Syrian
air defense forces having launched more than 1,000 surface-air missiles to try
and foil the repeated Israeli attacks. They’ve had little effect so far. (1)
While this does not provide exact numbers, the trend seems
clear. I’ve heard of no reports of
downed Israeli aircraft nor any credible claims of downings by Syria. Thus, the Russian S-300 system would seem to
have a pK of, essentially, zero.
 |
| S-300 - Ineffective? |
I know exactly what some of you are going to say. You’re going to wave away the failings of
this system and point to the wondrous S-400 system. Well, I’ll remind you that the S-300 once got
the same rave reviews that the S-400 gets today. Dr. Carlo Kopp, the renowned author, had this
to say about the S-300 system in 2006.
The
S-300 SAM systems remain one of the most lethal, if not the most lethal, all
altitude area defence SAM systems in service … (2)
This is yet another data ‘point’ that proves that SAM
success rates are quite poor across all eras and all systems. Despite this body of evidence, the US firmly
believes that its missile systems are extremely effective, to the point that we
don’t even mount close in weapon systems on the Zumwalts. We desperately need to put our defensive
missile systems through real, live fire weapon trials on sacrificial barges and
find out what they can, or cannot, do.
(1)Breaking Defense website, “Unanswered
Israeli Air Strikes Against Syria Raise S-400 Questions ”, Arie
Egozi, 9-Jun-2020,
https://breakingdefense.com/2020/06/unanswered-israeli-air-strikes-against-syria-raise-s-400-questions/
(2)Dr. Carlo Kopp, 25-Feb-2006,
https://web.archive.org/web/20110928142727/http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.93/pub_detail.asp
I think you are missing half of the story here. The point is of course to do more testing but the real question is: how to make sure that it is done in a relevant manner ? I still remember the 6 Phoenix missiles shot in the seventies where: the targets had the radar signature augmented ("hey I'm here"), their speed was subsonic (heard about a Backfire and its missiles?), the position of the targets was "compatible" with gimballs limit on the AWG9 ... Despite that only 4 drones were shot down.
ReplyDeleteWhat I am saying is that there is a fundamental conflict of interest between the navy wanting to show that the money they got for whatever weapon system was well spent and the need to be honest about the results. Think of all the things that can be gamed: simulated pre-runs, parameters in the software that can be adapted, indications about the scenarii given to the missile system operators ... etc. To that you can add physical (i.e. real constraints), for example I know that in Europe the testing of the Meteor missile is difficult because of its range (I supposed it's good to have Vidsel in Northern Sweden), I also know that the French never developped a cruise missile in the 80s for their deterrence because the question was : how do you test and validate in a sovereign manner ? France is too small for that and you don't want to go testing abroad in this particular case because you don't want other countries, even allies to know about the performance of your system. But maybe you do not have this issue in the US.
I have spent a good deal of my career in automotive testing and the good thing is that in this case journalists also do some testing, even if their methodology is sometimes ridiculous (braking distance testing for example) it puts at least some pressure on you.
"I think you are missing half of the story here. The point is of course to do more testing but the real question is: how to make sure that it is done in a relevant manner ? "
DeleteI can only assume that you're new to this blog since one of the major, overarching themes of the blog is REALISTIC testing! So, welcome! Please peruse the archives. You'll find hundreds of fascinating posts on all manner of topics including testing. You might also be interested in the DOT&E annual reports which make for fascinating reading for a QA/QC focused person such as yourself. Welcome and enjoy!
Actually I have been reading and enjoying your navy comments for quite a while now. It's nice to have somebody who thinks about real life problems. There used to be an ex-Air Force guy turned journalist (Robert F. Dorr was his name I think) who was talking a bit like you, he was a little less outspoken but still very good, unfortunately he died some time ago.
DeleteWhat I was trying to say is the difficulty of putting what you advocate in terms of testing (with which I agree strongly) in practice. Some of the difficulties are political, they stem from the character and the integrity of the leadership but some others are technical. I am an engineer and as I said I spent and still do a lot of testing, first in automotive and now in image processing and things are not always as objective as we would like them to be.
Let me explain : most of the systems today include a good deal of computing simply because you can't control a missile manually like it was done at the beginning a long time ago. There has to be some parameters that are here to set up the guidance (even if it's only a PID in the control loop) and these parameters can be "adapted" to the scenario, so they can be gamed to make things look better than they are in real situation where you won't know beforehand what will happen.
I guess this can be addressed with better training for the operators because the guys at the bottom of the food chain know what the real problem is and can help the development but how do you get there ? This is what I was (in a friendly manner) challenging you on.
"This is what I was (in a friendly manner) challenging you on."
DeleteOh my! No need to challenge me; I agree 100% with you! I also readily acknowledge that setting up realistic testing is challenging. HOWEVER, those challenges can be overcome with a bit of determination.
For example, how do we realistically test, say, our Aegis combat system? Well, here's one good way that could be implemented with minimal effort and expense. Take one of the Ticonderoga class cruisers that the Navy is trying so hard to early retire and set out in the middle of the ocean with its Aegis system set to auto mode (yes, there is such a mode) and then launch a real, saturation attack against it and see what happens. That's 100% realistic.
And so on. While safety limits our testing to some degree, a bit of creative thinking can get around most of the problems. You read the recent Fleet Problem post, I assume? They were able to make those as realistic as possible short of actually killing people (loved the dropping sacks of flour on the battleships!).
Another example: I've advocated shooting real torpedoes with inert warheads at ships in ASW exercises. Let our ships try to evade/counter real torpedoes. Sure, we might dent a few hulls but that's a small price to pay for some completely realistic training.
Much of our testing should be unannounced. An OPFOR should one day simply appear near a ship(s) and start launching drones or whatever and see the target ship react. No notice, no preparation, no tweaking of systems - just an instantaneous combat response from the target. I bet we'd find out just how unprepared we are for combat both systematically and mentally.
And so on.
"PID"
PID loops! I've tuned many loop in my day. A man after my own heart!
1. Israel is bombing with GPS, and that might not work in a major war as satellites are destroyed.
ReplyDelete2. Israel is lobbing long-range missiles from outside Syria. It is not doing direct ground attack needed to destroy mobile forces or to support ground troops.
3. If Israel ever goes "downtown" for a real attack it will be bloody, which is why they don't.
4. Note that ultra-expensive Israeli Apaches attack helos dare not enter Syria.
2. So your suggesting they are shooting what exactly at the edge of 400km?
Delete4 Well since thay are not actually at war with Syria (well thay sorta are but I mean they are not planning to invade), they are not running a suppression program vs its AA. They are executing attacks against Iranian proxy forces. Why would thay use helicopters in the first place?
" Israel is"
DeleteWhat is your point?
The fact is that, according to the referenced article, a thousand SAMs have been launched at targets that apparently met the target/launch parameters and they have resulted in zero confirmed kills.
Re. 1 - The GPS jamming threat. "According to former Air Force Space Command Chief Scientist Dr. Gene McCall, the next generation of GPS will be eight times more jam resistant than currently deployed GPS systems. But “GPS III would have to improve by a factor of 10 million to begin defeating the threat” of being jammed, McCall wrote in the April 2020 edition of the National Defense Magazine."
DeletePresumably why the big annual USAF Red Flag exercise conducted with no GPS.
Kath, the world is round and mountains exist. Radar cannot track low flying aircraft far away, so an attacker can stay low, soar up high and launch missiles, then dive down and disappear long before any SAM can reach them.
Delete"live fire weapon trials on sacrificial barges"
ReplyDeleteCan the LCS and use all of them in this roll. Use the money not spent to automate/remote them so they can maneuver and bolt on some more CIWS and BAE's new bolt on quad pack MK 41 tubes for ESSM. Since the attackers could stand off you could at least get a solid read on the inner shell of CIWS/ESSM. After that I suppose you need some kind remote attack barge to test the AEGIS vs a large scale attack. But wait you have be willing to budget for actually using missiles and not building a fire scout or a laser demo.
"barge to test the AEGIS vs a large scale attack."
DeleteNO! A much better idea is to take one of the real Ticonderogas that the Navy has been trying to early retire and place it out in the middle of the ocean with Aegis in full auto and then launch a real saturation attack against it and see what happens for real.
Sure, we'd likely lose the Tico but the Navy doesn't want them anyway so there's no downside. The Navy gets to early 'retire' a ship it doesn't want and they get real combat results to analyze.
But you need obfuscation and deniability. If you do toast a real Ticonderoga that looks bad (I mean if comes back as overwhelmed easily). A LCS going down you get data and can hand wave it was a flawed ship so as not to suggest your system failed to work up to vaunted 99 percent number.
DeleteI would it take real careful planning. You want to dodge satellite coverage and also put it all into effect quickly and quietly so you don't end up with 'friendly' fishing boats hanging about. Because you are going to have to do it in a remote part of the sea if you are using long range missiles.
I dunno Its just I would desperately love to a whole series of real tests with real missile loads that should in theory push defenses to the max. But how do you keep the results confidential from peer opponents. Although I suppose you could argue sine thay are basically invested in the same basic design and defense types it does not matter. I mean if a remote Ticonderoga can be bested easily than so can a type 055.
Would you think the target ship should pre hardened with reinforcement or inert material to try and simulate at least some damage control.
The Tico test idea is great, and the missiles can have inert warheads, so there is no danger in sinking the ship. I'd even use the latest greatest ship with a full crew.
Delete" inert warheads"
DeletePossibly, however, there would be great value in seeing how an Aegis system degrades in the face of actual battle damage. Can it take hits to the array and continue to function to some degree or would a single hit knock it so far out of alignment as to render it useless (as suggested by the Port Royal grounding)?
I wouldn't have a crew onboard! Even an inert missile can penetrate and cause a great deal of damage. Recall the drone that impacted the Aegis cruiser during an exercise?
Not exactly zero, a very rare example of Syrian success, February 2018 an Israeli F-16I shot down thou it was with a S-200 SAM :)
ReplyDeleteRecently Syrians have been openly criticizing the Russian radar systems used by the S-300 air defense system and the Pantsir-S air defense system, saying that they were completely useless with respect to Israeli cruise missiles.
According to the Syrian Arab News Agency. "Syrian air defense systems have intercepted several rockets launched by Israel over Palmyra. Currently, most of the weapons in the Syrian army, including air defense missiles, are produced in Russia. The Syrian air defense forces, armed with Russian-made air defense systems, are backward, including this also applies to such air defense systems as the S-300 and the Pantsir-S – they had no real success. Others, including the S-125, Osa, and Igra air defense missiles, are even more backward. But due to the fact that the Syrian air defense system uses radars made in China, there are results. Syria previously received a number of Chinese made radars, including at least the long-range radar JY-27, several long-range radars JYL-1 and the LLQ120 radar for warning of low-altitude targets”
Claimed Syrian military has indeed begun to intercept Israeli missiles by Buk-M2E anti-aircraft missile systems, which may indicate the fact that the Pantsir-S air defense missile systems are indeed ineffective.
Chinese saying the most productive step for Syrian air defense systems will be the transition to Chinese radar equipment :)
The comments also come after a highly-publicized series of articles in Russian newspapers which criticized the Assad government for endemic corruption and incompetence. The quote from the Syrian military source could be an attempt to publicly undermine Moscow’s military’s reputation as a form of under-the-table retaliation.
Comments taken from Bulgarian military com and Syria Direct
To me it seems simple.
ReplyDelete1. You build strong barges, concrete? (can be static as in this case we are not testing manoeuvring techniques etc just the ability to hit an incoming missile).
2. The attacking missiles can have dummy warheads as we are not testing their explosive power.
3. The control can be done remotely from land. This should be easy as that is the way the Navy is going , if not why re unmanned ships just round the corner.
You then test. Start with one out of date missile type and build up to the latest in saturation attacks. The only part of the system really exposed is the Radar/ sensors on our concrete ship. If the system performs as advertised happy days, aren't we great. If a missile gets thro' there is a good chance it will hit another part of the ship. If it damages the sensors the system failed and we need to come up with plan B.
Sign me up!
DeleteWe have the SDTS, and if used in a proper manner could/woyld tell us lots more. Of course recently the Navy has refused, repeatedly, to follow Congressional direction and embark the newest systems (Burke FLT III) and test them... Wonder why...???
Delete"SDTS"
DeleteThere is also no reason we couldn't/shouldn't have several SDTS. The cost of conversion and operation is nearly free relative to the Navy budget. We should have a permanent Burke SDTS, a permanent Aegis cruiser SDTS, and a permanent amphib (LSD-41 class?) Ship Self Defense System SDTS, at a minimum.
There is also a possibility to use a small island to install a "ship" radar signature building with the Aegis system and and launch missile with at it. Would probably be lower cost and easier to repair and launch again. First time a ship is subjected to missile damage should not be in an actual fight. The captain need to know what kind of damage the ship can withstand and what damage that will result in mission/actual kill.
Delete" small island … building with the Aegis system ... First time a ship is subjected to missile damage should not be in an actual fight."
DeleteYou bring up an excellent point. The Army and the various aviation programs conduct live fire tests against our new vehicles and aircraft to assess the type and extent of damage they can expect. The closest we come to this for ships is the shock testing. While it's asking a lot to conduct live fire damage tests against a multi-billion dollar ship, we should, nevertheless, be looking to conduct more extensive damage testing of components.
Great comment!
Well, first prototype ship I suppose (if looking at other defense hardware) will be nothing like the rest of the ships. If all expensive senor and equivalent system are removed it should not be that expensive.
DeleteIt should also be compared to the cost of losing the ship in combat and maybe tilt the battle to a loss with more ships or even a carrier(group), how expensive would that be?
Dont forget the price in life and experienced sailors. It is (relative) easy to replace hardware. It is not so easy to replace experience.
Also for moral issues, no one really cares about the ship if the battle is won and most of the sailors return home.
Who is operating those SAM systems in Syria, qualified personnel or random guys with two hours of "training"?
ReplyDeleteThey have a peculiar attitude to those things in the Middle East...
There are reports saying that the S-300 hasn't even been fired against Israeli aircraft and that the launchers are under Russian control.
ReplyDeleteHaaretz: Why Syria Isn’t Firing Its S-300 Missiles at Israeli Jets
Haaretz, "Syrian crews were dispatched to Russia to learn how to operate the new systems. Later Moscow supplied the systems to the Syrian army and they were deployed on its territory. Although some 20 months have elapsed since the incident, not a single missile has as yet been launched from an S-300 battery in Syria at IAF aircraft."
Haaretz suggested one reason for this is that the launchers are under Russian control.
Haaretz also reported, "On average, the Syrians have fired about 100 missiles a year at IAF aircraft. This indicates that Syria's aerial defense forces fire a substantial number of missile barrages at every attacking plane."
This would explain the "Syrian air defense forces having launched more than 1,000 surface-air missiles" comment from Breaking Defense.
Besides, TASS reported that "Russia delivered more than 100 surface-to-air guided missiles for each battalion." Russia provided Syria with three S-300 batallions. So, its not like they had a 1,000 missiles to begin with.
Forecast International: Caution: Armaments Not Intended for Use
"Noticeably, Israel has continued to carry out air strikes on Syria and there are no indications that any S-300 missiles have been fired in response."
From your first link:
Delete"Over the past seven years – the first attack attributed to Israel took place in April 2013 – Syrian anti-aircraft systems have launched a minimum of about 700 missiles at IAF warplanes.
One missile shot down an F-16 fighter jet. "
While that statement doesn't offer any details about types of weapons or numbers, it clearly reinforces the point of the post that defensive systems have a very poor performance record regardless of era, country, or type.
From your post:
Delete"Well, here’s a new data point for Russian S-300 system performance against Israeli aircraft:"
Your post suggests that Syria has fired more than a 1,000 S-300s and that does not appear to be the case.
"Your post suggests that Syria has fired more than a 1,000 S-300s and that does not appear to be the case."
DeleteIt's a quote from the Breaking Defense article. If you don't believe it, your argument is with them, not me.
I put more stock and credibility in Breaking Defense as a source than the ones you cited.
That aside, it is possible that the article refers to all SAMS fired, of various types, despite the apparent direct reference to the S-300 (read the entire linked article). Even if that's the case, it doesn't change the point of the post which is that SAM systems are nowhere near as effective as they're claimed to be.
So, what is it that you're arguing? There is a fair amount of actual combat data and it clearly demonstrates the very poor performance of SAMs across multiple eras, countries, and types. So, what's your point?
"It's a quote from the Breaking Defense article. If you don't believe it, your argument is with them, not me."
DeleteTrue. And, that quote, indeed the entire article, makes no reference to the S-300 being fired against Israel aircraft in Syria. Yet, you've used that quote to suggest that it has been and concluded that "the Russian S-300 system would seem to have a pK of, essentially, zero."
If Haaretz and Forcast International, both reputable sources too, are to be believed, the S-300 hasn't been used against Israeli aircraft. And, if Russia supplied over 300 missiles, how could Syria have fired "more than 1,000 surface-air missiles"? The numbers don't match, right?
In short, you're using a data set (the S-300 in Syria) that doesn't seem to exist.
Geez, I hate this kind of discussion. It contributes nothing to the premise and does not change the conclusion one bit. *sigh*
DeleteWell, since you didn't read the article, I'll provide more quotes from it:
"The first signs of dissatisfaction with the Russian air defense systems came on May 1 when the Syria Direct website ran a story quoting what was described as a Syrian military source who criticized the S-300 air defense systems supplied by Russia. The source pointed to the repeated failures of the Russian-made systems to protect sites in Syria from the Israeli strikes. The comments by the apparent Syrian military official was the first clear sign of a big dispute between Moscow and Ankara related to the operational efficiency of the air defense systems. …
Last year, the Israeli air force hit more than 200 targets in Syria connected to the Iranian effort to upgrade Hezbollah’s rockets. Some of those attacks have been reported to involve Israeli F-35s. The attacks continue apace this year with Syrian air defense forces having launched more than 1,000 surface-air missiles to try and foil the repeated Israeli attacks. They’ve had little effect so far."
There's not really any other way to interpret that than the S-300 system has been used and failed.
So, again, if you have a problem, go argue with Breaking Defense.
Here's a Wiki statement,
"In 2020, Syrian military criticized the Russian S-300 missile defence system, saying that it was largely ineffective against Israeli air strikes. Syrian military sources talking to the Russian outlet Avia.pro said that the radar used on the S-300 and the Pantsir-S systems had proven to be incapable of detecting and hitting Israeli cruise missiles on numerous occasions."
For sake of discussion, let's say you're right and that not a single S-300 missile has been fired (so how would the Syrians know it's ineffective if they haven't tried it?). The statement that a thousand SAM missiles have been fired still stands so, at most, that would change the post statement from,
"Thus, the Russian S-300 system would seem to have a pK of, essentially, zero."
to,
"Thus, the Russian [fill in the blank] system would seem to have a pK of, essentially, zero."
and the overall point that SAM systems have very poor demonstrated performance still stands - emphatically so.
Tedious. I've gone as far as I care to with this.
I know what you mean and I feel your pain. But, your premise and the conclusion drawn from it is faulty.
DeleteAs Wiki pointed out, "Syrian military sources talking to the Russian outlet Avia.pro said that the radar used on the S-300 and the Pantsir-S systems had proven to be incapable of detecting and hitting Israeli cruise missiles on numerous occasions."
This seems to be the crux of the problem. You can't hit what you can't see.
The Syrian Direct article cited Sitki Egeli, an assistant professor at Izmir University of Economics and the former Director of International Affairs for Turkey’s Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, who said, “As a long-range system, the S-300 suffers from the problem of radar horizon, meaning targets cannot be detected if they’re lying low due to the curvature of the earth. Strike aircraft, such as F-16s fly relatively close to the surface of the earth, and by the time they’re detected, they have already launched their munitions, so it’s too late."
The failure of the S-300 appears to be related it's radar and its inability to detect low-flying target and not the missile itself. And, if no missiles were fired, as reported by Haaretz, it is impossible to conclude the "system would seem to have a pK of, essentially, zero."
Now, if they had a more integrated air defense that included an airborne platform that could detect low-flying aircraft and missiles, the S-300 might be more effective. And, something like this is probably more effective at sea where the terrain can't mask your target, but you're still limited to the radar horizon. Given its reported range, the S-300 seems intended for higher flying targets.
But, do you really think Russia would allow Syria to shoot down Israeli aircraft? The political backlash would be enourmous and probably draw us deeper into the conflict. And, let's remember that their going up against the Israeli Air Force which has a long successful history of penetrating the air defenses of their neighbors.
I'd like some interpretations of this new data which seems on topic. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/06/lessons-yemens-missile-duels/166082/?oref=d-river
ReplyDeleteThat's an interesting article but, unfortunately, it has a lot of shortcomings. The data source(s) are unknown and, as such, not credible. There is not actual data cited (numbers, types, systems, etc.) beyond a generalized chart. And so on.
DeleteSo, I can't offer any analysis based on what's there other than to note that, on the surface, this seems to confirm the historical trend that every defensive missile system ever fielded has been a general failure.
Is there some specific aspect that jumped out at you?
The difficulty with hitting a missile with a missile makes me wonder if there are better ways to accomplish it.
ReplyDeleteOne method that I would be interested to see tried is with naval artillery.
Using the concepts used in "Return of the broadside" as a starting point, I would like to see a melding of naval guns with the beehive rounds or flechette rockets that the army uses.
Even a 5" gun should be able to put a spread of flechettes or ball bearings, with radar targeting and VT fuzes, in the path of incoming missiles.
I would think this would be pretty effective against the thin-skinned speed boats that the Iranians use as well.
Here's a youtube video that shows in slow motion what a simple canister round looks like being fired like a shotgun.
DeleteA round should be able to be designed with a more uniform spread of the projectiles.
With radar fire control, and the 5" gun able to shoot at rate of fire of 16-20 rounds per minute, they should be able to put projectiles in the way of anti-ship missiles.
Oops, here's the attachment:
Deletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mk6wxBQ3f_0
Would you consider adding Israeli's Iron Dome system to your data set of SAMs?
ReplyDeleteFrom Wiki, "As of August 2014, ten Iron Dome batteries had been deployed throughout Israel.[102] During the 50 days of the conflict 4,594 rockets and mortars were fired at Israeli targets; Iron Dome systems intercepted 735 projectiles that it determined were threatening, achieving an intercept success rate of 90 percent."
More recently, "On 10 May 2018, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran allegedly launched 20 rockets from Syria toward Israel in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes against IRGC facilities. According to an IDF spokesperson, 16 of the rockets fell short of the Israeli border, and Iron Dome intercepted the other four. Israel reported no casualties or damage."
Now, I don't know how many missiles it fires at given target. But, as a SAM system, Iron Dome appears to more effective than anything else on the market.
This story from The Drive is pretty interesting. The linked video shows one missile, one hit in testing. And, I'm sure Israel does more realistic testing than anyone else.
No, the Iron Dome doesn't fit the data set. The data set of concern is that which is applicable to attacking missiles and aircraft. Iron Dome's target set is 'dumb' rockets which are non-maneuvering, have no penetration aids, are unguided, and are relatively slow. They bear little resemblance to a missile or aircraft.
DeleteAs you point out, the actual number of defensive missiles fired and hits achieved is unknown.
As best I can determine from a multitude of sources (none particularly authoritative so I look at the cumulative 'weight'), Israeli claims are ridiculously inflated, probably to bolster public confidence. Even the most cursory logical consideration suggests the claims are not true since even in perfect, tweaked, scripted testing, weapon systems don't achieve 90% success. I suspect that they have contrived the 90% figure by lumping together multiple shots at one target, shots that didn't hit the target but the attacking rocket didn't hit anything important, and so on.
So, no, I don't consider the Iron Dome 'data' applicable. ID is more a C-RAM system than a defensive SAM missile system such as we're interested in.
As an aside, it would seem Israel is doing the bulk of "real life" combat testing of the F35 for the US.
ReplyDeleteYes, at least in the strike role, if not the air to air. How much of their experience they're sharing with us is unknown.
DeleteA lot I would guess, the more they share, the more hi tech kit the US is likely to supply them.
DeleteGiven the US inability to maintain secrets, I suspect Israel shares very little of real importance!
DeleteImportant topic. Apart from finding out how likely it is that we are able to hit incoming missiles, we need perhaps to figure out how to act if we can't hit them with a high probability. After all, a peer enemy might be trying to construct missiles that are difficult to shoot down (sea skimming, evasive, low radar signature etc).
ReplyDeleteWe have a pride problem; we love testing offensive weapons. We love showing allies and enemies that we can kill people and break things.
ReplyDeleteBut we hate testing defensive weapons. The navy might launch a test target or two at a navy ship, but they really don't want to do any kind of realistic testing that might have embarrassing results.
We could build a concrete "ticonderoga" or "AB" in the desert (California/Utah/Nevada?) with functional weapons and fire control. Shoot live weapons at it all day long to see how it handles.
I like better CNO idea, just take an old Tico cruiser out in the ocean, put on auto and fire away at it. Navy wants to get rid of them anyways, let's see if it works! I think the big worry of what China would learn from our secret tests is BS, USN would learn a lot more! Think about not just how many ASMs AEGIS can shoot down or not but all we would learn apart from that: What attack profile is more efficient or less efficient? What speed is best? Is max speed always best or at some point, it doesn't matter how fast ASM is traveling? What about LO? How about everything else tied to the ship defense, ESSMs, Phalanx? How do they all work together faced with multiple threats? Etc....
DeleteSomething else that matters: AEGIS does an incredible job, beyond belief and shoots everything down, ok, awesome, very unlikely so dont you think it would behoove USN and really everybody else that uses it and comparable AESA to find out what the freak happens when one of these billion $$$ ships gets hit?!? Does the darn stupid thing even work if its slightly out of alignment? What about if 1 panel is damaged? 2 AESA Panels?Consoles? Other computer,memory racks? How about the software? After a hit, let's put back a crew onboard: Can a regular crew operate AEGIS after a hit? Does is still work? How much does it degrade? How long does it take to be fixed? Can they even FIX IT? Or as soon as these billion dollars ship are hit, they are effectively mission killed? DOESN'T anybody else think that these assets being so important and hard to replace, should be tested TO THE MAX?!? We need to make sure we can keep them in combat longer than the enemy can keep his high value assets! Maybe that's who wins, not the most capable or more numerous but really just who can still operate and stick around after the battle....USN is so worried about having the best technology but if it's so fragile that any damage is a mission kill, maybe we need technology that degrades better and still be used after some battle damage....
"After a hit, let's put back a crew onboard: Can a regular crew operate AEGIS after a hit? Does is still work? How much does it degrade? How long does it take to be fixed? Can they even FIX IT?"
DeleteLove it, love it, love it!
"maybe we need technology that degrades better and still be used after some battle damage...."
Excellent! This is an extension of the KISS principle. We need to give serious thought to 'dumbing down' our technology in favor of ruggedness, reliability, and repairability.
"DOESN'T anybody else think that these assets being so important and hard to replace, should be tested TO THE MAX?!?"
DeleteFrankly, this should be a mandatory legal requirement.
I still find it absurd that incredibly expensive warships (WAR-ships) are built and commissioned in large numbers without even bothering to know whether they can take a hit or two.
"This is an extension of the KISS principle. We need to give serious thought to 'dumbing down' our technology in favor of ruggedness, reliability, and repairability."
DeleteGood point. Very good point.
My "high/low mix" idea is that we build some state of the art advanced technology ships and aircraft, just in case, but that we fill out the numbers with cheaper ships and aircraft with rugged, reliable, and repairable systems.
The side that wins the war is not necessarily the one with the snazziest toys, but the one whose toys work best under battle stress.
"The side that wins the war is not necessarily the one with the snazziest toys, but the one whose toys work best under battle stress."
DeleteExactly what I was thinking but you said it better!!!
Funny thing is pretty much every navy has now AESA, VLS, CIWS,etc,etc sure, every country has differences but also lots of similarity, in a way, very homogeneous, shoot, top line destroyers/cruisers really look alike across the world since there's only a few ways you can install all this stuff and get it to work properly. Really, the difference in war won't be the technology and systems BUT training and who can survive the longest. Doesn't seem most navies get that point anymore....
" the difference in war won't be the technology and systems BUT training and who can survive the longest."
DeletePartly right but still overlooking NUMBERS!
See, "Quantity Versus Quality"
I wonder if there is a difference between defensive missile results between manned war jet fighters and offensive missiles?
ReplyDeleteThis possible poor showing by defensive missiles is both good and bad news for , say, Taiwan.
It means that Taiwan could sink any Chinese invasion fleet given enough anti ship missiles.
But it also means it's hard to defend against incoming land attack missiles too.
But as long as you somehow keep your offensive missiles safe, you can hold off an invasion.
Is my reasoning worng?
Andrew
You're not wrong. The challenge lies in protecting your offensive missiles long enough to use them. For example, China undoubtedly has all of Taiwan's anti-ship capabilities pinpointed and would subject them to intense, saturation attacks prior to an invasion (as we did to the Japanese in our WWII island assaults). Can Taiwan hide or protect enough weapons (and sensors! don't forget those!) to mount an effective counterattack? I have no idea.
DeleteWe are in the age of missile and electronic warfare, and that age has fully matured. Great advantage comes to the first mover in missile warfare. We must commit ourselves to NOT being the victim of a first strike, and to instead strike first ahead of our enemies. No one can counterattack in missile warfare with any kind of force that would ever compare to their first strike capabilities.
DeleteRelately, in a naval format, I think that we overemphasize hard-kill missile-missile interception while underemphasizing soft-kill electronic defeat of missiles.
By that same token, Directed Energy is not a savior in that lasers will have limited range and can be oversaturated and High Power Microwave has very limited range.
"I think that we overemphasize hard-kill missile-missile interception while underemphasizing soft-kill electronic defeat of missiles."
DeleteWe here at Navy Matters have long recognized the value of soft kill methods. See,
"AAW - Hard Kill Or Soft Kill?"
"Soft Kill CEC"
Yes sir, absolutely, that's one of many things I enjoy about your blog, and I probably should have prased my comment as such.
DeleteThe Navy seems absolutely fascinated by, and focused on, trying to achieve longer and longer range missile kills using the Standard Missile family despite all evidence pointing to horizon range engagements being the norm. I think this is a reflection of the Navy's obsession with technology as a substitute for operations and tactics. The Navy simply doesn't grasp combat operations and tactics and, lacking that understanding, substitutes technology, which they're able to understand, in place of operational and tactical expertise. Instead of studying operations and tactics, the Navy studies technology.
DeleteThe technology obsession, in addition to ignoring operations and tactics, leads inexorably to more and more complicated and complex systems which are harder and harder to maintain and become impossible to repair during combat or even while at sea. Thus, every ship requires massive shore support for even the simplest of repairs. Of course, this is the antithesis of the WWII philosophy which was to conduct as much repair at sea as possible.
In WWII, was that gear or lever destroyed in battle? No problem, fabricate a new one and keep going.
Today, was that circuit board destroyed in battle? You're out of luck.
Today, was that circuit board destroyed in battle? You're out of luck.
DeleteActually, all you have to do is to order the appropriate replacement part from China :-) Just check out the article linked below.
https://news.usni.org/2015/05/05/navy-needs-new-servers-for-aegis-cruisers-and-destroyers-after-chinese-purchase-of-ibm-line
With older tech, even if more rugged and reliable, it will be easier for the enemy to know exactly what they have to build to, ie they will know they have to be able to defeat the known quantity x. With new tech and changing tech, is that x+1, x*2 or x*3 they have to build to. Its much harder for them to have a high degree of confidence they are in the dominant position.
Delete"In WWII, was that gear or lever destroyed in battle? No problem, fabricate a new one and keep going.
DeleteToday, was that circuit board destroyed in battle? You're out of luck."
Extremely correct, but to be entirely fair, it's not just the Navy who does this, for example the Air Force is at least as deluded (see: anything regarding the F-35).
@ Polish Ghost
DeleteToo bad the US would never stoop to subsiding any key infrastructure or capacity at a loss like China is willing to. I'm sure the invisible hand and short term quarterly thinking by industry will save us
"With older tech, even if more rugged and reliable, it will be easier for the enemy to know exactly what they have to build to, ie they will know they have to be able to defeat the known quantity x. With new tech and changing tech, is that x+1, x*2 or x*3 they have to build to. Its much harder for them to have a high degree of confidence they are in the dominant position."
DeleteWhich is one reason why I like the high/low mix with some expensive ships/aircraft with cutting-edge technology, and filling out the numbers with cheaper ships with proved systems. And lots of redundancy and damage control capabilities on both.
Suppose the bad guys figure out how to jam AEIGS/AMDR. It would be helpful to have some ships with APAR/SMART-L and some with TRS-3D/4D. Complicate the enemy problem as much as possible.
Of course in a military run by corporate-style bean counters, the reaction you get is, "OMG, the logistics chain gets harder and more expensive." So did the logistics chain for GM when they were making 5 distinctly separate cars. When they standardized everything, their cost and supply chain issues got easier, but when a Cadillac is just a Chevrolet with a few more bells and whistles, it's a lot harder to market.
"With new tech and changing tech, ... Its much harder for them to have a high degree of confidence they are in the dominant position."
DeleteIt's also much harder for us to maintain, repair, and operate our own equipment. We can't even operate our own Aegis system. It's very easy to produce a situation where our systems are too complex to even function reliably. Examples include Aegis, EMALS, AGS, AAG, Dual Band Radar, LCS Modules, LCS combining gear … and the list goes on almost endlessly.
I'm not concerned about an enemy figuring out how to stop some piece of technology. Technology doesn't win wars nor does the ability to stop technology. Wars are won by strategy, industrial capacity, numbers, training, and determination. None of those are subject to the enemy figuring out a piece of technology.
This is analogous to the old Green Bay Packers football team. It was said that they were so good and so confident that they would tell the other team the play they were going to run because they didn't think the other team could stop them even if they knew what was coming. If you train to the point of perfection, it doesn't matter if the enemy understands some piece of technology. You'll still be able to execute in spite of their efforts to stop you.
Finally, most people believe that China's cyber hacking gets all our tech specs as quick as we develop them anyway so the degree of technology is irrelevant.
I once read that the reason France has never developed any truly long range cruise missiles is because it has nowhere it can test them without other countries observing those tests.
DeleteTraining for war at sea is open to observation and always has been. Again, I remember reading somewhere that an English carrier group would include the Russian "trawler" that would follow them around everywhere in their daily helicopter drop of fresh bread.
China may hack our secrets as soon as we post them, yet it still seems to be a generation or so behind in many things. It still can't make a jet engine that works for example.
We, USN, RN, RAN, RNZN etc used to be the Green Bay Packers. Maybe we should just give up on the "secrets" and train once more.
The most viable deterrence is not tech, but a military that shows they know how to use it.
Of course if we completely befuddle their spy ships in the process, that's just a bonus.
France just tested one of their M51 SLBMs which was launched the western coast of France and landed some 650 kilometers from Puerto Rico, for about 6,000 trip. And, they already have a ship-launched, long range cruise missile called the Missile de Croisière Naval (MdCN standing for Naval Cruise Missile) which has a range in excess of 1,000 kilometers.
Delete"Missile de Croisière Naval"
DeletePerhaps France should have engaged in a bit more testing as its frigates assigned to participate in the strike on the Syrian air base was unable to launch any of the three tasked missiles and a backup frigate had to take the shots!
Thanks for making my point for me.
DeleteWould I be correct in stating we all doubt China's ASBM capability? There's a lot there, kill chain, and accurately striking a moving object with a missile that's doing what? Mach 18 or something? What's the CEP on a stationary object?
If they'd actually hit a moving target at sea, I'd still doubt the kill chain, but as it is, I doubt everything about that missile.
No one has any doubts about the Tomahawk cruise missile. How many launched now? 1500+ in war conditions for a pretty high strike rate.
How 'bout we test it against ourselves, openly? In another comment on this thread I've pointed out some of the ECM that can be used to make a missile's life more difficult, but has anyone every actually tried it? Put a ship out there, launch a few Nulkas, SRBOC, SLQ32 jamming and see what happens. Then try it again and see what effect all that stuff has on our own fire control radars? Then try it again and see if we can actually shoot down our own Harpoons, then try it again on the LRASM, and again on a.... We'd know, they'd know, we'd know they know. Clears up lots of confusion. Avoids Exercise Able Archer type near misses.
"Perhaps France should have engaged in a bit more testing as its frigates assigned . . ."
DeletePerhaps. In that engagement, the French frigate Aquataine was the primary platform with her sister ship, Languedoc, acting as its backup. But, given that the backup ship fired its three missiles, was the problem with the missile, the launch equipment, or something to do with the Aquataine itself? Hopefully, they've figured that out by now.
I'm guessing by now the Navy has figured out why their Standard Missiles were exploding upon launch. That would not be a good thing in combat.
Given blip enhancement, radar target generation, stealth, jamming, white noise, chaff... I'm wondering if the Israeli pilot left a suicide note.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.defencetalk.com/military/forums/t/interesting-obscure-ran-discussions-not-related-to-current-capabilities.15041/
ReplyDeleteThis guy says he did research on how a war would progress.
--------
" I was part of a US/Australian team looking at this question a few years back.
We found a significant conflict between like powers would see a mish-mash of technology by the six month mark. There would be large amounts of non-expendable high-tech stuff like radios and computers (plus some platforms), but most of the expendable high-tech stuff would be long gone. No AIM-120, no SM-2, no PGM, not even laser guided arty shells. Some would trickle through; it would be held in reserve for major pushes.
Now that provides a huge challenge. Assume war breaks out with Hobart in deeper level service and she survives the opening clashes. How does Hobart defend itself without SM-2? Noting the REDFORCE probably doesn't have anti-ship missiles, what does it need to defend against? 5"? Are there even REDFORCE ships left? Could Hobart be the most powerful surface vessel in the area? What does that mean for Australia politically?
Looking beyond maritime stuff; we guessed a revision to 1960s platforms and munitions, with 2010s kit held as strategic reserves. The F-35s probably wouldn't fly but would wait with our limited supply of precision munitions to support strategically significant attacks. Army wouldn't use PGMs at all - it'd be Tiger or Apache with 30 mm and unguided 70 mm while the guns fire large amounts of 155 mm dumb rounds. Trading mass for tech. Casualties would mount, and you'd probably end up with a fluid stalemate a'la North Africa in 1940-42 or the Eastern Front 1942-43.
But very, very, very few people are looking at this..."
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In this regard, it looks like only Italy is designing ships for war. Since anti air missiles aren't doing well, that only leaves anti radiation attacks and guns for defence.
They use 76mm guns for AAW (Strales), every warship has at least 1 main gun, usually 2-3, of 76mm to 127mm. Every ship of any significant size has 76-127mm guns on it.
Their Vulcano Support ship has x1 76mm gun.
Their LHD Trieste has x3 (!) 76mm guns
Their frigates have 2 main guns, their destroyers have x3 main guns!
Long term, when missiles run out, ships with more guns will be more useful than ships with less guns.
And the only Navy in the world with lots of main guns focuses mainly in the Mediterranean.....
Stock up on offensive missiles, seriously look at Leonardo Stales and Millenium guns for a layered gun anti missile defense.
Andrew
"we guessed a revision to 1960s platforms and munitions, "
DeleteI concur, which makes the US decisions to sink the Spruances and sell off the Perrys all the worse.
well, have to admit, this is a good article that basically spells out what alot of folks must be thinking, that despite SAM's getting better and better, the bar was pretty damn low to begin with if you looked at Russian SA-2's there and now to modern day. But not that this is a full scale reputable thing but the swedes themselves called out the s-400 and they do live across that bay from them.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.defenseworld.net/news/24400/Russian_S_400_Capability_Overrated__Swedish_Defense_Research_Agency
so if the Swedes can lob some scorn at it, imagine that the s-300 is not so hot. Until SAM's think, advantage to the thinkers in the cockpits and the stealthy drone/missiles.
We all need to remember that the Russians develop SAM systems for two purposes, only one of which is military. The other is financial for export sales to help fund their defense industry. Therefore, the make extensive efforts to hype their systems and the Western idiots that pass for journalists aid and abet them (I'll assume out of ignorance rather than treason). The really unfortunate part is that the supposedly more knowledgeable people like bloggers, observers, and our own professional military seem to buy into the hype, completely. Of course, for our military, the incentive is to agree with the Russian's hype because that provides the rationale for more funding for own weapon systems to counter the 'threat'.
DeleteAs I've said repeatedly, history clearly tells us all we need to know about SAM performance and Soviet/Russian SAM systems in particular. Unfortunately, it also likely tells us about our own systems and we're refusing to test them under realistic conditions to find out about our performance and make changes, if necessary.
Israeli air raids against Syrian targets have to be fully understood before any claims of weapons effectiveness are made. Vast majority of those attacks look exactly the same:
ReplyDelete1) One or more Israeli jets fly north into Bekaa valley in Lebanon, at the altitude of approx 1000m, just over the altitude that is relatively safe from possible Hezbollah MANPADS threat. This valley is behind Mt Hermon, in radar shadow for Syrian radars.
2) The jets turn east, climb to altitude, pop above 2000m and launch their weapons into Syria. They immediately dive down in radar shadow, thus minimizing their exposure to Syrian search radars.
3) They go south back to Isreli airspace.
4) Meanwhile weapons are flying towards their targets. It is these weapons that Syrians are firing their missiles at, not the jets.
5) Most of the targets that Israelis hit in Syria are within 50km from Lebanese border, and Damascus airport is 22km from the border. Israeli 113kg laser guided bomb Spice has wikipedia range of 100km.
What we can conclude from this is the following:
1) Israeli air force is extremely effective at using rules of engagement and terrain features in their favor - exploiting undefended Lebanon airspace, flying excursions in Iraq posing as US coalition aircraft etc.
2) Syrian air defence can't use their strategic assets like S-200 or S-300 against smart munitions. Instead they use Pantsirs and Shilkas, vith varying success.
3) These raids aren't good for evaluating AA/AD weapons, which aren't intended to fight smart munitions.
4) Syrians are willingly accepting these raids, because they are on their knees, and don't want another front open. Besides Isreali are hitting Iranians mostly.
There was one case when Israelis tried to attack from the sea, and that ended up in lots of dead Russian airmen in Il-20.
Please excuse my English.
Very nice summary and excellent English!
DeleteWe need to keep the premise firmly in mind and that is that SAM systems are only marginally effective. Whether that marginal effectiveness is due to great tactics by that attacker or trying to defeat weapons that aren't the ideal SAM target or whatever other reason is irrelevant. The fact is that the SAM system (every SAM system we've discussed, across multiple decades and types of systems) is unable to effectively prevent attacks.
So, while it is highly instructive to examine, say, Israeli tactics, the ultimate result is that the Syrian/Russian SAM systems are unable to effectively prevent attacks. This has been true across different eras and different systems and will continue to be true in the future. It is up to us, as naval defensive weapon designers and tacticians, to recognize that truth and allow for it. We need to test under realistic conditions and then we need to adjust our ship defensive designs and our defensive tactics.
"These raids aren't good for evaluating AA/AD weapons, which aren't intended to fight smart munitions."
I have to disagree with you on this. The Syrian defenses - all the various components - together make up the Syrian attempt at an A2/AD defense and the result is that it doesn't work well. The Israelis attacks are providing an excellent real world evaluation of the Russian systems and those systems are failing to meet manufacturer claims by a huge amount.
Very informative comment. Thank you for contributing. I look forward to more from you!
Actually, S 300 have never been used. No israeli airplane lauches attack in syria, they launch from lebanon. Combined pantsir, buk, s125 percentwge ot success is more than 75% of all missiles/gliding bombs.
ReplyDeleteDo you have any authoritative data to back up the 75% claim?
DeleteThe Russians have yet to turn over full control of the S-300 to Syrian crews. They're still manned by Russians. They have yet to be used.
ReplyDeleteIf I read correctly, you said a thousand rounds have been fired. These rounds are the size of telephone poles, if not bigger. And yet there's zero footage of a launch, or simply any evidence of the system being used in combat. Pantsir footage exists... A decent amount too. A S-300 being launched, especially a thousand of them, going unnoticed is far fetched to say the least.