Several years ago, the Navy had several thousand at-sea billet gaps but vowed to improve the situation. Today, in a USNI News website article, the Navy acknowledged that they have 5,000-6,000 gaps for at-sea billets.
The Navy has 5,000 to 6,000 gaps for sailors at-sea billets, the service’s senior personnel officer told a House panel on Tuesday.
The Navy currently has 145,000 billets at sea, Chief of Naval Personnel Vice Adm. John Nowell said during a House Armed Services subcommittee on military personnel hearing. Following the fatal collisions of 2017, the Navy added 23,800 sea billets in an effort to buttress manning on surface ships. The service is in the midst of assigning sailors to the emerging positions but is falling short by 5,000 to 6,000, he said.[1]
Added 23,800 sea billets? For a fleet of 296 ships (the latest Naval Vessel Register figure), that’s an average of 80 billets per ship. Given that the Navy acknowledges that its ships are still significantly undermanned, after adding 23,800 billets, how badly undermanned were we? The implication is staggering!
For historical comparison, in 2014, Adm. Thomas Copeman noted that the Navy had an at-sea billet gap of around 8,000 (see, “Manpower Shortage”).
The number of gaps has decreased somewhat, from 8,000 to 5-6,000 so that’s a bit of an improvement. If some twenty thousand additional at-sea billets have been added then it’s more of an improvement than it would seem on the face of it though still well short of what’s needed.
Before we leave this, something is bothering me. The claimed number of at-sea billets seems awfully high … too high. Let’s do a quick calculation. Using the current Naval Vessel Register ship counts, we have the following number of ships and ball park crew sizes. Let’s add them up and see what we get for at-sea billets.
|
Ship Type |
No. of Ships |
Crew Size |
Total Crew |
|
Carriers |
10 |
5000 |
50,000 |
|
DDG-51 |
70 |
270 |
18,900 |
|
CG-47 |
10 |
270 |
2,700 |
|
DDG-1000 |
1 |
150 |
150 |
|
LCS |
24 |
70 |
1,680 |
|
SSN |
49 |
100 |
4,900 |
|
SSBN/SSGN |
18 |
120 |
2,160 |
|
LHA-6/LHD-1 |
9 |
1000 |
9,000 |
|
Other Amphib |
22 |
280 |
6,160 |
|
Logistics |
61 |
80 |
4,880 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total = |
100,530 |
Our count leaves us around 45,000 billets short of the claimed number. Also, bear in mind that dozens of ships are currently idled, awaiting maintenance and have only greatly reduced caretaker crews so our count is likely too high by a fair amount. Even further, our carrier crew size includes the air wing which is half the carrier total. Eliminating that would bring the count down to 75,530.
I have no idea what else the Navy is including in their 145,000 count but it smacks of waste and accounting trickery though I have no idea to what end.
I also note that the Navy’s infrastructure manning (acquisition, medical, administration, benefits, human resources, etc.) makes up 42% of the total manning per the Department of Defense 2020 personnel report.[2] We’re short of manning for at-sea billets and yet 42% of the Navy is infrastructure? Surely we could transfer the missing 5-6,000 personnel from desks to ships to eliminate the shortage?
_________________________________
[1]USNI News website, “CNP Nowell: Navy Short More Than 5,000 Sailors for At-Sea Billets”, Heather Mongilio, 9-Feb-2022,
https://news.usni.org/2022/02/09/cnp-nowell-navy-short-more-than-5000-sailors-for-at-sea-billets
[2]Department of Defense, “DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT, Fiscal Year 2020”, April 2019,
The only thing more important to Service Flag Officers that number of units is total end strength. My service is bigger than your service therefore I need more money. Note the Navy's requested end strength requirement doesn't go down as the number of ships does. You are right to suspect chicanery. No one wants to use a metric that actually highlights how many combat units you field for a number of people.
ReplyDeleteYou make an excellent point, tying the personnel numbers to number of ships. Going a small step further, the same reasoning applies to the infrastructure. As the fleet numbers shrink - or as the size of the ships, meaning small unmanned vessels - makes for a larger and larger percentage of the fleet, the infrastructure size should decrease. As unmanned assets increase, the need for human resources should decrease. You don't need human resources departments to manage UNMANNED vessels!
DeleteGood comment!
"Unmanned" ships still need men and women to direct them by remote control; perform maintenance on them; and file paperwork for everything from permission slips for when and where they can sail, to request forms for fuel and spare parts they need.
DeleteSo much for the supposed "cost savings" the USN was going to get from using "unmanned" systems instead of manned ones.
Would note that have seen mention that crew number quoted for the USS Delbert Black DDG-119 commissioned Sep 2020 was 380 which surprised me as thought more like 330, if true 380 40% higher than your number of 270 for DDG-51s.
ReplyDeleteRe.the DDG-1000 GAO reported the Navy has had to permanently grow the crew size by 31 sailors, think remember seeing total crew quoted at 207 including the 28 air component which is ~38% higher than 150 quoted.
Would not think all your figures underestimated by 40% and wonder how many ships/subs crewed/operational at any one time, 50%?, thinking of the USS Boise in 'maintenance' for 8 years :)
The Burke crew numbers I used came from Wiki which lists 303/323 for Flt I/IIa. The Burkes have been chronically undermanned so I downsized from those numbers. I've seen actual crew size numbers in the 260-280 so the 270 I used seems reasonable.
DeleteNVR isn't so acccurate any more, but what they do have
DeleteDDG-115 IIA Restart - 314
DDG-79, the first IIA - 369
DDG-78, Last flight II - 356 - this number seems to remain all the way back through 51.
LCS and SSBN have 2 crews. I'm guessing both count as at sea billets even while ashore.
ReplyDeleteAlso, I know from touring the Fort Worth she was crewed by 88 sitting at the dock with no aviation det.
"LCS and SSBN have 2 crews. I'm guessing both count as at sea billets even while ashore."
DeleteYeah, I'm aware of Blue/Gold but I don't know whether/how the Navy counts them in terms of billets.
"Fort Worth she was crewed by 88 sitting at the dock"
That would be quite a bit higher than anything I've seen reported. That would also be more than the ship can physically accommodate in terms of berthing and food, water, etc. Are you sure that didn't include temporary training personnel, shore side maintenance, contractors, etc.?
The commonly reported core crew size is now up to 60-70 and that includes the embarked module personnel which are now considered part of the core crew. Of course, none of the LCS have an embarked module, except for a few of the stripped down ASuW modules that don't require much additional crew - so there are no module core crew which drops the core crew size to around 50 without an aviation det.
Bear in mind that aviation dets are assigned when a ship deploys. Ships don't have a one-for-one assigned aviation det so the number of dets and personnel is far below what one might assume for a one-for-one figure.
Accomodation is 98. All the double bunks were designed to be stacked 3 high is my understanding and that has now been done. I know they have also had to go back and build in more refridgeration for food etc to make that work in practice. The plan in growing was a crew with mission package of 70 + 23 for the AV det. When they have mentioned crews deployed I've never seen less than a number of 95 or 96.
Delete"Yeah, I'm aware of Blue/Gold but I don't know whether/how the Navy counts them in terms of billets."
DeleteI would think they would have to considering that is how those ships are operated. It's almost like a manufacturing plant operating two shifts. Your workforce is the sum of both shifts.
As for the other amphibs (San Antonio, Whidby Island, Harper's Ferry classes), based on Wiki numbers for crew size and number of ships, I think you're short a couple of thousand.
One factor that might figure into the Navy's magical calculations might be replacements. Though that might be a small number, maybe 5 to 10 percent. But, sailors get sick or transferred to shore for some reason, maybe even discharged.
But, like the other branches, the Navy has to defend their existence and purpose. So, maybe the Navy's numbers are part of doing just that.
I added up 274 ships in your list, compared to 296 ships in the naval vessel register. Some of your missing billets are probably on those 22 unaccounted-for ships.
ReplyDeleteThe remaining ships are a variety of small support vessels (tugs and such) with very small crews. Wasn't worth tracking down exact crew sizes.
DeleteThanks for the table. It made me think that we should be adding 5 to 6 SSNs and 2 to 3 SSBN/SSGNs to the fleet a year. The most survivable weapon system with the one of the smallest crews. I would like to see BAE and Rolls Royce start a shipyard for submarines in the USA. Increase the production of Virginias. They could split the build with Electric Boat like the Burke build is split.
ReplyDeleteMW
"I would like to see BAE and Rolls Royce start a shipyard for submarines in the USA."
DeleteWe do need more submarine production capacity! Just bear in mind that it would be nuclear so it's not quite as simple and straightforward as building a regular shipyard. Still, no reason it couldn't be done.
I'm not keen on adding a location. Adding capacity to an existing yard has to be cheaper in the short and near term assuming the 2 yards aren't entirely corrupt. Their capacity in the 80s build up was ample.
DeleteWhile I would also like to see that many boats per year, I don't think existing capacity is capable of it. During the Cold War sub building peak in the 1980s, we were commissioning an average of 3-4 688s/688(i)s and one Ohio-class per year. We certainly don't have more sub-building industrial capacity now than we had then.
DeleteHere's a thought on how to fix this: build two West coast submarine shipyards to complement the two we have on the East coast. This would allow us to plug the gap in our own submarine force, and maybe make the AUKUS deal workable in a useful timeline (the other obvious solution to that bit would be to split the cost of an Aus sub shipyard three ways between the treaty signatories so that somebody can crank out Astutes).
The best time to do this would have been fifteen years ago given how long it takes to spin up this sort of thing, but the second-best time is today.
Plus there's the question of what condition the existing yards are in. I'm guessing minimal updates and probably even maintenance over the last 30 years. The existing yards are probably also environmental nightmares/Superfund candidates.
DeleteIf DoD were clever, they could position the rehab of the yards as a "green initiative" by putting in solar power, EV ports, efficient HVAC systems, etc. to justify funding from Congress. There's no reason that such efforts in on-shore infrastructure have to be at the expense of warfighting capability.
"If DoD were clever, they could position the rehab of the yards as a "green initiative" by putting in solar power, EV ports, efficient HVAC systems, etc. to justify funding from Congress."
DeleteExcellent idea!
"Plus there's the question of what condition the existing yards are in."
DeleteThe condition of the private yards is unknown but the public yards are in terrible condition. The Navy has initiated a long term yard improvement program (see, "Shipyard Improvement Plan).
The initial funding has been allocated by Congress and work is underway. Whether the Navy faithfully follows through on the plan for the next twenty years remains to be seen but they have started and that's great news.
While Id applaud adding yards, especially on the west coast, I have to wonder how many suitable locations there are that has the local infrastructure to support it??? How many prior shipyards are now condos or shipping terminals? Theres very little of the Kaiser Yards in the Portland/Vancouver area that isnt now developed real estate, and I imagine many(most?) other ship building/servicing locations around the country have gone the same way...
DeleteAs a sidenote, I read in the past week or so about someone breaking ground on a new shipyard intended to do SSN work, but I don't recall the names or location, except it was east coast/Great Lakes(?) area. Anyone have any info or recollection??
Found it!!! Its the Lordstown/Lorain (Ohio) Project. They're looking to build a yard with two enclosed drydocks, and what sounded like depot level facilities for SSN/CVN work in another town nearby. Interesting development!!!
Delete"Found it!!! Its the Lordstown/Lorain (Ohio) Project. They're looking to build a yard with two enclosed drydocks, and what sounded like depot level facilities for SSN/CVN work in another town nearby. Interesting development!!"
DeleteAny vessel built/maintained there would have to transit the St. Lawrence Seaway to get to sea. From https://www.britannica.com/topic/Saint-Lawrence-Seaway,
"The size of a vessel that uses it is limited to a draft of 8 metres (26 feet), a length of 223 metres (730 feet), and a beam of 23 metres (76 feet)."
Doesn't appear that you could do much sub or carrier work there. Maybe build some sections and tow them elsewhere for assembly, like the Brits did with the QE/POW.
One of the articles on the subject stated that the subs would be barged to/from the facility via the St. Lawrence.
DeleteA barge with facilities to hook the sub up to in order to keep the reactor running?
Delete"One of the articles on the subject stated that the subs would be barged to/from the facility via the St. Lawrence."
DeleteThat seems a lot of trouble and complication when there are places along both ocean coasts where such facilities could be built.
I would also wonder about whether there is enough clearance under the Queen Elizabeth Way bridge on the Welland Canal for a submarine on top of a barge to fit under.
DeleteOne wild idea I've wondered about occasionally is if missiles with sufficient range could be built and put onboard submarines, what about having SSBNs patrol the Great Lakes? They would be pretty much immune from any retaliation by any enemy, and their positions would not be known at any time.
After 3 years of foolish losses during the Civil War, one of the first things Grant did when he took command in the East was to strip nearly 10,000 troops off things like the bewildering number of military bands, coastal artillery, and dozens of other posts that were not fighting. Many of these posts were of course occupied by the politically connected—some things never change. Land or sea, numbers count in conflict. You're correct in thinking that the Navy needs to take Grant’s approach and start cutting ashore billets.
ReplyDeleteIt makes no sense that so many are ashore positions especially support. Most of the logistics for all the services are going to contractors, not servicemen. And the paper paper-pusher work is highly automated (although admittedly somewhat outdated in IT).
But more importantly I feel that EVERY service branch needs to start tying promotion more to actual time manning combatant positions instead of rewarding every officer and high ranking NCO for the innumerable schools and programs more than they reward actually preparing to go and kill the enemy. USAF/USN needs to reward pilots for air time, surface ship officers rewarded for time in the CIC, and Grunts learning to lead with their troops not with classes.
More ships and more people at sea will make better retention when those more ships get used to deploy less for shorter periods of time.
Delete" And the paper paper-pusher work is highly automated (although admittedly somewhat outdated in IT)."
DeleteAh, but pushing papers is so clearly the way to ever higher and higher authority in the bureaucracy.
"More ships and more people at sea will make better retention when those more ships get used to deploy less for shorter periods of time."
DeleteWe need a regulation that states very clearly that in peacetime no sailor can be required to be deployed more than a certain length of time, I would argue in the 4-6 month range, with appropriate pre-deployment and post-deployment periods first to prepare for and later to recover from such deployments.
The big problem as I see it is that we are still trying to cover commitments which were inherited from, and maybe made sense for, a 600-ship navy, but we are down to 300 or so ships with which to do it.
We need 1) more and cheaper ships to operate, and 2) allies to take over some of our historic commitments.
"We need a regulation that states very clearly that in peacetime no sailor can be required to be deployed more than a certain length of time"
DeleteWhy? We'd just issue waivers as we do for all inconvenient regulations.
Not if we fired people for granting waivers.
DeleteYou're using circular logic. You want new regulations and assume we'll fire people for using waivers but if we'd fire people for granting waivers, we wouldn't need more regulations. We already have plenty!
DeleteThe Navy already came up with a deployment plan (Optimized Fleet Response Plan - OFRP) that would have limited deployments for both crew and ships and ensured required maintenance and they waived it almost immediately.
So, if you're envisioning an ideal world where there are no waivers then we don't need more regulations. We have plenty.
If you're envisioning the real world then waivers are commonplace and new regulations will simply be waived.
Pick one: real or ideal and then be consistent with your logic.
"So, if you're envisioning an ideal world where there are no waivers then we don't need more regulations. We have plenty.
DeleteIf you're envisioning the real world then waivers are commonplace and new regulations will simply be waived."
OK, just enforce the ones we have. I don't care as much about how we get there as I do that we get there.
And if we have regulations but are not enforcing them, then do we really have regulations?
DeleteNope!
DeleteThe entire Marine AAV fiasco was a series of waived regulations. The Burke collisions were a bunch of waived regulations. The Antietam grounding was waived regulations. The Avenger MCM grounding was waived regulations. The riverine boat/crew seizures were waived regulations.
Almost every incident (every?) would have been prevented had we followed the regulations we had. Every person in the chain of command that authorized the waivers in each incident should have been court-martialed for dereliction of duty, at a minimum, and then dishonorably discharged.
"We need 1) more and cheaper ships to operate, and 2) allies to take over some of our historic commitments."
ReplyDeleteThose ships will be useless without crews to man them, especially when the USN stupidly put itself in a death spiral of high operational tempos that burned out the ships' crews, leading to crew members quitting the Navy instead of reenlisting, which then forced the navy to maintain a high operational tempo with less human resources, burning out more crew members and making them quit... The USN tried to fix its manning problems with higher automation, as the LCS and Zumwalt class was supposed to have, but the unproven technology increased costs and delayed the ships' entry to service.
As for allies, the US Government spent a lot of time alienating them, as noted with France (see the French Government's outrage when Australia cancelled contracts for French conventional submarines in favor of American nuclear ones) and Germany (see the controversy with the Nord Stream pipelines through which Russia exports natural gas). Many of them are probably thinking the same damn thing the US did during World War I: "What did they ever do for us?" "Why should our people die for their glory?"
Our military and political leaders need to implement a top-down fix of these messes. We obviously can't maintain the ships we already have, which are rusting away from lack of maintenance, as noted in https://taskandpurpose.com/news/navy-sailors-overworked-undermanned-maintenance/ so we'll have to cut down their operational tempos, allowing us to maintain those ships still in good material condition, scrap the ships the USN allowed to fall to poor material condition, and let the crews rest. We then have to build new ships- with extensive testing so we can be certain any new technology they bear, will WORK- while embarking on an extensive recruitment and retention program so all the ships have the crew they need to maintain them on deployment. We also need to embolden our allies- real allies who'll have our backs in rough situations, not parasites like Ukraine- but make certain the ships we deploy to "support" them, will not discourage them instead, as was apparently the case when USN ships showed up covered with rust, as noted in https://blog.usni.org/posts/2021/09/08/maybe-we-should-pass-on-the-passex-for-awhile
"burning out more crew members and making them quit."
DeleteThat's an appealing hypothesis but do you have any actual data to support this? For example, the US Navy personnel levels have remain relatively constant since around 1997.
"the US Government spent a lot of time alienating them, as noted with France "
The submarine incident did not make France happy but if a single business incident is enough to sour a relationship with an ally then it wasn't much of a relationship to begin with. Do you have source that, perhaps, lists dozens or hundreds of incidents that might, in the aggregate, drive away an ally?
"so all the ships have the crew they need to maintain them on deployment."
The Navy claims to have 145,000 at-sea billets and a total personnel level of around 350,000 (off the top of my head). That suggests that we have more than enough people to fully man every ship so perhaps recruitment and retention is not the issue?
CBO's 2021 updated force structure primer (1) shows combined Navy and Marine Corps personnel as 234,000 combat, 94,000 combat support, 204,000 admin/overhead, total active 532,000, reserves 97,000, total end strength 629,000. CBO doesn't break down between Navy and Marines, but based on relative sizes of the two organizations, a prorated breakdown (probably not too far from accurate) would be Navy 151,000 combat, 61,000 support, 132,000 admin/overhead (pretty close to the 42% number), total active 344,000, reserves 58,000, total 402,000, and Marines 83,000 combat, 33,000 support, 72,000 admin/overhead, total active 188,000, reserves 40,000, total end strength 228,000.
ReplyDeleteSuppose we cut admin/overhead in half and distributed it 1/3 to combat, 1/6 to combat support, and 1/2 to reserves (plus a 25% bump up). The revised numbers for Navy would be 173,000 combat, 72,000 support, 66,000 admin/overhead, total active 311,000, reserves 155,000, total end strength 466,000, and Marines 95,000 combat, 39,000 support, 36,000 admin/overhead, total active 170,000, reserves 95,000, total end strength 265,000.
And if the Navy went from 151,000 combat to 173,000 combat, and 212,000 combat plus support to 243,000 combat plus support, I think we just found a bunch of those sailors that we need.
From a personnel cost standpoint, we pay each reservist for 60 days a year versus 365 days a year for active duty, so assume each reservist is 1/6 of a full time equivalent. A Navy with 344,000 active and 58,000 reserves is 353,667 FTEs, whereas 311,000 active and 155,000 reserves is 336,833 FTEs, a savings of roughly 17,000 FTEs or about 5% of personnel costs. Now, actually implementing this plan might require additional expenditures to make the reserves more attractive to potential sailor and to increase their tempo of training, but it would still be a relatively cheap way to build more capability.
(1) https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57088
Not as easy as you think.
ReplyDeleteWhen I was a JO in the early 80s I had 4 or 5 manning numbers to look at.
1. Number of folks in my division.
2. "Fair share", which which was number of folks available ship wide divided by whoever squawked loudest.
3. Normal complement: What the Navy thought was required to man my division.
4. War time complement: Larger number which would account for casualties.
1 < 2 <3 < 4
I no longer recall the specific numbers. But tell you what, the whole rotten affair maid you think 9 times before shitcanning a shitbird; I'ld just increase the work (and watches) for all those left.
Something else. Don't think there's fat in shore billets. You can't keep people at sea forever. Gotta' have somewhere for them to go so they can catch their breath. And maybe their families.
"Something else. Don't think there's fat in shore billets. You can't keep people at sea forever. Gotta' have somewhere for them to go so they can catch their breath. And maybe their families."
DeleteThere is plenty of fat in shore billets. When you have a Navy of 350,000 to support 100-150,000 seagoing slots, there is absolutely fat in shore billets. We have too many people, and disproportionately IMO officers, who simply migrate a career through one shore billet after another. And they tend to be good at shuffling papers, but terrible at combat.
The part about can't keep people at sea forever is absolutely true. The trick is to cut down on the length of separations inherent in sea duty. That's why I say an absolute hard cap on deployment limits. And no waivers. Anybody who approves a waiver is fired. That's hard talk, but the USN is at a point where hard talk is required. And no more promotions for officers who have gone from shore to staff to shore to staff with no shipboard duty.
Long term, we have to do two things:
1) Increase the number of ships. We are still trying to cover the same commitments that may have made sense when the Navy was 600 ships but don't make sense now that the number of ships is half that. To afford that, we have to reduce average cost per ship. I've shown a way to double the number of ships from 300 to 600 by cutting the average cost/ship in half, and crewing those ships with a combination of moving admin/overhead billets to combat/combat support and keeping a significant portion of ships in a reserve status. 600 ships, split between 10% major maintenance, 30% reserve, 30% home fleet/surge, and 30% deployed/deployable, would mean 180 ships deployable at any time. With current deployment levels around 100 ships, that would mean that the deployable ships would spend roughly half their time deployed.
2) Get allies to take over certain commitments. If we formed closer relationships with the British Commonwealth and the Quad, then UK in Europe, India and Australia in the Indian Ocean, and Canada, Australia, and Japan in the Pacific would be obvious candidates. None of them are anywhere near as large as the USN, but if each could take over a few commitments it would greatly ease the strain.
I don't know of any other way to get there from here.