Sometimes you get ‘news’ that is just so incredibly obvious
– and yet totally oblivious to the Navy – that you just have to laugh. Here’s one such example from a USNI News
website article addressing the impact of illness on ships,
The
increased technical complexity of systems and reduced manning make U.S.
warships less able to operate if a disease breaks out on a ship than the
previous ships that weathered the 1918 influenza outbreak, a panel of experts
said last week.
“There’s
not a lot of redundancy” to take up the slack if a crew member falls out due to
illness or injury as opposed to past eras, Kara Mandell, a senior research
scientist at CNA*, said during an online forum. (1)
*CNA is the Center for Naval Analyses
and is the federally funded research and development center (FFRDC)
for the United States Navy and Marine Corps.
You see the incredibly obvious, blatant lesson from this,
right? If crews aren’t large enough to
operate a ship when we lose sailors to illness, how are we going to operate a
ship when we lose sailors in battle (you know, stuff like being killed and
wounded)?
…
the service has said ships may need to fight sick if the need arises. (1)
The Navy seems baffled and scared about insufficient crews
to absorb illness and yet we’re intentionally designing ships with insufficient
crew to absorb battle casualties. How
can the Navy recognize the one problem but not the other? Only the Navy can be this blind to a fundamental
lesson that is being thrown in their face.
The stupidity continues,
Mandell
said research was ongoing as to how illness would affect an operational
warship. (1)
Research?
Research??? You have the entire
WWII experience to tell you what happens to ships when the crew is
incapacitated !
This is just the modern failure of leadership. When faced with a problem that has no
immediate, simple solution … study the problem some more.
Hey, Navy, you’re being given an invaluable lesson, at a
minimal cost, about the problem with minimal manning: the crews are too small
to fight hurt ! Stop trying to design
minimally manned ships. You’re just
going to lose them in combat, anyway, because at the first hit they’ll be
rendered combat-incapable due to casualties.
Immediately following that, the ship will begin sinking because there
won’t be enough crew to conduct damage control.
There certainly won’t be enough crew left to continue the fight.
Only the Navy could fail to make the connection between
crews too small to absorb illness and crews too small to absorb
casualties. It’s the exact same
problem. Only the cause is
different. Wake up, Navy!
(1)USNI News website, “Small Crews, Technical Complexity
Makes Operating Modern Warships in Pandemic Tough”, John Grady, 19-May-2020,
https://news.usni.org/2020/05/19/small-crews-technical-complexity-makes-operating-modern-warships-in-pandemic-tough
An aside reading the June GAO Defense Acquisitions Annual Assessment on Zumwalt , thought classic comment "Since the software is not as capable and does not enable as much automation as originally planned, among other things, the Navy has permanently added 31 sailors to the crew compared to initial estimates, increasing life-cycle costs".
ReplyDeleteHighlighting the failure of the Raytheon software engineering for the Zumwalt Total Ship Computing Environment which development may have cost a $billion, and the resultant ~20% increase in the crew, if Navy were able to write a tight contract they could have imposed a penalty on Raytheon to the value of 31 sailors pay for 35 years, at $300K per year, ~$325 million. Thou it did result in a larger crew:)
You could counter argue that sailors are becoming so expensive that the cost equation has changed, instead of incurring the cost of large crews that will save a certain percentage of battle damaged ships, use the saving on small crews and build more hulls? All sorts of complications/unknowns involved, the cost of software as highlighted by the failure with Zumwalt, future of USVs, why cost of sailors and the overheads so high etc.
I recently finished reading "Six Frigates", which I highly recommend.
DeleteHave we returned to the early days of the navy when one of the primary reasons for the frigates to be kept in drydock was the cost of manning the ships with a full crew?
"frigates to be kept in drydock was the cost of manning the ships with a full crew?"
DeleteKeep in mind that, at that time, the government had very few sources of income. Also, interesting to note that as recent as the 1930's the Navy sailed ships with only partial crews as a cost control measure. When war broke out, the Navy would assemble at bases to fully crew up.
So, would it be valid to staff ships in peacetime with not a skeletal crew, but say the crew size the navy uses now, and then during conflict have the capacity to up size to a combat crew - which presumably would be adding redundancy and resiliency?
ReplyDeleteIn older times with mechanically simpler ships that would work. All you needed for many jobs was a body and some minimal instruction. Today, the technology for even basic functions is so much more complex that the learning curve is to long to just quickly pile more bodies aboard and expect them to function. There might be room for some manpower reductions but not much unless you're willing to let your navy sit our the first several months of a war while you train up your crews.
DeleteMakes total sense what you're saying, doesn't really solve the problem then to borrow the crews from ships in repair - though it might provide the time for the training that is required now during early stages of a conflict - unless that leaves ships that could otherwise enter the fight without a crew at all.
DeleteThis is one of the major problems facing us in a long war. Even if we could quickly build new ships - which we can't - we'd have a very hard time training new crews in a useful time frame. For example, it takes years to train an Aegis operator to even a barely proficient level. The same applies to sonar operators, turbine engineering techs, electronic warfare operators, and so on.
DeleteIn WWII, we were able to provide crews as fast as we could build the ships but I fear that's no longer the case. If that's true, how do we sustain a multi-year war? And, if we can't sustain a multi-year war, what does that mean for our strategy? Do we risk everything, immediately, in a bid for quick victory, knowing we can't sustain the effort? Or, do we just settle in for a long, drawn out war?
This should also make us re-examine our design philosophy. The old K.I.S.S. (Keep It Simple, Stupid) principle still applies. Maybe, instead of Aegis, we should be sticking with older, simpler radars that can be maintained, repaired in combat, and people can be trained on? Something to think about!
" . . . we'd have a very hard time training new crews in a useful time frame."
DeleteAs in WWII, the training schedules will be compressed and simplified so as to train the number of sailors needed.
For example, at the start of WW2, Army Air Corp pilots recieved 9 months of training, 3 months each of basic, primary, and advanced. As the war progressed, each phase was reduced first to 10 weeks and then to nine weeks.
During the Korean War, Marine Corp basic training was shortened from ten weeks to eight, but returned to ten weeks after the war.
In war time, supply will find some way to meet demand.
Of course shortening of training times will occur but there's a limit to how short it can be. As I said, it takes years to train for many of the critical jobs. You might compress the time frame from several years to just a couple but it's still going to take significant time.
DeleteConsider that the Navy has a current fleet wide degradation of Aegis despite all the trained techs. The problem is that Aegis is simply too complex for anyone who isn't a PhD manufacturer's rep with a decade of direct experience to competently maintain the system. No amount of compressed training is going to turn out functional Aegis techs in any useful time frame.
It's one thing to shorten basic training for an infantryman but it's another to shorten training for an electronic warfare tech or sonar analyst by any significant amount. Similarly, in WWII, every enlistee was a backyard mechanic and could be fairly quickly trained to work on aircraft engines that were basically the same as automobile engines but it's quite another to train a turbine tech.
And so on.
Yes, we'll shorten basic training and produce new sailors quickly but the technologically critical skills will require much, much more time.
Now, the silver lining in this is that the enemy won't be able to produce skilled techs any quicker than us!
CNO, as you discuss some of the challenges with the complexity of Aegis I wonder how it compares to other radars like the TRS-4D.
DeleteThat seems like the answer might be too involved for a quick response.
If that is the case, maybe a future post on the subject?
"compares to other radars like the TRS-4D.
DeleteThat seems like the answer might be too involved for a quick response.
If that is the case, maybe a future post on the subject?"
I'd love to do a post on the subject but the problem is that there is no public domain data on the performance of either system beyond vague, general statements and there is even less on the technical maintenance and operations.
The only reason I know about the Aegis problems is that they got so bad, at one point, that the Navy formed one of their infamous - and useless - Admiral-chaired committees to oversee the fleet wide effort to fix the systems. A Navy Captain of an Aegis ship wrote an article in which he described how he thought his ship and radar were about the best in the fleet but when his system was examined by a manufacturer's rep team it was found to be badly degraded. The point he was making - and that I make continually - is that the technology was so complex that he didn't even know his system was bad!
Unfortunately, I've seen no official updates since then and I'm left to assume that the problem persists since no systemic changes have been implemented. I assume the fleet remains, largely, blissfully ignorant of the degree of degradation.
There is no corresponding level of information about the TRS-3D/4D system so I have nothing to compare. There is only the manufacturer's claims which are useless as all such claims are.
There are many such topics that I'd love to post on but the dearth of information prevents it. For example, all the really good DOT&E reports that would really tell us about the state of our Navy are classified (for good reason!). We get hints and we can apply logic to reason out general conclusions but that's often all we can do.
I'd also love to do detailed comparisons to the ships and weapons of other countries but there is even less information on them since none publish the various reports that we do.
"Yes, we'll shorten basic training and produce new sailors quickly but the technologically critical skills will require much, much more time.
DeleteNow, the silver lining in this is that the enemy won't be able to produce skilled techs any quicker than us!"
Completely spot on, in fact I think that's going to be one of the big unforeseen issues in a coming peer war (assuming it actually happens anytime soon).
I wonder whether China's much larger population will translate in a major advantage due to a larger starting pool of skilled people, by the way.
"I wonder whether China's much larger population will translate in a major advantage due to a larger starting pool of skilled people, by the way."
DeletePossibly in a general sense but you can only use as many people as you have ships and aircraft and tanks. Beyond that, they're just extra people - nice to have but not filling critical combat functions.
Now, if we're stupid enough to get into a land war then the Chinese population becomes an immense resource of cannon fodder as we saw during the Korean War.
The National Guard should be used as a storehouse of technical expertise. Guard training could be on ships or simulators for the technologically critical skills that would need to be maintained.
ReplyDeleteA special form of civil reserve force that only repaired/maintained Military equipment could also be useful. The company representatives that are used to maintain the combat systems are not subject to Military requirements for fitness for duty, combat training, etc. You may be able to keep a bunch of out of shape electronics technicians up to date on the combat systems if they were only used as a repair force and didn't have any other responsibilities (not filling sand bags when there is a flood, etc.)
I agree about simplifying ships. I would also like to see some diversity in the combat systems that are used (Aegis, Saab naval combat system, General Dynamic Shipboard integration and combat systems, Thales TACTICOS, Elbit systems - ENTCS 2000, BAE). Primary and back up combat systems that use different programming and different networks or have a back up stand alone mode would give at least some level of redundancy. I worry about cyber attacks that could disable the Aegis system and the majority of the fleet. I don't like the putting all the eggs in the Aegis basket.
We essentially have a 'reserve' force of technology experts, now. They're the manufacturer's reps. They often sail with our ships and provide the backbone of expertise on many systems. I understand that you'd like to have a somewhat more formalized and 'militarized' version and that's an idea worth considering. On the other hand, in the current system, we pay for the expertise when we need it but are not burdened with the administration, benefits, long term pensions, etc. So, there's positive aspects to both approaches.
DeleteThe larger problem is what happens when war comes? Civilian tech reps aren't going to sail into combat so how do we operate and maintain our systems then?
Your desire for redundancy is spot on. The only drawback to having two entirely different systems is that we're barely able to train to operate the one system we have. How are we going to be able to operate an entirely different backup system with any competency?
An alternate form of redundancy is to have two identical software systems but have them housed on two COMPLETELY separate hardware systems with absolutely no links or commonality, including separate power supplies. That way, if one system is damaged or compromised, we can switch to the other which has been isolated, separated, and secured from the primary.
What do you think?
I don't know which is better, or maybe, we need both the factory technicians and a reservist force of trained technicians that can take over for the factory technicians if a war starts. The pensions, pay , etc should be reasonable, I would think we are talking a small number of highly skilled people that will be paid to keep current on systems that they are already trained to operate. I could be wrong that the monetary cost will be low but the price will be paid for in blood if the ships are unable to fight because of a lack of support/upkeep.
DeleteAgree on the need for redundancy and the competency issues that would result from having two different systems. Training would be almost impossible with two systems with different workflows. I was thinking that it may be possible to make the interface for the sailor identical while the underlying software would be different for the back up system, like running MS Word on Windows and MS Word on a Mac. The sailor using the systems would use the same commands in both systems to do his job. Standardize the interfaces but use different software to limit potential cyberthreats taking out both systems.
The reason ships should have two guns is to limit single point failure. I'm in favor of complete duplication of the hardware and software required to fight the boat. Without a functional combat system, modern ships are out of the fight.
Another thought would be to make all positions at the Pentagon have requirements to be proficient in combat systems maintenance and repair. Tests of competence would be required for advancement and retention. Combat systems would likely become much easier to maintain and repair.
DeleteAny system that requires an army of civilian tech reps is not combat-ready.
DeleteWill possible future of smaller crew numbers ever become realistic for warships?, the 210,000 ton/400 m container ship Hong Kong operates with a crew of 22, a small unmanned cargo ship crossed English Channel one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world last year and with the expanding use of AI systems the new Aegis builds said to be have ability to operate without human intervention as humans too slow to react or maybe better in complicated scenarios eg numerous simultaneous air attacks from different directions or an unexpected attack by anti-ship supersonic sea skimming missiles as system never sleeps and seconds count, cannot wait for human reaction. The AI software algorithms would continuously asses all the options for defense based on input from CEC, IRST, radar, SEWIP etc sensors and make optimum use of the soft kill systems and firing missiles/guns it calculates have best chance of success, it will not overlook that one missile that a human might miss in the high pressure conditions.
ReplyDeleteWould depend on very, very good and no doubt expensive software and back ups with ability to degrade gracefully to work around battle damage as system, sensors and weapons taken out, thou Google/Waymo which began testing self driving cars back in 2009 and big$ investment its now 2020 with no sign ready for the road gives room for doubt AI warship ready for prime time yet, another five years or so?
"210,000 ton/400 m container ship Hong Kong operates with a crew of 22"
DeleteWhoa, there! Don't even begin to suggest that that's possibly equivalent to a warship. That commercial crew doesn't need to fight the ship, conduct damage control, refuel/resupply at sea, search for enemy contacts, conduct electronic warfare, board suspect ships, or the thousand other things that a naval crew has to do. That crew has only to ride the ship from one location to another. All maintenance is performed dockside.
"new Aegis builds said to be have ability to operate without human intervention"
Uh, Aegis has had a full auto mode since day one! In fact, it's the preferred mode and would almost certainly have prevented the Vincennes incident.
Worth a read May 5 "Johns Hopkins APL Delivers Prototype Defense Planning and Assessment Tool to USS Bunker Hill"
Delete"The hard kill/soft kill (HK/SK) Performance Assessment Tool (HaSPAT) helps the warfighter understand the planned defensive posture and evaluate combat system performance before an enemy attack. It also balances weapon inventory by advising what’s available and keeping enough weapons back for individual defense measures. // SK sensors detect signatures from weapons and then use electromagnetic countermeasures to disrupt them. HK countermeasures include physical weapons, such as projectiles, to destroy or damage incoming fire."
Think above capability should be in any CMS, surprised not in Aegis
Small crews, Bryan Clark when with CSBA Institute, now at Hudson Institute advocating 15-24 crew for an optionally umanned 2,000 ton corvette. Navy looking like planning on spending many $billions on USVs, interesting as to what Congress makes of it, expect Congress will call Bryan Clark to testify.
I posted on a soft kill CEC some time ago. See, "Soft Kill CEC"
DeleteThx, if APL software progresses it may meet the objectives you outlined.
DeleteMy understanding the John Hopkins APL laptop HaSPAT software is a simulation tool that produces analytics and performance metrics with the aim to advise crew how to optimize the best use of an individual ship's disparate AAW elements of soft kill/hard kill for defeating anti-ship missile attacks by advising what effectors are most appropriate based on their capabilities and conserving sufficient effectors for maximizing ship's own defense.
If software ever built into Aegis presumably by taking automated inputs from CEC, ESM & SIGINT (SEWIP & SSEE-F, maybe IRST if fitted), soft kill with ECM jamming (SEWIP), decoys (Nulka) and lastly hard kill with missiles+guns (ESSM-RAM-Phalanx), not clear if it would solve the problem thrown up during Falklands War when RN escort’s decoys saved the escort but had the unintended effect of redirecting the attacking missiles to the very ship the escort was trying to protect.
"best use of an individual ship's disparate AAW elements"
DeleteUnless the ship is alone, this is NOT the right approach as you astutely note,
"RN escort’s decoys saved the escort but had the unintended effect of redirecting the attacking missiles to the very ship the escort was trying to protect."
You've correctly identified the weakness in an individual defensive scheme. This is EXACTLY the kind of group tactics that the Navy should be exercising and developing now, during peacetime, instead of wasting our time on interminable deployments that accomplish nothing.
This is also a great example of a technological masterpiece of a feat (protecting an individual ship) that serves no useful purpose in combat since the ship will always be part of a group. This borders on technology for its own sake. Now, aspects of this could be rolled into a group soft kill CEC but the individual program is of no combat use. Unfortunately, the Navy engages in way too much of this type of thing.
Good comment and good reminder about the RN experience.
Pay X-Box or Playstation to release an Aegis-based video game, organise some competitions and some prizes that appeal to young people and they'll train themselves to a useful basic standard.
ReplyDelete