Stupidity Abounds!

The Boeing KC-46 tanker woes and resultant financial devastation should have been a cautionary tale for defense industries.  The lessons are myriad and obvious.
 
Now, we learn that Northrop Grumman (NG) has crafted its own aircraft production debacle with the B-21 bomber.  Grumman has officially taken a $1.6B loss and the production is just barely beginning! 

For several quarters, the defense contractor has disclosed in earnings reports that due to a fixed-price contract for the B-21 Raider’s low-rate initial production (LRIP) phase that was signed in 2015, a loss of up to $1.2 billion could be possible amid high inflation and workforce disruptions. That loss is now realized in a pre-tax charge of $1.56 billion, or $1.17 billion post taxes, according to the company’s 2023 year-end earnings report.[1]

Before you weep for Grumman and begin sending them donations, note that the fixed price contract isn’t actually fixed. 

The Pentagon so far has provided $60 million to offset some inflationary impacts for the B-21 program … discussions are ongoing for more …[1]

Sure, $60M is a drop compared to a $1.6B loss but I’m sure this is only the beginning of the financial assistance from the government.
 
Can Northrop Grumman learn any lessons from this stupidity-birthed disaster? 

As Northrop Grumman absorbs the losses associated with B-21, the aerospace giant is heeding lessons learned by other contractors about the pitfalls of fixed-price contracts. Since bidding on B-21 in 2015, “we certainly have changed our view on bidding of contracts where we did not have a mature design at the point of bid and yet we committed to fixed-price options into the future,” Warden said. “And we have, to my knowledge, not done that again.”
 
Northrop Grumman has “passed on high-profile programs” due to its apprehension around fixed-price contracts, according to Warden, and been more cautious in its bids.[1] [emphasis added]

So, by their own admission, NG knew what they were doing was stupid and yet they did it anyway.  In essence, they offered a fixed price bid on a fantasy wish list of a product.  A junior high school student would know not to offer a fixed price on an undefined product.
 
At least they now seem to realize that fixed price bids on immature product designs are stupid.  Of course, that’s closing the barn door after the $1.6B horse is out.
 
The military, of course, loves the idea of fixed price contracts on ill-defined products!  What they fail to realize is that, ultimately, they’re hurting themselves because it causes companies to refrain from bidding or to bid exceedingly high to cover anticipated cost overruns.  What the military should be doing is finalizing product designs before requesting bids.  That way, the companies know exactly what they’re bidding on and can make realistic cost estimates and bids.  In the end, both the manufacturers and the military win from that approach.  Unfortunately, that would require intelligence from the military and, like so many shortages today, there seems to be a severe shortage of intelligence in the military.
 
 
 
__________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Northrop Grumman logs billion-dollar charge on B-21 stealth bomber”, Michael Marrow, 25-Jan-2023,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/01/northrop-grumman-logs-billion-dollar-charge-on-b-21-stealth-bomber/

True Multi-Domain War

‘Multi-domain’ is the current buzzword and fad of the month in the US military although, in practice, it seems to just be gibberish-speak for more computers and more unmanned assets.  That aside, the basic concept is that you wage war not just on the kinetic level but on additional levels such as the electromagnetic, public relations, Internet, space, and so on.  Unfortunately, one of the major domains that has the most potential impact is also the most overlooked and ignored and that is the financial domain.
 
Consider the current Houthi conflict.
 
We’re trading shots back and forth with the Houthis and, clearly, not deterring them in the least.  This is yet another in an endless list of demonstrable failures of deterrence for those of you who believe deterrence is effective but, I digress …
 
The point is that our minimal attacks are having little or no effect.  This is quite similar to the ISIS truck-plinking that we engaged in some years ago and which had zero impact.
 
If we were serious about ending the Houthi actions, we’d focus as much on the financial domain as the kinetic and it would likely produce far better results.  The Houthis must finance their operations, weapon acquisitions, weapon component acquisitions, shipping and transport costs, ‘soldier pay’, etc.  That financial mechanism is not just a local, village level network.  They’re engaged in global financial dealings with suppliers, Iran, and others.  That financial network represents a major center of gravity and extreme vulnerability for the Houthis.  We have the means to completely shut down their financial network, halt bank transfers, seize assets, freeze and seize bank accounts, etc.  I’m not a financial expert so these are just the conceptual, top level ideas that I’m aware of.  I’m sure our government accountants and financial experts could devise much more extensive and effective methods.  We should also be tracking and covertly eliminating links in the Houthi financial chains … you know, CIA type work.
 
Waging war is not cheap and the Houthis are not above the financial requirements.  In fact, being a smaller operation, relative to the US, they are more vulnerable to financial disruptions.  Of course, it would help if we would stop giving billions of dollars to Iran![1]
 
I know that the administration will claim to be applying some sanctions against the Houthis but we are a universe away from bringing the full weight of our financial combat capability to bear.  Just as our occasional strikes accomplish nothing, a few minor sanctions also accomplish nothing.
 
We need to either bring our full military and financial might to bear on the Houthis in a true multi-domain fight or we need to leave the area.  What we’re doing is accomplishing nothing and risking everything.  One lucky hit on a warship and the Houthis win on the global stage.
 
As with so many things, our military and government (largely one and the same!) pay lip service to concepts but refuse to actually carry them out to the maximum extent.  We talk about multi-domain combat but largely refuse to engage in financial combat which has, arguably, the most potential to produce the desired results.

____________________________

 
Note: The same considerations apply to our dealings with China.  We are at war with China, right now, even if the current administration refuses to acknowledge it, and we’re making almost no effort to win or even engage.  If we were to fully engage in financial combat with China we’d win overwhelmingly.  Yes, there would be some short term pain for us but also some incredible long term gains.  However, that’s a topic for another post.
 
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Guardian website, “US agrees to release $6bn in Iran funds as part of deal to free detained Americans”, Julian Borger, 11-Sep-2023,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/11/us-iran-sanctions-waiver-americans-detained-iran

LUSV Arsenal Ship

The Navy appears to be designing the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) to be a poor man’s arsenal ship.  Is this concept valid?  Let’s examine the idea.
 
Recall that the Navy envisions the following roles for the large (LUSV) and medium (MUSV) unmanned vessels as:
 

LUSV – missile shooter;  16-32 VLS

MUSV – sensing (ISR)

 

LUSV Concept Image

As a reminder, while the word ‘large’ appears in the label, the LUSV is actually a very small vessel with a very limited vertical launch capacity. 

The Navy envisions LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having full load displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 tons, which would make them the size of a corvette (i.e., a ship larger than a patrol craft and smaller than a frigate). The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships with ample capacity for carrying various modular payloads—particularly anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads, meaning principally anti-ship and land-attack missiles. Each LUSV could be equipped with a vertical launch system (VLS) with 16 to 32 missile-launching tubes.[1]

The ships will have little or nothing in the way of sensors or defensive weapons other than what might be loaded in a VLS cell, such as the ESSM missile.
 
Similarly, the original arsenal ship concept envisioned a barge-like vessel with no function other than carrying and launching missiles – a missile barge, in essence.  The missile capacity has been suggested as being anywhere from a hundred to a few thousand VLS cells, depending on whose specific design one looks at.
 
At first glance, there would seem to be nothing wrong with the LUSV concept and much to like.  A small vessel – low cost, one presumes, thanks to its small size – with a significant supply of extra missiles allowing other ships, such as the Burke, to stay in a fight longer (assuming the LUSV cells contain anti-air missiles) or allowing for massive land attack strikes.  Further, with no crew, the operating costs should be very low and the vessels can be used in high risk situations and missions since they’re unmanned.
 
What’s not to like?
 
Well, before we celebrate the Navy’s brilliant vision, let’s just take a few moments to move beyond the sales brochure claims and examine the concept in slightly more detail.
 
 
Missile Capacity.  A Burke has 96 VLS cells so the additional 16-32 cells represent a 17%-33% additional capacity compared to the Burke.  That’s nice but is it tactically significant?
 
In the anti-air (AAW) role, we’ve already noted that a task force with, say, one to three dozen escorts (in war, no task force will put to sea with anything less!) already has 1,152-3,456 VLS cells with, realistically, 2,300-6,700 anti-air missiles, depending on the mix of Standards and quad-packed ESSM.  Will an additional 16-32 cells offer any significant contribution to that firepower?
 
If a task force has already expended three to several thousand AAW missiles, it’s mission has long since been over and the ships are likely at the bottom of the sea.  Of course, no enemy could possibly muster three to several thousand attacking missiles that would require that staggering expenditure of defensive missiles.
 
So, it would seem that an LUSV has nothing significant to offer to the AAW function.
 
What about land attack?
 
We’ve seen that the US used some 60+ missiles to conduct a very limited strike on an undefended Syrian air base (see, “Syrian Tomahawk Strike”).  Logic suggests that a full strike on a defended base would require something on the order of a few hundred or more missiles to ensure success.  For sake of discussion, let’s assume a strike of 300 cruise missiles is required.  A single LUSV could contribute 5%-11% of the required missiles.  In other words, it would take 10-19 LUSVs to conduct such an attack.
 
 
Missile Inventory.  Closely related to missile capacity is the issue of the Navy’s missile inventory.  Best estimates are that we already have several times more VLS cells in the fleet than we have missiles to fill them.  That being the case, why would we want to build more cells?  What will we fill them with?  If every cell in the fleet was filled and we have several thousand missiles left over then, maybe, you’ve got the slimmest of justification for building a small, unmanned missile barge but we are a universe away from that situation.
 
 
Cost.  One of the LUSV claims is that it is a low cost way to bring additional firepower.  However, according to Navy budget documents, the LUSV will cost around $250M-$300M and that’s the Navy’s estimate.  Every Navy cost estimate is significantly understated.  The true cost will likely be closer to $500M. 

The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission programs the procurement of production LUSVs through the Navy’s shipbuilding account, with the first LUSV to be procured in FY2025 at a cost of $315.0 million, the next two in FY2026 at a combined cost of $522.5 million (i.e., an average of about $261.3 million each), the next three in FY2027 at a combined cost of $722.7 million (i.e., an average of $240.9 million each), and another three in FY2028 at a combined cost of $737.2 million (i.e., an average of about $245.7 million each).[1]

On Station.  This is not a technical consideration but it warrants a discussion because I hear it so frequently.  There’s a school of thought that likes the idea of an arsenal ship (or LUSV) because its missiles will allow other ships to ‘stay on station’ longer.  Of course, this is idiotic and reveals an utter lack of understanding about how navies fight.  Ships in combat don’t ‘stay on station’.  They don’t sit in one piece and slug it out, day after day, with the enemy, fighting to ‘stay on station’.  Staying in one place is how you get found, attacked, and die.  Ships sortie, execute a specific and relatively brief mission, and then return to base.  There is no station to stay on!
 
 
Security.  Despite being an unmanned vessel, the LUSV, when armed with multi-million dollar missiles, would have to be guarded 24/7 by other military forces.  We’ve already seen multiple examples of other countries seizing (or attempting to seize) our unmanned assets with no repercussions.  Now, we may be willing to lose a UAV or small underwater glider but I would hope we draw the line at conceding the seizure of a missile armed asset.  Therefore, the LUSV will require constant guarding by manned units.  That being the case, is the unit really unmanned if it requires a constant manned presence hovering over it?
 
 
Operation.  The LUSV will require near constant communications and telemetry.  In war, constant communications offers the enemy a simple location fix.  Even supposedly secure line of sight comms are nowhere near as secure as is commonly assumed, according to military communications personnel I’ve talked to.
 
There’s also the issue of maintenance.  No machinery – and any ship is  just a collection of machinery – is maintenance free.  Normally, the routine maintenance would be conducted by the crew and emergent repairs would be handled by the crew.  Who conducts the maintenance and repair of the LUSV?  If we don’t provide regular, routine maintenance then logic would suggest that the vessels will have to be frequently returned to a base or tender for repairs that the non-existent crew did not perform.  That makes the LUSV availability poor.  In peacetime, that’s an annoyance.  In war, that’s leaving a task force partially crippled especially if the Navy comes to depend on them … which they will.  You know the Navy won’t simply – and correctly – use the LUSV as an augment to regular ships but will, instead, begin to use them as replacements for regular ships out of pure institutional stupidity and mental laziness.   This is analogous to GPS which was not used to augment manual navigation but, instead, replaced manual navigation skills which led to our current vulnerability and loss of skills.
 
 
Conclusion
 
What we’ve just discussed is, essentially, the considerations that would go into a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) if the Navy were to ever do one … which they have not and will not.  You know … just build it and get it in the hands of the sailors and they’ll figure out what to do with it.  That’s what passes for a CONOPS in the Navy, today.
 
What these considerations suggest regarding a CONOPS is that there is no viable, combat-useful role for the LUSV.  The weapons load of 16-32 VLS cells is tactically insignificant, the Navy lacks the missile inventory to fill the cells, the communications requirement is a detection vulnerability, the maintenance and logistical support requirements are problematic, and the cost is excessive for the marginal combat value of the vessel.  There is simply no combat value to be had from the LUSV.
 
Interestingly, although we did not discuss it, there might be some combat value to the MUSV although the communications requirements remain problematic in the extreme for a sensor platform.
 
The Navy is fixated on unmanned vessels for reasons unfathomable.  If I had to guess, I suspect the Navy’s fixation stems purely from the desire to eliminate crew costs which is a peacetime accounting consideration and is the last and worst justification for a combat platform.
 
The Navy would be much better served by focusing on single function, manned ships (AAW or strike, for example) that can act independently under EMCON conditions which is how a war will be fought.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Congressional Research Service, “Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O’Rourke, R45757, 20-Dec-2023

Do You Believe? – Follow Up

You may recall that we recently noted and expressed disbelief about a Navy announcement related to the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV).  Supposedly, the manufacturer/Navy completed a 30 day, uninterrupted run of the diesel engines as a demonstration of reliability.  ComNavOps expressed doubt.[1]
 
Well, here’s a bit of related news from Captain Scot Searles, the program manager of the Unmanned Maritime Systems Program Office, which starts the process of backtracking and qualifying the previous announcement: 

“It [the test engine] doesn’t have to be on for 30 days. It can start and stop, but nobody can touch it”[2]

My interpretation of that statement is that the vendor failed the test and the Navy opted for verbal gymnastics to turn it into a success.
 
As it turns out, potential engine vendors don’t actually have to be tested by the Navy. 

… vendors don’t necessarily have to stick to equipment tested by the government. They can also do their own 30-day testing on various pieces of equipment. However they must inform the program office ahead of testing and coordinate the testing with them.[2]

So, a manufacturer can test their own equipment.  I can’t see anything suspicious about that.  In fact, I’m going to make a daring and bold prediction (don’t try this at home;  I’m a trained analyst and predictor).  Every piece of manufacturer tested equipment will …  …  …  wait for it … … PASS!
 
So, to sum up, the engines don’t actually have to run non-stop for 30 days and manufacturers can test their own equipment.  Hmm …

 

LUSV Concept Image

It is telling that the Navy’s history of being veracity-challenged is so severe that my default position is disbelief about anything they say.  Sad, but that’s the position the Navy has earned for itself.
 
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2023/12/do-you-believe-navy.html
 
[2]Naval News website, “Second Vendor Clears U.S. Navy LUSV Milestone”, Zach Abdi, 16-Jan-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sna-2024/2024/01/second-vendor-clears-u-s-navy-lusv-milestone/

Constellation Fraud

The Navy assured us that the Constellation class frigate would be a zero risk, on-time, on-cost, romp through the park to build since it was, essentially, a copy of an existing Fincantieri FREMM design.  There would be only minor, inconsequential changes – the color of the paint, perhaps, or an extra bulkhead or two for greater compartmentalization – that would have no impact on the design or production of the ship.
 
Of course, when the concept drawings were released, it turned out that the ship had been heavily modified and actually bore little resemblance to the parent FREMM design.  The Navy had lied to Congress and the public by presenting the frigate as a minor variation of an existing design when, in reality, it was a nearly brand new design with little in common with the so-called parent.  I won’t bother reciting the litany of changes from the parent design as those are readily available on line.
 
So, how’s all that working out?
 
USNI News website reports that the ship construction and delivery is going to be delayed at least a year.[1]  Construction began in Aug 2022 and the Navy is now hoping for delivery in 2027.  Far more likely is a 2028-9 delivery.  That’s a five to seven year delivery for what the Navy claims is a minor tweak of an existing design!
 
This babbling, incoherent, pointless statement from Andy Bosak (deputy manager for the frigate program) tells you everything you need to know about the state of the program.  The Navy has no idea what’s happening, no idea how to fix it, and no idea when the ship will be delivered. 

We are doing our analysis, as the Navy does, of doing deep dives of causes and effects and various different levers of which we can pull within that shipyard,” he added. “And we need to, as a program, work with our leadership, kind of figure out what we want to do. And from that, we will make that assessment as to what the actual schedule impact is of where we are. And that effort is ongoing.[1]

The builder, Fincantieri, blames much of the delay on labor shortages, welders, in particular.  No doubt this is a factor but I suspect there are other, far more impactful problems.  For example, 

… Fincantieri … wrestled with Americanizing the FREMM design for two and half years before it hit the 80 percent design completion and could begin fabrication on Constellation in 2022.  The modification of the design altered almost every drawing of the FREMM and required review from NAVSEA … [1]

The labor situation was well known before Fincantieri submitted a bid and the before the Navy awarded them a contract so that should have already been factored into the schedule.  What wasn’t factored in was the extent to which the Navy would modify the design.  The modifications sent ripple waves of disruption spreading throughout the program, culminating in the major schedule slippage we learn about now.  Undoubtedly, the schedule will slip even further.  We’re likely looking at closer to a two year schedule delay for a ship that was supposedly a knock off of an existing design.
 
The Navy knew all this and understood what deviating from the parent design would mean. 

"[The Navy] and the shipbuilder agreed that design maturity was probably the single biggest factor we could do to reduce the risk of production,” former program executive officer for unmanned and small combatants Rear Adm. Casey Moton said in August of 2022.[1]

So, knowing full well what a modified (immature) design would do to the production schedule, the Navy went ahead and completely redesigned the ship anyway.  Not only is the Navy complicit in the current problems, they are the proximate cause of the problems!
 
Here’s yet another example of the ‘minor, insignificant’ changes the Navy made: 

… testing at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock found that the modified design did not meet service standards for operating in heavy seas, necessitating design changes that ate into the schedule margin … [1]
 
“We were already into the functional and detail design when that report came from Carderock – something of a surprise because the parent design didn’t really have that,” Vandroff (Mark Vandroff, Fincantieri Marinette Marine’s chief executive officer) said.[1]

That was a surprise to you, Mr. Vandroff?  Seriously?  You completely changed the design to the point that it is a brand new, never before produced design and were surprised to find that created new problems?  You’re not an engineer, I’m assuming?
 

 
Conclusion
 
This program has been nothing but fraud and deception piled on fraud and deception from the very beginning and now it’s coming home to roost.  The Navy tried to hide a completely new ship inside the shadow – and lies – of an existing ship and now they’re acting surprised that the fraud is impacting the production schedule.
 
We need to also keep cost in mind.  Schedule slippages of this magnitude don’t come free.  The cost is going to skyrocket and the Navy will, again, act surprised and attempt to blame the builder.
 
By the way, do you recall that the Navy claimed that the follow on ships (2-20) would cost less than $800M?  Yeah, they said that.  Here’s the quote from RAdm. John Neagley:
 
“The follow-on objective cost for FFG(X) is $800 million. We think we can get below that.”[2]
 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), on the other hand, estimated an average cost of $1.2B per ship.[3]
 
As it turns out, the actual budgeted costs are around $1.1B-$1.2B, and that’s before the inevitable cost overruns, costs associated with schedule slippages, deferred completion costs for incomplete delivery, etc.  The true cost will be somewhere in the $1.5B+ range.
 

 
 
______________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “First Constellation Frigate Delayed At Least a Year, Schedule Assessment ‘Ongoing’”, Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, 11-Jan-2024,
https://news.usni.org/2024/01/11/first-constellation-frigate-delayed-at-least-a-year-schedule-assessment-ongoing#:~:text=The%20service%20has%20briefed%20Congress%20that%20the%20future,legislative%20source%20confirmed%20to%20USNI%20News%20this%20week.
 
[2]Breaking Defense website, “Navy Says It Can Buy Frigate For Under $800M: Acquisition Reform Testbed”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 12-Jan-2018,
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/navy-says-it-can-buy-frigate-for-under-800m-acquisition-reform-testbed/
 
[3]CBO website, “The Cost of the Navy’s New Frigate”, Oct-2020,
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56675

Houthis and the Marines – Same Mission?

Reader ‘Robtze’ just thoroughly embarrassed me in a comment with an incredibly astute observation that I completely missed.  He observed/asked whether the Houthis were executing the same mission  the Marine Corps envisions with their island/coastal missile shooter concept.
 
To address his comment, yes, this is almost exactly the mission set.  Let’s take advantage of this remarkable similarity and examine how the coastal ‘missile sniping’ concept is working out.
 
Weapons.  One probable difference is the weapons.  While we have no definitive information on the missiles the Houthis are using, it’s likely that they’re smaller and shorter ranged than the missiles the Marines envision using.
 
Targeting.  From day one, this has been one of the unaddressed, major mysteries about the missile shooting concept.  The Marines have no ability to target beyond the horizon and, if they did, the size and scope of that effort would totally negate the ‘hidden’ and ‘small’ characteristics of the concept (using medium to large UAVs, for example).  We see that many of the Houthi missiles appear to be blind fired, being described by US spokesmen as having indeterminate targets. 
 
From this, we can infer that the targeting issue is a valid one that is not easily solved and will, indeed, be problematic for the Marines.
 
Logistics.  One difference is that the logistic (resupply) issue isn't present for the Houthis since this isn't an isolated island.  They can obtain supplies overland.  Of course, even in this case, the supply routes and methods present a vulnerability that could be targeted and disrupted by US forces.  It seems patently obvious that this logistic vulnerability will exist many times over for Marines on an isolated island in Chinese controlled waters.
 
One of the characteristics of the Houthi attacks is the scarcity of attacking weapons.  It would have been reasonable to expect that they would launch swarms of drones or saturation levels of missiles to try to increase the odds of getting a hit on a Navy warship.  That has not happened which leads one to wonder if their weapon inventories are significantly limited.  If so, this would, again, raise the logistic issue with resupply of missiles, despite being overland, being a weakness.  Again, this illustrates the difficulty (impossibility) of the Marines getting resupplies under their concept.
 
Survivability.  The US and UK have finally executed a counter-strike. 

The US and UK launched some 72 strikes against 60 targets in 16 locations.  The Pentagon described its targets as radar systems, drone storage and launch sites, missile storage and launch facilities and Houthi command and control nodes.[1]

This suggests that an isolated Houthi force, with no significant air defense or counter-air capability cannot prevent the enemy from locating and destroying them.  The Marines, of course, with no significant air defense or counter-air capability, believe that they’ll be able to operate undetected on tiny islands a miniscule fraction of the size of Yemen.  This incident would seem to suggest that the Marine concept is heavy on wishful thinking and light on reality.
 
Effectiveness.  The ultimate measure of the worth of anything is in the results.  The Houthis, due to targeting difficulties and, apparently, logistic (missile inventory) challenges, have been remarkably ineffective.  Some four dozen or more attacks have generated no sunk ships, no hits on a warship, and only minor damage to several ships.
 
The Marines, of course, can expect even less success.  Chinese ships merely have to remain beyond the 12 mile or so horizon and thus achieve total safety due to the lack of targeting.  In addition, there won’t be any Chinese merchant shipping in an active war zone so the Marines would be shooting at warships, not commercial vessels and the Houthi experience demonstrates that warships are, thus far, immune to damage from limited attacks by low end weapons and drones.
 
 
Conclusion
 
This Houthi scenario is offering us a rare opportunity to observe the Marine missile shooting concept in action.  The Marines were quick to jump on – and badly misinterpret – the Ukraine experience to justify their vision.  Will they be as quick to jump on this scenario which is a near perfect duplicate of their concept and is failing badly?  I suspect you know the answer.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “A 'Morning After' Look At the Strike on Yemen and What It Is Likely to Mean”, streiff, 12-Jan-2024
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/01/12/a-morning-after-look-at-the-strike-on-yemen-and-what-it-is-likely-to-mean-n2168651

Houthi Attack Lessons

The ongoing drone and missile attacks by the Houthis against shipping in the Red Sea ought to offer many lessons.  However, unfortunately, we have almost no detailed information about the attacks and defensive efforts which makes lessons and conclusions difficult.
 
To summarize, as best we can glean, the Houthis are using very low end aerial drones and cruise/ballistic missiles to target commercial and naval vessels.  It appears that some four dozen or so drones and missiles have been fired at various targets with a couple of hits reported on commercial vessels.  The US Navy claims one or two dozen shoot downs. 
 
That’s all the information we have.  Will that stop us from applying some analysis and drawing some conclusions?  Of course not!  Let’s see what we can learn.
 
 
Strategy.  You cannot win a defensive war/battle.  Only offense wins wars.  The attacker only needs an occasional success whereas the defense needs to be 100% successful and, long term, that’s impossible.  This is even more true when the disparity between the attacker and defender is so great.  Despite dozens of failures, a single Houthi hit on a US warship makes their entire effort an overwhelming success. 
 
By opting for a purely defensive posture, we’re putting ourselves in a no-win position where failure is assured.  It’s only a matter of when, not if.
 
Military Cost Curve.  All indications are that we are using Standard missiles to shoot down very low end drones and missiles.  That puts us on the wrong side of the cost curve.  Depending on the specific variant, Standard missiles cost $4M-$5M each.  Low end attacking drones and missiles cost on the order of thousands or tens of thousands of dollars.
 
While it is perfectly valid to say that we’re spending $5M Standards to protect $3B warships, that kind of economic exchange rate can’t be sustained.  We’re winning the battle and losing the economic war.
 
There are some vague hints that a CIWS may have engaged a target(s).  While that would be much more economical, it would also be very disturbing news:  that a low end attacking weapon could close to CIWS range against Aegis.  Note, this is far from verified.
 
Ill-equipped Ships.  Our ships are simply not suited for fighting a very low end war.  They’re equipped for high end combat (and not well, either, but that’s a separate topic) and lack effective, low end weapons.
 
Targeting.  The Houthi attacks are, presumably, directed towards specific targets although some of the descriptions of attacks strongly suggest that some portion are being nearly blind fired toward general areas.  Regardless, one of the often overlooked aspects of combat is counter-targeting.  The enemy can’t target what they can’t detect.  It is vital to understand how the enemy conducts their detection and targeting and then deny them that process.  There is no indication that the US is applying any counter-targeting effort.
 
Drone Effectiveness.  Despite the desire of the Western military world to jump on the unmanned fadwagon, the reality, as evidenced by these attacks, demonstrates that drones are, essentially, totally ineffective against a prepared and capable defender.  This should come as no surprise as we’ve repeatedly documented and discussed the lack of effectiveness of drones in combat situations in the pages of this blog.
 
 
Summary
 
It is clear that the US is approaching this situation unwisely by opting to adopt a defensive, appeasement stance.  It is delusional to believe that we can maintain a 100% success rate no matter how unsophisticated the attacking weapons are.  We must either leave the area to avoid the inevitable defensive failure or shift to an offensive posture and eliminate the threat.
 
It is also clear that our ships are ill-equipped to deal with low end threats in an economical but effective manner.  We need lower end vessels such as frigates, corvettes, or patrol vessels
 
Perhaps the major lesson from these attacks is that drones are not the all-powerful, invincible threat that so many make them out to be.  This mini-conflict is the perfect counter to the perceived (but incorrect) success of drones in Ukraine.  This is a warning to us not to make drones a major element of our force structure.
 
 
Caution:  As stated at the beginning, we have almost no detailed information about these attacks and defenses so be very cautious drawing lessons and conclusions.  The points I’ve made are general, based on the situation, rather than specific, based on details.  I would very much like to believe that the Navy actually recognizes these points and is taking appropriate action and just not making it public but there is no reason to believe that is the case.

Unmanned and Analytical Rigor

The degree of intellectual rigor being applied to unmanned systems is nearly non-existent.
 
For example, here’s an article about the first exercise involving a Turkish ULAQ 11 m unmanned surface craft.   The article lists claimed benefits of unmanned and joint manned-unmanned assets (they refer to the combined manned-unmanned operations as MUM-T, for some unfathomable reason).  Along with the claims, I’ve added the most cursory of intellectual and analytical rigor, in red, to examine the claim. 
 
Here’s the exact quotes and claims
 
Increased Operational Efficiency: MUM-T allows for the simultaneous operation of manned and unmanned vessels, enabling a more comprehensive and efficient coverage of a given area. Autonomous or remotely operated USVs can handle routine or monotonous tasks, freeing up human operators to focus on more complex decision-making.
 
There is no evidence that teaming an unmanned boat and a manned asset allows for more comprehensive and efficient coverage of a given area.  In fact, most unmanned assets are small and decidedly underpowered compared to equivalent manned assets and, therefore, have reduced sensor coverage compared to purely manned assets.  Further, human operators are not freed up for more complex decision making;  they’re merely transferred from one tedious job to another: in this case, from direct sensor observations and interpretation to indirect sensor observations and interpretation  …  same exact job, just using second hand data instead of direct observations.
 
Further, most unmanned sensors, being mounted on smaller unmanned platforms, have a significantly smaller field of view compared to a similar manned platform and are, therefore, less efficient in their coverage than purely manned platforms.
 
Risk Reduction: MUM-T can be used to mitigate risks associated with certain tasks. Unmanned vessels can be deployed for missions in hazardous or high-threat environments, minimizing the exposure of human operators to potential dangers.
 
This is partially true on a limited basis, depending on what capabilities the unmanned asset has.  Typically, the unmanned asset is far less capable than the equivalent manned asset and the manned asset must still be put at risk.
 
A closely related consideration is that if the risky task requires any degree of sophisticated capability, the unmanned platform will be correspondingly expensive and while the unmanned asset reduces (note:  does not eliminate) the human risk, the monetary risk is equal to, or greater than, the manned asset.
 
Extended Endurance and Range: Unmanned surface vessels can be designed for longer endurance and extended range. This is particularly beneficial for tasks such as persistent surveillance, reconnaissance, or data collection in remote or challenging environments.
 
Manned assets can equally be designed for longer endurance and extended range.  There is nothing inherently superior about unmanned asset range and endurance.  Further, longer endurance and extended range comes with a concomitant decrease in capabilities.  For example, an aircraft, manned or unmanned, can achieve longer range/endurance by reducing the weight of the payload.  Of course, reduced payload equates to reduced capabilities.
 
Flexibility and Scalability: MUM-T provides a flexible and scalable approach to maritime operations. Depending on the mission requirements, the combination of manned and unmanned assets can be adjusted to achieve optimal results.
 
This is ridiculous buzzword bingo.  Manned systems are equally flexible and scalable and can be adjusted to achieve optimal results.  Unmanned assets have absolutely no inherent benefits in this regard.
 
Sensor Fusion and Information Sharing: MUM-T facilitates the integration of various sensors and data sources from both manned and unmanned platforms. This enables enhanced situational awareness and information sharing, leading to better-informed decision-making.
 
As the quote correctly notes, ‘integration’ of sensors and data is not an inherent characteristic of unmanned assets and applies equally to manned assets.  Unmanned assets offer no ‘enhanced situational awareness’.
 
Coordinated Missions: Manned and unmanned vessels can operate in a coordinated manner to execute complex missions. This collaboration allows for a synergistic approach, combining the strengths of human intuition and adaptability with the precision and endurance of unmanned systems.
 
More marketing bilgewater.  Manned assets can, and do, ‘operate in a coordinated manner to execute complex missions’.  Again, there is zero inherent superiority in coordinating unmanned assets and, indeed, some significant drawbacks in that manned assets can act independently and with intelligence as situations change whereas unmanned assets cannot.
 
Training and Skill Development: MUM-T scenarios provide opportunities for training human operators in controlling and interacting with unmanned systems. This helps in developing the necessary skills for seamless collaboration between manned and unmanned assets.
 
This is the ultimate in self-licking ice cream cone logic.  Of course operating unmanned assets develops skill in operating unmanned assets.  So what?  Operating elephants develops skill in operating elephants but that doesn’t help warfighting and neither do unmanned assets.
 
 
Conclusion
 
This article was a marketing blurb, pure and simple.  Its only value was in clearly illustrating the lack of analytical rigor being applied to unmanned systems.  The West has made the leap directly from concept to implementation of unmanned systems without bothering to stop at the analysis step. 

The article reads like a Turkish arm sales marketing brochure and should be an embarrassment to the Naval News website.
 
 
 
_________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “ULAQ Combat USV Proves Efficiency On The Field”, staff, 29-Dec-2023,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/12/ulaq-combat-usv-proves-efficiency-on-the-field/

Free Up Ships for More Important Duties

We constantly hear the justification, [it (whatever it is)] will free up [something else] for other, more important duties.    For example, the LCS will free up Burkes for more important duties.  Or, the Constellation will free up Burkes for more important duties.  That sounds fine on paper but, in reality, it’s just buzzword garbage.  What are these other ‘more important duties’?  I’m looking around and I don’t see Burkes conducting other ‘more important duties’, do you?
 
We have 86 Burkes/Ticos.  Are they really all tied up on unimportant duties and need freeing up?  Are there really ‘more important duties’ that are going unattended because Burkes are being wasted on less important duties?  Most of our Burkes sit pier side most of the year.  Are we really short of Burkes for ‘more important duties’?
 
Many use this justification to promote smaller carriers;  if we had smaller carriers we could free up the supercarriers for ‘more important duties’.  Again, what are these ‘more important duties’ that our carriers are currently foregoing in favor of less important duties?  Remember, we have 11 carriers and most of the time only one or two are deployed.  Do we really lack sufficient carriers for ‘more important duties’?
 
Now some – myself foremost among them - might suggest that all of our Burkes and carriers are, actually, engaged in less important duties but that’s because there are no important duties that we’re willing to take on. 
 
What might be examples of these ‘more important duties’?
 

We don’t forcefully confront China, Iran, Russia, or NKorea, which would be more important duties, so that’s not it.

 

We don’t use our high tech, high firepower Burkes to rein in Iran’s antics in the Middle East or prevent them from attacking and seizing merchant ships.  In fact, our policy is to stand by and watch.  So, that’s not the ‘more important duty’.

 

We don’t shoot down NKorea’s rogue, out of control ballistic missiles during their tests so that’s not the ‘more important duty’.

 

We’re not aggressively trailing and harassing Chinese subs so that’s not the ‘more important duty’.

 

We’re not conducting Innocent Passage exercises through China’s territorial waters as they’ve done to us so that’s not the ‘more important duty’.

 

We’re not conducting regular and frequent live fire training exercises so that’s not the ‘more important duty’.

 

We’re not providing large escorts for our carriers (typically around three Burkes per carrier) so that’s not the ‘more important duty’.

 

We’re not developing and exercising combat tactics such as squadron destroyer operations so that’s not the ‘more important duty’.

 

We’re not cruising just off African nations and conducting surveillance and attacks on terrorist grounds so that’s not the ‘more important duty’.

 

We’re not conducting relentless training exercises against diesel subs, the most common type of enemy sub, so that’s not the ‘more important duty’.

 

 
Now, let’s talk about priorities.  Are we really choosing to assign Burkes and carriers to less important, lower priority duties instead of ‘more important duties’ that, presumably, have higher priority?  If so, that’s incompetence on a treasonous level.  I’ll give the Navy the benefit of the doubt on this one and assume that they’re assigning ships to tasks in order of importance and priority.  That being the case, by definition, there can’t be any ‘more important duties’ because we’ve already assigned ships to them.
 
To be fair, people attempt to use this justification for other platforms, too.  For example, I’ve heard people call for a new F-16-ish fighter in order to free up F-22s for ‘more important duty’.  What ‘more important duty’ are F-22s ignoring in favor of less important ones?
 
 
In short, ‘more important duties’ is a specious justification wholly unsupported by facts, logic, or reality.  It is a fraudulent attempt to justify something that cannot be justified on its own merits.

Don’t Train With Allies – More Proof

ComNavOps has long stated that we shouldn’t be wasting time cross-training with allies (see, “This Is Why You Don’tTrain With Allies”) since, far too often, they have their own agendas and won’t support us when needed.  That being the case, it is a pointless waste of time and resources to cross train.  Needless to say, this is not a universally popular position.  It is, however, supremely correct.  The latest example is the US attempt to form an alliance to protect shipping off Yemen from Houthi missile and drone attacks.
 
The concept of a naval coalition, while strongly indicating that the US lacks the will and courage to take unilateral action to defend itself and others, seems simple enough.  Various countries with shipping interests in the area band together to provide for the common defense. 
 
Unfortunately, even this simple, if weak, response appears to be beyond the capabilities of the US Navy and the administration.  Redstate website has an excellent summary article describing the failure of the coalition.  

The final box score shows that the 20 coalition members will contribute a total of two surface combatants.[1]

France and Spain have refused to participate under US leadership and most other countries have opted to limit their participation to sending staff officers.  Redstate reports that the 20 nominal participating countries are sending just two ships but are contributing 27 staff officers. 
 
Without debating the merits of the attempted naval coalition, this vividly demonstrates ComNavOps’ contention that allies simply can’t be counted on and it is, therefore, a waste of time cross training with them.
 
By the way, the two countries that agreed to send a ship were the UK and Italy.
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “Red Sea Security Coalition Melts Down As Member Nations Refuse to Accept US Leadership”, Streiff, 23-Dec-2023,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2023/12/23/red-sea-security-coalition-melts-down-as-member-nations-refuse-to-accept-us-leadership-n2167876