China is outbuilding the US in terms of warships. That means their fleet is growing faster than ours. However, we’re making a bad situation worse by retiring ships at a far greater rate than we’re building new ones. Here’s the Navy’s FY22 Retirement List[1,2] with each ship’s service life shown.
USS San Jacinto (CG 56), 34 yrs
USS Lake Champlain (CG 57), 34 yrs
USS Monterey (CG 61), 32 yrs
USS Hue City (CG 66), 31 yrs
USS Anzio (CG 68), 30 yrs
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), 29 yrs
USS Port Royal (CG 73), 28 yrs
USS Fort Worth (LCS 3), 10 yrs
USS Coronado (LCS 4), 8 yrs
USS Detroit (LCS 7), 6 yrs
USS Little Rock (LCS 9), 5 yrs
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41), 37 yrs
USS Providence (SSN 719), 37 yrs
USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723), 34 yrs
USNS Apache (T-ATF 172), 41 yrs
We’re retiring 15 ships[3] that are all capable and most have service life remaining. These retirements are unnecessary. Their replacements – the few that will be – are going to be small, unmanned craft, generally speaking, with an occasional obsolete Burke or Constellation thrown in. We are, quite literally, cutting our own naval throats.
As we predicted, the Navy is looking to quietly retire the LCS class. By the end of 2022, six LCS will have been retired or designated for retirement, all with ten or fewer years of service.
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[1]Defense Brief website, 18-Jun-2021,
[3]The two Los Angeles class submarine retirements had been previously announced or reclassified in 2021 and have been designated for scrapping/recycling in 2022.
I have no problem with the Navy decommissioning the LCS's. They provide no real combat and sensor capability yet incur an annual cost to the Navy in terms of manpower, maintenance, and fuel.
ReplyDeleteGet rid of them now. *All* of them. If the contractual penalties weren't so steep they should stop building them too, but apparently we live in a pants-on-head kind of world where it's cheaper to build and then immediately scrap the damned things than to just cancel the remaining order.
"I have no problem with the Navy decommissioning the LCS's."
DeleteNor do I, however, the problem is that we're still building new ones AS WE'RE RETIRING NEARLY BRAND NEW ONES!
Whoever signed off on the LCSs, the Fords, and the Zumwalts need to be lined up in front of the Pentagon and then do the old Brit thing and go around and cut the buttons off their uniforms. Then haul them into court-martial or court for fraud, waste, and abuse of federal funds.
DeleteThe problem I see is that our military leadership (both uniformed and civilian) has become more interested in winning budgetary battles than wars. That seems to be pretty common in peacetime militaries, when the paper shufflers take over from the warriors, but it is devastating when we have paper shufflers running the show while we are getting into one no-win "limited" war after another. That is kind of the worst of all worlds. It is made even worse because China (and to a lesser extent Russia) are busy building military forces to fight. PLAN at this stage can't really extend China's sea power beyond the China Sea, nor can the Russian navy really extend Russia's sea power beyond the Baltic and Black Seas and possibly Arctic Ocean, but if they keep going the way they are going, and we keep going the way we are going, that won't be the case much longer. We need to get back into the war-fighting business (or the preparation for war) and, along the way we need to find the warriors and move them ahead of the paper-shufflers. One of the truly ironic problems is that true warriors hate war because they have seen it up close and personal, whereas to the paper shufflers casualties are just numbers on a piece of paper or a computer screen.
To paraphrase GEN Norman Schwartzkopf, military forces are good at two things--killing bad guys and breaking their toys. And the extent to which they are proficient at those two things determines the extent to which nobody will dare pick a fight with us. If we get back to there, and if we successfully reject the temptation to stick our noses into everybody else's business, we will be okay. If we don't, we won't.
You don't out-woke the bad guys, you kick their butts. And the ability to kick those butts, combined with refusal to use that ability at half speed in "limited" engagements, is how to achieve any military force's lasting objective--peace.
"And the ability to kick those butts, combined with refusal to use that ability at half speed in "limited" engagements, is how to achieve any military force's lasting objective--peace."
DeleteYou recognize that you just logically and brilliantly completely invalidated your own half-measure, limited, 'containment' strategy, don't you? No need for me to argue against it, you're doing it without my help!
I can't believe the US still has 11 LCS being built talk about throwing money down the drain.
ReplyDeleteThe only reason the Chinese haven't done a pearl harbour is that leaving the USN fleet alone hurts the US more than them sinking it!
"The only reason the Chinese haven't done a pearl harbour is that leaving the USN fleet alone hurts the US more than them sinking it!"
DeleteThe Chinese are watching the USN suffer self-inflicted "Pearl Harbors"- first by overinvesting in unproven, "All New, All Different" designs like the Gerald R. Ford, Zumwalt, and LCS classes; then by scrapping still useful ships to pay for ships of "All New, All Different" designs; then by allowing divisive politics to dominate their military and political leaders' attention, instead of searching for solutions to its current problems, effectively EPIC FAILing to be a navy or even a coast guard. At this point, our enemies are asking, "Why bother?" as we self-destruct.
I will probably never understand why we build ship's with a supposed long life span but then we wind up retiring them before we give the American taxpayer's their money's worth. How much money has the LCS program cost? They were better off resurrecting the PT boats. I saw the LCS as an attempt to build a Swiss Army Knife type ship when in the end, we got plastic ware. What did having two different versions of the LCS accomplish? Did anyone ever think to suggest to either go with the more capable design or combining the best (if they exist) attributes of the two classes to make one design?
ReplyDeleteLastly, I do not believe it is a budgetary issue, it's more like an issue of piss poor research, development, and testing at the higher levels. This has the stench of the old $600 toilet seats.
Subtracting more then you are adding, is not a very smart idea. Would it have made more sense to replace ships on one for one basis. I'm sure unpeopled vessels have their place in the grand scheme of things as an augmentation, secondary role.
"What did having two different versions of the LCS accomplish?"
DeleteThis one has a fairly straightforward answer. At the time, the Navy preferred keeping two manufacturer's in business instead of one. This allowed the Navy to garner more budget support in Congress and it adroitly sidestepped the inevitable protest that a single source award would have caused.
Because there was no actual threat ('littoral' was a made up threat by the Navy; see, "Littoral Warfare"), the Navy didn't hesitate to accept the problems that accompanied a dual source build program.
From the very start, the LCS was never about building a warship. It was about securing budget at a time when the Navy felt their budget slice was threatened by the 'peace dividend'.
"Because there was no actual threat ('littoral' was a made up threat by the Navy; see, "Littoral Warfare"), the Navy didn't hesitate to accept the problems that accompanied a dual source build program."
DeleteThere may be a case for a littoral combat capability. But there is no case that the LCSs--either version--contribute materially to such capability.
Can it do NGFS? Not with a 57mm popgun.
Can it do shallow water ASW? Not with engines that are so noisy they blank out sonar.
Those seem to me to be the two things you want from a combat ship in the littoral areas.
Designing a "littoral combat ship" that is of no use in the littorals is about the most irresponsible thing imaginable.
There is much to criticize the LCS program over but your comment demonstrates a lack of understanding of what the program intended.
DeleteNGFS was NEVER an LCS design objective. A limited degree of land attack was to have been provided by the N-LOS.
The LCS was NEVER designed to engage in ASW. It was intended to offload a host of unmanned vehicles, stand back, and let the unmanned to the ASW. Thus, the LCS' engine type/noise would have been immaterial.
And so on.
Of course, none of those non-existent technologies ever matured and came into use which forced the LCS into roles and equipment it was not designed for.
This is not a defense of the LCS but we must be fair and accurate in our criticism. We can criticize the original design, but only for what was actually intended. We can criticize the implementation of the program. We can criticize the Navy's failure to recognize failure and cancel or radically adjust. And so on.
"There is much to criticize the LCS program over but your comment demonstrates a lack of understanding of what the program intended."
DeleteNo, I understand what the program intended, as conceived. My point is that the conceived intent had nothing to do with littoral or combat. So the whole "littoral combat ship" was a misnomer.
" My point is that the conceived intent had nothing to do with littoral or combat. So the whole "littoral combat ship" was a misnomer."
DeleteAgain, not accurate. While the entire concept of 'littoral warfare' is invalid and was created as a budget gimmick by the Navy, the LCS most certainly was designed and intended to be a shallow water - hence, littoral - combat vessel. The planned capabilities were all directed at shallow water combat operations. The concept was invalid but the name certainly did reflect the intended usage. The Navy never developed a CONOPS but the list of functions were definitely shallow water related.
This borders on pedantic but we must strive to be fair and objective in our praise or criticisms.
I have concerns with trying to keep and extend the cruisers. We know they've been maintained by the problem generation surface fleet. I'm in a build new mindset, but we have to change our thinking of bang for the buck. A 16 cell frigate needs to be looked at as having 64 rounds for shorter range work as an escort. ESSM, a VLA based on the 6.75" torpedo and ER-GMLRS creates a whole lot of uses. If we are using deck launchers why aren't they foor LRASM/JASSM for a high end strike package waiting for targeting info. NSM should be in the helo magazine. Niw a national security cutter can quickly turn into a viable threat. A sub billion dollar ship.
ReplyDeleteNow repeat that process to get more bang for our buck elsewhere.
"I have concerns with trying to keep and extend the cruisers."
DeleteI agree and disagree. We're procuring ships for the price of a 50-year service life with all kinds of expansion and futuristic costs included and yet we're winding up retiring them without ever upgrading. Those future-proofing costs are just lost. So, in that regard, I disagree - we need to maintain, upgrade, and keep the ships.
Alternatively - and my preferred option - , is to build ships with only a 20 year service life, since we're retiring them all early, anyway, and save the future-proofing costs. So, in that sense, I agree.
We've got to pick one or the other approach and then follow it through, completely. The logical choice is short service lives BY INTENT AND DESIGN. Right now, we're doing the worst of both worlds; we're paying for long service life and only using a portion of it!
" Navy is looking to quietly retire the LCS class"
ReplyDeleteNavy has realized that LCS is a strategic mistake. They are suitable in counter a strong naval force like China. Not to mention, they still have heaps of problems from power system to modules and weapons.
The nation doesn't have endless money to spend thus need to wise up. Despite many critics, Constellation is much more useful than LCS.
It gets worse down the line. 30 of the 69 Arleigh Burkes currently operational were built pre-2001 so are already 20-31 years old. By 2030 the oldest has been commission for nearly 40 years.
ReplyDeleteBut if Ticos are being phased out as young as 28 years old, then it stands to reason early Burkes will as well.
If we assume current plans to build a total of 89 Arleigh Burkes come to fruition and then assume Arleigh Burke's are retired as early as 30 years, US surface combatant fleet will shrink to a measly 59 Arleigh Burkes + some number of Constellations by 2030 (probably less than 10 as USS Constellation only due to be commissioned in 2026).
It's then a literal death spiral as another 29 Arleigh Burkes (commissioned 2001-2010) go to the breakers.
By 2040 fleet is 30 Arleigh Burkes, 20 Constellations and given current build rates, maybe 10 other new warships to support 10 carriers and all the other duties.
Deferring retirement to take into account full 50 year life span actually kicks the problem down 10 years but doesn't solve it.
Submarines are an equal disaster with the attack sub fleet to shrink by 20% by 2028 (around 41 assuming current procurement is maintained and they fix the busted up USS Connecticut) as well as retirement of all SSGNs. The commission rate of 1-2 submarines per annum won't make up for the fact that It is likely if Virginia's are built into 2040s that they will be replacing older Virginia's will be replacing earlier Virginia's.
US Government assumes ramping up of submarine production to increase fleet to 72-78 by 2040s though given current woes with production and spares as well as maintenance, who knows how close they will get.
Congressional Research Service report on submarine program from January 2022:
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL32418.pdf
It's evident that especially in the Pacific, the Japanese and South Korean Navies will have to play much bigger roles (Australia's navy is not slated to grow beyond 12 large surface ships and the submarine program is completely derailed).
This is the perfect spot for this quote:
ReplyDelete"Sometimes when I try to understand a person's motives, I play a little game. I assume the worst. What's the worst reason they could possibly have for saying what they say, or doing what they do?"
But seriously, if you were an officer who had a masters in a military subject, and diverse and sterling career of 30 plus years in naval defense... How does this make sense?
I get it for pre-command officers, ship command can be a career killer, easily. Making more valid paths to the admiral look makes sense. But the people making these decisions are well after that point.
"I get it for pre-command officers, ship command can be a career killer, easily. Making more valid paths to the admiral look makes sense. But the people making these decisions are well after that point."
DeleteBut those thought processes were learned and became ingrained earlier.
The 7 Ticos theoretically have 6-12 service years remaining, They should be retained, although keeping them merely hides the fact that the USN has nothing to replace them.
ReplyDeleteThe 4 LCSs can't be gone soon enough, although again, the USN has nothing to replace them.
The retirement of the Los Angeles class subs en masse was a stupid error, although these two may be at about the end of the line. All that diving and surfacing and adjusting depths stresses the hulls, so around 35 years may be a full life.
The Whidbey and the tug are probably at about the ends of their useful lives, so those are not particularly troubling.
What is truly troubling is that the USN is not building ships at a rapid enough rate to replace the ships it is decommissioning. At an estimated (by CBO) cost of $2.8B per ship, the recent average annual shipbuilding budgets of around $22B will build 8 ships/year. Over 35 years, that's 280 ships. Going to a high/low approach and stretching out the numbers with some cheap single-purpose ships could reduce cost/ship to $1.4B, permitting 15 new ships per year. Over 35 years, that supports a fleet size of 525.
The fact they send the NSCs into the Taiwan straight tells me its the other ship we could just be building to build numbers and be warship enough for crowd that thinks 7500 tons is a frigate. Its way more ready to fight than LCS. It doesn't need the survivability upgrade, it already has it. Just attach what can be attached on the cheap to add firepower.
DeleteThe NSC has no sonar (other than what its helos carry) and thus is not an ASW platform. But that could be added. OK, OK,ComNavOps, I know I'm adding on, but that one is truly needed.
Delete"The Whidbey and the tug are probably at about the ends of their useful lives, so those are not particularly troubling."
DeleteOn the contrary, it is extremely troubling that the Whidbey Island well deck has the capacity for 4 LCACs (or whatever other combination of landing craft) versus the San Antonio class which has only half the well deck capacity. For an AMPHIBIOUS ship, that is a major design failure.
"ASW platform. But that could be added."
DeleteYou don't just add a sonar and call it an ASW platform. An ASW platform - an effective one - needs quieting built into every rivet from day one of the design. It needs acoustic rafting of all equipment, acoustic isolation, Prairie/Masker, multi-frequency hull sonar (if the hull can take it), towed array (where's the room in the stern?), sonar analyst computers and compartments, analysts and operators which increases crew size which requires more berthing, food storage, water storage, more power for the sonars and arrays, and so on. You don't just bolt on a sonar and call it ASW.
Could a complete redesign and rebuild of the cutter produce a viable ASW platform? Perhaps, but not by bolting on a sonar.
"On the contrary, it is extremely troubling that the Whidbey Island well deck has the capacity for 4 LCACs (or whatever other combination of landing craft) versus the San Antonio class which has only half the well deck capacity. For an AMPHIBIOUS ship, that is a major design failure."
DeleteBut that doesn't make the Whidbey any younger. It just makes the San Antonios bad amphib ships.
"Could a complete redesign and rebuild of the cutter produce a viable ASW platform? Perhaps, but not by bolting on a sonar."
DeleteOf course you would need all that you referenced. My point is that it's not a reliable escort without an ASW capability.
One thing I don't understand is why we didn't just build an updated Whidbey Island. What's wrong with the Whidbey Island that requires us to replace it (in an era when we already have too many eggs in too few baskets) with a ship that is 60 or 70 percent bigger, carries MORE marines, costs twice as much, and has half the surface connector capacity?
DeleteBob, as an old Gator Navy sailor, I have been asking that question about pretty much everything we've done with amphibs since the 1970s. If the USN were trying to drive the USMC out of the amphib business, I'm not sure what they would be doing differently.
DeleteThe LHAs/LHDs are too big and expensive, and therefore pose too much risk, to operate close in to shore. And from 25-50 miles out, where USN doctrine now says they operate, they have no viable ship-to-shore connectors for getting tanks or heavy artillery ashore--boats are too slow, helos and V-22s can't lift the weight, and LCACs are too unreliable for combat use.
The San Antonios are similarly too big and expensive to be risked, and lack the surface connector capacity.
And no USN ships have anything bigger than 5" guns for NGFS.
Really hard to figure out what they are trying to do.
Agree with you CDR Chip... Somthing CNO has been saying forever too! The budget is probably quite adequate if used properly, and single purpose ships are built. Besides the Fords, Zoomies, and LCS debacles, the Burkes are killing the shipbuilding budget, never mind that the design is old, dated, and shouldve been replaced at least a decade ago.
Delete"And no USN ships have anything bigger than 5" guns for NGFS."
DeleteI remember seeing a late 1990s or early 2000s photo of Chinese artillery units literally sited on a freighter's deck, and firing what the captions mockingly described as a "broadside," to provide NGFS in an amphibious assault exercise. Can't the USMC do something similar with its MLRS and missile launchers? It'll admittedly be economically inefficient, considering the cost of those rockets and missiles; but it must be better than nothing.
BAE also designed a 155mm howitzer that fits in the 4.5" gun turret the Royal Navy uses. Can't the USN commission something similar for the 5" guns it uses? Just make sure the contractor designs the gun to use the EXACT SAME 155mm shells the Army uses, and avoid a repeat of the AGS and ammo made overpriced because it's incompatible with the 155mm shells any other service uses.
I keep thinking we really over complicate NGFS. WWII we had cheap rocket ships aside from borrowing surface combatants for the role. At this point, the GMLRS rounds cost the same as guided 155 rounds. Just build a naval system for storing and delivering the rounds and be done.
Delete"At this point, the GMLRS rounds cost the same as guided 155 rounds. Just build a naval system for storing and delivering the rounds and be done."
DeleteWhile conceptually appealing, the reality is that no land based, independent (of the ship's fire control system) weapon system can offer even a little bit of accuracy. The constant forward movement of the ship along with the constant pitching (however calm the seas) and rolling renders any hope of accuracy an unachievable fantasy. Now, if the weapon is to be used as a 'blind' area bombardment weapon, that's fine. However, if we're using expensive guided weapons as what amounts to area bombardment munitions, that's prohibitively expensive.
The solution is to marinize the land based weapon which entails re-engineering it to provide continuous stabilization and tie it into the ship's fire control system. Unfortunately, that is easier said than done and the success rate of previous attempts has been pretty poor. The German MONARC system is a classic example of the failure to transfer from land to sea.
I've always been REALLY nervous about the whole "divest to invest" strategy, where we decommission assets now, in order to save money to develop some super assets to achieve superiority sometime in the 2030's.
ReplyDeleteThis of course makes us weaker in the near term, and what makes us think we have 15 years? Even within the Navy, admirals have stated they expect China might move within the next 5 or 6 years.
Plus, of course, given our history with the development of new "super assets", what makes us think they'll even work?
They won't. About the best thing we have going for us is that maybe China's won't either.
DeleteThe ship retiring without replacement isn't good, that's not the problem.
ReplyDeleteThe navy dosen't do the training that a large fleet requires, dosen't have the logistics supply chain to support it, nor adequate missile reserves to arm it.
The navy could have 600 ships, but with their current mindset, they couldn't utilize it.
Here's an article from navy recognition. Their source article says China commissioned 32 vessels in 2021.
ReplyDelete32!
https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focus-analysis/naval-technology/11310-analysis-list-of-chinese-navy-vessels-commissioned-in-2021.html#:~:text=According%20to%20an%20infographic%20published,%2C%20one%20submarine%2C%20and%20destroyers.
As there is no sign of the navy build up slowing, another 320 ships in 10 years makes your wonder, as if we haven't already...what do they plan to do with a fleet of around 700 vessel in early 2030's?
The USA dominated the world with that number.
Andrew
"The USA dominated the world with that number."
DeleteThe difference is that the USN was a true blue-water navy with significant worldwide power projection and sea control capabilities. China is building ships to intimidate its neighbors around the China Sea, but is not likely to have true blue water power projection capability by 2030 or even 2040. As a regional force it will be hugely formidable. But it is longer away from being a worldwide power projection force.
But clearly, if the USN doesn't get on the stick, and pronto, PLAN will ask questions which is probably will not be able to answer.
DeleteThe Cry and the whisper from the Navy is always the same. They cry we need alot more money to build a fleet and they whisper it will create jobs in your district.
ReplyDeleteEverything else on the planet goes down the function price curve EXCEPT Defense Contracts. They even double the charges for less capability (Nimitz vs Ford). It seems capitalism does not work for Defense Contracts. A shame because it lifts everyone else's boats with decreasing cost for the same functionality.