Desert Storm provided an interesting perspective on the use of special forces in a conventional war. General Schwarzkopf was dead set against the use of special forces and had no plans to use them until forced by the President to do so.
Army Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, the four-star commander of US Central Command and the war's military leader, viewed unconventional-warfare units with skepticism.
Initially, Schwarzkopf was adamantly against special-operations units having any significant role in the conflict — though he did accept some Delta Force operators as personal bodyguards.
… after some persuasion from the White House and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Schwarzkopf relaxed his no-commandos policy. (1)
The problem with special forces in conventional wars is that, by definition, they can’t provide any significant firepower effects due both to their small unit size and their lack of heavy weaponry. The best case scenario is a minor, occasional, nuisance effect and that’s not a war-winning impact. Balanced against that minor impact is the significant cost required to man, train, and logistically support an entire military branch. In addition, special forces seem to constantly require emergency extraction which takes away from the activities of other forces.
I recognize that this is not going to be a popular post for many people but, objectively, it is what it is.
Now, let’s consider some of the historical successes by special forces in conventional wars:
WWII Coastwatchers – This consisted of individuals who were inserted into enemy territory to report on enemy ship movements.
Vietnam Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP, “Lurp”) – These small units inserted into enemy territory to provide deep reconnaissance.
French and Indian War (1754-1763) Rogers Rangers – This force was initially formed to provide scouting and reconnaissance but grew and morphed into light infantry.
Decima Flottiglia MAS – This Italian group of ‘frogmen’ conducted many ‘human torpedo’ attacks with a couple of partial successes such as temporarily disabling the British HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant. Overall, the effect was negligible and many/most forces were killed or captured.
The preceding examples demonstrate that there are a couple of characteristics of successful historical special forces:
Small Size – The forces have been small, ranging from individuals to small units. Contrast that to today’s special force organizations which have ballooned in size and have become bloated, self-propagating entities.
Reconnaissance – The focus of successful historical special forces has been reconnaissance as opposed to firepower effects. The question is whether the enhanced reconnaissance is worth the maintenance of entire organizations? Could the information thus obtained have been obtained using other, possibly better, methods?
Unfortunately, the historical characteristics of successful special forces seem to be at odds – indeed, almost direct opposites – with today’s special forces which are large and ever-growing and have moved far beyond (left behind?) traditional reconnaissance roles and into light infantry roles.
How does all this tie into the Navy?
The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) comprises approximately 10,000 personnel, including active duty and reserve component Special Warfare Operators, known as SEALs; Special Warfare Boat Operators, known as Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC); reserve personnel; support personnel, referred to as Enablers; and civilians. NSWC headquarters is located at Coronado, CA, and is composed of eight active duty SEAL Teams, two reserve component SEAL Teams, two SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams, three Special Boat Teams, and two Special Reconnaissance Teams. Because SEALs are considered experts in special reconnaissance and direct action missions—primary counterterrorism skills—NSWC is viewed as well-postured to fight a globally dispersed enemy ashore or afloat. NSWC forces can operate in small groups and have the ability to quickly deploy from Navy ships, submarines and aircraft, overseas bases, and forward-based units. (2)
That’s 10,000 people, untold quantities of equipment, and vast sums of money all to support a force that will have little use in a conventional peer war. That’s a lot of resources that could be better used by the regular Navy. None of this is to suggest that Navy special forces be totally eliminated – just that they be vastly scaled back. Navy SEALs, for example, should stop deploying as a ground infantry force and get back to operations in the water. For an in-depth discussion of SEAL forces and the kind of missions they should be performing see, “SEALs”.
Conclusion
The US’ special forces have grown out of the last few decades of continual small wars and anti-terrorism activities. Given that impetus and the inexorable tendency of any organization to attempt to grow itself (the bureaucracy is expanding to meet the needs of the expanding bureaucracy), the special forces have expanded beyond all reason and need.
As stated about Navy SEALs , this is not to suggest that all special forces be eliminated but they should be vastly scaled back. Conventional forces are more than sufficient for most of the missions we’re currently using special forces for. We also need to reorient our military away from minor conflicts and back to peer war.
Future peer wars are going to be massive, fast, and deadly with armor and artillery being emphasized (as the US will quickly discover, to its regret). This is not an environment where special forces will be particularly useful unless they re-embrace their roots of small size and reconnaissance.
_____________________________________
(1)Insider website, “How US special-operations forces helped the US military win its first post-Cold War victory”, Stavros Atlamazoglou, 23-Feb-2021,
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-us-special-operations-forces-helped-win-the-gulf-war-2021-2
(2)https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf
Another cost, the elite forces effect, siphoning off the more active officers and men from the vanilla force.
ReplyDeleteReducing the quality of the vanilla force.
I think Italy might have figured out the right approach to the problem you described exactly with the "Decima MAS" frogmen unit you mentioned.
ReplyDeleteYes, they didn't win the war alone but despite technological inferiority they provided an extremely cost-effective way to hit enemy capital ships.
Compare that with the current US paradigm of very numerous, expensive special forces using even more expensive high-tech weapons.
The US Navy needs to recover its SEALs from the US Army's Special Ops command where they mostly perform Army missions and transform them into true naval commandos.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.g2mil.com/commandos.htm
They absolutely do not. You completely ignore the repeated errors and inability of conventional forces to pull off special operations, particularly to coordinate multi-service/agency operations (e.g. The Mayaguez, Iran hostage crisis) that lead to the creation of SOCCOM through the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment (Title 10, Section 167, US Code ) as a supplement to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In no way are conventional forces capable of doing SOCOMs job.
Delete"In no way are conventional forces capable of doing SOCOMs job."
DeleteCorrect. Of course, the flip side is that in no way should SOCOM be doing conventional forces' job, either. That would be an egregious waste of resources, talent, and training. Unfortunately, that seems to be happening far too often.
What role, if any, do you see for SOCOM in a conventional war with China?
Starting with the present pre-war conditions:
Delete* Establish guerilla and recon capability in the PI and Taiwan.
* Special boats units as "aggressive" Coastal units to deal with the fishing fleets both before and during the war.
* Advise Vietnamese forces
* Improve port security by Red Cell OPFOR exercise
* Set mines in potential port staging areas.
* Gather intel on the "naval militia"
In wartime:
* Clear mines (since we don't have time to wait for the LCS to do it)
* Sabotage (limpet mines) ships, especially supply and commercial vessels.
* Infiltration and seizure of control points in harbors.
* Attack and sabotage African ports, denying them raw materials.
* Attach ECM devices to the hulls of enemy vessels for eavesdropping.
* Tapping into underwater communication lines.
* Raids against coastal radar stations.
* Backfilling missions in other areas of the world while main fleet engages in the Pacific.
At least that's a few things I hear about. My regular job is as a Librarian for a Spec Ops training center.
"pre-war conditions"
DeleteThere's a LOT we can do during peacetime and should be doing.
"In wartime:"
Most of these are invalid or insignificant or better handled by other forces.
For example, any mine clearance capability SOCOM has is miniscule compared to the magnitude of the mine problem during war.
We would undoubtedly blockade China's shipping at the ports of origin around the world. That doesn't require special forces.
Eavesdropping on enemy vessels. Presumably that means warships since civilian cargo ships won't know anything of value and will be blockaded. There's no way anyone is getting close enough to enemy warships to 'listen'.
If we're not already tapping into comm lines then we're already failing.
And so on.
The list sounds like wishful thinking from people looking to justify their existence. Cruise missiles will do most of those jobs are better, easier, and cheaper than special forces. Do those tasks seem both plausible and desirable to you?
We somehow won World War II without SOCCOM. The Marines were America's traditional special ops, but Pentagon squabbling games to let everyone play in every minor op caused problems. SOCCOM was created to give the White House/CIA/NSA their own little army to employ without having to go through the Pentagon and Regional Commanders, who often objected to illegal operations. This has led to several disasters, like Black Hawk Down and Benghazi where SpecOps got into trouble and had no immediate support since the regional commanders had not been told what they were doing.
Delete@G2mil: “We somehow won World War II without SOCCOM. The Marines were America's traditional special ops…”
DeleteFalse. The USA and her allies had an enormous quantity of SOF forces in WW2 that very much performed missions in a role similar to USSOCM striking German atomic weapon research, intelligence raids against German air search radars, seizing key bridges on D-Day, working with indigenous forces, and so forth. BTW, Captain Phil Bucklew, the father of Naval Special Warfare, one of the first UDTs, after D-day in France, went to China to conduct Office of Strategic Services (OSS) missions against the Japanese with indigenous Chinese forces.
Both the Central Intelligence Agency (in 1947) the Army Special Warfare Group of 1952 (which in turn served as a model for USSOCOM) evolved from the OSS. Page 72 of the Journal of National Security Law & Policy [Vol. 12:7]
https://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/USSOCOM-and-SOF%E2%80%94War-Around-the-Edges_2.pdf
Other WW2 Allied SOF (the Germans had the Brandenbergers, the Italians had the Decima Mas):
United Kingdom
• Special Service Brigade, or Commandos.
• The Parachute Regiment (formed from the Commandos)
• The Special Air Service
• The Special Boat Service
• No. 10 (Inter-Allied - French Commandos Marine, Dutch Korps Commandotroepen, Belgian Paracommando Brigade)
• The Long Range Desert Group
• Chindits
• Australian Z Special Unit and M Special Unit.
United States
• Office of Strategic Services
• United States Army Rangers
• USA/USN UCTs
• United States Navy UDTs
• Marine Raiders
• Merrill's Marauders
• United States and Canada also formed the 1st Special Service Force ("Devil's Brigade")
Italian frogmen of the Decima Flottiglia MAS arguably made the entire axis North African campaign possible by sinking or putting out of action a number of British warships in 1941 including two battleships HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant.
DeleteGab, WW2 OSS = current CIA which has fields its own (not inconsiderable) paramilitary forces outside of SOCCOM so they are a bit apples to oranges.
DeleteI believe G2mil's point about the SEALs role highlights a critical issue. What exactly were the SEALs doing in Afghanistan, a landlocked nation without any large bodies of water? Wikipedia even has a line that they initially lacked suitable vehicles and had to get Humvees from the Rangers.
I concur with ComNavOps and G2mil's points that USSOCOM exists to allow military operations with minimal public or Congressional oversight and debate, and as an arena of budgetary contest. This is similar to what happened with nuclear weapons in the 50's and 60's where all of the branches of the services contended for budget dollars and Congress would fund anything "atomic". "Special Operations" are "cool" with their call backs to action and war movies, military hardware geeks, and generally successful promotion with the US public and Congress. Therefore all of the branches have to have components in SOCOM to get in on the budge gravy.
I'll note that the Wikipedia page for USSOCOM basically says the Marine Raider Regiment currently exist to train allied military forces. That's nominally ~3,000 Marines parcelled out in tiny detachments scattered about the globe and therefore not immediately available in the event of war. And why does that mission need to be under SOCOM?
@Jay Kay: “WW2 OSS = current CIA which has fields its own (not inconsiderable) paramilitary forces…”
DeleteWrong. Wikipedia is not authoritative, and USSOCOM absolutely traces its origins to the OSS:
“… the modern age of U.S. special operations dates back to the behind- the-lines actions of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II. The OSS was dissolved when that war ended in 1945, but within a few years, both the Central Intelligence Agency (in 1947) and an Army Special Warfare Group (in 1952) evolved from it.” https://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/USSOCOM-and-SOF%E2%80%94War-Around-the-Edges_2.pdf [That ‘Special Warfare Group’ ultimately became 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) today. Also consider the career of Phil Bucklew CAPT, USN (Ret) – the Naval Special warfare center is named after him, for more on the relationships of the UDT to the OSS. https://www.usni.org/press/oral-histories/bucklew-phil, also the book “Brave Men, Dark Waters.]
The CIA and other IC agencies have relied on SOF augmenting their forces since 2001 – there are standing MOUs on this:
“The CIA has relied heavily on special operations personnel to support its paramilitary activities, and the CIA and USSOCOM have worked together extensively since 2001 on global counterterrorism operations.”
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21048
I would suggest your point about the IC relying on SOCOM to augment their forces in cover counter-terror ops just reinforces my point that SOCOM is a means to avoid oversight and as a budgetary black hole.
DeleteAnd maybe it's just me, but SOCOM being aligned with IC counter terror covert ops feels like it moves it away from conventional warfighting.
@Jay Kay: “reinforces my point that SOCOM is a means to avoid oversight and as a budgetary black hole.”
DeleteYou are making unsupported and baseless allegations.
SOCCOM was created by the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment (Title 10, Section 167, US Code) as a supplement to the Goldwater-Nichols Act – long before MOUs with the IC.
Further, SOCOM has a reporting chain through the SECDEF and President, its budget (MFP 11 funding) goes straight through the
If you want to talk about budgetary black holes: pull the thread on conventional force “CERP funds” in Iraq. Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) only got so far…
@Jay Kay: ”And maybe it's just me, but SOCOM being aligned with IC counter terror covert ops feels like it moves it away from conventional warfighting.”
DeleteSOCOM was *never* oriented to conventional warfighting and it literally traces its origins back to the OSS. You keep making baseless comments and analysis. Please research the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment and its background, as well as Joint Publication 3-05 before making these comments.
“In considering what USSOCOM and SOF should do for the next twenty years, we must remember the reasons why SOF’s origins lay outside the conventional military force structure. In this gray zone era between undeclared conflicts and declared wars, *we ought not be trying to figure out how SOF can support large-scale conventional operations*[emphasis added].” https://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/USSOCOM-and-SOF%E2%80%94War-Around-the-Edges_2.pdf Yes, I provided this link before. ☹
Special Forces work best as conventional forces' force multipliers- in the case of reconnaissance units, pinpointing enemy forces' locations so Army artillery barrages, Air Force air strikes, Navy naval gunfire and/or cruise missile strikes can erase them from existence. They also work well to counter enemy special forces units, e.g., Viet Cong guerillas.
ReplyDeleteThey do NOT work well for the "win war on the cheap" plans the US government keeps putting out. Special Forces can't do their jobs in a vacuum, they need something to support, and they need something to support them in turn- for firepower, for transportation, for diplomacy so potential allies won't misidentify them as enemies and then shoot them on reflex- but they keep getting put in a vacuum, as no government leader seems willing to fill the void.
What if the Navy dumped it all? Gave the Corps some of the teams, let the rest transfer to the army or CIA, and sent the SWCC and boats to the Corps for the commandant's island small unit combat fantasy.
ReplyDeleteThat would free millions, invest in a few more Burkes (since they can't get any other designs right) and man them. And be able to pull some maintence.
I agree. We have a massive Marine Corps, larger than the British Army, larger than the Israeli army. Far too large for available amphibious lift. We have Navy ships lacking crews. Shouldn't Marines perform these naval infantry missions, as they once did?
DeleteI wholeheartedly agree that the entire NSW community needs to go back to the sea. There is a reason why there is “Naval” in NSW and that SEALs & SWCCs are sailors 1st then their rate second. If there are SEALs onboard a ship, a fire breaks out, and don’t have a real general quarters station then they are reporting to the Repair Locker!
ReplyDeleteI vaguely recalled an article discussing a letter penned by NSW leadership to their community of their pivot back to the sea. I don’t know if anything tangible came out of that.
A question I have is: Does the Fleet know how to use SEALs and SWCCs in the combat envisioned to happen in the Pacific?
SEALs exist because Marine Generals became fixated with big unit Army missions, and the Underwater Demo Teams had nothing to do during the Vietnam war. SEALs arose and joined the Army and spent much time deploying to land locked Afghanistan.
DeleteUDT teams were heavily deployed in Vietnam - I would be happy to introduce you to former team members.
DeleteWere they performing their role in clearing shallow water mines, or repurposed as commandos who went ashore?
DeleteUDTs "went ashore" in Korea to conduct several inland demolition raids and other activities; in fact they had USMC units attached as security in a way that is echoed by 75th Ranger Regiment units providing security for certain National Special Mission Units today. There is nothing new about UDT missions ashore, and the common USMC stereotype of UDTs being solely support units for marines is incorrect.
DeleteFrogmen assigned to SEAL Team ONE and Two went through the same training at BUD/S and often came from the UDTs. UDT 11, 12, 21, and 22 were converted into SEAL and SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams in the 1980s (becoming ST-5, SDVT-1, ST-4 and SDVT-2 respectively). Two additional SEAL Teams (3 and 8) were added later. So the actual number frogman has largely been stable since the 1960s.
Naval Aviation also supported the SEAL and UDT Teams with Helicopter Attack (Light) Squadrons that was disestablished after the Vietnam conflict and recreated in various forms only to be disestablished again after 2006 or so. This largely mimicked USA Green Beret Special Forces Group organization, which generally had an attached aviation battalion during the Vietnam and Southeast Asia conflicts.
I suspect that discussion of the likely roles of small units operating independently in a likely future China conflict is hindered by them being considered politically awkward, much like any talk of movement restrictions in pandemic planning pre-Covid.
ReplyDeleteAssuming Taiwan is successfully annexed, then one likely next step for China would be seizing enough territory (such as islands) to provide effective control of a second exit to the First Island chain to the west, the Indian Ocean. Taiwan merely gives them access to the Pacific, which is not bounded by the countries they most seek influence over at present.
Beach reconnaissance, underwater obstacle clearing, plus the ability to reconnoitre or board some of the thousands of craft that will be in the area (China has upto 800,000 civilian fishing boats and we should assume that most of them will be requisitioned in the event of war) are roles that would be needed.
However, the numbers involved are staggering. I suspect that robust rules of engagement would be needed for any successful counter-move, which hinders rational discussion now. Plus with hundreds of islands potentially in play it seems legitimate to argue whether the sheer scale of tasks required should see conventional military re-tasked to some of them.
Brendan, the PRC has already begun what you suggest. There has been an ongoing bidding war for influence over the Pacific island nations between the ROC and the PRC where they essentially buy off governments. The PRC has also engaged in an emigration campaign of sending citizens to some of these island nations as well as purchasing port facilities. Once the PRC annexes Taiwan they will already have a well-established foothold in the western Pacific.
DeleteI am sure that this post was about Special Operations Forces (SOF): Special forces refers to specific Army units aka the Green Berets, under the command of 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne). The quotes about General Norman Schwarzkopf are hysterical, even as forces were flowing into theater, he had to be directed by the NCA and CJCS to actually move forces into position! The General and his staff apparently did not contemplate actual offensive action until the White House and Pentagon put boots in his behind…
ReplyDeleteAs a former frogman, and someone who has audited ‘a few’ budgets and programs for Congress; I find it laughable to claim that SOCOM, and by default Naval Special Warfare, somehow represents a huge waste of money for what it provides. SOF guys are not 10-feet tall, they have a limited application in peer warfare, nor do they block bullets with gold plated underwear, but they are an instrument of national power, and do provide a critical capability beyond what the conventional military can, or should do. They can be misused, and have done stupid things, but saying they should be arbitrarily cut in size is just as silly as calls certain politicians have made to arbitrarily increase SOF.
As to Naval Special warfare: there are about 2,000 operators and that number has been fairly constant over decades: during Vietnam there two SEAL teams (1 and 2), and four UDT teams (UDT-11, 12, 21, and 22) that were converted into SEAL and SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams in the 1980s. Two additional SEAL Teams (3 and 8) were added. Naval Aviation supported the Teams with a Helicopter Attack (Light) Squadron that was disestablished after the Vietnam conflict and recreated in various forms only to be disestablished again.
Looking honestly at capabilities and costs, the entire ~180,000-man USMC represents a far greatest potential for military efficiency and cost savings than curtailing a few frogmen and small boat crews. The utility/requirement for sea-borne infantry in the current geopolitical situation is minimal at best. USMC aviation units largely duplicate USAF and USN capabilities, and the USMC ground combat element largely duplicates mission sets that the U.S. Army, specifically the XVIII Airborne Corps, does better. The Army has a global power projection capability and can put more soldiers on the ground faster than the USMC. The 82nd Airborne Division can put its entire division anyplace a MEU can go, with the alert PIR conducting a vertical envelopment anywhere in less than 2-days, with the rest of the division to flow in in less than a week, perhaps the rest of the XVIII Airborne Corps. Anything beyond light infantry, in other words peer-peer combat, is strictly an Army show. And this does not address the staggering cost of procuring and operating Amphibious shipping, or the cost incurred by the Navy of providing medical personnel to the USMC, which certainly exceeds the 9,000 or so sailors under Naval Special Warfare Command. Indeed, the USMC has spent most of its existence with less than 30,000 marines.
Sad, but true. During the Cold War, the USMC foolishly sought to become a second US Army AND a third USAF (USN carrier-borne aviation being the second USAF), and the Pentagon foolishly let it; the problem only worsened after the Cold War, with the USMC preventing other services from using MARPAT uniforms, due to a desire to remain "special," forcing the US Army, Navy, and Air Force to each develop their own BDU replacements, a duplication of effort that wasted money that became increasingly scarce, due to budget cuts.
DeleteAnd now the USMC wants to become a third USN (the USCG being the second), as noted in ComNavOps' articles on the "Light Amphibious Warship" that's not light, not really amphibious (unless you're willing to write off all her embarked marines as casualties BEFORE they may debark to perform an amphibious assault), and not a warship (unless the only "warships" you're willing to have her face, are fishing boats whose crewmen bear AKM rifles, like Somali pirate vessels). If the Pentagon doesn't spank the service as the spoiled child it is, the USM will only waste more money other services can put to better use, if not lives in hair-brained schemes that'll make Operation Eagle Claw look like Desert Storm.
"During the USMC foolishly sought to become a second US Army AND a third USAF (USN carrier-borne aviation being the second USAF), . . ."
DeleteThey had some help. Per 10 U.S. Code § 8063, "The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein."
The USMC has historically been the most politically adept branch, sometimes to the detriment of the overall military. I mean they patented their camo pattern for pete's sake as per Wikipedia:
Delete"MARPAT was also chosen because it distinctively identifies its wearers as Marines to their adversaries, while simultaneously helping its wearers remain concealed. This was demonstrated by a Marine spokesman at the launch of MARPAT, who stated: "We want to be instantly recognized as a force to be reckoned with. We want them to see us coming a mile away in our new uniforms."[5] As such, the U.S. Marine Corps restricts use of the camouflage, preventing its use in most other divisions of the United States military with the exception of some elements of the U.S. Navy."
None of that strikes me as the basis for sound decision making.
I think you are right about small size & reconnaissance. One historical success you did not mention was at Inchon
ReplyDeleteMacArthur gets the credit. But it never would have happened without Lieutenant Eugene Clark USN and his small team of ROK Navy men. On the spur of the moment they inserted onto Yonghung-Do Island on Flying Fish Channel just 14 days prior to the landing. They obtained critical data on tides, beach composition, mudflats, seawalls, mines in the channel, lights, NK Army strength, fortifications, artillery positions, etc. It wasn't just secret squirrel snooping, they had to fight off several attacks, and did some mine removal. They also lit up Palmi-Do Lighthouse on the night of the landing to guide Admiral Struble's Task Force through the Channel.
Some argue that satellites, UAVs, and UUVs are all we need now for reconnaissance. But IMHO there is no replacement for human eyeballs and a human brain on the spot.
Later Clark and his team hopscotched up the coastal islands north to the Yalu. They confirmed reports of Chicoms crossing the river into Korea but unfortunately this time their intel was ignored by Mac and his staff.
A bit more on the topic. More of a how SOCOM is useful in the not so war that likely is to be the actual war rather than old school shooting style. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/november/china-and-russia-are-waging-irregular-warfare-against-united
ReplyDelete@CNO: “What role, if any, do you see for SOCOM in a conventional war with China?”
ReplyDeleteThis is very sensitive, and no I am not ‘read’ into it. Admiral Eric Olsen, former Commander of USSOCOM offered some tidbits in his article The Tools of Influence and Access USSOCOM and SOF: War Around the Edges. https://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/USSOCOM-and-SOF%E2%80%94War-Around-the-Edges_2.pdf
I note that the USA faces many threats, and that not every tool in the DoD or USG has a major, or any role in a conventional war against China. We live in an age with man-portable thermonuclear devices, a detonation of just one would absolutely devastate the nation. What USG organization has the lead on Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction – USSOCOM.
SOCOM has a lot of weird, but important missions that have implications that are not readily apparent, let alone understood to somebody without dcetailed knowledge. Some activities that appear to be ‘low value’ to someone focused on conventional war (like Foreign Internal Defense), may actually be hugely important as a means of developing relationships with people we need decades later. Our society is very impersonal, most people in the world are very relationship focused (e.g. Arabs, Latins, etc.) do want to deal with people they do not know. Armies are rarely destroyed in detail, the over-whelming number of defeats throughout history are triggered after a relatively small number of troops are killed: warfare is mostly psychological. (John Kegan: ‘The Face of Battle’)
GAB, I am not sure the argument that SOCOM has a lot of missions that cannot be readily understood outside of the experts is a great line to tske in a democracy which emphasizes civillian control over the military and spends a huge amount of money on its military.
DeleteI would certainly argue that FID/counter-insurgency is not a good example as it is readily understandable by civilians and you can't understand the modern world without understanding the history (and failures) of US counter-insurgency efforts.
@Jay Kay you are literally twisting my words out of context and then totally missed the point of FID!
DeleteI gave FID was an example of a mission that most MIL bloggers would grade as worthless mission.
FID missions were originally justified as a ‘peace time’ training extension for SOF, particularly for U.S. Army Special Forces; benefit to host nation forces was incidental!
Recall that Green Berets were specifically created to perform the Unconventional Warfare (UW) mission against the Soviet Union, which is SF heavily recruited Eastern Europeans back in the 1950s.
Looks like something is not working very well.
ReplyDelete“Royal Marines commandos 'dominated' US troops and forced them into a humiliating surrender just days into a mass training exercise in the Mojave desert, it has been revealed today.
“British forces took part in a five-day mock battle at the US Marine Corps' Twentynine Palms base in southern California, one of the largest military training areas in the world, and achieved a decisive victory against their American counterparts.
“The Royal Marines, along with allied forces from Canada, the Netherlands and the UAE, destroyed or rendered inoperable nearly every US asset and finished the exercise holding more than 65 per cent of the training area, after beginning with less than 20 per cent.
“Combatants used paintball-style training ammunition, which fires with reduced pressure and velocity, along with hi-tech simulators for heavier firepower like artillery, and live ammo on expansive ranges.
“Seeing no opportunity for victory, American combatants asked for the exercise to be 'reset' halfway through the five-day exercise, having taken significant casualties from British commandos.
…
“The Royal Marines trained with counterparts from the US, Canada, UAE and the Netherlands in the weeks before the main exercise.
“The British forces achieved their victory by targeting the American headquarters and equipment, severely hampering the ability of US combatants to launch counter-attacks.
“Artillery units also concentrated on eliminating vehicles and opposing artillery.
“A long-range commando assault with fighter jet support eventually defeated the American forces, who had launched a last-minute attack but were repelled.
“British forces were trialling the new Littoral Response Group (LRG) structure, which will be the new template for commandos - who are to become more flexible and mobile under reforms directed by First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin.
“LRGs are Royal Navy task groups centred around commando forces and set up to respond to world events.
“Following the restructuring of the Marines, Nato's northern and Baltic flanks will be covered by the UK-based LRG (North).
“LRG (South), built around Taunton-based 40 Commando, will be based around Oman's port of Duqm, operating with a focus on British military activity in the Indo-Pacific.
“Each LRG will be capable of working with the carrier strike group to assemble an expeditionary strike force which can operate anywhere in the world.
“The exercise focused around three urban sprawls which were defended by allied forces, the largest of which consisting of 1,200 buildings purpose built for military testing.
“The Marines won decisive battles early on and gained ground from their enemy, but amid a US Marines counter-attack, commandos carried out raids behind enemy lines.
“The exercise concluded with a last-minute assault by US forces, which was repelled.
“'Our success has proved the new commando force concept is more lethal and sophisticated than ever before and I am immensely proud of every member of the LRG and their vital contributions,' said Lieutenant Colonel Andy Dow, Commanding Officer of 40 Commando.
“'Operating alongside our partners from the USA, Netherlands, Canada and the UAE gives us a fantastic opportunity to test, integrate and continue to push our capabilities in new and innovative directions.
“'Throughout this deployment our focus has been on integrating game-changing capabilities from across the commando force to deliver disproportional effect in the face of a free-thinking peer adversary.'”
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10159949/Royal-Marines-commandos-force-troops-humiliating-surrender-training-exercise.html
While, as a UK-phile, I greatly enjoyed those media reports, reading further from public sources it seems more like the sort of exercise that western forces should be having.
DeleteThe US Marines were on both sides of the exercise, and I have read reports of marines placing trackers on the opposing forces vehicles and trying to listen in on the other team's HQ's. While a peer opponent might not use the same methods, it's the type of intelligence gathering and behind-enemy-lines efforts our forces should be practicing trying to counter. So that aspect of the exercise sounds like a worthy endeavour.
Meanwhile, Iran demonstrates how to use special forces by repatriating oil and an oil tanker taken by the USN in the Sea of Oman.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2021/11/03/669850/Iran-IRGC-confrontation-United-States-oil-piracy?fbclid=IwAR0yqoa8lKBCcT5GGIQIpV92Ebm60Mte5GX6GmVA7KBhdD-0iGI1KVKskb0
Special forces are not intended for conventional warfare. That's for conventional forces. Therefore it should surprise nobody that special forces are of limited utility in conventional warfare.
ReplyDeleteSpecial forces are for special operations. Our problem is that we've blurred the line, and every branch has its own special force. And the Marines, who arguably should be the special forces, have been so busy trying to become a conventional force--a baby army with a baby air force (and now a baby navy?)--that they have completely lost sight of any viable mission.
Here's my thinking. Rethink, reload, reboot. Army does conventional land warfare, Aerospace Force does conventional air and space warfare, Navy does conventional sea warfare--surface, air, subsurface--with Marines a part of Navy that focuses on coastal, littoral, amphibious, and commando ops. Marines get a lot smaller in that configuration, because they give up baby army to the Army and baby air force (except ship-to-shore movement and CAS) to the Navy, but it allows them to focus on being an elite bunch of bada**es.
If nothing else, combining Space Force into Air Force would get rid of those godawful Space Force uniforms.