The Navy has released the results of its investigation into the fire that destroyed the USS Bonhomme Richard, LHD-6. Navy Times website reports that 36 people are accountable and face possible disciplinary action (1) including the following:
- Vice Adm. Richard Brown, Commander, Naval Surface Force Pacific Fleet
- Rear Adm. Scott Brown, Pacific Fleet’s maintenance officer
- Rear Adm. William Greene, Fleet Forces’ East Coast maintenance officer
- Rear Adm. Bette Bolivar, commander, Navy Region Southwest facilities
- Rear Adm. Eric Ver Hage, Navy Regional Maintenance Center
- Capt. Gregory Thoroman, Bonhomme Richard’s commanding officer
- Capt. Michael Ray, Bonhomme Richard’s executive officer
- Command Master Chief Jose M. Hernandez
Now, before we celebrate the fact that several flag rank officers are included in the list, let’s note several things about this list and the possibility of disciplinary action:
- These are report recommendations and some, none, or all may occur. The reality is that most will likely not occur. You may recall that the Navy was, initially, going to charge the Commanding Officers of the Burkes that were involved in collisions with negligent homicide, among other charges. That never happened.(2, 3)
- While ComNavOps is entirely in favor of accountability, the number one person in accountability is conspicuously absent from the list and that would be CNO Gilday. This is just a scapegoat list, not true accountability. If there was any actual accountability and integrity, CNO Gilday would have submitted himself for disciplinary action and then resigned. This is just theater with a handful of sacrificial lambs being offered up.
- None of these people, if they had protested the prevailing conditions and failures prior to the incident, would have been listened to and would, instead, have been disciplined and fired for failing to make do. We’ve seen this repeatedly. Ask the Commanding Officer, Capt. Brett Crozier, of the carrier USS Roosevelt who protested COVID conditions. He lost his command.
- As we’ve seen in the previous investigation reports of multiple collisions, fires, groundings, and loss of ships, despite report after report and nearly endless lists or recommendations, nothing of consequence has actually changed and senior leadership has not been held to account. Nothing will change from this, either, and senior leadership will not be held to account to any significant degree.
Regarding recommendations and changes, one interesting passage from the report seems to recognize that the spate of collision, grounding, and fire reports in recent years has not materially improved conditions.
The Navy has created requirements that have not been followed or verified as effective by their owners, and many personnel within the Fleet lacked awareness to their existence as seen in this investigation. Crafting requirements without effective follow-through creates the illusion of fixing a problem, giving false comfort that the same problem would not recur. (4) [emphasis added]
Significant change and improvement will only come when the CNO is court-martialed and the Secretary of the Navy is fired. With that precedent established, their successors may become motivated to pursue actual improvement.
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(1)Navy Times, “36 officials, including five admirals, face potential discipline over Bonhomme Richard fire”, Geoff Ziezulewicz, 20-Oct-2021,
(2)The commanding officer and tactical action officer of the USS Fitzgerald received letters of censure in lieu of any formal charges.
(3)The commanding officer of the USS McCain pled guilty to a single charge of negligence in not setting a proper watch team. The plea resulted in a letter of reprimand and forfeiture of $6,000 pay.
https://news.usni.org/2018/05/25/former-co-uss-john-s-mccain-pleads-guilty-negligence-collision-case
(4)”Command Investigation into the fire aboard into the fire aboard USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) 12 JULY 2020”, p.312
file:///F:/Report%20-%20Navy%20Bonhomme%20Richard%20Fire%20Investigation%20-%20Oct%202021.pdf
"None of these people, if they had protested the prevailing conditions and failures prior to the incident, would have been listened to and would, instead, have been disciplined and fired for failing to make do."
ReplyDeletePrecisely: the rot starts at the top, using these guys as scapegoats will solve nothing.
The U.S. Navy. Business as usual. Brings to mind the MK 14 torpedo debacle and the USS Iowa turret explosion.
DeleteWhy is the Fleet Forces East Coast maintenance officer on the hook for something that happened to a west coast ship in San Diego?
ReplyDeleteAnd what is the role of the command master chief now, that they seem to be going after them whenever anything bad happens? I thought command master chief was supposed to be like COB on a submarine. Why are ChEng and DCA not on the hit list?
OK. Reading the Navy Times article, I see where ChEng and DCA were included, but names redacted.
DeleteMaybe go back to the 1890s. Hand ships over to the shipyard or contractor, stop treating ship's crews like prison labor while allowing the contractor to operate freely but blame the navy crew for anything they do wrong.
ReplyDeleteAS a side note, the navy blamed some kid for starting the fire. Do any of us believe that is likely? NCIS are all civilian college grads who didn't score highly enough to join the FBI, and they accept whatever the admirals say on ship stuff. And the admirals don't want to risk getting jobs with ship contractors after their retire.
I agree about the NCIS, they are a total joke. When I see adds for the NCIS series of shows I think if only people knew. I was a sensor operator on P-3s active duty and reserves but I also served as an IS. For a time I drilled with a Navy Intel unit assigned to NCIS headquarters: not impressed. On active duty, NCIS agents (I know hard to believe) would actually harass sailors about our uniforms (for me it was wearing my flight jacket with my dungarees). NCIS main function is to railroad enlisted and juniors officers at the behest of the senior zeros.
Delete"Maybe go back to the 1890s. Hand ships over to the shipyard or contractor, stop treating ship's crews like prison labor while allowing the contractor to operate freely but blame the navy crew for anything they do wrong."
ReplyDeleteThat's the way the Royal Navy does it now. The ship actually goes out of commission for yard periods.
"Significant change and improvement will only come when the CNO is court-martialed and the Secretary of the Navy is fired. With that precedent established, their successors may become motivated to pursue actual improvement."
ReplyDeleteThe problem is that the punishment after that would be confinement to the board of General Dynamics at a base pay of four to five times their previous salary. Being released from service may not be the punishment as in times past.
Brig time is always an option as is federal criminal charges such as the negligent homicide charges the Navy originally wanted to apply to the Burke COs. Federal agents perp-walking the CNO to jail would have to have a chilling effect. No corporate board is going to hire a criminally charged, disgraced, former CNO.
Delete"Significant change and improvement will only come when the CNO is court-martialed and the Secretary of the Navy is fired."
ReplyDeleteWhich means nothing will happen until military readiness becomes an important topic in mainstream national politics.
As I mentioned in other comments, the CNO can be charged with negligent homicide since he has direct responsibility for all ships and crew. A disgraced CNO rotting in jail ought to prompt his successor to take a more serious interest in safety.
DeleteThe only figure that people ever see is dollars spent. They just assume that since we spend more than anyone else we must have an effective military. I hoped the Afghanistan debacle would lead to a more substantive conversation in the mainstream. Sadly it got a couple days of coverage and people moved on.
Delete@Husker. You hit on something I am always harping on social media sites: DoD and contractors have done a masterful job of selling to US public that "more money, more defense, more safe" and it's almost impossible to challenge this statement. You just can't convince people otherwise, even when you show them the waste, the corruption or useless crap DoD buys like LCS, people just go:"Yeah but just give DoD more money anyways!" It's insane!
Delete"Significant change and improvement will only come when the CNO is court-martialed and the Secretary of the Navy is fired."
ReplyDeleteI understand the CNO part. But the SECNAV who was in charge at the time of the accident is already gone. The current one only just started. Why would HE need to be fired?
I'm speaking in general terms for any incident and any SecNav. For example, after the Burke collisions, the Port Royal grounding, the Avenger grounding and loss, the Antietam grounding, the Ford fiasco, etc.
DeleteActually I'm not sure SecNav is even the right top. Remember, SecNav is responsible for providing a trained and equipped force, but he (or she) doesn't control deployments. That's the responsibility of the regional combatant commander, who does not report to SecNav. He/She reports directly to SecDef. If SecNav says the ship isn't ready to deploy, but the regional commander says "I don't care, I want it anyway", who wins?
DeleteIn the case of the Bonhomme Richard, I think it's pretty clear that SecNav would be a good "top of the line" guy, but in some of the other cases you mentioned, I'm not so sure. In the case of the Burke collisions, my impression is that a lot of the problem was lack of time for adequate training (and maybe maintenance), was it not? In which case, whose fault is it really? The regional commander probably demanded that they deploy on schedule, ready or not.
I think this may be a general problem with "matrix management", which is also popular in the private sector. It means that lines of authority are divided, so who is actually accountable for decisions?
Setting aside any blurred lines of responsibility, SecNav is responsible for, among other things, from Wikipedia:
Delete"... all authority within the Navy and Marine Corps, unless specifically exempted by law, is derivative of the authority vested in the secretary of the Navy.
Specifically enumerated responsibilities of the SECNAV in the before-mentioned section are: recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, mobilizing, and demobilizing. The Secretary also oversees the construction, outfitting, and repair of naval ships, equipment, and facilities."
That means that every failed INSURV inspection, every failed acquisition program, every Ford fiasco, every collapsing drydock and maintenance facility, every loss of ship due to failure to train to firefighting standards, every ship collision, every grounding, every Fat Leonard criminal conspiracy, every captured riverine boat and crew, every failure to meet Congressionally mandated report deadlines, every … well, you get the idea, is the direct responsibility of SecNav and he should be held accountable. At the very least, any of the previously mentioned incidents is grounds for firing and many may be grounds for criminal proceedings for fraud, lying to Congress, and other failures. I'm not a lawyer but I suspect there is plenty of fodder for criminal investigations.
Just read some of the findings and its almost beyond belief!!! Almost no DC drills, no leadership, no overabundance of caution in calling away a fire... It sounds like Murphy's Law crossed with a Saturday Nite Live skit!! While it may have been arson that started the fire, every single element that contributed to BHR becoming a total loss was knowingly put in place. CONSCIOUSLY!!
ReplyDeleteFrom the lowest sailor who never spoke up about not being trained, to the duty section leaders who didnt drill their people regularly, to the DCs who let their equipment be/stay faulty, to the CO who didnt ensure his crew was trained properly and ready, to the Pentagon clowns who arent asking COs why they arent drilling regularly, or why their inspection reports show continuous failure...
If the Fitz/McCain incidents didnt answer the question: "Is running rust an outward sign of whats within?", the expose' on BHR certainly does!!!
When I went through RTC Great Lakes in 1992, we watched films of both the USS Forrestal (CV-59) and USS Enterprise (CVN-65) disasters, they served as hard lessons learned. I was an Airdale, we were required to go to General Shipboard Fire Fighting because we went to the boats with our airwings. I was even in a Repair Locker (1 Hotel). Damage Control in general, is an all hands on deck evolution, or it use to be.
ReplyDeleteIt is completely UNSAT that the BHR was allowed to die in the manner it did. This was a complete failure from the Top to the Bottom. If a fire cannot be extinguished on a ship pier side, can we afford to believe that it can be put out at sea?
It does not sit well with me and hopefully with a lot more peeps whether a Veteran or an active duty service member. Can we expect a Congressional investigation or are they preoccupied?
"If a fire cannot be extinguished on a ship pier side..."
DeleteI agree with everything you said, but to be fair, a ship in the yards has significant damage control handicaps. Parts or all of the shipboard fire mains are often offline, as was the case here as I understand it. Doors and hatches often have hoses and cables running through them, making it slow or nearly impossible to set proper fire boundaries. So I think a ship is more at hazard when in the yards then when out at sea. Now having said that,there were a ridiculous number of shortcomings and outright failings that allowed the loss of a multi-billion dollar asset, and the responsibility lies with lowest of the ships crew, all the way to the gold braided clowns in the Pentagon....
"to be fair, a ship in the yards has significant damage control handicaps."
DeleteTo be even more fair, the significant damage control handicaps are ALL self-inflicted.
For example, the inactive fire mains and sprinkler/foam heads should be repaired and placed back in service, in their entirety, BEFORE the ship is torn apart and flammable materials are strewn haphazardly around the ship. While the fire main/heads work is in progress, NOTHING ELSE SHOULD BE HAPPENING and LOTS of extra fire watches and roving fire inspectors should be employed.
For example, there is NO REQUIREMENT for flammable material to be haphazardly strewn around the ship. That's just lazy. Flammable materials should be stored on the pier, brought on board ONLY WHEN NEEDED, and then immediately removed when the work shift is over. Yes, that costs more money and slows the work a bit (even that's debatable because the trash slows work and a cleaner ship's space would allow faster maintenance work) but saving just one ship from becoming a total loss more than justifies the time/cost. We've lost the BHR and a sub due to yard fires because we wanted to save a few dollars. Penny wise and several billion dollars foolish.
For example, for a couple of weeks prior to maintenance docking, the entire ship's crew should be put through intensive firefighting and procedures training and the shore side firefighting should be contacted, coordinated, and exercised.
For example, fire boundaries should be rigorously maintained. If that means removing hoses and cables at the end of each shift and then rerunning them for the next shift, so be it. The extra price is miniscule compared to the loss of a multi-billion dollar ship. During hot work, people should be stationed at each compromised door/hatch with cutting equipment on hand to instantly cut and clear any obstacles to sealing doors and hatches.
I can go on all day with these kinds of examples but the point is that fire is ALWAYS a self-inflicted incident due to dereliction of duty and violation of well established regulations and procedures. Trying to blame any fire on yardwork, as if it's somehow unavoidable or an inherent condition of yard work, is failing to put the blame where it correctly lies and that is the leadership of both the ship and the yard as well as higher command that knows about and has for years accepted lax standards.
Yard work is NEVER an excuse for a fire. Fires are ALWAYS self-inflicted.
Speaking as a former E-6 AW (Aviation Warfare Operator) the Navy now is a total joke. Why are officers in charge of regional maintenance facilities Admirals? The ludicrously failed programs: LCS, Zumwalt, Ford Class, F-35. The collisions, the surrender of a riverine craft to the Iranians, the inability to deal with the fire on the Bonhomme Richard. I disagree about COVID on the carrier: our potential enemies are watching us and the hysterical reaction by the Captain: taking a deployed carrier offline for a respiratory illness that has little or no risk to healthy young sailors (yes, one man died: how often do pilots, helo crewmen, aviation boatswains mates die??), he deserved to be relieved. The media has brainwashed the majority of Americans that the Wuhan virus is the Black Death. Colin Powell was 84, has blood cancer and Parkinson’s disease but he died from covid? Nonsense. That’s the koolaide that carrier captain was drinking. The Chinese are watching and laughing. Our entire military is run for the financial benefit of the defense industry and senior officers (future employees of said industry). Our senior leadership, political and military are corrupt clowns. They betray the enlisted, junior officers and the American people.
ReplyDeleteComNavOps: I just listened to a podcast describing the final findings of the BHR Fire. Just a total lack of any leadership at all. Everyone standing around until finally an Admiral arrived to get things moving. Zero planning or preparation for fire fighting after the ship's fire system was disconnected during maintenance. The list is endless. You might want to write an article on the results and how things should be done correctly!
ReplyDelete"You might want to write an article on the results"
DeleteI already have - several times! It's exactly the same as the Port Royal grounding, the McCain collision, the Fitzgerald collision, the MCM grounding and sinking, etc. The reports are identical, with a litany of leadership failings, lack of training, lack of preparation, etc. Only the *fill in the blank* name of the ship changes. There's no point doing yet another post that would be identical to the previous ones. The Navy adamantly refuses to learn any lessons.