We’ve discussed the mechanics and timing of an anti-ship missile attack in various posts and comments. It’s clear, however, that a lot of people don’t quite have a grasp of how short the window of time is for defensive efforts because I consistently see comments about the value of having a large number of VLS cells despite the fact that we’ve demonstrated, repeatedly, that a defending ship will be very fortunate to get off two salvoes (4 missiles total) per attack. Well, it’s time to bring it home, graphically, with a second by second analysis of a theoretical attack and see what the implications are for our defenses.
Assumptions:
Anti-ship Missile
Type = Chinese C-80x family
Speed = Mach 0.9 = (761.2 mph * 0.9 = 685 mph = 11.4 miles/min = 0.19 miles/sec)
Defense
CIWS, effective range = ¾ mile
ESSM, effective range = radar horizon; launch rate = 1 missile every two seconds from two separate VLS clusters for an overall launch rate of 1 missile per second. ESSM missile speed = Mach 4 = (761.2 mph * 4 = 3,045 mph = 50.7 miles/min = 0.85 miles/sec)
Radar Detection Point - For a radar 18 m high (Burke arrays) and a target 5 m above sea level (sea skimming anti-ship cruise missile), calculations[1] give,
Radar Horizon = 10.9 miles = 9.44 nm
Radar Target Visibility = 16.6 miles = 14.4 nm
Note: the radar target visibility distance is slightly greater than the nominal radar horizon due to ducting of the radar waves.
Scenario
For simplification, this scenario involves a single Burke and a single attacking anti-ship missile of the type described above. Further, this scenario assumes that the crew and sensor/weapon systems are exquisitely trained and poised for instant action – eyes glued to screens, no hesitation, instant decision, fingers resting on launch buttons.
The general sequence of events is
- Detect target
- React
- Launch defensive missiles
- Observe results
- Repeat until target is destroyed or ship is hit
It is necessary to understand the Navy’s typical engagement sequence which is shoot-shoot-look. This means that two missiles are launched at a target and then the defending ship waits to see the results. This waiting period allows the cluttered radar picture, which has been obscured by exploding missile debris, to clear as the debris from the intercept attempt falls clear and the actual target is reacquired, if it survived.
Event
Here, then, is the second by second analysis of an attack and defense.
|
Elapsed Time, sec |
Missile Range, miles |
|
Action |
|
0 |
16.6 |
|
Missile crosses radar detection horizon |
|
5 |
15.6 |
|
Operator verifies contact and reports detection |
|
5-10 |
14.7 |
|
Command absorbs information |
|
11-16 |
13.6 |
|
Engagement orders issued, targets assigned |
|
16-19 |
13.0 |
|
Engagement enabled |
|
20-21 |
12.6 |
|
2x ESSM missiles launched |
|
22-24 |
12.0 |
|
Missiles tip over and acquire target |
|
27 |
11.5 |
|
ESSM = 2.55 miles outbound from ship |
|
30 |
10.9 |
|
ESSM = 5.1 miles outbound from ship |
|
35 |
9.9 |
|
ESSM = 9.3 miles; intercept explosions |
|
36-40 |
9.0 |
|
Radar picture clearing |
|
41 |
8.8 |
|
Re-engage |
|
42-43 |
8.4 |
|
2x ESSM missiles launched |
|
44-46 |
7.9 |
|
Missiles tip over and acquire target |
|
50 |
7.1 |
|
ESSM = 2.55 miles outbound from ship |
|
53 |
6.5 |
|
ESSM = 5.1 miles outbound from ship |
|
54 |
6.3 |
|
ESSM = 5.95 miles; intercept explosions |
|
55-59 |
5.4 |
|
Radar picture clearing |
|
60 |
5.2 |
|
Re-engage |
|
61-62 |
4.8 |
|
2x ESSM missiles launched |
|
63-65 |
4.2 |
|
Missiles tip over and acquire target |
|
70 |
3.3 |
|
ESSM = 3.4 miles; intercept explosions |
|
71-75 |
2.3 |
|
Radar picture clearing |
|
76-86 |
|
|
CIWS/RAM engages for 11 seconds |
|
87 |
0 |
|
Missile impacts ship |
There it is, 87 seconds to defend against an attack. That’s not much time and you can clearly see that there is only time for a theoretical maximum of three defensive engagement salvoes and the third is unlikely because it’s too close and would probably wind up within the missile’s non-engagement safety zone. Also, the sequence is based on absurdly optimistic conditions of perfect, unhesitating response and speed of execution. In addition, various time consuming steps were left out such as weapon system warm up time, external safety alarms and time to clear the decks of personnel, etc. Perhaps the Aegis system, operating in full auto mode could approximate this kind of response time; I have no idea.
Far more realistically, a ship would be lucky to get off a single salvo and two would be phenomenal.
Thus, having ten thousand VLS cells and missiles would be utterly useless in any single engagement. As we’ve demonstrated, a ship would be fortunate to get off 2-4 defensive missiles. The remaining 9996 missiles are of no use. This suggests that our ship design tendency toward ever larger VLS loads is pointless, at least from a defensive AAW perspective. Using the cells for offensive cruise missile attacks is another story.
Now, consider the above scenario and timing from a more realistic perspective. The radar/sensor operators are going to get momentary indications and will have to wait to try to firm up the possible detection. The ‘command’ will hesitate, wanting confirmation, and will require some time to evaluate the situation. Weapon operators will not have their fingers resting on launch buttons and will need some time to configure their systems, obtain weapon tracks, and prepare for launch. Missiles, while not needing much time, still need a brief ‘warm up’ period. And so on. All of that adds time – time that is simply not available. Hence, a ship would be lucky to get off a single defensive salvo.
Conclusion
Some of the conclusions from this scenario are:
- Detection beyond the horizon is critical, though very difficult; UAV ‘screen’ to provide early warning?
- Auto mode is the preferred mode in combat
- Training is critical to minimize hesitation time
- The defensive action sequence needs to be shortened as much as possible and ‘command’ layers need to be eliminated, to the extent possible
- Desperately need a better radar that can maintain target contact in a debris filled sky so that missiles can be launched continuously without needing to wait for the ‘look’ portion of shoot-shoot-look. Ideally, we want shoot-shoot-shoot-shoot-shoot …
________________________________
Disclaimer: I have not participated in an actual missile defense exercise so I may well be wrong about some of the events or timing – although it’s hard to imagine I’m overestimating any times! These are just my semi-informed best guesses. If anyone has actual experience and cares to share it, I’d appreciate it.
This post is NOT intended nor purported to be an actual combat simulation. It is simply an exercise in the approximate timing of some of the events in a missile defense scenario so as to provide a feel for the time frames involved.
________________________________
[1]https://www.translatorscafe.com/unit-converter/en-US/calculator/radar-horizon/?hr=10&ht=15&u=m
Bravo! Thanks for digging into those calculations. They make Tsirkon look awfully lethal.
ReplyDeleteNo wonder the Navy found that, even with an alerted crew, more than one-third of missiles got through.
I think the Navy should take a look at Active protection systems developed to protect tanks from missiles. These are very small and very short range counter-missiles designed to destroy incoming missiles just a few meters before they hit. Just turn them on and they operate automatically.
ReplyDeletehttps://below-the-turret-ring.blogspot.com/2017/01/hardkill-aps-overview.html
Phalanx is simply the naval version of that concept. And of course there are other systems.
DeleteGreat idea, except that modern warships are "unarmored" and a 1800lb missile flying 667mph is still ship killing at point blank ranges. In this case, the mechanism of damage is independent of the warhead functioning which is how APS systems for armor are designed to work.
DeleteOne of the missile destroyed the ship despite not exploding.
Delete"On 4 May 1982, Sheffield was at defence watches (second-degree readiness) the southernmost of three Type 42 destroyers when she was hit by one of two AM39 Air-launched Exocet missiles fired by Argentine Super Étendard strike fighters. The second missile splashed into the sea about half-mile off her port beam.[21]
The missile that struck Sheffield impacted on the starboard side at deck level 2, travelling through the junior ratings' scullery and breaching the Forward Auxiliary Machinery Room/Forward Engine Room bulkhead 2.4 metres (7 ft 10 in) above the waterline, creating a hole in the hull roughly 1.2 by 3 metres (3.9 by 9.8 ft). It appears that the warhead did not explode.[22] 20 members of her complement were killed, 26 injured and the loss of Sheffield was a deep shock to the British public and government."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exocet#Falklands_War
I agree with your calculations but disagree with your extrapolations. I don’t think this makes large numbers of VLS SAMS unnecessary, or that it implies that mid (5-30 nm) and long-range (>30nm) sea-skimming missile defense is unrealistic and/or impossible. While this was left unsaid, such an implication would mean that the navy is wrong to focus its energies on the mid and long-range aspects of AEGIS defense and should instead invest more in CIWS systems like phalanx and RIM-116 (I think I've also seen you endorse this position before).
ReplyDeleteYes of course surprise attacks like in your example can occur, but I think the important point is that in such a scenario you’re probably screwed anyway. If the ship is not on alert, it’s doubtful whether any engagements could take place at all, CIWS or SAM. The point of course is to not be caught unawares. This is what the whole AEGIS system is about, which your scenario entirely leaves out.
This is exactly why the US navy has invested in platforms like the E-2D Hawkeye. Having an AWACS capability is not, as you here imply (“Detection beyond the horizon is critical, though very difficult;”), a rarity. In fact, it’s been the central nexus of the AEGIS defense system since the Cold War. It is expected that in wartime major surface combatants will operate as part of CSG’s. The whole point of the AEGIS system is that it’s meant to function as a network. Having said this, we can now perhaps appreciate some vital capabilities that have been left out of your assessment, which only make sense when you consider the proper context.
NIFC-CA, along with active radar-homing SAMS like the SM-6 & ESSM blk II, allows the CSG to engage surface skimming SSM's at far off distances, potentially >100 nm (w/ SM-6). Obviously, this allows a lot more salvoes to happen. Another important consideration is that no ship would launch just 2 ESSM’s per firing sequence (where a firing sequence begins at launch and ends at interception). That’s a gross underestimation of modern AEGIS capabilities. In reality, the limiting constraints are the fire control radars (3 per Burke and 4 per Tico), and the data links (18-24 respectively I think).
It’s more likely that each ship would fire 6-8 missiles per salvo, at 3-4 targets, as limited by their respective fire control radars (they would have opened up their FCR arc coverage by maneuvering beforehand). But importantly, a salvo is not the same as an entire firing sequence/launch cycle, which you seem to be conflating. Semi-active radar-homing is only needed for about 3-5 seconds in the terminal interception phase. Thus, a Burke could have up to 18 ESSM’s in the air targeting 9 missiles, provided the salvoes were appropriately spaced apart so that no more than 3 FCR’s are needed at a time.
Your argument against this brings up radar clutter, but you grossly over-exaggerate the issue if you really believe that this is going to be the limiting factor that brings down an AEGIS volley from 18-24 missiles to 2 per firing cycle.
Firstly, SSM’s can come in at different angles and locations. Destroying 1 SSM at 10 miles at 8 o’clock won’t impact the radar picture at 11 o’clock. Secondly, the clutter issue gets better at close range. Even if the main SPY radar is blinded at ten miles, an ESSM at 0.5 miles could be close enough to distinguish the radar signatures of clutter versus missiles. At ten miles, a five-degree angular difference can translate into a 40-degree difference at half a mile. Thirdly, clutter is transitory.
Now I don’t know the exact capabilities of the AEGIS SPY radar of course, but I imagine this ignorance cuts both ways. So, I’m curious to know why you are so insistent that clutter would present itself as this overwhelming obstacle. If you know something I don’t, by all means please list your sources.
I have advocated mounting a few anti-air missiles on E-2D Hawkeyes in the past for self-defense if needed but also to down incoming anti-ship missiles.
DeleteI think that even taking into account your data you can fire maybe only 4 salvoes of 18 ESSM against 9 missiles per salvoe that in total are 72 ESSM. At 4 packed ESSM per cell we can use at most 18 cells before the ship is hit.
DeleteOf course in a AAW ship we will need also cells for long range missiles, cruise missiles, etc. But for practical purposes the 96 cells of a Burke seems to be in the high side of what is needed. Maybe could be enough with less cells.
For a ASW frigate with less fire control radars and less need to fire long range missiles maybe with 24 or 32 cells would suffice.
JM
"curious to know why you are so insistent that clutter would present itself as this overwhelming obstacle."
DeleteAside from simple logic which dictates that once a missile explodes there will be thousands of target size pieces of debris in the radar field and no radar in existence can handle that, I've read about this exact phenomenon in multiple reports including DOT&E reports so it's clearly an issue that the Navy is grappling with and not yet solved.
" disagree with your extrapolations"
DeleteYou aren't really. What you're doing is making a completely different set of assumptions. As opposed to the scenario of a simple one-on-one encounter between a ship and a single missile in order to illustrate the timing of a single attack/defense, you've jumped to an entire networked battle group with far flung surveillance and defenses. In that case, then, yes, possibly longer range defenses may apply and be effective.
You've also made the assumption that in a peer war, the carrier group and its surveillance assets will be continuously and freely emitting so as to establish and maintain total awareness. Of course, that is not realistic. No group is going to radiate and broadcast its location. This is a topic I've addressed repeatedly so I won't bother re-addressing it now.
Finally, you obviously completely missed or ignored the disclaimer - as so many do! - that stated that this was NOT a combat simulation. No attempt was made to include all the factors you cited. It was a simple arithmetical examination of the timing of an attack/defense. Nothing more.
"You aren't really. What you're doing is making a completely different set of assumptions... Finally, you obviously completely missed or ignored the disclaimer - as so many do! - that stated that this was NOT a combat simulation"
DeleteI don't think I ignored the disclaimer. Like I said, I didn't take issue with your calculations or your scenario construction, what I took issue with was your extrapolations based on this one scenario you came up with.
You are the one who claimed that your example invalidates the use of large number of VLS SAMS, and it was heavily implied in this post (as it has been elsewhere) that we should be focusing on terminal defense as opposed to long range defense (which of course necessitates large amounts of SAM missile cells). Therefore, it's totally valid for me to point out that this scenario misses a larger and more important element. Hence, my coming up with "a completely different set of assumptions" doesn't miss the point, it is the point! Again, I am attacking your extrapolations and not your calculations. If I can come up with a real-world example that refutes the logic of your reasoning, it won't matter that I haven't taken issue with your example.
About EMCON:
No, I didn't make that assumption. I made the assumption that a CSG will have continuous AWACS coverage, which is standard naval operating doctrine. If you want to mask your carrier group's location, you can offset your AWACS coverage. This was done during the cold war (offsetting by as much as 100 miles) and often confused the soviets. Could there be situations where total EMCON is needed for some reason? I don't know, maybe, obviously that would be a huge gamble. But the point is that no CSG would be expected to be placed in a situation where it could reasonably come under attack without AWACS coverage.
About radar clutter:
Here you didn't really address my points regarding why radar clutter probably isn't as big a deal as you make it out to be. Further, the point about the DOT&E reports seems irrelevant. I wasn't denying the phenomena exists, I was just questioning whether it would be so problematic that it would render long range defense against sea-skimming missiles ineffective. But it seems you believe such a defense is possible anyways, so the point is moot.
As an aside, I note the reference to "weapon system warm up time." Which leads me to several questions. Assuming that vessels are operating in a conflict with an reasonably high-level of alert
ReplyDeleteIs this (weapon system warm up time) a significant consideration in the context of solid rocket motors and solid-state electronics?
If it is can this constraint be circumvented by keeping weapons in a "warmed up state?
And if it is necessary, and possible to do this, has the Navy trialled doing so for a prolonged period in the order of days or weeks in order to better understand impacts on system reliability, readiness, etc.?
I realize that some or all of these questions may not be reliably answerable in a public forum.
Thinking back to my past readings I note that this short engagement window seems to be reminiscent of that experienced by the British in the Falklands War.
As such one missing component seems to be the use of ESM to identify the presence of inbound missiles prior to direct radar detection. Would not either the launch vehicle or the missile itself need to emit in order to localize its targets, thereby potentially providing important advance notice for the engagement?
Final thought, would not the defending forces use of jamming, electronic attack and chaff potentially further complicate the defensive environment?
Regarding Sorites observation, is it reasonable to assume that in a conflict US vessels, individually or collectively will not travel the seas unless in company with a carrier and its aircraft?
Hey MKB,
DeleteI know this wasn't addressed to me, but I just wanted to clarify that I in no way believe that "it (is) reasonable to assume that in a conflict US vessels, individually or collectively will not travel the seas unless in company with a carrier and its aircraft".
It's just standard US naval operating doctrine to operate high value assets and escorts as part of a CSG, but of course that doesn't mean that the US navy shouldn't or wouldn't occasionally disaggregate its assets. I was just disputing ComNavOps assertion that "Thus, having ten thousand VLS cells and missiles would be utterly useless in any single engagement... This suggests that our ship design tendency toward ever larger VLS loads is pointless"
"Thinking back to my past readings I note that this short engagement window seems to be reminiscent of that experienced by the British in the Falklands War."
DeleteQuite right. The short engagement window is not something I've made up. It's simply the reality of the speed of weapons versus detection distances. It's reality, not an opinion.
"Warm up"
There are various unpublicized steps required to bring a weapon system to the point of launch. Exactly what they are an how long they take, I do not completely know. In the exercise, I allocated on a couple seconds which is likely extremely optimistic. As one tiny example, the VLS hatch covers must be opened. It only takes a second or two but when you only have 87 seconds, it makes a difference.
"Would not either the launch vehicle or the missile itself need to emit in order to localize its targets, thereby potentially providing important advance notice for the engagement?"
Yes, attacking missiles need targeting from some external source. It is that which we need to try to prevent. The missiles won't start emitting (assuming they're active emitters and not IR/EO) until they reach the designated target area, inside the radar horizon, at which point/time, it doesn't matter.
"would not the defending forces use of jamming, electronic attack and chaff potentially further complicate the defensive environment?"
If you're asking about self-interference of defensive EW efforts, that's a good question and I don't know the answer.
"is it reasonable to assume that in a conflict US vessels, individually or collectively will not travel the seas unless in company"
No ship is going to travel alone during a war! As the disclaimer - which I'm sure you read - noted, this was not a combat simulation. It was just an arithmetical examination of the timing of a single attack/defense.
A few thoughts IF enemy able to obtain targeting information for their AShM.
ReplyDeleteAShM could be supersonic Oniks or the ~ Mach 3 BrahMos, and in the near future (if Russian claims to be believed) will face the Russian hypersonic Mach 8 scramjet Tsirkon drastically reducing the reaction time in CNO scenario to ~10 seconds, another likely probability more than one AShM fired at ship simultaneously decreasing chance of interception of all missiles.
If long range ISR not available from Hawkeye/Triton etc as enemy threat too high to fly, ship drones could extend horizon substantially to ~ 100nm? as CNO mentioned, my thoughts would be either tethered drone using ships abundant power, or self powered as the V-Bat Navy testing, hopefully fitted with passive ESM and IR sensors.
Soft kill, ships SEAWIP ESM activating its Nulka radar decoys, not clear if SRBOC IR decoys still deployed, the newest variant SEWIP(V)7 includes very powerful jammers but expensive at $73 million each, don't know how effective SEWIP(V)7 against the equivalent Chinese/Russian passive IR/ESM etc seeker to those in LRASM and maybe HOJ possible?
The sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor in the Falklands war said to be due to its escorting frigate firing its 4.5" gun with chaff shells that caused the Exocet to divert and hit the Atlantic Conveyor, highlights need for sophisticated AI software and comms so diverted AShM missile doesn't impact on another ship in group with little or no warning).
PS
Do not think G2mil suggestion of active protection with very small and very short range counter-missile effective against heavy AShM, the Navy found during WWII the short range small 20mm and 40mm shells were not powerful enough to stop the mass of the Kamikaze and its kinetic energy impacting ships. Navy never showed interest in the short range 5 lbs Lockheed MHTK missile.
July last year four SM-6 Dual II missiles fired from Burke Ralph Johnson off Hawaii, presuming to test if effective in defending a carrier against the Chinese anti-carrier ballistic missiles DF-21 and 26. MDA PR "one target was successfully intercepted. At this time, we cannot confirm the second target was destroyed" 50% success rate?
What causes me concern as in the latest DOT&E report on Ford was the poor performance of Phalanx after 50 years continuous development. The vessel’s Gatling gun-like system “experienced numerous reliability failures that in several cases prevented the system from executing its mission”, do similar problems effect ESSMs, has it been realistically tested against the supersonic Coyote head on.
If an ESSM detonates, it’s likely a kill. The proximity fuse will only detonate within the lethal radius of the warhead.
ReplyDeleteI could quibble with some of the other numbers but the overall analysis is reasonable. We’ll only have, at most, a couple opportunities at any one missile.
""If an ESSM detonates, it’s likely a kill."
DeleteI've never seen any data supporting that. Do you have a reference? The theory is correct but the reality is that there have been many proximity fuzed missiles of various types throughout history that have exploded without producing a kill. I have no reason/data to believe ESSM would be the exception.
Also, I made no statement about the pK of the ESSM, one way or the other. It's effectiveness is a complete unknown as the Navy refuses to test it under realistic conditions.
"We’ll only have, at most, a couple opportunities at any one missile."
And that's the point of the post!
As we know, no one is going to give us that data. As Martha says, "That's a good thing, Comrade". LOL!
DeleteI think it's better to perhaps say, " if the essm doesn't kill it, it is because of extreme range at detonation or malfunction and no detonation". If either happens the radar will not be cluttered. It was designed for that discrimination.
Just as important, we do not shoot 1 and wait. We shoot salvos at each threat. The timing you're talking about and the pk of the entire salvo being 1+ is part of it. The essm blk ii will add into that as well.1
Why not change your strategy to shoot-shoot-shoot-look? That would increase the probability of defeating the target regardless of its probability of a kill.
ReplyDeleteAt the same time, you kind of make the case for SeaRam, which has about 8 times the range of CWIS, and adds an intermediate layer of defense between ESSM and CWIS.
"shoot-shoot-shoot-look"
DeleteThe problem is that once the first missile explodes, the radar picture becomes a useless mess. So, the following missiles lose whatever track they have and they're wasted. The Navy appears to believe that they can get two missiles to guide before the radar picture is lost. Would a third missile work? Who knows? The Navy has settled on shoot-shoot-look so I have to believe that's the optimum until I can get data showing otherwise.
"you kind of make the case for SeaRam"
I love SeaRAM … in conjunction with CIWS as the absolute last resort. I didn't include it in this scenario because the subject of the scenario, a Burke, doesn't have SeaRAM but, yes, I'd like to see multiple SeaRAM and multiple CIWS on every ship.
Good post and as with most things, people lose sight of the forest for the trees.
ReplyDeleteComNavOps wrote "Thus, having ten thousand VLS cells and missiles would be utterly useless in any single engagement. As we’ve demonstrated, a ship would be fortunate to get off 2-4 defensive missiles. The remaining 9996 missiles are of no use. This suggests that our ship design tendency toward ever larger VLS loads is pointless, at least from a defensive AAW perspective. Using the cells for offensive cruise missile attacks is another story."
I would argue that the 9996 VLS missile remaining ARE the very reason we have ships to begin with. The mission of the Navy/ship/seaman is not to shoot down incoming missiles. The mission is to persist in the enemies back yard and deliver accurate fires when and where we choose.
Maintaining large vls magazines that might get sunk on the first engagement is a cost of doing business. What comes after the first engagement is what matters. If our VLS magazines are not deep "enough" and the ship must be withdrawn to reload it is the same as a mission kill.
The FLT IIA ships were conceived during the height of Soviet naval aviation when massed missile launches were expected. I think it was also expected that counter launches would occur at maximum ranges owing to active E-2 systems giving maximum warning. This is vastly different than the phone booth knife fight scenarios we are gaming now.
Let's not let the pendulum swing too far the other direction so that we take ourselves out of the fight after the first punch is thrown.
"If our VLS magazines are not deep "enough" and the ship must be withdrawn to reload it is the same as a mission kill."
DeleteOn the face of it … true. HOWEVER, you're overlooking a couple of things.
1. The nature of naval combat. Ships don't stand in one place and fight indefinitely. They sortie, execute a mission, and return to base. Thus, the number of engagements and number of required defensive missiles is quite low. In fact, if the task force is having to fight multiple engagements in order to execute the mission then they would retire immediately because they would have clearly lost any element of surprise.
2. Quad packed ESSM allows great density of missiles. Consider a task force with a relatively small number of escorts - say 20 - each with, say, 30 VLS cells filled with quad packed ESSM. That's a total of 2,400 ESSM missiles. There is no conceivable scenario in which a task force would come remotely close to using up 2,400 ESSM. Hence, my repeated comments about VLS cell number overkill FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.
It still amazes me that USN never seriously tested AEGIS.
ReplyDeleteWhy? It achieved its goal--to buy a big hunk of budget for a long time.
DeleteYou missed probably the two most important defence systems. The EW suite and Nulka decoy. These two do a good job on their own and is all cheap ships probably need. ESSM is command guided so requires a powerful radar that ASM love.
ReplyDeletePlus high powered microwave and high powered lasers are being installed as we speak.
"missed probably the two most important defence systems"
DeleteNope. Didn't miss it because it wasn't the subject of the post. The post was purely about reaction time of an anti-missile engagement.
The post didn't make any attempt to offer the 'best' defensive strategy or any attempt to describe all the defensive options. It was just a reaction time examination for anti-missile engagements.
"Type = Chinese C-80x family"
ReplyDeleteC-80x family are export version, for instance, C-802 is export version of YJ-83. China doesn't install YJ-83 on their advanced destroyers - either 052D or 055. They also have CM-401 supersonic anti ship missile for export.
On 055 and 052D and some submarines, China use YJ-12 and YJ-18.
YJ-12 is a high supersonic missile use ramjet with 4 boosters. It flies at high attitude at high speed (~4 Mach).
YJ-18 is two stage cruise missile. First stage flights close to sea surface at 0.9 Mach until near its target. Then, it drops the first stage and ignite the second stage which has a rocket engine to boost end speed to ~2.5 Mach.
China said its type 730 CIWS firing at 5,800/min (Phalanx at 4,500/min) is insufficient for supersonic missiles thus need to be replaced by type 1130 firing at 11,000 round/min.
You did not address a simultaneous (or near simultaneous - all missiles in flight), multiple wide bearing angle attacks. Granted in a screen each ship has only so much angle to cover, but it is still fairly large, especially on the outward ships. Switching between different target groups is hard and is limited by shipboard resources.
ReplyDeletePerhaps a CONOPS should be war gamed that has many more, smaller (Less VLS cells), cheaper ships for the screen. The CONOPS could be these cycle through the screen stations to be reloaded, perhaps moving back to a "secure" forward base. Perhaps only one radar face, with tip off being given by larger ships, aircraft, or other assets.
As your earlier post highlighted, the CONOPS in the Anit Ship Missile environment needs to be validated to see what will work.
What's also interesting is that whilst a huge chunk of a ship's arsenal is dedicated to air defence, its anti surface offensive capabilities are often really, really limited.
ReplyDeleteYour average western warship carries a measly 8 anti-ship missiles (usually ageing Exocet or Harpoon and later Arleigh Burke's currently carry none!), a single gun varying in calibres from useless 57mm to 76mm or 127mm.
That's it. The torpedoes carried by both surface warships and helicopters are too light for anti-surface work and especially against commercial tankers etc.
And again many modern western navies don't even have these capabilities eg neither RN'S Type 45 nor Type 26 have torpedo capability (Type 23 does)!
Helicopters provide some anti-shipping capability but are vulnerable.
Literally the point of modern western warships seems to be primarily air defence with a secondary antisubmarine role and a withered rudimentary anti-shipping role.
Just a note, some types of Standard missiles have an anti-surface mode. They would not be very effective against a ship of even moderate size but the capability is there and has been used (Operation Praying Mantis, for example).
DeleteThere are seemingly two variants of the SM-6, SM-6 Dual I and II and the SM-6 Block 1A and 1B missiles and my assumption is the Dual's are primarily AA missiles with 21" booster and 13.5" dia. main rockets motor and the Block 1A/B's are dedicated anti-ship missiles, the 1B comes with the 21" booster and with a 21" main rocket motor for extended range taken from the BMD SM-3 Block IIA, how effective Block 1A & B will be with their GPS/INS guidance in a GPS denied environment is open to question.
DeleteWhy drawing the above conclusion is that the large dia. 21" 1B rocket motor leaves no room for missile stakes/wings for terminal maneuverability in AA role (operating in the atmosphere using control surfaces to convert forward thrust into lift which is an order of magnitude more kinematically efficient than directly applying lateral thrust as used with the SM-3 IIA which operates in space)
PS Would note semi-exception the LM Patriot PAC-3 which uses direct lateral thrust mini rocket thrusters for terminal maneuverability designed to operate at high altitudes in thin atmosphere, Raytheon offered the SkyCeptor (Rafael Stunner) as PAAC-4, Patriot Advanced Affordable Capability-4 to MDA/Army as a replacement, which is also a HTK as is the PAC-3 with as understand no lateral thrust mini rocket thrusters purely relying on aerodynamics for terminal maneuverability and claiming it would be only ~20% cost of the PAC-3, implying that lateral thrust expensive, Army appear not interested in Raytheon offer.
Rafael say that SkyCeptor/Stunner, as part of its David Sling system, missile, C4I system and radar' can effectively intercept multiple threats during saturation attacks, which seems believable after their long experience in countering mass rocket attack from Gaza by Hamas with Iron Dome, which would seem on the face of it to cracked the problem highlighted by CNO ??
"Aside from simple logic which dictates that once a missile explodes there will be thousands of target size pieces of debris in the radar field and no radar in existence can handle that, I've read about this exact phenomenon in multiple reports including DOT&E reports so it's clearly an issue that the Navy is grappling with and not yet solved."
"Literally the point of modern western warships seems to be primarily air defence with a secondary antisubmarine role and a withered rudimentary anti-shipping role."
ReplyDeleteWhich is why I thought the FREMMs, which were a decent GP escort, should be optimized for the ASuW/ASW roles, instead of turning them into mini-AEGIS platforms. I still think the idea is to make them the numerical but far less capable, replacements for the Ticos, "See, we used to have 22 Ticos, but now we have 20 FFG(X)s, so we've only lost 2 AEGIS platforms," without bothering to note how many missile cells we lost. But nobody asked me or ComNavOps. They should have.
Go back to his post last month on future ship design--stealth, power, small expendable UAVs, guns, AAW, EW/ECM, armor. Give us designs with those things. I would add ASW/ASuW and armored internal bulkheads, plus an extensive EW suite and Nulka decoys, which seem to be effective against anti-ship missiles. I'm probably more favorably inclined toward IEP or CODLAG engineering plants and helos than ComNavOps is, but I am really concerned about our future fleet's ability to handle ASW, and I see both of those as contributing to a better ASW platform. I really, really like ComNavOps's idea of trying to adapt the Virginia class's side arrays to a surface ASW ship. And I think we need to have some 21"/533mm anti-surface and anti-submarine torpedoes, in addition to our current 12.75"/324mm ones. Most importantly, we need to train and practice ASW 24/7/365. It's a skill that atrophies fairly quickly.
Captain Smith program manager (PMS 515) at SNA 2022 symposium emphasized once again that Constellation (USN variant of FREMM) CONOPS is primarily as an ASW platform, followed by surface warfare, electromagnetic maneuver warfare and air warfare, the idea to make Constellations the numerical but far less capable replacements for the Ticos looks total nonsense.
DeleteThink nearest equivalent you might compare Constellation to is the near 1,000t larger Sprucans whose primary mission was also ASW with ASROC, LWT's and two SH-60 LAMPS III helos, anti-ship Harpoons and with minimal local area AA defense with 8 Sea Sparrows, land attack role added role later with installation Tomahawks deck canisters and the mid life update with VLS cells.
"CONOPS is primarily as an ASW platform, followed by surface warfare, electromagnetic maneuver warfare and air warfare"
DeleteIt's not really a Concept of Operations when it's 'do everything', is it?
To certain extent agree but Constellation is maybe the best design by Navy since the Spruance class. Constellation optimized for ASW with its quiet hull, HED propulsion and FPP, would certainly argue its OTT with its 32 VLS cells, think originally 16 spec'd and its AAW suite of large SPY-6 radar and SM-2's, but it does need ESSM for local area AAW, RAM's for CIWS and SEWIP for electromagnetic maneuver warfare, re surface warfare don't think 16 deck canisters too extravagant cost wise or its 57mm gun.
DeleteThink Dr Regan Campbell NAVSEA program manager for FFG(X) did well on keeping control, think she has left and it shows with the future proofed DDG(X) program whose specs and requirements look way over the top and will result in a very expensive ship.
" Constellation is maybe the best design by Navy since the Spruance class."
DeleteIronically, what you're overlooking is the CONOPS. What you've described is a do-everything ship. Why is the Constellation a do-everything ship? Because it has no CONOPS so it needs to be able to do everything since we don't know what we want it to do.
Now consider what that means in terms of cost and numbers of hulls. At $1B+ per ship, we're only ordering twenty. Now, let's imagine that we had a CONOPS that was strictly for an ASW focused ship. We'd cut the VLS in half, downgrade the radar to something like a TRS-3D, eliminate the EW, eliminate Standard missiles, down-spec the combat software system, decrease the overall size of the ship (thereby making it quieter which is good for the ASW CONOPS!), decrease crew size which decreases berthing, food storage, water storage, etc. In other words, we could have built a smaller, dedicated ASW ship for half the cost which would give us twice the numbers (I'm speaking conceptually) … if we had an ASW focused CONOPS instead of a do-everything non-CONOPS design. Why did we need mini-Burkes when we already had seventy or so full size Burkes?
The Constellation was a wasted opportunity because we couldn't be bothered developing an actual CONOPS to see how the ship would fit into the rest of the fleet.
You outlined again your cogent arguments for CONOPS of a single function ship design philosophy, in this case an ASW ship, which would result in much lower costs and higher numbers to build up fleet where numbers are critical, do agree and as said in my prior post the SM-2s, the SPY-6 radar and 32 VLS cells OTT. A point of disagreement with you is in eliminating the EW/SEWIP capability for its soft kill defensive capabilities, though a single function ship would not leave it defenseless.
DeleteThought with the Constellation Navy allowing for its over specified AAW system it was moving in the right direction of single function ship, but as said Navy reverting to type with the multi-function future proofed DDG(X) and going in the opposite direction which will result in a very expensive ship, Congress might well cancel it due to costs and continue to build limited number of Burkes whose design dates back to the 1980's, even Burkes are too expensive ships at $2+ billion each.
"A point of disagreement with you is in eliminating the EW/SEWIP capability"
DeleteThis goes back to CONOPS, again. If a dedicated ASW ship is going to be operating in company with other escort ships (like Burkes) then the ASW ship doesn't need EW. The other ships will provide it. Or, if the ASW ship will be operating independently around the periphery of a war zone (patrolling choke points or escorting 'safe' convoy routes) then, again, EW is not needed. Or, if the ASW ship is going to be asked to go into enemy waters to conduct ASW without any escort then, yes, it would absolutely need EW.
You see? It all depends on the CONOPS. What are you going to task the ship with? And the answer is not - can not be - 'everything' or else you're going to pay for everything.
Ship design is always a compromise. You design the ship for the likely CONOPS so as to control costs and maximize numbers of hulls. You accept the risk that you might put the ship into an unforeseen situation and find it lacks some element (EW, 16" guns, a flight deck). That's a risk you take in order to keep costs under control and numbers up. If you want to cover your bases against every conceivable scenario then you'll pay for it.
I don't disagree that EW is useful (it's incredibly useful !) but in my mind the CONOPS for a dedicated ASW vessel doesn't REQUIRE EW. When we design a ship we should run EVERY piece of equipment and capability through the filter of, is this ABSOLUTELY REQUIRED for the task. If it is, put it in the design. If it isn't, leave it out. In my mind, EW is NOT absolutely required for a small, dedicated ASW vessel.
Wasn't the HMS Sheffield mostly Aluminum like the Sprucans? Wasn't that one of the big reasons the Burke's were constructed mostly out of steel? Doesn't having fewer escorts in a CSG, particularly, AEGIS platforms, open it up for saturation/swarm missile attacks?
ReplyDeleteSmall, unmanned surface vessels operating as radar ricketts/ECM capability, perhaps? Should more Burke DDGs be built beyond whatever the production cap will be to ensure adequate CSG protection?
(DISCLAIMER: I was an Airdale, A Tweeker, I was on CV/CVNs, nor did I stay in a Holiday Inn Express.)
Are you Bruce, from M.A.T.S. website?
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