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Wednesday, October 20, 2021

Passive Hawkeye

Without a doubt, the most important aircraft in the carrier air wing is the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and battle management aircraft, the E-2 Hawkeye.  The problem with the Hawkeye is that it is mostly an active sensor and reveals its position when it operates.  Yes, the aircraft flies offset from the carrier group because of that but it still tells the enemy that there’s a carrier in the area and where to begin looking for it. 

 

We’ve also noted that in future combat the E-2 will be forced to operate much farther back than desired due to the threat of very long range air-to-air missiles (see, “Goodbye Poseidon and Hawkeye”).  The Chinese VLRAAM reportedly has a range of 300 miles and a speed of Mach 6.  Hawkeyes are not survivable against such a threat.

 

What is needed is a stealthy, passive version of the Hawkeye.  A passive version of the Hawkeye would use:

 

  • IR/IRST (Infrared/Infrared Search and Track)
  • EO (Electro Optical)
  • SigInt (Signals Intelligence)
  • TCS (Tactical Camera System)

 

Being passive, there would be no aircraft sensor emissions for the enemy to locate and track.  In addition, if the airframe were stealthy the aircraft could operate much closer to the enemy thereby compensating for the reduced sensor range, resolution, and field of view compared to active radar.

 

A partial – and successful ! - model of such an aircraft is the old electronic version of the S-3 Viking, the ES-3A Shadow, which used signals analysis to provide situational awareness for the carrier group.  By all accounts, the ES-3A was quite effective and was phased out only as a [badly misguided] cost savings measure.


ES-3A Shadow - Passive Hawkeye?


 

Operating multiple such passive AEW aircraft would allow triangulation location of targets and increased coverage area.

 

Alternatively, we’ve discussed a stealthy active radar AEW aircraft based on the B-21 (see, “B-21 Hawkeye”).

 

The main point is that the E-2 Hawkeye is no longer survivable on the modern battlefield.  We need a fast, stealthy version of a Hawkeye, likely based on the B-21.  The aircraft can be either passive or active (ideally, both!) or an air wing could have a mix of the two.  We've got to stop simply repeating the past because it was once successful.  Building more and more Burkes just because they were once successful and screwed up every design since is wrong.  Building endless upgrades to an ancient, prop driven aircraft because it was once successful is timid and wrong.  Instead, we have to start thinking about what future combat will be like and start designing equipment and operating concepts to fit that future.

57 comments:

  1. Where are we on bistatic/multistatic radar? Having a UAV emit & stealthy manned receiver aircraft might work.

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    1. Short answer … who knows?

      Longer answer … this seems more appropriate for land based scenarios with, potentially, dozens of emitters and receivers. At sea, especially in enemy air and water, the only emitters/receivers will be those we can put in the air. A large, powerful emitter will still be easily detected and targeted. Whether small UAVs can emit enough power is unknown but, I suspect, unlikely. Similarly, small UAVs seem unlikely to be able to receive signals and process them.

      Large UAVs will not survive.

      Since WWII, the Navy has not faced an enemy capable of hunting our Hawkeyes. China is clearly capable and this will cause a rude awakening for us. I expect our Hawkeyes to suffer a lot of attrition until we figure out to correctly employ them and that correct employment is likely going to result in drastically reduced coverage for us - another rude awakening.

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  2. This idea is right on target. I'd suggest that the F-35 helps do some of this. Obviously, more stealth and persistence are most desired. I'd say its a version of a future UCAV we don't have. Goes back to getting the air wing right. Unfortunately this idea is getting punted a generation down the road. Doubt that proves to be the smart move.

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    1. "I'd suggest that the F-35 helps do some of this."

      F-35 supporters make this claim repeatedly but I have my doubts. Can it help to some small degree? Sure, but so can any aircraft. Unless it's flying around emitting all the time, the F-35's passive sensors are limited in range and field of view. So, some help but nowhere near a substitute for a Hawkeye of some sort.

      Also, if F-35s are flying around doing mini-Hawkeye tasks, they won't be doing air superiority which is their main use/strength. Now, if the Navy wants to abandon F-35 combat squadrons and instead just carry a half dozen F-35s strictly for surveillance, that would work although the effectiveness would be limited. In other words, an F-35 can't monitor and control an aerial battle AND BE PART OF THE BATTLE. It's one or the other.

      Control is another issue. The Hawkeye isn't just a radar sensor. It's a battle management system and uses several air combat controllers to manage the air fight. No F-35 can do that so, again, the F-35 is a very poor substitute for a Hawkeye. The best I can see is for the F-35 to be an occasional supplement for the Hawkeye, under limited circumstances.

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    2. "I'd suggest that the F-35 helps do some of this."

      Seems to me that the F-35C could be modified for that role. I think you'd want a second person in the cockpit, in order not to overburden the pilot. You could put him/her where the lift fan is on the B. And fill the bomb bay with additional electronics and fuel tanks to give it longer legs. That might be the highest and best use of the F-35C.

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    3. I think we want a platform with better endurance than a fighter, but the F-35 does have passive situational awareness geared toward what is under discussion here. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AN/AAQ-37

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    4. "Seems to me that the F-35C could be modified for that role. I think you'd want a second person in the cockpit, in order not to overburden the pilot."

      Excluding the pilot and copilot, the E-2 Hawkeye has a three-man mission crew, consisting of a radar officer, combat information center officer, and aircraft control officer. No way one person can fulfill all those roles; no way the tiny F-35 can fit all those people, without diminishing its range, endurance (a fuel tank replaces the F-35B lift fan in the F-35C), and capability (due to the need to reduce the internal weapons bay's size, to accommodate the mission crew).

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    5. " the E-2 Hawkeye has a three-man mission crew"

      This is what so few people understand. The E-2 is not just an airborne radar, it's a battle management asset. It's an air traffic control tower for combat, so to speak.

      Great comment!

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  3. Allis not lost. The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye was the first version of the E-2 to have the ability for in-flight refueling. I can think of three possible augmentations to the Hawkeye's survivability:

    1) Develop a unmanned wingman-type platform to escort the Hawkeye. Four to five of these unmanned wingman to pair with four to five E-2's in each airwing. The unmanned wingman could be either a dedicated ECM platform, an armed unmanned escort or a combination of both.

    2) This one is might be iffy. Depending on the number of E-2D's in each airwing, for sake of this post, lets say five. With the current paltry makeup of a typical carrier airwing, a dedicated squadron of 10 to 12 F-35C's can provide 2 escorts per E-2 sortie. The F-35C would be preferable because it is stealthy and they could shadow the Hawkeye for the duration of its sortie.

    3) Take the AN/ALQ-250 EPAWSS (Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System) that has been developed by BAE Systems for the F-15E Strike Eagle and the new F-15EX and and adapt it to suit the E-2D.

    None of these proposed options is a 100%, no fail solution, those only exist in dreams but they can help increase the survivability chances of the E-2D.

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  4. The B-21 may not be the aircraft you think it is. According to Air Force Magazine, "The B-21 is believed to be somewhat smaller than the B-2, with a payload of around 30,000-pounds, just large enough to carry one GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator precision-guided conventional bomb, the largest in the Air Force inventory." This suggests an aircraft with less range than the B-2 and less ability to reconfigure it into another role.

    At the same time, such an aircraft can't have all passive sensors as passive sensors can't detect and identify every type of target. An active radar will be necessary, though emission control will be even more important.

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    1. "The B-21 may not be the aircraft you think it is."

      Or it may. What a pointless comment. This is exactly the kind of pointless, argumentative comment that does nothing to further any discussion. You're capable of better. Step up your game.

      "such an aircraft can't have all passive sensors as passive sensors can't detect and identify every type of target."

      And what kind of target would it be unable to detect?

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    2. "And what kind of target would it be unable to detect?"

      Obvious answer: stealthy ones, for which specialized radar, e.g., long wavelength radars, which the Russians claim have anti-stealth capabilities.

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    3. "Obvious answer: stealthy ones"

      Not so! In fact, depending on the range and other factors, passive sensors such as IRST, EO, and TCS ARE MORE LIKELY TO DETECT A STEALTH AIRCRAFT than radar. There have long been reports (unconfirmed!) that passive sensors have been able to detect and track stealth aircraft when radar could not.

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  5. I think a stealthy flying wing could pull this off. Basically a version of the UAV strike aircraft I'd prefer for the carrier. Bump that flight ceiling up to 50,000 feet might be nice.

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  6. My understanding is that Mach 2-3 is the max for self-guided missiles, otherwise the nose heating blinds/destroys the nose mounted sensor. If fired at 300 miles, it would take ten minutes to reach the target so that target must stay on course. But a Hawkeye would certainly detect the incoming missile and have plenty of time to shut down and dive and evade. And small AMRAAM radar only sees out 20 miles in small cone so the Hawkeye would be long gone, and this assumes no Growler jamming support.

    A Mach 6 missile is possible, but requires guidance from a ship or ground radar, or maybe huge airborne radar. But then they would become targets too.

    One solution would be small radar emitting cruise missiles. Their signals would be read by passive Hawkeyes.

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    1. "My understanding is that Mach 2-3 is the max for self-guided missiles"

      I'm not sure this is true. Consider a counter-example. The Pershing 2 missile of the 1980's had terminal radar guidance, and traveled as fast as Mach 8. Of course, it was a ballistic missile so the flight profile was far different from an air to air missile, so perhaps that might make a difference.

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    2. Note also that even the ESSM has a maximum speed of Mach 4+. At least according to Wikipedia.

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    3. The Standard SM-6 is listed as Mach 3.5 and uses active and semi-active radar homing.

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    4. The Chinese VLRAAM missile is credited with Mach 6+ and uses terminal active AESA radar homing. Of course, information about Chinese weapons is always suspect ...

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    5. The higher the altitude the less air friction and speed increases as fuel is burned. I suppose the Chinese could use a heat shield cone that falls off when within radar range and slows to allow better maneuverability and time to lock on. I'm sure Hawkeye and AWACS have tactics that remain secret. In Vietnam a "Wild Weasel" F-4 would zoom in front of incoming missiles to throw it off targeted bombers, which I assume a Growler could do.

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    6. But I agree that AMRAAMs are a huge problem because they can be fired in volleys, so evading one is possible only to face another a few seconds later with no time to react. I read several accounts of the Battle of the Java Sea where destroyer squadrons would unleash a volley of 40-90 torpedoes at a task force. Nearly all would miss but the two or three that hit something caused major damage.

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    7. "a Hawkeye would certainly detect the incoming missile and have plenty of time"

      Well you've highlighted one of the key unknowns for this type of scenario. A missile, even if not stealth shaped, has a very small nose-on cross section which means an inherently small radar return. I have absolutely no data but I would be shocked if a radar can detect a missile at 300 miles. So, where is the detection point?

      If it were, say, 150 miles then the reaction time for a Mach 3 missile is 3.9 minutes.

      If it were, say, 50 miles then the reaction time for a Mach 3 missile is 1.3 minutes.

      A radar would be hard pressed to detect an aircraft at 300 miles so my wild guess is a detection distance of around 50 miles for a missile with ?1/100? the cross section of an aircraft is likely.

      Of course, if the missile is faster, as the Chinese VLRAAM is claimed to be, then the reaction time is even less and begins to approach seconds rather than minutes.

      Again, you've highlighted the key unknown!

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  7. ALthough not a screaming loud "here I am" as a radar, this version still has to communicate with the Group and Aircraft. That makes it as vulnerable as the entire distrubuted network concept. If tactics are that it stays passive until a major strike is detected and then goes active, or if it is used to tip off other assets to go ch3ck out small numbers of tactics, I can see that helping.

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  8. Can anyone speak to orbital systems that can satisfy these four requirements below?

    *IR/IRST (Infrared/Infrared Search and Track)
    *EO (Electro Optical)
    *SigInt (Signals Intelligence)
    *TCS (Tactical Camera System)

    I can't, but would suspect that the US can do all these things with polar orbiting satellites situated over the Western Pacific. Two technologies that have to be mastered are 1. The actual sensors required to do all these things, and 2. the ability to fuse the data between individual satellite passes over the region into a coherent picture.

    Based on cursory knowledge, the sensors exist, even at the hobbyist level. As for the second technology, I wouldn't bet against the US not being able to derive tactical data from a satellite overflight.

    Polar orbital periods are roughly a 100 minutes at 600 miles attitude. While that is a predictable orbit, the altitude makes it a harder target to intercept. Add a couple of satellites in a similar orbit, and your 100 minute observation delay could almost become a continuous unblinking "EW/EO eye."

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    1. I have no direct, intimate knowledge about satellite military observation capabilities beyond what is available in the public domain which isn't much. That said, I note that the various passive sensors, when mounted on aircraft, have very limited ranges. IRST, for example, is credited with an effective range on the order of 50 miles. Similar for EO and TCS. Does it then seem likely that those same sensors on a satellite 600 miles high can be effective?

      Perhaps a satellite can have much larger sensor packages that could produce much better range?

      I also note that there is a difference between taking an image of the Pacific Ocean (or any subset thereof) and actually analyzing that image to produce an identifiable target. I know we don't use men with magnifying glasses (do we?) but image interpretation is still often a subjective art even with computer assist. Interpreting shadows and obscured, partial images is still an art.

      So many people think a satellite instantaneously sees everything perfectly and is direct connected to the firing button on a ship or aircraft. That's just not the case.

      Just some thoughts to add to the question you posed.

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    2. I don't think we are quite there yet with "sat AWACS", just recently, USAF pretty much said it will look for an interim airplane to replace E-3, probably a E-7 Wedgetail so USAF is pretty much admitting that the sat tech isn't ready yet for prime time, a sat AWACS demonstrator in a few years appears likely BUT I won't bet on anything orbital soon. EVEN if an AWACS constellation would to appear, still plenty of issues other than just radar to figure out: network, data transmission, who and how to manage the info, etc....

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    3. @MudMarine:

      Orbital EO and IR isn't responsive and persistent enough to replace AWACS. Either the satellite is in a geostationary orbit, which means that it's in a fixed point and therefore has a limited field of view, or it's in a geosynchronus orbit, which means that it's always in motion and will this have limited time over the search area.

      Aside from the bandwidth issue in imagery analysis, there's also the issue that the high altitude at which EO and IR sats operate means that cloud cover and bad weather can stymie them.

      And then there's the issue that your satellites' sensors cannot get away from physics, so you are always stuck with tradeoffs: if you want sensor resolution, you sacrifice search area.

      It's telling that the Chinese, who have already have a maritime surveillance satellite network, are prioritising more MPAs, long range MPA drones, and more carriers, fighters and carrier-borne AWACS, rather than increasing the size of their satellite network.

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    4. Even so, the Chinese have demonstrated the ability to shoot down satellites. I wouldn't become too dependent on satellites. If I was China my strategy to open a war against the United States would be to destroy as much of the US's satellite network as possible. The nature of satellites makes their positioning fairly predictable once they've been detected. I believe we should assume that the Chinese have identified nearly all of our satellites and prepare to conduct a war without them.

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  9. Going outside the box here, but would an unmanned or possibly even tethered blimp/aerostat fit the bill?

    It seems to me that a tethered asset would be in a great position to not only detect inbound threats like cruise missiles, but deploy countermeasures like chaff. To really take this way out the box in a creative way; imagine if instead of an aerostat, we towed a large kite equipped with FLIR type sensors, and automated flight controls to keep the sensors pointed where we wanted them. A sensor kite deployed from an escorting frigate could be directed to fly not just several thousand feet above the sea, but a mile or more laterally outside of the fleets' footprint.

    This could be the optimal solution to sensors being limited by the height of the host ships' Mast.

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    1. This idea keeps coming up and I keep shooting it down. A blimp/kite/whatever is a large radar reflecting beacon saying here I am and just below me is my ship! Offsetting a mile from the ship is nothing to anyone/anything looking for the ship.

      There are practical problems like power source, data transmission, field of view, deployment/retrieval time, etc.

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    2. Might be a dumb idea, but how about deploying the blimp from a smallish USV escort?

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    3. "tethered blimp/aerostat"
      "several thousand feet above the sea"

      Have you considered the lift requirements for such an arrangement? Aside from the sensor payload itself, you'd need a tether cable which would have to be pretty substantial given the wind shear stress at altitude, a comms cable (again substantial), and a power cable (again substantial), as a minimum. I'd guess the combined cable would be 1-5 lbs per foot of cable length. Let's say it's the low end at 1 lb per foot. For a several thousand foot height that's around 10,000 ft to get several thousand feet altitude (the cable doesn't go straight up, remember!). So, the blimp would have to lift 10,000 lbs just from the combine cable. How big a blimp do you need to generate 10,000 lb lift. Then add in the sensor weight, steering mechanism weight, comm gear weight, ?heater? weight, etc.

      Of course, you could eliminate some of the cables by installing wireless comm gear, receivers, and antennae on the blimp along with a power supply, batteries, and ?generator? but that just transfers the weight from the cable to the blimp so you don't gain anything.

      You've got to think through the engineering of this.

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    4. "how about deploying the blimp from a smallish USV escort?"

      Look at the comment above about weights and consider what that means for a tow vessel.

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  10. While I hate to say this, Im wondering if scouting/surveillance isnt somthing that could/should be passed to the Air Force(?) Sure there's problems with not having that capability aboard the carriers, as well as inter-service compatibility and doctrinal issues. But short of having a stealthy passive platform, Im thinking that maybe long range land based aircraft should be doing the scouting out front of the battle groups (?). The Russians had some good ideas going with their Bear/Badger/Backfires as anti-CVBG tools. There still needs to be some iteration of the E-2 for air battle management, but by outsourcing the rough surveillance, we arent using organic platforms to announce the CVBGs location until we're ready. Naturally the distances are greater than in the N Atlantic battle scenarios, but somthing Bear-ish, loaded with passive sensors, could reach the ECS and Philippine sea from multiple locations. It'd have to be a large number built to get the coverage, and they'd have to have a relatively expendable status vs the E-2/E-3.
    With all the posts and conversations about E-2 utility/survivability, Im just not sure all the functions it performs can continue to be carrier-borne. Admittedly, air wing ops and capabilities are not my strong suit so I can be dead wrong here...

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    1. "Im thinking that maybe long range land based aircraft should be doing the scouting out front of the battle groups"

      How would they survive … out front … alone … If you'll recall, the Soviets expected (and were comfortable with!) an expectation of considerable Bear attrition rates. They considered it acceptable as a trade for finding and killing a carrier group and, in the math of war, it probably was. Our scenario lacks that big payoff to justify losing Air Force AWACS/scouts.

      The carrier borne scout/surveillance model is quite viable but the tactics and aircraft need to change, as I've outlined.

      One of the WWII tactics we've abandoned is the carrier scout. In WWII, a carrier would fly off a dozen scout planes every morning, fanning out in all directions to provide situational awareness for the carrier. The scout planes were SBDs and, later, other types.

      We've gone to AEW but we've abandoned long range scouting. Maybe we should reinstate that practice?

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  11. Recent article by Breaking Defense on Project Convergence 2021 and mentions Army focus on ISR saying they do not receive timely ISR from Air Force and/or the Intelligence Community and want to develop their own ISR systems including satellite ISR payloads, their need driven by need to provide targeting info for Long Range Precision Fires program, both its new long range artillery and missiles with max range of ~500 km, aiming to up that in the future with the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM)

    One ISR system the Army will be looking at during Project Convergence is the Airbus Zepher HAPS, High Altitude Platform System, solar/battery/electric powered with its 25m wingspan, very low weight 75 kg enabling very high altitude flight of drone to ~70,000 feet which has been testing at Yuma recently.

    The big drawback will be its very limited payload for sensors but the pluses with its low signature it will be difficult to detect, very long endurance of up to 26 days, the high altitude giving its sensors long range and expect cheap enough to deploy in numbers so will be able to triangulate targets to establish range with passive sensors. No doubt other factors to consider but worthy of note that once again Army leading the way in experimenting and testing new systems.

    https://breakingdefense.com/2021/10/project-convergence-2021-kicks-off-showcases-110-new-technologies/

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    1. "saying they do not receive timely ISR from Air Force"

      This is the old Marine argument for why they need their own air force and navy - because the Navy supposedly abandoned them at Guadalcanal. Setting aside the validity of such arguments, the ultimate result is needless and wasteful duplication of effort. The Marines now have their own duplicate and highly inefficient air force. The Army now wants to duplicate the AF's ISR. There are dozens/hundreds of examples of similar duplication throughout the armed forces. The answer is not duplication, it's better co-ordination.

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    2. Operation Allied Force saw USAF ISR assets being pushed back due to the risk of Serbian SAMs, degrading their effectiveness. I don't see this risk-adverse nature having changed in the last 30 years.

      The Army's thinking is that if the Air Force is unable to provide ISR - because the airspace is contested by enemy fighters, because longrange SAMs threaten AWACS and J-STARS - as you note, the E-2 is no longer survivable on the modern battlefield, and this is a smaller aircraft than the E-3 Sentry - then the Army will need organic ISR assets of their own.

      I'm asking because I seek to understand: how would better co-ordination help in this regard?

      As for the Airbus Zephyr HAPS, at 150 lbs, this isn't that big a drone. It sounds to me that this is meant to be a company sized asset so that the infantry/Stryker/Abrams company has an organic ISR asset of its own so that it's not reliant on battalion or division HQ interfacing with the air force for ISR.

      (And the Army has already had its own independant ISR assets for decades now, in the scout platoons and the Kiowa companies...)

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    3. "As for the Airbus Zephyr HAPS, at 150 lbs, this isn't that big a drone."

      It's quite large, with a wingspan of around 75 ft! It appears to be one of those almost ultralight 'gliders'. I'm guessing it would provide a very large radar signature and have a very short lifespan.

      "then the Army will need organic ISR assets of their own."

      If AF assets can't survive, how will organic Army ISR assets fare any better?

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    4. "If AF assets can't survive, how will organic Army ISR assets fare any better?"

      Sir, you're avoiding the question with a question of your own. How will better co-ordination solve the problem of the Air Force's ISR being pushed back on the unsurvivable battlefield?

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    5. I'll answer your question when you answer mine.

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    6. Relax! There's no problem here. I'm happy to answer your question. You appear to have misunderstood - or I failed to make clear - that coordination refers to interservice planning. It has nothing to do with individual ISR asset survivability. I'm talking about coordinating plans so that the AF provides sufficient ISR assets to meet the Army's needs. Nothing more complicated than that. If the two services coordinate plans then there's no need to duplicate efforts and assets.

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    7. Isn't that just the ISR equivalent of Distributed Lethality? The Army has no ISR of its own and is wholly reliant on the Air Force.

      Anyhow, I promised you an answer for an answer:

      "If AF assets can't survive, how will organic Army ISR assets fare any better?"

      My observation of historical trends in the Army and the Army's efforts to gain its own ISR assets and loitering munitions show to me that there's two paradigms in play. Firstly, scouting. As you noted, carriers used to launch scouts to search for the enemy - in the same vein, the Army deploys scout helicopters, Hummvees (to be replaced with JLTVs), and M3 Bradley Cavalry Fighting vehicles. The scouts head out, probe for enemy contact, and have enough firepower to defeat enemy pickets or break contact from superior forces.

      Secondly, with loitering munitions and glider drones, organic ISR ability is pushed down to the battalion and company level, allowing greater scope for independant operation without being tied down to ISR arranged by higher command echelons; while company-level drones may not give as good picture as the theater-level ISR assets that division HQ can arrange, it's still much better than nothing, and allows the company some level of operational ability, albeit degraded.

      As to question of survivability of organic Army ISR, ultimately the Army's ISR assets are a lot more expendable than the Air Force. J-STARS is amazing at tracking the movement of enemy formations, but there's only 17 J-STARS aircraft in existence. A company of scout helicopters is more expendable to the Army than a single J-STARS is to the air force, and can exploit terrain masking for protection in a way that aircraft can't. My understanding of drones like HAPS and loitering munitions is that these are going to be launched and considered disposable, and therefore the company is going to be carrying a supply of these weapons into the field.

      There's also the belief I've heard from a number of Army officers I'm acquainted with that within the next 10-20 years, the line between antitank missiles and semi-autonomous loitering munitions will blur more and more, until loitering munitions are going to propagate down to the platoon level in the same numbers as antitank missiles. Consider the Javelin antitank missile, which costs between 100k to 170k: this is a squad-level weapon in the US Army, and a company-level weapon in every other nation that uses it.

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    8. You may have a misunderstanding about the scope of ISR. The Air Force ISR that the Army is concerned about is the large and very long range Predator-type UAVs and the large EW/SigInt type aircraft. I think you're describing small Blackjack-type UAVs and even quadcopters. Those are useful for surveillance in the near front of the Army and no one has a problem with the Army having as many of those as they need/want.

      What the Army is concerned with is ISR for the Long Range Precision Fires weapons which have ranges 500-1000 km. Those kind of ISR assets cannot be supported at the company or even battalion level.

      If the Army were to acquire their own large UAVs/aircraft, they would be no more survivable than the AF. As I said, the solution is better coordination between the two services so that the Army's ISR needs are met. Duplication is not the solution.

      Stated another way, the ISR 'lack' that the Army fears is not related to company ground operations but to the LRPF weapons program. Personally, I think the entire LRPF program is duplication and should be terminated as a duplication of effort.

      The ISR issue is an issue only because the Army is encroaching on AF long range strike responsibilities.

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    9. "As for the Airbus Zephyr HAPS, at 150 lbs, this isn't that big a drone."

      CNO - "It's quite large, with a wingspan of around 75 ft! It appears to be one of those almost ultralight 'gliders'. I'm guessing it would provide a very large radar signature and have a very short lifespan."

      Looking at the video of the Zepher it appears to be made out some sort of light plastic with solar cells on the top sides of the wings, so assumed it will have a tiny RCS signature and as flying at 70,000 feet difficult for any radar to detect due to its minimal reflectivity, am i missing something?

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aSPn1Rqr9jg&ab_channel=AirbusDefenceandSpace



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    10. "am i missing something?"

      Several possible concerns:

      1. It's made not of plastic but of carbon-fibre composite. I don't know how radar reflective that material is.

      2. Regardless of the main construction material, the aircraft contains solar panels, batteries, motors, communications gear, antennae, and sensors which contain metal and are radar reflective.

      3. The listed cruise speed is 30 kts which, presumably, is not against a headwind. I suspect it would have a hard time keeping up with a naval task force.

      4. The payload is listed as 5-10 lbs which means any sensors must be very small and very small sensors have very limited range and field of view.

      5. It takes 8 hrs to reach 70,000 ft which makes it a persistent asset but not a responsive one.

      6. Communications, as with every military asset, is a potential weakness/beacon.

      7. In addition to whatever radar signature it has, it also has an IR and optical signature to unknown extents.

      8. If detected and attacked it has zero maneuverability and survivability.

      I can't find any assessment of its actual sensor capabilities given its very small payload capacity. Perhaps you have some information?

      Depending on the effective sensor range, it might make a useful peacetime monitoring asset but it seems doubtful to be an effective combat sensor.

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    11. My understanding the first Zephyr sensor capability was rated at NIIRS 6 on the National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale for the quality of imagery acquired from various types of imaging systems, NIIRS 6 Ground Resolved Distance (GRD) of 0.4 to 0.75 meters, now speculation that with latest sensor capable of NIIRS 8 with GRD of 0.1 to 0.2 meters, which if true with such a small 11 lbs total payload sounds totally amazing. Sensor, the Optical Advanced Earth Observation system for Zephyr, OPAZ, haven't found any info on it to confirm its capability, just the images shown on the video which don't show height taken from.

      At Yuma reached 76,000', U-2 territory, would note at that altitude will need a capable(expensive?) missiles to take out especially if Zephyr cheap enough that able to use in numbers.

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    12. Just a note about image resolution. Resolution is nice but field of view (coverage area) is far more important for combat surveillance. For example, being able to count the hairs on the legs on an ant is impressive but if the field of view is only one square inch, that's of no use when the task is to scan umpteen thousand square miles of ocean.

      Typically, when you enlarge the field of view, you lose resolution. For example, it's possible to photograph an entire hemisphere of the world in one image but then you can't see much more detail than entire continents.

      So, what you want to find is the COMBINATION of field of view and resolution.

      Of course, the next issue is the speed of interpretation and action. If it takes days to analyze the images (whether manually or via computer assist) and pass the results to various agencies/services and then more days to make decisions and disseminate the data to field units, it's of no value.

      So, again, it's the COMBINATION of field of view, resolution, analysis speed, and dissemination/action speed. And, of course, there's also the effect of clouds, moisture, weather, rain, fog, etc. which all negatively impact coverage area and resolution. What you cited with NIIRS (never heard of it!) is, I'm sure, a best cast scenario. What about the real world?

      With all that in mind, what's your assessment of the effective surveillance capability?

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    13. CNO thanks for your point on FOV, did wonder how it was possible with a small sensor to achieve such an amazing level of high definition, but with your explanation it makes sense.

      Zephr as pseudo satellite with its very high very altitude, making it expensive to take out, if low RCS and cost affordable to buy in quantity definitely worth a look (Japan bought three large 32,000 lbs MQ-4C Tritons for $490 million).

      The limitation is the minimal payload, but if able to use in quantity might be able equip with various complimentary sensors eg narrow and wide FOV, IR etc. Many operational practicalities to be overcome as you mention, control and co-ordination etc, but think worth pursuing due to its usp of its high altitude. It will not have the capabilities of the Triton, but will have the numbers so would expect much higher chance of survival, half a loaf of bread better than none. Possible alternative to Zephyr looks like constellations of LEO SAR micro-satellites, SpaceX has launched approx 2,000 of its telecom satellites to date, 60 per rocket.








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  12. I have often wondered why someone hasn't done this with a Fiesler Storch type aircraft. A captured example was once landed on the elevator of an RN carrier. These could be flown from any helicopter carrier. Take off is about 50m, less factoring in a headwind and speed of the ship. Landing was 40m, less including ship speed. Packed full of passive sensors would give non carrier groups a viable early warning and could be networked to the ship via laser so minimal emissions. This could replace the Merlin AEW in RN service and be a boon to RAN, JMSDF, Spanish and other navies.

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    1. The aircraft, in its original form, was very slow and had very limited range. What would be gained over a helo?

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  13. "I have often wondered why someone hasn't done this with a Fiesler Storch type aircraft."

    It's an interesting idea. I think the concern would be its longevity in a non-permissive environment.

    I think CNO has proposed a similar idea, I'll try and do it justice here.

    Utilizing a UAV carrier, send out large numbers of small and relatively inexpensive drones using passive sensors.
    These drones would send info back to the battle group via directed microbursts.

    The battle group would then take these small pieces of information and synthesize them to gain situational awareness.

    The reason for the 'inexpensive' nature of these would be an expectation of high loss rates, which might be problematic if using the Fiesler Storch.

    Lutefisk

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    1. That's not really what I was proposing. A Stork could take off and basically hover over the LHD group at 10,000 ft or a little lower so O2 isn't needed. That height would give a huge advantage in terms of ESM and possibly IR and other sensors. It is a siiting duck but well within the sm2/essm bubble. As soon as it is painted by L S or X band it's job as EW is done. It should be able to pick that up long before the radar can actually return a signal. This gives solid warning to the ships below, perhaps the can change course etc as required.

      Not a replacement for an E2 or Wedgie, but very useful, cheap and can be used across a wide variety of military forces.

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    2. " hover over the LHD group"

      You may not be grasping the degree of spread of escorts in war. The escorts would be 20-50 miles out from the main ships. A small aircraft with small sensors would be doing well to even 'see' out to the escorts.

      Height does not confer unlimited range to passive sensors. For example, the F-14 IR/EO chin sensors had ranges of 20-50 miles for fighter size targets and 70-100 miles for large bomber size targets. Modern strike-fighters or incoming missiles would be detected at or inside the escort ranges. Presumably, the escorts would have already detected the targets.

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  14. I've pondered a new SR-71 with down looking radar. It would be land-based, but very long range with a dash speed of Mach 4 at 90,000 feet. (perhaps with a small a rocket booster to move even faster if needed). It could look down to defeat stealth aircraft designed to hide from radar in front. It would move too fast to intercept and outrun anti-air systems as even faster missiles would exhaust fuel trying to reach it. It couldn't control the air battle, but would provide great intel for task forces and worry an enemy.

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    1. You raise a few interesting issues.

      1. Speed. To what degree does speed confer survivability on the aerial battlefield? Ballistic missiles travel mach-several and yet the US Navy believes that they can be intercepted by certain Standard missiles. While a tail chase intercept would not likely succeed, a frontal intercept, as in the case of a ballistic missile or a SR-71-ish heading toward the enemy, might well be successful. This raises the question, to what extent should speed be emphasized in fighter aircraft or in high value AEW/AWACS/EW aircraft? In other words, what is speed worth and where should it rank in the priority list of aircraft design requirements?

      2. Such an aircraft would [presumably] only be able to provide occasional sorties. The original SR-71 had a one-sortie-per-week availability due to intense maintenance and flight prep requirements. Can occasional sorties provide enough surveillance and situational awareness to be worth the effort? Alternatively, can we afford to build such an aircraft in large enough numbers to compensate for low sortie rates?

      3. This approach would only provide overall situational awareness due to the significant time delays in processing images/data and the episodic nature of the sorties. However, as you suggest, overall situational awareness is a very valuable tool for commanders. This leads to the question, could such an aircraft/approach provide the survivable, effective surveillance that current surveillance assets (P-3, large UAVs, satellites?, etc.) cannot? Could this be one of the missing pieces of the surveillance puzzle?

      I don't have any definitive answers but this is definitely worth some consideration.

      Great comment and intriguing idea!

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    2. Good points. The B-1 can do Mach 2 at high altitude and has far more internal space than a Hawkeye. Could we have a smaller version on carriers with an afterburner and Mach 2 speed to outrun AMRAAMs, just a burst to dodge incoming AMRAAMs and fighter jets?

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