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Friday, December 10, 2021

Top Heavy

We’ve talked about the current trend in ship design as it relates to superstructures (see, “Ship Superstructures”) and we’ve noted the many disadvantages to massive superstructures.  Inherent with a massive superstructure is weight which invariably leads to top heaviness (metacentric height).  All modern US Navy surface ship designs are inherently top heavy.  To be fair, this has been a problem that has plagued ships since the very first ship in history.  However, the US Navy designs have taken a chronic challenge that typically manifests over time as more equipment is added to a ship during refits and codified the problem into designs that start with top heaviness built in.  The Freedom class LCS design, for example, violated the Navy’s own design requirements for weight growth margin and metacentric height.  The problems didn’t come from refits and added equipment;  they were designed in!  That’s insane.

 

Just for fun, let’s take a look at a few bow-on photos of ships from WWII versus today and compare their ‘visual’ top heaviness.

 

To begin, here’s a photo of the USS Pasadena, a Cleveland class cruiser.  The superstructure, at its base, extends around half the width of the ship and narrows quickly as it rises.  Most of the superstructure is around a half to a quarter of the width of the ship.  Also note that the structure height (not the mast height) is relatively low compared to the height of the hull as seen at the bow. 

 

 



 

 Next, here is a photo of an unidentified crusier.  Again, note the skinniness of the superstructure which occupies perhaps half the width of the hull and, again, narrows quickly;  not a lot of weight high up.

 

 

 


 

 

Now, let’s take a look at some of today’s ships.

 

Here’s a Burke class destroyer.  Note the massive size of the superstructure which extends all the way to the extreme edges of the ship and rises nearly vertically.  That’s a lot of weight!


 

 


 

 

 

Here’s a view of a Freedom class LCS.  The superstructure extends the width of the ship is just massive compared to the hull.

 


 




Next is a view of a Ticonderoga class cruiser and the USS Long Beach.  Again, they just look immensely top heavy, don’t they?


 

 



 

I don’t have metacentric height data for the ships so this is just a visual impression of top heaviness but it’s quite instructive, nonetheless.  How stable do you think these ships will be after they’ve taken some damage and taken on water?  We’re building in the tendency to capsize!  We’ve got to radically rethink our ship designs on so many levels.  When we lost BuShips, we lost our ship design compass and institutional knowledge..


49 comments:

  1. All these ships are top heacy, including those from WWII. Fargo, Juneau, Oregon City were all revisions of earlier designs to address topside weight. After the war, the weight of the radar drove the switch to Aluminum superstructures. Then the Belknap fire and hull cracking in the aluminum deck houses led to the revision to Steel in the Burke deckhouse. Then to make weight Burke IIA has the composite hangar. Now Zumwalt has a composite deckhouse, revised to steel on the 3rd ship as part of that settlement with General Dynamics on the A-12. Both LCS designs suffer from bad requirements. The mission module equipment weight allowance was obviously too light at a glance. The equipment was placed too high in either design even if weight allowance was met. Either way, ballast is often our friend. Its actually one of the Burke Flt III design changes. As best I can tell it has to be how Japan's Burkes can have the radar and bridge so much higher. That and their ships not having as flared a hull. Plus they just build them bigger. I'd really like to get our surface community tied to the hip with Korea and Japan to get them back in line.

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  2. Maybe the Spruance hull just isn't big enough for what they're trying to accomplish.

    Maybe there's just too much unnecessary crap being included.

    But regardless, it seems like they simply ran out of room to fit things below decks so they built up, like skyscrapers in the downtown of a big city.

    For example, if I was going to design and build a replacement for the Ticonderoga class, it would be on a Cleveland hull.
    That should provide enough hull/deck space for the radars, CIWS, armor, and VLS cells.

    Lutefisk

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    1. "Maybe the Spruance hull just isn't big enough for what they're trying to accomplish."

      It isn't.

      "For example, if I was going to design and build a replacement for the Ticonderoga class, it would be on a Cleveland hull."

      I've thought even bigger--Des Moines.

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    2. "Maybe the Spruance hull just isn't big enough for what they're trying to accomplish."

      If it's not big enough it's because we're trying to cram too many functions in one ship. The Tico's function is AAW. That means it doesn't need a hangar, flight deck, towed array, ASW software suite, multiple RHIBS, etc. Eliminate all that and the associated manning along with their berthing, food storage, fresh water, and so forth and you wind up with a significantly smaller ship.

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    3. CNO, I'm thinking a Tico replacement having AEGIS style radar, 200 VLS cells, 5" guns fore and aft, multiple CIWS of Phalanx, SeaRAM, and Goalkeeper, ECM equipment.

      No ASW at all.

      Is a Cleveland hull too much?

      Lutefisk

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    4. I'm thinking about the senseless of cramming all types of equipment on a ship.

      What happens if a Tico doing the AA scort of a fleet detects a possible sub contact? Should the ship let the fleet alone without AA cover hunting for the sub? Obviously not, but then all that ASW equipment has, at most, a defensive utility.

      It would be better to put that equipment into a dedicated ASW ship that enables much more flexibility.

      Even better, that would increase the number of command post available and benefits the naval stablishment. I don't understand the sense of all of this unless is plain incompetence.

      JM

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  3. If you look at a Independence class ship head on, it does NOT look top heavy. The Zumwalt class is pretty high, but it slopes well, and IS seaworthy. A steel hulled(I am biased) trimaran with tumblehome hulls would be very seaworthy, and fuel efficient.

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    1. A trimaran would seem to be inherently stable but it has severe sea keeping problems that have been identified by DOT&E. They have discussed the issues only in vague terms so I can't provide any details.

      The Zumwalt has unknown stability but known sea keeping issues. The Navy has issued limitations on the Zumwalt's sailing in certain seas (quartering seas, as I recall. Further, the tumblehome nature of the hull results in a DECREASED wetted area (decreased buoyancy) as the waterline rises - for instance, during flooding. Thus, the ship loses buoyancy as it sinks whereas a conventional outward flaring hull increases its wetted area and increases buoyancy as the waterline rises.

      The Zumwalt superstructure is quite tall and extends the full width of the ship albeit with some small degree of inward slope.

      I have no information on fuel efficiency for either ship type. Please share it if you have data.

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    2. A serious trimaran design is what I would have suggested as well. Pity DOT&E didn't give more details.

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    3. Trimarans are supposed to be very stable. The only problem that I can see is that the Independence class has its amas (outriggers) at the stern in order to overcome the normal hull speed limitations. That could possibly cause problems in quartering seas. The only other possible reasons is bureaucratic inertia against ships with wave piercing bows.

      Everett W

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  4. (Don McCollor)...I think another concern would be wind pressure on the high superstructure. Already top heavy, hurricane force winds could push them right over. It happened to WW2 destroyers with low ballast awaiting refueling. Another destroyer rolled 90 degrees, then recovered when she lost her stack and radar mast...

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  5. Playing this game some more. I like to count decks to the main radar. Long Beach takes the cake, followed by the Japanese Aegis ships. Japan's also have more freeboard to the helo deck, place more of the VLS load forward and therefore lower. Their are more than one way to skin a cat. Seem China hasn't masterest iit yet as they kee their radar even lower in the hull than ours.

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  6. Granted this may only affect the Burke class, but instructive is the bombing of the USS Cole on this issue?

    The Cole suffered a 40 x 40 foot hole in her hull amidship and listed only slightly. Per Wiki, "The crew fought flooding in the engineering spaces and had the damage under control after three days."

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  7. Remember a Naval Engineers Journal report from 1996 which said the cheap fix to restore adequate stability was to add lead ballast, mentioned fleet at that time was carrying ~28,000t of ballast.

    Out of interest the CBO 2020 report on Cost of Frigate included Table 1, Characteristics of the Navy’s (10) Surface Combatants, 1970 to 2020, included was the displacement in long tons for both light and full, the difference the deadweight, Zumwalt and Burke Flight III figures exactly the same at 2,117t, though the Zumwalt at 15,656t is 60% higher in displacement than the Burke at 9,714t. Presuming down to internal sea water tanks and very powerful pumps to ensure stability of the tumblehome hull?, just hope Zumwalt never loses power in rough seas.

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  8. Some of the topside issue is inevitable with post WW2 hulls. Before that, the main armament weight was center-line, magazines were heavy, very low in the ship below the waterline.

    Today, the armament is located on the main deck, above the waterline. Modern warships have a plethora of radars, FC, and electronics very high in the super structure. Seems to be the nature of the beast.

    One mitigating factor is fin stabilization, which we might deploy in 'pairs of pairs' for redundancy. Of course you need headway and power for them to work. another is electric propulsion: which would put heavy electric motors low in the hull again, and also contribute to better main space compartmentation.

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    1. " magazines were heavy, very low in the ship below the waterline."

      You bring up a good point/reminder. VLS cells are 'tubes' that the missiles exit through/from. I wonder if the VLS assembly could be placed a deck or two lower in an open 'pit' of sorts (retractable deck cover?)or, alternatively, if the VLS cells could placed a deck or two lower with the cells length extended upward to reach the top deck? The missiles would have to travel further through the 'tube' but does that matter? Just thinking out loud. I don't know enough about the engineering of the VLS to know whether this could be done.

      Either way, it would consume additional internal volume but I suspect - and have documented - that modern ships have a lot of non-combat spaces that could be reclaimed.

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    2. "main armament weight"

      Another good point. WWII ships had heavily armored main weapons. They understood that there was no point building a ship whose main weapons could be rendered inoperative due to minor hits or simply shrapnel. Today's main weapons, the VLS, are unarmored from above. I'm unsure what degree of armor, if any, they have on the sides and bottom and whatever they have is likely intended to direct an explosion upward rather than being intended as protective armor in the traditional sense.

      This leads to the question of whether our VLS ought to be armored. I've posted on this and my emphatic position is, yes, our main weapons should be armored.

      What this would do to weight issues and stability is unknown.

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    3. I think that insensitive munitions (an under-appreciated revolution), have eliminated much of the survivability benefit of putting magazines underwater, but the trade-off in topside weight saving/stability is an interesting issue.

      Of course, we can put magazines deep in the hull and fire through several decks. I am not sure that modern hulls have as much volume as we should like to pull this off.

      The Navy has not truly built a cruiser sized hull capable of supporting the sensors, weapons, and electrical power demands attendant those demands since CGN-9 Long-Beach, itself one of the most top heavy designs.

      GAB

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  9. I'm not sure the photos prove that modern ships are top heavy. Obviously, each ship design is unique and must be analyzed on its own, so let's consider two examples: the Burke Class destroyer and the Cleveland Class cruiser.

    It's true that the Burke's superstructure is larger than the Cleveland's. On the other hand, it's also true that the Cleveland has a very large amount of topside weight in the form of armor, on the gun turrets, barbettes, deck, and conning tower (which is fairly heavy and located fairly high up in the superstructure). Thus, it's entirely plausible that the Burke's superstructure might be larger than the Cleveland's without being heavier. It's even more plausible that the overall weight distribution on the Burke could be no more top-heavy (and maybe even less top-heavy) than on the Cleveland. The photo isn't proof. We'd need more detailed weight distribution information which I don't have, and which may even be classified.

    As for the comment about the larger superstructure making the ship more likely to capsize after internal flooding, being certain would again require detailed weight distribution information that I don't have and may even be classified, and also hypothetical information about the particular type of flooding, but we do have SOME real world experience with Burkes. Remember that 3 Burkes have experienced significant internal flooding after damage incidents, and none of them tipped over and capsized, either immediately or ever. So there's that.

    So, based on the limited information available to me, I'd say that, while there may be many problems with the Burke design, I haven't seen convincing evidence that being top-heavy is one of them.

    Now, you might say that, for damage control and survivability reasons, the Burke ought to have more armor. And you are probably right and I'd agree with you. But that's a separate issue. If we did it, we'd probably have to make the superstructure smaller to compensate for the weight of the armor. In any case, it would be a separate design which would have to be analyzed separately, and would say nothing about whether the current design is top heavy.

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    1. "I'm not sure the photos prove that modern ships are top heavy."

      I'm absolutely sure that they don't prove anything. As stated in the post,

      "I don’t have metacentric height data for the ships so this is just a visual impression of top heaviness …"

      The lack of analytical rigor in this post was further confirmed in the post with this statement,

      "Just for fun, let’s take a look at a few bow-on photos …"

      So, having disposed of any pretense of analytical rigor, let's move on.

      The Cleveland class and similar have their heavy armored weapon mounts located no higher than the second deck up. As GAB noted, the associated magazines were located deep in the ship, acting as ballast and decreasing the top heaviness. In contrast, the Burkes have their heavy radar arrays and associated cooling and electrical equipment located approximately four decks up which is a worse situation in terms of effect. Whether it is worse in absolute terms depends on data we don't have and never will. I also note that the Burkes have their large, aft VLS located 2-3 decks up which is an undesirable situation regarding metacentric height.

      The non-mount armor on WWII ships generally rose no higher than the weather deck (there were armored citadels and conning towers on some ship classes). The bulk of the non-mount armor weight was thus located at deck level or lower.

      I would also point out that the Cleveland class and similar were much narrower than the Burkes. The Cleveland class, for example had a length:beam ratio of 9.2:1 whereas the Burke is 7.7:1. This makes the Burke more barge-like and, hence, aids in stablity. This also strongly suggests that if the Burke were magically thinned to 9.2:1, the superstructure would, indeed, cause the ship to instantly capsize. Again, there is no data to support this conclusion, just a bit of reason. It is likely that the Burke designers were forced to use a shorter ratio precisely because the superstructure was so top heavy.

      Regarding the absolute weight of the two superstructures, it is a near certainty that the Burke's superstructure is significantly heavier than the Cleveland. Looking at a profile (side) view of the Cleveland, one notes that the superstructure occupies, effectively, only around 25% of the fore/aft length of the ship, based on a visual estimation. Combine that with the narrowness of the superstructure and you have a very small structure. In contrast the Burke superstructure extends over around 50% of the ship's length in addition to extending side to side. Yet again, no data but this conclusion seems quite reasonable.

      As far as not having any indication that the Burkes are top heavy, YES WE DO! The entire Burke Flt III design was an effort to deal with the top heaviness and lack of metacentric height margin. The AMDR arrays were supposed to be significantly larger but the Burkes were unable to accommodate the weight at the required height - they were significantly top-heavy limited and had no margin to work with.

      So, in summary, having not attempted to prove anything, I stand by the visual impression that modern ships are inherently top heavy in comparison to WWII ships.

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    2. "Now, you might say that, for damage control and survivability reasons, the Burke ought to have more armor. And you are probably right and I'd agree with you."

      This argument has always made sense to me. Our ships need more armor, and I have very much favored smaller and more heavily armored superstructures.

      The other thing that I think we need is more heavily armored internal bulkheads. The USS Pittsburgh in WWII lost its bow in Typhoon Viper, but had sufficient watertight integrity that, after the crew was able to shore up the forward remaining bulkhead, it was able to make it back 1000 miles or so to Guam. The sheared off bow also stayed afloat, and in a bit of Navy humor was nicknamed the USS McKeesport. I'm not sure that any modern USN ships could do that. Obviously, the Norwegian Helge Ingstad couldn't. One thing about heavier internal bulkheading is that it would mean a lot of low weight, which at least in theory should help with stability.

      As far as extending the superstructure to the width of the ship, that seems to be necessary for modern stealth requirements. But it would seem that doing so creates a lot of additional internal space that, with proper design, could be used to lower a lot of superstructure spaces (bridge, signal bridge, CIC) by at least one deck. I kind of like the RN idea of locating CIC away from the bridge and lower in the ship, so that if the bridge gets knocked out then CIC doesn't go with it. I don't know what the tradeoff would be regarding metacentric height and stability, but I think it would be interesting to know. On my FRAM destroyer, I used to try to play games with how things could be rearranged.

      So the formula that I would like to see tried would be heavier armor, heavier internal bulkheading, and trading superstructure height for width to accomplish stealth and lower weight.

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    3. " more heavily armored superstructures."

      Why? Ships have not typically had armored superstructures. Armor protected the hull/citadel but that armor generally stopped at the main armor deck, one deck below the weather (decapping) deck. Yes, some ships had a small, armored conning tower that extended up to the bridge level but that was, literally, a small 'tube' of armor. Superstructures were not generally armored.

      Are you proposing a new development in ship's armor or are you using the terms loosely and don't literally mean armored superstructures?

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    4. "As far as extending the superstructure to the width of the ship, that seems to be necessary for modern stealth requirements."

      This does not appear to be true. The implication, here, is that a sloped superstructure is more stealthy than a flat deck and yet even fairly stealthy ships generally have large amounts of open, flat deck space. If one considers the concept of stealth, flat, horizontal decks ARE stealthy in that they are nowhere near perpendicular to incident radar waves. In fact, the concept suggests that they should be the MOST STEALTHY since they are the most angled relative to the incident radar.

      I have been puzzled by the extreme width superstructures since they first appeared as I can find no good rationale for them. For a time, I thought they might be stealthy 'covers' for equipment that would otherwise be exposed on deck and yet that seems not to be the case to any significant extent since most deck equipment is useless if 'covered'. Deck equipment is located outside, on exposed decks for a reason (UNREP, boats, winches, etc.). It is possible to design in roll up covers so that covered equipment can be externally accessed but this do not seem to be the case for the Burke/LCS/Constellation to any great degree. Visby appears to have some degree of this but is not, of course, a US ship.

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    5. "The implication, here, is that a sloped superstructure is more stealthy than a flat deck and yet even fairly stealthy ships generally have large amounts of open, flat deck space."

      Not at all. The implication is that a clean sloped side is more stealthy than a cluttered outside passageway with a vertical external side several feet inside the edge of the hull, and a second external side several feet above. If you can create enough interior room with a slanted, stealthy external outer wall to move some spaces downward, then you can move stuff down from the 01 level to the main deck and from the 02/03 level to the 01 level, and then you have that flat deck where the 03 level and most of the 02 level used to go.

      Kind of doing the layout of that old FRAM can from memory 50 years ago, it was:

      03 - Signal bridge
      02 - Bridge, captain's sea cabin, CIC
      01 - Captain's inport cabin, chart house, radio central

      With stealthy sloped flush sides to the main deck, I have always wondered if you could created enough room to relocate spaces

      Main deck - CIC, radio central, chart house, Captain's inport cabin
      01 level - bridge with 360-degree view, signal bridge, Captain's sea cabin

      Deck equipment that needs to be outside could be placed behind removable covers.

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    6. Your statement was that an extreme width superstructure was NECESSARY for stealth:

      "As far as extending the superstructure to the width of the ship, that seems to be necessary for modern stealth requirements."

      It is not. Removing deck equipment is necessary for stealth but an extreme width superstructure is not.

      If you want to hide equipment behind an exterior superstructure for stealth reasons, that's fine but it carries penalties with it: lack of deck space, hindered movement fore and aft, excess weight, impossible corrosion control, top heaviness, etc.

      Stealth superstructures are not a requirement for rearranging internal spaces. The only requirement for rearranging is to free up (or swap) spaces. As I've stated, we can easily free up spaces by eliminating many of the crew comforts like lounges, game rooms, weight rooms, ship's post offices, and so on.

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    7. "As I've stated, we can easily free up spaces by eliminating many of the crew comforts like lounges, game rooms, weight rooms, ship's post offices, and so on."

      Partly agree. Some things that exist only for crew comfort are superfluous. Physical fitness is a combat skill, and therefore I would be inclined to keep gyms/weight rooms. Mess decks can serve as crew lounges. As far as game rooms, all branches have found that modern computer games are very useful for developing and improving the hand-eye skills required to operate and control drone systems and other automated weapons effectively, but those can also be placed on mess decks. And a post office is pretty important not just for deployments but also if the ship stays in port. So I would favor cutting down but not totally eliminating them.

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    8. "It is not. Removing deck equipment is necessary for stealth but an extreme width superstructure is not."

      If the width lets you eliminate a higher deck, then it should make you stealthier. And angling the exterior upward to deflect radar seems to be a biggie for stealth, and that is easier if you start with the deck edge. The way I understand it, you want to avoid 90 degree angles, and the historic design (like that FRAM) had a 90 degree angle between the main deck passageway and the main deck superstructure, and another 90 degree angle between the overhead of the main deck passageway and the main deck superstructure. It seems to me that if you brought the main deck superstructure out to the deck edge and angled the exterior upward (like the French LaFayettes and others based on that design), you could create another 2000 or so square feet (perhaps not 100% usable, of course) of enclosed main deck area on that old FRAM. If you could fit CIC and radio central into that volume of space, you could basically eliminate one level of superstructure.

      I agree with reducing the number of creature comfort spaces, particularly if you reduce deployed time. In the 1980s, you could get 100 deployed with ships deployed about 15-20% of the time, now it's more like 35-40%, and that makes a huge difference. Grow the size of the fleet and build up alliances (UK, Australia, Japan, India, Canada) to take over some of our world policeman duties. As far as spaces to give up, I think physical fitness is a military requirement, and thus I would keep gyms and weight rooms. I also think the post office is necessary, not just when deployed, but even in home port. I do think that lounges and game rooms could be incorporated into the mess decks and would save needing any other space dedicated to them.

      As far as superstructures, I would look seriously at composites to save weight. You might also do some Kevlar. I don't know what the ups/downs of either are, but they would seem to deserve a look.

      And I still think that armored internal bulkheads are a key. If you can stop the spread of a problem, you can deal effectively with a lot more problems

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    9. "gyms and weight rooms ...
      post office is necessary ...
      lounges and game rooms could be incorporated into the mess decks"

      I never cease to be amazed at the pervasive peacetime, non-combat mentality that infects the Navy and so many observers.

      None of the functions you listed are combat requirements, especially for a navy that does not do worthless deployments. Any of those functions can be dispensed with for a few days/weeks while on a mission.

      It's just incredible to me that we fought a several year world war without any of those functions and yet now we believe that they are 'necessary'. How does our thinking about combat 'necessities' become so distorted?

      Setting aside all other reasons for dispensing with those functions, there is one overriding reason to eliminate them and that is crew survivability. Every single piece of non-combat-essential equipment is a potential killer of crew in an emergency situation. In point of fact, that is exactly what happened in the Burke collisions. Crew almost certainly died when the non-combat-essential equipment became fatal and lethal obstacles in mangled, flooding compartments. The reports and photos from the interiors of the Burkes demonstrated this quite graphically. A ship's space that has been damaged is bad enough in terms of managing egress from a compartment. Every piece of non-essential equipment becomes another life-threatening obstacle.

      In addition, every piece of non-combat-essential equipment becomes a fire hazard which compounds the threats to crew survivability.

      Stripping ship is a time honored tradition that exists for very good reasons. The difference between then and now is that there is no longer such a thing as 'peacetime' when, at any moment, you can suffer a catastrophic collision, a terrorist bombing, a terrorist missile attack, mine explosion, and more. Our ships are CONSTANTLY in danger. That you want to risk crew lives for comforts that serve no combat purpose is unbelievable. The crew that died on the Burkes would gladly have given up their comforts in exchange for survival, if they had known. We do know and yet some of us still want gyms, weight equipment, exercise machines, post offices, game consoles, lounges, lounge furniture, etc. That's not a combat-ready WARship, that's a high risk cruise ship that is totally unprepared and unsuited for combat or danger. It is shameful to risk crew lives for the sake of non-essential crew comforts. Shameful and despicable.

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    10. "It's just incredible to me that we fought a several year world war without any of those functions and yet now we believe that they are 'necessary'. How does our thinking about combat 'necessities' become so distorted?"

      I'm fairly certain that those ships that won WWII all had post offices onboard. As far as gyms and weight rooms, physical fitness is a combat capability, and given the problems sailors have had with obesity, those seems a reasonable addition. As for lounges and game rooms, I don't see why those could not be incorporated into existing mess decks. I would note that US bases in Iraq and Afghanistan typically included a fairly extensive set of game consoles, which aircraft and drone operators used to develop and maintain hand-eye coordination skills required to operate their weapons. Also, in the modern volunteer force era, recruiting and retention are critical, and going completely spartan could be a deterrent to that. I think the space could be managed to avoid the access and fire and other hazard problems. So I would come down on the side of way less space devoted to those uses than the Navy currently allows, but probably not complete elimination.

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    11. "I'm fairly certain that those ships that won WWII all had post offices onboard."

      An occasional sack of mail does not require nor constitute a post office and ships conducting short missions can easily forego mail for a few days/weeks. This is NOT a combat requirement.

      "I would note that US bases in Iraq and Afghanistan typically included a fairly extensive set of game consoles,"

      Very few land bases get rammed and flooded by commercial cargo ships so this is utterly irrelevant.

      "which aircraft and drone operators used to develop and maintain hand-eye coordination skills"

      This is total garbage made up by someone to justify playing games. Sports are a much better means of developing hand-eye coordination and they also provide cardiovascular benefits as opposed to sitting around getting fat playing video games.

      "physical fitness is a combat capability, and given the problems sailors have had with obesity, those seems a reasonable addition."

      No. We won a world war without gyms so clearly they aren't a necessary combat requirement. Eliminating deployments completely eliminates the need for gyms. No one is going to turn into a 98 lb weakling in a couple of weeks at sea.

      Given that obesity has increased while we've had gyms on board ships, your contention is completely disproven by the historical evidence. The answer is not life-threatening gyms and equipment; the answer is harder work while on missions and less free time to sit around drinking sodas and playing video games.

      Your utter disregard for the life-threatening hazards of all this non-combat-essential junk is very disappointing.

      Are you even reading your own comments? Do you see what you're defending? You served. You should know better.

      If something doesn't directly enhance combat capability it has no place on a ship.

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    12. "You served. You should know better."

      Yes, I did serve, and my comments are based upon that experience.

      "If something doesn't directly enhance combat capability it has no place on a ship."

      I think recruiting and retention directly enhance combat capability, and I think that if we went back to WWII habitability standards, we would lose a lot of good people in a hurry. I think this is one issue, like several others, where I come down somewhere between where the Navy is and where you are. I think we both agree that the Navy is proceeding stupidly in a number of areas. I just think you are a bit extreme the other way. One of the problems, as I understand it, with weights and other exercise gear on the Fitzgerald/McCain is that there wasn't a designated compartment so it was just scattered about. Having it in one compartment, that wasn't on anybody's escape route from anywhere, would have avoided the problems. I don't see the need for crew's lounges, as I don't see why the mess decks can't serve that purpose for the crew. The wardroom does for officers. And I don't see the harm in having a few video games included in that area, as long as they are properly secured.

      I think if you go as spartan as you are proposing, you are going to have a hard time retaining anybody. And I the needs of the Navy to attract and retain quality personnel outline the other needs you have listed.

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    13. And the problem with no deployments is that we have made some commitments to allies that require some level of presence. If we abandon those commitments, the legitimate fear is that China and Russia will come in, scarf them up, and basically take over the world.

      Again, this is another of those areas where I think that I come down somewhere between you and the Navy. Back in 1980s when we had 500-600 ships, deploying 100 ships basically meant being deployed 15-20% of the time. Today, with 250-300 ships, that same level of commitment means being deployed 35-40% of the time. That's a huge difference with respect to training and maintenance. What to do? Seems like only two real solutions:

      1) Build more ships, back up to the 600 ship level, and then you are talking about 15% of the time deployed again
      2) Get allies--UK, Australia, Japan, India, Canada--to pick up a share of our commitments

      Grow the fleet to 600, get allies to take over 20 of our deployment commitments--UK in Europe, India and Australia in the Indian Ocean, Australia, Japan, and Canada in the Pacific--and we would be looking at 80 ships, or 13% of the fleet, deployed. I think we could get a handle on training and maintenance in that case.

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    14. "I think if you go as spartan as you are proposing, you are going to have a hard time retaining anybody."

      Only if we insist on sending people on 6-12 month deployments. Sending ships on missions of a few days/weeks is not a problem.

      You have seen the answer to the recruiting and retention issues but you fail to recognize it. If we follow the old (not current!) Marine/SEAL/Ranger/Green Beret/etc. model where we give people difficult and meaningful challenges then we'll have people lined up begging to join.

      Frankly, your view of today's recruit pool is unrealistic and disappointing. America is full of young men (not women!) looking for a meaningful challenge. The services aren't providing that so we have a recruiting/retention problem. The Marines and all the other groups I mentioned have never had a recruiting/retention problem until just recently when they've started to lower standards and perform useless tasks.

      If we provide tough enough challenges that have real world value, people will cheerfully sleep standing up in the bilges just to be part of it.

      The old Marine recruiting ads essentially said, you're not tough enough to be a Marine and we don't want you … and they all the recruits they could use. There's a lesson there. Recognize it.

      We need to go back to meaningful, difficult challenges. You should know this.

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    15. " we have made some commitments to allies that require some level of presence."

      No, we haven't. Don't distort the facts. There is not a single treaty we've made that requires our naval presence. This is you imposing your own desires. You may state that as your opinion but do not attempt to state it as fact.

      "fear is that China and Russia will come in"

      They already are and all our presence is not stopping them, at all. Russia has seized Crimea and is in the process of annexing the rest of Ukraine. Russia has seized portions of Georgia and wages constant war at varying levels against them. China has seized the entire S/E China Seas and is in the process of annexing Vietnam, Philippines, and others including expansions into Africa, South America, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean.

      Our presence is a laughable farce and reality completely disproves your contention.

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    16. "If we provide tough enough challenges that have real world value, people will cheerfully sleep standing up in the bilges just to be part of it."

      Maybe they will, maybe they won't.

      I agree that the Marines had the right formula--for them, or at least for whom they used to be. They need to 1) get back to being Marines and 2) get back to their old recruiting formula.

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    17. "Maybe they will, maybe they won't."

      Oh good grief. Aside from the logic of it, we've actually seen that the concept works and not just for the Marines. All the special forces groups do just fine with recruits/applicants. People rush to join tough, challenging, worthwhile groups. This isn't my opinion, it's documented fact. I understand that you're reluctant to admit it because you're holding on to a flawed vision of comfortable cruise ships but, at some point, try to acknowledge documented, demonstrated proof.

      We can operate a Navy of WARships instead of cruise ships and do so quite easily. You keep suggesting that our views are similar. They are not. I envision a fleet of W A R ships while you envision a fleet of cruise ships. I envision a navy of tough, challenged sailors who thrive on difficult missions and harships while you envision a pampered group of today's sensitive, video game playing employees that you have to compete with industry or unemployment benefits to attract.

      Our views have nothing in common.

      Delete
    18. Wow, this thread has gone from top weight to deployments versus training, and now recruiting.

      You would probably enjoy this month's Naval Institute Proceedings, with a cover page headline and three articles about forward presence versus readiness.

      With the change in subject, this probably fits more in the new thread.

      Delete
    19. "They are not. I envision a fleet of W A R ships while you envision a fleet of cruise ships."

      I really take strong exception to that. Just because I'm not willing to go as spartan as you are, or as we were in WWII, doesn't mean I'm proposing cruise sips instead of warships.

      I had a thought. This time of year I always manage to watch the movie, "A Christmas Story," on TV--the one where the kid wants a BB gun but mother is worried he will shoot his eye out. What strikes me is just how spartan our homes were in 1948 or so, compared to today. A sailor coming out of that environment, or worse during the depression, would not have seen the accommodations on a WWII tin can as such a huge step down as one might today. I think that needs to be considered in recruiting and retention.

      As far as the Marines and Special Forces getting plenty of people, yes thy do, but their numbers are a whole lot smaller than the Navy needs, and I'm not as optimistic as you that there are enough of those folks to meet the Navy's needs.

      As far as competing with industry or unemployment benefits, that is the competition. I think Navy recruiting needs to go more the direction you suggest--I liked the "warheads on foreheads" advert, for one. So rather than nothing in common, I think you could put me more somewhere between you and the Navy, with my views tempered somewhat by what I see as reality.

      Delete
    20. "You would probably enjoy this month's Naval Institute Proceedings"

      I cancelled my subscription around a year or so ago. It has become a mouthpiece for admirals to push "I love me" trash writing and politically correct and navy-acceptable company lines. I was getting nothing out of it anymore.

      Delete
    21. " I think that needs to be considered in recruiting and retention."

      It absolutely does … if you're recruiting employees. If, on the other hand, you want warriors then you need my approach.

      "I'm not as optimistic as you that there are enough of those folks to meet the Navy's needs."

      And that's where massive personnel cuts come in as both of us have described. If you're going to keep the same navy we have, with lots of unnecessary administrative personnel and lots of useless functions then, yes, you'll need a large force of employees, just like any other corporation.

      "As far as competing with industry or unemployment benefits, that is the competition."

      Wow, you are just not getting this at all. The military is not (or should not be!) competing with civilian corporations because their is almost no overlap in job descriptions - hence, no overlap. The Navy/military should be seeking tough, angry, fighters looking for a worthy opponent to measure up against (I'm using a bit of hyperbole to make the point). That's not even remotely what the civilian world is looking for. They're looking for huggy, feely, diverse-embracing, feminine, squishy, consensus-loving, get-along/go-along employees who will meekly assimilate and follow the company line. Why would a combat organization want to compete for those people?

      Are you getting this at all? We want fighters. The civilian world wants lovers.

      " views tempered somewhat by what I see as reality."

      Good grief. Reality is what you make it. Did Rickover temper his views to accommodate reality? No! He made his own reality. The Navy needs to make their own reality: tough, hardened warrior-sailors who want a fight, sleep on nails, and can't wait to fight the Chinese (again, a bit of hyperbole to illustrate).

      Reality is what you make it. If you accept gender sensitivity training then that will be your reality. If you accept video game playing, fat, lazy sailors then that will be your reality.

      Instead of trying to accommodate a flawed reality, why don't you pick a reality you really want (or maybe you have?) and fight for it, Cdr Chip Rickover.

      Delete
  10. "Are you proposing a new development in ship's armor or are you using the terms loosely and don't literally mean armored superstructures?"

    Oops, my fingers kind of got ahead of my brain there. I am very much in favor of smaller (and lower) superstructures, but not necessarily armored. I actually wonder about composite superstructures. Aluminum doesn't work because of sturdiness, resistance to fire, and dissimilar metals corrosion problems. But I wonder if composite would work. Maybe composite superstructure with some armor around a smaller area housing essential ship control functions. But this is just spitballing, don't really know how any of this would work.

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  11. Key is center of gravity which cannot be found merely from shape.

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  12. The Ticos have always looked really top-heavy to me. The Burkes maybe slightly better. I think AEGIS drives a lot of it.

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  13. Battleships tended to be top heavy so they would be stable gun platforms and most capsized and then righted themselves underwater when the turrets fell out. Missile boats do not need to be as stable as gun platforms. We would need to have the metacentric height data to make an accurate determination of stability.

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  14. Metacentric height doesn't mean what you think it means. Your critique of the large superstructures of modern warships is about their center of gravity. And the Cleveland-class is an ironic point of comparison because they had marginal stability, along with the USS Wichita, because of being top-heavy. The Cleveland's main and secondary batteries add up to about a thousand tons, all carried on the deck or higher:

    See an explanation on metacentric height here: http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-009.php

    Greater metacentric height is associated with greater stability and ability to self-right. A ship generally capsizes when its metacentric height falls below its center of gravity and it can no longer return to vertical.

    Incidentally, there's a table here with the metacentric heights of various WW2 battleships: http://navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Bismarck.php - the Bismarck's is notably quite high.

    The Cleveland class light cruisers only had marginal stability. When running light, their metacentric height was at the bare minimum - 1.76' to 2.29'. Later ships in the class improved that slightly. USS Houston was one of the later ships with improved stability, but even then, damage control measures after taking a torpedo hit in '44 included tossing 120+ tons of topweight.

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  15. Here's a crazy thought about the Burke Flight 3 ...

    One of the major problems with the ship (perhaps THE major problem but certainly ONE of them) is that the radar is smaller than optimal because weight and power limitations in the underlying ship design prevent the optimal sized radar from being installed up top. Whether or not you believe that the CURRENT Burke design is top heavy, the 35 year old hull design does not have enough margin for topside weight and power to accommodate the optimal radar, so it certainly WOULD be top heavy if we installed it.

    However, suppose that we shifted from a 4 face radar to a 3 face radar (with the faces separated by 120 degrees rather than 90 degrees). This would mean that the total radar would have 25% less weight and require 25% less power than a four face radar (for the same size faces). Or, for the same weight, each face could be roughly 30% bigger (in area) which would buy back a lot of resolution.

    For those who believe this would violate laws of physics, let me point out that we are ALREADY developing a 3 face radar using the same technology (albeit smaller) for the new frigate. So it seems like it ought to work.

    Admittedly, we'd probably have to modify the shape of the superstructure to accommodate the different number of panels, but, on the scale of changes to a ship design, that seems relatively modest compared to changing the shape of the hull.

    Just sayin ....

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  16. Capt, the fat superstructure is used to house the AESA radar (blocky things on superstructure cheeks)

    How the stuff works is scanning a sector of any target quickly with tons of mini radars in that cheek thingy.

    Problem is, you need 4 of them scanning all 4 sectors (say north, east, west, south in 90 degrees)

    So... you need them superstructure like that. You can make it a box like the long beach class but it would give higher radar signature than an angled superstructure.

    So ya, thats why it happened. Also thats why ticon also have FAT superstructure (albeit less stealthy).

    If you want you can make things smaller and more traditional like the russians, but you cant use AESA radar nicely.

    except u somehow follow europeans making a tall, weird mast and tuck AESA on it. But it wont be as good as surface area of the AESA lowered and as such, the number of radar scanners lowered.

    So.... thats why things happened. Hope its informative....

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