One does not need to have the overall superior force in order to win. If one can achieve localized mass and superior firepower, one can win enough individual battles to eventually win the war. On land, this localized massing of firepower is achieved through maneuver warfare, according to modern theory. The wisdom of localized massing of force/firepower is generally undisputed. The challenge lies in creating the circumstances that allow for it.
The Marines, until just recently, appeared to subscribe to this theory with their published doctrine of Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) (1), Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM) (2), and, less formally, ‘land where the enemy isn’t’ philosophy. Now, of course, the Marines have switched to the exact opposite approach and want to deploy small, dispersed units that will be individually overmatched in every scenario.
Before we go any further, let’s remind ourselves that the term ‘massing’ actually refers to the massing of firepower rather than troops and weapons. For example, massing light infantry against heavy armor may produce superior numbers but not superior firepower. With that firmly in mind, let us also recall that massing can be achieved two ways (on a related note, see, “LCS– Mass or Disperse” for a general discussion of massing as applied to the LCS):
- Concentration of forces which is the traditional method.
- Concentration of firepower which requires only simultaneous time-on-target. In this approach, the forces may be physically dispersed and only their weapon effects need to mass. Of course, that requires perfect networking and data sharing which seems like an unlikely event in a peer contested electromagnetic and cyber spectrum.
So, to return to the Marines, we see, now, that instead of maneuvering and creating localized, superior firepower and mass, the Marines want to operate on small islands from fixed points where maneuver is not even possible and the amount of firepower that they can bring to bear is extremely limited. Yes, I’ve heard the Commandant describe the ability to relocate from island to island, in a form of maneuver, but does anyone really think that’s possible – to casually sail in, pick up Marine units, sail to another island, and unload without being detected and destroyed? That’s just pure fantasy.
Unless we want to believe that the Marines have discovered a war-winning alternative to massing which no one else in history has managed to do, we have to conclude that the Marine’s concept is badly flawed and runs counter to one of the most fundamental precepts of warfare.
If concentration of mass/firepower is the key to success, why aren’t we practicing it? Train like you fight, fight like you train.
_____________________________________
(2)https://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/Documents/Concepts/STOM%20May%202011.pdf
"If concentration of mass/firepower is the key to success, why aren’t we practicing it?"
ReplyDeleteBecause concentration of fire isn't possible from the platforms the Navy is providing. To get concentration of fire, you need to get tanks, artillery, and armor ashore with infantry, and you can't do that from an LHA/LHD because you don't have the connectors to do so. And it needs to supplemented with naval gunfire support (NGFS) and close air support (CAS). The Navy doesn't have any viable NGFS platforms, except maybe some 5-inch fire if you are willing to risk Ticos and Burkes in close to shore. The Marines can provide some of their own CAS. but they need a "Marine A-10" to do it properly, and that's not the F-35. So the Navy is not currently building anything tailored toward conducting an amphibious assault with concentration of force or firepower.
Ever since Westmoreland sent the Marines north to I Corps and the Army south to the riverine Mekong Delta, the Marines have just been playing baby Army instead of doing anything distinctive befitting a sea service. The Marines have wanted a piece of the action so badly that they have taken whatever the Army gave them. If all the Marines are going to be is a baby Army, then why do we need them?
Marines are not a baby Army. They don't occupy territory. They get in, do the job, and move on. That requires mobility and concentration of firepower. Their uniqueness is that they can bring a heavy amount of combined arms fire at a relatively small organizational level, so they can concentrate a lot of firepower in a relatively small force. This lets them punch well above their weight, and their ability to move around at sea as well as ashore gives them a great deal of maneuverability. Being able to bring infantry, tanks, artillery, and armor to bear on an objective very quickly from the sea, supported by NGFS and CAS, would give them a capability that can be very significant in many contexts. Occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan are not two of those contexts.
Seeing that, the Commandant has two options. Find a relevant mission for Marines or see the corps disappear. The missions he has chosen may be stupid, but they may be the best of what he has to choose from. They don't make sense to me, but then neither does the Navy's approach to amphibious warfare.
5 inch guns aren't really NGFS against any serious enemy, regardless of what the Navy might say, even if they were willing to use a Tick or Burke for that.
DeleteMarines don't really bring any more ground firepower than an equivalent Army unit. Especially with the retirement of the M1s. At best, they are less well armored, armed and mobile than a Stryker unit. Their only firepower and mobility advantage is ACE.
Delete"5 inch guns aren't really NGFS against any serious enemy"
DeleteAnd that's a Navy force design problem.
"Marines don't really bring any more ground firepower than an equivalent Army unit."
Certainly not the way they are being reconfigured. But that's a function of Navy force design. When your only tool is an LHA/LHD with no viable connectors to get tanks, artillery, or amphibious armor ashore, you become a light infantry with no heavy firepower. What you can accomplish with that force is severely limited, but don't tell anybody.
"When your only tool is an LHA/LHD with no viable connectors to get tanks, artillery, or amphibious armor ashore, you become a light infantry with no heavy firepower."
DeleteI have to disagree. The Marine's had choices, options, and tools but chose not to exercise/adopt them. For example, and for sake of discussion, let's say you're correct that all the ills of the Marines lie with the LHA. That being the case, the Marines could have remained perfectly viable and stayed at the heavier end of combat (meaning with tanks, artillery, heavy vehicles, etc.) by simply adopting the port seizure mission which would provide the landing/unloading facility they need to get heavy equipment ashore. Yes, they would need to modify and adapt their methods and resources to accomplish the port seizure. For example, seizing a port would likely require simultaneous aerial assault (paratroops?, vertical assault?) with infiltration, indirect assault (land where they ain't and move rapidly to the port), direct assault by one-way transports (RO/ROs, LSTs, etc.), close in naval support (gun, C-RAM, counter-battery, etc.), etc. Thus, instead of amphibious assault of a large, open area which you believe the LHA makes impossible and which requires vast resources, the method becomes pinpoint port seizure which requires far less numbers and has the advantage of a degree of protection provided by the surrounding infrastructure (desire by the enemy to prevent destruction of the very resources the enemy would need to use to launch counterattacks), civil structures (prevents most missile, artillery, and mortar fire due to the vertical shielding), and citizenry (to the degree that an enemy would hesitate to kill their own citizens which, I suspect, the Chinese wouldn't hesitate to do).
Thus, the Marines had options but have chosen not to use them. There are always options.
"5 inch guns aren't really NGFS against any serious enemy" Could someone explain that one to me?
Deletehttps://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a051873.pdf
DeleteIn past experience, 5" was generally sufficient against troops in the open, but did not have the ability to disrupt armored reserves, nor the ability to destroy or suppress hardened targets like we saw in the Pacific or Korea. 8" was generally preferred over 5" for essentially all NGFS tasks.
Does even the Army still have the ability to produce a pre-assault rolling artillery barrage these days, ala WW2 scale?
DeleteSo many problems with what USMC doing, just getting repetitive....
ReplyDeleteIf the island is important to China, aren't they already on it or done preliminary work,recon,plans to acquire it before the USMC? If its not important to China, would it be important to aquire for USMC? Not all these islands are important for a whole bunch of reasons...I bet there's maybe a handful that meet all requirements and China knows which ones to take or keep an eye on. Even if USMC gets there first and initially undetected, how long would that last after USMC missile launch? Come on, Chinese aren't that stupid, they'll figure out pretty fast high probability of launch points and counterstrike immediately. If the island is small, can you really hid all that gear necessary or scoot-evade that fast? Plus even if USMC does manage once to scoot to next island, China finds first island empty,hmm, where did USMC go to next? Or does USMC believe China will drop the matter and wait for next USMC second launch?!? Highly unlikely, China will look for USMC units and hunt them down and waste them. If the island is big, why isn't China on it or if they do send in their Marines, its bad day for USMC since we getting rid of all the heavy metal and light infantry never does well against tanks....as Americans sports fans get the analogy, USMC is going to become a finesse team trying to look pretty and not get dirty, keep your opponent at bay where as Chinese Marines seem to get ready to play the dirty grind it out close encounter game.
"If the island is important to China, aren't they already on it or done preliminary work,recon,plans to acquire it before the USMC?"
DeleteThe Chinese only have so many lift assets. The problems with JFEO go both ways. The vast majority of these islands already have allied nation militaries occupying them.
"If the island is small, can you really hid all that gear necessary or scoot-evade that fast"
Yes, anything short of chemical or nuclear will not have the blast radius to affect a whole island.
"f USMC does manage once to scoot to next island, China finds first island empty,hmm, where did USMC go to next?"
China only has so many ISR assets capable of reaching the first island chain. If they're looking for Marine bases, they're not looking for CSGs, which is a big part of the point.
"China will look for USMC units and hunt them down and waste them."
With what are they pulling off the CSG hunt? How wil they find them?
"light infantry never does well against tanks" Historical examples abound of tank-heavy formations being annihilated by light infantry. Most recently, just look at Grozny 1995.
"China only has so many ISR assets capable of reaching the first island chain. If they're looking for Marine bases, they're not looking for CSGs,"
DeleteThat's absurd. The one does not exclude the other. An occasional aerial check is sufficient to check islands (along with satellites, ships, radar, EO/IR, signal gathering, UAV monitoring, etc.) leaving the vast majority of ISR available for carrier hunting or whatever other surveillance they wish to perform.
"An occasional aerial check".
DeleteYou're joking right? Even a half-assed CCD (camouflage, concealment, deception) effort would make your "occasional" aerial check a waste of time. And that says nothing about the survivability of Chinese aerial ISR assets underneath a US and Japanese Integrated Air and Missile Defense umbrella or how survivable it'd be with US and Japanese Defensive Counter-Air efforts.
So again, if the Chinese are going to expend assets (and I do mean expend) assets to find USMC bases on the hundreds of 471+ foot straight roadways, what are they not looking at?
I really think we need to delineate what islands we are talking about....
Delete"camouflage, concealment, deception) effort would make your "occasional" aerial check a waste of time."
DeleteYou're joking, right? You've got a base that was set up using slow, non-stealthy ships, has to have daily deliveries of fuel, munitions, equipment, spare parts, food, water, etc. by a multitude of helos/aircraft/ships and you don't think the Chinese will see it? That is some serious denial of reality!
"You've got a base that was set up using slow, non-stealthy ships, has to have daily deliveries of fuel, munitions, equipment, spare parts, food, water, etc" Who said the base is co-located with the port?"
Delete"by a multitude of helos/aircraft/ships and you don't think the Chinese will see it? " Besides the not being co-located statement, the lack of survivability of that slow Chinese ISR asset is an obvious answer.
NICO, in sequential order....Okinawa to Miyako to Yaeyama to Yonaguni to Taiwan (if desired). Each of those main islands has civilian airports, minor ports, smallish JGSDF garrisons, and lots of paved and unpaved roads. Each jump is between 100 km-200 km, well within supporting range of the last jump.
Delete"Each of those main islands has civilian airports,"
DeleteAnd you think China won't drop a bunch of missile on them at the first sign that they're being used for military purposes?
And yes, I'm well aware the USMC has nothing more interesting than a Stinger at the moment. That is a huge material gap in the concept, one that I think everyone that wears a uniform is acutely aware of. I cited NASAMs as a fairly obvious candidate for the AA BN in the Littoral Regiment.
Delete*Sigh* (and facepalm)
DeleteAll the Chinese need to find any such base is one dedicated guy with a phone on each island. And maybe a pair of binoculars. How hard is that to accomplish?
R.
A lot harder than you're making out given the CCD operations, the fact that the Japanese would be unlikely to look kindly on people walking around with binoculars, and the fact that cell phones will likely be rendered inoperational.
DeleteKnock it off with your CCD cloak of invisibility bs. No, it's not going be hard at all. It's going to be just about the easiest job in the world.
DeleteAnd did you get where I mentioned *MAYBE* a pair of binoculars? You won't need them!!!!!
Did you for even a second consider how much noise a F35 makes? Did you? It's a lot more than most other jets. Even now as you're reading this you're dismissing it as completely irrelevant, aren't you? It's not. It's what going to get them killed and not just in your island fantasy.
I live less than a hundred yards from a major river that serves as a flight route for all sorts of military aircraft. I've seen just about every NATO jet and helicopter that's not a heavy bomber fly by and more importantly, I've heard them fly by.
The noise of an F35 is unbelievable. In your fantasy scenario, every single inhabitant (and uninvited guest) on the island will absolutely know that there are F35's around from the noise alone. You don't need satellite reconnaissance, you don't need spy planes, you don't even need binoculars. All you'll need is ears.
That's why I said that all the guy needs is a phone. I didn't say cell phone, did I? That's what you made of it because that's what you do every time. You twist everything to fit your preconceived notions.
What, the marines are going to jam every single form of civilian communication on the island? Talk about a red flag for the Chinese! Hmm, there's one island that's gone completely dark, I wonder where those marines went?
Are you seriously going to claim that it will be too hard for the Chinese to get some kind of operative working for them on the island but easy for the marines to erect your fantasy base? Really?
Did it ever occur to you that the people working for the Chinese will most likely be precisely those locals who according to your 'expert knowledge' about them won't look too kindly on people walking around with binoculars (because it's 'a fact' that Japanese don't like that, oh no they don't!)? They ARE the likely operatives!
Here's another thing that apparently never crossed your mind. As soon as US ships approach the island and military aircraft start landing on the civilian airports, clips of it will be all over the internet. That's what happens in 2020 and beyond. Or were you planning on draping them in your CCD cloak of invisibility too?
You won't even need a Chinese operative. Just one local who thinks it's cool to post military stuff or who doesn't like the US presence (and there are plenty of those, the marines' behaviour on Okinawa over the years has seen to that) and it's game over with your hide and seek.
And did it occur to you that the Chinese can read English? That if you read it, they read it too? That they too can figure out that there only a handful of islands that this new 'amazing' capability could be applied to? And that, assuming there's even a remote chance that it is practically feasible, they too can figure out that they better take some (cheap) precautions? Like put a guy or girl on each island?
Come on, get real.
R.
THe intent is not to deceive them which island we're on. It's to deceive them as to exactly where on that island critical activities are occurring. You accomplish that by CCD, survivability moves, OPSEC, and constantly changing patterns.
Delete"As soon as US ships approach the island and military aircraft start landing on the civilian airports, clips of it will be all over the internet. "
The presence of US forces on the island is not and was not the surprise. Where on the island critical activities are occurring is the surprise.
"And did it occur to you that the Chinese can read English? That if you read it, they read it too? That they too can figure out that there only a handful of islands that this new 'amazing' capability could be applied to? "
Again, the surprise is not that we're on the island, but where exactly on the island we are executing critical activities.
"Knock it off with your CCD cloak of invisibility bs. "
CCD has a long history of working, even against enemies with satelittes. Just ask General Wesley Clark how effective the US air campaign was.
And again, small forces on small islands are deliberately designed to be below the targetting radar compared to obvious targets like Misawa, Yokota, Atsugi, Futenma, Kadena, Iwakuni, Yokosuka, Sasebo, etc.
DeleteThe Chinese only have so many munitions and so many delivery platforms. Even getting "an operative with a phone" doesn't change the fact that a small island with a battalion-sized force is still just a battalion-sized force spread over a vast area in warhead terms.
"Knock it off with your CCD cloak of invisibility"
DeletePlease keep the discussion impersonal. Feel free to attack the idea but not the person.
"Even getting "an operative with a phone" doesn't change the fact that a small island with a battalion-sized force is still just a battalion-sized force spread over a vast area in warhead terms."
DeleteA battalion-sized force spread over a vast area isn't a battalion at all. It's just a lot of individuals with no significant connection to each other. You need a considerable degree of concentration to be a battalion. It's in the definition.
And this applies to equipment and supplies even more than it does to men, as it is typically much harder to concentrate those on short notice. Not to mention that it would be far more obvious to observers if those assets keep going back and forth to concentrate and disperse (not to mention the extra fuel requirements).
So no, your force is not going to be spread out over a large enough area, not unless you want to defeat the purpose of them being there in the first place yourself, without a shot being fired.
"The Chinese only have so many munitions and so many delivery platforms."
Now we're getting somewhere! From claiming to the force being nigh undetectable and thereby effectively invulnerable, you're now making your case based on the assumption that this 'game-changing' US force would somehow not be worth bothering with because the Chinese wouldn't have enough bombs, missiles, ships and aircraft.
For one thing, there's the pretty obvious fact that the Chinese would be allocating the resources that they do have, based largely on the effectiveness of specific oppositional assets. In other words, the more effective your force is, the more likely it is the Chinese WILL spend the necessary munitions to deplete said force to irrelevancy. That basically the job description of every military.
There is a much bigger problem with your claim though. Let's assume for argument's sake that you are right. I don't believe you are, but let's say that the Chinese have such a limited inventory of munitions that it forces them to be frugal when it comes to their allocation. The logical question that needs to be answered next, and on which your entire argument hinges, is then: What would be the best, easiest and most effective way for the Chinese to overcome this problem?
Well, that's easy. All they have to do is increase the number of munitions and delivery systems they have to the required level. Then your entire argument is moot and your force destined for destruction.
Let's not forget that this forward basing concept is far from feasible at the moment. A lot still needs to happen first. So we're talking about a FUTURE capacity, not a current one. So would need to look a likely FUTURE Chinese capabilities too, not current ones. The time you need to make this concept a reality, is time the Chinese will have to develop counters to it.
Now, let's look at some facts about the Chinese:
Are they constructing more warships (with a lot of firepower) to add to the already large number of hulls they have? Check.
Are they building more highly capable modern jets (and buying some too) to add to the very large and quite capable air fleet they already have? Check.
Are they manufacturing a lot more missiles (both for the ships and aircraft as well as those that can reach the islands in question on their own)? Check.
Are they likely to be running short on relevant munitions and delivery systems by the time this marine forward basing concept could become feasible? No, they won't.
R
"A battalion-sized force spread over a vast area isn't a battalion at all. It's just a lot of individuals with no significant connection to each other. You need a considerable degree of concentration to be a battalion. It's in the definition."
DeleteThere's literally no definition of battalion that requires concentration. A battalion can be any O-5 level of command leading any number of similar or dissimilar O-2/3/4 level commands for the accomplishment of a task. Peacetime command relationships are helpful, but not necessary as they routinely execute task forces/Battalion Landing Teams.
"Now we're getting somewhere! From claiming to the force being nigh undetectable and thereby effectively invulnerable, "
I never made that claim. You're making up words. I said that with CCD you can get inside the Chinese targeting cycle, sowing doubt, delay, and confusion. Doubt, delay, and confusion are all survivability measures.
"he more effective your force is, the more likely it is the Chinese WILL spend the necessary munitions to deplete said force to irrelevancy" Which is my point. If they're EXPENDING assets (they only have 120 bombers and 400 modern fighters) to attack fuel trucks and the occasional F-35 doing a hot refueling, they're not expending assets attacking CSGs, ESGs, Japanese airfields or Taiwanese airfields.
"All they have to do is increase the number of munitions and delivery systems they have to the required level. "
They still have to find and target in real time. It's an entire network of capabilities they have to develop, not simply just build more munitions.
"Are they likely to be running short on relevant munitions and delivery systems by the time this marine forward basing concept could become feasible?"
They have 1000+ MRBMs and 200+ cruise missiles, plus several hundred air-and sea launched cruise missiles. They don't have enough to simultaneously attack all targets. They will never have enough.
Just look at the 5 civilian airfields in the Southern Ryukus. Each one would require between 6 and 25 munitions just to cut the runways in a way that an F-35B couldn't use it. Then they'd have to keep them cut every 24-48 hours, as engineers have a nasty habit of fixing runways. Ballistic missiles don't cut runways very well. Therefore, that's cruise missiles and bombs. It's almost certain that Taiwanese airfields and known US MOBs like Kadena will be the first and only target for the limited stockpile of Runway destruction munitions
Delete" cut the runways in a way that an F-35B couldn't use it."
DeleteYou have a fundamental misunderstanding about how to incapacitate an air base. You don't do it by attacking the runway. As you note, that's a very short term solution. The way to incapacitate an air base is by attacking the links in the sortie chain that are particularly vulnerable and critical such as fuel storage/transfer, maintenance facilities, mission planning facilities, munitions storage, etc. In this FARP scenario, simply hitting a handful of fuel storage or transfer pieces would bring the entire operation to a halt. Getting replacement HERS or M970s or whatever to dispersed locations is not a quick effort and trying to replace lost fuel when you're already required to deliver over a million pounds of fuel daily is simply not feasible without a mammoth support system which defeats the purpose of a small, dispersed base. If you pile the kind of resources required to dispense and deliver over a million pounds of fuel per day, you've created a very attractive source target for the Chinese.
Targeting a handful of the fuel transport ships would also quickly, easily, and effectively shut down the operation, as well.
And so on. That's how you shut down an air operation.
CNO,
DeleteCutting the runway is exactly what RAND describes https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR968/RAND_RR968.pdf Pages 19-23.
The aircraft parked on the ramp would be hit by small submunitions, and the runways will be cut in enough places to prevent takeoff and landing of new aircraft.
"[N]umbers on the order of 30–50 TBM per base appear to be sufficient to overload and kill air defenses, cover all of the open parking areas with submunitions to destroy aircraft parked there, and crater runways such that
aircraft cannot [take off] or land."
As described, the maintenance facilites are on a MOB anywhere from 800-2000 (depending on tanker support)miles away from the FARP, thus almost untouchable. Munitions, as I said, could easily be ferried in on that very F-35 plane. The only logistical link that's missing is Fuel, which could either come from caches, civilian on-island sources or from surface and air connectors (in that preferential order).
A single SSC can haul 148,000 pounds, or a quarter of the required fuel for the templated 84 sorties.
"Getting replacement M970s..." Which is why MEBs need more M970s for redundancy. Seems like an easy peacetime problem to solve. We're in agreement that pre-planned redundancy is key.
"A single SSC can haul 148,000 pounds, or a quarter of the required fuel for the templated 84 sorties."
DeleteTo begin, 148,000 lbs is only 13% of the required daily fuel load, not 25%.
Second, you appear to be using a maximum theoretical loading capacity which is not a true capacity. It would only be true if the fuel was in an uncontained state, lying on the deck. In reality, the fuel is in containers of some sort which, themselves, contribute weight, thus subtracting from the maximum capacity (10-20% or so, depending on the type of container). Further, and more importantly, the containers take up area. For example, if the fuel was in the form of M970 tankers, each tanker must be chained down and there must be room around each one for the crew to access. Thus, looking at the dimensions of the tanker compared to the size of the LCAC/SSC, and looking at photos of LCAC loads of a similar size, an actual load of tankers is only 2, I would guess, which is only 52,000 lbs of fuel which is only around 4-5% of the daily requirement.
"Cutting the runway is exactly what RAND describes"
DeleteNo. The RAND report was a simulation of the effect of various types of munitions on an airbase and the various types of damage. It was not a tactical analysis of the best way to attack a base. In fact, at a quick glance, it did not even consider better ways to attack a base. It was a defensive description.
Finally, RAND is not the military.
You are continuing to make incorrect statements that I'm having to correct. This must end.
What really kills me about the concept of Miss Marines is that if it actually works you don't need Marines. If the small units of missiles, radars and drones work from land and can be moved by a small ship, then you can attach the equipment to a dedicated ship to do the same thing. No Marines needed. As for the F-35's the LHA's will work better than an island. No Marines needed.
ReplyDeleteThe Commandant has made a case for expanding the Navy.
"What really kills me about the concept of Miss Marines is that if it actually works you don't need Marines."
DeleteWhat if that is actually the (unsaid) goal?
"What if that is actually the (unsaid) goal?"
DeleteI don't think it was anybody's goal, said or unsaid. I think we just stupidly wandered into it.
I was a Middie when the LPHs and the whole vertical envelopment concept caught on, and got taught how great an idea it was. Then as a JO in the mine force, I saw the helicopter minesweeping concept, working off the LPHs, catch on. Then, still a JO, but now in the phib force, we got told how the LHA (later LHD) was totally going to reinvent the whole amphibious concept--now everything was going to be carried on one faster ship. But, we asked, what happens when one lucky torpedo or rocket sinks it, and there goes your whole assault? If anybody thought about it ten, they didn't let on. But some time after we had built about ten of them, somebody figured out that it could be a big problem. So they came up with this idea that we'll just move them 25-50 miles offshore and avoid the problem. But the question nobody has asked (or at least nobody has answered) is how to get the big stuff ashore from out there--boats are too slow, helos and V-22s can't lift the weight, and LCACs are too unreliable. So now the Marines become light infantry and search for missions that can be done by Boy Scouts with BB guns.
I don't think anybody (outside the Army or maybe Air Force) set out to kill the Marines. But a combination of decisions not thoroughly thought through, coupled with the Marines' being so willing to get into any fight that they took on Army roles unsuited for a "from the sea" expeditionary force, has reduced them an organization without viable mission.
Basically, to quote one on ComNavOps's favorite themes, it was a case of becoming so caught up in technology that they let it drive strategy.
Delete"roadway sections … for F-35B operations."
DeleteThis comment has been deleted as factually incorrect. Roads cannot be used for F-35B operations.
So let me re-iterate what I said. There are 5 civilian airports and inactive airport in the Southern Ryukus Islands. Given the demonstrated takeoff roll of 471 feet with 2x JDAMs and 2x AMRAAMs, those 5x 6000 foot runways would have to be cut in at least 14-15 places, and then re-cut every 24-72 hours to actually prevent US re-occupation. Adding in munitions required to cut and re-cut Futenma, Ie Shima, Kadena, Misawa, Atsugi, Yokota, and the tens of JGASDF active airfields, and the Chinese have run out of munitions. When you factor in Japanese and US IAMD and DCA, the munitions requirements to actually do what you say they'd do is immense, and distracting from their core mission of seizing Taiwan (or whatever their aim is).
DeleteNow, if the conflict is over Taiwan, the bulk of munitions will be expended over Taiwan. Period. They don't have the munitions to do everything. Therefore, in all probability, they will only expend munitions on airbases, like Futenma, Kadena, etc. They'll likely be black on runway cratering devices long before we look at building FARPs.
Now you ask, what is the actual combat power provided? Leaving aside rotary wing combat power and land-based combat power, the Marines themselves estimated that a MEB could sustain roughly 28 aircraft flying 3x DCA missions a day for a total of 87 DCA missions in a given day. That's upwards of 348 AMRAAM shots a day, not to mention the intelligence value of having dozens of "mini-AWACs" operating 500-700 nm in front of the CSGs.
DeleteSource: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1141&context=nwc-review
"That's not what the USMC who actually use the F-35B and work with the F-35 say."
DeleteIf you can present documentation that the F-35B can use civilian roads for operations, I'll gladly adjust my position. Until then, it's false and I won't allow it to stand.
"COmpared to your 10 year old blog reference"
DeleteDid the F-35's engines get colder over the years??? The documentation stands.
I've got to tell you, you're making up a lot of stuff based on what you think or want to be true and you're ignoring the facts and documentation I've presented. This blog is based on facts and logic. I refer you to the Comment Policy page. Consider this a friendly warning.
AS I said in the previous post, what islands are we talking about here? Are we talking about Taiwan/Japan/Okinawa, East China Sea or South China Sea because I'm thinking more along the lines of islands in SCS with no roads or inhabitants anywhere near, for me what Berger is talking about is more a remake or rerun of "Guadalcanal", where USMC takes an island with very little on it, not operating out of a parking lot or a stretch of road in Okinawa or Kadena....I really don't understand why we would bother much then, we have already the facilities to operate there without going "austere", just need to protect them more with AEGIS ASHORE or THAAD.
Delete"MEB could sustain roughly 28 aircraft"
DeleteThe Marines can imagine anything they want but this is fantasy taken to the ridiculous.
As actual experience has demonstrated, the F-35B readiness rate is something on the order of 50% and that's with clean, well equipped bases stocked with plentiful spare parts and manufacturer reps for assistance. In a war, with limited spares, dirty conditions, and no manufacturer support, readiness rates will drop to 25% or so and that unrealistically assumes no battle damage. Modern stealth aircraft require exquisite care which is not going to be available at austere forward bases and certainly won't be available if aircraft are trying to fly 3X missions per day. There won't be time for even routine maintenance.
The logistics of the fuel and munitions is staggering as described in the report you cited:
"... postulated that the air-combat element would launch twenty-eight aircraft daily, each flying an initial combat air patrol sortie, refueling and rearming at an M-FARP, flying another sortie, resetting again at an M-FARP, flying a third sortie, and then recovering to the sea base. Each F-35 would load missiles and six tons of fuel after each sortie. Together, then, the three M-FARPs would require resupply of 336 tons of fuel and up to 280 tons of containerized munitions each day. Depending on the number of transportation and other vehicles deployed ashore to connect the MDSs to their M-FARPs, and on whether the F-35s bedded down on the sea base or an expeditionary airfield ashore, the total tonnage of fuel required to support the ground and air elements of DSOs would range from 544 to 1,337 tons per day, plus the nonfuel sustainment requirements of shore complements ranging from eight hundred to eighteen hundred personnel."
While that may sound good on paper, it simply can't happen in combat. Again, it assumes 100% availability of the MEB transportation assets (fantasy) and no combat losses (another fantasy).
One also has to seriously question the conceptual wisdom of employing an entire MEB to support the operation of 28 aircraft, even if the concept were viable instead of being pure fantasy.
It is also necessary to recognize the magnitude of the effort. An afloat MEB uses 9+ big deck amphibious ships. That will certainly attract some Chinese attention. In turn that will require dozens of escorts, taking away from any other operations we might have going. So, the cost to operate 28 aircraft now includes not just an entire MEB but 3+ ARGs and dozens of escorts. All to operate 28 aircraft that are severely weapon-limited.
The report also fails to address how these little bases will jump from island to island every few hours. How will they move tons of fuel, trucks, people, munitions, etc. from island to island in a matter of hours - and all while the Chinese remain cooperatively unaware. This is hand waving at its best!
I can go on but that report is just blithering fantasy and its own information points out just how ridiculous the concept is.
As I said, if you wish to buy into the fantasy, feel free. However, I have warned you about presenting factually incorrect information so proceed accordingly.
"Modern stealth aircraft require exquisite care which is not going to be available at austere forward bases and certainly won't be available if aircraft are trying to fly 3X missions per day."
DeleteWhich prompts the question, just how important is stealth for a CAS aircraft? The A-10 is the gold standard, and here's not much stealthy about it. I keep hearing about all the compromises that were made in the design of the F-35 to give the Marines a STOVL airplane, but I just don't see the crying need for all the stealth stuff. The Marines need rugged, they need ability to fly a bunch of missions, it needs a big gun like the A-10 cannon, it needs to carry a heavy weapons load, and it needs to be able to operate off carriers. Beyond that, I see a big plus if it is STOL or STOVL or even VSTOL so that the Marines can take it ashore with them and operate it off short or unprepared strips close to the front--pop up, kill the bad guys, and pop back and get ready to do it again. But I don't see where the F-35 stealth is a critical Marine need. And if they don't need it, then surely we can build them a cheaper airplane that meets their critical needs.
If the F-35 can't operate off a road, then some of the value of STOVL is lost.
Delete"If you can present documentation that the F-35B can use civilian roads for operations,"
DeleteI presented multiple citations from USMC testing and development organizations. You just chose not to believe it.
"Did the F-35's engines get colder over the years??? The documentation stands."
It's a blog.
'As actual experience has demonstrated, the F-35B readiness rate is something on the order of 50% and that's with clean, well equipped bases stocked with plentiful spare parts and manufacturer reps for assistance."
Start-up maintenance habits are unlikely to replicate readiness next year or the year after. https://breakingdefense.com/2019/10/f-35-readiness-rates-soar-from-55-to-73-price-drops-12-8/
28/36 is roughly equivalent to current OR of 73%.
"Modern stealth aircraft require exquisite care which is not going to be available at austere forward bases and certainly won't be available if aircraft are trying to fly 3X missions per day. There won't be time for even routine maintenance."
You're completely ignoring the role of the MOB in this.
" Together, then, the three M-FARPs would require resupply of 336 tons of fuel and up to 280 tons of containerized munitions each day."
CL III could easily be procured on the economy out of the five commercial airports to a certain extent (surface and air connectors will have to fill in the delta). Most efficient delivery means for the munitions is the F-35 themselves operating in "beast mode" (side note I hate that term) to the M-FARP, to be unloaded for two or three combat sorties. Glad I could solve that logistics puzzle for you.
"The report also fails to address how these little bases will jump from island to island every few hours. How will they move tons of fuel, trucks, people, munitions, etc. from island to island in a matter of hours - and all while the Chinese remain cooperatively unaware. This is hand waving at its best!"
DeleteNow how about jumping around the same island, but in a geographically different part?
"One also has to seriously question the conceptual wisdom of employing an entire MEB to support the operation of 28 aircraft, even if the concept were viable instead of being pure fantasy."
DeleteSure if you oversimplify and ignore the other ancillary benefits of being able to deny China the terrain, land-based HIMARs/Patriots/NSMs shots over Taiwan, the land-based ISR platform, and the value of rotary wing aviation....
Oh and of course that whole survivable mini-AWACS screen 500-800 nm in front of your high value bases in Guam and your carriers. SUre let's pretend those aren't of value.
"Now how about jumping around the same island, but in a geographically different part?"
DeleteYonaguni is 11 sq.mi. There's nowhere to go!
"current OR of 73%."
DeleteNo one, absolutely no one, believes that readiness across the military jumped from 50% to 70% in less than a year. What jumped was the reporting methods.
I've got to be honest, you might be happier and better off finding another blog that's less demanding and less rigorous. Give it some thought.
An Army doctrinal Battery PAA is 3km x 3 km, or roughly 3 square miles. That's, by doctrine large enough for six howitzers to shoot and move far enough to survive. 11 square miles is more than adequate for a HIMARS/NSM/Patriot composite battalion to execute survivability moves.
DeleteDo you have any evidence behind your assertion that the F-35 OR rates are falsified? It's logical given the emphasis SecDef placed on fighter OR rates. It also matches the Rhino trend. So please, present your evidence.
If you don't want thoughtful, fact-based opinions in dissent I wouldn't advertise that your blog "This blog presents a serious and thoughtful analysis of U.S. Navy matters and is intended to raise the level of discourse available on the Internet. It is based on fact and logic."
In general I think your blog is amazing and I agree with 95 of what you say. But I too like to have thoughtful, fact-based, logical discussions.
"Do you have any evidence behind your assertion that the F-35 OR rates are falsified?"
DeleteCircumstantial evidence and logic. I've read multiple articles that the Navy, when ordered to improve readiness, hired civilian airline reps to teach the Navy how to modify their reporting so as to achieve higher readiness without actually changing the physical readiness - analogous to the airlines practice of disconnecting the airliner from the gate and then leaving it sitting so as to be able to claim the plane left on time even though it didn't. I did not bother saving the articles so I can't offer a link.
Logic suggests that the Navy/Marines which had been working on readiness for years and getting nowhere could not suddenly, in the space of a few months, jump the readiness from 50% to 70%. If it were that easy, they'd have already done it. During those few months, there was no significant change in spare parts availability, depot availability, number of mechanics, time available, or anything else. Logically, the improvement could not be real. Just as the Navy pencil whips status reports and plays games with equipment transfers for inspections, it is obvious that the readiness improvement could not have been real.
"Which prompts the question, just how important is stealth for a CAS aircraft?"
DeleteI don't really think it's so important.
Nice to have, sure, but not mandatory particularly if it drives cost too high.
https://www.airforcemag.com/f-35-mission-capable-rates-up-for-all-variants-lord-tells-hasc/#:~:text=Marine%20Corps%20F%2D35B%20readiness,percent%20mission%20capable%2C%20Lord%20asserted.
Delete"Across the US fleet, mission capable rates—the metric that shows how many aircraft in a fleet are available for action at any given time—“increased from 55 percent in October 2018 to 73 percent in September 2019,” she wrote. Marine Corps F-35B readiness leaped from 44 percent to 68 percent during that period, Air Force F-35A jets improved from 66 percent to 75 percent, and Navy jets, which only became operational this year, are over 75 percent mission capable, Lord asserted."
"n addition to more spare parts, Lord said there 161 reliability and maintainability improvement projects that have been identified and “68 completed.”"
The Apr 2019 GAO F-35 Sustainment report (Fig 4., p.12) presents a chart showing the actual full mission capable (FMC) rate for the F-35B to be 16% for the period ending Nov 2018. Availability and mission capable (capable of flying) rates were around 46% and 50% but simply indicate the percentage of aircraft capable of one mission (like flight), not fully mission capable of combat.
DeleteThe 2019 DOT&E annual report, p.29, cites the full mission capable rate (FMC) for 2019 as less than 65% but does not give an actual value.
The mission capable rate in the report you cite is the lesser flight-capable rate rather than the relevant FMC. The FMC appears to be lingering in the 10's or 20's%.
To believe that the MC rate jumped from 40-50% to 70+% in a matter of months defies credulity. Meanwhile, the FMC (the only combat relevant rate) languishes. The claimed improvement is pretty clearly a pencil-whipping exercise.
Ok I think you're downplaying what MC actually means. I suspect the ongoing transitions to Block 3F software has a lot to do with the discrepancy between MC and FMC. (2B and 3i were never FMC). That's a temporary issue, not a permanent one. It's a pencil whipping exercise to say that it's a permanent problem.
DeleteAnd yes, I believe that MC rates for the F-35B jumped from 50% to 68% in the course of a year with more maintainers, more pilots, higher priority level from the highest levels, and more experience working with the problem. The F-35 has seen the same jump as the Rhino did.
Going back to the bigger point though, do I think that in the near future, that a stylized MEB operating out of a MOB say in Guam, composed of 3x16 F-35B squadrons sustain 28x3 daily sorties by FARPing on various islands in the Ryukus, yes. That only requires a 58% OR rate. If they decide to opt for the 10 plane squadron Berger's hinted at, that would be far more challenging of course.
Delete"yes, I believe that MC rates for the F-35B jumped from 50% to 68%"
DeleteYou are a true believer, I'll give you that! You really need to join the Commandant's staff!
I could bother but im not even going to but 36 F35Bs with 28 operational flying 3 times a day.....thats more than 1 fuel truck, probably more than 2. LOL! Honestly, Chinese aren't going to notice that logistical tail? Come on, thats not small and/or easy to hide.
DeleteI've read Berger too and this defense from Larwit (and doing a great job of advocating for Berger) seems to me WAY BEYOND the scope of what Berger is talking about. Forget F35 mission and go back to just trying to move truck mounted ASMs or UAVs for recon, scoot and fire and the concept seems far fetched, as far as I read it, Berger was talking about 1 or maybe 2 small transports with a few troops, these missions already are probably tough and a stretch, now we want to refuel 28 F35s a day?
I give it to LARWIT, he's working the problem hard and doing a good job but sorry, I'm not buying what you selling...keep trying though, its interesting IMO. Case in point, Going back and forth on this post though made me realize that what Berger has in mind, sure isn't defined, in my mind at least, not sure about others but its obvious that he has completely different meanings and possibilities depending on whatever one believes. For me, its a LOT smaller mission and size than what I gather others like Larwit have in mind...maybe thats the problem, we are talking past each other because we haven't really defined the parameters, they are pretty vague....
I've tried to keep clean and impersonal, like I said, not buying it but love Larwit defense.
"Ok I think you're downplaying what MC actually means. "
DeleteOk, I think you're ignoring what MC actually means. It means that the aircraft is flyable but NOT combat capable. The FACT of the matter is that the FMC rate is somewhere around 25%.
I'm unaware that FMC is determined by software block. Do you have any documentation to support that?
Do you really believe that the entire Air Force, Navy, and Marines, all of whom have been desperately trying to improve readiness for years and had formed myriad study groups, Admiral-chaired support groups, etc. in an effort to improve readiness, all simultaneously in a few short months managed to leap their readiness rates by factors of 2-3x? Spare parts shortage have been an on-going problem for years with long lead times and unavailability causing problems. Manpower shortages have plagued the readiness effort for years despite efforts to increase levels (it's not possible to hire new people and have them immediately be functional - they need a year or more of training to be effective). Funding has been an issue for years.
All the foregoing problems, even if addressed instantly, require many months or years to actually show improvements. For example, placing an order for more spare parts doesn't result in the parts showing up the next day. It takes months/years for the suppliers to gear up to produce more parts. For example, increasing funding requires a year, minimum, to include in the next year's budget and make available. And so on.
Despite all these actual limitations, you believe that real improvements of 2-3X readiness occurred in just a matter of months due to " more maintainers, more pilots, higher priority level from the highest levels, and more experience working with the problem"? I'm not sure how more pilots (despite every service stating that they are LOSING pilots every year!) increases readiness of aircraft but I'll ignore that for the moment.
If you honestly believe the real readiness increased by 2x in just a matter of a few months then you're just ignoring reality which does not help your credibility.
The difference between MC and FMC is the Block 3F software, an issue that's scheduled to be largely resolved this month.
DeleteThe improvement was over 12 months per all citations, not "matter of months"
I gave you the citation. Readiness improved by 18% from 50% for the B model. That's not 2x or 2-3x. Not sure where you got that. Operational squadrons will likely see significantly higher OR rates as the DOTE report from 2019 highlighted.
"No significant portion of the fleet, including the combat-coded
fleet, was able to achieve and sustain the DOD mission
capable (MC) rate goal of 80 percent. However, individual
units have been able to achieve the 80 percent target for short
periods during deployed operations."
"36 F35Bs with 28 operational flying 3 times a day.....thats more than 1 fuel truck, probably more than 2"
DeleteThe concept calls for 9 total active FARPs and 24 decoy FARPs, operating widely dispersed (such as across a 500 km long island chain). Per the citation I provided above, 28x3 sorties requires an OR rate of 58% for the F-35, and roughly 600+ tons daily of CL III and V, of which about half can be flown in by the F-35 itself (beast mode ferry flight) and about half would have to either be procured on the island, cached on the island, or brought to the island. Dispersed, numerous cache sites are the lowest cost/lowest risk option but require local buy-in. The alternative is to procure off the local civilian airport (and ship in what else is needed due to enemy action).
So yes, it's more than one truck, and a doctrinal MEB has 10 trucks (too few) that'd be spread across a 500 km island chain. The whole point of the exercise is to spread the force so that no one target is worth the assets expended looking for and killing it.
There are very clear material and organizational gaps in the Berger concept. Cache sites are one big gap. It’s the single biggest way to get the M-FARP concept up is to have a network of fuel caches distributed around each of these islands. The surface connector to make up for a lack of cache sites is another key gap. The complete lack of a realistic SAM or ASM missile is another. An over-reliance on a Marine-only solution as opposed to joint is another. Too few F-35Bs and too many F-35As is another. A lack of coherence for any Marine formation outside 4th Marine Regiment is yet another. I could go on and on with the list. That said, getting Marine batteries and FARPs inside the A2AD is the ultimate in a layered defense in depth for the CSGs.
"Readiness improved by 18% from 50% for the B model. That's not 2x or 2-3x."
DeleteWell, actually it's 2.78x
50% to 68% is not 2.78x..... In case it wasn't clear, last year the MC was 50%, this year it's 68%. Not 2.78x
DeleteFrom 50% to 68%. How do you get 2.78x?
DeleteCombat readiness, which is the only readiness that matters, is given by the FMC, not some manufactured partial readiness that amounts to nothing more than being able to take off without crashing. FMC was in the 10-20% range and people are trying to claim a jump to around 70% (while mixing definitions).
DeleteAnyone who is trying to use or defend a partial mission capable measurement is just trying to obscure the fact that the F-35 has a horrendous combat readiness. Why not measure 'one landing gear' readiness rates? It's just as meaningful as any other partial readiness measurement and we'd have really high rates!
Just a possible mention of the overly-obvious, but how can we be excited about a readiness jump to 68%?? Or even 78%?? Im not well versed in this, but those numbers are abysmal!! 68% is a "D" back when I was in school, and earned me lots less free time. How can we even be remotely comfortable with our military spending cubic dollars on ANYTHING that doesnt earn an "A" in reliability and availibility for combat?? Our country and lots of young men and women in uniform deserve and need better....!!!
DeleteAgain, it's not actual readiness, it's a partial readiness measure. FMC is the full mission capable (combat capable) and that's still atrocious as best we can tell.
DeleteIt's only you that's defining FMC as the only (combat capable) readiness measure. As they define it, MC can do some or most "tasked missions," while FMC can do all "tasked missions." You're literally describing the difference between Block 2i and Block 3F software, a problem that's clearly temporary.
DeleteJjabatie. Airplanes, like all machines, are intricate and require maintenance. 80% is about the best you're going to get given required maintenance intervals.
So why isnt it 80% then?? Even that seems low. Maybe we should be engineering in some low maintenance features so that more can fly, more often??
DeleteLarwit1512, correct me if I am wrong but I still don't see how your explanation of time and experiences for a 24% increase (the figure you cited above is 44% to 68%) in reliability just a few short months while this is a long-term problem the branches have tried to do over the years. If such an increase is true, we must saw an incremental of that level in the year before from 20% to 44%. It's not impossible but it requires a magnitude of effort from more depots and increased production of parts and increased training of personnel. All of these things CNO has noted NO significant change for such an increase could happen. Therefore I highly doubt the statistics you cited.
DeleteI highly doubt the MC rate that you are referring to contains mostly of partially combat capable aircraft. The definition of MC is also too broad ranging from flyable to missing one capability. I think it's much more the former than the later. Imagine you are the military, SECDEF has told you to increase reliability rate to meet Congress expectations. What do you do? If you are gonna use the MC rate to report (noted in my comment below),would you either have 50-60% partially capable or 60%-70% flyable aircraft? Noted that both translated to the same MC rate. It's still possible that the military takes after what you said but with the recent events, I highly doubt the leadership.
Another issue that you kept referring to is the "temporary error" in the block 3i (I assumed because there is no block 2i) to block 3f but I haven't really seen any sources cite that it's the single reason preventing the aircrafts from MC to FMC. What i saw was structural issue, design issues, logistics problems and a host of other classified "deficiencies" and multiple software problem (sources noted in a comment on this post). If the military has really fixed the issue that you said is the reason, it would have been in every front news page boasting about how superior the F-35 is. If you do have that information, I would love if you could cite it.
No one cares if the depot can generate 80% OR. We care about what kind of readiness III MEF and I MEF can generate. Do I believe they can accomplish the required 58%? Yes. Period.
Delete"The wisdom of localized massing of force/firepower is generally undisputed. The challenge lies in creating the circumstances that allow for it."
ReplyDeleteAnd, applying that amassed force and firepower where it will hurt the enemy the most, which isn't always easy to do.
Have you ever thought of doing an F-35 update article?
ReplyDeleteHere is a nice source for anyone to do a March update on the F-35 program: https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/03/uncorrected-design-flaws-cyber-vulnerabilities-and-unreliability-plague-the-f-35-program/
"
The F-35 still have at least 9 or worst, 13(reported cases of reclassifying issues when reporting to Congress) Class 1 deficiencies and unknown numbers of Class 2 deficiencies but 860 were last reported since the end of the development phase last year.
The gun for the Air Force’s version not only can’t shoot straight, but breaks the aircraft when fired.
There have been no appreciable improvements in the program’s overall reliability since 2016.
The military now reports mission capable (if you can take off!) rate as the reliability rate. the FMC (Full Mission Capable) rate isn't reported since 2016 where it was 26%.
ALIS due to delays would be replaced with Lockheed Martin’s Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN)and being built by the same company that make ALIS in the first place.
The entire F-35 system remains vulnerable to cyber threats due to the piecemeal update and testing.
The simulation facility necessary to fully test the aircraft and train pilots remains unfinished and being built by the same company that failed to complete it."
Yes, I have thought about an update but it's like beating a dead horse. The world - and me - have pointed out thousands of problems with the program. That there's more - or continuing - problems is barely newsworthy any more.
DeleteThe one aspect that intrigues me and that I might do a post on is the readiness rates which have been, apparently, fraudulently reported by changing the reporting criteria. I'll give it some thought. Thanks!
How about supporting The Marines (aka "Naval Infantry") with Naval Fire Support? Keep the quarter billion dollar planes a thousand miles away where they'll be safe and bring back the big guns -- Battleships. With my Son going into the Marines, I certainly don't want him backed up with guns smaller than what the enemy will have. You won't have to worry about unloading artillery if the Navy can actually provide fire support. Ships that won't sink if they hit a fishing boat can go from island to island without needing to unload anything but destruction.
ReplyDeleteUS marine is NOT second army but a force specialize in amphibious operations. Once its task is done at shore, further mission should pass to army.
ReplyDeleteFuture wars change with technology advancement. Concentration of forces invite total destructions. You can see US and Chinese armies both abandoned amours divisions but put tanks in small groups. large scale land battles tend to happen only in cities than open fields as too many missiles, you know.
For marine, large scale amphibious operations under enemies' fire become impossible, especially face another superpower.
"The wisdom of localized massing of force/firepower is generally undisputed."
ReplyDeleteSomebody please explain to me a better way to do this without the modern equivalent of the Battleship. Explain to me without using general statements like "longing for obsolete weapons" or etc. These statements are older than the Iowa Class, so when you do, I will destroy your arguments. If the Navy will no longer support the Marines, then dismantle the Marine Corps.
The fact is that the Iowa Class were one of the greatest accomplishments of an entire generation and when merged with modern armor, weaponry and electronics, those four ships would be more powerful than an entire fleet. Yes, keep the other ships to take on the submarines and remember that submarines existed as those ships were being built.
I'm suggesting four ships out of hundreds to fill a role that has been lacking for too long.
Well, if we are a bit confused about the mission and requirements, sounds like USMC doesn't know a whole lot more than us, not sure if that's good or bad thing....we looking at 3 more years of testing or trials.....
ReplyDeletehttps://breakingdefense.com/2020/09/marine-corps-builds-new-littoral-regiment-eye-on-fake-chinese-islands/