ComNavOps has railed against unmanned vehicles, at least as the Navy envisions them, but is there an unmanned future that might make sense? I do actually see a future for unmanned combat but not the way the Navy is going about it. Let’s do a fictional exploration of the unmanned future done the right way.
By the way, here’s a couple of previous posts on the subject:
Here’s a story describing a different approach to unmanned combat. As always, and especially so in this case, this is not an attempt at presenting a realistic combat simulation. It is just a presentation of concepts in a more entertaining story form.
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The enemy island base had become an intolerable thorn in the Navy’s side. The base’s surveillance UAVs were ranging far and wide and restricting what the Navy could accomplish. The effective surveillance had enabled the enemy to employ their own anti-ship missiles to hold the Navy at a distant arm’s length. Cruise missile attacks against the base had proven fruitless as the enemy AAW laser emplacements, railguns, and miniature hypersonic Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) had simply blotted the attacking cruise missiles from the sky and the few missiles that had gotten through had been insufficient to make an appreciable dent in the base’s operations due to the facilities having been built into underground, reinforced structures or above ground, hardened shelters.
It was time for some up close and personal attention. The Navy was going to conduct an amphibious assault against the base but it would be in a form unimaginable to the sailors and Marines who had conducted the long series of amphibious assaults in the Pacific of WWII. As a former Marine Commandant had once said, the Marines were out of the frontal assault business but that didn’t mean that an assault couldn’t be done.
As the invasion fleet began its approach – ‘approach’ being a relative term for a fleet still a thousand miles away! - to the island, the opening moves began.
The fleet’s UAV carriers began launching unmanned combat aircraft (UCAV) to seek out and destroy the enemy’s long range manned and unmanned aircraft. These UCAVs were not the ‘Terminators’ of popular conception that could go to toe-to-toe with manned fighters – not even close! Instead, the UCAVs had a simple search and destroy function that was successful due to numbers rather than individual capability. In fact, the UCAVs weren’t much more than aerial missiles that, themselves, carried two missiles, each. The UCAVs were designated areas to search and instructed to destroy anything they found. The first wave consisted of almost 200 UCAVs. This was massing at the local level.
Of course, the enemy had their own UCAVs and the attrition rates on both sides were stunning, the more so when unmanned aircraft met manned. The manned aircraft generally made short work of the UCAVs but the overwhelming numbers of unmanned aircraft ensured that they could still accomplish their mission.
The first wave of UCAVs fought to a standstill but succeeded in depleting the enemy’s manned aircraft weapons and forcing them to return to base to refuel and rearm. While that was happening, the fleet’s UAV carriers launched a second wave of 200 UCAVs which, thanks to the greatly reduced enemy manned aircraft threat, was able to largely eliminate the enemy’s airborne sensor platforms which allowed the fleet to continue its approach to the island with only a greatly reduced anti-ship missile threat to deal with.
As the UCAV battle progressed, the UAV carriers also launched a wave of nearly a hundred unmanned sensor monitors. These were UAVs that were modified to fly to a designated location and then ‘crash’ into the sea whereupon they would float and act as passive monitors. Being passive and with not much more than horizon sensing range, they were not some kind of super-sensor that could find all enemy targets in the region. Instead, they functioned more by providing a sense of where the enemy was not rather than where they were. Of course, occasionally, they were able to definitively detect enemy units but that was almost a side benefit. Thus, the invasion fleet was able to establish a reasonable picture of enemy locations and activity.
Despite the reduced anti-ship missile threat, enough got through the fleet’s defenses that a few ships were sunk and several damaged to the point that they had to individually retire and make their way back to base. Still, a sufficiently intact fleet arrived at the actual assault point.
At this point, the UAV carriers launched a wave of sonar equipped underwater unmanned scout vehicles (SUUV) to scout the approaches to the landing site. The SUUVs quickly identified shoals of enemy mobile mines slowly converging on the fleet, drawn to it by their passive sonar. These mobile mines were, essentially, torpedoes optimized for long range, slow speed approaches, hugging the bottom of the ocean floor. Their intent was to reach a point under a ship and then initiate a near-vertical terminal sprint into the underside of the target ship.
The UAV carriers had a counter for the mobile mines which were smaller, faster underwater ‘fighter’ UUVs (FUUV) that would search for the mobile mines and fire very small torpedoes which mimicked the function of an aircraft’s air-to-air missiles. The FUUVs engaged in underwater ‘strafing’ attacks against the mobile mines and were able to largely destroy the threat. Again, not all could be stopped and several more ships were damaged and two more sunk.
As the FUUVs were being recovered back aboard the UAV carriers, those same carriers began simultaneously launching the first assault wave of crawlers. The crawlers were an amphibious, mobile vehicle that traveled on spherical, tracked rollers that granted tremendous maneuverability and the ability to traverse broken ground and obstacles on land or under the sea. With the mine threat eliminated, the crawlers were able to complete their slow approach to the beach whereupon they began emerging from the waves and started to move inland.
The crawlers were programmed with simple destination and targeting instructions and were free to choose their own paths to the enemy base. While they were easy enough to kill individually, their numbers and small size ensured that many would survive to reach the target base. This was massing on a local basis and it was effective. Once at the base, the crawlers performed simple optical and IR scans to locate suitable, pre-defined target types, approached those targets, and detonated themselves. Of course, the enemy had their own unmanned, ground combat vehicles that roamed the battlefield and tried to intercept the crawlers. However, the degree of intelligence and capability of the sensors that could be fit into small unmanned ground combat vehicles was limited and while many crawlers were intercepted and destroyed, the massed crawler numbers were sufficient to ensure that enough got through to the target.
The crawler’s main targets were the SAM radars, launchers, and reloads and they were sufficiently successful that the fleet could begin launching cruise missiles and aircraft for more precise strikes with larger weapons.
At this point, there would be a great deal of hard fighting still to come but the assault was a success. The enemy’s defenses had been breached and follow on forces could complete the mission.
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Here’s a description of some of the unmanned vehicles mentioned in the story.
Crawlers – These are small, heavily armored, mobile explosives. They are spherically tracked which gives them great maneuverability and the ability to traverse broken terrain and obstacles. They are equipped with various short range sensors and rudimentary find and destroy ‘intelligence’. They seek out a designated target, move up to it, and explode. The heavy armor makes them hard to kill. They can crawl along the sea floor and on land equally well. They are employed by the thousands. Each has an explosive equivalent to an 8” shell which, with propulsion gear and sensors, gives a total weight of around 500 lbs.
Waves of these crawl up out of the sea and inexorably move to the designated targets and explode.
Lest you think this is a ridiculous, scifi, fantasy concoction, note that we already almost have this in the form of two separate, existing vehicles:
Ground robots – For example, the QuinetiQ Modular Advanced Armed Robotic System (MAARS)
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| MAARS |
Mobile mines – For example, the US Navy Mk67 Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM)
All that is needed is to marry the two concepts.
Monitors – These are UAVs that would fly to a designated location and then ‘crash’ into the sea whereupon they would convert to a floating ‘raft’ of sorts with passive optical, communication, and IR sensors as well as a small onboard solar power generator. The sensors, being located very low on the water, had only a horizon range sensing capability although the comm sensors could often detect signals originating much farther away thanks to signal ducting in the atmosphere. The value of the monitors was the ability to develop a picture of where the enemy was not more so than where they were. Precursors of this already exist in the form of sonobuoys and Chinese floating sensor platforms. All that is needed is to scale the concept to the appropriate size.
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| Floating Sensor Platform |
FUUV – These are unmanned underwater vehicles that are the equivalent of UCAVs. Equipped with passive and short range active sonar, FUAVs use a simple seek and destroy control program and are armed with two micro-torpedoes which are the functional equivalent of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. A precursor of this already exists in the form of Archerfish, Barracuda, and others.
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| Archerfish |
SUUV – These are unmanned underwater scout vehicles. Equipped with passive and short range active sonar, their function is just what the name implies: to scout for enemy underwater assets. These essentially already exist in the form of Knifefish and others.
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| Knifefish |
Summation
This is not in any way meant to be a realistic, balanced combat simulation. It is simply a more entertaining way of illustrating some unmanned concepts. So, what are the key takeaways from this?
Numbers. The common theme throughout the story is large numbers of unmanned assets. Lots and lots of numbers. By the hundreds and several times that. It is important to recognize that one of the key characteristics of unmanned assets is – or should be – cheapness which translates to numbers. Individual assets are not supremely capable and are, in fact, only marginally capable. It is in the aggregate that they become capable. Numbers. Lots and lots of numbers.
Artificial Intelligence - Unmanned assets, lacking Terminator level artificial intelligence, need to be employed in very large swarms to be effective which, again, takes us back to affordability. One of the key aspects of the story’s vision of unmanned assets is that not only are the individual assets not very ‘intelligent’, they are downright simplistic. This means that they are not suited for low end, peacetime operations that would require careful discrimination between combatants and non-combatants. Instead, they are intended only for high end combat where anything they see that meets a basic set of criteria becomes a legitimate target. This keeps the programming simple, cheap, reliable, and far less prone to deception by an enemy.
Carriers - It is obvious that launching, controlling, collating data, and recovery of the required number of unmanned assets requires a dedicated carrier capable of handling both aerial and underwater unmanned vehicles.
It is clear from this story that ComNavOps’ vision of a potential viable future for unmanned assets is radically different from the Navy’s. This vision is focused on utilizing unmanned assets for combat scenarios rather than the ridiculously optimistic scenarios that the Navy is assuming. Further, this vision of unmanned assets focuses on the characteristics and strengths of unmanned assets (cost, simplicity, numbers, and risk tolerance) rather than trying to create gold-plated unmanned systems that are unaffordable and unachievable.
There is a future for unmanned assets but it’s not the Navy’s vision.
First, good story and good concepts.
ReplyDeleteA few observations:
- "The fleet’s UAV carriers began launching unmanned combat aircraft (UCAV) to seek out and destroy the enemy’s long range manned and unmanned aircraft. [...] the UCAVs weren’t much more than aerial missiles that, themselves, carried two missiles, each."
How is this different/better than using a bunch of drone missile cruisers (or smaller sized ships)?
- Wouldn't non-drone mines be a major obstacle to this kind of fleet, or do you see unmanned MCM as realistic?
- Having some experience of this, I am skeptical about the "crawlers" ability to reach and destroy/seriously damage a properly defended target like an enemy base or even individual SAM units: I can think of too many ways to incapacitate such ground vehicles barring scifi-level AI.
Seems like missiles/UAVs would be needed instead.
That said, I liked the post.
"How is this different/better than using a bunch of drone missile cruisers (or smaller sized ships)?"
Delete1. Cheaper by far. Even an austere missile drone barge would likely cost around a half to a billion dollars.
2. Range. A UCAV can range out to hundreds of miles. A drone ship cannot unless it brings a sensor platform with it, like a Burke, in which case the drone ship serves no purpose.
3. Dispersal of risk. Losing a drone ship costs a half to a billion dollars whereas losing a simplistic UCAV costs something on the order of $10-20M.
4. Flexibility. UCAVs can be spread across a vast operating area whereas a drone ship can only be in one location. Of course, we could build lots of drone ships but then the cost is prohibitive.
"Wouldn't non-drone mines be a major obstacle to this kind of fleet, or do you see unmanned MCM as realistic?"
The SUUVs would easily detect conventional mines and the FUUVs would destroy them thereby providing the needed mine clearance. Also, the assault crawlers would be unaffected by mines. Only the ships would be at risk and they would stand off - the point behind using unmanned assets!
" I can think of too many ways to incapacitate such ground vehicles"
In small numbers, yes. In large numbers …? What is an example of large scale way to incapacitate ground robots? It's an important question because Russia and China are developing exactly such ground robots so a way to incapacitate large numbers would be quite helpful.
That aside, the point of the post was to look at general methods to make effective use of unmanned assets. Whether any one particular hypothesized asset is practical or not is irrelevant. It's the overall characteristics that are the point of the post.
The point of the post is that I see a completely different way to use unmanned assets than the direction the Navy is taking. My way maximizes the unmanned advantageous characteristics while the Navy direction almost ignores the advantageous characteristics.
DeleteWhat kind of unmanned COMBAT-EFFECTIVE vehicles would you pursue?
"Cheaper by far. Even an austere missile drone barge would likely cost around a half to a billion dollars."
DeleteI mean, yes, but how is any "UAV carrier" going to cost much less than half a billion?
It seems that you're essentially calling "carrier" a missile ship and "UAVs" the missiles it launchs, or am I missing something here?
Not saying the concept is bad, just trying to understand.
"In small numbers, yes. In large numbers …? What is an example of large scale way to incapacitate ground robots?"
For the ones you envisioned? Just dig a moat surrounding whatever you want to protect, for example.
"What kind of unmanned COMBAT-EFFECTIVE vehicles would you pursue?"
I think a lot of this unmanned trend is about reinventing the wheel, really.
We already have "unmanned attack aircraft", they are called missiles and work well.
Particularly for ground combat, you still really want human-machine cooperation (I believe that's the trendy term) as opposed to autonomous drone operations, even with simplistic instructions.
That said, UUVs are interesting.
For example, "undersea patrollers" could keep enemy subs from ports, bases, etc.
I also think convoy escort (will it be needed again?) could be done with UUVs since the Navy won't have ships to spare anyway.
They wouldn't try to kill enemy subs, just deter them with their presence.
It's a more complex concept, though.
" how is any "UAV carrier" going to cost much less than half a billion?"
DeleteThis is a paradigm at work! You think we can't build a ship for less than a billion dollars because we can't. The reality is that an unmanned vehicle carrier is not remotely a real carrier. It's a glorified cargo ship with a some tiny catapults and 'torpedo tubes' added. We go buy up used cargo ships for next to nothing, make some modifications, and we're done. It wouldn't have any of the things you think of in Navy ship: no lavish crew comforts, no radar beyond navigation and air traffic control, no sonar, no 30+ kt speed, no complex hybrid CODOGCRAP engines and gearing to utilize diesel/turbine/warp propulsion, no towed array, no hangar, no helos, no helo maintenance facilities, etc. Think modified liberty ship.
"dig a moat surrounding whatever you want to protect,"
:) You noted where these things came from, right? The sea! A moat is not an obstacle. You also noted the target types, right? Radars, SAMS, launchers, etc. Is an enemy really going to dig dozens/hundreds of massive moats around each one of those? If so, those targets become immobile, known, fixed targets and susceptible to ballistic missile attack. That'd be great!
"Particularly for ground combat, you still really want human-machine cooperation"
Why? That's another paradigm constraining your thinking! It's a battlefield. EVERYTHING IS A TARGET. Turn 'em loose!
"convoy escort (will it be needed again?) could be done with UUVs"
No, you're trapped in the underwater naval iron triangle. You can't have the combination of very long range (convoy route), speed (convoy speed), and firepower/sensors (size).
You're also falling into the Navy paradigm of non-combat drones. What's the point of a non-combat drone in a war? The Navy's developing all kinds of unmanned drones that have no use in combat. What's the point? Why would you want a convoy escort that can't actually kill what it detects, assuming it could even detect anything?
"The reality is that an unmanned vehicle carrier is not remotely a real carrier."
DeleteI know, I'm not comparing it to a CVN, I'm trying to understand what's the difference (if there is any) between your "unmanned carrier" and a LDUSV-sized ship with missiles.
"A moat is not an obstacle."
I'm not talking about the water in the moat (might not even be needed), I'm talking about bots falling inside and not being able to exit since they can't climb.
For base defense, for example, it would work well.
The trade-offs for single units would be the ones you noted, sure, but do you need to approach those from the ground instead of the sky?
It just makes everything more complicated.
"Why? That's another paradigm constraining your thinking! It's a battlefield. EVERYTHING IS A TARGET. Turn 'em loose!"
You're going to have horrendous accuracy with that kind of approach, unless the enemy is retarded.
Which could be acceptable if you could build this suicide UGVs with a cost and speed that frankly seem unrealistic.
"No, you're trapped in the underwater naval iron triangle. You can't have the combination of very long range (convoy route), speed (convoy speed), and firepower/sensors (size)."
Yeah, probably not a good tasks for UUVs.
Thinking about it, a "drone Flower-class" would be a better choice for convoy escort, and shouldn't cost too much.
"Why would you want a convoy escort that can't actually kill what it detects, assuming it could even detect anything?"
Convoy escorts (particularly unmanned ones) aren't supposed to kill subs, if nothing else because they are tied to the convoy.
Effective sub-killing is done with more capable, manned assets who have all the time to hunt subs.
Definitely a better way to construct and utilize unmanned vehicles than the direction that the Navy is taking.
ReplyDeleteMy only question would be you're talking about huge numbers there, and how many and what kind of unmanned vehicle carriers will that require?
The unmanned vehicle carrier would be a converted cargo ship, preferably a used one that we pick up for nearly free. Slap a small flat deck on it and weld in some 'torpedo' launch tubes and you're nearly done! Buy and convert as many as needed. They'll be nearly free relative to Navy budgets. A cargo ship should be able to hold several hundred (?thousands?) of the kind of small unmanned assets I've described.
DeleteThink of the unmanned assets as containerized missiles, ready to launch. Haul 'em out of the hold and launch 'em. No maintenance. Our paradigm is that we want to gold plate everything and this just doesn't require it.
The ship is simple. No radar beyond navigation and air traffic control, no sonar, no 30+ kt speed, no complex hybrid CODOGCRAP engines and gearing to utilize diesel/turbine/warp propulsion, no towed array, no hangar, no helos, no helo maintenance facilities, etc. Just a cargo ship with a few simple modifications. Think modified Liberty ship, not a near-Nimitz.
I would worry about that ship's ability to keep up with a task force, and also about whether it might be a sitting duck in a war zone.
DeleteI like your unmanned vehicle concept, but that's why I would incorporate it in the battle-carrier and flight-deck-cruiser concepts that I have discussed, adding a bunch more small UAV/USV/UUVs for ISRT (intel/surveil/recon/targeting).
I know you don't like that approach, and we've pretty well aired that disagreement. I will at least say that I'd much rather have your idea than the USN's.
"I would worry about that ship's ability to keep up with a task force"
DeleteWhy would that be a concern? The carrier won't be accompanying combat task forces. It's an amphibious or special purpose vessel and doesn't require any great speed. WWWII escort carriers were rated at around 18 kts and performed quite well. This is the same concept.
Again, I would do it differently, but I would go along with your approach way before I would go with the USN's approach.
DeleteThe problem with your approach is that it's unaffordable both in time and money.
DeleteInstead of the extremely basic ship I described, you want a fast, ?stealthy?, hybrid cruiser/carrier with, presumably, advanced electronics, sensors, fire control, complex propulsion systems, etc.
By definition, you can't afford many.
By definition, and more importantly, you can't build them quickly. We could convert and have in operation twenty of ships I described in the time it would take to construct a single one of the cruiser-carriers you want. In a war, that's the path to defeat. Ask the Germans how that worked out for them.
In more general terms, your constant desire for do-everything ships is contrary to the demands of war which is to provide fast and cheap assets. Again, ask the Germans. Winning a war demands a thousand Shermans not ten Tigers.
"The problem with your approach is that it's unaffordable both in time and money. ...
DeleteBy definition, you can't afford many.
By definition, and more importantly, you can't build them quickly. "
If you do it the way the USN does things, agreed. But I'm also talking about a complete change in the USN process of buying things.
And it's not a constant desire for do-everything ships. I think some of those are useful, but it's a mix. Build out the numbers with single-purpose ships that you can build cheaper and faster. In my ideal fleet, I'd build 8 of those battle-carriers and 20 of those flight-deck cruisers--but on the low end I'd also build 80 single-purpose ASW frigates that are basically your ASW destroyer escort, and I'd build 60 escorts that are basically the original FREMM (32 VLS model) instead of honking up the design to get AEGIS onboard.
Yes, I would build some high-end ships, but I would also get numbers, and fast, by building a bunch of cheaper ships. Using CBO cost estimates, my approach would build 600 ships at an average cost of $1.4B/ship for the same money as the USN's proposed 300 new ships at an average cost of $2.8B/ship. That's $840B either way--$28B/year over 30 years or $21B/year over 40 years. Assuming lives from 20 (small combatants) to 50 (carriers) years, that works out to a weighted average of about 35 years, or $24B/year to maintain once built.
If I'm cutting the average cost/ship in half to get numbers, I don't quite see how that is gold-plating anything.
It's a philosophical difference in approach. Unfortunately, I don't think the USN is listening to either of us.
"over 30 years ... over 40 years"
DeleteYou're describing the problem without even realizing it! Setting aside the cost issue, if someone gives you a leisurely 30-40 yrs to build a fleet, that's great. What do you do if the war with China starts in five years? You won't be able to build ships quickly enough to build your fleet to combat effective levels before the war is lost and over. You certainly won't be able to build replacements for sunk ships in any useful time frame.
Just as the US found in WWII, you have to build small, cheap, SIMPLE ships in quantity while you try to build a handful of higher end ships. Unlike WWII, we'll be starting from a severe deficit in shipyards so getting new construction in and out of the yards quickly will be even more important. Tying up yards for several years at a time to build large, costly, complex ships is the path to defeat. Ask Germany.
Worse, we'll face shortages of rare earths and other raw materials necessary for those high end ships/electronics that you want. Chip production, alone, will be a nightmare! Again, we'll need lots of basic ships with basic technology as quickly as possible, not a very few high end ships.
Throw in yards being tied up doing combat damage repairs and the situation is even worse (of course, our ships aren't made to take damage and survive so maybe there won't be many ships to repair - they'll just sink).
No matter how you look at this, complexity is the enemy of industrial efficiency in war and industrial efficiency is the key to winning.
I've said it before but you're caught up in the neatness of spreadsheets and peacetime aspects of the notion of building a fleet. How will you build a fleet when the war starts tomorrow?
We're actually on the path you're advocating: ever larger, ever more complex, every more expensive ships, with ever more capabilities crammed into one hull. Heck, we're firmly on that path right now and where is it taking us? Smaller and smaller fleets that cost more and more to build and operate. And you want to continue on that path? I know you don't see it that way but it's what you're describing.
"We're actually on the path you're advocating: ever larger, ever more complex, every more expensive ships, with ever more capabilities crammed into one hull."
DeleteBut that's not the path I'm advocating. I'm building some larger, more complex ships because I think there is a need for some of them. There are potential situations requiring that level of capability.
But what you continue to ignore is that the vast, vast majority of what I am proposing is exactly the smaller, cheaper, simpler ships that you claim to favor.
You can't cut the average cost/ship in half from what the USN is proposing without building lots of smaller, cheaper, simpler ships. Math doesn't work that way. A high/low mix requires lots of low to go with some high. The low is the part of my approach that you don't seem to want to address.
I would build twice as many carriers by cutting the cost per carrier in half by building a mix of Nimitz CVNs and modernized Kitty Hawk CVs instead of Fords
I would double the size of the amphib force for half the money by building smaller, cheaper, and simpler amphibs (my six-ship PhibRon would cost about as much as one new LHA/LHD).
I would build 80 ASW specialist frigates (functional replacements for Knoxes and Perrys) for about what 20 Burkes would cost.
And one reason why I would propose lots of smaller, cheaper, simpler ships is that would be a way to get a lot more shipyards involved, and start to build back that resource that we are going to need, as you correctly note.
"Just as the US found in WWII, you have to build small, cheap, SIMPLE ships in quantity while you try to build a handful of higher end ships. ... Again, we'll need lots of basic ships with basic technology as quickly as possible, not a very few high end ships."
Which is precisely what I propose to do.
Except that your 'low end' ships aren't really low end. I'm not sure but I think you believe your cruiser-carrier hybrid is a low end ship but it's not. As we noted in previous discussions, your frigate is decidedly not a low end ship although you call it that. And so on. Simply saying a ship is low end doesn't make it so. Your idea of 'low' is actually quite high and your 'hi' end is very hi; all of which calls into question your cost assumptions.
DeleteEvery time you're given a choice, you opt for the high end. Today's example of a simple, incredibly cheap converted cargo ship for use as a unmanned carrier and you instantly opt for making it a hybrid battlecruiser-carrier of some sort.
Your supposed low end ASW frigate, as I recall (correct me if I'm wrong), has lots of VLS, high end radar (it has to for the VLS !), and is most definitely a multi-function, do-everything ship. Compare that to my ASW Escort (Destroyer Escort) which is a true single function, low end ship.
As I've said before, you have a philosophy so be proud of it. Don't try to pass off high end ships as low end. Call them what they are: multi-function, hi end ships!
“Except that your 'low end' ships aren't really low end. I'm not sure but I think you believe your cruiser-carrier hybrid is a low-end ship but it's not.”
DeleteNope. It’s a high-end ship and I’ve never presented it as anything else. It’s cheaper than a carrier, and like the Soviet Kirovs and Kievs, it can be a formidable force outside the range of enemy shore-based or carrier air.
“Every time you're given a choice, you opt for the high end. Today's example of a simple, incredibly cheap converted cargo ship for use as a unmanned carrier and you instantly opt for making it a hybrid battlecruiser-carrier of some sort.”
Nope. I’m not converting a cheap cargo ship into a battlecarrier or cruiser. The battlecarrier and cruiser would each have some extra space, since I’m replacing their labor-intensive 5-inch and smaller secondary guns with smaller and less labor-intensive SeaRAMs and Phalanxes. This would merely be a cheap and useful application of that available space. If needed, I would opt for some of your cheap converted cargo ships to augment. Obviously, if we needed a bunch in a hurry, the converted cargo ship would be the way to go.
“Your supposed low end ASW frigate, as I recall (correct me if I'm wrong), has lots of VLS, high end radar (it has to for the VLS !), and is most definitely a multi-function, do-everything ship. Compare that to my ASW Escort (Destroyer Escort) which is a true single function, low end ship.”
Nope. I will correct you because you are wrong. I think you are confusing two ship types which I have proposed—a GP escort (basically a FREMM) and an ASW frigate (basically your ASW DE). I have proposed 60 of the former and 40 of the latter. The terminology may have something to do with that. My target cost would be $1B apiece for the GP escorts and $500MM apiece for the ASW frigates, both costs benefitting from long production runs.
My ASW frigate is your ASW destroyer escort, considering two possible changes, depending on cost, 1) IEP or CODLAG for quieter running during ASW, and 2) exchanging the ASROC box for some Mk41 cells, in order to carry some ESSMs and NSMs for self-defense, since it will be operating on the outer reaches of formation screens. Given the proliferation of IEP on cruise ships, there should be relatively cheap IEP systems already on the market. I am not aware of any reason why Mk41s should be significantly more expensive than ASROC boxes, nor am I aware of any need for high-end radar for either ESSM or NSM.
I totally reject what appears to be the USN plan to blow up the cost of the FREMMs to make them less capable AEGIS replacements for the Ticos.
“As I've said before, you have a philosophy so be proud of it. Don't try to pass off high end ships as low end. Call them what they are: multi-function, hi end ships!”
Nope, I’m not trying to pass it off as low-end, because it’s not. I am calling it what it is—a mix of high-end, multi-purpose ships and low-end cheap and numerous ships. Carriers, battlecarriers, cruisers, and SSNs would be high-end. Frigates, amphibs, and SSKs would be low end. I would save money on the high end buy building a mix of Nimitzes and conventional CVs instead of Fords, by basing SSGNs off the existing Ohio model instead of the Columbia, and by building a mix of Virginia VPMs and something cheaper (perhaps Barracudas?) for the SSNs. I would convert the current high-end amphibs to other uses. The purpose of the SSKs would be to patrol choke points and littoral areas, freeing the SSNs for blue water missions. And I would impose strict cost controls on all classes to avoid the design creep that infects the USN.
The USN is headed toward all gold-plated, multi-function, high-end ships that you are (wrongly) describing my approach as being. CBO estimates that their proposed shipbuilding plan would run $2.8B per ship. Using the same estimates and a high-low mix, I would cut the cost/ship roughly in half, to $1.4B per ship. That’s not an all-high-end navy.
About the crawlers 'Each has an explosive equivalent to an 8” shell'
ReplyDeleteA USN WW2 8inch shell carried an explosive payload of either 5lb of AP or 21lb for HE so using the HE shell as the basis that's not a lot of explosive a Javelin anti-tank missile has 19lb of explosive.
The 8inch shell even the HE version is still mostly hardened metal as it's going to hit thick armoured plate which needs to be punched through.
If the crawlers are 500lb how about the Maverick air to surface missile as a base since that has a 120lb warhead which will give a more effective blast radius especially if the targets are soft like SAM's and radar's.
You appear to be suffering from a common misconception about explosives. Many/most people believe the effect of an explosive shell is simply the weight of explosive material it contains. Nothing could be further from the truth!
DeleteUnlike missiles, the explosive effect of naval shells is greatly amplified by the explosive material being contained within thick walls. This allows the destructive effect (the pressure wave) to build to much higher levels by compressing the expanding gases. This is why a 16" AP shell with only a 40 lb burst charge or a 16" HC (high explosive) with only a 150 lb burst charge produces a bigger effect than, say, a 250 lb bomb or missile with hundreds of pounds of explosive material.
This phenomenon is what explains why gunpowder in open air just burns while gunpowder in a contained shell explodes.
This keeps coming up. I'll probably have to do a post on this at some point. In the meantime, peruse the Internet. The information is not readily available but it's there.
The military used to have equivalency tables relating naval shell effects to aerial bomb effects.
It's not the weight of the explosive that matters; it's the EFFECT that's achieved.
One point for the numerous unmanned things. Probably not a showstopper, but they'd need to be shielded against weapons (like an EMP attack, for example) that might take out a whole swarm at once.
ReplyDeleteOf course, the enemy would have the exact same problem. EMP does not discriminate between friend and enemy. Every piece of their own equipment would have to be similarly shielded.
DeleteMaybe. Probably true of nuclear EMP. But we are working on microwave weapons (there's one program called "CHAMP" that gets mounted on cruise missiles and supports multiple shots). I think some of them might even be directional.
DeleteALso, EMP was AN example but not THE example of a weapon that could take out the whole swarm. Other approaches might be some other form of electronic warfare or cyber attack.
As I mentioned, I suspect it can be managed but we DO need to think about it in advance.
"Other approaches might be some other form of electronic warfare or cyber attack"
DeleteThe easy answer is hardened, secure electronics, simple code (as noted in the post!) that is not easily attacked, and comms that are deactivated or removed at launch so as to prevent electronic attacks - no receiver, no entry point.
More to the point, presumably, it would be just as legitimate to speculate that we would apply 'electronic warfare or cyber attack' against the enemy's devices, thereby negating their ability to use 'electronic warfare or cyber attack' against us. If they have the capability then so would we.
Too many people view these discussions as one capability (ours) against the entire assembled might of the enemy where the enemy can employ any and all of their capabilities, unhindered, to thwart whatever capability of ours is under discussion. In a one vs all, one loses every time.
However, this is not how wars are waged. In reality, the enemy will be under continual attack from every weapon and capability we have and the reverse will also be true. Some things will work, some will not. Most will work to some degree but nothing approaching isolated, manufacturer delusional claims.
So, rather than focus on finding the one capability that can thwart a crawler, I would ask you to consider the larger picture of the type of unmanned usage envisioned in the story. Is this vision the right direction as opposed to the Navy's path? What is the best role for unmanned assets in combat? Is it better to emphasize cheap, simple numbers (as I've stated repeatedly) or to emphasize limited numbers of exquisite assets as the Navy is doing? Is there a role for humans in this type of scenario or would humans simply make things more complicated? Do the ethics of this type of 'turn 'em lose' killing drone matter on a battlefield where everything is 'enemy'? So many great questions to ponder. Don't get bogged down in debating individual characteristics of non-existent assets!
I look forward to your larger thoughts. Thanks.
"However, this is not how wars are waged. In reality, the enemy will be under continual attack from every weapon and capability we have and the reverse will also be true. Some things will work, some will not. Most will work to some degree but nothing approaching isolated, manufacturer delusional claims."
DeleteAbsolutely. The history of warfare is replete with examples that what works best is not what has the most exotic bells and whistles, but what is most reliable under sub-optimum operating conditions. As soon as you put an enemy on the field, you will be operating under sub-optimum conditions, because that enemy's job is to make your operating conditions sub-optimum. In the words attributed to Joseph Stalin, "Quantity has a quality all its own."
What is the mission, what does the enemy have to prevent our accomplishing that mission, and how do we overcome that enemy?
"The crawlers were programmed with simple destination and targeting instructions and were free to choose their own paths to the enemy base."
ReplyDeleteI would think there would be some level of coordination between the crawlers and even some human control of their performance. Some targets are certain to require more than one crawler to be destroyed. In those instances, similar to the artillery concept of multiple rounds, simultaneous impact, multiple crawlers would simultaneously (or as near as possible) converge on the same target to achieve a greater blast effect. In breaching walls or structures, some crawlers would create gaps for other crawlers to pass through and further the attack.
"some level of coordination between the crawlers and even some human control of their performance."
DeleteWhy?
Coordination is difficult and opens up the possibility (likelihood?) of cyber attack entry points. With sufficient numbers, coordination is not required. This is the equivalent of blind area bombardment. When dozens of unmanned assets all approach a suitable target, they'll wind up acting like a coordinated attack anyway, with one after another hitting the same target/spot. Once the target is no longer recognizable (destroyed), the swarm will move on to the next target they see.
What can humans contribute? Without complex networks and extensive communications, they can't control the unmanned assets. Even if they could, how would that help when sufficient numbers of assets are swarming the enemy? With sufficient numbers, the swarm will hit most of the targets they need to anyway. Human interaction will just make the assets more complicated (meaning more expensive and less of them) and provide no gain in combat effectiveness. This is just a paradigm at work - that humans must be in the loop. The reality is that it's simply not needed.
"The common theme throughout the story is large numbers of unmanned assets. Lots and lots of numbers"
ReplyDeleteMy first thought is that China at the present time and in the immediate foreseeable future appears to have the industrial capacity and knowhow to out produce by a large number anything US can eg thinking of DJI in the civilian market.
So question is what can US do nullify China's advantage in numbers, will concentrated attack on single point be enough or are there any other options and how to defend if China uses same tactics when attacking Taiwan.
"China at the present time and in the immediate foreseeable future appears to have the industrial capacity and knowhow to out produce"
DeleteBeyond a certain point, production capacity becomes irrelevant. Other factors such as logistics, supply trains, training, and the like become more important. For example, once you have sufficient capacity to produce ammunition any additional production is just excess. What's more important is the ability to get the ammo to the front line troops on time and when needed.
If you only need a hundred bullets, it doesn't matter that you can produce a thousand. That's just waste.
We do not lack production capacity; we lack desire. We've consciously ceded numerical superiority to China while we pursue information superiority. This is idiotic but it's an intentional choice on our part. If we chose to, we could easily match China's production capacity but we've unwisely abandoned that path.
Finally, numbers matter not on a production spreadsheet or piled up in warehouses but at the local level where the battle/use is immediately needed. If we can bring more of whatever to the immediate battle - even if it's only a fraction of the overall inventory by either side - then we've achieved numerical superiority where and when it matters. Historically, this has been the point of maneuver warfare - to create conditions of local numerical superiority. Sadly, we've also abandoned strategic and operational thought in favor of our pursuit of illusory information superiority.
So, we're hurting but it's not because of any inherent lack of production capacity; it's because of conscious choices not to emphasize numbers.
I don't think the US military got the memo about cheap UAVs. Unlike say Israel or Turkey US is continuously going for more expensive UAVs that are unaffordable in large numbers.
ReplyDeleteThat sounds like a much more realistic view of robotic, naval warfare in the future.
ReplyDelete