The AnnualEx 2021 exercise took place November 21-30 in the Philippine Sea off the southern coast of Japan. It involved naval forces from five countries:
Royal Australian Navy (RAN)
Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)
German Navy (GMN)
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)
U.S. Navy (US)
Five countries! And in the Pacific theater where our pacing threat, China, is? It sounds like a major exercise with several dozen ships involved, surely! Given the location, perhaps it is an exercise focused on high level combat with China along the lines of the pre-WWII Fleet Problems? One might reasonably assume three dozen or more ships from the US Navy, alone. Let’s take a look at this mammoth exercise.
Public relations photos indicate that the exercise consisted of 17 ships, in total, six from the US Navy. Uh oh. This doesn’t sound as mammoth as I envisioned. Well, if not big it should at least be focused on China and high level warfare, right?
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| AnnualEx 2021 Group PR Photo |
As best I can ascertain, here is the list of participating ships:
US
USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70)
USS Lake Champlain (CG 57)
USS Stockdale (DDG 106)
USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204)
USNS John Ericsson (T-AO 194)
Los Angeles class submarine
Canada
HMCS Winnipeg
Japan
JS Teruzuki (DD 116)
JS Kirishima (DDG 174)
JS Yamagiri (DD 152)
JS Asahi (DD 119)
JS Onami (DD 111)
JS Izumo (DDH 183)
JS Inazuma (DD 105)
JS Harusame (DD 102)
JS Chokai (DDG 176)
Soryu class submarine
Australia
HMAS Brisbane (D 41)
HMAS Warramunga (FFH 152)
Germany
FGS Bayern
There appear to have been some Japanese ships that participated only briefly which may change the apparent numbers.
Various reports list the following training events during the exercise:
- maritime communication tactics
- anti-submarine warfare operations
- air warfare operations
- replenishments-at-sea
- cross-deck flight operations
- maritime interdiction maneuvers
- enhanced planning
- live-fire gunnery events
- combined information warfare
As usual, the US Navy contributed its bit of buzzword bingo.
“The U.S. Navy is honored to be invited to participate once again,” said Rear Adm. Dan Martin, commander, Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 1. “ANNUALEX presents an opportunity to strategically coordinate, collaborate and further strengthen our network of partnerships and alliances, enabling us to remain a flexible, adaptable and persistent combined force capable of quickly projecting power, where and when needed.” [1]
So, the exercise lasted 10 days. Day one and day ten were meetings, photo ops, and self-congratulatory press exercises. So, that leaves around 8 days of actual exercises … at best. We noted a list of 9 supposed training events. Doing the arithmetic, that’s just more than one event per day. Is that really effective training? How much can you learn in one day when 17 ships have to cycle through the day’s event? A bit more arithmetic shows that 17 ships would get an average of 1.4 hrs per training event. Can you learn to be a professional baseball player in one day or one hour? Can you learn to be an anti-submarine warfare expert in one day? Can you become an air warfare expert in 1.4 hrs? There were 15 ships and two submarines, as best I can tell. Again, do the math. That’s 7 ships per submarine. If each ship had a turn at a one-on-one event with a sub, that’s an average of 3 hrs ASW training per ship. Can you really learn anything about ASW in 3 hrs? In any kind of realistic exercise you’d be phenomenally lucky to even detect a sub in 3 hrs. ASW is a long game, played out over many, many hours or days for a single encounter.
Of course, all this assumes 24 hour, non-stop exercising. Far more likely is that the events were limited to daytime for safety’s sake so that means even less time per event.
Sure, some of these events may have occurred in parallel. ‘Maritime communications tactics’, whatever that is, could possibly be done while something else was going on. That does not, however, change the fact that no useful training could have possibly occurred in the time allotted.
What did we – the US military/Navy – accomplish by this exercise? Did we actually learn anything or was this just an excuse for a multi-naval, international group hug?
Best case … even if the exercise was wildly successful and worthwhile … it involved three US Navy warships and a sub. Three warships and a sub that was presumably there just to be a ‘target’. Three out of a US Navy fleet of 285 ships gained something. How is that making the fleet more combat ready?
We say we’re pivoting away from anti-terrorism and nation building to peer competition and yet we can’t seem to let go of these useless, low end, group hug exercises. Where are the massive, high end, combat exercises that last for weeks … you know, like a real war operation would?
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It's a PR event isn't it? What a wasted opportunity. I think the JMSDF is the one force that can actually field a good ASW task force (Hyuga class + Abukuma class destroyer escorts). Would have been nice to spend the entire week doing ASW exercises instead.
ReplyDeleteLoc
Comnavops: It would be nice if you would suggest a good yearly schedule for the USN's training and exercises. I have my ideas of what it should be but would love to hear yours. Thanks!
ReplyDeleteThat has no short answer but I'll try to offer a very broad strokes concept.
DeleteThe individual functions (sonar operators, pilots, fire control operators, damage control personnel, etc.) should be training every day. Units (aircraft and ships) with their entire crew should be training frequently - ranging from weekly to monthly depending on the unit and function. The disparate units should come together quarterly for combined exercises as a destroyer squadron or ASW hunter-killer group or 4-carrier group or whatever. The entire Navy should conduct a massive fleet exercise spanning days/weeks on a yearly basis.
The key aspect to the above is that there are NO DEPLOYMENTS. The fleet stays home and trains constantly with the exception of an occasional short term mission.
That's a very crude and basic description. Hope that somewhat answers your question. What's your thought on a training schedule?
Mine would be basically the same as yours. No deployments for the Battle Groups. Patrolling would all be done by a fleet of dedicated Corvettes, backed up by Independent Cruisers.:
Delete4 weeks Fleet Exercise during early Spring.
Each ship would have an INSURV every year or two (hopefully including tactical & weapons test like the RN's FOST's)
The entire fleet would have a random sea alert once per year during the Fall. Drop everything and get to "x" location, loaded for bear. You have 2 weeks. First one there gets a prize. There might be a SinkEx.
June would be "Reserves Month". Every reserve ship (skeleton-crewed, but about 1/4 of the fleet) would have to man up with Reserve sailors and admin types and go out for 2 weeks. Nothing complicated, but learn how to man and train a brand new crew during a call-up.
I love your emphasis on individual function training. I would also add lots of shore training facilities to help do that as well.
We should be training every day the way we plan to fight.
ReplyDeleteWhen I was in the army, we would go out in the Ft. Campbell reservation in a civilian car and do things like scout out potential field sites for future field problems.
We would follow admin radio procedures for flights when in garrison (I was a scout helicopter pilot).
We would get supplies from civilian run warehouses on post.
Etc, etc...
What we should have been doing was operating as if deployed as much as possible.
The Division should have had an Opfor out in the reservation at all times.
Any time we entered the reservation we should have been MILES-ed up.
Scouting field sites should have been in a helicopter or other scouting method, with the danger of giving away the location.
We should have been using tactical radio procedures and frequency hopping at all times.
We should have been getting our supplies from the support units that we would be using during deployment.
If you do all those things, then you have prepared for many of the problems that plague units moving from a peace-time mindset to being combat ready.
I see the Navy as having the same kind of opportunity.
The world's oceans are the training area.
Ships should be moving together in battle groups.
They should be practicing EMCON, and learning how to move and conduct their business in that environment.
They should be operating as if they are in a hostile environment whenever they are out of port (not weapons hot, obviously).
If they find that their current manning can't sustain that operational tempo, then they've learned something.
Maybe manning is too light.
Maybe crews can't sustain that tempo for more than a couple of weeks.
But at least you know. And when the balloon goes up, they'd be ready.
Just my two cents.
Lutefisk
Agree here. Way too much time at sea is wasted. Anytime out of port should be spent as if it was a GITMO REFTRA. Evidently those have gone away long ago, but as a junior sailor, I can say that they were invaluable, and I learned and honed my skills there to a high degree. The reports about the Bonhomne Richard, and the complete lack of consistent training is probably a good reflection of the fleet in general, and thats all bad!!
DeleteI agree with CNO about ending deployments. When I was on Med deployments eons ago, we had daily GQ drills, security alerts, etc. On an auxilliary!! Our combat ships should be seeing multiple GQ/battle problems/fire drills daily. In port ships should have at least weekly emergency sorties. Building that DC/combat "muscle memory", and being able to get underway/navigate with reduced crew are the kind of skills that I think are absent, and allow our malaise to continue. The USN will pay dearly if we dont reverse the decades of arrogance and neglect.
"Just my two cents.
DeleteLutefisk"
Agree totally with your concept. I see two problems with training at home. One, there is some knowledge to be gained from actually going places and doing things in those places. Two, if we abandon deployments altogether, our allies question our commitment and Russia and China see a vacuum which they fill, both of which seem to me to be bad results.
I would see ships operating through about a 10-year cycle.
Years 1-3, Phase 1 starts with delivery of new ships or coming out of the yards for ships completing major overhaul, you're basically in a reserve maintenance status. You repair and maintain equipment, do any sort of equipment quals, train reservists, and function (with reservists onboard) as an OpFor for fleet training exercises.
Years 4-6, Phase 2, is basically home fleet training status, along the lines that ComNavOps suggests. Quoting him, "The individual functions (sonar operators, pilots, fire control operators, damage control personnel, etc.) should be training every day. Units (aircraft and ships) with their entire crew should be training frequently - ranging from weekly to monthly depending on the unit and function. The disparate units should come together quarterly for combined exercises as a destroyer squadron or ASW hunter-killer group or 4-carrier group or whatever. The entire Navy should conduct a massive fleet exercise spanning days/weeks on a yearly basis," is a pretty good description. An annual Fleet Problem/Springtrain built around a realistic threat scenario with Phase 1 units providing OpFor should be the high point.
Years 7-9, Phase 3, deployed or deployable, probably 3 6-month deployments in that time frame, broken up by 3 6-month periods of high-tempo pre-deployment training. Lutefisk's description fits here, as well as phase 2, "The world's oceans are the training area. Ships should be moving together in battle groups. They should be practicing EMCON, and learning how to move and conduct their business in that environment. They should be operating as if they are in a hostile environment whenever they are out of port (not weapons hot, obviously)." Make deployments part of the training cycle.
Phase 4, year 10, would be a major maintenance period at a shipyard with some time in drydock. At the 20-year mark, the end of the second 10-year cycle, the sequence would be reversed with Phase 4 coming in year 21 (thus 2 years back-to-back in major maintenance, or enough time to accomplish a FRAM updating period--change machinery, weapons, and sensors, as needed. Then repeat Phase 1 in years 22-24, Phase 2 in 25-27, and Phase 3 in 28-30, at which point a decision is made whether or not to stretch out one more cycle.
"there is some knowledge to be gained from actually going places and doing things in those places."
DeleteThat's called a mission. Go, train there intensively, learn the area, and come home.
"6-month deployments"
DeleteHere's the best argument against both long term deployments and crew comforts - it's from the McCain collision report:
"24. The occupants of Berthing 2 described a rapidly flooding space, estimating later that the space was nearly flooded within a span of 30 to 60 seconds. By the time the third Sailor to leave arrived at the ladder, the water was already waist deep. Debris, including mattresses, furniture, an exercise bicycle, and wall lockers, floated into the aisles between racks in Berthing 2, impeding Sailors’ ability to get down from their racks and their ability to exit the space."
Crew comforts are death traps and deployments only serve to increase the number of comforts.
Quoting your post from the "Top Heavy" thread because I think this fits better here.
ReplyDelete"They already are and all our presence is not stopping them, at all. Russia has seized Crimea and is in the process of annexing the rest of Ukraine. Russia has seized portions of Georgia and wages constant war at varying levels against them. China has seized the entire S/E China Seas and is in the process of annexing Vietnam, Philippines, and others including expansions into Africa, South America, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean.
Our presence is a laughable farce and reality completely disproves your contention."
You're making a huge assumption--that China and Russia would be behaving exactly the same way if we were not maintaining some sort of presence. I don't make that assumption.
If we pulled back and just did training and maintenance in and around home ports, I think you'd see two quick negative results:
1) Our allies would question our reliability, and
2) We would leave a void that China and Russia would be all too happpy to fill.
As far as Georgia and Ukraine, there really is nothing the USN can do about either one. The Montreux Convention says no carriers through the Bosporus, and without carriers, a USN task group in the Black Sea would be very limited in what it could do. We could respond with Army and Air Force (and possibly Marine, although I think the Marines really, really need to work hard to get out of the baby army role) units through Romania and Poland, but that's really about all we can do. Right now we have a standoff, and as long as we have at least some sort of presence, I don't think Putin will do as much as he would if we were not there. For now, Europe is mostly an Army/Air Force, unless and until Putin brings the Med, the Baltic, and the North Sea into play.
As far as the South China Sea, yes China has made some moves. But if we were not there in basically a token presence, how long before China takes Taiwan and the Philippines and starts putting pressure on Japan, Korea, and Indonesia? Is that the result we want? I don't think so.
I think the problem with our "presence" in WestPac is that it's too token. A destroyer doing a FONOP transit is basically useless. A carrier task force or task group and/or a surface action group, wit or without an ARG doing that same transit says, "China, don't mess with us."
How we manage that while reducing deployment days seems to involve several things:
- Turn over a lot of commitments to allies; we really don't need the force we have in the Arabian Gulf; India could cover most, if not all, the needs there
- Don't do these photo op "exercises"; given that the players in the AnnualEx are all pretty modern, professional navies, why couldn't that have been 24/7 ASW for two weeks? we sure as heck need that, and they probably do as well; would have been nice to do it when the UK task force 2021 was still in the area, maybe even do some stuff with one group playing a serious OpFor to the other.
- Build more ships, which also means cheaper ships as a way to afford it; and staff them by converting a bunch of shore billets to seagoing billets; 100 ships deployed out of 500-600 was something we handled pretty easily in the 1980s; 100 ships deployed out of 250-300 is a totally different situation
It seems to me that we have three options to avoid continuing to run our fleet into the ground:
- Build more ships
- Turn over more commitments to allies
- Abandon the field and let Russia and China fill the vacuum
I vote for a combination of the first two. I see the third as the unacceptable, but inevitable, result of the approach you are proposing.
"China and Russia would be behaving..."
Delete"I vote for a combination of the first two."
Mostly agree, certainly in regards to Europe. Its long past time to let the Europeans police their own backyard. While Russia is saber rattling and making some predatory moves, its nothing that we should be involved with, and in the naval vein, even less so. If there's any place for a "token" US presence,imho, itd be Europe.
"You're making a huge assumption--that China and Russia would be behaving exactly the same way if we were not maintaining some sort of presence. I don't make that assumption."
DeleteHow much more expansionistic could they be???!!! They'd have to be the modern version of the Mongol Horde to be any more aggressive. Again, you're seeing what you want to see rather than reality.
"Our allies would question our reliability"
As opposed to now?
"How much more expansionistic could they be???!!!"
DeleteVery much more. China could have invaded Taiwan, Russia could have conquered Ukraine, for just a couple of examples.
"A carrier task force or task group and/or a surface action group, wit or without an ARG doing that same transit says, "China, don't mess with us."
DeleteYou do know we have a forward based carrier in Japan, don't you? And it hasn't stopped the Chinese from anything.
Here's a list of forward deployed ships at Japan:
DeleteUSS Blue Ridge (LCC-19)
USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76)
USS Antietam (CG-54)
USS Shiloh (CG-67)
USS Chancellorsville (CG-62)
USS Barry (DDG-52)
USS Benfold (DDG-65)
USS Milius (DDG-69)
USS Higgins (DDG-76)
USS Howard (DDG-83)
USS Dewey (DDG-105)
USS Ralph Johnson (DDG-114)
USS Rafael Peralta (DDG-115)
This may not be up to the minute but it conveys the size of the forward deployed 'presence' near China.
According to you, this is too small a presence? How many more ships are needed to make China pause their expansion?
I'm sorry but I can't help but laugh at the notion that China will tremble because we use a carrier for FONOPS instead of a cruiser or destroyer.
"You do know we have a forward based carrier in Japan, don't you? And it hasn't stopped the Chinese from anything."
DeleteWe don't know that it hasn't--and we can't without knowing what they would have done without that presence.
"According to you, this is too small a presence? How many more ships are needed to make China pause their expansion?"
DeleteIt's not how many, it's what they are doing. If they're just sitting in port except going out in onesies and twosies to do things like FONOPS, that's not much of a deterrent. If they are operating at a heavy tempo, that could send a different message.
"If they are operating at a heavy tempo, that could send a different message."
DeleteThat's some heavy duty wishful thinking, there, but okay, you're welcome to your opinion.
"If they are operating at a heavy tempo, that could send a different message."
DeleteThe message China got, was "We need a large and powerful navy capable of defeating the Americans when they intrude in our territorial waters, like drunken frat boys trespassing on a family's property to use that family's pool,"- NOT "We should cower in fear of the US Navy's firepower!"
You're repeating the same damn mistakes as the idiots who cost us the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan- wars we COULD'VE won, but didn't, because we weren't able to see from the POVs of those we fought against. Read some books on CHINESE history- focus on the Opium Wars- before you advocate actions that'll cost us another war.
"The message China got, was 'We need a large and powerful navy capable of defeating the Americans when they intrude in our territorial waters, like drunken frat boys trespassing on a family's property to use that family's pool,'- NOT 'We should cower in fear of the US Navy's firepower!'"
DeleteIt's a fine line we have to tread. Despite mistakes here and there--Vietnam being the largest, by a wide margin--we trod that line pretty effectively in Cold War I. The trick is to pose a credible enough opposition threat that the bad guys don't go too far, without ourselves going too far and stepping over the line. As my retired USAF colonel uncle used to say, "One drunk soldier in Berlin could set off World War III."
I still think we need to reprise the Cold War I game plan to win Cold War II--Truman bribed up an alliance to contain the Soviets, and Reagan put pressure on their economy to bring down the Evil Empire. Whatever influence China has established around the SCS, those people all have some hatred toward China. It's just that right now China is the only alternative. We need to make the USA a viable alternative to China--economically and militarily, just like Truman and Marshall did with Europe. Start with the Quad, help bring CANZUK into fruition, extend to the Commonwealth, and finally bring countries like Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines into the fold. That means things like moving manufacturing out of China, bringing essential stuff home, and the rest to these partner nations. That means things like enough of a permanent military presence to eliminate questions about our reliability.
One interesting idea I read about a few days ago. Australia apparently wants to create an A2/AD system like China to guard its northern flanks. If that extends to Sunda and Malacca (which appear to be well within range) then that gives China a huge problem.
China's economy is a lot stronger that the USSR's ever was--on paper, but there are a lot of issues. Basically China is a bunch of people who don't like each other--the warlike north doesn't get along with the commercial Shanghai and the agricultural Yangtze Valley, and neither gets along well with the Cantonese south, not to mention Tibet and the Uyghurs out west. So the plan is to export cheap consumer goods and invest the cash in make-work projects with no economic viability (the empty cities, for example) to keep the peons too busy to revolt. One result is that these non-productive enterprises are way, way overleveraged, to the extent that China makes the USA in 2008 look like nothing. Now, debt does not mean exactly the same thing to a communist economy that it does to a capitalist market economy, but it is still not without perils. And the whole thing falls apart in a few weeks if they can't get oil from the MidEast. Their economy crashes and their people starve.
PLAN is not designed to be a blue-water navy--yet. It and the rest of their military are designed to intimidate their neighbors around the SCS. If they had to escort convoys of oil tankers from the MidEast, they run out of ships pretty quickly and their ability to intimidate their neighbors takes a massive hit.
The Chinese POV, like the Russian, is historically defensive. Both worry about outside invaders. If we can convince both (and our allies) that we will provide credible support to our allies against any attempts to invade them, but that we have no conquest ambitions of our own, we can make this work. It's a narrow line, but we trod it successfully with the USSR for 45 years, and I think we can do it again. But not the way we are headed now.
" enough of a permanent military presence to eliminate questions about our reliability."
DeleteYou still don't get it. For all practical purposes, we've had a permanent presence in the middle east for decades and yet Iran feels free to seize our vessels and crews. Presence means nothing without the will to use it and we utterly lack that. China has seized our aircraft and drones, established illegal military bases, violated territorial waters of various countries, etc. Iran conducts and exports terrorism while laughing at our presence. Iran mines cargo vessels while laughing at our presence.
We have no will to use our military presence and without will and ACTIONS, no amount of presence will deter anyone. We have an entire fleet forward deployed near China and we haven't deterred anything because we refuse to do anything with it.
Your concept of a carrier conducting 'high temp ops' is laughable. We'll fling aircraft continuously into the sky to … ah … do … do what? Nothing! We did nothing while the Iranians seized our vessels. Why would the Chinese think we'll do anything with a carrier?
You really need to get a handle on reality.
I've asked you in the past what specific action you'd take with the military presence and you've offered not a single thing beyond vague, generalized 'let them know we're serious' platitudes. Well, neither we nor you are serious which makes presence a useless joke.
Until you're willing to engage in specific, forceful actions, all your plans for containing China (already too late!) are meaningless.
"PLAN is not designed to be a blue-water navy ... to intimidate their neighbors takes a massive hit."
DeleteWhile there have been lots of headlines about the Chinese trying to create footholds all over, including Africa, I think the Chinese are building a Navy thats "blue water enough". They just want to be able to expand their denial of use out into the Phillipine Sea. Their serious efforts to create modern CVBGs will give them that. Within a decade, they will be able to take their 'neighbor intimidation' activities to new levels, AND be able to eliminate or at least severely hinder outside intervention. The build rates will soon put the USN at a disasvantage and the gap will only widen after that. While they may eventually want a global navy, most of their "local" goals can be met by expanding their denial area.
"Start with the Quad, help bring CANZUK into fruition, extend to the Commonwealth, and finally bring countries like Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines into the fold."
DeleteVietnam REFUSES to join any US-led military alliance, as noted in https://thegrayzone.com/2021/04/08/pentagon-vietnam-military-china-us-war/
The average Filipino may be WARY of the US, and actions such as that noted in https://therhk111philippinedefenseupdates.blogspot.com/2021/12/no-china-subic-daw-yes-paying-php-135-billion-year-us-use-lands-there.html have NOT helped.
Again, study other nations' histories. It's not just "everyone hates China" or even "everyone hates America," so forming an alliance there will be a headache, no matter which side you're on.
"That means things like moving manufacturing out of China, bringing essential stuff home, and the rest to these partner nations."
You mean "moving manufacturing back in the US." If the US government orders American-owned companies to close their factories in China, the Chinese will just form new companies to takeover and then run the factories STILL IN CHINA- and as those American-owned companies will incur significant costs in time and money to setup new factories in the US, the US government will have to provide substantial financial subsidies to those companies to convince them to make the move.
THINK MORE.
"That means things like enough of a permanent military presence to eliminate questions about our reliability."
It's not just MILITARY reliability we should be concerned about, but DIPLOMATIC and FINANCIAL. Remember what happened when then-President Carter pressured the Shah of Iran on human rights? If our allies adopt relatively authoritarian policies due to fear of unrest, can they trust us not to use "human rights" as an excuse to withdraw our aid or even take actions against them, as Filipino President Duterte has complained about? If the US raises tariffs to protect domestic industry, can our allies- such as Japan- trust us to make exceptions to stuff they export here, so their industries won't suffer for our sake?
"You still don't get it. For all practical purposes, we've had a permanent presence in the middle east for decades and yet Iran feels free to seize our vessels and crews. Presence means nothing without the will to use it and we utterly lack that."
DeleteExactly. And I'm not talking about presence without the will to use it. It has to be used with some finesse, but there are ways to show China (and Iran, for that matter) tat we mean business.
"Until you're willing to engage in specific, forceful actions, all your plans for containing China (already too late!) are meaningless."
DeleteIf I recall correctly, I proposed some specific actions and the response was to the effect of, "OMG, you're going to start WWIII." We will have to deal with some disbelief at first, since we have refused to act for so long, but we can build up credibility if we really mean it.
If presence does not deter, I can assure you that absence invites.
As I see it, we have a problem with too many deployments interfering with our training and maintenance. Done right, deployments can be valuable training evolutions. But aside from that, I see three options:
1) Build more (and necessarily cheaper) ships to reduce the deployment burden per ship; in the 80s, with 500-600 ships, having 100 deployed was 15-20% deployed; now, with 250-300 sips, having 100 deployed is 35-40%, and that has a very different impact
2) Forming alliances and getting allies to take over some of our obligations
3) Retreating from the field, and letting China and Russia fill the vacuum
The idea of no deployments, and strictly training in and around home ports, seems to me to be option 3. If not, how and why is it not?
"It's not just MILITARY reliability we should be concerned about, but DIPLOMATIC and FINANCIAL."
DeleteAbsolutely.
"If I recall correctly, I proposed some specific actions"
DeleteI don't recall any. Feel free to remind me and list some specifics that you'd do.
You might start with your belief that a carrier - apparently different than the one that is permanently forward deployed in Japan - will make China stop all its expansionistic efforts. What, specifically, will this carrier do? Unless you'd have it attack something, it's no different than an LCS, a patrol boat, or a combat canoe; it just floats around and does nothing.
What will this carrier do?
"there are ways to show China (and Iran, for that matter) tat we mean business."
DeleteWhat are these ways?
I'm sorry, but every time I've put forth a specific proposal, I feel that it has been mischaracterized for the sake of argument. For the record, I believe:
Delete- We should build warships, not cruise ships.
- We should be able to build a navy for about half the cost per ship that the USN is planning to spend.
- We need some high-end multi-purpose ships, but we have to fill out the numbers with cheaper single-purpose ships.
- Areas where the current USN approach is severely weak include ASW, MCM, NGFS, EMCON, and amphibious ops.
- USN ships spend too great a percentage of their time deployed, in part because deployed time is not used efficiently.
- Recruiting and retaining qualified sailors in the 21st century does require some habitability, but far short of where the USN is currently headed.
- We cannot measure the true effect of "presence" without knowing what would have been the effect of "absence," and since that is not knowable, any opinions about the utility of "presence" are just speculation.
So I'm just going to sit back and see what others think. What would you do, by the way? Once you end all deployments and pull everybody back to home waters to train and maintain, what in fact COULD you do? You seem to want to pursue a pretty aggressive strategy with China, and have panned my approach as "containment," so when and how do you transition from training in home waters to launching missions to degrade all of China's institutions (if am mischaracterizing your approach, I apologize).
And don't go mis-attributing to me any idea that training and maintenance don't matter. Our ships and sailors spend way too high a percentage of time deployed, in order to maintain a fairly minimal "presence"--look at the USNI weekly fleet trackers. The only solution would seem to be some combination of
1) a bigger (and thus inherently cheaper per ship) fleet (100 ships deployed out of 500-600 is a much smaller bite than 100 ships deployed out of 250-300, and we handled the former pretty easily in the 1980s),
2) more efficient use of deployed time (with the units and navies involved, AnnualEx should have been a one-week high-tempo ASW exercise, and it should have been scheduled when the RN task force was in the area with a second week with one group serving as an OpFor for the other), and
3) building alliances and turning a bunch of our commitments over to allies (the AnnualEx I just proposed could have been a pretty good test/shakedown for that idea).
I simply don't think that withdrawing to home waters and leaving a vacuum for China and Russia to fill will lead to anything but China and Russia filling that vacuum. I'm interested to know how you would prevent that.
Again, you've offered no specific action for our military 'presence' to take.
DeleteI've offered an entire blog of things we could/should be doing.
"I simply don't think that withdrawing to home waters and leaving a vacuum"
Who's advocating leaving a vacuum? Staying engaged is what missions are for.
Rather than cruising aimlessly around for 6-12 months while our ships, aircraft, equipment, and crews suffer wear and tear and lose any warfighting skills they may have had, we go home, train relentlessly, conduct ALL needed maintenance, and strive for combat readiness. As we do that, we conduct missions. For example, a great mission would have been to prevent the Chinese from building illegal islands and militarizing them. A great mission would be to forcibly evict the Chinese from Mischief Reef inside the Philippine EEZ (assuming we could get Philippine support!). A great mission would have been to provide air support for our EP-3 that was forced down and seized. A great mission would have been to bomb the EP-3 that China seized. A great mission would have been to sink the vessel that seized our UUV. A great mission would be to closely trail Chinese surface fleets during their exercises so we could collect intel. A great mission would be to send ASW units into the E/S China Seas to hunt and prosecute subs short of sinking them. A great mission would have been to ram the Chinese ships that tried to foul our towed arrays. And so on. Those are specific military actions, short of war, that would actually give the Chinese pause. They're aggressive but that's why they would be effective in deterring China. What they are not, is wishy-washy, vague, fantasies unconnected to reality.
You'll recall that I wrote an entire fictional account of one example of how to deal with China's illegal islands.
And, of course, we should be fully engaged on every other level but that's a topic for another blog.
So, not only would pulling back not leave a vacuum, it would be the exact opposite. We'd be more militarily engaged than ever and far more effectively. We just wouldn't have to be there on a daily basis for months on end while our equipment wears down and our crews lose their skills. We execute a mission when appropriate and return to base when the mission is complete.
Now, feel free to offer even one specific action you'd take that would actually deter China.
A few other thoughts.
DeleteA couple of years ago, when China pulled the clearance for some of our WestPac ships to visit Hong Kong, I would have arranged a visit to Kaohsiung. My guess is that Taiwan would have bent over backwards to make it happen, even on short notice. That's not shooting anybody or starting a war, but it does send a pretty clear signal. As far as Iran, when they send those small boats out to harass USN ships, I'd give them a minimum distance to stand off, and I'd sink the first one to violate that.
As far as a "containment" strategy, that's how we won Cold War I--contain the Soviets until their internal problems dragged them down. It might be a bit more difficult to win Cold War II that way--mainly because we've been asleep at the wheel for 30 years--but I still think it can be done, and China is certainly not devoid of internal problems that can drag it down. But our effort needs to be coordinated in three phases--military, economic, and political. And our domestic policy needs to complement our foreign policy.
"For example, a great mission would have been to prevent the Chinese from building illegal islands and militarizing them. A great mission would be to forcibly evict the Chinese from Mischief Reef inside the Philippine EEZ (assuming we could get Philippine support!). A great mission would have been to provide air support for our EP-3 that was forced down and seized. A great mission would have been to bomb the EP-3 that China seized. A great mission would have been to sink the vessel that seized our UUV. A great mission would be to closely trail Chinese surface fleets during their exercises so we could collect intel. A great mission would be to send ASW units into the E/S China Seas to hunt and prosecute subs short of sinking them. A great mission would have been to ram the Chinese ships that tried to foul our towed arrays. And so on. Those are specific military actions, short of war, that would actually give the Chinese pause. They're aggressive but that's why they would be effective in deterring China."
DeleteThat would be a pretty good laundry list of things that I would do. My question is this. Most of those are events of opportunity. If you start with the fleet back in home port, how do you get then there in time to do those things?
What I would NOT do is what you describe as "cruising aimlessly around for 6-12 months," and quite frankly I do not appreciate having my thoughts mischaracterized as such.
"Most of those are events of opportunity. If you start with the fleet back in home port, how do you get then there in time to do those things?"
DeleteWhy not increase the number of ships home ported in the areas where they would be doing missions?
Increase the number of ships stationed in Japan and Guam.
See if we can get back into Subic Bay and home port some ships there.
Maybe we can get some patrol craft working out of Cam Rahn Bay and establish a presence there.
Backing off of the South China Sea, maybe someplace like Darwin or Singapore.
In the Mediterranean maybe some ships in Italy or Malta.
Maybe an agreement with India for operations in the Indian Ocean and/or Persian Gulf.
Just throwing some ideas out there.
Diplomatically some of those spots might be challenging, but isn't that what the State Dept is supposed to be doing?
Lutefisk
"You might start with your belief that a carrier - apparently different than the one that is permanently forward deployed in Japan - will make China stop all its expansionistic efforts."
DeleteYou might start by recognizing that is not my belief, and I have never expressed that it was. What is my belief is that 1) without that carrier we do not know how far China would have taken its expansionistic efforts to date, but a good guess would be that Taiwan would no longer be independent, and 2) the types of actions to oppose Chinese expansion that you have suggested would likely be impossible without that carrier. One thing for sure, we were not going to provide air support for our EP-3 from San Diego.
"how do you get then there in time to do those things?"
DeleteThe illegal island bases didn't come into existence in one hour. They required months to construct. That's plenty of time to move forces to the area.
You seem to have another misconception and that is that every home port is in CONUS. There's nothing wrong (and a lot right!) about Guam as a home port or Yokosuka. Not every ship in the US Navy has to have Norfolk as its home port. Come on, open up your thinking!
"What I would NOT do is what you describe as "cruising aimlessly around for 6-12 months,"
You've described, in great detail, how you would generate deployments of several months. As I recall, in various comments you've specifically cited 2-6 month deployments (or longer? I can't recall specifically). At least own up to your own statements. With no specific mission, a deployment is, by definition, an aimless cruise. Own it.
Still waiting to hear any specific action that your carrier is going to do to deter the Chinese.
" my belief is that …"
DeleteOkay, that's your opinion and that's fine. I may disagree but you are free to express your opinion. In fact, I'll do one better and help you strengthen your belief!
First, you need to recognize that if the generally idle, forward deployed carrier has prevented the invasion of Taiwan (really? that's all it took to stop China? one idle carrier in Yokosuka? but, I digress …) then you don't really need to do anything else because it's still sitting there, idle … deterring.
Alternatively, if you think the idle carrier in Yokosuka has not deterred China then you need to come up with something concrete that a carrier can do that would actually deter China.
You see? You've kind of created a logical Catch-22. Either the carrier that's already there is effective in which case we don't need another or it's ineffective (as I contend) and you need to come up something for it to do.
So, what can a carrier do? Here's where I'll try to help. As you know, a carrier's only function is strike (well, defense, too). So, what can a carrier's air wing do that is short of total war? Here's some thoughts (some may mirror my previous list of actions):
-strafe/sink Chinese fishing vessels in Philippine/Vietnamese/other territorial waters
-aggressively 'buzz' Chinese naval activities in international waters (as Russia routinely does to us)
-Provide intercepts on Chinese aircraft violating Taiwanese and Japanese air space and Air Identification Zones
-Bomb artificial islands
-Bomb Mischief Reef in Philippine waters
-Conduct up close signals intercept and analysis of Chinese naval and air activities
-Ride herd on any Chinese aircraft that enters international air space
Do you see one of the problems with a carrier? The possible actions are pretty limited unless you want to approach war very closely. This suggests that a carrier is actually LESS effective than other assets that can employ less severe measures. A carrier also represents a much bigger risk for us by operating it so close to China with so little support (unless you're contemplating a full 4-carrier battle group with 30 some escorts!).
So, those are actions that might well deter China but the more effective ones approach war very closely. What actions do you see that appeal to you? Or … is this possibly a 'stop sign' about carrier usage for deterrence - telling us that a carrier is not a good instrument for deterrence?
Any other ideas on how to use a carrier?
Now maybe you see why I think so little of a carrier as a deterrent. Unless you're willing to use the air wing to strike, there's not much it can do. In general, I don't believe the military offers any great deterrence unless we're willing to use them. Iran is a great example. Despite our constant presence, Iran feels perfectly free to mine vessels right in front of us, conduct attack runs on our ships, export terror, seize our boats and crews, down our UAVs, etc. Why? Because they know that we won't do anything.
The most effective deterrence is economic backed up by selective military actions, as needed. One more carrier isn't going to deter anyone from anything (unless you want to strike?).
I'm afraid your comments about china being a bunch of people that hate on each other is too simple, and may be misleading. Sure, Chinese peoples/dialects may have issues with each other (same as any other tribes of the same people), but they certainly see outsiders as a far, far bigger threat.
DeleteMay I suggest that whilst cultural and traditional considerations are important, start looking at them simply as people (with their own interests).
Loc
"The most effective deterrence is economic backed up by selective military actions, as needed."
DeleteAgreed. That's been my approach all along, which you have previously criticized as "containment." Welcome to the club.
Sorry, no. My club has specific military actions. Yours does not. I'm still waiting to hear one specific carrier action. You're welcome to join my club but the price of admission is specific military actions.
Delete"Still waiting to hear any specific action that your carrier is going to do to deter the Chinese."
DeleteWe've had a carrier sitting in Japan for decades and China hasn't invaded Taiwan. We had 150,000 or so troops in western Europe for four decades and the Soviets never invaded. I can't give you a rigorous proof, because none of us knows what would have happened had those things not been there.
"Sorry, no. My club has specific military actions. Yours does not. I'm still waiting to hear one specific carrier action. You're welcome to join my club but the price of admission is specific military actions."
DeleteIf you want to claim the club as yours, fine. But I don't have to join it, I've been there all along.
"We've had a carrier sitting in Japan for decades and China hasn't invaded Taiwan."
DeleteThat's what I thought. No specific action. Just sitting idle. If that's the case and that idle carrier has been so successful in deterring China then your argument that we need a carrier to deter them is invalid because we already have one. So, as I've said all along, your position is actually status quo which allows China to continue their slow and steady expansion.
I said before, if status quo is your position (and it clearly is, militarily), then be proud of it and state it openly and loudly. We both agree that we need to engage on other levels although I strongly suspect that also lean towards status quo there, as well. However, that's for another blog.
Still waiting ...
Delete"I'm still waiting to hear one specific carrier action."
DeleteAs far as specific carrier actions, how about providing the air support for that EP-3 that you want, or for destroying that EP-3 on the tarmac after it landed? Actually, most of the specific acts you reference in your post above would utilize carrier air. You're not going to fly over from San Diego to do them. And you really can't do them from inport Sasebo or Yokosuka or Guam.
Actually, almost none of the missions I listed for myself would involve carriers and, in fact, most would be better executed by forces other than carriers. The only mission I listed that might be done by carrier air is escorting high value aircraft and even that's better done by land based air.
DeleteIt's clear that you have no actual military plan beyond a vague 'presence' that, even at its most optimistic, has only slowed the rate of Chinese expansion, not stopped it, and realistically hasn't even done that.
DeleteThat leaves only your oft described alliance of nations. The problem with that approach, aside from being impossible to do, is that it would have no power. Unlike Europe/NATO which did have the combined military power to oppose the Soviet Union, the entire collective military might of every first island chain country wouldn't even begin to approach that of China so the alliance would have no real power. Unified, they might be able to exert some small degree of political influence but that would be about the limit.
The addition of the US would, of course, match China's military might be we already have that without any other country so there's nothing to gain from such an alliance unless the various countries would allow us basing rights which is extremely unlikely. Think about it … the two most often cited prospects for a US base are Vietnam and Philippines, neither of which has any chance of happening!
So, your alliance concept fails because the individual countries are simply insufficiently strong to amount to anything worthwhile, even on a collective basis.
What that leaves is the US engaging China directly on every non-military level. This is eminently doable and would certainly succeed but requires some extreme measures such as deporting all non-citizen Chinese from the country, removing all manufacturing from China, eliminating all our dependence on China for strategic materials, etc. This is what we should be focusing on. In addition, we can work towards obtaining basing rights somewhere but that's an unlikely prospect and, even if successful, may not be that helpful (how to sustain an isolated, forward base during war?).
Partnering with India, specifically and individually, is a worthwhile effort.
Strengthening ties with Japan for the specific purpose of preparing for war with China is another worthwhile effort. We should be working to harden bases in Japan to make them survivable in war. Simply having basing rights to park a plane is nearly useless if the base can't survive sustained attacks.
I know you're enamored of a post-WWII type alliance but I don't see that an alliance is either likely nor would it be effective even if possible. You might want to give it some more thought and move beyond the vague concept and into specifics just as I've prodded you to do with your military desires. What, specifically, can your alliance actually accomplish?
"Actually, almost none of the missions I listed for myself would involve carriers and, in fact, most would be better executed by forces other than carriers. The only mission I listed that might be done by carrier air is escorting high value aircraft and even that's better done by land based air."
DeleteFrom what land base?
Also, if you are so dismissive of carrier air, why do you have so many carriers in your proposed fleet structure (more than I do in mine)?
"From what land base?"
DeleteThe same base the EP-3 came from?
" if you are so dismissive of carrier air, why do you have so many carriers in your proposed fleet structure"
Seriously? They're there for war, not peacetime deterrence.
"I know you're enamored of a post-WWII type alliance but I don't see that an alliance is either likely nor would it be effective even if possible. You might want to give it some more thought and move beyond the vague concept and into specifics just as I've prodded you to do with your military desires. What, specifically, can your alliance actually accomplish?"
DeleteI think we are trying to build the Quad--India, Australia, Japan, USA--into a stronger alliance, and that's where I'd start. You've already agreed that India and Japan are important. The AUKUS submarine deal can solidify things with Australia (and UK, although that's more for Europe). I still think a major motivation for the sub deal from our end is that a nuke sub base on the northern or western coast of Australia would be very convenient for USN boats to use for ops in the SCS. Also Australia is considering building an A2/AD system like China's to protect its northern flank. If its coverage reached as far as the Malacca and Sunda Straits, that creates a huge problem for China.
I would further strengthen the ties to Australia and UK (and bring New Zealand into the deal, FWIW) by trying to facilitate the CANZUK proposed alliance and forging very close ties with it. I'd probably start by bringing UK into NAFTA to give them a post-Brexit trade deal, then bring Australia into that.
At that point, India and Australia can take over some of our responsibilities in the Indian Ocean, Australia and Japan and Canada can take over some responsibilities in the Pacific, and with two carriers UK can pick up a lot of the load in Europe.
I would also look at some kind of associate membership in the Commonwealth. At that point, we would already have the two strongest Commonwealth countries in the region, but a couple of smaller ones--Malaysia and Singapore--have a very strategic location with respect to Malacca and Sunda. Finally, once we had everybody around them lined up, we could probably get Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Korea signed up. Having China basically surrounded by sea would create lots of problems for them, and expose a lot of weaknesses in their economy. Maybe it would just give us enough negotiating leverage to get some hard bargains out of them.
As far as specific military actions, they would depend to a great extent on what moves China makes. The critical question is what if China goes after Taiwan. I think the answer there depends on a lot of info that I am not cleared for, but if our presence is enough to keep China off Taiwan, that should be good enough.
I'm sorry that this is more conceptual than a list of specific events. You've given a laundry list of specific events, and I agree with your handling of them. If we can build up and economic, diplomatic, and military alliance around basically the first island chain, while maintaining enough presence to convince China that the cost of something like Taiwan might be more than they want to pay, I think we can come out ahead in the end.
Yes, it's a containment strategy, but it's containment with a hard edge, and that latter is the major change from where we have been. It's not, nor is it intended to be, more of the same.
We can debate this until the cows come home. The USN is obviously not going to do any of it, so it really does not matter. I'm out.
DeleteThe point of this is not to convince each other. The point is to discuss options and publicly present viable alternatives for those who read this blog. I get feedback from various sources and I know the active Navy, at all levels, reads this. My hope is that the thoughts on this blog can exert some small influence over Navy leaders and offer some alternative thinking to the idiocy of the formal Navy leadership.
Delete"The point of this is not to convince each other. The point is to discuss options and publicly present viable alternatives for those who read this blog. I get feedback from various sources and I know the active Navy, at all levels, reads this. My hope is that the thoughts on this blog can exert some small influence over Navy leaders and offer some alternative thinking to the idiocy of the formal Navy leadership."
DeleteAnd I think this forum does a really, really good job of that. You are clearly providing a useful service. I just hope tat some Navy leaders somewhere are reading it and considering the points being made.
I think the point ComNavOps is trying to make is that it's pointless to have presence if you refuse to use it.
DeleteAs to the point of balancing actions to prevent a larger conflict, perhaps we can take the example from 2016 when the Indonesian Navy fired upon to disable a Chinese fishing vessel, seized it and arrested the crew. From my recollection this was done in the presence of the Chinese coast guard that stood off and did not approach to "rescue" their compatriots as they usually do by ramming other ships.
I have no knowledge of any other nations that have fired upon Chinese vessels to this date. War did not start then, I wonder why nobody else have done this.
https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/south-china-sea-indonesian-navy-fires-at-and-arrests-chinese-fishermen/
When you breal it down by time/numbers, thats kinda telling!!
ReplyDeleteA couple of thoughts:
First: Why would/should the USN EVER participate in any multinational anything and be outnumbered?
Second: Since nobody else brought any, our auxilliaries are the only ones that were probably "busy".
Third: German participation is a bit suprising. Its a good thing of course, but the fact that they bothered is telling about the futureveiw in the Pacific.
Fourth: The fact that a CVN shows up anywhere besides drydock with just a CG and DD escort is pathetic. Where has the BG in CVBG gone?? Even in peacetime, this isnt ok. In the Pacific, we have a clear adversary. Shouldnt we be training/prepared 24/7?
Fifth: The participants, the numbers (especially Japanese), and current events like AUKUS, seem to show that everyone is rising to the pivot west. Except the USN...
CDR Chip, you know that I am not a navy person so this is not a rhetorical question...
ReplyDeleteWhy can't the navy home port ships in closer proximity to where they are forward deployed?
Wouldn't that solve some of the practical difficulties of replacing deployments with 'short' training missions?
Lutefisk
We have a number of those now, some in Japan and some in Rota. And we used to keep a bunch of the boomers in Holy Loch. I think there are some logistics issues associated with having your homeport on foreign soil, but it is something that the USN is doing on a smaller basis now and might consider expanding.
DeleteThe USN is having problems maintaining ships it already has; it cannot fix these problems without first fixing its problems with recruitment and retention, i.e., get and then keep the service members its ships need to keep them operational.
ReplyDeleteAn exercise like this can help the US maintain ties with its allies, but if those allies are unreliable- as was the unfortunate case in Afghanistan, with the Afghan National Army having nonexistent soldiers because its commanders embezzled the salaries those soldiers would've drawn- then the exercise will be nothing more than a waste of time and money, wearing down ships that will then require more time and money to maintain.
We need to get our house in order before we can wage a prospective Cold War II- and we obviously aren't waging such a war with any seriousness, considering we aren't making plans to ration fuel and other resources, rebuild domestic industries- in January of this year, news reports stated Ford idled vehicle production lines because it couldn't get computer chips manufactured in China, but the company didn't announce plans to build its own chips until NOVEMBER, ten months after it realized it had a problem- or even announcing a peacetime draft so we'll have the manpower needed in case the war goes hot.
Bring the ships home, and fix them- fix the shipyards while we're at it, along with the factories we need to build things the shipyards need to fix our ships. Bring the service members home, for rest, recovery, and then training and retraining so they'll be ready when we have to deploy them again. Stop wasting time, money, and in many unfortunate cases, lives.
I think the modern Japanese Navy (JMSDF) would make for a great subject for a series of posts.
ReplyDeleteBearing in mind that there is very little public information available, what aspects would you suggest looking at?
DeleteI understand that there isn't much good info publicly available, unless your Japanese is much better than mine, still there's plenty of interesting aspects.
DeleteHere's a few:
- Their approach to shipbuilding is interesting and seems more effective than what the US is doing.
Are they simply avoiding the obviously stupid stuff, or is there something more to it?
- They've produced a lot of designs in recent years, do you see any of them as particularly interesting?
- Can the JMSDF and Japan in general successfully defend against a Chinese attack, if the USA doesn't join the war?
The "fun" part will be finding out if they actually had lessons learned, as in something went wrong. With this kind of exercise, it should be nothing more than an excuse for the commanders involved to attend a celebration party But I have noticed more than a few times even these cake walks end up with problems. Just attempting the basics on these was where LCS problems started being recognized by those outside the program.
ReplyDeleteSad but true.
The surprising part of this exercise is the german contingent of it.
ReplyDeleteWith the state of readiness of that nation's military, let alone its navy, I'm amazed they were able to get a ship into the Pacific at all.
Yeah, that one was interesting and puzzling. Germany is never going to jump into a fight with China and haven't got the resources to do so even if they wanted to so what was their goal? I have no idea.
DeleteHi CNO,
ReplyDeleteIn line with- what's the point of long duration deployments and minimal exercises, Navy Lookout published an interesting article on the UK Carrier Group global deployment here:
https://www.navylookout.com/what-did-the-2021-carrier-strike-group-deployment-achieve/
It was, it seems, a real life example of sign up and see the world- a paid worldwide holiday. The hundreds of dignitaries and senior military hosted was huge. Some helicopter groups spent several hundred hours drilling, though it works out at about an hour a day. Great for working out the kinks in the carrier, and building soft power, I guess. No mention of actual war fighting though.
Andrew
The article gets really bad if you analyze the numbers.
DeleteFor example, the 18 F-35s flew 2200 hrs which sounds impressive until you do the math and realize that's only 122 hrs per aircraft. For the 244 day deployment that's 0.5 hrs per day per aircraft. They flew 1278 sorties for 2200 hrs which is only 1.7 hrs per sortie.
They ran 18 set-piece naval/air exercises so a chunk of those air hours were worthless scripted - probably air show type flying for the entertainment of dignitaries - hours that accomplished nothing.
The real question is, if the RN has to go to war today, did this deployment prepare them for combat? Or, did it prepare them for hosting diplomatic events?
"if the RN has to go to war today"
DeleteWho would they be fighting?
A Russian assault on Ukraine. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan. A renewed Argentine assault. Iran attempting to close the gulf. Russian subs in UK waters. An erratic and unpredictable Turkey. …
DeleteWho knows? Wars have a way of popping up.
China is simply way too large and distant for the UK to do anything about it except maybe send a few, token skips in solidarity with US/JAP/Taiwan.
Delete(This also applies to all others European nations.)
Iran is smaller and much less powerful, but the same still applies, and again the US would to most of the job anyway..
Argentine is back into its usual cycle of internal mess, and really REALLY unlikely to be a threat again.
Turkey, yes, could be an issue, but it won't be an UK-only issue.
The RN would operate together with FRA/SPA/ITA/etc., against an inferior enemy, so that's already plenty of overkill unless they're retarded.
A full-fledged Ukraine war would essentially be a land affair, assuming it even happens.
Submarines could be a vital threat to the UK, and while I don't think Russia would do something so stupid, ASW is or at least should be a major focus.
While the USA has to care about wars all over the world (at least until the current policy of being the world's cop continues), the UK is not the British Empire of old.
The main naval needs are strong ASW and occasionally beating up smaller, riotous nations with the help of other European nations.
Unless British policy changes, one would have to ask whether their force structure matches their actual needs.
(Do they need aircraft carriers at all, for example?)
But that's not popular nowadays.
If a war breaks out between the US and China, the UK is in it. They'll stand with us as they always have and always will - as we will for them. So, they need to be prepared to contribute to a high end fight.
DeleteThe same applies to Iran.
Argentina is always a threat. Argentina still claims sovereignty over the Falklands and the Falklands remains a constant reminder of failure for Argentina and eventually they'll try again. The issue did not go away just because Argentina lost the previous battle.
And so on.
The point of having a military is to be prepared for both the known threats and the unanticipated threats which seem to arise all too often. The UK will not fight a major war by itself but if the UK is going to contribute to wars it has to be prepared. If war starts today, did their carrier deployment prepare them for it? If not, it was a useless deployment; and it sounds like it was a useless deployment.
Unless you can predict with 100% accuracy where and when wars will come, the only alternative is to be prepared for war today.
"Unless you can predict with 100% accuracy where and when wars will come, the only alternative is to be prepared for war today."
DeleteAgreed. And when it comes to the probability of doing that, I'm reminded of a quote from former SecDef Gates:
"...when it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more -- we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged."
Many years ago, I was in counterinsurgency training prior to going to Vietnam. Someone asked one of our instructors, "Sir, what will the next war be?" His answer, "The one we don't prepare for."
DeleteWars are a come as you are event. You don't fight wars with the forces you are building, you fight them with the forces you have now.
"We say we’re pivoting away from anti-terrorism and nation building to peer competition and yet we can’t seem to let go of these useless, low end, group hug exercises. Where are the massive, high end, combat exercises that last for weeks … you know, like a real war operation would?"
ReplyDeleteWe need to pivot away from nation-building, but we better keep a pretty strong anti-terror force. If anything, we need to be better at anti-terror than we have been.
But we do need to focus on more realistic training. I would favor an annual Fleet Problem or Springtrain type exercise, with every ship that can get underway participating, some as OpFor.