There’s an article on the Defense News website that manages to unintentionally reveal so much that is wrong with the Navy and how they continue to go ever further off the tracks. Ostensibly, the article is a celebration of the USS Carl Vinson’s current deployment and its triumphant initial use of the F-35C in the air wing. Let’s take a look at the following issues that the article touches on in what the Navy and the author think are positive, glowing terms and yet we’ll see that they’re actually indictments of failure.
Air Wing Size
The Navy is trumpeting an increase in the air wing size. If that were true, it would be a good thing considering that the air wings have shrunk from 90+ aircraft to the current, anemic, 65 or so with only around 44 combat aircraft.
“We’ve increased the numbers of aircraft: we’re going to sail with seven EA-18G Growlers [compared to the usual five], 10 F-35s, we’re going to sail with five E-2D Hawkeyes [compared to the usual four],” he said from a call aboard flagship Carl Vinson. “We’re bringing more capability, we’re bringing more quantity, and we figured out just through training and analyzation [sic] of our tactics and techniques and procedures that this is the right amount: this is the right amount of air crew, the right amount of airframes.” (1)
With 67 planes in the air wing and three CMV-22s coming and going from their shore-based hubs, the ship needed to clear out more space on the deck and in the hangar. (1)
So, according to Martin (Rear Adm. Dan Martin, the commander of the Vinson strike group),
“… we figured out just through training and analyzation [sic] of our tactics and techniques and procedures that this is the right amount: this is the right amount of air crew, the right amount of airframes.”
So, let me get this straight, an increase of 3 aircraft (2 Growlers and 1 E-2) plus a decrease of 2 (decrease in squadron size from 12 Hornets to 10 F-35) for a net gain of 1 aircraft, constitutes a larger air wing? One additional aircraft is a larger air wing?
Does a carrier even have room for an air wing with one extra aircraft?
According to Capt. P. Scott Miller, Vinson’s commanding officer,
“… the behind-the-scenes increase in the number of EA-18G Growlers, two more of those, and one more E-2 has really been what’s filled up the inside and the topside of the ship.” (1)
So, one extra aircraft ‘filled up the inside and the topside of the ship’ ?????
Do these guys even hear themselves speaking? They must not or they’d surely stop out of abject embarrassment.
So, the claim of a larger air wing is false.
Massive Escort
The Vinson group was massively increased by increasing the number of escorts. Again, if true, this is a great thing as we’ve pointed out in previous posts that in actual combat we’ll need 25-30 escorts.
Additionally, he said, the strike group went through its final pre-deployment training and certification event with a massive destroyer squadron of eight ships. Only six deployed from San Diego with the carrier, and some will peel off along the way for homeport changes to Japan or will proceed straight to the Middle East ahead of the carrier. (1)
Ah … 8 escorts is not exactly a ‘massive destroyer squadron’ and then we see that the Vinson didn’t actually deploy with 8 destroyers but, as it turns out, less than 6 … like 2.(2)
So, the claim of a massive escort is false.
The Reality of War
Well, at least the Navy claims that they’re finally getting serious about war.
… the certification exercise with the advanced carrier air wing and the plussed-up [sic] destroyer squadron let the strike group conduct complex operations Martin said were tougher than anything he’d expect to see against a real-world adversary. (1)
Really????? A pre-deployment, check-box, scripted, work up exercise was ‘tougher than anything he’d expect to see against a real-world adversary’ ?! The good RAdm. Martin seems to think China is going to be easier to face than a canned exercise? He has absolutely no grasp of the reality of war. This is symptomatic of our Navy from top to bottom. No one has any concept of the reality of war. This is why we don’t train for war in any realistic way.
So, the claim of training for real world combat is false.
EA-18G Growlers
Effective electronic warfare (EW) is a force multiplier that is potentially even more effective than stealth. The Russians have clearly and forcefully demonstrated the value of EW on the battlefield. Here’s a statement from the Navy about EA-18G Growlers in the air wing.
“Our EA-18G Growlers are kind of our cornerstone non-kinetic airborne electronic attack for the air wing. We get a couple extra ones with the air wing, which gives us a little more capacity to be able to spread that capability across,” Locke [Capt. Tommy Locke] said. (1)
Well good for the Navy to recognize the importance of EW aircraft. The problem is that we need more … lots more! The air wings need around a dozen Growlers and new doctrine and tactics to maximize their effectiveness.
Crew Comforts
According to Capt. P. Scott Miller, Vinson’s commanding officer,
And to prepare for that [the one extra aircraft], we’ve paid particular attention to what other support equipment we have on board, and we’ve slimmed down or leaned down the things that we would have on board that are a bit for crew comfort. If you were on an aircraft carrier five, seven years ago, you’d see a lot of treadmills and exercise equipment kind of littering the edges of the space.”
“Those are all gone now; we’re to mission-essential items only as we learn how to operate with this higher operational density,” Miller continued. (1)
So, the Navy is in the midst of an eye-opening revelation that crew comforts were overdone and only mission-essential items should be on board? We knew this once and it is a sad commentary on Navy leadership over the years that we’ve forgotten it and are now having to relearn it. Combat is an unforgiving enterprise and some sailors paid with their lives to have crew comforts on the Burkes that were involved in the fatal collisions. I’ve harped on this and now the Navy seems to be getting on board, as well. I hope this trend continues and spills over into new ship design and the Navy begins eliminating crew comforts and recognizes them for the potentially lethal extravagances that they are. The Navy used the right term: ‘mission-essential’. Now practice what you preach, Navy.
Warfighting
This is a stunning commentary on the complete lack of historical understanding of how a Navy fights a war.
Even if the V-22 is operating as a logistics aircraft in the carrier strike group rather than a warfighting aircraft, Miller said its inclusion in the carrier strike group is making everyone safer.
“I would say as an air wing, to include the carrier onboard delivery, we were able to more confidently operate tactically and safely at a further distance from land than I’ve seen in my career,” said Miller, a career pilot. “If we get to choose where we want to operate from, that gives us a significant tactical advantage in whatever environment we might find ourselves in.”
He noted that, while the carrier wants to operate farther from enemy shores and outside the range of enemy missiles, the carrier strike group can only operate in areas where it can sustain itself. The longer legs on the V-22 “allow us to operate at those ranges that I hadn’t seen before.” (1)
Is this CO really saying that he’s uncomfortable operating out of reach of land? Here’s the salient comment: ‘able to more confidently operate tactically and safely at a further distance from land than I’ve seen in my career’. Is he really concerned about safety if he’s out of reach of a land based aircraft? Does the CO of a carrier not know that the Navy is supposed to operate out of reach of land, in the middle of the ocean? Does the CO of a carrier not know that the middle of the ocean is the safest place to be as regards enemy actions? Is this really the farthest from land he’s ever operated? If so, what a tragic commentary that is about naval operations, his career, and the selection criteria for CO of a carrier.
This is also a disappointing commentary on the state of Navy sustainment at sea and logistics/UNREP ship support.
Summary
The referenced article was a stunning admission of failure by the Navy in so many ways. It is painfully obvious that the Navy has forgotten how to operate as a combat naval force. The Navy’s decades of timid, zero-defect, cost cutting actions have left us with today’s hollow force that is scared to get too far from land.
_______________________________________
(1)Defense News website, “Carl Vinson strike group using first deployment with F-35C, beefed-up air wing to hone advanced operations”, Megan Eckstein, 10-Aug-2021,
"Here’s the salient comment: ‘able to more confidently operate tactically and safely at a further distance from land than I’ve seen in my career’. Is he really concerned about safety if he’s out of reach of a land based aircraft? Does the CO of a carrier not know that the Navy is supposed to operate out of reach of land, in the middle of the ocean? Does the CO of a carrier not know that the middle of the ocean is the safest place to be as regards enemy actions? Is this really the farthest from land he’s ever operated? If so, what a tragic commentary that is about naval operations, his career, and the selection criteria for CO of a carrier."
ReplyDeleteI don't know which is worse--that the Navy brass thinks like this, or that there seems to be no effort afoot to correct it.
"'If you were on an aircraft carrier five, seven years ago, you’d see a lot of treadmills and exercise equipment kind of littering the edges of the space. Those are all gone now; we’re to mission-essential items only as we learn how to operate with this higher operational density,' Miller continued."
ReplyDeleteMinor quibble. It seems to me that if we are going to reduce or eliminate crew comforts, the effort ought to start somewhere other than treadmills and exercise equipment. Sailors are notoriously overweight and out of shape, and that would seem to impact combat readiness negatively. Can't we find other things to eliminate first?
And oh, by the way, the fact that such equipment was strewn about littering spaces suggests a strong need to provide a dedicated space for it. Surely, there is something more non-essential that we can give up.
"the fact that such equipment was strewn about littering spaces suggests " … … …
DeleteWhat it suggests is that the Navy is no longer focused on combat and readiness. Every piece of equipment that is "strewn about littering spaces" is both a potential death obstacle as the Burke collisions fatally demonstrated and an impediment to immediate combat action should the need suddenly arise.
The solution is NOT a dedicated space for the equipment. The solution is to eliminate the equipment. As I've pointed out, we should not be conducting months long cruises that require crew comforts. We should be home ported and training so hard that no one has the time or energy to get fat or need to exercise aboard ship.
Looking for a dedicated space is just going along with all that is wrong with the Navy: the lack of combat focus, the endless pointless deployments, the lack of readiness, the lack of training, the lack of meaningful missions.
"Surely, there is something more non-essential that we can give up."
If there is ANYTHING that is non-essential, we should eliminate it, not repurpose it to something else that is equally non-essential.
I guess our difference is that I just don't see physical fitness as non-essential. And it can be difficult to maintain an appropriate level of physical fitness in the context of daily shipboard operations, whether deployed or training or simply sitting in port. There are a lot of creature comforts that take up space which could be set aside for a gym. Get rid of some of those other creature comforts, and put a command emphasis on maintaining physical fitness as an essential part of combat readiness.
DeleteQuoting from Jerry Hendrix, writing for the National Interest, "However, in recent years the hangar bays of the carrier have been overtaken by weight machines, treadmills, trash compressors, and recycled waste storage units which have had the net effect of decreasing the number of aircraft that can be carried on and hence launched from the carrier." (1)
I would say that the fitness equipment contributes to combat readiness, the trash compressors and recycled waste storage not so much. But neither belong on the hangar deck.
For AndyM, Hendrix gets into a pretty detailed discussion of spot factor in the referenced article.
Maybe there are other ways to address the physical fitness issue without having a shipboard gym. But in any event, I find it hard to believe that room cannot be spared for a proper gym without reducing the number of aircraft. We're talking about a reduction from 90 to 65. A gym does not need to be large enough to displace 25 aircraft.
(1) https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/naval-aviation-be-relevant-or-not-be-the-question-17432
Thanks!
Delete"Maybe there are other ways to address the physical fitness issue without having a shipboard gym. But in any event, I find it hard to believe that room cannot be spared for a proper gym without reducing the number of aircraft. We're talking about a reduction from 90 to 65. A gym does not need to be large enough to displace 25 aircraft."
DeleteCalisthenics.
Peacetime carriers arent doing 24/7 flight ops. So why would there be a ton of treadmills when there are acres of flight deck and hanger to run/walk/exercise on??? Really??That actually sounds memeishly absurd!! Wonder what the Navys treadmill budget is???
Delete"it can be difficult to maintain an appropriate level of physical fitness in the context of daily shipboard operations"
DeleteThe problem is you're still thinking the Navy way which means months long deployments, floating around, doing nothing. If that's what you want your navy to do then, sure, you need luxury cruise ships with all the amenities.
On the other hand, if you want a combat-ready navy then you need to home-port and conduct INTENSIVE, 24/7 combat drills. At the end of the day, sailors should have lost several pounds and be too exhausted to do anything except collapse into a bunk or hammock (yeah, I like the old berthing!). When you get back to port, then you can relax a little bit and exercise and gain weight and fix your teeth and collect your mail and whatever else. At sea, you train non-stop and you train hard.
You need to break out of your deployment mentality.
"...we should not be conducting months long cruises that require crew comforts. We should be home ported and training..."
DeleteFrom my standpoint, this is one of the key tenants of this blog.
My experience as a young army officer was as a scout helicopter pilot in a divisional cavalry squadron.
We would go the field a lot, but it was always for limited time, typically one or two weeks.
And it was always tactical; camo painted faces, flak vests, camo netting over tents and vehicles, fighting positions dug and improved, mortar pits dug near sleeping areas, noise and light discipline, perimeter security in fighting positions with crew-served weapons.
This was prime time and was never wasted. We would have training and missions planned for the entire time.
But we didn't go out there to perform maintenance, or do PT, or sit in classes. That was what garrison was for.
I was not in the navy, but I would envision the navy maintaining their ships and doing skills training on shore.
Then going on training missions with a specific purpose, moving tactically simulating wartime, and for a limited duration.
Sailing around with individual ships, or pairs of ships, seems pointless. It reminds me of staff aviators 'boring holes in the sky' to log flight hours to meet their minimums.
I think for the navy in regard to time at sea, less is more.
Lutefisk
"The problem is you're still thinking the Navy way which means months long deployments, floating around, doing nothing. If that's what you want your navy to do then, sure, you need luxury cruise ships with all the amenities."
DeleteNo, not really. Even if all you do is local ops, when you're out at sea the opportunities to maintain physical fitness are limited. You can say calisthenics, but not every ship has room. I really don't have a problem with a gym. That doesn't mean I agree with all the other creature comforts. And a gym is not the reason for cutting 25 aircraft, from 90 to 65. It just doesn't take up that much room.
"No, not really."
DeleteYeah, exactly. Your reply is further proof that you don't grasp the concept of home ported, high intensity, short sea period, combat training. You sail for a specific purpose/mission. You don't just cruise around. When you're sailing, you're conducting high intensity training around the clock. No one should have the slightest bit of excess energy for a gym session. If they do, then you weren't working hard enough.
Also, the missions/training are short duration - a few days to a couple weeks. No one is going to get out of shape in that period especially while training exhaustingly hard. Sailors can work out as much as they want/need when they get back to port. If sailors don't lose weight while at sea then they weren't working hard enough.
Read about the combat work ups that ships did during WWII. Drills started as they were leaving the pier and didn't stop for days/weeks: battle stations, damage control, AAW, ASW, loss of GPS/navigation, loss of power, firefighting, emergency steering, endless tracking, and on and on. WWII ships conducted live fire training almost daily. We should be doing the same although admittedly it's a little more difficult today due to the range of missiles but a little creative thought ought to be able to find a solution (non-warhead 'live' missiles?).
You are wedded to a paradigm that you just can't seem to break out of, if you even wish to.
They could save some workout equipment a bit by focusing on the food served first. Then time spent actually doing the flight deck work, then organizing organized PT when and where space and bodies are available.
ReplyDeleteIt would also be great to see air wing comparisons by spot factor. Not a number we often see. Last I remember was when they were designing LHA-6 and compared old and future aircraft.
The part about the "filling" up space is weird when as CNO mentions, in the 80s and decades before, 80 to 90 plus aircraft on-board carriers sure seemed routine and nothing special. Now 67 is really filling it up?!?! Is it lack of training and experience of the crews that prohibit it more than lack of space because since US carriers haven't gotten SMALLER, then what the heck has occupied the space before used by jets?!? IMO, I'm leaning towards lack of experience from current USN sailors, they just don't have the experience and training previous generations had at operating at those higher numbers and conduct safe operations. Also and USN will never admit this BUT does make one wonder if it also might be a result of reduced manning, do carriers have the same numbers of sailors as before,even a few 100 less probably might be enough to make impossible or dangerous to have a higher number of jets? Maybe we are seeing the results of reduced manning on carriers now, not just on DDGs....
ReplyDeleteInteresting little notice that V22 was also picked to help with COD to amphibs, I had never heard that before, my understanding about the RFP was just regular carrier COD....seems like USN hide that part about the amphib requirement.
ReplyDeleteAlso, rumors about Australian sub buy are out again, supposedly French subs are out and Virginia's are back in! Wow, that would be a twist!
The big issue has been Australian reluctance to buy a nuclear submarine when they don't have the internal infrastructure to support nuclear power. The French sub was going to be a nuke sub design converted to diesel-electric/AIP. There is considerable political push-back against nuclear. There is a pretty amazing exchange in a hearing between an Australian senator and a rear admiral where this was the underlying issue. I'll try to find a link and post it.
DeleteHere is a link to the session between the Australian admiral and senator:
Deletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k870cg2E4LM
Pauline Hanson, the senator in the video, has been very critical of the submarine acquisition process. There is a longer exchange with the same admiral, which I can't find now, where she asks whether pump jets require nuclear propulsion.
"rumors about Australian sub buy are out again, supposedly French subs are out and Virginia's are back in!"
DeleteThe reports are far from clear but I interpret them to mean that the US/UK are providing Aus with nuclear propulsion technology, not actual subs.
It would be stunning if the US sold Virginia class subs to Aus because the US is so secretive with the Virginias that they are not even allowed to participate in exercises with friendly navies. Transferring an entire sub to Aus would be nearly unthinkable unless it was so stripped of technology as to not even be a Virginia anymore.
Also, I notd that Aus leaders emphatically denied any desire to develop a civil nuclear capability. How they will operate nuclear subs is a bit of a mystery, then. With no native nuclear expertise, Aus will be 100% wedded to the US for training, support, supplies, etc. That seems like a less than desirable situation from Australia's perspective.
It's been a while but New Zealand used to ban US nuclear powered ships from visiting. If this is still their policy, how will this affect Australia?
We'll have to wait an see what actually comes out of all this.
Yes, I was getting the rumors a few hours earlier than the official release. VA is probably not in play but US/UK technology. There's obviously plenty of unresolved issues, apparently next 18 months will be discussions about that. I wonder if possible to sell an automatic nuke reactor sub back end, if I recall the Soviets/Russian worked on that with little to no crew in the "engine room", wonder if that could be one way to sell a SSN reactor without falling foul of NPT and other non proliferation treaties. Basically, AUS would operate a SSN but not really build or maintain the nuke part. Not saying its possible or realistic but maybe that's an option?
DeleteNZ has already said NO to new Aus SSN so they look like they want no part of it or basing.
ALSO wonder if and how this affects other regional countries like JAPAN, SK, maybe Singapore, will they be tempted to invest into getting a SSN? Its not just technology and military weapons system, its also about FACE, will they be ok operating SSKs when the big boys like US, CHINA and now AUS operate SSNs? We'll see....
"I interpret them to mean that the US/UK are providing Aus with nuclear propulsion technology, not actual subs."
DeleteOn the other hand, does Australia really have the capability to design a new submarine, even if we provide the nuclear propulsion technology? If they do, then why did they contract with the French a couple years ago to design one for them?
I'm assuming that Aus intends to adapt a SSK design to nuclear propulsion, giving them a small SSN. Pure speculation on my part.
Delete"There is a net increase of one aircraft so we've got a bigger air wing" is a pretty amusing statement.
ReplyDeleteTechnically true yet effectively worthless.
Not sure how USN leaders can say that with a straight face!!!
DeleteKind of makes one wonder, none of these guys know what a carrier looked like in the past?!?!?
One of the main justifications for dropping battleships was how vulnerable they were to land and carrier-based aircraft. Carriers, they said, were cheaper, and were less vulnerable to aerial threats, particularly those from other carriers.
ReplyDeleteIt has also been asserted that vessels of all types are at risk when in range of land based aircraft, missiles, and other armaments. If we are unable to operate outside of land range, it would seem that the response would be to shift over to more heavily armored vessels that are capable of taking hits from the land.
"If we are unable to operate outside of land range"
DeleteYou may have missed the nuance, here. It's not that we can't operate far from land, it's that we can't operate far from FRIENDLY land. That eliminates operating near enemy and unless that land also happens to be near friendly land.
Since it's only friendly land we can operate near, that eliminates any need for ships that can take hits since we won't take hits from friendly land, one presumes.
Sorry, I wasn't clear enough on that in my comment. I understand that distinction. Is there a place where we would confront China that is within range of friendly land that isn't also within range of their land-based aircraft and other armaments? If there is, is that a particularly large area?
DeleteIt's all just marketing spin.
ReplyDeleteAnd given a certain US general has advised the Chinese he would forewarn them of an attack, it's clear the purpose of the US military is not fighting any wars against peer level competitors.
If true...and it sounds like the report came directly from Milley bragging about his own virtue....it is absolutely mind boggling. Literal "end of the Republic" stuff.
DeleteYes... If what Ive heard of it is true, then Id think he violated dozens of civil laws, as well as plenty of UCMJ articles.... Politics aside, the uniformed military subverting or disregarding civilian leadership is, well, Im not sure that treasonous is too strong a word. And yeah, the road to **** is paved with (supposedly) good intentions...
Delete"And yeah, the road to **** is paved with (supposedly) good intentions..."
DeleteIf true, this is not an example of the road/good intentions. Instead, it's an example of the ends (removing/subverting Trump) justifying the means. We were all taught as children that the ends do not justify the means but too many people practice exactly that: lie, steal, cheat as long as it results in 'good' outcomes.
There are other choices in carrier and airwing size/scope. This recent book offers some,
ReplyDeletehttps://www.fpri.org/article/2021/09/where-are-the-carriers-u-s-national-strategy-and-the-choices-ahead/
First, thanks for the link!
DeleteGiven that it's a small book length writing, I have not had time to read it yet but I did read the conclusion section and found it quite interesting.
While the conclusion discussed various factors such as size, sortie rate, cost, nuclear vs conventional fuel, etc., the one aspect that wasn't discussed (or barely so) was actual carrier operational concepts. In my mind, operational concepts (CONOPS) is far and away the primary factor in evaluating carrier alternatives. All other considerations are a far distant secondary concern. To be fair, not having read the entire tome, it is possible that carrier CONOPS were discussed in the body of the writing but just not drawn out in the conclusion although I suspect that's not the case.
Carrier CONOPS, to my way of thinking, can be summarized thusly: today, carriers have two main functions:
1.) escort the Tomahawk shooters (Burke/Ticos)
2.) establishing local air superiority in support of other operations
What is notably missing from the CONOPS is aircraft strike operations as I do not see them as viable or desirable, generally speaking. Cruise missiles are far superior (and cheaper!) to manned strike aircraft in almost every respect.
The CONOPS goes a long way towards establishing what kind of carrier is needed and how many. THAT is the heart of any carrier evaluation. It goes without saying that the CONOPS also establishes the makeup of the carrier air wing and neither the F-35 nor the F-18 meet the resultant requirements … but that's a different though intimately related topic. The carrier is the air wing.
As I said, my apologies if my incomplete reading has resulted in mischaracterizing your work. Feel free to correct me, if so.
I also note that most of the book's conclusions closely mirror my own so … well done!
Is there any aspect you'd like to comment on in more depth?
Our current navy leadership seems to have no concept of how to conduct combat carrier combat operations (multi-carrier group operations, large escort placement and handling, multi-carrier strike operations, etc.). How can we regain our carrier combat institutional knowledge? Why have we abandoned realistic carrier training? Why are we not training the way we'll fight?
I'd enjoy hearing your thoughts on any of this in either a comment or a guest post!
working on that and thanks!
ReplyDeleteI look forward to whatever you have pending!
DeleteSomeone *hint, hint* should do a piece on the future of the LCS. The Navy has dropped some aspects of the original concept, modified many others, and added some new. Some capabilities (speed, range, endurance, crew size, etc.) have been downgraded. What does all this mean for the future utilization of the class? Where does/should the LCS fit into the fleet? What kind of operations is it suited for? Will the LCS be quietly early retired or will it rise and assume a prominent role?
The maintenance model has proven far more expensive and difficult to implement than originally envisioned. How can/should the LCS be maintained going forward? How can whatever maintenance model is used be sustained in a war (that was always one of the glaring weaknesses - contractor supplied, forward maintenance was never a realistic concept during war)?
It would be interesting to hear someone's thoughts in a sort of retrospective-future point of view. Just saying ...
"the future of the LCS"
DeletePlenty of places could use some new reefs, just saying.
While the LCS has had a troubled road and may not have turned out exactly as originally hoped, they are here and they could fill quite useful roles. Here's a post on some alternative LCS roles: "LCS Alternative Uses"
DeleteHumour aside, I like the SigInt idea, LCS can find a niche in non-combat roles since the maintenance mess makes them a bad fit for combat.
DeleteThe mothership option is also interesting.
Speaking of fiascoes, adapting the Zummies as EW ships could also be a way to get some use out of them since the gun doesn't work anyway.
Sea Control is the often forgotten, first priority of the carrier and providing air cover for other vessels and localized are control are absolutely essential as you suggest. The sortie generation rate (SGR) comes from the Navy's First Gulf War experience. The Air Force roundly criticized the Navy for not providing enough ground attack sorties for the conflict, even though the Navy got there first with the most aircraft at the outset of Desert Shield. In response the Navy has been trying to develop more sorties ever since and that effort has produced a much larger ship that costs much more and needs a level of experimental, unproven systems that dwarf those of LCS. Like the Japanese YAMATO class BB's, the Ford has become a very large ship focused on a narrow mission (high SGR.) The $$$ spent on one FORD might have bought two of the smaller carriers the book suggests. Conventional carriers can also have a 30 year lifespan and be retired and replaced without the very expensive RCOH of their nuclear cousins. You make other good points in that longer-ranged aircraft are again needed and that the F-35C is not a major improvement to the CVW beyond some of the EW capabilities it brings. On the cruise missile; yes they are good weapons in concert with others but they cannot be the only weapon. Too expensive. We fired over 800 Tomahawks in the 2003 Iraq War. How many would we fire against the PRC in just the first week? We need reusable carrier aircraft as part of an overall strike capability that includes manned and unmanned aircraft as well as missiles.
DeleteLCS 2 is out and deployed as usable small combatant. Like my first ship (a Knox class FF,) its not going to survive a dedicated air attack, but it has its uses. The Navy has grown increasingly unbalanced with too many high end DDG assets and not enough low-end ones. LCS 2 is doing some useful low end missions. Not sure why the LCS-1 has so many challenges. It may be in the Navy's training of the engineers for that platform. Fincantierri drives them around without issue on the builders trials but then Navy crews can't seem to maintain them. Maybe the plant is just too complex and they need to go, much like the CASCO class monitors, the last two predreadnoughts that were sold to Greece after only 4 years in USN service, or some of the Cold War frigates with pressure-fired boilers that were retired early? Will keep thinking.
"The sortie generation rate (SGR) comes from the Navy's First Gulf War experience."
DeleteSGR was a flawed concept from the start in that it was based on - and derived from - an non-war scenario. By that, I mean that as far as naval carrier operations, Desert Storm was not combat. It was just an aircraft sortie exercise. The carriers had no threats to contend with and they didn't move. You know your naval history - in a naval war, the carriers will sail, execute a mission, and return to port. They will not stand in one spot, day after day, launching sorties. Thus, the ?main? design criteria of the Ford was based on a NON-WAR (!!!!) scenario. That was a horribly flawed design concept. I can't think of a single example in history where a carrier was sortie rate limited. That's just not how carriers operate. As you know, the conduct missions in 'pulses' of aircraft using cyclic flight ops. Sortie rate is never a constraint.
"Conventional carriers can also have a 30 year lifespan and be retired and replaced"
Yes!
"Too expensive. We fired over 800 Tomahawks" "We need reusable carrier aircraft"
Remember to factor in aircraft attrition. At $100M per aircraft, each lost aircraft represents 30-50 missiles, depending on missile cost. Far more important is the replacement rate. We can replace an expended missile in a fraction of the time it takes to replace a lost aircraft. Our air wings are already 'attrited' from 90+ to around 65. We can't afford to lose aircraft in strikes (and we will) because we have no replacement aircraft and can't get any in any useful time frame. Missiles we can get although even those take longer than they should. China has numerical aircraft superiority, regionally, and very strong AAW defenses. We'll suffer significant attrition using manned aircraft strikes - attrition we can't afford and can't replace. Yes, I understand that many (most?) aircraft strikes will involve some sort of standoff weapon launch that we hope will reduce attrition but the Chinese aren't going to simply allow us to do that unchallenged. They'll meet our strikes and we'll have to fight through to launch points and we'll suffer attrition.
"Will keep thinking."
Keep commenting, too! Agree or disagree, your thoughts are fascinating, informative, and thought-provoking. I value them!
"Sea Control"
DeleteAh, now there's an interesting topic. Everyone seems to have their own definition of what sea control is.
One can make a good argument that sea control (meaning attrition of enemy naval forces and denial of use of the sea) is best accomplished by modern SSNs rather than carriers.
A definition and discussion of 'sea control' would make a great post *hint*!
thanks!
Delete