroyed if the result is inevitable and when do they see that?

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    2. Why was this war expected to last 3 days?

      When Germany invaded Poland it lasted 35 days.

      When Germany invaded France in 1940 it lasted 6 weeks and the French did not want that fight till it was forced upon them.

      2003 invasion of Iraq also about 6 weeks.

      It Ukraine is still holding on in 2 more weeks I will agree with you but the Russian military seems to have finally started taking the fight seriously (nothing like seeing friends/comrades killed to motivate conscripts to fight harder).

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    3. It was likely a logistical error that sent conscripts to the front line at the start of the war, the are meant to be there in a support capacity, with the professional volunteer forces at the front. I'd imagine some officers / personnel have been throw in prison for that incompetent mistake.

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    4. Various reports suggest that Russia has held back its front line equipment and, presumably, its front line personnel. Why? Unsure.

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    5. Perhaps in case it got a more aggressive response from Nato etc??

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    6. @ComNavOps

      Because they don't actually have any or not very much of it and what they do have is either to expensive or to difficult for them to maintain.

      What we are seeing isn't Russia holding back it's the best they can do after 30 years of neglect and downsizing.

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    7. "What we are seeing isn't Russia holding back it's the best they can do after 30 years of neglect and downsizing."

      Possibly ... or they're trying to modulate their actions to pacifiy citizens (their own and Ukraine's), or they're trying to influence world opinion in their favor, or they're trying to stay below the level of violence that would trigger NATO/US action, or any number of other reasons.

      Your statement may be true in part or in whole but you have no proof - which was the point of the post. We just don't know, yet, so, if we're wise, we'll withhold our analyzing for the time being.

      "Because they don't actually have any or not very much of it and what they do have is either to expensive or to difficult for them to maintain."

      Or ... they anticipated an easy victory and opted not to risk having top of the line equipment wind up in NATO/US hands.

      Again, beware of drawing conclusions about things we have no definitive information about.

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    8. Agree/disagree? not sure! LOL! But yes there is one strange thing about the mishmash of gear and surprising amount of old gear thrown in with 1 or 2 brand new spec gear which I can't really find any explanation for, Ive reached out to some serious people and even they are "clueless" about why Russians forces have done this. It doesn't make sense really ,lots of suppositions and guesses but no hard answers.

      Example: why did the Russians used very little jamming, some sporadic reports of heavy jamming but generally, not much and far less than what was expected? Why then did Ukraine just capture what sure looks like a brand new, new spec jamming vehicle?!? Why did the Russians bring it so close to the front to lose it? Especially the latest model!!! Hopefully US or West secret services are getting their hands on it! Why is Russian COMSEC so bad? Why are they using so many civilian phones?!?

      Same goes for what we now know are those MLRS PENAIDS decoys, those were undisclosed in open literature, maybe CIA knew about them and not even sure about that but now, it's out in the open and again, hopefully US and Western forces are getting their hands on them, why bother using your latest tech if more than likely, you didn't need to use it?!?? Russians are disclosing A LOT OF NEW GEAR for really no major reason....and no one really knows why? Lots of suppositions but no hard answers yet.

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    9. I don't think the Russians are holding back their best. Kinshals, Iskanders, Kalibrs, Su-30/34/35 is their best. They haven't deployed some new kit ala T-90M or T-14 Armata or Su-57 but I suspect that is because they don't have sufficient operational numbers to be worth deploying it.


      And they seem to be running out of their best - Iskanders are becoming rarer and older Tochka's have been brought out of retirement. US thinks use of Kinshal hypersonics also indicates they are running out of precision missiles.

      Delete
  7. First, excellent post.

    There's just so much ignorance and stupidity being thrown around on this war, to say nothing about outright incompetence and sheer dishonesty.

    Technical analysis will have to wait since we're being flooded with disinformation, propaganda, fakes and whatnot from all sides.
    (Hilariously, television ran some video game footage while claiming it was from Ukraine. Retards.)

    However, there's plenty we can already learn from this.

    First, propaganda is everywhere and more important than ever, aimed not just ar Russians or Ukrainians (internal propaganda) but crucially at the international media who shape Western/American perception.

    Both sides know that America will not start WWIII over this, but might if things got worse.
    Hence why Zelensky is clumsily but stubbornly trying to escalate things and to push the USA into war, for example.
    Putin is more experienced but his position is also more awkward.

    Verifying information is extremely difficult and time-consuming, not to mention that people don't care.
    Just record a video of some Slavic guy speaking in his native language and write whatever you want in the subtitles, 90% won't even think about checking whether it's true.

    Much like China, Russia knows well how to push just before the level that would result in America starting a war.

    This is why Putin is not turning Kiev into a new Dresden, because mass graves and a million dead civilians would generate a reaction.
    Of course this means their beloved artillery is less useful, for example.

    Much like in the Israel-Gaza situation, Ukrainian troops are taking advantage of the situation by blending with the general population.

    Of course if the number of evacuees keeps rising, things may change.

    Pushing Russia and China closer together is a major geopolitical mistake, by the way, but that's a slightly different subject.

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    1. Russia is relying on its nuclear arsenal to deter America / Nato as long as it doesn't attack a Nato country of course.
      Look at how much angst America had when dealing with North Korea and their ancient military and piddly stockpile of maybe a few nukes.
      Russia, if they are holding back, has been doing so because they are trying to alienate as little of the Ukranian population as possible and destroy as little as possible.
      However that may change in the weeks ahead.

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    2. It will only be a matter of time until the Russians decided that any civilian population that mingles with the Ukrainian military are valid military targets, common rules of war states that armed forces draws as clear a distinction if possible from the civilian population and the civilians must wear identifications if they want to be partisans or actively resist the enemy.

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    3. "Russia is relying on its nuclear arsenal to deter America / Nato"

      No, not even a little. Russia may threaten to use nuclear weapons but it will not. It would have zero chance of surviving a nuclear war. It's pure posturing and can only be effective against timid, frightened leaders. I'll refrain from offering an opinion and leave it to you to decide whether nuclear threats would be effective against our political leadership.

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    4. "It will only be a matter of time until the Russians decided that any civilian population that mingles with the Ukrainian military are valid military targets,"

      I think that ship has already sailed. If reports are to be believed, Russia is already targeting shelters, hospitals, schools, etc. This is reminiscent of the German's attack on London during WWII which did not achieve the civilian collapse that the Germans hoped for but, instead, strengthened the British resolve.

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    5. "No, not even a little. Russia may threaten to use nuclear weapons but it will not. It would have zero chance of surviving a nuclear war."
      Correct, but it would also have zero chance if Nato attacked it now so it would have nothing to lose.

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    6. That is, even if Nato attacked just with conventional forces.

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    7. Who knows Putin's motivations for certain but it's hard to imagine he would opt for the complete nuclear destruction of Russia over a squabble about Ukraine. He's just posturing. He would also die and I don't think that's in his long term plans.

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    8. We tend to be so frightened that it alters our thinking and removes our objectivity.

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    9. To be honest, tactical nukes against regular Ukrainian formations in the east and even around Kiev and in Mauripol would make sense about now to expedite operations.

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  8. "If amphibious ‘operations’ is the core mission, why have the Marines shed their tanks and reduced their artillery?"

    Because you can't get them ashore from an LHA/LHD operating 25+ miles offshore?

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    1. You consistently put the chicken before the egg on that issue. The Marines have not abandoned assault because of the Lxx issues. The removal of the amphibs to 25-50 miles offshore came about because of the threat of missiles. Facing that threat, the Marines/Navy opted to move far offshore and give up on assaults. THEY GAVE UP PRIOR TO MOVING OFFSHORE!

      The end of amphibious assault began when the LST was eliminated and the LCAC was doctrinally relegated to follow on function. That left the Marines with no viable connectors. It wasn't the Lxx, it was the Marines pursuing land combat budgets instead of amphibious budgets.

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    2. Well, you don't get eggs without a chicken. The first LHAs came into the fleet in the late 1970s. The Marines gave up tanks and heavy artillery in 2020, long after the LHA/LHDs proved themselves incapable of getting them reliably ashore from 25-50+ miles out. I think the time sequence pretty clearly establishes the change in thinking.

      As far as the LSTs, as an old T sailor I have long argued for a T renewal. I have noticed that your proposed fleet includes 9 large deck amphibs (LHA/LHD) and 6 attack transports (LPA) but no LSTs, whereas I have proposed 10 LSTs and nothing as large as current USN LHA/LHDs (the LHA/LHD I propose would be based on the successful and much smaller SP Juan Carlos/AU Canberra). I would think seriously about doubling the number of Ts.

      The Marine pursuit of land rather than amphibious combat budgets pretty much paints them into a corner as baby army, with no really unique capability, and strikes me as a great way to get the Corps absorbed into the Army. I still think a big part of this started when Westmoreland sent Marines north to I Corps rather than south to the Mekong Delta, where they would have been well placed to build a formidable riverine force working with the Navy.

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    3. "tanks and heavy artillery ... the LHA/LHDs proved themselves incapable of getting them reliably ashore from 25-50+ miles out."

      You're not understanding the issue(s) correctly.

      1. We CAN get tanks and artillery ashore from far out by using LCACs and LCUs.

      2. The issue is that tanks and artillery are doctinally not considered 1st wave equipment REGARDLESS OF DISTANCE. They're considered follow on equipment AFTER THE LANDING IS SECURED.

      Thus, the ability (or not) to get tanks and artillery ashore is NOT why the Marines have abandoned amphibious assaults. The Marines have simply decided that assaults are too hard, for reasons that elude me. LXX placement has nothing to do with it.

      Have you ever seen a single statement from any Marine official saying that they can't do assault because of LXX distance?

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    4. I'm not aware of any situation where an active-duty Marine officer would not find such a statement to be a career-limiting move.

      I have seen such statements from at least one Naval officer--you. You are where I got the idea from.

      Am I misunderstanding what you mean by reasonably straightforward statements like,

      "The final piece of the puzzle is the fact that we can’t actually conduct an amphibious assault from 25-50 nm standoff distance as our doctrine calls for!"

      or

      "Of course, all of this discussion is pointless given the nonsensical 25-50+ mile standoff doctrine. The maximum time troops can be in a landing craft is an hour, and that’s pushing it. Any longer and the troops will be rendered combat incapable. So, unless we can develop a first wave, infantry landing craft that can travel at 30-50 kts, the starting point must be moved back in to the horizon or closer."

      or,

      "The Marines and Navy can talk all they want about amphibious assault but until they begin to acquire the basic, non-glamorous capabilities like MCM, naval fire support, C-RAM, functional first wave connectors, etc., amphibious assault will remain just talk."

      Of course, we agree totally on,

      "The Marines need to bring something unique and valuable to the table or fold up and go away. There is no middle ground. Hey, Marine Corps, that sound you hear behind you is the Army sniffing at your butt. Time to wake up!"

      Delete
    5. "The final piece of the puzzle is the fact that we can’t actually conduct an amphibious assault from 25-50 nm standoff distance as our doctrine calls for!"

      You seem to have completely misunderstood me!

      The reasons we can't execute an assault from a distance are many (no MCM, no naval gun support, no initial assault reusable landing craft, no first wave mobile firepower, no ability to logistically sustain an assault, and so on. Few or none of the reasons have to do with LXX distance and tank/artillery transport.

      The Marine Commandant has publicly stated that he's unwilling to attempt an assault due to fear of the enemy's capabilities. I post his statement and my analysis. Basically, I demonstrated that he's afraid of the task. What he did NOT say is that the LXX are too far away. He stated why he wouldn't conduct an assault and it had nothing to do with LXX distance.

      While the end result is the same regardless of the reason, the reason is critically important in discussing solutions and this is where you're failing and why I keep pointing it out. Before you can fix a problem you have to accurately see the problem.

      For example, simply moving the LXX closer to shore won't provide critical naval gunfire support, it won't clear mines from the surf/beach, it won't provide C-RAM coverage, it won't provide firepower to deal with fortifications or enemy armor, it won't provide a 2nd wave of infantry, it won't logistically sustain an assault, and so on. I've posted on all these aspects.

      LXX distance is an issue and doesn't help things but it is not why we can't do assaults and it is not why the Marines have abandoned assaults.
      You really need to come up to speed on this.

      Delete
    6. Here's the Commandant's own statement about why the Marines can't conduct assaults. Note that it has nothing to do with LXX distance.

      "The Final Nail"

      Delete
    7. My thinking about the LHA/LHD and amphibious assaults started in my active duty Gator Navy when, in between taking time to trim the sails, we had serious and repeated discussions about how the "big deck amphibs" were putting too many eggs in one basket. Roll forward to a couple of years ago, when you had several posts about the lack of viable connectors to get tanks and heavy artillery to the beach from 25-50 or more miles offshore, where Navy doctrine now dictates that such ships operate because of that risk. I see a connection with the Marines' decisions to get rid of tanks and heavy artillery, which renders them a pretty inept amphib assault force. You apparently disagree. I don't think we are going to get to an agreement on that point, so I think we are better to agree to disagree.

      Delete
    8. "I see a connection with the Marines' decisions to get rid of tanks and heavy artillery"

      To put it as gently as I can, you're making up a story to fit your notion of what happened. There is ZERO evidence that the Marine's decision had anything to do with LXX distance. In fact, there IS evidence that it didn't - the Commandant's own statement, for example, as I just documented.

      You're welcome to your own (unsupported) version but do not present it as a statement of fact. The blog requirement is facts and data. As long as you identify your version as an unsupported interpretation when you bring it up, I won't have any objection.

      Delete
    9. I don't put a lot of trust in the statements of the Commandant or CNO. And I don't think I've ever intended to offer the LHA/LHD argument as anything more than my interpretation of the factual record. If you got a different impression, I apologize.

      Delete
    10. I take statements at face value until or unless I can disprove them ... which I frequently do and then document it on this blog. For this case, I can find no evidence to dispute the Commandant's explanation about the Marine's refusal to consider amphibious assaults and it fits logically with the rest of the Marine's attitudes and actions such as dumbing down of 'toughness' in favor of diversity and gender integration, lowering of standards, emphasizing sensitivity over fighting spirit, establishment of women's liaison units, elimination of tanks, reduction of artillery, etc. Given all that, the Commandant's explanation seems right in line and I believe his statement. To discount it requires that you ignore a whole bunch of supporting evidence and logic, as I just described.

      You can choose not to believe him, of course, but doing so kind of suggests that you have made up your mind and facts be damned! You may not like the Commandant's explanation but you should follow the facts where they lead rather than hold on to a belief that is totally unsupported.

      To be sure, the distance factor doesn't help anything but it's clearly not the reason why the Marines gave up amphibious assault.

      By the way, I've got a post coming where the Commandant publicly states that the Marines have NOT given up assaults despite his many statements to the contrary. You'll like the hypocrisy of it!

      Delete
    11. To me there appear to be three interconnected trends:
      1) The lack of supporting NGFS, MCM, and other capabilities essential to a proper assault;
      2) The Marines moving to baby army with baby air force, starting when Westmoreland sent them north to I Corps instead of south to the Mekong Delta to build a formidable riverine force with the Navy, and continuing as they moved further and further from their core mission in Iraq and Afghanistan; and
      3) The LHA/LHDs being poor amphibious platforms.

      I'm not sure which was the dominant trend, but I think all three contributed. If anything, my thinking may be influenced by the timing--all three started during my active duty years, and we thought all three were nuts then. So perhaps there is a tendency on my part to believe that our predictions came through. But I still trust my analysis more than the Commandant's (probably self-serving and clearly hypocritical) statements.

      I think the Marines are currently lost without a mission. They are under some pressure to be absorbed into the Army. And they're grasping at straws to find relevance somewhere. Well, dudes, EABO ain't it.

      Delete
    12. For a little more perspective on the issue, you might want to check out this post from some years ago:
      "LX(R) and LCAC"

      Delete
  9. The lessons that I'm seeing here from the couch watching TV:

    - Logistics, logistics, logistics

    - You need to blind the enemy's satellite surveillance (how much have the Ukrainians benefitted from our satellite intelligence?)

    - Combined arms are the key; tanks need to mass as a team to be the mailed fist, infantry needs to support the tanks and keep the enemy infantry at arm's length, artillery must be ready to support troops in contact

    - Training; tough realistic training in which the commanders and troops are stressed is critical to preparing for combat

    - Believing in what you're fighting for is pretty important

    None of this is new.
    It's really more reminders of what we already know to be true rather than lessons learned.

    Lutefisk

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Believing in what you are fighting for is largely irrelevant. The Americans have been involved in that many poorly conceived wars from Vietnam to Iraq to Afghanistan yet US troops performed professionally and as expected.

      In movies you see how soldiers fight for the men in their unit. Russians don't do that - they leave their dead behind. There is no cohesion.

      The Waffen SS and Japanese in WWII were as fanatical as they come yet they were wiped out and thrashed by superior firepower, C2 ISTAR and logistics.

      The Russian military is basically a relic of the Great Northern War against the Swedes in early 1700s - untrained, non cohesive, no effective NCOs/junior officer corps, and effectively a bludgeon.

      The tactics they field are that from WW2. Eg they use the Su-30 and Su-34 (equivalent to F-15E or F-111) in the same way they used to use Il-2 Shturmoviks in 1941-45!

      This is not a modern army. The whole doctrinal shift they've been talking about for years was in the end an academic exercise that was clearly never implemented across the board.

      Delete
  10. The Marine Corp is restructuring as a screening defensive force. By defending in this way they allow the USN to manoeuvre and remain offensive.

    This will probably lead to a lot of small unit jungle warfare. As opponents will also deploy troops to the same places.

    As to Russia, their units need to be within 80 km of a rail head. They have supply units one third of a western unit (ie a battalion has a platoon supply unit versus a supply company in the west). Note the WW2 German army with horse drawn logistics could operate 200 km from a rail head.

    Unlike most countries Russia is built on rail lines not highways. Hence their dependence on rail.

    They have two tow trucks per battalion. They are abandoning vehicles because they can't tow them. The US Army expects a battalion of tanks that one will break down per hour.

    ReplyDelete
  11. "Specifically, the lawmakers said the new system should be low-cost, exportable to allies and available in 36 months."

    So CONGRESS decided we need a replacement STINGER and it needs to be exportable and low cost. Always nice to see what we can do when we in a hurry....SARCASM! Seriously, we are not serious about war!


    https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/exclusive-hasc-leaders-want-next-gen-stinger-replacement-as-stockpile-dwindles-due-to-ukraine/

    ReplyDelete
  12. According to the R-MSM the special military operation is going well, the Wehrmacht will be expelled from Kiev in days.
    The Red Square Victory parade will be May 1, Putin will be on the white horse, not Zhukov.
    Anyone saying otherwise is a an agent of Trotsky.

    So once Putin takes Ukraine, the sanctions mostly stay on.
    China becomes Russia's banker, Russia is then Sri Lanka with Rockets. Petrograd will be a Chinese treaty port.
    Putin will find the Chinese make very uncomfortable bankers
    compared with Germans. But he'll have Ukraine.




    ReplyDelete
  13. Several thoughts: US media is claiming a daily loss rate, adjusted for the Russian forces size, greatly in excess of Tarawa and the Meuse Argonne-- Multiples higher. That is impossible. As are the daily claims the Russians are being driven back, but then they keep advancing to new potions to be 'driven back' again, before the next reported advance.

    I know the first casualty in war is the truth. But this is taken past extremes.

    As for the US Marines. It is so, so, so much worse. The genius squad running the Corps not only got rid of the armor and half the tube arty, they also got rid of assaultmen and the entire missile section in each company. To make budget room for more cyber.

    So no tanks to fight armor with, and no Marines who are trained missilemen, and darn few missiles left at all. And a lot less arty.

    I want this to be a joke, but I am 3/4 serious. If the Commandant was on the payroll of China and Russia to let them win the next war--what would he do differently?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. " If the Commandant was on the payroll of China and Russia to let them win the next war--what would he do differently?"

      Political purge of those that don't agree with the ideology of the current administration?

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    2. "As are the daily claims the Russians are being driven back, but then they keep advancing to new potions to be 'driven back' again, before the next reported advance."

      It's not inconceivable or exclusive with reality. It's very easily explained by the Russians advancing during the day, and then being driven back at night, as the Ukranians exploit their greater nightvision supply and superior comms. Daylight equalises a lot of those advantages.

      And then you have things like Hostomel, where VDV were being lifted in penny-packet company-sized movements to take the airport, which is why they kept seizing portions of the airport and kept getting repulsed...

      Delete
    3. Care to share where you are getting or how you are making the Tarawa comparison?

      Delete
  14. "I think that ship has already sailed. If reports are to be believed, Russia is already targeting shelters, hospitals, schools, etc. This is reminiscent of the German's attack on London during WWII which did not achieve the civilian collapse that the Germans hoped for but, instead, strengthened the British resolve."

    @ComNavOps: I'm reminded about your earlier post on civilians, and your argument of how in a total war scenario, there are no true civilians as we understand it because these people are supporting the war effort. It would seem that the Russians are in agreement with you in this regard.

    No judgement, just a thought that flew into my mind, remembering your earlier work.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "remembering your earlier work."

      I'm honored that you recall my work!

      "in a total war scenario, there are no true civilians"

      In an existential fight for survival, as Ukraine is engaged in, there are few true civilians. Almost everyone is contributing to the war effort in one way or another.

      As I've said in other comments, I find the parallels between this and the Battle of Britain to be uncanny. History has a strong tendency to repeat, doesn't it?

      If history is repeating, does that suggest that we, the 'Allies', should get involved now to stop Hitler/Putin before more damage is done? One of the major lessons from WWII is that the Allies waited too long to take action. Could this be history offering us the opportunity to learn from past mistakes? What do you think?

      Delete
  15. After weeks of battles, after cross reading of different sources (propaganda is part of battle, right?), my opinions are:

    Before Russian invasion, most Ukrainian elite troops were in its eastern front pressing the two separate Republics' militia.

    In first few days, Russian troop's goal was to isolate them. Apparently, Russia achieved this. This is why Russian troop focused on speed and left out of order equipment behind unattended.

    Russia has truly no intention to capture Kiev. It attack Kiev to lure Ukrainian elite troops trapped in eastern front to reinforce Kiev Giving Russia has air supremacy, if these heavily armored Ukrainian troops move in large column, Russia can bomb them out.

    Russia wants to destroy Ukrainian elite troops so its goal of disarmament will be achieved PHYSICALLY.

    Ukrainian troops perform poorly since Russian invasion. Up to date, we don't see any large scale movement of its troops. All seem stay in their fortified positions in cities (use human shield)> I don't know whether they are chicken out or understand if they move out of fortifications, they will be bombed into ...

    Now, Russia has to cut off their supplies, especially food supplies. Open humantarial pathways can achieve goals to let only fighters in city so Russia can starve them to death.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "
      Ukrainian troops perform poorly since Russian invasion. Up to date, we don't see any large scale movement of its troops. "

      Wouldn't it be prudent for the Ukrainians to hunker down in place as opposed to exposing themselves to air attacks? As it turns out, the cities are their best fortresses. If the Russians demolish cities with artillery, then the Ukrainians win over foreign support and the rubble still serves as strong protective cover. If the Russians do take the city, they will need to rebuild at high cost.
      On the other hand, if the Ukrainians leave the cities, then Russians can take the easy political victory and keep the prize without the cost. Solely military bases will be targeted outright by Russians who have overwhelming air and artillery power.

      It seems that the Ukrainian strategy is fairly straightforward. I wouldn't call it chicken, rather just prudent.

      Delete
  16. Good post in affirming that we don't really know anything much on what is happening in Ukraine. I disagree with many of the western assumption of why Russia ultimately invaded Ukraine but that's strategic politics I guess and not for this blog. I'm not sure ComNavOps will look kindly on discussing motivations and strategic thinking. These are simply my observations.

    The lesson I am learning, watching everything from Asia is that ultimately the west is not ready to face China, if that ever happens. From clear propaganda coming from the majority of the mainstream media, it is distressing to see how many people actually believe them. From "reports" of Russia's "ALL OUT INVASION", BRAVE Ukranians repeatedly FORCING back the mighty Russians, and how an edited video clearly showing a convoy column of transiting vehicles being labelled as ASSAULTING/ATTACKING a village being ambushed and REPELLED. They even show a tank creating smoke screen and state that it was on fire. Viewers cheered like they won the world cup. Most people certainly do not bother to read history or other information even though they are easier to obtain than ever. Nobody stops and verify or ask why. If the Russians made the mistake of believing their own propaganda then the west clearly does too.

    I play video games too, but the delusion I am witnessing is on a different level.

    Another lesson many in Asia are learning is that it is clear that we should not expect much from the rest of the world when China decide to come knocking. Except maybe a token force (remember ABDACOM from WW2?) and most certainly weapon sales. Let's see if the grossly negligent ASEAN countries wake up and do the responsible thing and arm up and harden both military and civil defence now. Looking at Ukraine, I pity the Taiwanese. Too much virtue signaling happening and far too little action. Worst case scenario, politicians sell out their countries and fold into Chinese sphere since lip service from the west isn't going to do much either. I'm not sure if the American leadership understands how all this is viewed from outside (international relations) rather than domestic, it will not be hard to imagine the Koreans, Japanese, Taiwanese and ASEAN leadership look at all this and grow ever more nervous.

    Sadly for technical/practical analysis of the conflict in Ukraine there is little, we don't even know what doctrine both sides adhere to, we can but guess. If we guess that the Russians' current doctrine is an evolution of Soviet massed assault doctrine then clearly as you rightly point out, what we are seeing is atypical.

    Loc

    ReplyDelete
  17. "Worst case scenario, politicians sell out their countries and fold into Chinese sphere "
    well, how much of ones country and one population needs to be destroyed if the ending is inevitable. If a defeat comes to be seem as genuinely inevitable at some point then its pride, hubris, irresponsibility, negligence or perhaps even criminal to continue to have people killed and infrastructure destroyed over a lost cause.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Indeed, if it comes to that I absolutely agree. I don't think many people share this unpopular opinion.

      However we are not there yet, we should be observing, learning, adapting and make decisions that will best suit us/align to our goals. That is what I believe responsible people should do.

      Alas I do not believe this is happening now, what I observe is a narrative that is pushed and reinforced, ignoring all else. Realism/pragmatism have gone out the window.

      The net result is, in my opinion, we are going towards the stated undesirable outcome.

      Loc

      Delete
    2. "how much of ones country and one population needs to be destroyed if the ending is inevitable."

      I can't completely agree with that. History suggests that there is a time and place to stand and die for one's beliefs and that positive results can come from such an act. The examples of the Alamo, Masada, and many others have inspired people throughout history. Martyrdom is a strong motivator. Whether Ukraine falls into this category, only they can determine but fighting to the end is not always irresponsible.

      There was a slogan during the Cold War, 'better dead than red'. There are times when death is deemed preferable to life under evil.

      Delete
    3. "There are times when death is deemed preferable to life under evil."
      Yes, it is. Just make sure you are judging correctly. No point dying if you are just going to live under a different governing system for a time. The Romans conquered many because they were strong but they also brought pax romana and many other benefits. They were just a stronger civilization, but no more evil than any they conquered.

      Delete
  18. There will be many 'lessons learned' from the Russo-Ukraine war of 2022; after all. every war has its lessons; but the biggest take away is confirmation that war remains unpredictable and there are many unintended circumstances that will arise from this conflict and that also involves the 'western response'

    The Russians obviously made many strategic assumptions based on their 2014 experiences in the Ukraine that have proved false, in no particular order:

    - Estimates of Ukrainian resistance
    - Domestic support for war in Ukraine
    - Foreign response to war in Ukraine
    - Viability of strategic and operational planning
    - Force selection and viability
    - Training to execute the operational plan
    - Logistics support capabilities

    We might sum these up as a failure to apply and think through the old ‘Method, Purpose, End State’ calculations.

    The West also completely misjudged Putin, the EU, and Germany in particular, completely failed: WRT to military force structure (grossly underfunded), energy policy (over-reliance on Russian energy, failure to plan for alternatives (LNG terminals, retaining nuclear power, etc.); diplomacy (would Swiss/Austrian type neutrality really have been acceptable? Probably not now…). Will the Russians choke off EU energy in response? Will the Russians enable fundamentalist and other terrorist against western targets?

    The unintended consequences are also potentially severe as the USA and EU have ‘weaponized’ sanctions and currency. The CCP certainly watched this and are now attempting to convince the Saudis to end the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency. If successful, the USA, with its $30 trillion-dollar public debt, will loose many advantages in financing its debt. Anyone thinking of the ramifications of sanctions being applied against not only the USG and its officials, but also private citizens should be concerned. Anyone who is familiar with the failure of fiat currencies throughout history should be horrified.

    GAB

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "The Russians obviously made many strategic assumptions based on their 2014 experiences in the Ukraine"

      This gives rise to a major factor in strategic thinking that is rarely considered and that is the future consequences. For example, as you note, Russia drew conclusions and lessons and those formed the basis for then future actions (now today's actions). So, what we choose to do or not do, today, may lead to consequences in the future. It's not enough to merely answer the question, do we have a direct, immediate strategic interest in Ukraine (or anywhere else)? That answer might be no. HOWEVER, the question, will our action (or inaction) cause negative consequences for us in the future may turn out to be the more important one.

      Did our inaction when Russia seized Crimea lead to today's invasion of Ukraine and will our inaction today lead to further and worse consequences for us in the future (like China reading this as an okay to begin a Pacific war)?

      While it's good to examine our immediate strategic interests before we jump into a conflict, we also need to examine our future strategic interests and this is rarely or never done.

      Delete
    2. @GAB

      "convince the Saudis to end the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency"

      That statement makes no logical sense. The not in the power of the House of Saud. Do you mean stop trading its oil in Dollars - the petro dollar myth? Would not hurt the US much at all if we even noticed it. What the alternative be anyway?

      Delete
  19. "Did our inaction when Russia seized Crimea lead to today's invasion of Ukraine and will our inaction today lead to further and worse consequences for us in the future (like China reading this as an okay to begin a Pacific war)?"

    That's really the $64,000 question.

    My hope is that Xi's enthusiasm for foreign adventures is curbed by the international reaction to Russia's Ukraine invasion.

    But regardless of Russia's international standing, someone will always be a buyer for their energy.

    China's economy, on the other hand, depends on international trade.

    But does the international community have the guts to break off trade with China if they invade Taiwan?
    Possibly.
    But I have my doubts.

    Lutefisk

    ReplyDelete
  20. Oryx has been keeping track of the equipment destroyed in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine based on open source data:
    * Russian equipment lost - https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
    * Ukrainian equipment lost - https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html

    There are likely other open source intelligence people with their own list, but these are well sourced.

    ReplyDelete

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