The Navy recently conducted what they labeled as Large Scale Exercise 2021 (LSE) that supposedly involved massive numbers of ships, aircraft, and personnel spanning the globe. Wow! This sounds like the pre-WWII Fleet Problems. Could it be that the Navy is finally conducting massive, realistic, useful training?!
LSE 2021 will include approximately 36 live ships underway ranging from aircraft carriers to submarines, over 50 virtual units and an unlimited array of constructive units in addition to the Sailors, Marines, Government civilian and contract employees assigned to command and training staffs providing support to the exercise. Participating units will span 17 time zones to include six naval and Marine Corps component commands, five U.S. numbered Fleets and three Marine Expeditionary Forces.(7)
Oh, oh … ‘span 17 time zones to include six naval and Marine Corps component commands, five U.S. numbered Fleets and three Marine Expeditionary Forces’. That sounds suspiciously like the description of the F-35 program where the main purpose was involve as many states as possible to ensure Congressional funding. This exercise description sounds like someone is trying to impress with statistics rather than actual, useful training. I have a bad feeling about this … but, let’s continue and keep our fingers crossed.
What’s the purpose of the exercise? According to the Navy, LSE is,
… designed to refine how we synchronize maritime operations across multiple Fleets, in support of the joint force. (6)
Oh, no … Could that be any more of a meaningless buzzword vomit? I’ve got a bad feeling about this.
Let’s take a closer look.
Scope
The LSE is, presumably, supposed to mimic the Fleet Problems of the pre-WWII era. Those exercises, as you’ll recall, were massive live exercises with entire fleets going at each other. They were the closest thing possible to actual combat and, in at least one case, involved dropping sacks of flour on battleships at Pearl Harbor to simulate bombs! So, what does the Navy envision for its LSE? From a US Navy press release about LSE 2021,
LSE
2021 is a Chief of Naval Operations-directed live, virtual, and constructive,
globally integrated exercise that spans multiple fleets. LSE 2021 is
designed to refine how we synchronize maritime operations across multiple
fleets in support of the joint force. The training is based on a progression of
fleet battle problems and scenarios that will assess and refine modern warfare
concepts, including distributed maritime operations, expeditionary advanced
base operations, and littoral operations in a contested environment. (1)
Yep, that’s some outstanding buzzword bingo that says nothing.
We also note that the exercise is not like the actual, physical, real Fleet Problems of the pre-WWII era. Instead, it is a combination of live, virtual, and constructive (computer generated?) units. In fact, it appears that most of it is virtual and simulated. You noted the reference to ‘over 50 virtual units and an unlimited array of constructive units’? I’m not quite sure what the difference between a virtual unit and a constructive unit is but it’s clear that the vast majority of the ‘participating’ units were not real.
Data Over Firepower
More cringeworthy noteworthy is the following,
“We have shifted focus from the
individual Carrier Strike Group to a larger fleet-centric approach, challenging
fleet commanders' abilities to make decisions at a speed and accuracy that
outpaces the adversaries,” said Adm. Christopher W. Grady, commander, U.S.
Fleet Forces Command. “LSE is more than just training; it is leveraging the
integrated fighting power of multiple naval forces to share sensors, weapons,
and platforms across all domains in contested environments, globally.” (1)
We see again, the shift from firepower (carrier groups) to information: ‘commanders' abilities to make decisions at a speed and accuracy that outpaces the adversaries’. We’re going to think circles around our enemies and defeat them with information, not firepower. Of course, our intel and decision making speed and accuracy couldn’t even execute a simple drone strike in Afghanistan but we’ll defeat China with our decision making speed and accuracy. Riiiiight …
Repetition
Here’s some delusion to go along with everything else:
“LSE will test our commanders' abilities to deliver coordinated effects, from all directions, any time or all the time. It will help us build the necessary muscle memory to do this routinely at the operational to strategic levels of war,” said Adm. Robert P. Burke, commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe. (1) [emphasis added]
For anyone who’s not familiar with the phrase, ‘muscle memory’ is what athletes use to perform tasks such as shooting a basketball. The concept is that one performs the task thousands upon thousands of times so that the muscles become locked in to the position and movement required to successfully perform the task routinely. The key is that it requires tens of thousands of repetitions to lock in the muscle memory.
So, looking at the analogy, LSE is a triennial exercise – once every three years. How is an event that occurs once every three years developing any kind of mental muscle memory? Do these people actually believe the delusional things they’re saying? Mental muscle memory comes from doing a task on a daily basis. That’s why athletes practice every day rather than once every few years!
Piecemeal Exercise
One aspect that stood out about the exercise was its piecemeal nature. The LSE, unlike the Fleet Problems, had individual units operating in an unrelated fashion and scattered around the world. For example,
-Marines in Hawaii exercised some aspect of expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) by deploying small units to Oahu and Kauai.
One unit loaded up rucksacks with supplies, weapons and needed surveillance equipment and marched across Oahu. The second was transported to an Oahu shoreline via amphibious hovercraft. The third unit, flown to Kauai, experimented with an intelligence-gathering system called Network on the Move-Airborne, which provides data in real time collected by the entire joint force. (2)
-A 50 person group from 2nd Fleet staff operated an expeditionary Maritime Operation Center (MOC) at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek, Virginia.(3)
-The Aegis cruiser, San Jacinto, idled pierside in Norfolk while undergoing a maintenance availability, participated by simulating AAW actions.(4)
-The exercise involves some 25 ships both in port and underway. The Navy has not provided information on the number of ships in port versus at sea during the exercise.(5)
-A simulated carrier strike group ‘operated’ off Norway.(5)
-F-18 simulators provided some of the ‘aircraft’.(5)
Reactions
I’m sorry but there is simply no substitute for real units performing real actions – just ask the highly trained CIC watchstanders aboard the Vincennes in 1988 who found that training and simulations did not match reality. Or, ask the highly trained watchstanders aboard the Burkes who collided with merchant ships.
There’s nothing wrong with virtual exercises, per se, unless they take the place of real exercises which this does. The annual Fleet Problems have been replaced by largely virtual exercises.
The exercise was highly disjointed and, for most units, involved nothing more than a small, isolated exercise.
This exercise accomplished little or nothing.
Unfortunately, like most of what the Navy spews forth, the claims about the recent Large Scale Exercise 2021 (LSE) are full of exaggerations, spin, and outright lies.
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"Adm. Christopher W. Grady, commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command"
ReplyDeleteWhat is the U.S. Fleet Forces Command and why do we need it?
ComNavOps, off the top of my head, this looks like an excellent candidate for one of those admirals you want to get rid of.
"this looks like an excellent candidate for one of those admirals you want to get rid of."
DeleteOne of???? Seriously, I'd get rid of all but around 10-20. If they're competent, that's all we need and if they're not, no amount will compensate for incompetence.
Here's another: RAdm. Gayle Shaffer, Deputy Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery/Deputy Surgeon General of the Navy/Director, Medical Resources, Plans and Policy Division, N0931, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. She's the admiral of dentistry!
Never let it be said that the USN lacks teeth.
Delete"So, looking at the analogy, LSE is a triennial exercise – once every three years. How is an event that occurs once every three years developing any kind of mental muscle memory?"
ReplyDeleteUnless things have changed since I was in, that's about the time required to ensure 100% turnover of personnel. Literally no one will have any idea what was going on during the last time the unit did the exercise. Every exercise will be a one off.
Am I missing anything?
So, a few (?) Marines went on a camping trip in Hawaii, four dozen people played with computers in Virginia, and a non-existing carrier group operated off Scandinavia.
ReplyDeleteNice and realistic, just as you'd expect.
Also, note the purposely deceptive name: this so-called "Large Scale Exercise" is actually a few small scale exercises of questionable utility scheduled to happen at the same time to make the whole thing appear impressive.
ReplyDeleteCheap tricks are no substitute for actual training.
The Russians showed up to take a look off Hawaii. You could see something going on with an LPD off Kuai. You could also watch the AIS of the torpedo retriever boat also nearby. In San Diego they had both Zumwalts at the time and both Sea Hunter/Sea Hawk out. Evidently the Overlord prototypes were also out of Port Hueneme. And by out, I mean not in port which the stock exercise photo had implied to many as their just playing around there at the port entrance. I think the big question is, did we learn anything? if so, what? Did we learn anything strategic, anything tactical?
ReplyDelete"A simulated carrier strike group ‘operated’ off Norway."
ReplyDeleteWTH is a simulated carrier strike group? Seriously, this looks like we simulated way more than we did.
I gather that there are some Brits on here. I'd be interested in knowing more about the old Springtrain exercises out of Gibraltar. In his book about the Falklands, Sandy Woodward describes the 1982 version as about as big an exercise as a smallish navy can conduct, and he seems to give it credit for enhancing the readiness of units he took south to the Falklands. That's all I really have to go on, and so would be interested in comments from any RN types who participated. How big a deal was Springtrain really? And they have apparently stopped doing them. Why?
Is that a concept that we could expand into a major USN exercise? Or if we got a sizable hunk of our Navy underway at the same time, would they just go out and all run into each other?
"Is that a concept that we could expand into a major USN exercise?"
DeleteWe already have the example of how to conduct a useful exercise: the Fleet Problems.
That aside, Wiki has a decent writeup about the Spring Train Exercise and, in particular, the 1982 version.
Agree about the Fleet Problems.
DeleteFrom what I have read, perhaps it would be fair to describe Springtrain as the closest thing to the Fleet Problems that a much smaller navy can accomplish.
Springtrain or Fleet Problems, we need to emulate that model and do it once or twice a year.
And "simulating" a carrier task group is perhaps the most absurd comment I have heard in a long time.
"And "simulating" a carrier task group is perhaps the most absurd comment I have heard in a long time."
DeleteSetting aside the absurdity of a simulated carrier group, if you're going to do that, why place it off Norway. Assuming no one thinks Norway is going to attack us, the purpose was, presumably, to act against the Russians. I don't know of any serious analyst who thinks there is even the remotest chance of war with Russia. Why not simulate the group around the E/S China Sea in action against China? The Navy took a dumb idea (simulated carrier group) and made it dumber by fighting Russia instead of the obvious enemy, China.
I wonder how realistic the simulations are? Did we lose any ships to collisions with merchant ships? Did the simulated EMALS break down every hundred shots or so? Were the simulated technicians able to repair it? Did the simulated aircraft have a 50% full mission capable availability as they do for real? Nooooo …. I'm pretty certain the simulated carrier group performed flawlessly.
DeleteI guess they picked a place near Russia for political reasons and just called it a day.
Delete"I'm pretty certain the simulated carrier group performed flawlessly."
DeleteAnd unfortunately, that's probably the only kind of carrier group that can perform flawlessly.
Instead of a simulated carrier group, how about doing an actual exercise involving getting all of the LCSs underway. Half of them would probably run into the other half, they'd all sink, and we'd get a bunch of new diving reefs.
At this point, although we certainly need realistic fleet exercises, I think the Navy needs to relearn the basics. Its been years since collisions took sailors lives, but clearly, no real meaningful changes took place afterwards. Just having regular, suprise scrambles to put every ship to sea and assemble into task groups would be a start. Last year the Reserve Fleet did somthing like that, with less than stellar results. Consider this: I read recently that to save money, east coast ships will only move in and out of port during the week. So what happens when we give Second Fleet a war warning emergency sail notice saturday evening?? How many ships will get underway with, say, 2 hours notice?? Heck, we arent even saddled with the long process of "raising steam" any more. I have to laugh at the thought. Imagine whole DesRons paralyzed because they dont know how to go to sea without tugboats!! How about a CVN?? Anyone think a carrier captain could/would "throw all lines" and drive away from the pier in a pinch?? Not likely. The most basic of evolutions arent "muscle memory" by a long shot!!
ReplyDeleteMaybe once we can get ships to sea and maneuver safely, then we can work on the tactical stuff...
As a footnote- If we did throw the fleet a curveball, and order an emergency sortie, the COs that drove away from the pier, dragging hull, scratching paint, and maybe even springing a few hull seams... Those are the guys we keep, emulate, and after they train more like themselves...promote.
Delete"If we did throw the fleet a curveball, and order an emergency sortie, the COs that drove away from the pier, dragging hull, scratching paint, and maybe even springing a few hull seams... Those are the guys we keep, emulate, and after they train more like themselves...promote."
DeleteIn today's USN, those are the guys we would fire.
Exactly!!!! Thats why I made specific mention of it!!👍
DeleteNo doubt, what Navy needs to prepare is conflicts with China regardless it happens or not. Well preparation actually prevents conflicts from happening.
ReplyDeleteThere is a key issue here - what will these conflicts be like? Can current tactics meet this challenges? Obvious, Pentagon has yet not figured out what would be like on battles between US and China. Not just Pentagon, I think that even China has no form idea what would be like on a navy battle with US.
Because there is no firm tactics to play, spend lots of money on old tactics, my view, doesn't make sense. Therefore, announce a "global" scale drill but key is to explore what might be than actually play through a know tactic.
Also, China views international alliance as a liability than assets. It tends to use its navy to extend her defense circle step by step than entering alliances with other nations thus have bases all over the world. This makes previous tactics developed against Soviet Union not work.
I would really like for someone to explain exactly what benefits are derived from this sort of "exercise." Compared to the interbellum Fleet Problems or what I understand of Springtrain, this seems like a waste of time.
ReplyDeleteIf you want to play tabletop war games, then by all means play them, but label them as such and recognize their limits. If you expect to derive any benefit to operating forces, then get those forces underway and have them actually do things, with at least some reasonable facsimile of an OpFor opposing them.
"I would really like for someone to explain exactly what benefits are derived from this sort of "exercise."
DeleteYou know. You're not happy about it any more than I am but we both know the purpose. It's to 'validate' the Navy's path with a scripted exercise that 'proves' the Navy's path is the right one.
Who lets these people get away with this and why? Surely, at some level, there has to be someone who understands that this does nothing to prepare us for war with China--or with anyone else, for that matter.
DeleteThe Navy simply doesn't see war with China as being possible. You're not going to prepare for something you don't think will happen. Yes, the Navy will use China as a justification for more budget but their daily actions prove that they don't really think war can happen.
DeleteThe Marines see war with China as somewhere between inevitable and highly likely.
The Army sees war with China as somewhere between possible and likely.
The Navy sees war with China as somewhere between impossible and highly unlikely.
I don't know where the Air Force stands.
"The Marines see war with China as somewhere between inevitable and highly likely."
DeleteDo they? Seems like they're just budget-grabbing and attempting to stay "relevant", to me.
"The Navy simply doesn't see war with China as being possible. You're not going to prepare for something you don't think will happen."
This is most likely their reasoning, and I actually agree there's not going to be a peer war with China anytime soon, but it's still unforgivable.
The fire department has a duty to be prepared for firefighting at all times, even if they think it's unlikely for a fire to break out.