A reader recently offered his opinion that the US has no
hope of achieving victory in a war with China due to China’s overwhelming
superiority in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity. I’m not going to cite the reader’s comment as
I have no wish to embarrass him.
Besides, his view is shared, to varying degrees, by many people so he’s
hardly unique. Is he correct? Is America doomed? Let’s examine this view.
For starters, the reader’s assumption of China’s
overwhelming superiority is incorrect, in many ways, but for the sake of this
discussion, let’s stipulate that he’s exactly right – that China does, indeed,
have overwhelming superiority of technology, numbers, and industrial
capacity. It would seem, then, that the
US, indeed, has no hope of victory.
After all, those are the main determinants of victory in any war, right?
Or are they?
Let’s start where we always do … history. Let’s look at some recent examples.
Vietnam – The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in
technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the war.
Afghanistan (US) - The US enjoyed total, overwhelming
domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet lost the
war.
Afghanistan (Soviet Union) - The Soviet Union enjoyed total,
overwhelming domination in technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and yet
lost the war.
Korea - The US enjoyed total, overwhelming domination in
technology, numbers (at least until the Chinese entered the war), and industrial
capacity and yet could only achieve a stalemate.
Without a doubt, technology, numbers and industrial capacity
are important, especially in a conventional war, but, clearly, history proves
that there are other, more important, factors that can overcome technology,
numbers, and industrial capacity. What
are those factors?
In every example conflict cited above, the loser violated
one or more (generally all!) of the factors just described.
So, can the US win a war with China even with the
stipulation that China possesses superior technology, numbers, and industrial
capacity? Of course we can! However, it requires unwavering
determination, crystal clear victory conditions, and total commitment.
There is yet another factor that can offset superior
technology, numbers, and industrial capacity and that is unconventional
strategy and tactics. Ukraine has amply
demonstrated this with their unmanned assets, among other developments. The Chinese used human wave attacks. The North Vietnamese / Viet Cong used all
manner of unconventional tactics. The
Taliban used IEDs and hid amongst the civilian population. And so on.
Some people refer to this as asymmetric warfare and often
use it as an excuse as to why a seemingly superior country lost to an inferior
one. Is asymmetric warfare some kind of
magic solution? Let’s consider it.
Let's start by dispensing with the silly notion that
asymmetric war is somehow a different kind of war. It's not. War is war.
Asymmetric simply means the enemy used different tactics than you did and, more
often than not, asymmetric is used to try to explain away how you managed to
lose to an inferior force.
So, recognizing that war is war, we now note that technology
is not only NOT a guarantee of victory, it is often a detriment. For example,
Germany's focus on ever more exquisite tanks to the detriment of just plain
good tanks produced in large quantities cost them valuable time and resources.
Thus, Vietnam and Afghanistan are not some kind of special war for whom the
constants of war do not apply. They are war and the enemy conducted their war
better than we did.
As an aside, readers, you might benefit from reviewing
Vietnam, Korea, Desert Storm, Afghanistan, and more and try to identify which
factors were truly deciding in the outcomes. You'll be surprised. Ours is not the only way to wage war and,
arguably, might be the least effective, depending on circumstances! Figure out
why.
During a discussion of asymmetric war, and in response to
the examples of Vietnam and Afghanistan and others, an anonymous reader made
the comment,
"Afghanistan and Vietnam were asymmetrical,
counterinsurgency operations, so are not analogies to what we would face with
China."
Again, sticking with our stipulation of China possessing
superior technology, numbers, and industrial capacity, and keeping in mind the
other factors that impact victory, what does that suggest for a US strategy? A
student of warfare, might look to history and postulate that the US could and
should fight exactly the kind of asymmetric war that the reader dismissed as
not being applicable! Perhaps the US should identify asymmetric operations and
tactics that would enable it to succeed despite being hopelessly outclassed by
the Chinese in every conceivable way?
How could the US do this? What kinds of asymmetric tactics
could the US use that might succeed? Well, for example, instead of attempting a
toe-to-toe slugfest of army against army, perhaps the US should emphasize the
use of small, special forces units to destroy Chinese oil and gas pipelines in
Russia (*gasp* we can't put troops inside Russia! that would violate
international law! ... well, that's why they call it asymmetric; you'll recall
that the NVietnamese used Laos and the Taliban didn’t hesitate to cross into
Pakistan?) thereby imposing a total sea AND LAND blockade of a critical
resource.
Another example might be that instead of going toe-to-toe
with the magnificent, all-powerful, Chinese navy, perhaps we could emphasize
our still formidable advantage in submarines to destroy their fleet and
systematically launch cruise missile attacks on every Chinese port, airfield,
and base on the Chinese mainland - basically, guerilla warfare using
sub-launched cruise missiles! Done correctly, this kind of attack would be
almost undetectable and unstoppable.
And so on.
Asymmetric is not a special category of war that transcends
the constants of war. It is merely a set
of tactics and operations that your/our military doesn’t normally use. If we think China truly has superiority of
technology, numbers, and industry then perhaps we should be looking at
implementing asymmetric tactics ourselves.
If we took this approach, it would, of course, require a different force
structure, doctrine, and tactics and would require intense training to become
proficient … none of which we’re doing.
China is beatable.
What we need to do is decide how we want to go about it and start
getting serious about equipping and training for it.
- Will – First and foremost is will. Determination. The absolute unwavering desire for victory and nothing less.
- Victory Conditions – One sure way to lose a war is to enter into it without a clear idea of the end state (total victory, one assumes). The US has violated this requirement repeatedly since WWII. Indeed, a very strong case can be made that the US has not had a clear idea of victory conditions in any conflict it’s entered since WWII.
- Commitment – Hand in hand with will is the willingness to do whatever is required to win. This means not allowing the enemy sanctuary across some border, not holding back out of fear of collateral damage or casualties, not scrubbing target lists to see which ones will play well on the public relations stage, and not giving a damn what the rest of the world thinks. If you’re serious enough to enter a war, the only ‘good’ outcome is total victory as quickly as possible using whatever means necessary.
- Training - Training can overcome a lot of other
disadvantages. A properly trained man
with a knife can beat a man with a machine gun.
We have hollow forces, currently; China's level of training is unknown. We need to be trained to the peak of
effectiveness.
- Brutality – Part of the commitment to war is the commitment to the brutality of war. The US has been far too squeamish about war since WWII and, thus, unable to wage war efficiently, meaning brutally effective. I recall a small uproar of protest amongst the population during Desert Storm when it was revealed that the US bulldozed trenches and buried Iraqi soldiers alive. Killing is killing. It’s not our job to gently cradle enemy soldiers while we wait for them to die of old age. Our job is to kill as efficiently as possible.
- Simplicity - Simplicity trumps complexity in battle. Complex equipment that won’t function in the stress of combat, can’t be maintained, and can’t be repaired is of no use.
- Decentralization – A decentralized command and control structure can only help during war. It reduces confusion and eliminates a vulnerable center of gravity.
Simply, amen. Your explanation for the various "losses" is spot-on, and is the answer to all those that suggest we havent won in the past and can't in the future. The world landscape would be quite different if we'd of never stopped playing by WWII rules... Even recently in Gaza, after basically suffering their own 9/11, Israel seemingly worried too much about world opinion. If they'd of unleashed their forces to fully do their job, there would be no cease fire today, because the IDF would've been home in 6 months. "Civilized" nations have to become quite the opposite when they make the decision to go to war, or else their objectives, and "victory " aren't truly achieveable. Non-state and terrorist groups are admittedly a tougher proposition, and nobody fancies indiscriminate killing, but, what other choice is there if you actually want to eliminate the enemy? The Gazans should thank their stars that I'm not an Israeli leader!! Now, with respect to China, I think we are probably behind the curve- and need to not only grow our kinetic abilities, but work on cyber and other abilities that allow infrastructure damage and massive disruptions to the country and it's ability to support its military. Think about all the long costly bomber raids of WWII that went after power plants, dams, communication centers, transport hubs, etc... things today that could be taken out of play instead, with keystrokes. Obviously, explosives on target are a more thourough solution, but, lacking deep magazines, we absolutely have to look at other ways to do the job...
ReplyDeletePerhaps, in regards to China and the post above, we might consider extending the life of all the Trident submarines for say a dozen years. Could that be done for $1b each? Make them all cruise missile boats as they are retired from their ballistic missile boat role. Gives us increasing capacity now as they're converted, and then ultimately replaced in the future. Seems a better answer than surface ships to carry cruise missiles. That's an "asymmetric threat" toward anyone.
Delete"we might consider extending the life of all the Trident submarines for say a dozen years."
DeleteI'm not sure that's possible. Supposedly, the subs are physically limited by the number of dives, reactor fatigue, and other issues. How true that is, I don't know.
I've advocated for putting the current SSGNs in a reserve status, to preserve them for future use. And frankly, I wouldnt be against pulling two more, newer SSBNs offline for conversion as well. While nuclear deterrence is important, China is still far behind in warhead counts, so I think we could afford the move strategically, especially since the Columbias are a numerical warhead downgrade from the Ohios anyway. As we reach the end of Columbia production, we could always add additional boats if needed then...
DeleteJjabatie, if your premise of SSGN ( or future missile subs) is of carrying out conventional attacks , then it won’t be efficient against land targets in China. Remember the Syrian airbase? It resumed runway operations 10 hours after an 60-Tomahawks attack. SSGN would be out of fight after 3 salvos, and the targets will be back in operation before SSGN travels half way to Hawaii for reload. And there are over 50 Chinese airbases just within 500km of Taipei.
Delete"SSGN would be out of fight after 3 salvos, and the targets will be back in operation"
DeleteYou need to read No Fuel, No Fly before you embarrass yourself any further. In addition, the Syrian airbase example you cite was NOT an attempt to destroy the base. In fact, it was a limited attack intended to send a message rather than achieve a military objective.
You also seem not to recall that multiple SSGNs can muster anywhere from 150 - 600 missiles by varying the number of subs and that's just with the four existing subs.
You also seem not to recognize that there are hundreds/thousands of worthwhile target facilities other than airbases.
You need to do some research and put much more thought into your next comment if you choose to comment again.
China industrial capacity is anywhere between 2-3 times of the US, greater than combined US/Germany/Japan/South Korea/GB put together; this is WW2 “US vs. Germany&Japan” capacities in reverse, and you think US can win war against China at its front door with couple hundreds B-21’s and subs with sub-thousand conventional warheads? Was it gulf-war 1 or 2 I don’t remember, we shot off over 7-800 Tomahawks against a 3rd world Iraq just in the opening salvo. Against China we will run out of smart munition in a week, and this is not counting what China will do us in reverse.
Delete"and you think US can win war against China"
DeleteI'm sure someone said,
"and you think Vietnam can win war against US"
"and you think Afghanistan can win war against Soviet Union?
"and you think Afghanistan can win war against US?
You didn't grasp the premise of the post, at all, did you? Did you even read it?
When it comes to the Korean War, because the Chinese weapons sucked, the determination and perseverance of the Chinese, as well as their courage to sacrifice, seemed to be much higher than that of the Americans, resulting in a stalemate for the United States. Now, in addition to these advantages, what are the advantages of weapons?
ReplyDelete"what are the advantages of weapons?"
DeleteWell, things such as machine guns, the airplane, tanks, etc. have all revolutionized warfare but you know that so what are you really asking?
Two Chinese advantages you didn’t mention are “distance and physics”. China will only fight to the death over Taiwan which sits 100 miles from China and 7000 miles from CONUS (think sorties multipliers), and ships sink land doesn’t. PLA can stack its attack 3000 miles deep (except last 100 miles over water) all on terra firma.
ReplyDeleteFirst, the factors mentioned are universal factors not factors specific to a China war.
DeleteSecond, unsinkable land is a nonsensical concept. Every Pacific island in WWII was taken from the defenders. Being unsinkable didn't help at all. Fortress Europe was unsinkable and that didn't save the Germans. And so on throughout history.
May I ask just where to do you have in mind of this US-China war where Americans have to fight asymmetrically with intangibles such as will and determination? Your WW2 Pacific island counterpoints were all predicated on reversal of your article premise- that US had overwhelming hardware and manpower advantages, not the enemy. Otoh, Imperial Japanese soldiers were skilled and fanatical enough; it didn’t do them much good.
DeleteYou either didn't grasp any of the points or you're being deliberately obtuse. Neither case is worth the effort pursuing.
DeleteChina doesn't like US easily entangling into geopolitical conflicts. There is no Israel that China has to bet on farm. No matter how Iranian government pleas, China only said empty words than do anything. Almost every one knows China supporting Russia but it doesn't supply Russia weapons so technically follow international law on neutrality (like Switzerland during WWII). You can expect China keeps supporting Putin to get his wish - a deal that ensure US INABLITY to disintegrate Russia and remove its nuclear weapons in foreseeable future. If this is achieved, cross Atlantic alliance ends as Europe will seek peace with Russia on terms US dislike. Except with North Korea (a leftover from the Cold War), China has no treaty obligation to any nation.
ReplyDeleteRegardless of Chinese support, I dont see Europe ever having to "negotiate an unfavorable peace". Russia is a spent force that may never recover, and not a serious threat to Europe. In spite of their weak military expenditures (that are slowly, finally increasing), NATO nations could likely handle a Russian conflict even without US participation. Heck, I'd put $20 on Poland going it alone with only material support...nevermind an actual Article5 united Europe!!!
Delete"China doesn't like US easily entangling into geopolitical conflicts. "
DeleteOf course they don't. It interferes with China's global entanglements!
Will and determination. Any war with PRC (I sure hope not. The losses will be unreal) will be over territories belonging to other nations. The first American territory affected will be Guam (how many Americans even know Guam is American) and Will and Determination may be in short supply when it comes time to risk the entire fleet to defend Taiwan. Just my two cents and worth every penny. ( Now I wait for CNO to blast me. Reminds me of checking out with the XO at the end of the day).
ReplyDelete"Will and Determination may be in short supply when it comes time to risk the entire fleet to defend Taiwan."
DeleteQuite right. America has always straddled the fence on Taiwan. It is a distinct possibility that the US response would be half-hearted.
Pearl Harbor crystalized US determination in WWII. Would the Chinese be unwise enough to provide the US with a crystalizing moment as part of an attack on Taiwan? Who knows?
A bold, yet plausible, move by the Chinese would be to attack Taiwan WITHOUT attacking Guam or any other US territory or asset. This would allow them to claim that it is purely an internal Chinese matter and force the US into the position of being the aggressor if we want to defend Taiwan. Such a position would likely result in very lukewarm US support for a war thus violating the 'will' factor. Of course, if the US did militarily enter such a scenario, the Chinese would have lost the opportunity to inflict some significant early damage on the US. Bold ... but risky.
Thats exactly what I would do if I were China. Take Taiwan quickly, make the situation a fait accomplai and challenge us to take it back. We wouldn’t be able to even if we wanted to. Game over.
DeleteThis is actually the least risky and therefore most likely possibly. If you are China, why the heck would you go attack a bunch of other sovereign nations - thereby all but guaranteeing they will come after you - when you can just attack the only one you want, and one you don’t consider an independent nation to begin with? Attacking us, Japan, the Philippines you name it is not only unnecessarily provocative but unnecessary to achieve your military outcome. Russia just attacked Ukraine.
I see no scenario where the US can wage some sort of asymmetric campaign against a China that already has Taiwan in hand that results in China giving it back. The best we could hope for is internal unrest within Taiwan itself that would make it hard to be governed. But China has its ways of dealing with that; Hong Kong hasn’t always been easy for them to deal with, but China isn’t giving it back to the UK!
"why the heck would you go attack a bunch of other sovereign nations"
DeleteAs I explained, and you seem to have ignored, there is a significant likelihood that the US and the West WOULD enter a war to save Taiwan. If that was the case and China did NOT attack the US as part of a Taiwan assault, they would have lost a chance to inflict significant initial damage on US forces in the region. That would be a foolish move on China's part.
China has a dilemma and has to decide how likely they think the US is to enter a war. It will, undoubtedly, depend on what the administration of the moment is. They lost an opportunity to attack while Biden was President. He would have been unlikely to respond and, if he did, the military was at a low point in capability and readiness. In addition, we were depleting weapon inventories to support Ukraine. I'm actually surprised China didn't act. Trump is more likely to enter a war and is working to improve the military. China may have missed their best opportunity.
PLA won’t (large scale, conventional) attack right away; it will blockade the island and wait for Taipei to surrender (Taiwan’s energy reserve is only 2 weeks), in the meantime turn outward its A2AD, and beforehand prep the “battlefield” to lay ambush against the rescuers. That’s how KMT lost its fortress cities during Chinese civil war. CCP forces surrounded these cities/bait, and waylaid the better equipped KMT rescue forces.
DeletePoint of order with Chinese human wave tactics in Korea: that was a myth popularised. A study of their tactics shows that the Chinese were adept at infiltrating company size forces at night, on foot, and made prodigious use of mortars for suppressive fire. The pop culture impression of human wave attacks is a misunderstanding of the mismatch of a numerically superior force attacking squad sized outposts.
ReplyDeleteIn short, they were following Jeb Stuart's maxim: get there the fastest with the mostest.
From one of many dozens of articles discussing Chinese human wave attacks in Korea,
Delete"The “human wave” tactic was borrowed was from ancient strategist Sun Tzu, who advised commanders to “attack like water,” flowing over or around enemy positions.
Using it, the CPVA inflicted the worst defeats suffered by both the US and British armies since World War II: The destruction of two US regiments at Kunu-ri in 1950, and the annihilation of a British battalion on the Imjin River in 1951."
The Chinese clearly used human wave attacks. If you wish to be a lawyer and term it something else, feel free but it doesn't change the reality.
Try for a more productive comment in the future.
My point is that just writing it off as human wave tactics is underestimating the Chinese and refusing to acknowledge how our undertrained, underequipped, Army soldiers were outfought by them. They understood a classic warfighting maxim better than our soldiers did.
DeleteThe Chinese were tactically adept, were able to perform company size movements with stealth, and were able to exploit that stealth to take our positions by surprise with numerical superiority and fire superiority from their mortars and supporting weapons. In terms of soldiering skill, they were institutionally superior to the US Army that had experienced a hollowing out after WW2, barely 5 years earlier.
That said, they didn't see the same level of sucess against the Marines, who famously attacked in another direction in order to affect their retreat. Which just goes back to your point about preparedness and will; unlike the Army, the Marine Corps of the 50s was not as hollow and still had a solid core of fighting men.
It does not behoove us to be willfully blind to the capabilities of our adversaries, and our own limitations thereof.
Delete"just writing it off as human wave tactics"
DeleteWho is doing that? I've noted the tactic as highly effective. Quite the opposite of 'writing it off'. You might want to re-read the post.
" In terms of soldiering skill, they were institutionally superior to the US Army"
And yet, for all the brilliance you claim the Chinese possessed, they failed to win the war for NKorea, achieving only a stalemate after being driven back.
Off topic :The JCS Chairman, vice chairman & the CNO have been fired.
ReplyDeleteThank you. An interesting idea. Yes. It is more about 'attitude' than tech.
ReplyDeleteI agree with the assessment that China solely attacking Taiwan would pose difficult geopolitical problems for an alliance against China. There would be strong incentives for neighbouring countries to stay out of the fight or risk losing a lot of capital and lives.
ReplyDeleteI believe the asymmetric part of the defense of Taiwan, and indeed, grey zone operations should be primarily a concern of the Taiwanese (grey zone operations should be coordinated with the Americans to manage risk).
These are the people with the most to lose from a Chinese takeover and pressure from the American administration should be getting the whole of Taiwan government, education, healthcare etc. focused on that problem (better if this had happened 10 years ago!).
Trade between countries is theorized to reduce hostilities between those countries. And there is an argument to be made for that. But, when a country like China operates at the edges of the international order without buying into it, those incentives take a backseat to what is best for Xi Jinping and the Communist party (something we often fail to appreciate in our western culture).
America has a lot of experience dealing with the problems faced with asymmetrical threats in Afghanistan and Iraq and now has a better idea of the limits and pitfalls of relying on a technological approach to warfare where politics, people, and culture play a role in the mindset of the population in general and the thinking of politicians. Not many people want to face the reality of a peer conflict.
Rather than encouraging the Taiwanese to spend on big ticket items that make money and profits for companies, there should be an emphasis on what works, is survivable and available in large numbers in the expected timeframe of hostilities.
History shows that a small, professional army is not enough to replace the losses of full scale modern industrial combat. A large, properly funded, supported and motivated part time militaire would ideally attract people from society with the skills and motivation to react quickly to changes on the ground. They can be supported by Taiwanese special forces that can also react quickly to such changes and provide additional skills and knowledge. Realistic training should be conducted to explore these concepts to ensure command, control and communications are achievable and scalable under likely battlefield conditions.
Decentralization of command under battlefield conditions are essential at the tactical level combined with a centralist whole of government approach at the geopolitical and strategist level. Both a top-down and bottom-up approach to leadership where and when appropriate.
Dave P
"now has a better idea of the limits and pitfalls of relying on a technological approach to warfare"
DeleteYou may be giving the US a much larger degree of learning lessons than it does. We keep making the same mistakes over and over, no matter how many times!
"History shows that a small, professional army is not enough to replace the losses of full scale modern industrial combat."
DeleteIF ONE CHOOSES TO ENGAGE IN MODERN INDUSTRIAL COMBAT!!!. As noted in the post, the examples of small countries defeating large countries indicates that your statement is not true or, at least, has some very serious qualifies to it - which is what the post demonstrated.
Sorry, I was thinking of initial British efforts WW2 (The BEF).
DeleteDave P
The point I was trying to make, not very well, is that the Taiwanese Army probably won't do well going toe-to-toe with Chinese forces. Maybe they can be trained to fight asymmetrically or, a militaire/ home guard army may be more effective.
DeleteDave P
I don't think anyone believes that Taiwan can stand toe-to-toe with China's military. Taiwan's goal should be to hold out until US/West forces can enter the battle - assuming that they would even do so. Of course, if the US/West opts not to enter the battle then Taiwan has no chance (the same thing we thought about Vietnam!) and would have to resort to a decidedly non-conventional war.
DeleteContinued. . .
ReplyDeleteEquipment of these (Taiwanese) forces should focus on reliable communications down to the platoon level (through high end radios AND/OR low-tech solutions ie runners etc). Massed artillery, mortars, SAMs, mines (sea and land) are needed with the ability to produce/buy both the systems and munitions at scale (no gold-plated systems).
A few hundred artillery pieces are not enough for Taiwan. Experience in Ukraine shows that even towed artillery has its uses if it can fire, move and hide effectively. The same is true for mortar teams, antitank teams and short-range SAM units.
The is also true for munitions.
A few thousand munitions are not enough. High end munitions can be developed, but then serious efforts need to be made through bringing in industrial experts that can push down costs through mass production.
In terms of Americas contribution, Sarah C.M. Paine (Historian at USN war college) has some fascinating theories on Maritime vs Continental power politics. One of the points she makes is that the British contribution to WW1 and WW2 led to ultimate victory but the cost (in terms of lives and treasure) hastened the collapse of the British empire.
With this in mind, Americas efforts should be directed at producing munitions at scale that can be fired at range but may be rapidly targeted by commanders locally (ie targeting ships massed at beach landing sites) or strategically such as ports etc.
Technologies and concepts like rapid dragon should be tested to determine if massed standoff attacks are achievable, targetable and if the carrying platforms are survivable.
Tech is just a tool. Not a solution. It needs to work under real world battle conditions at scale.
If Taiwan is to survive, it needs to be prepared, optimized and capable of surviving a massed Chinese attack with little initial American support.
America needs to be optimized to tip the balance by disrupting an incredibly difficult beach assault followed by urban and mountain warfare to defeat Taiwanese forces and pacify the population.
I believe it is in Americas interests to do this at range whereby American casualties may be kept lower (although keeping casualties low should be balanced with combat effectiveness).
The need to effectively counter China should be communicated to the population of the countries involved. The Finnish defense model would be a good start for Taiwan (and maybe the Philippines etc). Sarah C.M. Paine noted that historically, Taiwan did not offer as much resistance to Japanese invasion during WW2 as South Korea and therefore did not suffer as much brutality to the population. Such thinking may affect modern Taiwanese politicians and the population as a whole. Therefore, brutally honest debates need to be had by the Taiwanese. Those members of society willing, trained and able, need to be enabled to take a stand to defend their way of life.
Dave P
Continued
ReplyDeleteSomeone like Eric Prince could be useful in providing 'asymmetrical' ideas along with training and support to the Taiwanese via private contractors but could also help and guild the US in an effective, coordinated response that doesn't necessarily involve big army etc getting involved simply because China is the primary competitor and therefore that's where they need to be to get funding. During the cold war, Air-Land doctrine was developed to specifically counter the Soviet threat to Europe. I realize this all takes time that we may not have. The strategy needs to be effective within the time constraints of expected hostilities.
Another great observation from Sarah C.M. Paine was on Americas grand strategy during both WW2 and the cold war. During WW2 Germany was identified as the major peer continental force. A coalition of very different allies as Britain (colonial) and the Soviet Union (Communist) was formed to defeat the main threat.
During the cold war, the Soviet Union was the main peer competitor. The US formed alliances with the Europeans, other allies and China to stretch the resources of the Soviet Union to breaking point and beyond. The Soviets needed massive armoured forces on their European AND Chinese borders.
Working towards getting the Russians to view the Chinese (correctly) as a major threat would divert a massive amount of resources away from Chinese expansionist ambitions. At one point during the cold war the Russians asked the Americans if they could nuke the Chinese. These tensions over land, people and resources have not gone away. We should be conducting propaganda efforts on the Russians. The (in their words) yellow-fication of eastern portions of Russian is a very real threat. During the century of humiliation, China lost land to Russian. There are massive amounts of much needed resources available in low population areas of east Russian that the Chinese would love to get their hands on.
This approach could work on breaking up cooperative efforts between other countries opposing the American led world order. They should be coordinated to ensure they achieve the aim of defeating the main competitors goals.
The use of Ukrainian special forces to attrit Russian forces in Syrian and Africa may align with the goal of helping Ukraine resist Russia, but getting the Turks destabilise Chechnya (they aided Chechens in their wars of independence) may not be a good idea. You want the Russians looking eastward rather then south.
I should point out that my ideas are that of an amateur who has not served in the military so forgive me if my views are amateurish.
Dave P
I completely agree. The idea that we’re doomed because China has more technology or numbers doesn’t hold up. History shows that it’s not just about having superior resources—it’s about will, strategy, and adaptability. Asymmetric tactics could absolutely be our way forward, focusing on unconventional methods that play to our strengths rather than trying to match them head-on. We need to rethink how we approach conflict and get serious about training and equipping for that kind of war.
ReplyDeleteRE: making heavier use of submarines. There's something I don't understand about the Virginia Block 5 submarines (with the extra section for 4 missile tubes - holding 7 Tomahawk missiles each).
ReplyDeleteDuring the Cold War, prior to the Ohio Class, we had a whole series of SSBN classes over multiple decades during which the subs were similar in width (beam) to the Virginias (actually slightly less - 33 feet vs 34 feet) and actually shorter than the Virginia block 5. And they carried 16 full sized missile tubes, which could fire the Trident 1 missile which was only slightly narrower than the D5 missile that the Ohios fire. So maybe they couldn't hold 7 Tomahawks, but they'd still hold a bunch.
Yet the Virginia Block 5 can only hold 4 tubes with 28 missiles? Why? This is totally inadequate, as CNO has repeatedly mentioned. And given history, it isn't clear why?
An uncomfortable thought: if we look at historical parallels, our position is reversed. We're much closer to the IJN of the Pacific War, and China is much closer to the USN of the Pacific War. The IJN started the war with the most sophisticated ships and the most skilled air wings, but these advantages were attritted away from the sheer bulk of the US wartime production. In ONE YEAR, America launched more DDs than the IJN produced in the prewar years and the wartime years combined.
ReplyDeleteThis is not an apples to apples comparison, of course, but the Chinese are in a significantly better position to regenerate their lost combat strength faster than we can. They have a larger industrial base, a greater population, and more slips and shipyards capable of building warships than we have. They're putting to sea more merchant shipping and more combatants than we are.
That said, there's a key difference between us and Japan: we aren't reliant on global trade for our needs. The United States is self-sufficient in strategic resources. We can't be starved by a blockade. We can, in the worst case, absorb a defeat and rebuild ourselves.
The biggest question is the will and the fighting spirit of the American people. Quite frankly, I don't think that actually exists anymore. Every side of the political spectrum of the United States of America has abandoned the idea of service before self, of serving a higher purpose. We have raised two generations of entitled selfish brats who do not have the resilience to rise to the challenge of a war.
"We're much closer to the IJN of the Pacific War"
DeleteI understand your point but, at the risk of splitting hairs, no, that's not quite right. Japan had a limited population, very limited resources (which is why the war began!), no world trade/military partners, and was a geographically small, isolated island nation. In contrast, the US has a large population (not as large as the Chinese, of course), abundant resources, an extensive world trade/military partnership network, and is a large continent.
Both the US and China have critical raw material and resource vulnerabilities. China has no advanced world wide trade and military partners. When war comes, the US will have a coalition of Western countries providing trade, resources, and military forces whereas China will stand alone with the possible exception of Russia (we should be working to make Russia neutral, if not friendly and I've offered thoughts on how to do that).
Depending on what factors you value most, an argument can be made for either China or the US having the overall advantage. Personally, I highly value the global trade/military network and think China will be much more negatively impacted by war than the US.
Another major unknown is the quality of the Chinese military. They have numerical advantages in many areas (though lacking in critical ones like subs and stealth aircraft) but the quality of those numbers is unknown. Just as the US currently has impressive numbers on paper but is hollow, so to may China have hidden problems. We don't know.
You gave the example of three weak countries on the other side of the world that the vastly superior US forces attacked, and failed to defeat. How do you think it will end if the US goes half way around the world to attack a country that is a peer or near peer?
ReplyDeleteDid you wish to contribute something meaningful to the discussion of the post?
DeleteOne thing the US does very well is the initial invasion. I don't recall the US being repelled once since WW2. It's what happens afterwards as things drag out into minor guerilla warfare that the US fails.
ReplyDeleteSo even if the US loses long term, to say the US will lose outright isn't quite correct. If the aim is simply to stop an invasion of Taiwan, then it's possible the initial few weeks will be enough to expend ordnance and then force both sides to the negotiating table. Usually it's long term will that is lacking on the US side. Short term though, the US usually has plenty.
Combined with the points made by CNO, it's not really clear China will win.
Andrew
"Combined with the points made by CNO, it's not really clear China will win."
DeleteI only commented on the military aspects. There are a host of other factors such as international banking, global public relations, the entire cyber arena, and so forth. Those factors may favor one side or the other. Winning is never as straightforward as seeing who has the biggest gun!
The most important common denominator with each of the US losses you listed was that for the US the outcome wasn’t critically important which accounted for the lack of will.
ReplyDeleteVietnam was worth less to us than the money and several thousand KIA each year. Afghanistan wasn’t worth the money or even 100 KIA per year.
The US was never defeated, in both cases victory just wasn’t worth even comparatively minor costs (as compared to what the Civil War or WW2 cost).
The problem is that in any future conflict with China, victory will be of more critical importance to China. Almost certainty any fight will be over Taiwan. While the Chinese see Taiwan as a renegade province just off their coast, the subjugation of that province being of critical importance to the long term legitimacy of the regime in Beijing, and of great strategic value, what is Taiwan to us? Vague affinity for another democracy, a matter of national pride if we commit ourselves to its defense, and a source of chips, this last point perhaps being most vital.
If the US could be guaranteed a flow of chips, it’s hard to imagine that the loss of Taiwan will ultimately matter much than losing in Vietnam mattered during the Cold War.
So on top of China having a massive advantage from a geographical, industrial and manpower perspective, victory is also more critical for them than for us. To even things up from a will perspective, the US would have to provoke a new Pearl Harbor, as FDR did with Japan, but that would require China taking the bait and the US being able to hide its provocation sufficiently well in the social media era. I just don’t see it happening.
" what is Taiwan to us?"
DeleteAn examination of maps of the region show that the South and East China Seas are bounded by the first island chain. China has to 'run' the gauntlet between islands to enter the open ocean. Currently, none of those islands are controlled by China which makes breakouts into the Pacific potentially problematic for China. If China gains control of Taiwan, that opens the door to the Pacific.
Additionally, Taiwan offers the US an observation point very close to the Chinese mainland - a valuable capability to have.
Taiwan's existence also dictates much of China's current and future political and military actions. Being able to predict the enemy's actions is invaluable.
So, Taiwan is of significant strategic importance to the US. Taiwan is also important for various trade and product reasons, as you noted.
Whether all of these reasons are sufficient for the US to fight for Taiwan is a legitimately debatable question but to simply write Taiwan off as having no value to the US is shortsighted in the extreme.
Here's a thought: If I believed China would annex Taiwan and stop right there and never attempt to annex another territory, I'd be less likely to see Taiwan as a mandatory fight. However, I believe just the opposite. Seizing Taiwan is just one of many territories on China's 'to do' list. China has made claims of ownership of parts of Japan and the entire first and second island chains so, clearly, their ambitions lie far beyond Taiwan. That being the case, logic would suggest it's better to fight over Taiwan than over the entire Pacific. This is the Hitler analogy. Had Hitler been confronted at the start instead of waiting until he had conquered all of Europe, the resulting war would have been much more contained and easier. If war is inevitable, sooner is better than later.
Thank you for your article. Regarding your above points, I could not agree more - but it seems that this reasoning can perfectly be applied to the situation in Ukraine (Seizing [Ukrainee] is just one of many territories on [Russia] 'to do' list, the future of the war "dictates much of [Russia] current and future political and military actions", That being the case, logic would suggest it's better to fight [indirectly] over [Ukraine] than [directly] over the entire [Eastern Europe]".
DeleteWhat makes you think that the current US leadership will confront China while they appease Russia ? I am genuinely curious about this , as - being an European - I am completely unable to explain the new US foreign policy. That being said, I am now off-topic from your article, my apologies.
Fine points from CNOps, of course.
ReplyDeleteThere is no reason to fight the enemy on his strong points, if that can be avoided.
It is also worth noting that all the examples of "asymmetrical" warfare achieving anything, whether Viet Nam or even Ukraine, were fought on "home ground" geographically speaking, and the PLAN isn't going to land on the West Coast.