We’ve had a lot of discussions about the role of the carrier. ComNavOps has stated that strike (land attack) is no longer a carrier mission. There remains, however, a substantial number of observers who still cling to the outdated concept of carrier strike operations.
Why is carrier strike – meaning, manned aircraft – no longer a mission? Modern, peer defenses, consisting of both defending aircraft and land based surface to air (SAM) missiles along with extensive and sophisticated sensors have rendered aircraft strikes far too risky.
The preferred alternative is, of course, cruise missiles as suggested by the following missile characteristics.
Cost – Tomahawk cruise missiles cost around $2M compared to aircraft which cost $80M-$100M each. In addition, aircraft operate on a daily basis and flight hour costs are on the order of $15K-$30K per flight hour, day after day. That makes for an incredibly expensive weapon delivery system. In contrast, a cruise missile has no operating or maintenance costs to speak of. Finally, the cost of training and ‘maintaining’ a pilot is enormous whereas, again, the cruise missile has no pilot cost.
Expendability – Cruise missiles are, by design and by cost, expendable. Aircraft, by design and cost, are not. Modern peer defenses guarantee that strike aircraft will suffer significant attrition and the cost to replace the airframe and produce a new pilot is staggering. Worse, the time required to produce new airframes and pilots is prohibitive during a war.
Stealth – The US Navy currently has no stealth strike aircraft. That aside, cruise missiles have significantly greater stealth than even a stealth aircraft due to their much smaller size, smaller cross sectional area, smaller profile (regardless of angle), smaller engine exhaust (IR signature), and ability to fly a sea skimming terminal approach. And, of course, new cruise missiles have stealth shaping.
Numbers – The current US Navy Tomahawk cruise missile inventory is somewhere in the vicinity of 3000-5000. The Navy currently has 9 air wings with around 44 F-18 Hornets in each for a total of 396 potential strike aircraft. Of course, in actual operations only a fraction of those would be available as aircraft are needed for carrier defense, various CAPs, tankers, and escorts.
Missiles can be massed in very large numbers against a target. Strike aircraft are severely limited in number although each aircraft can carry 2-4 missiles or several bombs. Weight limits, weight distributions, external fuel tanks, range considerations, self-defense requirements, etc. limit the number of missiles that can realistically be carried.
Weather – While carrier aircraft can operate in bad weather, to a degree, there are significant limits. Missiles, in contrast are virtually unaffected by weather.
Range – Cruise missiles have a range of around 1000 miles. Aircraft have an effective combat range of 200-300 miles although various types of standoff missiles would add to that range. For example, the air launched Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) has a range of somewhere around 300 miles which, when added to the aircraft’s range, puts the total strike range at around 500-600 miles. The extended range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM-ER) has a range of 500 miles or so which, combined with the aircraft’s range, gives a total strike range of 700-800 miles. Other weapons such as the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) have much lesser ranges. JSOW has a high altitude release range of 70 miles.
The benefit, such as it is, of air launched, standoff attack missiles is negated by very long range SAM defenses and enemy aircraft which can, and will, contest the launch points. The effort required to conduct an airborne, standoff strike (aircraft, fighter escorts, tankers, EW escorts, BARCAP, etc. also negates the benefits. In short, it requires a far more massive effort to conduct an airborne, standoff strike than to conduct a simple ship-launched, cruise missile strike and the benefits are few especially when weighed against the inevitable aircraft losses.
So, is ComNavOps alone in his assessment? After all, a lot of people are still unwilling to give up their comforting paradigm of carrier strike. Well, it would seem that the Navy has also concluded that cruise missiles are the preferred strike asset as evidenced by the strike history of the last few decades. The table below is adapted from Wikipedia.(1)
|
Operation |
Date |
No. of Missiles |
|
1991 |
288 |
|
|
Iraq disarmament |
Jan 1993 |
46 |
|
Iraq disarmament |
Jun 1993 |
23 |
|
Sep 1995 |
13 |
|
|
Iraq disarmament |
Sep 1996 |
44 |
|
Aug 1998 |
79 |
|
|
Dec 1998 |
325 |
|
|
1999 |
218 |
|
|
2001 |
50 |
|
|
2003 |
802 |
|
|
Mar 2008 |
2 |
|
|
Al-Qaeda training camp in Yemen |
Dec 2009 |
2 |
|
Mar 2011 |
124 |
|
|
Sep 2014 |
47 |
|
|
Attack on suspected radar sites in Yemen |
Oct 2016 |
5 |
|
Apr 2017 |
59 |
|
|
Damascus/Homs chem weapons strike |
Apr 2018 |
66 |
There have been manned aircraft strikes during that time but those have been relatively few and only in low threat scenarios such as the infamous ‘truck plinking’ during the ISIS campaign.
You might also recall that not too long ago, the Navy had stated that the F-35 would be last manned naval aircraft – further recognition that manned aircraft strikes were no longer viable – and, more recently, the Navy attempted, but failed, to develop unmanned strike UAVs (that eventually ‘devolved’ into the unmanned tanker). Clearly, the Navy has moved on from carrier strikes.
The implication of the Navy’s recognition that cruise missiles are the preferred strike asset is that the carrier air wing should be shifting its composition from strike to air superiority. We need to drop any aircraft that is a ‘strikefighter’ and switch to pure air superiority. The immediate import of this line of reasoning is that the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft, which the Navy is working on now, needs to be a pure air superiority fighter and not a strikefighter. Disturbingly, the Navy is already referring to the NGAD as the F/A-XX strikefighter so that train is already headed off the tracks.
Carrier aircraft strike has gone the way of the battleship in terms of being the primary strike method. We need to complete the transition to carrier air superiority by modifying our doctrine and operational practices and adjust our air wing composition accordingly. Carriers and their air wings remain just as vitally important as ever but their mission has changed. Just as the battleship proponents clung to their outmoded paradigm, so too will the carrier strike proponents cling to theirs but the change is inevitable.
________________________________
(1)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tomahawk_(missile)#United_States_Navy
Good analysis of the first contact costs. However, we tend to underestimate the amount of ordanance required to destroy targets. I am woored that Cruise missile effectiveness is being over estimated and we are falling back into the Bomber Mafia's erroneous assumptions that limited, "surgical" strikes can cripple an enemy's forces or industrial base. Granted targeting and delivery accuracy has vastly improved with GPS, but on a dynamic battlefield you often need real time ordanance larger than artillery shells can deliver. Look at all the ordance we delivered in the recent (after Vietnam) wars and how effective they were before we give up on a capability. Also there is a point a 500 lb GPS guided bomb is WAY cheaper than a cruise missile.
ReplyDeletePlease don't assume I'm suggesting that we can win a war with nothing but cruise missiles. I'm not! I'm merely saying that if we want to conduct a strike, cruise missiles are the preferred method over carrier air strikes.
DeleteYou're quit right that dumb bombs are way cheaper (in isolation) than a cruise missile. HOWEVER, the cost of delivery is prohibitive in terms of aircraft attrition because the aircraft have to directly overfly the target and against modern peer defenses, that's near suicide. Losing $100M aircraft trying to deliver $10K bombs is NOT economical. So, while the missile costs more than the dumb bomb, the actual, overall cost when aircraft bombing losses are factored in, is cheaper.
As long as the enemy's IADS is intact - hopefully not longer than a few days or weeks into a major war - the risk of attrition for aircraft launching non-standoff weapons is unacceptable. Beyond that time, the opportunity cost of housing those strike aircraft on CVs is prohibitive; air superiority, ASW, and support aircraft take priority.
DeleteThat said, launching land attack cruise missiles from DDGs and SSGNs is not necessarily the most effective or cost effective tactic. The Bomber Mafia can dismantle the IADS with standoff weapons on day 1 using cheaper air-launched missiles, can sortie faster than a fleet sailing across the pacific, and doing so frees up the fleet(s) to focus on sea control and SinkExing the PLAN with anti-ship-heavy VLS loadouts.
After the IADS is significantly degraded, (stealth) bombers are still the ideal method of delivering "dumb" ordinance to truly cripple the enemy's industrial base. The parallels from the WW2 pacific theatre are clear; naval aviation was performing air superiority as well as naval strike (now replaced by ship-launched missiles), but we used land-based bombers to drop a significant fraction of the ordinance deployed against every island we occupied in that theatre.
"The Bomber Mafia"
DeleteAs you noted from the post, we're talking ONLY about carrier strikes. The Air Force's use of aircraft, missiles, bombs, or whatever, is a separate topic outside the scope of this blog. The premise of the post is simple: that FOR THE NAVY cruise missiles are preferred over carrier strikes.
"outside the scope of this blog"
DeleteYou're right to focus on one branch and develop expertise in discussing it, but the operational doctrine of the navy does not exist in a vacuum. If they're not the best method of delivering warheads to inland targets, we don't need to figure out the best way to strike inland targets with naval assets. Recognizing that CVN-based strike aircraft aren't viable doesn't beg that question unless you treat the navy as the only relevant force in a China war.
I can see why you would want to prevent this devolving into an Air Force vs Navy discussion, but to a certain extent it is highly relevant.
"You're right to focus on one branch"
DeleteYou've just 'answered' your own question (you didn't really ask one but still …). Every post I write could be a full length book if I were to thoroughly cover the topic. Obviously, I can't do that in the space of a blog.
Similarly, I have to focus on just the Navy aspects of any topic. I know it's all interrelated but I simply don't have the space to address it in its totality. I trust that astute readers, such as yourself, understand this and can fill in the linkages for themselves.
"There have been manned aircraft strikes during that time but those have been relatively few and only in low threat scenarios such as the infamous ‘truck plinking’ during the ISIS campaign."
ReplyDeleteDuring what time? Desert Storm alone saw manned aircraft flying over 100,000 sorties and dropping 88,500 tons of munitions.
Iraqi Freedom saw us drop nearly 20,000 PGMs, only 4% were Tomahawks.
Cruise missiles have been a drop in the bucket during large strike campaigns.
As you noted from your careful reading of the post, we're talking about carrier air strikes not overall US and allied military strikes, as you misleadingly cited. So, the vast majority of the sorties you're referencing were US Air Force and allied strikes, not Navy carrier sorties.
DeleteThat aside, Desert Storm was a very low (non-existent after the first few days) threat environment for carrier aircraft. The same for Op IF. These prove the premise of the post. Beyond that, the trend is clearly towards cruise missile strikes over carrier strikes.
What you say is true. But you may have missed that the author specified "peer" opponents.
Delete"USMC and Navy air flew 15,800 SEAD"
DeleteComment deleted. We're not going to argue minutiae for sake of argument. See the Comment policy.
Aaand now I remember why I stopped posting here. I spent time gathering those numbers. Pretty uncool.
DeleteAnyway, facts are facts, Tomahawks have been bit players even just considering Navy air.
You spent time gathering information to argue irrelevant minutiae. No one said that aircraft had never been used. In fact, quite the opposite. Here's the statement from the post:
Delete"There have been manned aircraft strikes during that time but those have been relatively few and only in low threat scenarios such as the infamous ‘truck plinking’ during the ISIS campaign."
So, you're arguing about something that was never stated which means you're arguing just to argue and that is not up to the standards and expectations of the blog.
If you wish to continue commenting, do so in a productive fashion rather than arguing irrelevant minutiae. That way, maybe your time won't be wasted. If you can't do that, find a blog more to your liking.
You have much to offer if you'd focus on productive comments rather than irrelevant, pointless arguing but that's up to you. In any case, there will be no further unproductive comments.
How can you say there is a trend towards cruise missile strikes for the Navy? Your evidence is a grand total of 2,100 TLAM shots over the past 30 years. Most of those instances were against undefended or lightly defended targets. Only the major combat operations had anything close to peer level air defenses, and really only Desert Storm comes close to the density one might expect from a peer.
DeleteIf you look at the table in the post, especially the last decade or two, the trend is clearly towards using cruise missiles rather than carrier strike. Every time the US wants to conduct a strike, it is primarily, or only, cruise missiles on the part of the Navy. The instances of aircraft strikes are limited to very low (non-existent) threat scenarios like truck plinking. This isn't even debatable. It's just the historical facts.
DeleteI've wasted enough time on this.
DeleteTo those who still think manned aircraft can do strike missions go look up aircraft losses in Vietnam.
ReplyDelete3,744 planes, 5,607 helicopters and 578 UAVs.
The F-15, F-16 and F-18 will suffer very high attrition while the numbers of those aircraft pale in comparison to the number of aircraft the US military used to have.
To try to decrease losses the US fielded numerous EW and SEAD support aircraft.
E/RB-66 Destroyer
F-100F Wild Weasel
EF-105F Wild Weasel III
EF-4C/D Wild Weasel IV
EKA-3B Skywarrior
EA-6B Prowler
The list goes on.
While now all the EW and SEAD aircraft have been retired with only the F/A-18G Growler remaining and in only limited numbers.
If it's not stealth it's skeet and if it's stealth it's payload is small and short ranged since the internal bays don't allow the fitting of the bigger long range air launched munitions.
Excellent comment!
Delete"if it's stealth it's payload is small and short ranged since the internal bays don't allow the fitting of the bigger long range air launched munitions."
Ohhh … shoot. I should have thought of that and mentioned it but I failed! Glad you chimed in.
Three more key issues.
ReplyDelete1. Downed pilots become POWs. This was a huge issue in Vietnam and many were captured in Iraq. Tomahawks don't risk pilots.
2. For every strike aircraft our Navy needs around one supporting aircraft. Trainers, tankers, fighter escorts ect. So one must add the cost of procuring and operating those support aircraft.
3. Infrastructure costs. How many Tomahawk bases does our Navy have? None! How much does it cost to operate Oceana, Leemore, Yuma, ect. Plus support bases like Fallon, Pensacola, ect.
Okay, you seem to be in agreement that cruise missile strikes are preferred over carrier air strikes. That being the case, what are your thoughts on the implication of that for future carrier air wing compositions and the role of the carrier? I've stated that I see the role of the carrier as air superiority and escort for the Tomahawk/cruise shooters. What are your thoughts?
DeleteThe Navy seems to have come to the same conclusion about strike doctrine but they have not taken the next logical step to the implications for air wing composition and carrier role.
G2mil, your comment appeared in the blog spam folder for no good reason that I can see. I try to check that folder frequently but there will, inevitably, be a delay in getting the comment published. So, if you don't see your comment appear immediately, rest assured that it will get published.
DeleteSeveral other people have had comments default to spam the last few weeks for no apparent reason. Apologies to all but there is nothing I can do about it except to keep checking the spam folder as often as I can.
On the plus side, Blogger is simple, easy, and free but on the flip side, I have very little control over its behavior and settings. For the moment, the positives outweigh the negatives.
A question for ComNavOps: Does the Navy have a land-attack mission after fixed targets (i.e.: buildings & bridges) are destroyed? If so, what are those missions?
ReplyDeleteThat's a good question. I assume you mean after most of the know, fixed targets have been eliminated? At that point the war is, essentially, over because all of the enemy's bases, ports, facilities, manufacturing, command and control, etc. will have been destroyed so … no more war capability. Right? That probably wasn't where you thought the answer would go.
DeleteNow, if you meant on a more local basis, like no more fixed targets in a smaller area like an amphibious assault zone, then the answer is either conventional carrier aircraft strikes if the threat level is low enough or support via naval artillery (large caliber naval guns) which, of course, we don't have.
On the face of it, your question reveals a shortcoming or gap in the Navy's capabilities. In localized scenarios, the Navy does, indeed, run the risk of losing relevance due to the lack of naval artillery.
Of course, there's always surveillance and EW missions but those aren't land attack missions, per se, although they can be useful adjuncts.
Did that answer your question or were you going after something else? I suspect you had something a bit different in mind. Feel free to expand on your thought.
What about anti-ship strike?
Delete"What about anti-ship strike?"
DeleteWhile the post was about land attack, the same general principles apply to anti-ship. Cruise missiles are still the best option. Given the lower threat from surrounding defenses, one can make a somewhat stronger case for air launched cruise missiles but ship launched cruise missiles are still the preferred, easier, cheaper, simpler option.
Do you have a different take on it?
I'd like to see someone build modern, stealthy naval strike aircraft and test them against, say, a carrier task force's defenses, but that's unlikely to happen.
DeleteSince of course ship move, targeting for the missiles would be a challenge compared to just flinging them at an enemy base or whatnot.
"I'd like to see someone build modern, stealthy naval strike aircraft and test them against, say, a carrier task force's defenses"
DeleteWe already have such an aircraft. It's the F-22/35. While they may not be pure strike aircraft (although the F-35 was conceived as mainly a strike aircraft), they don't need to be just to test a carrier group's defenses. It would be an enormously useful and informative test but, as you say, it's unlikely to happen.
"targeting"
You are spot on. This is always the key to any type of strike and we've devoted many posts to the topic. To the best of my knowledge, no one has tested any of our presumed surveillance/targeting assets against an enemy force that is actively trying to prevent being detected. This would be yet another informative test.
I'm nominating you for Director of Navy Testing!
I see anti ship strike as having worse problems than carrier strike. A warship's anti-air defenses are dangerous to a manned strike aircraft and the manned aircraft can't fire enough rounds to swamp a hostile fleet's anti-missile defenses. Manned aircraft could effectively finish off a crippled enemy warship or defenseless transports but that's about it.
ReplyDeleteThe other drawback for carriers is manning. Considering an airwing can have 1,500 personel, all of whom must be trained and taken care of, that is both an expense and a small town's worth of people who could die in combat. Actually it would be an even larger crew size reduced as you have 1500 less people that require cooks, supply staff, etc. to be supported.
ReplyDeleteOf course as you've pointed out airwings aren't what they used to be but still, when that first carrier is inevitably sunk during Peer combat we may wish there had been less crew on board.
Looking at your conclusions and then considering the difficulties with the Ford class actually launching aircraft, perhaps converting the Ford to an arsenal ship would be in order? It has sufficient space for hundreds of cruise missiles and the number of AA missiles and CIWs could be 5 times larger and you would will have room for ASW or mine sweeping helo's on the back. And the now vacated air crew space can be used for special surge teams, extra storage, or just expanding and improving bunking for the existing crew.
Question's for ComNavOps
ReplyDelete1. Do you think different types of cruise missile need to be developed for the USN rather than a single do everything type like how the current Tomahawk is used?
I can see two types working.
A stealthy Tomahawk sized weapon with current Tomahawk range and warhead and a high speed dash for the attack phase.
A large stealthy cruise missile the size of a P-700 Granit for anti-ship and large hard targets with the corresponding larger warhead and higher kinetic damage from the high speed.
2. Do you think the SSGN capability needs to be kept?
An idea I had is when the Columbia class start entering service is retire the oldest Ohio SSGN first while sending the newest Ohio's to be refit into more SSGN's while they still have 15 years of life in them rather than the USN's current plan of retiring the SSGN's for Virginia's and the oldest Ohio SSBN for a Columbia which is far earlier than necessary based on how long USS Ohio has served.
"current Tomahawk"
DeleteThe current Tomahawk is obsolete. It is slow, non-stealthy, non-maneuverable, and limited in sensors. We desperately need a faster, stealthy, highly maneuverable (terminal approach), multi-sensor cruise missile.
As far as multiple versions of such a missile, yes and no. Yes, we need the ability to swap out sensor packages and warheads but, no, we don't need completely different missiles.
The Tomahawk (and any new replacement) has a 1000 lb warhead which should be generally adequate. We might want to develop a small number of very large, very fast missiles for 'bunker buster' type work but I would envision those as being ballistic missiles rather than cruise missiles.
The only other type of cruise missile that might be warranted is a small (say, 200 lb warhead), shorter range, anti-ship missile for use against smaller vessels. This might be along the lines of the current Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) and would placed on smaller ships like the LCS or FFG. Whether that's worth the maintenance of a second supply chain, I don't know.
" Do you think the SSGN capability needs to be kept?"
Kept and greatly expanded! The SSGN is far and away our best cruise missile launching asset. It has unparalleled stealth, sufficient missile loads, and excellent survivability. What's not to like?! Only the US Navy could be stupid enough to retire those without replacement.
Totally agree about SSGNs here!!! While the Ohios are getting old, their potential in a second life as SSGNs isnt somthing to miss out on. As the Columbias get closer, Id look at starting more conversions, possibly even dropping the number of active SSBNs to 8 or 10 temporarilly. There are tons of ways to make this work, including blue/gold crews and keeping many of them in reserve status. We dont need them for deployments, we need them only for the next war. So conserving what life the reactors and associated equipment has is key. This applies even to the current SSGNS. They should be placed in reserve, but maintained at the highest level, so that we can get "one good war out of them".
DeleteI understand that it doesn't make sense to try to do strikes on the Chinese mainland from an aircraft carrier, but what about strikes on an island (in the first island chain, for example) in support of amphibious operations (or in support of defense against Chinese amphibious operations)? Wouldn't there be a role for strike (or maybe close air support) aircraft in that scenario?
ReplyDelete"strikes on an island"
Delete"Wouldn't there be a role for strike (or maybe close air support) aircraft in that scenario?"
Well, think about it. For the few visible, fixed targets that would be on an island, cruise missiles would be the preferred choice for the reasons listed in the post. Once those are gone, air strikes would be limited to either area bombing or targets of opportunity … essentially close air support. That is not normally a carrier air mission. That's the LHA/F-35B role.
As demonstrated in WWII amphibious ops, fleet carriers do not normally provide air support for ground assaults. The role of fleet carriers is to provide far distant interdiction of enemy resupply, reinforcement, and counterattack. The LHA type ships (escort carriers in WWII) are the ground support component.
What's missing - and what you're really asking without realizing it - is where is the naval large caliber gun support for the type of operations you're describing? Unfortunately, the answer is the Navy abandoned that vital role so there is, indeed, a significant gap in our capabilities but fleet carrier air is not the answer, as I've pointed out.
Do you see that?
In summary, what the Navy needs are two squadrons of new BCK-1's per carrier. A low-cost, subsonic, non-stealthy Bomber/Cargo/Tanker aircraft with fuel efficient turbofan engines, e.g a new S-3. As a bomber, it can carry four Tomahawks to triple the strike range of carriers today. It could reach further supported by identical aircraft in the same squadron serving as tankers. In situations where enemy high altitude air defense does not exist or has been destroyed, it can drop dumb bombs or guided JDAMs to pummel targets below. As tankers or CODs they can support anything. The drawback is that industry profits for design, upgrades, and production will be less than half what they get from an F-35 or whatever BS they are planning for.
ReplyDeleteI agree that submarines are the best missile carrier/launcher for many reasons. But, cost is a driver too. What sort of ships beyond what we already have should be built? A truck carrying hundreds of missiles and air defense, or smaller pickups carrying dozens of missile to spread the targets out? Then, how many missiles should we have available? Surely more than 3-5000?
ReplyDelete"What sort of ships beyond what we already have should be built?"
DeleteI've addressed this in detail. See the 'Fleet Structure' page.
"how many missiles should we have available? Surely more than 3-5000?"
Our current inventory is fine PROVIDED WE CAN QUICKLY MANUFACTURE MORE … but we can't. Our focus should not be on building up our inventory but, instead, on building production capacity.
We can build production capacity via the combination of several paths:
1. More construction capacity (more factories).
2. Simpler designs. We don't need Terminator AI level missiles that can be reprogrammed in flight and guided by every soldier or sailor with a cell phone. We just need something to follow waypoints and then go boom.
3. Stocking long lead parts.
Is there a place for air-launched cruise missiles, where the air-launch platform is itself launched from the carrier? Think of it like rocket staging, with the heavy aircraft as the reusable first stage and the missile as the expendable second stage. Let's say, a stealthy, supersonic missile with a thousand mile range, weighing 1,500 kg, and a launch platform very similar to a navalized F-15, with a radius of 1,000 miles, to provide a combined range of 2,000 miles. The launch point for the missile could by anywhere in a long arc of ocean, many hundreds, to a thousand miles long: too long and too far from the target to be intensively defended. The F-15-like launcher would not be stealthy, but would be fast enough to be survivable at the very long distance from the target required to launch missiles. With 50 aircraft per carrier and, say, four missiles per aircraft, a carrier could launch a respectable number of missiles in a strike.
ReplyDeleteWhat you're describing already exists though not with the ranges you cite.
DeleteAt the risk of asking an already answered question, what does a notional cruise strike group look like? Presumably ship launched missiles have to take on some aspect of the SEAD mission first, unless the assumption is any new cruise missile will be sufficiently stealthy to pass through a fun tonal air defence network?
ReplyDeleteHow many cells does a strike group need to stay on station for a useful time period? (I guess you can't do VL cell replenishment at sea, so you go with what you've got)
So does a given group need 3-4, or 6-10 ships with a couple of hundred cells each to give a decent number of strikes before coming off station?
Or do you have an arm launcher so you can replenish at sea, but accept a lower launch rate?
"before coming off station"
DeleteThere is no such thing as a 'station' in war. That's a peacetime or no-threat concept. In war, a naval task force executes a mission and then retires as quickly as possible. Any group that hangs around 'on station' will be sunk.
"what does a notional cruise strike group look like?"
It consists of whatever is needed to accomplish the mission. That might be a dozen missiles, a thousand missiles, or any other amount.
"SEAD"
SEAD is not really needed for cruise missiles. The purpose of SEAD is to enhance the survivability of aircraft. With missiles, this isn't really an issue. The success of the mission derives from the number of missiles rather than the survivability of individual missiles.
I think we mostly agree that cruise missiles are pretty specialized. If we were fighting a Chinese invasion force of the size we deployed in WWII with thousands of ships then trying to sink all of them with cruise missiles would be unrealistic. I think cruise missile cost would quickly become too high for anything but a special occasion once both sides developed more close-range, inexpensive missile defense out of desperation using shells, bullets, and guided rockets (like you've mentioned in the battleship fiction post).
ReplyDeleteThen we are back to large diameter guns and bombs in situations where aircraft can survive. I also think there is a huge opportunity for the Navy to develop its own version of multiple launch rocket systems. They are cheap upfront, labor efficient, and the ammo is containerized. You could reload them at sea. There is also the flexibility to use unguided rockets with sub munitions or launch fewer longer-range guided rockets. I can see rocket volleys softening up enemy battle groups for further run and aircraft attacks.