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Thursday, September 17, 2020

War Games Built The LCS

Commandant Berger is completely remaking the Marine Corps.  Why?  Because of the results of a series of war games.

 

The Navy is going to be replacing Burkes with medium and large unmanned surface vessels (MUSV, LUSV).  Why?  Because of the results of a series of war games.

 

The US military is investing heavily in UAVs.  Why?  Because of the results of a series of war games.

 

The Navy established the Ford class aircraft carrier specifications because of the results of a series of war games.

 

ComNavOps has expressed doubt about all of the above but they were all established by war games so they should be solid, logical requirements, right?  None of us are privy to the details of the games so we should just relax and accept the results and conclusions of war games run by our professional warriors, right?  Right?

 

Well, before we buy in on blind faith, let’s consider what we do know about previous war game results and conclusions.

 

Millenium Challenge 2002 – This is the classic example of a staged, utterly unrealistic game that had a pre-determined outcome and, as a result, absolutely no value, whatsoever, as a combat simulation.  From the Wiki article about the event,

 

After the reset, both sides were ordered to follow predetermined plans of action.  After the war game was restarted, its participants were forced to follow a script drafted to ensure a Blue Force victory. (1)

 

 

Ford – USS Ford was designed based on the results of a war game modeled after Desert Storm rather than a peer war. (2)

 

LCS – The LCS program was initiated and executed based on the results of a series of war games. (3)

 

Zumwalt – The Zumwalt design was derived from war games that determined that a long range naval fire support capability was needed.  It was also derived from simulations that determined that a family of future warships was necessary.  Of course, the Zumwalt went from the mandatory future of naval combat to unwanted by the Navy in a matter of weeks based on classified naval studies and simulations that, apparently, completely contradicted those that came shortly before.

 

Dogfights – After the Korean war, the US Air Force determined from combat simulations and studies that dogfighting was a thing of the past and began building aircraft without guns.  The folly of this was demonstrated in Vietnam.

  

 

The US military has a long history of conducting war games, combat simulations, and studies and then basing future platforms and force structure off the results.  Unfortunately, the US military also has a long history of drawing exactly the wrong conclusions from the war games, combat simulations, and studies.  So, what does this suggest about the likelihood of the Marine’s restructuring being correct?  It suggests, with near 100% certainty, that the Marines and Commandant Berger are acting upon incorrect conclusions drawn from faulty war games.

 

More generally, the military has wholeheartedly embraced unmanned assets in combination with extensive networks and data flow as the key to future success in war.  Given the preceding discussion and examples, why would we trust the war games that are telling the military to drop firepower in favor of networks and data?  The military has gotten nearly every war game conclusion wrong so should we now believe that their emphasis on networks and data instead of firepower is correct?

 

Do you know what would make me a believer in networks and data?  If the military would run realistic exercises where our own anti-network, anti-data, anti-sensor, anti-communications – meaning electronic and cyber warfare – were applied against our networks, sensors, and comms and prove that we could effectively operate our networks, collect our data, and communicate.  Do that and I might begin to buy into the concept.  Lacking that kind of actual proof of concept and remaining fully cognizant of our badly flawed history of incorrect war game conclusions, I’ll remain highly skeptical about our plans to emphasize networks instead of firepower.


War games built the LCS and now war games are building a new Marine Corps.  Not exactly confidence inspiring, is it?

 

 

 

 

__________________________________

 

(1)Wikipedia, “Millenium Challenge 2002”, retrieved 7-Sep-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Challenge_2002

 

(2)Navy Matters, “Ford Design Considerations”, 23-Mar-2020,

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2020/03/ford-design-considerations.html

 

(3)Navy Matters, “LCS – Conceptual Origin”, 10-Sep-2012,

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2012/09/lcs-conceptual-origin.html


100 comments:

  1. "LCS – The LCS program was initiated and executed based on the results of a series of war games."

    To think I always blamed that one on booze...

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  2. The war game was fought and won using an FSF-1 Sea Fighter type ship. The organic helo and size growth came later. The LCS interface control doc laying out the space and weight requirements came later. I will say this is where FSF-1's speed polluted the future in that speed needed to go with platform growth.

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  3. As a current member of academia, and previously as an attorney involved in "your expert versus my expert" lawsuits, I know full well that the results of any "study" can pretty much be manipulated to support whatever conclusion you want. As someone once said, "I can preach it round, or I can preach it flat."

    So it comes as no surprise that war games can be manipulated to produce whatever the desired results are.

    As I've said before, the question that I don't think anybody is really asking is, "What would a peer war look like?"

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    1. I think it looks more like right now than what people dream of. Their fishing fleet just shows up at your door one day and wrecks your fishing industry. As ridiculous as Space Force is as a show, it might now be that far off. Are we going to go to war because a Chinese satellite came by and snipped the solar panel off one of ours? Basically the devil pulling off his greatest trick, convincing us he isn't real. Death by a thousand cuts, etc.

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    2. As Cappy Dick said years ago, (darth vader voice)
      "We will hire consultants and they will tell us exactly what we want to hear."

      GIGO.

      The old Victory Games Fleet series is closer to the real world than the wargames the Navy was using.

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    3. "I think it looks more like right now than what people dream of."

      I agree. I think China and Russia know that they can't go toe-to-toe with us militarily, so they do what they can.

      I've probably quoted him before on here, but Ross Perot said something in 1992 that I had been thinking for a while by then, "In the post-Cold-War world, economic power will become more important than military power."

      We have spend nearly two decades trying (largely unsuccessfully) to impose our will militarily in the Mideast. Meanwhile China has been using economic power to build up influence in South Asia, Africa, and now starting in Latin America.

      We need to make absolutely certain that we have everything we need to dominate a peer war, but we also have to understand that as long as we have that, nobody is going to want to go head-to-head against us, so they're going to use economic leverage and to sponsor proxy wars and rebellions and terrorism, in order to create problems for us. And given how poorly we fight "limited" wars, we need to come up with another solution there too.

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    4. And when we tend to use our economic strength it tentds to tie to diplomacy in lieu of a military solution. If you look at GDP growth by year we basically cut 1-1.5% out of our long term growth starting with Bush 2. None of the 3 since have really hit growth like what we could regularly reach before.

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    5. "I think it looks more like right now than what people dream of."

      Do not confuse prelude with war. Pre-WWII Germany engaged in exactly the same kind of step-by-step territorial expansion that Russia and China are engaged in now. Germany, you'll recall, seized the Rhineland, Austria, Sudetenland, etc. and the Allied powers capitulated (appeasement) due to a fear of war.

      China is pushing every boundary and will continue to do so until the US/West says stop. Thus far, we have passively watched as Russia and China have seized, annexed, or are actively working to seize Crimea, Ukraine, Georgia, the entire South China Sea, Philippines, Vietnam, etc. as well as making inroads in Africa, South America, and the Middle East, among others.

      When the US/West eventually decides that can't stand for any more, then real war will occur. Until then, the expansionist prelude will continue and China will continue to build its military just as Hitler did. The parallels are frightening.

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    6. "When the US/West eventually decides that can't stand for any more, then real war will occur."

      Or we can draw the line now and make it clear what we will and will not stand for. Neither China nor Russia wants to take us on now. But we keep going the way we are going, and they keep going the way they are going, and that won't always be the case--at least not with China.

      With respect to places like Georgia and Crimea, we are very limited in what we can do. We can put a CVBG or two into the South China Sea to let China know we mean business. But we can't do that in the Black Sea without violating the Montreux Convention. And if we lose Turkey as an ally, we'd probably have to shoot our way through the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmara, and Bosporus to do it even if we wanted to. So I am wiling to cut GWB and Obama some slack for not responding more strongly to Russia's actions in those areas.

      But there is no excuse for what we have allowed to happen in the SCS. We need to put together an alliance to prevent China's taking the first island chain, and we need to do it fast.

      There are limits to how far Russia can go, and whatever those limits are, the get way more confining in the next decade or so as an aging Russian population means they run out of 20-somethings to serve in their armed services.

      China is running out of 20-somethings too, as a result of the one child policy. But it's one thing to run out of 20-somethings in a population of 1.5 billion, and quite another to do it in a population of 150 million. PLA won't run out of people any time soon. But with an aging population and not enough young consumers, China will be even more dependent on exports--and oil imports--in the future than now. If they get control of the first island chain, with the inroads they are making economically in South Asia, Africa, and now Latin America, we could have major, major problems with them. But if we and our allies control the first island chain, they have a much, much harder time.

      I don't think China can or will go to war over our establishing alliances around the chain. They had a cow when we put two carriers into the SCS at the same time a few weeks ago, but in the end they really didn't do anything about it. Make that SOP and let them learn to deal with it.

      We need a Navy that can absolutely go toe-to-toe with Russia and China simultaneously and wipe them both out. We may have that now, because they are both pretty weak. Russia will probably remain that way. China won't. What we have now, and what we have talked about building, won't blow China away in 40-50 years.

      ComNavOps, what you have proposed, and what I have proposed, will. Our difference is mainly that I want to keep an amphibious force. My thinking is that maybe we never invade China or Russia. But until we get into a toe-to-toe peer war, there are going to be all sorts of brushfire proxy engagements. And having a real amphibious assault capability can be very useful in those.

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    7. "we are very limited in what we can do. … But we can't do that in the Black Sea without violating the Montreux Convention."

      We are limited only by our own determination. As an example, what better way to show how serious we are than to intentionally violate the Convention? I'm not stating categorically that we should but I'm not ruling it out, either.

      China ignored UNCLOS when it no longer suited them. Russian has ignored treaties when it no longer suited them. The precedent has been set - by them.

      Something to think about.

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    8. Of course. I think with Georgia and Crimea, we determined that the objective was not worth the international impact of doing what is pretty clearly an act of war under the present treaty structure. If Russia made an attempt to take over a larger part of Ukraine, we would have to re-evaluate. And obviously as they get closer to Western Europe, we could do more by land and air.

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    9. I don't really think the Black Sea Region is something our national command authorities of either party really put much value in, but....

      If (big if) presence in the region were something the NCA wanted, exploiting the rules of the Montreux Convention while staying within the letters would be most feasible with an LCS style vessel, especially partnered with the Black Sea Rotational Force or the Army Stryker Task Forces that routinely pass through.

      You get a lot of presence while staying under the 15,000 ton cap with the LCS.

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    10. "If Russia made an attempt to take over a larger part of Ukraine, we would have to re-evaluate."

      Are you saying you're okay with Russia taking over small parts of other countries?

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    11. I think what CDR Chip is alluding to is that we really have no way of affecting change in that region without massively escalating the problem. Whether anyone's "okay" with it or not is irrelevant.

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    12. "we really have no way of affecting change in that region without massively escalating the problem."

      And that's the issue for us. Do we think Russian invading countries is okay and not worth escalating? Chamberlain attempted to be okay with Germany just invading a few areas and countries and that just encouraged more. At some point, we have to take a stand. Is Ukraine that point? Would Taiwan be that point? Are illegal islands that point? (clearly not, so far)

      Avoiding escalating now may just lead to a larger problem later.

      We also seem to be deathly afraid of 'escalating' even though Russia and China seem to have no fear of it whatsoever. Russia invades a country with seemingly no fear of escalating (can you get any more 'escalating' than invading another country?) and yet we are paralyzed by fear of escalating from reacting forcefully. Does this make sense?

      Just as a though exercise, why shouldn't we invade Crimea and annex it? The Russians did so and with no apparent fear of escalation so surely we can, too.

      Russia and China act while we're paralyzed by fear.

      I'm not advocating starting a global war but we need to recognize the emotions that are impacting our judgement.

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    13. Not sure how to put it in words or express it correctly but Ill try: it's not important and do "nothing" (nothing meaning sanctions,etc..in Ukraine, Syria, Taiwan, China islands) or it's super important and we SERIOUSLY escalate BUT we hear too many people or experts say it is important BUT we don't want to escalate or too afraid to escalate, well, which one is it?!? If it is really that important to US national security interest, then we should have no problem escalating, the fact that there doesn't seem, to me at least, that there's not much consensus to "escalate" leads me to believe that it's not as important OR that the case of the "importance" hasn't been properly made....OR the options presented to previous POTUS or current POTUS aren't very good, maybe that's a problem too. What are ALL THE OPTIONS to escalate?

      Not quite what I was thinking but that's the best I can write it down....

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    14. "If it is really that important to US national security interest, then we should have no problem escalating"

      Exactly right. The challenge is to determine whether it - whatever situation 'it' is - is really important, or not.

      One aspect of determining importance that most people fail to see is the long term consequences of doing nothing. Sure, that tiny third world country that has no immediate national security impact is not worth fighting for but what if, by doing nothing, we allow that tiny country to become the birthplace of the next ISIS and they wind up threatening something of genuine US national security? We have to learn to see not only the immediate impact but the future impact if we do nothing. The danger is that we can always rationalize NOT doing anything. The harder part is seeing the future threat.

      "leads me to believe that it's not as important "

      OR … leads me to believe that we've lost the will and courage to face the consequences of escalation. It's easier to do nothing which is what our society, today, does all too often. To paraphrase, all that evil needs to succeed is for good men to do nothing.

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    15. "And when we tend to use our economic strength it tentds to tie to diplomacy in lieu of a military solution. If you look at GDP growth by year we basically cut 1-1.5% out of our long term growth starting with Bush 2. None of the 3 since have really hit growth like what we could regularly reach before."

      I'm going to try to keep this non-political, but as an economist I have a viewpoint on this. We are in a global economy today, whether we choose to participate or not. And so far we really haven't. Our ratio of international trade to GDP is the lowest among developed countries, yet we are also the biggest net importer. The only way that those can both be true is that our exports must be minuscule.

      We basically make what we consume (or what we don't import) and pretty much don't manufacture much for the export market. There are a number of factors that I would blame for that, but without a vigorous export component, our capacity for growth is significantly constrained.

      The good news is that we have perhaps the one economy that could survive global trade interruption. But our capacity to grow is limited.

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    16. "The only way that those can both be true is that our exports must be minuscule. "

      I don't know about ratio of exports to GDP - and whether that's even important - but World Atlas website lists the US as the number 2 exporter in the world behind China.

      That aside, perhaps being less dependent on exports is a strategic advantage and something to encourage. China, being more dependent, has a strategic weakness in that respect, in the event of war.

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    17. Purchase from Ukraine some of the land that Russia has annexed. Ukraine doesn't control it now so getting paid for some land would be better than nothing. The USA would have the right to transit since we would now be a Black Sea nation. The USA having legal ownership of Sevastopol would be interesting for the Russians. Charge them rent for the occupation. Freeze the ability of Russia to do international business until they pay the rent or leave.

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    18. "Purchase from Ukraine some of the land that Russia has annexed."

      Now that's some first rate, out of the box thinking!

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  4. The IJN war gamed the Midway campaign. They won -- the war game. No one reads history?

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    1. Didn't the IJN Midway wargame actually produce realistic results, only to be changed because considered "unlikely" or whatever?

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    2. According to Ian Toll, in his book Pacific Crucible, the purpose of the pre-Midway war games was to validate the plans of Yamamoto and his staff. And, yes when results didn't go the way they liked the "judge" changed the results of each exercise so that it would reflect the thinking of Yamamoto and his staff. and, one of the game exercises involved an air strike from the port flank of the Japanese carriers which was devastating. The results were disallowed as being an unbelievable situation. The point here being is not our Navy doing the same thing?

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    3. "The point here being is not our Navy doing the same thing?"

      The IJN was a lot more serious than current USN leadership but yes, good point.

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    4. It is a bit more complex, the main element usually quoted was the sinking of two carriers from land based B-17. The umpire, Admiral Ugaki, overruled the decision that had been a product of a dice roll. Now anti-IJN people claimed Ugaki basically discounted friction. But few people stop to consider the actual wargame rules. They were base don the RN 1922 rules. These were deterministic in nature eith fixed results based on number of shots fired bombs dropped, you can search for them on the net, Jim Curry also reprinted them). The IJN added an element of variability, probably gathered from the USN Fire and Maneuver rules. The issue here is that the tables for level bombing from high altitude were quite optimistic, with something with over 30% hits. IJN experience with B-17s on the AS role made these tables suspected in the least. Ugaki decision was basically incorporating actual combat experience on pre-war rules. Not bad. If you want to read a critique of the RN system look at Alan Zimm article in Warships 2018 on wargaming and the battle of River Plate.

      The second element is the 'flank attack' it was gamed and deemed successful. That led to the staff order to keep an AS reserve of torpedo armed plane that, in the end, created more issues than it resolved. Then after the successful attack, the ships sunk were 'resurfaced' for a second phase of the game that explored follow on operations. It is a common technique, also because the games have to explore more than one scenario. All in all, the IJN did not do anything bad in wargaming Midway per se. The issues stemming from the games were two. Yamamoto's assumption on USN intention coupled with overestimating losses inflicted up to that point of the war and before the games. The arbitrary decision on the AS reserve made with little input from Nagumo's staff and without regard from context.

      The games themselves were not bad, and Admiral Ugaki decision was simply a reflection of something not working with the rules confronted with reality. But they were held in a situation where specific assumption had already been made and the games were not changing it.

      Finalyl there is the issue of

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  5. As far as war games, are we talking about table-top simulated "games," or are we talking about actually going out there and doing a proposed operation? I think we probably need some of both, but the table-top games don't really confirm anything. They can be manipulated to produce a result. But when you actually have to do it to get the result, you find out that a lot of those table-top deals don't work with boots on the ground.

    I think a lot of those war games have to be table-top. When you actually have to do things, that's when you find out what will work and what want.

    So play all the table-top games you want. But when you come up with an idea, build a prototype or two and run them through some realistic kinetic training to see how they work for real.

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  6. Im reminded of my time as a junior sailor. I, and a couple friends and shipmates volunteered to be the "bad guys" for a security alert drill. We came up with an unorthodox but totally plausible attack plan, one that anyone with binoculars and a basic clue about the ships layout could devise. Of course,we were able to kill off the entire ships security, and backup alert teams, and seize the ship. The fact that we dressed in white sheets and faux arab headdresses in a nighttime drill added a touch of insult to injury. It created an uproar, and the next morning the CO was understandably angry, since drill results were officially logged events. Of course, there were cries of "unfair", and the security force was driven quite hard for a while afterwards. But we made a point to prove the deficiencies we saw,even though we weren't part of the security team, and lessons were learned. I dont see how anyone can support pre-scripted and outcome-planned games and think anything will be learned. Red/blue teams should always be allowed free reign to do whatever necessary to win!! Whos allowing this?? Its absolute idiocy...

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    1. I have played the bad guy several times in simunition active shooter training in various police courses.

      Usually you start with simple textbook scenarios teach in building blocks the tactics to employ. But at the end FTX - anything goes.

      Ive been yelled at a few times by my supervisors for being to hard.

      One time I hid in cieling tiles, got three out of four of the entry team. Another I hid under a desk i got all of them as they stacked up to go into the next room (failed to clear under the desk).

      Another time I got two entry teams shooting at each other (each in different rooms).

      That's how you learn. IMO you dont learn anything by winning a war game. Using easy scenarios to build up and reinforce the building blocks of tactics and strategy - yes you should win those.

      Maybe we need a dedicated Red Force as a seperate military branch. Divorce servive or inteservice politics from real training.

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  7. I've been playing this modern naval wargame "South China Sea" by compass games. All of my players demanded that I add the IJN Yamato into the game. So, I added a modern version of Yamato with Aegis, heavy armor, VLS antiship missiles, and 18in guns (just you like mention in your battleship blog posts). Supported by JMSDF aegis destroyers and very little F-35B air cover from Japanese light carriers it annihilated a 3 carrier Chinese battle group (ominously however, the F-35Bs were overwhelmed by Chinese airpower). Nothing wrong with wargames when you run them fairly.

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  8. After Soviet Union's dissolution, for a long time, US navy has no competent opponent. Its main mission has become supporting land invasions. Bottom line - US navy not prepared to fight another powerful navy. Therefore, war games based on then scenarios led to LCS, DDG-1000, ... etc. aim to invade regional powers than face superpower.

    Chinese navy's "sudden" rise causes chaos on Pentagon. To them, this is not a gradually but seems suddenly. Since 2014, measured by tonnage, except one year, China has launched more than US despite Chinese navy budgets are only a fraction of US (way too many on US military industry complex food chain, this is another topic). Not just number, technologies of new Chinese battle ships also stunned Pentagon.

    Therefore, Pentagon has to re-consider US Navy's direction - possible of face a superpower navy if US doesn't want to give up Western Pacific. LCS and DDG-1000 become strategic blunder than new direction.

    Furthermore, as information technology advancement would strongly change future navy battles beyond current navy commanders can image, war games become only tools to explore what shall we go.

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  9. I have no problem with re-structuring the Okinawa Marines. What Commandant' vision is lacking in a big way is the organic surface connectors necessary to get his littoral Marines to their EABs on the first day of war. Then the surface connectors to get their equipment (HIMARS, Patriot-esque SAMs, FARP) there. The idea that the Gator Navy should do it is absurd.

    Surface connectors need to be shore-to-shore, cheap, plentiful, and fast. Something like the CB90, CCA, or CCM.

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    1. "Surface connectors need to be shore-to-shore, cheap, plentiful, and fast. Something like the CB90, CCA, or CCM. "

      ???? By 'shore to shore', I take it you mean from one land location (a port, presumably) to another (the final landing site, presumably)? If so, the vessels you suggest are extremely short ranged. The CB90, for example, has a range of around 200 miles. That's not going to be anywhere near enough to transport troops to a forward base in, or bordering, enemy waters. Am I missing something in your concept?

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    2. Yes. 4th Marines is in Okinawa. Miyako is 300 km away, Ishigaki is 402 km away, the Senkakus are 411 km away, and Yonaguni is 508 km away. All of those are currently Japanese, but not militarized.

      From Yoniguni, you're 158 km from Taipei, which is right around the point where land-based fires can affect both the Taipei land battle, sea battle around, and the air battle above. Yonaguni is also plenty large to support multiple mobile F-35B FARP sites.

      The problem is the lack of connectors. Amphibs are too slow, vulnerable, and expensive. V-22s are an option but can't carry equipment, are extremely expensive, and are generally more exposed to hostile air action.

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    3. Isn't the whole point of "expeditionary" bases that they're deep inside enemy territory?

      You can (maybe) get Japan to allow military installations in, say, Yoniguni or Isigaki, but that's a different thing.

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    4. 1) In a military sense water can never be "enemy" or "friendly" (I think that was Corbett but it may be Mahan who stated that). Seas are always contested, they are never owned.
      2) The point of expeditionary bases is that they're deep inside the A2/AD zone, not that they're deep in some land territory (where would that be? Beijing?).
      3) We are very unlikely to get permanent installations in Yonaguni or Isigaki. The next best thing is to cache CL III and V but leave the drunken Marines and sailors on Okinawa. The next best option to that is to be able to rapidly move Marines, sailors, CL III and V, and their equipment rapidly on near no-notice.

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    5. If you care to split hairs, during a war the entire planet is 'contested' until a victor has been determined. Water is controlled to varying - and possibly changing - degrees as determined by the each side's ability to bring firepower to bear on it. For example, the entire East and South China Seas would initially be controlled by China. The US would, likely, attempt to alter that condition.

      Expeditionary bases, as we commonly define them, are always on land. In the Marine's vision, the land consists of islands, presumably in and around the E/S China Seas.

      Japanese islands that are hundreds of miles from the likely central point of contention (the E/S China Seas and/or Taiwan) are not what the Commandant envisions as forward bases since, being significantly removed from the point of contention, they would exert little or no impact on the naval situation. The only logical location for the Commandant's bases are on islands bordering the South China Sea. As such, small, short ranged transports do not have the required range.

      The Commandant's public descriptions of his vision BEGIN with his small units ALREADY hidden on a forward island. He has, so far, completely ignored the challenge of how they got there and how they'll be resupplied. His vision of the Light Amphibious Warship is not a solution to this challenge given that it is small, slow, unarmored, undefended, and non-stealthy which make it a target drone for the Chinese to practice attacks on.

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    6. It's more than just splitting hair. It’s a fundamental difference between conflict at sea and conflict on land.

      Initially, the East China Seas and S. China Seas would be contested by whatever forces exist on the spot, allied or US. Neither side would have command of the seas.

      " In the Marine's vision, the land consists of islands, presumably in and around the E/S China Seas."
      I ticked off three islands in the East China Sea, to include one that's a bone of contention between Japan and China, all of which are in small boat range of 4th Marine Regiment. All three are in F-35 range of the conflict zone, and one is HIMARS, Cobra, Apache, Patriot, and NSM range of the conflict zone.

      "The only logical location for the Commandant's bases are on islands bordering the South China Sea. As such, small, short ranged transports do not have the required range."

      You already conceded the East China Sea and now constrain it to the South China Sea. As I said fairly clearly at the outset, the Littoral Regiment concept makes more sense for the Okinawa Marines than it does for the Hawaii Marines or the rest of the Marine Corps. As such, the small boat concept makes more sense for the Okinawa Marines than it does for the Hawaii Marines or the rest of the Marine Corps.

      "The Commandant's public descriptions of his vision BEGIN with his small units ALREADY hidden on a forward island."
      That's the gap I identified. We either need to change how the Okinawa Marines are based or we need a flotilla of small transports to get Marine squads, platoons and the associated Cobras, Apaches, F-35s, Patriots, HIMARS, NSMs etc. to their advanced bases quickly. For diplomatic reasons I think the latter is more likely.

      "His vision of the Light Amphibious Warship is not a solution."
      Agreed. It neither solves the range problem for “big” Marine Corps nor does it have the speed to quickly seize the decisive terrain (the advanced bases).

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    7. The fundamental problem with these envisioned island bases is that the small units the Commandant envisions are combat irrelevant. A platoon with a few anti-ship missiles (and no means of targeting - another fundamental flaw in the vision) can have no significant impact on events. If, on the other hand, the units are made big enough to potentially have an impact (an airbase for 40 aircraft, say, or a unit with hundreds of missiles) then they'll be readily visible and wiped out at leisure with a few cruise missiles.

      The transport issue is fundamentally flawed but the basic concept is even more flawed.

      Consider your own analysis of a single base within significant combat effect range. If the base is tiny, it's combat irrelevant. If it's large enough to be relevant, it won't last a day (ignoring how/why China would even allow it to be established - one might sneak a few troops onto an island but no one is going to sneak an entire large base with Cobras, Apaches, F-35s, Patriots, HIMARS, NSMs etc. onto an island!

      The real 'gap' is not how to get the troops to the island, the real gap lies in the concept of how a few troops can be combat relevant even if they could get where they want to be.

      Delete
    8. You're falling into a false dichotomy between platoon with a couple missiles and major Wing-sized permanent airbase. To be clear, I'm talking about FARPS. Forward Arming and Refueling Points. Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps all execute it in training as a doctrinal task. A FARP can be and (in training) is extremely temporary and mobile.

      The permanent infrastructure is nothing but fuel blivets, pumps, some vehicles, and planes and helicopters coming and going. No planes would sit there for any periods longer than an hour.

      What would the CHinese do exactly to prevent it from being established if US ground troops are already on the island? You keep constructing this large base when I keep describing a road-side FARP that never has any permanent planes.

      Delete
    9. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf

      From the DoD dictionary of military and associated terms

      "forward arming and refueling point — A temporary facility, organized, equipped, and
      deployed, to provide fuel and ammunition necessary for the employment of aviation
      maneuver units in combat. Also called FARP. (JP 3-09.3)"

      Delete
    10. This comment has been removed by the author.

      Delete
    11. From the Air Force FARP operations.

      https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a610304.pdf

      "If it needs few
      munitions, a four-ship of F-22s can be back in the air 60 minutes after
      landing. In most situations, arming/refueling the fighters takes 60 to
      120 minutes"

      F-35B is analogous to the F-22. 3 mobile road-side FARPs could keep potentially 24-48 F-35Bs up for nearly sustained rates from within 150 nm of Taipei. That's a lot of sortie generation from a mobile base on an indestructible island.

      Delete
    12. "You keep constructing this large base when I keep describing a road-side FARP that never has any permanent planes."

      That's fine, however, I again go back to the combat relevance. Refueling a few aircraft isn't going to accomplish anything and if large numbers of aircraft are going to be serviced then the 'base' needs to be larger (greater fuel storage, greater traffic control, more parking space, larger runway space, more people to operate equipment, etc.) and will immediately attract cruise missiles against which it will have no defense. Of course, you could add Patriot batteries, radars, medium range SAMs, etc. but then you're into a very large base.

      So, servicing a few odd aircraft accomplishes nothing and servicing large numbers is not survivable.

      Delete
    13. " indestructible island."

      The island may be indestructible but the people, equipment, and landing/parking/refueling areas are not. Modern aircraft require scrupulously clean landing and take off areas. They simply can't tolerate dust, dirt, and debris. That requires some sort of finished landing area which is not mobile and not survivable.

      The FARP concept is fundamentally flawed and not executable.

      Consider … would we allow a Chinese base to operate near us during a war? Of course not! Why do we think they'll allow us to operate this base near them?

      Delete
    14. "F-35B is analogous to the F-22. 3 mobile road-side FARPs could keep potentially 24-48 F-35Bs up"

      Did you read the link you provided? The requirements for the FARP are impossible. For example, from the link, the very definition of FARP precludes the small, mobile location you describe,

      "Fighter FARP, ... It uses existing airfields throughout an area of responsibility to increase the range and tempo of fighter operations."

      There are no existing airfields on these islands and if there are then they aren't small, mobile locations - they're large, readily visible, and easily targeted.

      "Fuel is transferred from a source aircraft’s (C-130, C-17, or C-5) internal tanks to receiver aircraft."

      No small, mobile location is going to be capable of operating C-xx aircraft as fuel sources.

      Again, from the link,

      "It pairs a four-ship of fighters with a transport aircraft, making use of FARP to rearm, refuel, and swap pilots quickly at over 250 possible locations throughout the WPTO."

      The concept requires a very large, C-xx transport aircraft which, in turn, requires prepared runways.

      More impossibility,

      " Successful implementation of the fighter FARP concept depends upon three key elements: ... (2) the availability of acceptable runways throughout the joint operations area (JOA) where FARP operations can occur with reduced risk of enemy attack …"

      Again, it requires acceptable runways which are not found on small islands. It is also important to note the requirement for reduced risk of enemy attack. Quite the opposite is likely when trying to operate from forward bases.

      Yet more impossibility,

      " The pavement classification number, an additional consideration for the C-17, represents the weight-bearing capacity of the runway."

      The support aircraft requires a full size airbase runway as does the F-22. The F-35B, due to its downward exhaust, requires a far more specialized and rugged landing and takeoff area. As the Navy found out, even steel ship decks are inadequate for F-35B operations as the heat destroys the decks. Further, the exhaust will kick up enormous debris if the landing area is not scrupulously clean and impervious to chipping.

      Another aspect of the F-35B operation is that it requires a runway for take off. It is NOT a vertical take off aircraft when combat loaded.

      The impossibilities in this concept continue but that should suffice for now. These kinds of small, mobile, ?hidden?, island bases are pure fantasy.

      Delete
    15. "Again, it requires acceptable runways which are not found on small islands."
      That's the Air Force's version intended for civilian airfields. The F-35B has no requirement for acceptable runaways.

      "The support aircraft requires a full size airbase runway as does the F-22. "
      I sent the Air Force link as an illustration of how small the footprint of a FARP can be. USMC and USA practice FARPs with trucks in the middle of the desert routinely. USAF routinely practices A-10 FARPs in the middle of the desert as well. https://www.youtube.com/watch\v=tvyt0hQdynk

      "Another aspect of the F-35B operation is that it requires a runway for take off. It is NOT a vertical take off aircraft when combat loaded."

      It requires about 600 foot of straight highway. Just like the A-10s the USAF used to operate off the Autobahn and that the USAF receently operated off Estonian country roads. Let's not pretend it requires a runway.

      "The F-35B, due to its downward exhaust, requires a far more specialized and rugged landing and takeoff area."
      War is hell. I'm sure a few American dollars will help the locals out after the war.

      Delete
    16. "Consider … would we allow a Chinese base to operate near us during a war? Of course not! Why do we think they'll allow us to operate this base near them?"

      How will they know? Trucks and fuel blivets don't exactly make for obvious targets.

      Delete
    17. "That's fine, however, I again go back to the combat relevance. Refueling a few aircraft isn't going to accomplish anything and if large numbers of aircraft are going to be serviced then the 'base' needs to be larger (greater fuel storage, greater traffic control, more parking space, larger runway space, more people to operate equipment, etc.) and will immediately attract cruise missiles against which it will have no defense. "

      That's the point of distributed operations. No individual target is large enough to attract attention, but the sum of the collective operations is quite a lot of combat power operating from well within range constraints.

      Delete
    18. Another piece to survivability is clearly Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception. Put simply, even a half-assed attempt at CCD would dramatically complicate the Chinese ability to target FARPs. When there are "FARPS" everywhere, there are FARPs nowhere.

      Delete
    19. "How will they know?"

      Oh come on, now. Back in the 1960's we could spot a single missile that appeared in Cuba. I'm pretty sure China will have no problem spotting a 600 ft runway, fuel containers, aircraft coming and going, etc.

      The much more serious flaw in this is the fantasy that we'll be able to sail a slow, non-stealthy transport ship (of whatever type) to these islands to deposit the troops and equipment without being seen, tracked, and identified for subsequent missile attack.

      If you believe we can do this unseen by the Chinese then you have a place on the Commandant's personal staff waiting for you because that's the degree of fantasy he's engaged in.

      Delete
    20. "the sum of the collective operations is quite a lot of combat power operating from well within range constraints."

      Seriously, think this through. I've already demonstrated that the requirements for a forward refueling base of the type you're describing are either impossible or so limited as to be nearly useless. If you keep it very small, you can't service more than a couple aircraft. A 500 gal fuel bladder, for example, contains around 3500 lbs of fuel which is 19% of the fuel load of a single F-35. You'd have to have dozens/hundreds of these things to accomplish even a little bit and now you're right back to a major operation which is easily spotted.

      So, the 1-4 aircraft that you can service are absolutely meaningless in terms of combat effectiveness. Even a handful of these bases scattered over the thousands of miles of the E/S China Sea can't accomplish anything even if they could, somehow, miraculously, remain undetected while operating aircraft, trucks, dozens/hundreds of fuel bladders, 600 ft of runway, etc.

      Finally, a combat loaded F-35B doing a short take off run is going to consume enormous amounts of fuel - to the point that it's almost not worth refueling due to the amount of fuel expended in a vertical landing and short take off.

      There's absolutely nothing about this concept that makes sense.

      Delete
    21. I'm all for exploring various concepts in warfare but at some point reality has to be acknowledged. This is where the Commandant comes up short. He, thus far, absolutely ignores the reality that the transport by slow, non-stealthy vessels will easily seen and, likely, destroyed before they ever arrive, that the bases can remain undetected despite large runways, lots of equipment, and lots of activity, and that a few aircraft can contribute any meaningful combat effect.

      This ignoring of reality is an affliction that has beset our command levels the last few decades. Their hand-waving away of impossibilities is staggering. It is up to us, as outside, intelligent observers not to get caught up in the insanity and to call them out on their fantasies.

      Explore concepts but recognize reality.

      Delete
    22. I know it's still early in the F35 program (LOL) but I just did a rapid google search of F35 FARPs and well, I couldn't find one where it looks even remotely "austere", sure looks like a lot of concrete laying around...compare to Harrier first introduction when they were taking off in grass and hiding under trees for weeks, I seriously doubt you could pull off what the Brits and USMC (lesser extant) were doing with the Harrier with the F35.

      At best and I mean everything goes perfect and plus add some luck, you might get away with like a quick pit stop, refuel and F35 continues the mission and lands back on the amphib or carrier BUT NO WAY you do this on a routine basis, F35 will get trashed on hte ground and your foot print just won't let you, you need at least 3000FT for the C130,everything else is just too small, you need at least the space to land and takeoff a C130. Even something as "small" as 600ft, no way China misses that on satellite pictures!!!! Fuel and weapons take up a LOT OF SPACE, forget maintenance!

      Delete
    23. " I couldn't find one where it looks even remotely "austere", sure looks like a lot of concrete laying around..."

      Country Roads are made of concrete.

      " A 500 gal fuel bladder, for example, contains around 3500 lbs of fuel which is 19% of the fuel load of a single F-35" A single M970 Fuel Refueler carries 5000 gallons. A single HERS can carry 4500 gallons.
      https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCTP%203-20B.pdf?ver=2018-10-30-131227-370.

      "Even something as "small" as 600ft, no way China misses that on satellite pictures" A 600 foot road with a couple M970 trucks? Even if they got lucky and we didn't blow their satellites up, you're talking about Chinese national assets being tasked to find tactical assets (and now not looking for CVNs, airbases, etc.).

      "Oh come on, now. Back in the 1960's we could spot a single missile that appeared in Cuba. I'm pretty sure China will have no problem spotting a 600 ft runway, fuel containers, aircraft coming and going, etc."

      And when 2 out of 3 are those are just nothing but wooden mockups? When the real one's moving every 24 hours? Let's not overstate their capabilities when even we couldn't figure the difference between a wooden tank and a real one in Serbia.

      "So, the 1-4 aircraft that you can service are absolutely meaningless in terms of combat effectiveness."

      III MEF has 10x M970, I MEF and II MEF each have 40x M970. Each M970 can fill 2x F-35B. That's a lot of sortie generation, especially when the sortie radius is only 150 nm.

      "Despite large runways"
      600 foot of straight road isn't a large runway. For helos any field will do.

      Delete
    24. https://nara.getarchive.net/media/snow-covered-f-16-fighting-falcon-aircraft-mockups-rest-on-a-fake-taxiway-during-4c0453

      https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:F-16_mockups_on_fake_runway_Spangdahlem_AB_1985.JPEG

      Great examples of what CCD can do to complicate targetting. The Cuban missile crisis is itself a highly successful example of CCD, as we had no idea there were nuclear missiles 90 mile away until they were operational.

      Delete
    25. "M970"

      That's a giant truck! How does that get to an island, undetected, and remain undetected while operating?

      "HERS"

      HERS uses 500 gal bladders AND REQUIRES FORK TRUCK SUPPORT!

      You've got to get serious about this. Even your small operation, by your own requirements, needs 600 ft of runway, fork trucks, dozens/hundreds of fuel bladders, giant trucks, specialized landing and take off areas (no, an F-35 can't take off from a dirt strip because of FOD), etc. all delivered by a slow, non-stealthy vessel. You can't seriously think that won't be spotted????? It's one thing to hope for the best but to totally ignore reality is Commandant level fantasy. If you believe that, you're welcome to your fantasy.

      Delete
    26. "600 foot of straight road isn't a large runway. "

      It most certainly is when you're trying to stay hidden! A 600 ft runway on a small island will stand out like a blinking light!

      Delete
    27. "Country Roads are made of concrete."

      There are no concrete roads on small islands. Even if there were, an F-35 can't take off from one because if would destroy the road and FOD itself. Even if it managed to take off, it would be a one time even because the road would be destroyed.

      I mean, come on, be just a little bit real about this.

      Delete
    28. "That's a giant truck! How does that get to an island, undetected, and remain undetected while operating?" Again, surface connectors are the gap, and LAW is not the answer. Maybe a modified LCAC, maybe JHSV, maybe some other form of connector. It's the gap in his concept. I don't think the presence of a gap completely invalidates the concept, it just means the gap needs to be filled.

      " dozens/hundreds of fuel bladders" Again, M970 is a single truck, SIXCON is a single container, HERS has many permutations.

      "Specialized landing and take off areas" Roads and a mea culpa to the locals.

      "A 600 ft runway on a small island will stand out like a blinking light!"

      How? It's a road.

      "There are no concrete roads on small islands"
      Each of the islands I mentioned is replete with paved roads.
      "if would destroy the road"
      War is hell. Mea Culpa and some Benjamins to the locals.
      "Even if it managed to take off, it would be a one time even because the road would be destroyed."
      I have doubts that one liftoff would kill the roads.

      Delete
    29. To be clear, anything LCAC sized or larger would absolutely require an escort, something with the kind of speed to keep up and a basic air defense system at least with ESSMs.

      I am not advocating sending JHSVs alone and unafraid into a contested waterspace.

      Delete
    30. "600 ft"

      By the way, the 600 ft runway spec appears to be from a carrier, assisted by the carrier's headwind. The land take off distance appears to be around 900 ft:

      "Using Harrier’s take off run tables and adjusting for weight/thrust of f-35b, with zero headwind taking off from the ground, it should be roughly 850-900 feet."

      Delete
    31. More on trying to use F-35's on austere surfaces:

      "But a Navy report issued in January says that the F-35B, in fact, won’t be able to use such forward bases. Indeed, unless it ditches its short take-off, vertical landing capability and touches down like a conventional fighter, it won’t be able to use land bases at all without some major construction efforts.

      The newly released document, hosted on a government building-design resource site, outlines what base-construction engineers need to do to ensure that the F-35B’s exhaust does not turn the surface it lands on into an area-denial weapon. And it’s not trivial. Vertical-landing “pads will be exposed to 1700 deg. F and high velocity (Mach 1) exhaust,” the report says. The exhaust will melt asphalt and “is likely to spall the surface of standard airfield concrete pavements on the first VL.” (The report leaves to the imagination what jagged chunks of spalled concrete will do in a supersonic blast field.) Not only does the VL pad have to be made of heat-resistant concrete, but currently known sealants can’t stand the heat either, so the pad has to be one continuous piece of concrete, with continuous reinforcement in all directions so that cracks and joints remain closed. The reinforced pad has to be 100 feet by 100 feet, with a 50-foot paved area around it. By the way, any area where an F-35B may be stopped with the engine running – runway ends, hold-shorts on taxiways, and ramps – also has to be made of heat-resistant concrete to tolerate the exhaust from the Integrated Power
      Pack (IPP), which is acting as a small gas turbine whenever the aircraft is stopped."

      From: https://theaviationist.com/2010/11/24/the-f-35b-heating-problems/

      You need to research the whole F-35 austere basing issue a bit more.

      Delete
    32. Here's more"

      "The F-35B or short take-off and vertical landing version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is predicted to subject airfield pavements to extremely high exhaust temperatures, velocities, and heat fluxes during vertical landings (VL). These thermal loadings are much greater than what a conventional Portland cement concrete can withstand, resulting in a high foreign object damage potential from explosive spalling...."

      From: http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=23565

      Delete
    33. "LCAC sized or larger would absolutely require an escort, something with the kind of speed to keep up and a basic air defense system at least with ESSMs. "

      You don't think a pair/group of ships operating near Chinese controlled territory and sailing to small islands and unloading trucks, fuel, troops, and equipment is going to be noticed?????

      Delete
    34. "I have doubts that one liftoff would kill the roads."

      This is not an issue that has 'doubt' attached to it. It's just simple fact and I've provided documentation in previous comments. If you have doubt it's because you haven't researched the issue sufficiently. You need to do your homework.

      Delete
    35. https://theaviationist.com/2010/11/24/the-f-35b-heating-problems/
      Surely you could find a more recent source than 2010 right?

      " is predicted to subject airfield pavements to extremely high exhaust temperatures, velocities, and heat fluxes during vertical landings (VL)"

      https://www.f35.com/news/detail/f-35-pax-river-itf-expands-expeditionary-envelope-for-usmc

      It would appear that OTS AM-2 matting is sufficient to cover the VL requirement.

      ""Using Harrier’s take off run tables and adjusting for weight/thrust of f-35b, with zero headwind taking off from the ground, it should be roughly 850-900 feet.""

      Source?

      "This is not an issue that has 'doubt' attached to it. It's just simple fact and I've provided documentation in previous comments."

      Your documentation ignores existing AM-2 matting and demonstrates the problem only exists during VL portion, suggesting a small area is potentially affected, thus requiring small amounts of AM-2 matting.

      Delete
    36. https://navalaviationnews.navylive.dodlive.mil/2018/03/21/marines-f-35b-expeditionary-envelope-expands/

      The below article suggests that with proper preparation with AM-2 matting, even relatively flat dirt fields could become potential FARP sites.

      Delete
    37. "You don't think a pair/group of ships operating near Chinese controlled territory and sailing to small islands and unloading trucks, fuel, troops, and equipment is going to be noticed????"

      1) small, fast, and plentiful are all critical enablers to survivability.
      2) Every asset the Chinese dedicate to finding and killing small, fast, and plentiful vessels is one less asset looking for and killing the CSGs.
      3) If they do expend assets to look for this vessels, they're coming right within our own DCA and AAW envelope.

      Delete
    38. "It would appear that OTS AM-2 matting is sufficient to cover the VL requirement."

      Have you researched what that is? It's a major undertaking to transport, move, and assemble. Again, you need to research this stuff.

      Delete
    39. Well, I've given you all the evidence you need to properly evaluate this fantasy concept and you're choosing to ignore it. There's nothing more I can do. You're welcome to your fantasy.

      Delete
    40. "It's a major undertaking to transport, move and assemble" The standard to set up a 1000 foot runway is 3 days. If all you need is an HLZ (because the landing is the only issue) subtract 90%.

      Again, you didn't provide evidence, you provided 10 year old blogs that the USMC has taken little credence of (for good reason).

      Delete
    41. BTW, per the December 2018 Selected Acquistion Report, the F-35B requires 471 feet to launch with two 1000 lb. JDAMs and two AMRAAMs and fly a 450 nm mission. Unclear if wind over deck was at the 10 knot standard or not.

      https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/FY_2018_SARS/19-F-1098_DOC_33_F-35_SAR_Dec_2018.pdf

      Delete
    42. "1) small, fast, and plentiful are all critical enablers to survivability."

      But what are we planning/proposing now that would be small, fast, and plentiful. The LCSs are at least theoretically fast, but neither small nor plentiful (thank goodness we didn't waste any more money on more of them). And they are basically useless in combat. I'd take a Visby over an LCS one-on-one, and the Visbys are 1/4 to 1/5 the cost.

      Delete
    43. "'It would appear that OTS AM-2 matting is sufficient to cover the VL requirement.'
      Have you researched what that is? It's a major undertaking to transport, move, and assemble. Again, you need to research this stuff."

      The SAAB Gripen is able to operate off unimproved strips and to take off with a full load in about a quarter mile on a prepared strip. It is capable of around Mach 2 and has a weapons load similar to what an A-4 carried. It strikes me as something to work from to develop a "Marine A-10." I don't think the F-35 can be what the Marines really need.

      Delete
    44. RE: small, fast, and plentiful, we're talking about a Ro-Ro transport and bulk fuels transport, something like the LCAC. Not really sure what exactly the SSC improves upon the LCAC. LCS can pace the LCAC so could theoretically provide escort, but you'd need an AAW module.

      RE: Gripen. Not sure how that'd be an improvement for the Marines in developing an A-10, but I think at this point that ship has sailed in many ways. The F-35B will almost assuredly be chopped for CFACC usages more often than not.

      Delete
    45. Regarding fuel needs for an F-35B (13,500 lb internal fuel) … for the envisioned 28 aircraft flying 3 sorties per day per aircraft, that's 84 sorties which, if each requires a full internal load of fuel, equals 1.135M lbs of fuel.

      That requires 44 M970 tankers PER DAY!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Where are those coming from and how are they being refilled? A single M970 tanker (26,000 lbs fuel in off-road carrying configuration) can fill 2 F-35s and then the tanker has to be refilled. How does over a million pounds of fuel get transported to austere locations EVERY DAY?????????

      Delete
  10. (Don McCollor)...Even in war games, the "Enemy" does not always do what is expected. Adm. Galley relates a WW2 tactical exercise testing the Panama canal zone air defenses. All fighters were shifted to the USS Mission Bay, and all bombers to the USS Guadalcanal, which then split up. Mission Bay launched its fighters from the west to climb high luring the CZ air defenses while Guadalcanal sent her bombers across Nicaragua to attack unopposed from the Atlantic side...

    ReplyDelete
  11. The dangers of letting the experts at war games show us how expert at war games they are.

    The problem is always you get ahead by winning the war game and not necessarily the war.

    ReplyDelete
  12. Without a clear picture, war games are actually important way to explore what future wars would be. Key issue is how competent these people design and conduct these war games.

    What really shock Pentagon recently is the very fast rising of Chinese Navy. Since 2014, measured by tonnage, except only one year, Chinese Navy launched more than US Navy despite its expenses are only a fraction of US. Not just number and tonnage, technology advancement of Chinese Navy is really the biggest problem. Since 2018, Pentagon has conducted many computer simulated war games on US Navy against Chinese Navy in West Pacific, all end in US Navy lose. US has lost ability to invade China!

    Certainly, Pentagon needs to think about possible ways to counter Chinese Navy. There is no so called right or wrong as Americans loyal to US and Chinese loyal to their nation.

    To build navies, each side now has to guess and explore what future wars would be. Not just US Navy is in puzzle, so does Chinese Navy as you can see they are doing conflict things --- high tech missiles to attack ships far away but build ships can be attacked by these missiles at high speed.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "US has lost ability to invade China"

      Anyone who thinks the US ever had the ability to invade China needs to have their head examined.

      "Since 2018, Pentagon has conducted many computer simulated war games on US Navy against Chinese Navy..."

      I'd suggest that the intended recipient of that message is the United States Congress at budgeting time, and the truth may be more nuanced.

      Delete
    2. "I'd suggest that the intended recipient of that message is the United States Congress at budgeting time"

      I'm sure there is an element of truth to that, however, I suspect that a larger purpose to war games is to provide cover for a Navy leadership that lacks professional expertise and, therefore, falls back on war games for their decision making with the belief that they can blame any failures on the games rather than their own lack of professional knowledge.

      Delete
    3. "I suspect that a larger purpose to war games is to provide cover for a Navy leadership that lacks professional expertise"

      So where do we find leaders with that expertise, or how do we build them?

      Delete
    4. As technologies advance so fast that no one can comprehend what future naval battles would be. It is bad for people make decisions from their own imaginations. Explorations from war games is one way provide these war game platforms are developed by competent people so leaders can play on scenarios of likely future wars.

      Keep building large battle ships base on past "victories" than future need would bring disasters.

      Like or not, drones would play significant roles in future navy warfare although drones have their own weaknesses. One key issue is electronic signal attenuation with distance thus in enemy territories, their electronic signals are much stronger.

      Delete
  13. Sadly, I think you are on too something there CNO. USN leaders aren't completely brain dead, they know that after LCS, Zumwalt, Ford,etc are failures and their reputations is damaged...I wouldn't be surprised at all when they get questioned by politicos now that they respond:"we really need it this time, WE WARGAMED IT." As you said, its cover.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The wargaming issue is getting worse. It used to be that the games were tabletop, with human participants and referees and could, therefore, be questioned, doubted, validated, and examined. Now, however, the games are switching to computer analyses which, in the minds of 'people', removes all doubt about the outcome due to the old, "if its from a computer, it must be right". We've seen this phenomenon with the Internet, "if it's on the Internet, it must be right". People are going to accept the results without question because it came from a computer. People forget, or don't understand, Garbage In, Garbage Out.

      The military, presumably smart enough to understand the manipulation of computer output, can input any garbage they want to achieve the desired results and then, because it came from a computer, the results must be right. It's perfect cover for bad decisions.

      Delete
    2. I've always been skeptical about tabletop war games, and now even more so about computerized games. I think the only games that are truly worthwhile are those that involve actual kinetic activity. Of course, the way the rules are set up for those, they may not be all that valuable either.

      I think you have to have an opposition force that has free rein, because that's what the enemy will have.

      Delete
    3. Tabletop wargames can be extremely useful, particularly in terms of training staff officers.
      They have been a fundamental aspect of staff work since the Prussians refined it in the 18th century.
      But they are only as good as the staff officers that run them, define the rules and scenario and umpire the outcomes.
      That doesn't mean that militaries shouldn't also preform real world exercise of course, but tabletop wargames are still a fundamental aspect of preparing staff officers for their duties.
      They are also important in actual operational preparation during war.

      Delete
    4. "Tabletop wargames can be extremely useful, particularly in terms of training staff officers."

      I understand their usefulness. They just need to be validated with realistic kinetic exercises before taking them as gospel truth. It's one thing to say that Force A can achieve Objective B in a table top game. It's another thing to see if Force A can actually do it where the rubber meets the road.

      You test the theory of a certain approach on the table top. You validate the reality by physically simulating the action in a kinetic exercise. And both have to be set up objectively, with enemy forces given free rein, because that's how it will happen in a real war.

      In theory, theory works well in practice. In practice, it doesn't.

      Delete
    5. There is a theory of learning that is (re)gaining traction. Wargaming to define a hypothesis. Quantitative M&S to refine it. Exercises to validate it.

      The problem that I've seen is senior leaders don't understand the difference between wargaming. M&S and exercises. And how one can reinforce the other.

      Delete
    6. "The problem that I've seen is senior leaders don't understand the difference between wargaming. M&S and exercises. And how one can reinforce the other."

      By M&S, I assume you mean modeling and simulation?

      You've got an idea in mind but I'm not quite understanding what you're suggesting. Would you explain it a bit more and how it relates to wargaming?

      Delete
  14. I'm don't have time to review the thread comments right now so I apologize for potential redundancy ahead of time.

    "Millenium Challenge 2002 – This is the classic example of a staged, utterly unrealistic game that had a pre-determined outcome and, as a result, absolutely no value, whatsoever, as a combat simulation"

    I'm not sure I view it quite that way. Before the reset it did make it clear the USN had a problem. Although realistically I think only Iran has/had the resources, ability and fortitude to pull off Red's first run attack (In the Gulf).

    But I would not say really that the game leads to the LCS. It leads I think rather to the ideal that the USN really did need a corvette - to frigate class ship (and more even less expensive patrol boats), inexpensive and harsh to say disposable. If we going to play in the Gulf or similar enclosed spaces we really don't need to be sending cruisers or CVs into the gulf. They should be doing their job at range.

    That the game was than absoultly scripted is a failure. But the larger failure of the LCS is in the procurement side turning what should have been purpose built boats into super expensive ships based on multi function vapor ware. That is not really the game's fault. Nor is the fall on your sword commitment to small crew size the USN seems welded to at any and all cost.

    If the games lead to wanting gun support again. They don't say you need a supper stealthy uber high tech ship but just something durable with a couple or more 8" guns. If you are worried about counter fire presumably air and a lot larger store of cruse missiles should have dealt with that already.

    OT

    Seems like according to the war zone the Zumwalt might get something to put in its guns

    https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/36504/testing-points-to-relevance-of-hyper-velocity-projectile-for-zumwalt-destroyers-dormant-guns

    Maybe thay can be really expensive coastal defense monitors?

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    1. "But I would not say really that the game leads to the LCS."

      Neither would I! And I didn't! The games that led to the LCS occurred in the mid-1990s.

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    2. I may than have misinterpreted you. But I still think the games are less to blame than systemic failure in procurement.

      A set of inexpensive brown water ships would in fact have been useful in the not peer war that was the GWOT that the USN was asked to fight.

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    3. "But I still think the games are less to blame than systemic failure in procurement."

      The LCS failed twice:

      1. The outstanding concept that came out of the 1990s war games was quickly corrupted by a Navy that wanted to gold plate everything.

      2. The acquisition was corrupted every step of the way and every way possible. But - and this is the key point - even if the acquisition had been flawless, the design was already corrupted conceptually and would have produced a useless product.

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    4. What is the war we are going to have to fight? Right now, I don't see Russia or China as willing to face us in a toe-to-toe peer war, because I think they believe (correctly) that they can't win such a war (perhaps nobody can). So what do they do? They can sponsor proxy wars, rogue states, and terror groups. Better from their standpoint, we aren't very good at fighting any of those.

      So what do we do:
      1) Establish and maintain the ability to dominate a peer war, conventional or nuclear.
      2) Figure out how to fight--and win--an asymmetric conflict.

      Army, Air Force, and Navy take care of 1). Give the Marines 2), as asymmetric warfare is closer to their DNA.

      Army fights major overland warfare, Air Force does strategic attack, continental air superiority, and tactical support of Army. Navy is responsible for worldwide sea control--air, surface, and subsurface. Marines do special ops and (with the Navy) littoral/amphibious stuff--say from 50-100 miles offshore to 50-100 miles inland.

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    5. And diplomatically, we use our economic power to compete with what China is doing in the economic arena. We've had our heads so buried in the sand of the Mideast that we haven't picked up on what China is doing in South Asia, Africa, and now starting in Latin America. We need to step up our game in the influence and alliance buying world.

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  15. Edit add a lot ifs in the link. And the Zumwalt would still remain massive a waste of money for the capability.

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