We’ve come to believe that long, drawn out development programs spanning decades are the norm for new aircraft. That’s our paradigm and because we labor under that paradigm, we see decades long development programs as normal and don’t question it. In fact, we question when someone suggests a shorter development cycle. For example, read the responses to the post, “How To Build A Better Aircraft” to see the knee jerk, paradigm-inspired, negative reactions.
The reality is that our paradigm could not be more wrong.
Let’s consider the example of the F6F Hellcat, the aircraft that won the naval aviation war in the Pacific. The Hellcat went from prototype contract award in Jun-1941 to first production aircraft in Oct-1942, a period of only 16 months and then entered squadron service on the USS Essex just 4 months later in Feb 1943.
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| F6F Hellcat |
In contrast, the F-35 has been under development for well over two decades with the first X-35 demonstrator prototype contract having been awarded in 1997. Development is still ongoing with the Block 4 full combat software suite still not ready and likely never will be !!!!!!
What if the F-35 had been needed for WWII? It would have been the mid-1960’s before the aircraft would have been ready even in the limited form it is today. We’d have lost the war while waiting for the F-35 (well, no we wouldn’t but I’m making a point).
Most of you are already pounding out a reply pointing out (rationalizing failure, actually … think about that … about what you’re defending …) that the F-35 is vastly more complex than the Hellcat so, of course, it would take more time. Well, why don’t you pause your typing for a few minutes and let’s examine that argument.
First, is the F-35 really more complex than the Hellcat was, for its time? The Hellcat incorporated new technology such as laterally distributed, hydraulically actuated, landing gear that rotated 90 degrees while retracting. It had a new powerplant, the Pratt & Whitney R-2800-10 with a two stage, two speed, supercharger. The propeller featured variable pitch which was regulated by oil pressure via the propeller governor. And so on.[1]
Adding to the complexity and degree of difficulty was the fact that all design work was done by hand. There were no computers, no computer aided design (CAD), no computer drawn blueprints, and no computer performance modeling and simulations. Calculations were done by hand or, perhaps, with the aid of a slide rule. Aeronautical theory was barely out of its WWI infancy. Aircraft design was largely a matter of corporate institutional knowledge, trial and error, and ‘feel’ from the designers.
Production was a challenge. There was no automated, robotic assembly; everything was hand built. New production techniques, such as the use of flat aluminum sheets on the Hellcat, were being conceived and put into use on the fly.
The Hellcat was a complex undertaking, for sure!
It’s highly debatable that the F-35 is more complex than the Hellcat was. However, that’s an unproductive debate. For the purposes of this discussion, let’s stipulate that the F-35 is more complex than the Hellcat was. [uh … I’ve got a bad feeling about this] In fact, let’s stipulate (with no supporting evidence) that the F-35 is the most complex undertaking man has ever attempted. That should satisfy the F-35 apologists and allow us to move on with our discussion. [oh, oh … why does this feel like a trap coming?]
Having reminded ourselves about the development time of the Hellcat and the F-35 (and blamed the complexity of the F-35 for the extended development time!), let’s ask ourselves, which is better: a short development time or a long development time? It’s not a trick question. The answer is obvious. A short development time is infinitely preferable to a long development time.
The F-35’s protracted, glacially slow development time is all kinds of bad and wrong. The F-35’s original design requirements, established well over two decades ago, are no longer relevant. Many aspects of the F-35, such as the IRST, now border on obsolete because they were spec’ed a couple of decades ago. What might have been revolutionary capabilities two decades ago, such as the sensor fusion, are now commonplace and likely better in other aircraft. The degree of stealth that might have been useful and very effective two decades ago is now considered merely semi-stealthy and is losing its effectiveness every day.
Far worse, this kind of protracted development is simply not acceptable in a world that might go to war at any time. The Hellcat is the model for useful development time.
Now, let’s re-examine our reason (rationalization) for the F-35’s prolonged development. What did all you apologists just clamor about? Oh yes … the complexity of the F-35. [and the trap closes!]
So, if complexity is the reason for protracted development times and if prolonged development times are bad then it stands to reason that complexity is bad. Simple logic. Also, blindingly obvious.
Thus, the very complexity that the F-35 supporters and apologists proudly proclaimed earlier in the post is, in reality, the reason why the F-35 has been such a failure! The fanboys have proudly latched onto the root cause of failure and are promoting and defending it. [… oops!]
So, having identified what’s wrong with the F-35, let’s now address the ‘why’. Why is the F-35 the most complex undertaking ever attempted by man? Again, it’s not a trick question. The answer, of course, is because we attempted to leapfrog generations of rational, methodical, educational development in an attempt to jump into the future. In other words, we unwisely latched onto revolutionary instead of evolutionary.
In contrast, the Hellcat, while it had new features which were then state of the art, was still an evolution of the F4F Wildcat and, as such, was a magnificent and timely success. Revolutionary development usually fails and, if it succeeds, takes decades. Evolutionary development produces a useful, timely product. Which approach should we be following? Again, not a trick question …
There’s nothing wrong with pursuing revolutionary developments … as long as they stay in the lab until they’re ready. It is folly to base production programs on non-existent, revolutionary technology.
We have to break this cycle of attempting to develop exquisite, leap ahead technology that winds up consuming billions/trillions of dollars and never actually pans out. We’ve had enough LCS, Zumwalt, F-35, Ford programs that reach for the stars and land in the mud. We need Hellcats. If the Navy is right about their prediction of war with China (assuming we opt to contest China’s assault on Taiwan), we need Hellcat’s, now, more than ever.
Consider the F-35. What if, instead of trying to create a sensor fused, holographic, multi-dimensional, subspace, see-through image displayed on a magic helmet in an aircraft that tried to do all things for all services by implementing horizontal and vertical takeoff and landing and can’t communicate with anyone other than itself, we had designed a state of the art (but no further!), single function aircraft, using only existing technology? We’d have had an optimized, operating aircraft fifteen years ago and it would have been the best aircraft in the world, at the time! We’d have had a modern Hellcat! Instead, we have a flying black hole of a money pit … you know, the 50% of the time it’s actually ready to fly (F-35 readiness rates being what they are; see, “The Real Aircraft Readiness Rates”).
So, what do we conclude from all this?
- As regards development time, complexity is the enemy of brevity.
- As regards war, complexity is the enemy of timeliness.
- As regards usefulness, complexity is the enemy of relevance.
- As regards budgets, complexity is the enemy of affordability.
- As regards numbers, complexity is the enemy of quantity.
Wow! Complexity is the enemy of many things, isn’t it? Maybe that should be telling us something about our obsessive desire for complex technology?
Maybe that should be telling us something about the next generation aircraft the Navy is pursuing?
Maybe that should be telling us something about the cruiser replacement the Navy is pursuing?
What was that old caution? Oh yeah …
Keep It Simple, Stupid
K.I.S.S.
The Navy needs to K.I.S.S. their next aircraft and next ship.
________________________________
[1]LCDR Richard Dann, USNR, Walk Around F6F Hellcat, Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc., 1996, ISBN 0-89747-079-6
"First, is the F-35 really more complex than the Hellcat was, for its time?"
ReplyDeleteGiven the vast differences in technologies (e.g., jet engines, tolerances, metullurgical requirements, and sheer number of moving parts (or in the case of fly-by-wire, no parts), I do not think that this is a helpful comparison. Even though the Hellcat was breaking new ground in the 1940's, it was still an easier lift relative to the manufacturing technologies available.
A better comparison might be "how does the development time of the F35 compare to current aircraft with similar technologies--Rafale, Gripen, Typhoon, etc.?" I think you hit the nail on the head with "Revolutionary development usually fails and, if it succeeds, takes decades." Complexity and revolutionary technology are related, but are not equivalent--like the Ford, the F35 reached too high relative to the technology available at the time. Many of the revolutionary features in the F35 (like sensor fusion) are more widespread because the processing and memory capacities finally caught up to the requirements. At the same time, I don't think we can build aircraft solely to current technologies--in the same way that advanced features in automobiles show up in the high end cars first (e.g., airbags, anti-lock brakes, nav systems), we need to pick one or two of the most promising aspirational features for inclusion in future designs, then let them trickle down.
" I do not think that this is a helpful comparison."
DeleteSeriously? Did you read the post? Here's where I addressed that:
"However, that’s an unproductive debate. For the purposes of this discussion, let’s stipulate that the F-35 is more complex than the Hellcat was."
" I don't think we can build aircraft solely to current technologies"
Of course not. That's what research is for. Here's where I addressed that:
"There’s nothing wrong with pursuing revolutionary developments … as long as they stay in the lab until they’re ready."
Come on, read the post.
"A better comparison might be "how does the development time of the F35 compare to current aircraft with similar technologies"
Absolutely not. That's just comparing failures among each other to see which was slightly less bad. We have to look for the stellar examples from history and analyze them to figure out why they were so much better than what we're doing now. That's what this post did. It identified a great example from history, analyzed it, and exposed the reason why we're failing today.
I agree that probably it's not a good comparison.
DeleteI think a better comparison would be in rockets: SLS (aka Senate Launch System) Vs Spacex Starship.
SLS has spent already 11 years of development and 23000 millions of dollars even reusing components like engines and boosters and not having nothing new nor revolutionary. Each flight will cost like 2300 millions but has not being launch yet.
Starship design started in 2016, in 2019 began flight testing that continues since. It's a totally reusable rocket that even without reusing would offer greater capabilities that SLS. Cost is estimated at half of the SLS and probably will made first orbital flight this year.
SLS is like a Hornet costing twice as a Raptor that would be the equivalent for Starship.
JM
Absolutely stellar post!!! Too many ppl look back on previous achievements and don't grasp how new technology was just as difficult (or moreso!!) to achieve at that time. The Hellcat appeared just decades after SHOVELING COAL INTO A BOILER was the standard means of US Navy propulsion!! It appeared when, in the US, outhouses were still common, and electricity wasn't in every home!! One only has to look at the auto industry and its state of the art at the time, to make the comparison of how truly complex our weapons systems were then!!
ReplyDeleteDig up the timeline for long lead items used on the build-to-print Super Hornet. I think it is at least 12 months, maybe 18 months.
ReplyDeleteI'm not quite sure what point you're making but long lead items are an indicator that a design is too complex. We should be making every effort to use readily obtainable parts. It may not always be possible but the requirement for too many long lead items is telling us we have a problem.
DeleteFor the crowd who believe that the long development time of the F35 is justified by its complexity, maybe another couple of comparisons could be made to somewhat more recent programs.
ReplyDeleteThe F14 was developed in response to a request for proposal issued in July 1968. First flight was December 1970 and IOC was in 1973.
The F15 was developed in response to an RFP issued in September 1968. First flight was July 1972 and IOC was January 1976.
Neither of these aircraft was a simple design, and both provided a revolutionary leap in combat capability compared both to the aircraft they replaced and to contemporary threat aircraft.
All of this was done in the era before CAD and CNC machining. Technical drawings had to be produced on paper using physical drafting tools and parts produced on manually operated machine tools. Computer code was compiled from punch cards.
The primary reason for the quite frankly absurd development time of the F35 (and nearly ALL other projects of the Military Industrial Complex) is to insure that the funding continues to pour into certain pockets. The ability to quickly develop a functional weapon system, say in case of a military conflict, is a tad further down said list. The current weapon system development times are insane. My grandfather was an engineer at Lockheed. He was involved in the development of the P-38 and other fighter aircraft, and the development times were short as there WAS a war on. He later went on to work with Kelly Johnson at Lockheed Skunk Works, where he assisted in the development of the U2 and the SR71 Blackbird. A fact not commonly known is that the SR71 was the last major U.S. aircraft engineered by a slide rule. Lets see our current day engineers do THAT. I miss you grandfather.
ReplyDeleteIn the news today:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-16/lockheed-s-tardy-f-35-is-hit-with-a-35-cut-in-2023-u-s-budget?sref=IYQ5mP1s
It's flawed, so we'll buy fewer for now. Key parts:
The Pentagon will request 61 F-35s in its next budget, 33 fewer of the stealth jets from Lockheed Martin Corp. than previously planned, according to people familiar with the spending blueprint.
F-35s remain hobbled by flawed execution of a crucial upgrade of their software and hardware capabilities that’s estimated to cost $14 billion.
Along with the proposed F-35 reduction, the Air Force will request 24 non-stealthy F-15EX jets built by Boeing Co., up from 14 planned in the fiscal 2021 budget. The EX model carries more ordnance than the F-35 and is estimated to be cheaper to fly. Still, the service plans to purchase many more F-35s than EX jets.
You have to take into account that the F-15EX is being procured for the CONUS air defense interceptor mission, as an interim replacement for the F-15C, which is a fraction of the size of the F-16 and A-10 fleets that the Air Force plans to replace with the F-35. While your statement is factually correct, your inferences are lacking a certain nuance.
DeleteThe true replacement for the F-15C and F-22A fleet is going to be Next Generation Air Dominance, which will see service who knows how many decades from now.
I just reread your post on "How to Build a Better Aircraft". A couple thoughts on the "Use an existing air frame" point.
ReplyDelete(1) Are we sure that developing the air frame is really the problem in the long development cycles, as opposed to the integration of too many immature technologies? In that post you mention several aircraft (the F-14, the F-15, and probably the F-16) that were developed quite quickly even though they were new air frames.
(2) One of the major requirements for a new naval air superiority fighter is greater range than existing aircraft (including, probably, the F-22). But if you fix the air frame design in advance, that also pre-determines the volume inside the air frame, and thus the amount of fuel that can be carried inside. Since we'd probably also be using an existing engine, that pretty much determines the range of the aircraft, which in the case of the F-22 is probably inadequate. Could we perhaps at least modify the air-frame a bit to be a bit bigger for more fuel and range?
"I just reread your post on "How to Build a Better Aircraft"."
DeleteA thoroughly enjoyable way to spend some time!
"Could we perhaps at least modify the air-frame a bit to be a bit bigger"
Could we add one inch to it without incurring excessive costs? Sure.
Could we add one foot to it without incurring excessive costs? Iffy. We'd need to conduct tests to check how it impacts the aerodynamics, balance, stealth signature, maneuverability, etc. That sounds expensive.
Could we add several feet to it without incurring excessive costs? Nope. Without a doubt, we'd have to initiate a major developmental test and debug program.
You've missed a few major points about how to build a better aircraft:
1. You build with what you have to control costs. If you want something different (a bigger airframe, for example) you initiate a R&D program and WHEN AND ONLY WHEN that R&D is fully developed then you put it into production. That's how you get your modified airframe.
2. Because you've controlled costs by sticking to existing airframes, you've been able to get your aircraft into production quickly and cheaply. You've also been wise enough NOT TO COMMIT TO PRODUCTION RUNS OF THOUSANDS OF AIRCRAFT so that you can only build one aircraft every half century. Because you were wise enough to build relatively short production runs, the moment that R&D airframe becomes available you can initiate a new production run with it and, because you tested and debugged the new airframe during R&D, it will be cheap to base a new aircraft on it.
There's a beauty of simplicity to all this!
In your "How to Build a Better Aircraft" post, you talk about building to a well thought out CONOPS. I agree almost completely, but I do believe there is value in having SOME flexibility. Not a "do-everything" design, but some flexibility. The problem, as I see it, is that the pre-war CONOPS may be wrong. For example, the Battle of France in World War 2 pretty much proved that the French pre-war CONOPS, involving centralized decision-making (in Paris) and inadequate radio communications among individual tanks, was totally inadequate to dealing with the German tactics.
ReplyDeleteIn addition, I believe that in the Pacific, both submarines and battleships ended up being used in ways that weren't expected in the pre-war CONOPS.
So having enough flexibility to still be useful in a modified CONOPS does have some value, I think. Obviously it's a trade-off between flexibility and complexity, which we've lately been getting wrong.
"French pre-war CONOPS, ... inadequate radio communications among individual tanks,"
DeleteYou're commenting on this from hindsight so, of course, you're right that they should have had radios. However, you're 100% wrong about your desire to include everything imaginable in the name of 'what if' flexibility - yes, that's really what you're asking ... everything imaginable because, without the benefit of hindsight, what would you have included in the French tank design? More armor? Bigger engine? Bigger gun? More ammo storage capacity? Larger crew? Space to carry infantry dismounts? More fuel storage? More secondary guns? And so on ...
Without hindsight, which would you have included? You'd have no way of knowing which to include so you'd have to include all of them and then you'd have an unaffordable behemoth.
No, the only sane design method is to develop a good CONOPS and build to that and nothing more. Of course, if your CONOPS is wrong, you're screwed. That's why it's so vital to have professional warriors set the requirements and why it's so vital to conduct REALISTIC tests and exercises to develop good CONOPS.
If you build a good, solid, single function design, it will have a degree of inherent flexibility in it. The other aspect to flexibility is the need to develop MULTIPLE classes of ship or aircraft or land vehicles. That way when an unexpected use/need arises, you have multiple choices to fill that need and, likely, one of your many existing classes can fill the need. If, on the other hand, you unwisely built only one class (like the Burke being our only surface ship) then you may not have a ship that can fill that unexpected need.
The lessons of WWII are telling us, loudly and clearly, how to go about building a military but we're not listening.
Many have said over the years, that with each new generation of aircraft taking longer & being more expensive than the previous generation, the day will come when even a country like America will only be able to afford to build 1 aircraft that will cost a few $billion & take 50 years to develop.
ReplyDeleteLittle bit of a misunderstanding here.
ReplyDeleteWe all know what the goal of the Hellcat program was, and it's undeniable it succeeded.
On the other hand, what was the F-35 program's actual main aim?
It was not to produce an useful aircraft, rather to ensure that it would have been politically impossible to kill the program itself.
Hence the crooked built-in-every-state scheme, the monstrously complex United Nations-type multinational consortium, and so on: making it "too big to fail" was the aim most effort went to.
Compare that with Grummann simply building the damn plane in their own factory as fast as possible.
Well by those criteria, it's been a roaring success!
Delete"what was the F-35 program's actual main aim?"
DeleteI know you're being facetious - though not much! - but you raise a serious point. By engaging in these flawed programs, repeatedly, we're developing bad habits that we won't be able to instantly shake off in the event of war and a read need to develop a good product, quickly. We need to start developing good habits, now, so that we can respond quickly and well when true need arises. We need to treat every program as if we're at war and our lives depend on the program.
ComNavOps, Why not turn this Blog into a forum like site where threads with the most recent comments can be seen easily. It will allow even old threads to come back to life via discussion if someone posts a great comment or is becomes topical again.??
ReplyDeleteHmm ... Your suggestion is not without merit. I'm not a big fan of pure forums because they lack the initial post (by me!) which is my purpose for having the blog. I suppose the initial thread offering could be a pseudo-post but then things like pictures, tables, and such become more difficult to insert and the posts become harder to archive and search/retrieve.
DeleteAlso, the forums I've used seem to have a high degree of reliability/stability issues and require moderators and, generally, more administrative effort.
Ideal, in my mind, would be some kind of hybrid blog/forum but I'm unaware of such a product. Maybe you know of something?
Forums also require fees/financing as opposed to this blog which is free.
I'll give it some thought but, at the moment, I'm inclined to stick with this.
"I'll give it some thought but, at the moment, I'm inclined to stick with this."
DeleteGood! If it ain't broke, don't fix it!
On Complexity as an excuse--lets talk Rocket Science.
ReplyDeleteNasa went from launching the first satellite to putting a man on the moon in 9 years. Designed mostly by human being with slide-rules and computers less powerful than the Ti-84 calculator kids use in high school. Never been done before.
Over 50 years later NASA tries again to go to the moon. Same challenge. The SLS is to use the same engines as the Shuttle, a modified shuttle external tank and modified shuttle boosters--existing technology. It has taken 11 years, and has not yet launched.
So the F-35 was meant to be single engine, cheaper version of the F-22. The F-22 went from a paper proposal to prototype in 6 years and prototype to production in 6 years. The F-22 broke new ground in avionics, stealth super-cruise flight, and thrust vectoring.
The F-35 has not super-cruise or thrust vectoring like the F-22 partly in an effort to reduce complexity. Its stealth and much of its aerodynamics were derived from the F-22. Much like the SLS was derived from existing shuttle technology.
So both NASA and DOD have the same problem: They broke new ground and complexity on the game-changers of Apollo and the F-22. THe replacements or both had existing technology as a starting point. Both were supposed to be cheaper and better. Its not true for either.
Complexity isn't the problem, it is the government-industrial mindset that just doesn't have the passion, drive, and focus on the national goal is the problem. Both Apollo and the F-22 are products of the Cold War and the defeat of the Soviet Empire. The SLS and F-35 are products of the present political generation to whom they are simply very expensive government jobs programs.
Complexity is the excuse of those contracted to build the next new thing to keep a paying customer forever.
ReplyDelete'Don't kill the job'. That's the mantra.
-That's why you see 4 guys holding up shovels at a road construction site while one guy actually works...
-Thats why doctors 'treat the symptoms' rather than 'cure the disease'...
-That's why contractors design solutions that are infinitely more complex than they should be...
When the job is completed successfully, payment stops. The 'customer' has no reason to come back and shell out more money because they got exactly what they needed.
Don't kill the job.
What it takes to speed up development is to involve and empower people that know what the product should do, know what it takes to develop that product, and know the acquisition system.
ReplyDeleteCol Boyd knew what he wanted the F-16 to be. He was a fighter pilot himself and figured out how to use the acquisition system. Pierre Sprey talked to the CAS pilots and drew out what the A-10 airplane needed to do (big gun, no hydraulics, armoured cockpit, etc). He also used the system because no Zoomie wanted to be associated with the development. Kelly Johnson knew what it took to build and airplane and how to work with customers.
We continually put people and teams in charge of acquisition programs that have no idea what it takes to develop something, don't have a vision of what the product should do, and how to use the acquisition process. Instead, they look for committees to give them cover for all decisions, allow requirements to grow and have the product try to do everything, and then they try quick fixes to give the appearance or progress. As we have seen in the Navy there are not even CONOPS for the "Most Important" and urgently needed items. The people in these billets are not Program Managers but Political Managers. They are not leaders who stay focused on mission but instead cater to the whims of anyone that might influence their chance at promotion. A leader in the requirements command who saw that there was no CONOPS would generate one immediately. A Careerist will MAYBE convene a committee to generate one.
This situation is what drives development through the roof.
I am not necessarily an all in Elon Musk fan, but he is a good case study of someone who generates the vision and then drives and enables his teams to get things done. He is the first to mass produce electric cares (without an existing car Manufacuring plant), batteries, get an space based internet system working, develop reusable rockets, and who knows what next.
As Col Boyd said, the most important things are: People, Ideas, and then technology. Want to improve development time, get put better trained and experienced people in place.
The people who knew ships inside and out were the General Board and BuShips. We eliminated both due to politics and never replaced them. We have no in-house ship design expertise. It's certainly not the standing joke of NAVSEA! We need to re-establish the General Board and BuShips.
DeleteWorse it looks like Contractors have lost he knowledge also. Look at the Ford Elevators - either the designers were inexperienced, negligent, or even worse. I remain amazed that people with little or no training or experience are put in positions with expectation that results will be different. I see it also on the Contractor side. Hiring a DoD O6 or above that has no experience running a company or P&L center and expecting to get good results.
Delete"Look at the Ford Elevators - either the designers were inexperienced, negligent, or even worse."
DeleteWe've got to be fair. There were no existing elctromagnetic ship elevators so there couldn't possibly be engineers with experience to design the elevators. There are various commercial electromagnetic motor applications but they just aren't the same as a carrier elevator. This was, literally, a first-time, one-of-a-kind build. The only realistic expectation was major problems ... which is exactly what happened. This is a classic example of something that should have remained in the R&D world until completely debugged. The fault was not the engineers who had an impossible job but, rather, the Navy program managers who insisted on including a non-existent piece of technology before it was developed.
I'm sure the manufacturer oversold the elevators but that's just what manufacturers do. It should have been no surprise and the Navy should have refused to spec the elevators until they were proven at a land facility AND THEN PROTOTYPED AT SEA ON A TEST SHIP so as to account for the flexing that a ship undergoes which a land test facility does not.
I'm happy to criticize contractors but I also try to be fair and objective about it. In this case, they were asked to do a job that had no reasonable chance of success. To then turn around and blame them for failing an impossible task is unfair.
I believe you are being too generous to the designers of the elevators or else taking my experience label too literally. I have worked for many years with designers that have had to design something that has not been done before. But they were not doing pure new research, they were taking existing proven ideas and applying them to develop the new design. This is how I use the term experience. The electromagnetic elevators had been proven out in other arenas although not on a carrier. Experienced designers would have analyzed the differences and would have encountered small hiccups but not opps they don't work and the ship is launched. I hope that clarifies what I meant by experienced.
DeleteEVERY land based electromagnetic motor application is stationary. A carrier application - whether EMALS or elevator - is continually flexing. That's a world of difference, as the engineers have come to realize. No amount of land application experience can prepare one for the new phenomenon of continual flexing in an application where precise alignment is so critical. Without a land and sea prototype effort, they had no chance, whatsoever, of pulling this off. They're now doing the sea based prototyping that should have been done prior to inclusion in a production design and, predictably, it's taking years to develop.
DeleteDuring the time of the Hellcat, the U.S. Navy had in-house expertise to test manufacturer's claims on aircraft and aircraft-related: this was the Naval Aircraft Factory (NAF) as it was first called, and it sometimes license-build aircraft and aircraft related stuff from manufacturers to provide data to the U.S. Navy on costs as well as did its own research.
DeleteIn fact, it made aircraft carrier catapults like below (later replaced by steam and to be replaced by electromagnetic as mentioned below)
https://www.patriotspoint.org/news-and-events/hydraulic-catapults-enter-navy-service-1934-2/
I find the comment in the link above by "U N Owen" interesting in that to quote:
"in reality EMALS occupies more space, is heavier, and less reliable than steam catapults"
Makes me wonder if the Naval Aircraft Factory should be brought back to give the U.S. Navy more accurate costs data and test the manufacturers' claims as was the NAF original goal, what I find most interesting is:
"In all, the NAF produced 63 types of aircraft and 33 types of catapults and arresting gear."
https://www.hmdb.org/m.asp?m=191615
Maybe the NAF should be back in part to at least do the type of testing manufacturers are unwilling or unable to do, moreover... Oh, right you said:
"NAF was only a partial success, at best. As far as I recall, the NAF never actually produced a front line combat aircraft. They mostly built some trainers and patrol aircraft and only in small quantities."
https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2021/04/f-35-readiness-failure-lessons.html
But that was not the point (as I understand about the NAF, if I'm wrong I'm wrong) and as far as I know the NAF was never supposed to product front line aircraft (although I did posted you were right about the Gripen from back then though)
The original purpose was:
"The U.S Naval Aircraft Factory was established during World War I to assure a reliable source of specialized aircraft, generate cost data as a check on private manufacturers, and maintain control over design and development."
Something we really need right now at least in my opinion.
No, the NAF was never intended to produce front line combat aircraft and I hope I never gave the impression that I was criticizing them for not doing so.
DeleteThe NAF was sort of the equivalent of BuShips and, in that regard, should absolutely be reincarnated. NAVSEA is supposed to have some of that function, at least for ships, as they are supposed to be the in-house experts who can evaluate ship designs and construction but they have proven themselves to be politically directed and totally incompetent from a technical aspect.
So, yes, we need the General Board, BuShips, and NAF to come back!
As Gen. Patton said: The perfect is the enemy of the good.
ReplyDeleteYes the F-35 is one example but unfortunately is not the only one. Just look at the debacle of the KC-46 Pegasus.
And how about the lack of a dedicated carrier based tanker aircraft?
How many reading this blog know about Omega Air Refueling?
The Navy contracts with them for refueling during training and exercises, which leads to unrealistic expectations since they won't be available during combat.
http://www.omegaairrefueling.com/
RE: the KC-46 Pegasus. I think something is really wrong at Boeing. The KC-46 is a converted airliner, the Boeing 767. It was designed in the 1980's. It's well proven. And Boeing successfully converted the very same airliner into a military tanker 10 or 15 years ago. So the KC-46 is really doing the same thing again, to the same basic airliner. And they STILL can't get it right !!
DeleteIf the price is right, they'll operate during combat too.
DeleteLet us hope the B21 shows it can be done in a reasonable time scale.
ReplyDeleteWell ...
Delete2014 request for proposals
2015 development contract awarded
2018 critical design review
2021 first two aircraft (prototypes?) under construction
2030 anticipated IOC
So, right now, 8 years and counting. A 2030 IOC would put development time at 16 years ... and delays always happen.
"The Hellcat incorporated new technology such as laterally distributed, hydraulically actuated, landing gear that rotated 90 degrees while retracting. It had a new powerplant, the Pratt & Whitney R-2800-10 with a two stage, two speed, supercharger. The propeller featured variable pitch which was regulated by oil pressure via the propeller governor."
ReplyDeleteAll of these features could be found in the F4U Corsair whose first flight was two years before that of the Hellcat.
Watch a YouTube video of the Corsair taking off and you would see the landing gear rotating 90 degrees with the wheel above the landing strut when retracted.
The Pratt & Whitney R-2800-8 also featured a two-stage, two-speed supercharger. The first production engines delivered to Navy in November, 1941 and used on the Brewster F3A-1, Goodyear FG-1, Vought F4U-1 and F4U-2. Later models, the -8W and -10W, used water injection to improve performance.
The Hamilton Standard Hydromatic variable pitch propeller was introduced in the late-1930s. The idea of a variable pitch propeller goes back almost 20 years earlier.
The Hellcat had the advantage of significant design input from the Navy based on the performance of the F4F Wildcat against the Japanese Zero. The Navy knew what they wanted from the Hellcat.
The real sin of the F-35 was including VSTOL variant for the Marine Corps. Had we stuck with the A and C variants, development probably would have gone a lot smoother.
I'm thoroughly familiar with the Corsair. I didn't say it was non-existent technology, I said it was new. The technology was new to Grumman and had not been done by them before, to any great extent. Vought and Grumman did not share technology any more than companies share technology today. Grumman had to design and assemble a package of new technologies - a complex undertaking.
Delete"Had we stuck with the A and C variants, development probably would have gone a lot smoother."
Unlikely. It probably would have produced a better designed plane in terms of capabilities but the F-35 program delays have not had much to do with the -B model, specifically. The major delay issues like sensor fusion difficulties, helmet integration, ALIS, structural issues, spare parts shortages, reliability issues, and most importantly, combat software development have little or nothing to do with the incorporation of the -B model.
Comparisons are odious.
DeleteLots of love
The Royal Navy
Comparisons, properly analyzed, offer lessons and wisdom.
DeleteBest wishes,
ComNavOps
Here is a link to an article/website that details the problems at hand with the F-35 program:
Deletehttps://www.defensenews.com/smr/hidden-troubles-f35/
Amongst the troubles listed:
"An issue that risks damage to the F-35’s tail section if the aircraft needs to maintain supersonic speeds is not worth fixing and will instead be addressed by changing the operating parameters, the F-35 Joint Program Office told Defense News in a statement Friday."
The deficiency, first reported by Defense News in 2019, means that at extremely high altitudes, the U.S. Navy’s and Marine Corps’ versions of the F-35 jet can only fly at supersonic speeds for short bursts of time before there is a risk of structural damage and loss of stealth capability.
From the Airforce Technology website:
https://www.airforce-technology.com/features/featurelockheed-martin-f35-pratt-whitney-engine-analysis/
And one more:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/f-35-can%E2%80%99t-fire-its-cannon-without-committing-suicide-122541
There are growing pains with anything new, but when growing pains seem to morph into a chronic condition, then you now have limitations.
Here's an idea, if we ditch the big amphibs (LHD/LHA/LPD), then you could add a squadron (or two) of Marine F-35C squadrons to beef up an extremely underweight carrier air wing.
I'm starting to think that the biggest threat to the Navy is not the PLAN or the Russian Federation Navy, but the Navy itself, assisted by the erosion of our once talented Defense Industrial Complex. Just my thoughts.
At a time of war, I find it difficult to believe that defense contractors wouldn't support each other. But, given the Navy's familiarity with the engine and everything else, I'm sure Grumman got all the technical assistance, if any, they needed, when they needed it.
DeleteI have to agree with you concerning your remaining comments about ALIS, software, etc. The F-35, like the LCS and Zumwalt programs, far overpromised and woefully under delivered.
"I find it difficult to believe that defense contractors wouldn't support each other."
DeleteYou may find it hard to believe but every book I've read about the period and the people involved in the various companies makes it clear that every company jealously guarded its institutional knowledge as they competed for significant government contracts.
It's no different today. We're facing a global war on terror, a rogue Russia, a resurgent China that is bent on war in the Pacific and yet the various defense companies not only won't share the tiniest bit of data, they actively and routinely sue to prevent each other from gaining contracts.
Most of my family, to include my late Father, worked for Grumman and the defense industry has always been competitive and steered by politics. It wasn't always the better design that would win a competition for a new fighter, etc. Sometimes it came down to what state(s) had a defense contractor competing for a new project and how much pull the respective Congress folks had.
DeleteMy Dad was always getting calls from McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, etc offering him more money to jump ship from Grumman to them.
If a contractor gets butt hurt over losing a contract to a competitor, they sue. Here is a recent example:
https://leehamnews.com/2022/02/07/pontifications-kc-x-aerial-tanker-competition-becomes-a-pass-fail-rfp/
Post Cold War, the downsizing of the military coincided with the run of takeovers/mergers of defense contractors. Think about it, fewer defense contractors means fewer competitors but, it also means you may wind up with a less than stellar design.
Apologies if I drifted off subject.
"We've got to be fair. There were no existing elctromagnetic ship elevators so there couldn't possibly be engineers with experience to design the elevators."
ReplyDeleteEach of the 11 Ford elevators is UNIQUE rather than being THE SAME. How is this ever a good design practice regardless of the technology?
"Each of the 11 Ford elevators is UNIQUE"
DeleteI've heard this statement a few times but never with any detail. How are they unique?
Speaking of complex failures, it appears that the awful combination drive problems have finally led to the Freedom-class LCS being put on the chopping block. Good riddance!
ReplyDeleteProbably the most useful thing we could do with these ships now would be to put a full countermeasures and terminal missile defense (CIWS, RAM/SeaRAM, etc) suite on them, rig them for remote control, and test fire some weapons at them while they try to dodge to see how well the weapons and countermeasures work in a realistic setting. Placate the environmentalists (who will inevitably complain about lighting about 80,000 gallons of fuel on fire at sea) by claiming a net-positive environmental impact due to the artificial reefs which will be created in the process as havens for sea creatures.
I don't this comparison as fair the Hellcat was a a fairly liner and evolutionary development of the previous fighters.
ReplyDeleteThe WW2 comparison would the B29. Because it aimed to be a all leap beyond the B17, not a upgrade to it.
1938-1943/44 Development time. More expensive than the Manhattan project. More half of the first production deliveries were not airworthy. Retained teething problems (nasty ones at that) for the entire war. Lost more aircraft to mechanical failure than enemy action. And was really not the plane it supposed to time upgrades that post dated the end of the war.
But if you wanted heavy bomber for the pacific war with range for the theater simply upgrading the B17 was not the answer.
"I don't this comparison as fair the Hellcat was a a fairly liner and evolutionary development of the previous fighters."
DeleteYou may have missed the point of the post. The only aspect of the Hellcat and F-35 that I compared was the Hellcat's evolutionary development versus the F-35's revolutionary development and the blindingly obvious conclusion was that revolutionary (which necessarily means complex) development is an approach doomed to failure.