The San Antonio (LPD-17) amphibious assault ship class has been in production since the lead ship began construction in 2000. Now, 21 years later, the bugs ought to have been long ago worked out and the manufacturer, Huntington Ingalls (HII) ought to be delivering polished, problem-free ships on a regular basis, right? Well, here’s what an Oct 2020 Defense News website article noted from a GAO report about LPD-25, commissioned in 2014:
For example, the GAO found that 25 of the 58 systems required to be certified for deployment on LPD-25 were incomplete at the time of the ship’s delivery, and 14 were still incomplete when the ship was transferred to the fleet. Multiple systems were found deficient while the ship was in the fleet, including an advanced electronics system that “controls nearly all systems and equipment on the ship,” the GAO found.
“The system has experienced widespread performance failures and the Navy has been unable to repair the ship efficiently, including during the post-delivery period and after the ship was provided to the fleet,” the report found. “As a result, the Navy is in the process of looking at incorporating a new system.” (1)
I don’t know what the ‘advanced electronics system that “controls nearly all systems and equipment on the ship” ‘ is but it must be big and it must be important.
That the Navy has been unable to repair the system is worrying and is yet another example of the trend of modern systems becoming too complex to operate and maintain and too complex to achieve their anticipated performance. We’ve seen this with the fleet-wide degradation of Aegis. Despite this trend, the Navy is continuing to pursue ever more complex systems in violation of both the K.I.S.S. principle and the common sense requirement that combat systems be as rugged, robust, and repairable as possible.
Equally worrisome is that the Navy is ‘looking at incorporating a new system’. The Navy appears to be giving up on what is clearly a very important system. This, too, is becoming a trend. For example, the F-35 ALIS software system has been a debacle of sufficient magnitude that the military has given up on it and is trying to replace it. Note that I am not arguing against giving up on failed systems but it is troubling that so many systems are advancing so far, only to be abandoned. We need to identify failed systems much earlier in their development cycle instead of allowing them to become part of what should be mature production systems.
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| LPD-25, San Antonio Class |
The LPD-25’s problems are not isolated to one unfortunate ship of the class. The INSURV inspection for USS Portland, LPD-27, noted,
On LPD-27, the Portland, the ship scored lower than any of the previous four ships over the past five years, with deficiencies in main engines, aviation, small boat handling, anchoring, generators and air search radar systems, the report found. (1)
Of course, the Navy doesn’t see any problems. As Adm. Moore enthusiastically described it, the Portland is an amazing success.
Portland
is the 11th San Antonio class Amphibious Transport Dock ship to be presented to
the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) for acceptance. Acceptance
Trials are conducted with INSURV and are intended to demonstrate a ship's
readiness for delivery through a series of dock-side and underway tests and
evaluations.
"The USS Portland is a well-designed ship that is going to increase our
Navy and Marine Corps warfighting capability for years to come," said Vice
Adm. Thomas Moore, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. "The material
condition of the ship is fantastic, and the success she had during acceptance
trials is a true testament to the men and women that built her." (2)
There you have it. According to the Adm. Moore, LPD-27 is ‘fantastic’ and an unmitigated success. It would appear that INSURV/NAVSEA didn’t get the memo from Adm. Moore about just how fantastic the Portland is.
Despite endless years of incomplete and damaged ships being delivered to the Navy, the Navy continues to accept these ships and does not require warranties from the shipbuilders. Why even bother with issuing contracts since the shipbuilders have no intention of meeting the contract requirements and the Navy has no intention of holding them to the contract requirements? We could save a lot of money by just dropping the charade and simply accepting whatever non-functional crap industry wants to deliver. It’s what we do now, anyway, but we spend a lot of money negotiating contracts neither side has any intention of fulfilling so let’s stop pretending.
_____________________________________
(1)Defense News website, “US Navy inspections of Ingalls-built ships uncovered significant problems, report shows”, David Larter, Oct 8, 2020
Do these ships even have a mission anymore, considering all the CONOPS changes that the marines are making?
ReplyDeleteI don't think mommy and daddy are talking to each other anymore.
I don't think mommy and daddy are even speaking the same language, albeit both are fluent in Money.
DeleteThey (and the LHAs/LHDs) have never really had a mission. Their mission was supposedly amphibious assault, but you can't do a proper amphibious assault from them. So, as is, no mission.
DeleteDid it stay afloat and not sink. YES. PASS.
DeleteCNO, you've talked about budget games concerning ships being "delivered" while not actually complete. I don't know how much of this is a factor here, but with the continual muddying of the financials in shipbuilding, it seems to be getting out of hand. Of course, systems that just dont work vs ones that are incomplete are a serious if not separate issue. Clearly, the Navy needs to rethink the timeline and criteria between builders trials and the acceptance trials. There's no above-board reason for the Navy to "accept" a ship, the keys, and the Lojack key fob for anything that isnt 100% complete and functional.
ReplyDeleteWith the sad nature of new ships and systems, and the historical departments responsible for testing and acceptance just a memory, maybe there needs to be a new entity created?? Possibly an inspection/evaluation department similar to GAO, but answerable directly/only to Congress and/or the Armed Services Committee?? An entity filled with headhunters and a thouroughly vetted crew of naval-experienced personnel. (Maybe each service needs their own dept?) An entity that pays well enough to attract people away from industry, and that aren't influenced by a lucrative future in it. Im loathe to suggest another bureaucratic body, but clearly the Navy brass needs someone with true power and oversight looking over their shoulder, that can stem the flow of poorly performing builders and contractors. Ideally we could trust the Navy to do the right thing, and maybe intelligent reforms could bring that about, but as of now we certainly cant.
Anyone notice that the LPD 25 in the pic has no anchor? Is that a failed system as well?
ReplyDeleteThat is odd!!!
Delete"Those darn Chinese chains we bought..."
To be clear, that was a joke. I believe anchors and chains are under federal mandate to be domestically sourced, but with the immense amount of items found faulty due to poor metallurgy (Chinesium) in my industry lately, I couldnt resist...
Deletecould the missing anchor actually perhaps be hidden as a stealth measure?
DeleteBefore this anchor thing goes any further, no photo I've seen of the LPD-17 class has a visible anchor showing. It appears that the anchor tucks completely up into the anchor well. The anchors are there, just not readily visible.
DeleteI think this thread and the one immediately prior about the LHA/LHDs neatly encapsulate the problem that the Marines are facing. Two trends:
ReplyDelete- You can’t run a proper amphibious assault off the LHA/LHDs and LPD-17s, because they are too big and expensive to be risked in the ways necessary to perform amphibious assaults and we don’t have adequate ship-to-shore connectors to make up for it.
- At the same time, the Marines have gone about becoming a baby Army occupation force in Iraq and Afghanistan, following the lead established when Westmoreland sent them north to I Corps instead of south to the Mekong Delta in Vietnam.
Marines need to refocus themselves on their historic amphibious mission—assaults, port capture, demonstrations, even humanitarian actions—and the Navy needs to support that mission. Leave the long-term territorial conquest and occupation mission to the Army. Get in, get done, get out—that was, and should be, the Marine way. Assume the role that the Royal Marines adopted when faced with budgetary extinction in the 1960s/1970s—amphibious plus commando force. Get out of the “baby Army” business and turn your “baby Air Force” air superiority mission back to the Navy to focus on air assault and CAS.
If LHA/LHDs and LPD-17s are too big and expensive for amphibious operations, the Marines’ proposed LAW goes too far in the opposite direction—too small, too slow, not stealthy enough. What we need is a Marine Corps focused on its core mission, and a Gator Navy that can deliver them to perform that mission. Go back to a more traditional amphibious squadron/ready group (PhibRon/ARG). A smaller and cheaper LPD/LSD, an LST, an LPA/LKA, plus an LPH and a smaller, cheaper LHA/LHD. You can build all 5 of those ships for about the cost of one big LHA/LHD. Add a NGFS/land attack frigate to the PhibRon/ARG, and some big gun cruisers/battleships to support them, plus some kind of viable MCM platforms. Give them an ECM/countermeasures suite that gives them some significant degree of stealth and enables soft kills of air/torpedo attacks, and multiple CIWS (SeaRAM/Phoenix). And be willing to take some risks to get Marines ashore when and where needed.
Now, what to do with the existing LHA/LHDs and LPD-17s? One option is to park them. Congress isn’t going to like parking $2-3B ships and will take away future funding. My thinking about what to do with them has evolved to the following as the least bad options:
1) Convert as many of the LPD-17s as have enough service life remaining to make it cost effective to the ABM/BMD that HII has proposed on the same hull. That fills a hole in the Navy’s current capability. There is clearly a risk to turning such an important mission over to a ship type with such a checkered past with regard to reliability. But with proper quality control (the elephant in the room) it could be done. An older example is that the Lockheed Electra had a pretty bad safety record as a commercial airliner, but it turned into a pretty effective P-3.
2) Convert the current LHA/LHDs to Lightning Carriers. Put ski jumps on them and make up for the lost aircraft parking spaces by converting troop and troop equipment spaces to a larger hangar deck and aircraft maintenance spaces. I know they are limited in capability and compare unfavorably to CVNs, and for that reason ComNavOps and others don’t like them, but they’re not going to be fighting against CVNs. Worst case, if we had 11 Lightning Carriers and no CVNs, we would still have the strongest naval air force in the world, by a fairly wide margin. Pair them with a CVNs to produce a 2-carrier CVBGs (which could be combined with another CVBG to form one of Marc Mitscher’s WWII 4-carrier CTFs). And I’m only looking at them on an interim basis until the modernized Kitty Hawk CVs come into the fleet. It would probably be 10-15 years before any of the CVs would get to the fleet, about the time that the service lives of the interim Lightning Carriers would start to expire.
I think the cheaper, easier reuse of LPD is as an ASW carrier. In the long run for UAVs, short term maybe V-22s with some ASW gear to get out further than MH-60. Get 4 Mk VI size USVs out there with towed sonar. Plus the ship itself could easily carry a tow while doing all the rest. Get those Mk 41 installed for ESSM and VL-ASROC or follow on. Mount the NSM and plan the MH-60s to carry NSM too. Now you are firmly in the sea control game while not dropping the big money on the radar and combat system upgrade.
Delete"reuse of LPD is as an ASW carrier."
DeleteInteresting.
What do you envision the aviation component consisting of in terms of numbers? I ask because the LPD is only rated for one aircraft in the hangar (is that correct?). While it can operate 2-4 aircraft, they can't be stored internally and that's a problem.
"Get 4 Mk VI size USVs out there with towed sonar."
What kind of towed sonar did you have in mind? For example, the ubiquitous SQR-19 towed array is about a mile long and the Mk VI does not have the power to tow one nor the handling equipment room. A smaller sonar such as the SQS-20 might work but that's a small mine hunting sonar not an ASW sonar.
The LPD could certainly tow an array although the array would conflict with the well deck location/operation.
You have an interesting idea but it needs to be fleshed out with some carefully considered specifics. Think about it and tell me more!
I think you probably stick with an MH-60R compliment until you get a UAV that can improve range and endurance. I don't have the hangar size, but the original spec included:
DeleteAVIATION FACILITIES Hangar: "O" Level Maintenance Facilities for:
One CH-53E, or Two CH-46s, or One MV-22, or Three UH/AH-1s
Landing:
Two CH-53s, or Four AH/UH-1s, or Four CH-46s, or Two MV-22s, or One AV-8B Harrier
I think if it can have the Nixie on one side of the well deck they could pull off an MFTA or potentially a VDS on the other side. TB-37U and/or whatever VDS they actually finally settle on. CAPTAS-4 should have always been the answer.
On the USVs, I'd shoot for a container unit like Curtis Wright's TRAPS. Again, a bit of this is using what is available rather than reinventing the wheel.
Just a bit more. Given the VDS for LCS was tested on a fast crew boat, my guess is you could pair that down and still accomplish the task with a smaller FSV and larger tow, Captas-4.
DeleteCaptas-4:
https://www.thalesgroup.com/sites/default/files/database/document/2020-10/UWS_BL_Datasheet_CAPTAS-4-2020.pdf
Incat Crowther crew boat with deck capacity for captas-4 and to fit the footprint of a Mk VI. https://www.incatcrowther.com/ships/workboats/crewboat-and-fast-supply/ic18001
Quick thought to continue the speculation, if you are converting an LPD-17 to an ASW helicopter carrier the current hangar size is probably not a relevant consideration.
DeleteIf nothing else there would surely be no further need to maintain the vehicle decks in their current form which might allow the establishment of a below decks hangar. After all there is likely to be a great deal of other modification undertaken anyway.
"vehicle decks"
DeleteExcellent thought.
The navy needs expeditionary warfare officers to man and command amphibs, not surface warfare officers. They have little training in amphib ops which are mostly just transport and want to perform sea patrols. Hence ships like the current massive LPD where they want to add Aegis and VLS and LHAs. They cut back plans for the LPDs, which are also suppose to replace the ageing, smaller practical LSDs. The current LPD is a horrible design for a horrible concept, as explained here:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.g2mil.com/Devo-Amphibs.htm
"I don’t know what the ‘advanced electronics system that “controls nearly all systems and equipment on the ship” ‘ is but it must be big and it must be important."
ReplyDeleteIt also sounds like a single point of failure guaranteed to take down your ship in combat. Perhaps a redesign should be considered.
It also sounds like an incredibly juicy target for Chinese hacking and jamming.
DeleteIn commercial world, include my own experiences, while you buy-off an expensive order, you check everything meet spec. before sign off to accept the delivery. Apparently, force behind HII can force Navy to accept incomplete ship (not meet spec.) so they can get payment.
ReplyDeleteHere's a thing I've been wondering about regarding the LPD-17 flight 2. Supposedly they are to replace the Whidbey Island class. But given that we're worried about putting too many eggs in too few baskets, I'm curious about what is wrong with the Whidbey Island class that requires us to replace them with a ship that is 60 or 70 per cent bigger, carries substantially MORE marines, has half the surface connectors, and probably costs twice as much? Wouldn't it make more sense to just build an updated Whidbey Island? I get that the Whidbey Island itself may be too big for the new world, but at least we wouldn't be going FURTHER in the wrong direction. And we could buy a lot more of them.
ReplyDeleteThe main factor I've heard cited is commonality of the hull. Combat and functional requirements were relegated to distant secondary concerns in favor of commonality which was supposed to result in decreased costs … a dubious supposition.
DeleteAs we've seen repeatedly, this violates the dictum that you design combat ships to combat requirements, not business cases.
"modern systems becoming too complex to operate and maintain and too complex to achieve their anticipated performance."
ReplyDeleteThere are more complexed commercial products, especially in electronics. For instance, iPhones have CPU far more powerful (thus complicate) than F-22's mission computer's CPU. Many commercial server systems, AI, software, ... are more complicated and advanced than military used.
While it is possible Pentagon is pursuing a system beyond current tech capabilities, another possibility is competency issue of military industry complex.
For instance, US has 8 hypersonic weapon programs and started earliest in the world. There is NONE completed and entered service. However, it is China's DF-17 being the first entering service in 2019. Why don't they have problem?
In commercial world, if you fail to deliver, sorry, customers won't pay. You cannot cry to Congress to get paid.
"For instance, iPhones have CPU far more powerful"
DeleteYou didn't mean to but you just proved the point that you were trying to disprove. A modern phone is beyond anyone's ability to repair if it gets broken. You have to buy a new one. That works for a non-critical item like a phone when you're surrounded by stores selling new phones. However, if your electronic device breaks at sea, a thousand miles from anywhere, and you can't repair it, you're in trouble.
That example was for a relatively simple phone. For a radar system, the issue becomes many times more serious.
"For instance, US has 8 hypersonic weapon programs and started earliest in the world. There is NONE completed and entered service. However, it is China's DF-17 being the first entering service in 2019. Why don't they have problem?"
DeleteObvious answer: The US has EIGHT DIFFERENT PROGRAMS, all competing against one another for a portion of the R & D budget, the latter competing against procurement and sustainment for the overall Department of Defense budget- all while people ask, "Why are we spending so much money developing previously nonexistent technology to make possible an unproven weapon, when our existing and proven cruise missiles can do a good enough job in all but the most extreme cases?"
Meanwhile, China already faces the "extreme case" of getting past the US's formidable antiaircraft and antimissile defenses, so it's determined to get its hypersonic missile program right, as it doesn't have a viable alternative. It also focuses its efforts and resources on a single program- compared to the US spreading them out so the Army has its own hypersonic missile, the Navy has its own, the Air Force has its own, with none of the sister services willing and able to use each other's weapons due to their disdain towards anything "not invented here," which results in duplication of effort and the resulting waste. (For historical examples, see the USAF using the ineffective AIM-4 Falcon instead of the USN's effective AIM-9 Sidewinder.)
There are two issues - system too complicate to make and incompetency of military industry R&D.
DeleteIncorporate working new technologies do improve fighting power. Take example of 155mm artillery, without precision ammunition M982, you can conduct close-in support to battle field. In Afghan, there was a case where front line troop asked artillery to fire on enemy less than 200 feet away. Without M982, front line infantry simply dare not to ask and artillery dare not fire traditional shell as they could hit US front line infantry ("friendly" fire).
Incompetency of military industry R&D could be a serious issue.
"There are two issues - system too complicate to make and incompetency of military industry R&D."
DeleteNo, neither of those statements is true.
Systems are not too complicated to 'make' - by which, I assume you mean produce. US manufacturers routinely produce very complex and complicated systems … too complex to maintain. It is maintenance, operation, and reliability/repairability that is the issue, not production.
Military-industrial R&D is not incompetent at all. Quite the opposite. The US R&D routinely develops quite complex and advanced systems. Yes, there are some failures but that is the nature of R&D.
Many of the systems have only limited value in the real world but that is the fault of the military's nonsensical design requirements not industrial R&D.
Noting much to add, this just reveals how dysfunctional and broken US DoD is: buying weapons it doesn't know it needs anymore or not, accepts whatever is delivered, over pays, time delays, can't fix them once in service and can't wait to get rid of them after crying they don't have enough ships....it's a wonder how US population still has so much faith in it's military.
ReplyDelete@ NICO,
DeleteThe quality issue is baffling.
If you want a good read that gives some insight into how ship procurement used to work, I would recommend a book called "Fresh Water Submarines".
It is the story about how a Great Lakes shipbuilder in Manitowoc, WI ended up being "drafted" by the Navy Department to build Gato class submarines on the eve of WW2.
The author is Rear Admiral William Nelson, the commander of the first sub that was built there, so he was on sight from the beginning.
The BS that happens now would never have been allowed to happened then.
Lutefisk
CNO,
ReplyDeleteI try to read across a range of blogs, IG accounts, etc and one of them was a pro China one. One entry talked about, amongst other things, how the US was positioning itself to invade China. I immediately laughed and recoiled in disbelief, knowing the US could not possibly do so, even if it wanted to. Attack, yes, invade and occupy---you must be joking. And this latest blog entry shows another reason why.
The point I want to make though, is that this is why I try to read a wider range of issues, even if I don't agree with them viewpoints. We often stick to the issue we're enthusiastic about, and we only know stereotypes or superficial knowledge about other things, like this pro china site did.
When I pointed out reasons why the US couldn't invade and occupy China, (attack, yes, invade, no), the replies flooded in, with such things like.."They have 800 bases around the world, you know!"
I mean, that simply spreads the US further afield, don't you think?
I know this isn't relevant to the debacle that is US naval shipbuilding, the complexity, the cost, the careerist behaviour of the USN instead of war focus, but I just wanted to point out that it's not only good to read more detail about the things you like, but sometimes to get other people's viewpoints on other issues too.
Now back to the flood of non stop depressing USN news :(
Andrew