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Monday, June 8, 2020

Fleet Problems - Then and Now

The Navy’s most famous exercises were the series of 21 major Fleet Problems conducted between 1923 – 1940.  These massive exercises not only presciently predicted the course of the WWII naval campaign but also developed the doctrine and tactics that would become the foundation of our WWII naval operations.

From the Wikipedia compilation of Fleet Problems, here is a summary of the exercises.(1)  Look them over and note the remarkable similarity they bore to the actual WWII naval operations.


Fleet Problem I

Held in February and March 1923 and was staged off the coast of Panama. The attacking Black force, using battleships to represent aircraft carriers, tested the defenses of the Panama Canal. A single plane launched from Oklahoma—representing a carrier air group—dropped 10 miniature bombs and theoretically "destroyed" the spillway of the Gatun Dam.

Fleet Problem II

Simulated the first leg of a westward advance across the Pacific.

Fleet Problem III

Focused on a defense of the Panama Canal from the Caribbean side. The Blue force was defending the canal from an attack from the Caribbean by the Black force, operating from an advance base in the Azores. It was to practice amphibious landing techniques and the rapidity of transiting a fleet through the canal from the Pacific side.

In the exercise, a Black force special operations action resulted in the "sinking" of Blue force battleship New York in the Culebra Cut which would have blocked the canal.

Fleet Problem IV

Simulated the movement from a main base in the western Pacific to the Japanese home islands—represented in that case by islands, cities, and countries surrounding the Caribbean.

Fleet Problem V

Held in March and April 1925 and simulated an attack on Hawaii. The Black force, the aggressor, was given the United States' first aircraft carrier, Langley along with two seaplane tenders and other ships outfitted with aircraft, while the defending Blue force had no carriers. In addition, aircraft aboard the battleship Wyoming could not be launched for lack of a working catapult. Langley's positive performance helped speed the completion of aircraft carriers Lexington and Saratoga.

One aspect of Fleet Problem V was conducted near Guadalupe Island off Baja California and involved attacking a lightly held position and refueling at sea.

Fleet Problem VI

Held off the west coast of Central America in early 1926.

Fleet Problem VII

Held March 1927 and involved defense of the Panama Canal. The highlight of the exercise was Langley’s successful air raid on the Panama Canal.

Fleet Problem VIII

Held in April 1928 between California and Hawaii and pitted Orange, a cruiser force from Pearl Harbor, versus Blue, the Battle Force.  It also involved a convoy search and anti-submarine operations.

Fleet Problem IX

This scenario in January 1929 studied the effects of an attack upon the Panama Canal and conducted the operations necessary to carry out such an eventuality, and pitted the Battle Fleet (less submarines and Lexington) against a combination of forces including the Scouting Force (augmented by Lexington), the Control Forces, Train Squadron 1, and 15th Naval District and local army defense forces. In a daring move, Saratoga was detached from the fleet with only a single cruiser as escort to make a wide sweep to the south and "attack" the Panama Canal, which was defended by the Scouting Fleet and Saratoga's sister ship, Lexington. She successfully launched her strike on 26 January and, despite being "sunk" three times later in the day, proved the versatility of a carrier-based fast task force.

This was the first major test of independent carrier task force operations which would eventually become the model for WWII naval operations in the Pacific.

Fleet Problem X

Held in 1930 in Caribbean waters. This time, however, Saratoga and Langley were "disabled" by a surprise attack from Lexington, showing how quickly air power could swing the balance in a naval action.

Fleet Problem XI

Held in April 1930 in the Caribbean.

Fleet Problem XII

USS Los Angeles moored to USS Patoka, along with other ships off Panama during Fleet Problem XII.

Held in 1931 in waters west of Central America and Panama. Black, attacking from the west, was to land forces and establish bases in Central America and destroy the Panama Canal, while Blue defended with an aviation-heavy fleet.

Blue's two carrier groups, centered on Saratoga and Lexington, attacked the invasion fleets but failed to stop the landings and got too close to the Black fleets.

Fleet Problem XIII

Fleet Problem XIII began in March 1932, one month after Army/Navy Grand Joint Exercise 4. Blue, based in Hawaii, was to sail east and invade three "enemy" ports on the North American Pacific coastline to try and gain a foothold for future operations. Blue had nine battleships, one aircraft carrier, and many lesser ships. Black defended with one modern aircraft carrier and some fictional battleships, as well as a number of actual cruisers, submarines, and many other ships.

Blue's advance was quickly located by Black's picket line of submarines which then took heavy losses from air attack. Both sides put a priority on destroying the enemy aircraft carrier, launching air attacks almost simultaneously after a few days of probing. Significant damage was laid on both carriers, with Blue's carrier eventually "sunk" by torpedo from a Black destroyer.

After-action critiques stressed the growing importance of naval aviation, and an increased need for the construction of aircraft carriers in the event of a war in the Pacific. Submarines operating at or near the surface were seen to be critically vulnerable to air observation and attack. The exercise showed that one carrier was insufficient for either fleet attack or area defense, so the practice of two or more carriers operating together became policy. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell said that six to eight carriers would be required for a Pacific campaign, but no orders were placed for new carriers, as Depression-era financial difficulties caused President Herbert Hoover to limit naval expenses.

Fleet Problem XIV

Held February 10–17, 1933, Fleet Problem XIV was the first naval exercise to test simulated aircraft carrier attacks against the west coast of the United States. Pacific cities had for decades vied for permanent stationing of U.S. military assets, and vulnerabilities exposed through the exercises were used by metropolitan navy boosters to leverage their cases. In spite of early Navy plans for San Francisco to be home port for the main west coast fleet, these plans had failed to materialize with San Diego incrementally gaining the majority of navy investments.

Fleet Problem XIV coincidentally occurred the month before Franklin D. Roosevelt, a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, took the office of the presidency. The results of the exercise between the U.S. Navy's 'black' and 'blue' fleets, were mixed. The simulated attacks had certainly been mitigated by the defensive 'blue' fleet, however the 'black' fleet had scored key victories with strikes on San Pedro and San Francisco, California, respectively.

Fleet Problem XV

Held in May 1934 in Hawaii, this was a three-phase exercise which encompassed an attack upon and defense of the Panama Canal, the capture of advanced bases, and a major fleet engagement.

Fleet Problem XVI

Held in May 1935 in the northern Pacific off the coast of Alaska and in waters surrounding the Hawaiian Islands, this operation was divided into five distinct phases which were thought to be aspects of some real naval campaign of the future in which the U.S. would take the strategic offensive.

Fleet Problem XVII

This problem took place off the west coast of the U.S., Central America, and the Panama Canal Zone in the spring of 1936. It was a five-phase exercise devoted to preparing the fleet for anti-submarine operations, testing communications systems, and training of aircraft patrol squadrons for extended fleet operations, and pitted the Battle Force against the submarine-augmented Scouting Force.

Fleet Problem XVIII

This exercise was held in May 1937 in Alaskan waters and in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands and Midway, practicing the tactics of seizing advanced base sites—a technique later to be polished to a high degree into close support and amphibious warfare doctrines.

Fleet Problem XIX

This operation in April and May 1938 gave the navy added experience in search tactics; in the use of submarines, destroyers, and aircraft in scouting and attack, in the dispositions of the fleet and the conduct of a major fleet battle. In addition, the exercise again dealt with the matter of seizing advanced fleet bases and defending them against minor opposition. Fleet Problem XIX also tested the capabilities of the Hawaiian Defense Force, augmenting it with fleet units to help to defend the islands against the United States fleet as a whole. The last phase of the exercise exercised the fleet in operations against a defended coastline.

Fleet Problem XX

Took place in February 1939 in the Caribbean and Atlantic, and observed in person by President Franklin Roosevelt. The exercise simulated the defense of the East Coast of the United States and Latin America by the Black team from the invading White team. Participating in the maneuvers were 134 ships, 600 planes, and over 52,000 officers and men.

Fleet Problem XXI

An eight-phase operation for the defense of the Hawaiian area in April 1940.

Fleet Problem XXII

Scheduled for the Spring of 1941, but cancelled.

Grand Joint Exercise 4 (GJE4)

Similar to the Navy’s Fleet Problems, the Army and Navy held a few large, combined exercises.  This particular exercise revolved around an attack on Pearl Harbor.  Lexington and Saratoga conducted an air strike on Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning, 7-Feb-1932.(4)  The attack was an unmitigated success with facilities, aircraft, and ships being decimated.  Attacking aircraft even dropped sacks of flour on battleships to simulate bombs!(5)  Army defenders protested the ‘inappropriateness’ of an attack on a Sunday morning and the unfairness of the attacking aircraft having deceptively approached from the direction of the mainland.(5)  As we know, this was almost an exact foretelling of the actual Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.



Operations During Fleet Problem X


What is striking about these exercises is the sheer size compared to what we laughingly call exercises today.  Today, a couple of ships that happen to pass each other is called an exercise whereas the Fleet Problems were actual, entire fleet exercises!  The commanders learned to operate entire fleets and squadrons for real.  Here’s an interesting explanation for the size of the Fleet Problems:

This large-scale participation was possible because very little of the U.S. Navy was forward-deployed, so forces could be brought in from the East and West Coast bases. (2)

Hmm …  Better training thanks to reduced forward deployments.  Does that sound familiar?  This is exactly what ComNavOps has been calling for and yet we had it back in the 1920’s!  History is shouting at us, telling us what we should be doing but we’re not listening.

Also noteworthy is that the exercises were not just technology demonstrations as today’s exercises are; they were scenarios that tested operations that we actually believed we might be called on to execute in a war.  The exercises tested specific aspects of War Plan Orange that we were unsure about which made the exercises highly relevant since they were taken from the actual operational plan of war with Japan.  Of particular note are Fleet Problems II (first leg of an advance across the Pacific), IV (advance on the Japanese home islands), V (attack on Hawaii), XVIII (seizing advanced bases in the Pacific via amphibious assault), XXI (defense of Hawaii), and GJE4 which exactly simulated the eventual Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  It was evident that as early as the 1920’s, the Navy was already anticipating war with Japan and developing the doctrine and tactics needed to conduct that war.  What are we exercising today?  What are we preparing for?  In a word … nothing.

Note all the techniques, tactics, and operations that were tested and exercised that eventually became the foundation of our WWII naval operations.

The Navy has revived some minor exercises and fraudulently given them the name of ‘Fleet Problem’ but they do not even remotely capture the essence, purpose, or magnitude of the real Fleet Problems.(6)

Another interesting aspect of the Fleet Problems was that they were real in the sense that problems were not hand-waved away and the results, good or bad, stood.

… the Fleet Problems assumed there often would be a clear loser—and not a junior officer designated to be defeated, but an officer of stature and accomplishment. Senior officers could and did fail dramatically, were critiqued candidly and publicly, and continued to advance and lead. Indeed, across the 21 Fleet Problems, timidity and inattention seemed to be the only unforgivable errors in command. (3)

This is how you learn … by doing and, often, failing!

We need to bring back real fleet problems, not the small, pathetic, watered down efforts that we call exercises today – exercises which are conducted for just a few days while transiting somewhere.(5)  We need to assemble entire fleets and conduct real war games.  Here’s a few examples of some large scale fleet problems we should be conducting.

  • How to operate 4-carrier combat groups and their escorts
  • How to penetrate a thousand mile A2/AD zone
  • Where and how to attack China
  • How to defend or reseize Taiwan (if that’s even part of our geopolitical strategy)
  • How to operate groups when we don’t have aerial supremacy
  • How to operate non-carrier surface groups
  • How to escort convoys and defend against subs, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and aircraft

Of course, all of these possible Fleet Problems presuppose the existence of a modern War Plan Orange aimed at China and, sadly, I see no evidence that we have such a plan.  We need a War Plan Pacific aimed directly at China and we need to start exercising it.




____________________________________

(1)Wikipedia, “Fleet Problem”, retrieved 5-May-2020,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fleet_problem

(2)Naval History and Heritage Command website, “Fleet Problem IX”
https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/heritage/usn-lessons-learned/fleet-problem-ix.html

(3)United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Captain Dale Rielage, Jun-2017,
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/june/bring-back-fleet-battle-problems



(6)USNI Proceedings, “Fleet Problems Offer Opportunities”, Adm. Scott Swift, Mar 2018,
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/march/fleet-problems-offer-opportunities

29 comments:

  1. Couldn't agree more.

    I would add another fleet problem: how to limit the scope of engagement to non-nuclear exchanges (from either side!) Because if you start one, you've already lost...

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    1. "how to limit the scope of engagement to non-nuclear exchanges"

      Nuclear fear is among the most stifling of topics in naval discussion. There is a sizable group that is so fearful of nuclear war that they can't even contemplate basic self-defense for us out of fear it will lead to instant escalation to nuclear war. Everything we do must be fearfully measured against the looming prospect of nuclear war. Well, China doesn't want nuclear war any more than we do and they have even less incentive to engage in it than we do since we completely overwhelm them in weapons and delivery systems, at the moment. So, while nuclear responses are, of course, a consideration, they are not the paralyzing threat that so many believe.

      Setting that aspect aside, I don't think a Fleet Problem is a possible platform for nuclear use concerns. It might be a platform for nuclear tactics but not geopolitical nuclear considerations. That would best be considered in table-top geopolitical games.

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  2. Possibly naïve question here. Are you implicitly saying there would be no 5th Fleet in order to do the exercise that you propose?

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    1. Is that question for me? If so, I'm not sure what you're asking. What does the existence (or not) of 5th Fleet have to do with whether we conduct exercises? You lost me. Try again?

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  3. Were you a resident of the Canal Zone? I was. I did the ocean to ocean cayuco race for 5 years.

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    1. ???? Now you've completely lost me!

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    2. Let me help.

      It was non-nuclear...see?


      Yeah, me either.

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  4. Fantastic summary and a clear reminder of what we should be doing.

    I can also see how having so much of our assets forward deployed prevents these kinds of exercises today. It's a bureaucratic non-starter to plan an exercise for units committed elsewhere, even if they aren't doing anything useful.

    In the spirit of letting the results stand, it would also be great to see any of these exercises, even the easiest or most basic, be performed with realistic ECM. Nothing would be more educational than to see the exercise break down at the start because units can't communicate.

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  5. Sandy Woodward's book about the Falklands discusses leading an annual RN exercise Springtrain, where they take about 25 ships south to Gibraltar to escape UK winter, and run what for them is a major fleet exercise (probably about half the RN). This sounds like the kind of fleet exercise we need, although we would want maybe 50-100 ships. They were in the midst of Springtrain when Argentina invaded the Falklands, and took some of the Springtain participants south for Operation Corporate, joined by two carriers and two LSDs and some additional ships from UK (one LSD was already at the yards to be broken up and was hurriedly prepared to go, and the two carriers were in the process of being sold, so if the Argies had waited 6 months the Falklands would be Las Malvinas today).

    The previous fall, Woodward had run a shorter exercise in the Arabian Sea where he commanded an RN destroyer, 3 frigates, and 2 RFA supply ships as the opposition force against USS Coral Sea and its escorts, and by very devious means had "sunk" the Coral Sea with Exocets.

    Woodward makes the point that these kinds of realistic training exercises had a significant impact on preparing the RN for success in the Falklands, and in particular preparing him to lead. Those are exactly the kinds of fleet problems (albeit on a larger scale) that we need.

    Woodward also speaks very highly of the "Perisher" training program that all RN submarine captains must pass (flunk and you can never again serve in subs). The RN also has a program called Fleet Operational Sea Training (FOST), which I take to be something like the fleet training we got at Gitmo. Some US ships have participated in FOST and described it as harder and more intense than any US training.

    Some interesting models there for us to copy.

    I've thought about having the fleet operate on a 10-year cycle--3 years in reserve with 1/2 active, 1/2 reserve crew, 3 years in home fleet with emphasis on training, 3 years deployed/deployable with blue/gold crews, and 1 year in major maintenance/shipyard. Repeat the cycle in years 11-20, combine years 20 and 21 into a longer yard period for major upgrades, and then repeat the cycle two more times until retirement at age 40. That provides basically 30% of the fleet for deployment, 30% for quick surge (30 days), and 30% for longer-term surge (90 days). Until we can pass off some world policeman duties, we probably need about 100 ships deployed. The 30% in home/training status could do something like FOST and multiple fleet problems (1+/year) with the reserve ships serving as the enemy fleet. CO’s could do something like Perisher before taking command.

    This cycle would require about 3-1/2 crews for each 3 ships. But manning the ships in the home and deployed cycles with 85% active and 15% reserves would reduce manning to basically 3 crews for 3 ships. The blue/gold turnover for deployed ships could be scheduled with about a 1-month in-port overlap with a tender to catch up maintenance.

    I previously discussed where the Navy could get additional sailors. Per CBO, the Navy and Marines (CBO combines them and doesn't report separately) have about 210,000 personnel in combat roles, 93,000 in combat support roles, and 202,000 in admin/overhead roles, for a total active strength of 505,000, about 325,000 Navy and 180,000 Marines. Cut the admin/overhead personnel in half, give 1/3 to combat (34,000), 1/6 to combat support (17,000), and 1/2 to reduction in active duty headcount (50,000). There go your useless staffs, ComNavOps. The Navy/Marine split is, say, 22,000 combat and 11,000 support to Navy and 12,000 and 6,000 to the Marines. Double the number of reserve personnel from 97,000 to 194,000, to increase end strength from 602,000 to 649,000. Since a reservist gets paid for 60 days a year (1/6), that's an increase of about 16,000 reserve full time equivalents (FTEs), with 50,000 fewer actives, so the net is a reduction of 34,000 FTEs, which should reduce manpower costs.

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    1. AFAIK the UK no longer does the Perisher course. Australia now sends it prospective captains to the Netherlands (I think) Perisher course.

      Most students fail. Out of the 5 submarine commanders in Australia 4 are from friendly navies. Only 1 is home grown. See http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2020/03/the-5-collins-submarine-commanders.html

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    2. "AFAIK the UK no longer does the Perisher course. Australia now sends it prospective captains to the Netherlands (I think) Perisher course."

      I don't see that as a reason why we shouldn't.

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    3. A little further digging. Both Perisher and FOST still exist, but they were renamed and modified slightly in a reorganization of the RN's training arm. The Perisher course was a RN/Netherlands joint effort for a number of years. Now the RN does the nuclear one since all their subs are nuclear, and the Netherlands does the conventional one, so the Aussies would go to the Dutch course.

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    4. "by very devious means had "sunk" the Coral Sea with Exocets."

      I've not been able to see a detailed writeup of that incident. My vague understanding is that it was one of a series of exercises and involved taking advantage of a peacetime situation that would not exist in combat (mimicking a cruise liner). So, kudos to him but not a very useful tactic during war. In the Falklands, for example, the entire region was an exclusion zone and any unknown 'cruise liner' would have been treated as hostile.

      If you have any better information on the incident, please share!

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  6. A carrier air wing is woefully undersized from what they were 20 years ago. A carrier could easily support another 16-20 aircraft and helicopters. Shouldn't planning for the next war include reinforcing our carrier air wings?

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    1. And this is why we should be doing realistic fleet training problems. We would find out pretty quickly if we could do everything needed with current carrier air wings. My guess is that one of the first things we would figure out is that subs would cause us enough problems that we would need to get S-3s or something similar back into carrier air wings.

      Among other things that I expect we would figure out:
      - The LCS has basically zero combat value, except as a target to require the enemy to expend a missile or two.
      - The concept of conducting an amphibious assault from an LHA/LHD is simply not viable (aside: I spent a year in an LST, including two short back-to-back deployments, and in all that time we did not do a single bona fide amphibious assault exercise; we were going to do one in Crete in October 1973, but the Arabs and Israelis decided to go to war and disrupt that plan).
      - All of our snazzy fancy electronics have a problem working properly in a full EW threat environment.
      - We simply don't have a viable ASW capability; would have been nice to have kept the 6 Spruances and 51 Perrys that would not yet have turned 40, but that didn't happen.
      - We have no clue what to do in a mine warfare environment. I would guess that mines would bring any major exercise to a complete halt.

      While embarrassing to find those things out now, better now than when we have to do it for real. The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war.

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    2. I think we'd also realize that we need a navalized F-22 to keep the other fellas at arms length from the carrier group.

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    3. "I think we'd also realize that we need a navalized F-22 to keep the other fellas at arms length from the carrier group."

      As I understand things, that came down to the 90s Peace Dividend: the Navy had to choose between more Nimitzes, or NATF, and chose more Nimitzes. There's been talk of stopping Super Hornet buys early to put that money towards F/A-XX.

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  7. But one purpose of fleet problems should be find out the holes in our current strategy, equipment, and tactics. I am guessing the Navy brass don't want to do this because they don't want anyone to see how undersized our carrier air wing is. Or just how useless the LCSs are. Or how hard it is to a credible amphibious assault from an LHA/LHD. Or how badly we need more ASW assets.

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  8. Some food for thought, China is is having it worse than the US but the gap is steadily decreasing. They probably wanted to conduct huge exercises and maneuvers designed to counter the US but their nearby territorial waters have been hotly contested by allied and neutral countries that is against China land-grab policy. This leaves us some breathing space but we must return to full-scale exercises designed to strain the systems and test all the new "toys" then see how much they can stand up to real warfare. It's even possible that all these new toys that the Navy has invested so much it will prove hard to replace and failed to live up to expectations, we will end up fighting blind like back in the World Wars. When does the Navy leadership that by not taking action right now, thousands or even millions of Americans will pay for these mistakes in the future. Another important news if you look through this,https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/06/07/if-china-invades-taiwan-this-is-what-the-fleet-could-look-like/#d0b0035a7b07. We have agreed that this concept of amphibious warfare used by the Marine Corps and Navy is flawed and extremely dangerous but now China has copied almost the entire thing (I don't know of any Chinese VTOL carriers like the USMC is using. This means that at least China wanted to understand how does the US force structure pans out and how does the concept work by investing in platforms with similar capabilities. Which brings me to my next point, i believe that China generals have by now probably figured out how much a failure this is and used this as a platform to exploit the risk of a US amphibious operation and so the warning is in the next cycle of ships replacement, we will see a new amphibious concept that will much more effective than ours and a military much better designed to counter the current amphibious operation of the Marines. And that's when even if wanted to take back Taiwan, we have no way of doing so (or even countering China possibly-future dominance in sea)

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    1. I agree with CDR Chip, USN doesn't want to do big real exercises because it's too dangerous for their careers and more importantly, reveal too many bad decisions in acquisitions like LCS, Zummy, not enough fighters, very little ASW, no MCM,etc...

      Just imagine the fleet leaving port and suddenly all GPS-comlinks go down, throw in a sighting of a SSN, are we even sure fleet manages to continue without collisions and getting lost with just that thrown at it? Talk about embarrassing...

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  9. You fight the way you train.

    Not profound, I know, but certainly true.

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  10. This seems like an appropriate place to drop in a ready-made solution/concept I dreamt up that the US could use to both make the best use of the Marines and get realistic scenario training just like they used to. I came up with it when looking at what size the Marines could be reduced to:

    [Tl;Dr version: if the aggressor logic & equipment used now works for air assets & a common failing in forward planning is lack of realistic war games or practise, In a unit like the II MEF the USA has a force greater than that of many countries that is pretty self-mobile, multi-domain and well-equipped that could be used for plugging that exact hole.]

    The wiki page has a pretty good set of numbers, but doesn't break it into individual exercises, rather by year: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exercise_Red_Flag

    There are also good write ups like this: https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/us-uk-australia-exercise-red-flag-19-1/
    They give number like 100ish aircraft and anything from a few hundred people to over 2000 (https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/maple-flag-exercise-significantly-cut-back-but-exact-reasons-why-remain-murky/)

    Those are numbers for individual excercises though. Foal Eagle is on a bigger scale and includes Marine Units already: https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/us-south-korea-kick-off-annual-military-drill-without-us-strategic-assets/
    Theres over 12,000 (mostly) Marines involved with that instance quoted there.

    Looking to another US ally, Australia, numbers I've found quote 25,000, although there is no breakdown of who makes that up: https://www.defence.gov.au/Exercises/TS19/FAQGeneral.asp

    These have all been examples of US allies that are around the Pacific area, and Japan isnt left out either: https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/us-japan-kick-off-military-exercise-involving-57000-personnel/
    Again, Marine units are specifically mentioned in there. Apologies for the numerous links - no doubt the formatting is going to look horrid, but I wanted to 'show my working'.

    Now, how much is needed for the multi-domain aggressor role? Going back to your Marine Corps Manning post led me to this page (https://www.iimef.marines.mil/About/What-is-II-MEF/).
    It has a good breakdown of the units it includes with a total of about 47,000 individuals. Being generous and assuming you need another 10,000 support roles that would bring you to just under 60,000 Marines in total.

    Now, this force would be able to do something mentioned here several times - go out and win allies, project a presence, without having to tie up Carrier Task Forces. They would be able to hone the skills of US allies pretty much all over the globe as well as domestically.
    Over & over here the lack of realistic training and war games is pointed out as a fatal flaw. Looking through those sources I found, 1 common theme is that those exercises are being shortened/scaled down/ happening less frequently/ being swapped for tabletop or planning exercises. None of those are good.

    Imagine if Australia were simply told; "Sometime in April next year we will be sending the II MEF to Australia to land and conduct an amphibious assault/ maneuver from the sea (whilst obviously not landing in the middle of Sydney!). Australia is tasked with finding, intercepting and engaging the force at sea and on land." That would be a pretty realistic scenario that could be played out everywhere from Korea to Canada to the UK as well as the US coastal areas. Theres no reason why other military branches couldn't play a role as well, like including strategic bombers.

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    1. "Australia is tasked with finding, intercepting and engaging the force at sea and on land."

      There's nothing wrong with that and it would certainly be a vast improvement over what we're doing now, however, what we really want to do is pit ourselves against Chinese forces. Obviously, we can't use real Chinese forces so the next best thing is our own Opposing Force (OPFOR) that trains to simulate Chinese weapons, force structure, and tactics. Exercising against Australia or our own Marines wouldn't do that.

      So, your approach would be an improvement but isn't where we want to go in training.

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    2. It would be a start and a good one. Think about the disciplines required. Emcon, searching,comms, see if all that actually works against a peer. Can a growler get the job done? How close can a B52 get?

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    3. Agreed though - Australia is only an example, replace that with Hawaii or Anchorage for example. The premise is that the basic 'Top Gun' concept was put in place a long time ago and has proved successful - and now allies take part in that too. The same concept would work here, give the Marines a purpose & long term, achieve the goal of recreating Fleet Problems.

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  11. Now that's how it's done. The most fruitful exercises I was involved with were plain company + US army v Aussies.

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    1. Talisman Sabre? I took part in a few of those.
      Best exercise I was involved in, on the largest scale. It's too rare that we do these large scale 30-40,000 personnel exercises.

      Only time we ever simulated a full scale amphibious assault involving full combined arms and all the service branches. A lot of the Americans on the exercise said the same thing.

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  12. "Of course, all of these possible Fleet Problems presuppose the existence of a modern War Plan Orange aimed at China and, sadly, I see no evidence that we have such a plan. We need a War Plan Pacific aimed directly at China and we need to start exercising it."

    We need a plan, we need to figure out what resources we need to implement that plan, we need to get those resources, and we need to exercise that plan. Figure out where the holes are and fix them. And be ready to go whenever need be.

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