Let’s consider a few historical examples and then we can discuss
the phenomenon.
First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal – 13-Nov-1942
The Japanese, in a major attempt to reinforce Guadalcanal,
committed a large task force of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers,
commanded by Adm. Abe, to shell Henderson Field and prepare the way for
transports carrying troop reinforcements.
After a confusing, point blank night battle, the defending US force was
almost wiped out while Abe retained the bulk of his force intact and relatively
undamaged. The way was clear for Abe to
continue on and completely eliminate the US naval presence, destroy Henderson
Field, and assure the safe landing of the Japanese reinforcements. Inexplicably, Abe broke off the engagement
and retired. His timidity likely cost
the Japanese possession of Guadalcanal.
Battle off Samar – 25-Oct-1944
Japan’s Center Force, led by Kurita, was still very
powerful, consisting of four battleships (including the Yamato), six heavy cruisers, two light
cruisers and eleven destroyers.
The group encountered the US escort carriers
and escorting destroyers (Taffy 3). Despite incessant US air attacks by improperly
armed aircraft which were generally ineffective and the destroyer’s heroic
actions, Kurita’s force sank three destroyers and the escort carrier Gambier
Bay. At that point, the way to the
amphibious shipping at Leyte Gulf was wide open. Inexplicably, Kurita broke off the attack,
turned away, and retired to the north.
German Surface Fleet in WWII
The Germans exhibited repeated, institutional timidity in
the use of their surface fleet. This
resulted in the withholding of powerful ships (Tirpitz) from action and the
piecemeal expenditure of other ships for little gain.
US Submarine Commanders – 1942
US submarine commanders in the first year of WWII exhibited
the inbred, institutional timidity that their peacetime training had instilled
in them. They were cautious and timid in
the extreme. It wasn’t until more
aggressive commanders took their places that the US submarine effort became
effective. Of course, the faulty torpedo
issue didn’t help!
General George McClellan – US Civil War
Gen. McClellan’s repeated timidity was demonstrated by his
refusal to press his advantage during the Peninsula campaign and the Battle of
Antietam which could have dealt a decisive blow to the Confederacy. Thus, the war dragged on and President Lincoln
eventually replaced McClellan.
Military history is replete with examples of timidity that
forfeited the opportunity for decisive victory.. History is also full of examples of the
opposite, which is calculated boldness and aggressiveness. For example,
Battle of Mobile Bay – 5-Aug-1864
During the American Civil War, a Union fleet led by Adm.
David Farragut attacked a Confederate fleet and three forts guarding Mobile
Bay. During the battle, when confronted
with a minefield that could have stymied the Union attack, Adm. Farragut issued
his oft paraphrased order, “Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead”. The Union fleet passed through the minefield
and went on to defeat the Confederate fleet, seize the forts, and capture
Mobile Bay.
I won’t belabor the point with endless illustrations of
timidity and boldness.
Today, US commanders are the very epitome of timidity. They spend their command tours in a state of
near-paralysis, praying that no one in their command makes a mistake that could
result in the dreaded ‘loss of confidence’ and removal from command. US naval timidity derives directly from the
zero-defect mentality that has taken hold of the Navy. When mistakes are not allowed and no second
chances are given, timidity quickly manifests and becomes the ruling culture.
While the formal antidote to timidity is intel,
comprehensive intel is often unavailable at the opportune moment. At that point, there is no substitute for an
inherent sense of boldness and aggressiveness backed, of course, by tactical
competence and experience. Boldness
requires self-confidence whereas timidity results from the complete absence of self-confidence.
It should be noted that timidity is not simply an artifact
of hindsight where poor decisions or poor results are ascribed to
timidity. Someone can make bad decisions
without being timid. An aggressive plan
can go badly wrong without having timidity to blame (Operation Market Garden in
WWII, for example).
This leads us to note that there is a fine line between
timidity and prudence. Prudence can be
thought of as the opposite of a calculated risk – it is a calculated caution. Adm. Spruance’s decision at Midway to retire
after having achieved a significant measure of success was a calculated caution
that avoided a possible night battle with Japanese battleships – a battle he
could not have won. His prudence
preserved the American success.
So, how do we avoid instilling a habit of timidity in our
military leaders? It starts with
abandoning the zero-defect mentality and practice. In fact, we need to practice the opposite. We need to encourage officers to make mistakes
that they can learn from. We need to
foster an attitude and environment of calculated risk taking coupled with
forgiveness.
Encouraging mistakes is good but we have to provide a
‘sandbox’ where officers can exercise their risk taking. That sandbox is wargames and fleet
exercises. No amount of policy papers
encouraging mistakes will accomplish anything.
We need to turn officers loose in realistic exercises to try things and
succeed or fail and to do so with no penalties for failing. We need to be running ten times as many
exercises as we do now and they need to be free form and realistic.
We bred timidity into our Navy and we can breed it out. We just need to make it a priority.
Yeah, but Skipper, isn't it for the civilian command structure above the Navy to rid itself of THEIR timidity? They way we've structured our personnel and ships, a little timidity might be in order for a bit. Now prudence, I get. For instance, we killed Iran's guy Soleimani in Iraq, in reply they attacked a base with missiles in Iraq either killing or seriously injuring (depending on who we believe) lots of U.S. personnel. Our decision to cut off hostilities rather than escalate at that point, do we call that prudence, or timidity? And who made/makes that decision, military or civilian political leaders in the administration?
ReplyDeleteI just don't consider the last war or the one before that anymore, the current world is endlessly FUBAR in ways we never saw back in WW1,2 or any of the others before and as we saw, nothing worked in Vietnam. Seems to me in Korea and Vietnam and now with Islamics, we started facing enemies that took whatever we dished out and it was a LOT. When your enemy is that sort, you can never win. So isn't prudence the way to go? How much rubble can we bounce, anyway? Or, is that my timidity? Good takes, Skip, ya always get me thinking.
"So isn't prudence the way to go? How much rubble can we bounce, anyway? Or, is that my timidity?"
DeleteYou answered your own question.
You do raise a good point about civilian leadership. This applies just as much to them. We need civilian leaders that aren't timid just as much as we need military leaders.
"Our decision to cut off hostilities rather than escalate at that point, do we call that prudence, or timidity?"
If you decide to enter a war, you do so with total victory as the objective. Anything else is a waste of time and resources and shouldn't be entered into. So, to reach a certain point and then back down is not prudence, it's poor planning reinforced by timidity. It means you either weren't serious about the war (then why did you get into it?) or you lack the fortitude to see it through.
I also note that you're talking about the higher level geopolitical objectives whereas I'm talking about the lower level tactical timidity in the post. I'm talking about the guy running the battle who 'freezes' and then backs off due to timidity rather than calculated caution. The post examples illustrated this.
"ya always get me thinking."
And that's the point. You don't have to always agree (unless you want to always be right! :) ) but you should always think about the topics. So, good for you for having an open mind and considering the topic!
Watched an interesting online video yesterday, from a BBC series, "Warship," about life on a Leander class frigate in the 1970s.
ReplyDeleteIn the episode, hard-charging new CO and XO come aboard, ship had been laid up in Gibraltar for several months for various reasons. Crew is very tired of doing nothing. New CO sets all sorts of short deadlines to be ready to go to sea, which crew takes well, but Weapons Officer doesn't. He's one of the timid safety first crowd, and he puts in for a transfer. They are called by the police to pursue and stop a gun running ship. They have to launch their Wasp helicopter first, and send sailors in RHIBs to establish and maintain hot pursuit while still in Gibraltar water. The crew steps to it, obviously ready to do something after sitting around, they launch the Wasp in 7 minutes and are ready to go in short time thereafter. They chase down the gun runners, who are now in international waters and refuse to surrender. So they fire a shot very close across the bow, and then start raking the top of the bridge with machine gun fire. The gun runners surrender. Last scene, CO and XO (who came as a package) are having a drink and remarking about how quickly the crew turned two. CO says, "I hope we are good enough for them." Weps officer comes in and asks to withdraw his transfer request.
Funny side story. There's a leading steward who goes ashore and gets into the middle of a rendezvous with a lady from the gun running boat and her contact ashore. He gets into a fight and ends up at mast. Turns out, this chance encounter identifies the gun runners and leads to the pursuit and capture. When they are forming the boarding party, the CO says, "I think Leading Steward Brown needs to be part of the boarding party."
That's almost 50 years ago. Wonder how that scenario would work with a US ship today.
Warship is a very taut drama, the series format was devised by a serving Royal Navy officer at the time and there are some excellent action clips showing off the lovely lines of the Leander class!
DeleteI just found it last night, and I'm looking through all the episodes. Good find.
DeleteIn regards to the WW2 submariners, I think the case can be made that the crew's complete lack of trust in a weapons system, the mk14, created a timid mindset.
ReplyDeleteI can imagine, if the F35, or any modern weapon system, repeatedly fail in combat, the aggressiveness to continue using said platform, would probably dry up.
While the torpedo problems didn't help, it has been well documented that the peacetime, safety first, mindset created a cautious, timid culture that carried over into the first year of the war. Off the top of my head, I don't know of any successful submarine CO who was in command at the start of the war. We had to bring in new, aggressive commanders.
DeleteInterestingly, the pre-WWII safety first mentality and unrealistic testing and training reads very much like today's refusal by the Navy to test weapons and conduct realistic exercises. The parallels are eerie.
One thing that I think was a factor then, and has been a factor in other wars, is that we started out with career Navy guys in charge, to grow the force we had to add a lot of reserves. The career guys were worried about careers. The reservists just wanted to get it over in a hurry and get back home. So one takes risks, the other doesn't. It's one possible explanation for what Russians supposedly used to say, that Americans were hard to fight because our guys didn't follow their manuals.
Delete"The career guys were worried about careers."
DeleteDuring peace time I'm sure that was a factor, however, when a CO was on patrol and looking at a Japanese target, I doubt that career thoughts were foremost in his mind. Our COs were conditioned to timidity by peacetime safety concerns and unrealistic exercises.
COs like O'Kane and Morton were in the Navy as careerists prior to WWII but - this is the key point - they weren't yet COs and hadn't yet been conditioned to timidity when the war started. The COs in place at the outset of the war were the 'damaged' ones.
There probably were reservists who commanded a sub but I can't think of any off hand.
I don't know about reservists commanding a submarine specifically, as my comment was meant more generically. The lifers were the ones "conditioned to timidity by peacetime safety concerns" were the ones that were problematic. The guys who had been bankers until called up did not inherit that mindset. They wanted to get the war over, win it, and go back home.
DeleteI doubt that career thoughts were foremost in anyone's mind when out on patrol. Survival probably more than career. But a non-venturing mindset brought upon by years of safety-first CYA thinking would certainly have been more of a factor for some than others.
Follow up reply:
ReplyDeleteYou should do a post, if you haven't already, on why US submarines and their crews deficiencies/ problems contributed to their poor early war performance.
Read Ian Toll's books on the Pacific war. He goes into detail on the travails of out submarine force early in the war.
DeleteBy the time of the Battle of Samar, we had a Navy that could accept losses because we had a large standing fleet and the capacity to readily replace damaged and lost ships, plus the crews to man them. That is a capability we don't have today. And, each major warship is a multi-billion dollar invest that no captain wants to bear responsibility for losing. How does this factor into the calculus of timidity versus prudence?
ReplyDeleteAs demonstrated during WWII, it takes time to develop such a capability. This goes back to previous posts about building simpler ships. But, how much simpler can a ship be and still be able to fight a peer?
"By the time of the Battle of Samar, we had a Navy that could accept losses"
Delete?????? The example was about Japan's timidity when presented with the opportunity to destroy the invasion fleet.
Just about every form of combat requires a commander to weigh the risk of losing men and equipment relative to his mission objectives. At the same time, a commander has to balance all of that against his existing resources. For example, does he have enough ships, planes, fuel, and ammo to continue the mission? At that time, the US was in a far better position to risk losing men and ships than Japan.
DeleteThere are plenty of 'what-ifs' here and Kurita has varied his explanation on why he retreated. But, it's possible that had he continued that he may have suffered even greater losses in a battle against Halsey's fleet, including the loss of the Yamoto.
You might characterize what Kurita did as timidity, others might say that he lived to fight another day.
"You might characterize what Kurita did as timidity, others might say that he lived to fight another day."
DeleteNo, this is not even debatable. You need to come up to speed on the entire Leyte Gulf battle and the Japanese Sho-Go plan. The entire purpose of the plan was to lure the US cover force away from the invasion so as to allow the other forces to get at the invasion fleet. Also, the Sho-Go plan was a near one-way suicide plan. As Japanese officials put it:
"There would be no sense in saving the fleet at the expense of the loss of the Philippines." (quoted in Wiki)
Kurita had the entire US invasion fleet before him, unprotected, and turned away.
Read up on the battle.
The Battle of Samar was essentially the end of Kurita's career. He lived, but he failed in his objectives and lost most of the remaining power of the Japanese fleet in the battle doing it.
DeleteCNO is right, there's no justifying his decision as "living to fight another day".
Samar was also a lesson in prudence though - Halsey was imprudent, and against the advice of virtually his entire command staff and Nimitz himself, he tore off with all his fleet carriers and fast battleships leaving the escort carriers and amphibs completely exposed to Kurita - a threat he had been repeatedly warned about and knew existed.
For mine, Spruance was the pre-eminent carrier fleet commander of the war, precisely because he tempered his fighting instinct with calm, rational caution.
CNO is right, there's no justifying his decision as "living to fight another day".
DeleteAgreed. If you err towards caution and dont seize offensive opportunities, you just parked your ships in the "fleet in being" anchorage like the Germans did. Between the tech, platforms, doctrine, and risk-averse leadership, I feel like today our Navy is ready to sail to any corner of the globe and defend itself. That wont win a conflict...
Jjabatie
DeleteFor the Germans 'the fleet in being' was more useful as the amount of resources the allies expended on defending Artic convoys in case the Germans sailed and in attempting to sink the Tirpitz was far more than would have been needed if the German navy sailed and was then sunk like Bismarck and Scharnhorst.
The German navy was vastly out numbered and was barely a fleet with only 10 heavy units ranking from the battleships to heavy cruisers.
"For the Germans 'the fleet in being' was more useful as the amount of resources the allies expended"
DeleteAbsolutely not! The point of a military is to destroy the opponent's assets, not make them consume resources. The allies had an infinite amount of resources, for all practical purposes. The Germans needed to use their naval forces to impose operational and strategic defeats on the allies - which they failed to do or even attempt to any great degree.
"if the German navy sailed and was then sunk like Bismarck and Scharnhorst."
The German navy had a tendency to sail - and sink - in piecemeal fashion (there's a lesson for us, today, with our distributed lethality concept!). What they needed to do was sail in concentrated packages FOR WORTHWHILE OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC GOALS.
They also needed to operate in combined fashion with aviation assets.
Solitary commerce raiding was NOT a good use of the Navy. The allies had, again, an infinite supply of merchant ships. Sinking a handful was not going to impact the war.
A quick compilation of the RN naval strength early in the war was:
15 Battleships & battlecruisers, of which only two were post-World War 1.
7 Aircraft carriers?
66 Cruisers, mainly post-World War 1 with some older ships converted for AA duties.
184 Destroyers of all types.
Note that ?half? of the naval strength was dispersed around the world. The effective, local (England/Germany) strength of the RN has roughly comparable to the local German strength.
One can imagine many useful operational and strategic uses for the German fleet ranging from defeating the British Home Fleet to sealing the British ports to prevent incoming convoys from unloading and so on.
The one thing the Kriegsmarine could have done, was to support Sealion. Germany was at its strongest, Britain at it weakest. Yes, it still was a crapshoot, but Germany could not fight a long war.
Delete@CNO EXACTLY!! In so much literature, the German fleet in being has been widely praised...but the reality is that it didnt contribute to their war effort, except for being an administrative burden for the Brits to properly task guard units. The channel dash, again espoused as a bold move, was in fact a massively glorified retreat. It was the last example of German massed fighting power, and it was a self defense move that led to their piecemeal destruction. And while their avocations and situations were quite different, having an aggressive commander like Prien, Kretschmer, or Schepke at the helm of the surface fleet might have produced vastly different results!!
Delete"The one thing the Kriegsmarine could have done, was to support Sealion. Germany was at its strongest, Britain at it weakest. Yes, it still was a crapshoot, but Germany could not fight a long war."
DeleteIt was not even a crap shoot. Germany simply had no way to really land or support and sustain its landing force.
Better to have sortied everything and hope to get a force out the the air gap in the Atlantic and suck the UK into a fight.
"Germany simply had no way to really land or support and sustain its landing force."
DeleteThat's incorrect. See, D-Day in Reverse for a discussion of the concept.
"Absolutely not! The point of a military is to destroy the opponent's assets, not make them consume resources."
DeleteThis is exactly correct, especially for the Germans who were at a material disadvantage. It becomes quite class when you look at it from the opposite perspective. What did the German Navy actually accomplish side from burdening Germany with beurocratic, man power and material burdens. Actually, the point could be made that of the production and maintenance costs invoked upon Britain and Germany, Germany was less well able to waste those resources without obtaining any true military, economic or political objective. In other words, a tie in the North Sea with equal resources devoted to the theater by both sides is a loss for Germany. Had the Germans achieved the same outcome without any capital ships or had any major success with the resources spent, then we could have scored then a victory. In the end, the entire fleet was a parasite to Germany and didn't even really get to go down in a blaze of glory for a worthwhile objective.
Under "What if" scenarios, it would be interesting to see how the battle for the North Sea would have played out with more long range German naval reconnaissance, fighter and bomber aircraft. Given the efficacy of carriers at the time, Denmark would make an excellent carrier with long enough reach.
“Timidity eliminates the possibility of bold success – and devastating failure”
ReplyDelete- respectfully disagree CNO: the timid commander may never know bold success, but it is only a matter of time until the enemy figures out the commander is timid and the enemy hands the weak commander catastrophic failure.
“Bias for action and momentum can make up for less than stellar decisions” - dead German the Marine Corps loves to quote
Timidity, prudence and just plain waiting for HQs to make a decision will become the norm when US DoD achieves data network centric linking nirvana then privates can take direct orders from generals....it will be what we have started to witness in sports with replay. Refs have started to swallow their whistles and just wait for coaches to call for replay. Why whistle on real time when you can go back and look at the video?
ReplyDeleteSame phenomenon will apply for lower ranks, with every move and decision being judged in real time by higher ups, won't the tendency be to do nothing and wait? Interestingly, all we are achieving with all this fancy data collection networking AI crap is going to make humans react slower or not react at all....you know the day will happen after a defeat and we'll hear:"we lost the data link" or "AI stopped working so we stayed in place" as excuses....
Your discussion of Japanese faltering during World War II is interesting. Many of the Japanese were trained in kendo. Among the concepts of kendo is that of Shikai - or the four sicknesses of the mind
ReplyDelete“Surprise, Fear, Doubt, and Confusion are states of being that we must take care to prepare ourselves against.
Surprise (Kyou / 驚) You become surprised by circumstances that you are not expecting, so much so that the movements of your mind and body become disturbed. You become unable to make correct judgements, or take relevant measures. You assume a state of being at a loss for what to do.
Fear (Ku / 懼) You become afraid of your opponent, and your sprit arrives at a standstill. Your limbs begin to tremble, and you lose the ability to move freely.
Doubt (Gi / 疑) You begin to question the movements of your opponent, you lose the ability to make calm judgements, and you become indecisive.
Confusion (Waku /惑) You are filled with hesitation, doubt and indecision. In this situation, it is impossible for you to make fast decisions, or swift movements.”
Of course, it is much easier to talk about, or even recognise these ailments, than it is to prevent or avoid them. But through rigid training, experience, and constant reflection, we can reduce the occurrences of them. With a good understanding of Shikai, we can consider how this not only affects our own Kendo, but how it affects the mind of the opponent. We can begin to ask, how are my movements affecting the mental state of my opponent? How can I apply Seme (pressure) in order to plant the seeds of Shikai in their mind?"https://kendostar.com/blogs/default-blog/shikai-the-four-sicknesses-of-kendo
Sounds like they need to introduce kendo into the USNA as a team sport.
(Don McCollor)...back a few years at work, we had an important series of pilot-plant tests (with all of our good engineers gone). I requested a lady in our group that was working as accountant (she was smart, knew numbers, knew overall what was going on). Raised quite a few eyebrows (including hers) when I said she was in complete charge when I was not there. One thing. Make a decision, and whatever she decided, I would back her up all the way. Just don't stand around dithering...
ReplyDeleteThe other side of timid is reckless. Reckless could win praise from some fellow citizens but hurt the nation.
ReplyDeleteI think that the author assumes even if US commander makes mistake, there is no serious consequence on US as a nation. Foreign nation would not further strike wounded US troops.
In reality, depends on who the foreign is and situation. If a "patriotic" US commander strikes (open first fire) Russian but ended up lose heavily, it could bring disaster to US as a nation because other nations could see US as a paper tiger and they can get protection from Russia, especially if they have economic dispute with Russia.
German dares go ahead with Nordstream 2 under US sanction, you know.
The other side of timid is bold; they only call it reckless if it fails.
DeleteI would bring a different perspective to the Action off Samar. Yes hindsight clear made the case that Kurita was winning and should have pressed the advantage. Situation on the spot on that day... well less clear. Kurita did not really know what he was facing. The cairrers had been misidentified several times as fleet carriers, and he knew other groups were around. He spotted but was unable to engage another taffy group. He had no reports from Nishimura and Shima, so he did not know they had siphoned off Oldendorf surface force. On the other hand Nishimura and Shima were not appearing. Furthermore, Ozawa information that the Carriers were going after him, and that his part in the plan has been a 'success' was not re-transmitted. Of the latter Toyoda was reponsible. Over-complicated plan, no central control and command? But as Admiral Ito is supposed to have said the following April 'Admiral Toyoda wisdom could be questioned'. Okay Toyoda was the same chap who adamantly said to the Emperor that the Americans could not have more than a dozens of a-bombs and could not drop more than 4 before an invasion, so the IGHQ could carry on and await the invasion. Okay, that assumption was quite spot on, but we have no idea how it figured the numbers (good assesment of production/refining of fissile material due to the IJN studies on the matter... rolling the dice... seers?) and of course no mention to the people he was supposed to defend and would have atomized...
ReplyDeleteAnyway Kurita decision was not that bad or timid. He had pressed the engagement early on. According to doctrine he had relied on individual maneuvers during air attack, and that had split his force, and he needed to reform. He had no real report on the location of other US forces. He did not know how long his advantage would have continued. all in all, probably is decision to withdraw, based on his available intelligence, was sound.
Same for George Brinton McLellan at Antietam. His mission was not to obliterate the ANV but to defend Washington. By evening he had just one uncommitted corps, and that is all. Yes he was not as aggressive as historians, wargamers and pundits would have wanted, but certainly Antietam is on a different level than the Peninsula. He was aggressive and, ANV fan be damned... he won the day. Lee plans were thwarted and it was the ANV that had to limp back without any real accomplishment for the invasion. There is a good analysis of Antietam, using recent scholarship, in Dean Essig's None But Heroes.
Best,
Arrigo
You make a well reasoned case for Kurita. However, one can almost always make a case for caution whereas it's boldness that achieves victory. Caution strives for the status quo as opposed to boldness which strives for victory. He who risks nothing, wins nothing.
DeleteSo, yes, a reasoned case can be made for Kurita but history has clearly demonstrated that a bit of boldness would likely have yielded a great victory (wouldn't have changed the outcome of the war, of course).
CNO, being a historian... jobless for now, but still a historian, I am always careful in saying someone was timid. It is much easier to say someone was reckless. I am also a professional wargame designer and have clocked thousands of hours of serious wargames. That helped me to see a difference between the 'player' picture and the actual picture. Basically looking back we have all the information on both sides, and more often than not we know intentions and plans. In the midst of action we do not have that, and we are even under pressure. What it is clear in hindsight is often muddled or even counter-intuitive at the moment. Even with fairly open intelligence simulation I have seen countless cases of 'why you did that?'
DeleteAlso people cracking under non existent threats. There is also the annoying difference between enemy 'intentions' and 'capabilities'. Yes Kurita would have influcted more damage if he stayed in the fight but at what costs? Sooner or later the Carriers would have caught up, and despite some assertions of the contrary Sho-go stressed force preservation. I still maintain that, all being the same, Kurita's decision was sound at the moment. In 2020... with 20/20 hindsight, it is debatable.
But there is also the Little Big Horn example. Custer had an incomplete picture and he reverted to previous experience, doctrine, and what intelligence told him. Everyone condemned him as reckless, but, actually he operated accorded to expectation and analyzed one by one, his command decisions that day were sound. The issue was the extremely large size of the native american 'village' that was something never encountered before and that was completely unreported before the battle. Sound decisions or not, he got a disaster and was forever blamed.
Said that, here is the crux. If we push too much on hindsight and gambling, we have the risk of a reckless generation of commanders that will gamble too much based on too little information and too great expectations. IF we are too cautious, well here is where your observation came into play. Too little daring, and a zero defect mentality that risk, on the long run, to increase losses. Basically it is a no-solution problem. You must find an equilibrium during training and in your doctrine, but you have also to always be aware that individual decisions will always be subjected to scrutiny by informed and not informed people alike.
"much easier to say someone was reckless"
DeleteI disagree for all the same reasons you cited while defending timidity. 'Reckless' is just the label we apply in hindsight to aggressive decisions that didn't turn out well. When that same decision turns out well, we label it 'bold' and 'victorious'.
What you have failed to do as a historian, in this case, is factor in the context of Kurita's decision. At that point in the war, unless he was delusional (a possibility), he knew, as the Japanese command structure knew, that the war was lost. Therefore, the context was that only a bold miracle could appreciably alter the situation. Conserving forces wouldn't do it. The ONLY worthwhile result was to destroy the invasion fleet and then worry about force conservation. Of course, even total destruction of the invasion fleet wouldn't have changed the ultimate outcome of the war. That was already determined on Dec 7. However, the ONLY hope Japan had at that point was a major defeat of the US that might buy Japan more time and might cause the weak-willed and war-weary Americans (the Japanese view which was incorrect and doomed them) to stop and sue for peace. Thus, the situation not only cried out for boldness, it demanded it!
"Basically it is a no-solution problem."
No, it's not. As a historian, you know that no one has ever won a war by being cautious. Wars are won by being bold. It's also true that wars can be lost by being recklessly bold but that's the price of not being timid. Military history clearly points to the solution: boldness is favored over timidity.
The US submarine commanders were institutionally timid at the start of the war. As those commanders were relieved and replaced, the sub commanders, as a group, abandoned timidity and became bold. That boldness, AS A GROUP, led to the defeat of Japan even though some of the bold decisions of individual commanders led to submarine losses. The net result, however, was a war-winning boldness.
Finally, I would also point out what you, as a historian, undoubtedly know, and that is that the Japanese military, both as an institution and as individuals, exhibited a pattern of timidity throughout the war (even Pearl Harbor demonstrated that timidity as Japan opted NOT to launch yet another strike which would have completed the crippling of the US fleet). US pilot reports are replete with observations of Japanese pilots hanging back and refusing to engage. Japanese ship captains demonstrated a pattern of hesitation and timidity. And so on. This, too, should be factored in to our assessment of Kurita's actions. It is clear that he acted timidly. US admirals, in the same situation, would have aggressively pressed the attack, without a doubt. Any US admiral that wouldn't have pressed the attack would have been fired for timidity and this did happen from time to time during the war, as you, again, know.
CNO,
Deletethe 'no-solution problem' refers to how inculcate a right (by definition a subjective measurement) amount of caution and aggressiveness in peacetime. Just centering your doctrine on 'charging is always right' is not a panacea. My experience in wargaming with the military is that too often doctrine is based on 'proof by assertion' and that sometime both idiotic rashness and cowardly timidity are inculcated with serious effect (ie: the enemy will always fold when we attack, but we stop at the first casualty). That combined with peacetime personnel management procedures based on specific patterns that not often link with potential battlefield performance.
I also maintain that there is a difference between boldness and recklessness.
My comment about it is easier to quantify reckless decisions is about the availability of information. It is much easier to criticize someone for being stupid rash than cautious, because enemy strength is, often, more readily apparent than enemy weakness.
There is also a danger to criticize too much. USN submarine commanders at start of WW2 were not getting results because timid doctrine, over-reliance on acoustic findings over direct sight by periscope (linked to the former), personal caution, operational situation (especially at start bases were disappearing, making repair facilities unreliable) and faulty torpedoes. The chain of command focused on reason number 3 for their own benefit especailly because 1, 2 and 5 were their own fault. Now reason number 3. Reason number 3 was also a product of 1 and 2, coupled with the USN personnel management system. I would also say that without issue number 5, and issue number 4 being fixed better commanders would not have improved the overall performance. Actually without the logistic network and a supply of new submarines being assured, boldness would have led to increased losses without strategic rewards.
Said that we can also argue with success that reason 1,2, and 5 were a product of what you have identified as peace-time zero-defects, blame-someone-else peacetime mentality in other posts.
As the Japanese timidity... I am afraid that this is more a product of bad historians than reality. The Second strike at Pearl Harbor has been proven more or less a fallacy and a self-serving claim by Fuchida, and this is coming from Lundstrom, Parshall, Zimm, and Franks. Considering available daylight, flight time, and weather conditions it was basically impossible to launch. US Pilots reports are not a really reliable source (as plenty of pilots' reports). If an accusation could be leveled at IJN aircrew especially in 1941-42 was to be too eager to press on, notwithstanding losses. There is also an undercurrent of racism and chest-beating in earlier USN works and histories that has not yet been completely gotten over. There is a lot of 'proof by assertion' that has not yet been fully examined. It is also worth to note that, despite supposedly increased training, USN air to surface hit ratios decreased during the war instead of increasing.
End part 1...
Start part 2...
DeleteOne thing people should be careful with the use of history is that history it is open to revision, debate, and discussion, and that often the final result is as reliable as the worst reliable source used.
As Kurita in particular, I am afraid that he is been placed in the 'strategic lieutenant' shoes, something that I maintain is a break down of proper chain of command rather than a feature (despite the current popularity of the concept). It was not his job to make such a choice. It should have been clearly explained in his orders, and Combined Fleet should have maintained control over the operation. It is more of an issue in Combined Fleet (both under Yamamoto and Toyoda) rather than an institutional problem. Now for the current discussion this is a point worth exploring, mission orders, mission goal, and command and control.
'Any US admiral that wouldn't have pressed the attack would have been fired for timidity and this did happen from time to time during the war, as you, again, know.'
None of us is either King or Nimitz. So this is an empty statement. No US admiral was in Kurita's shoes, so we do not known. As the firing of commanders was and still is concerned... more often had to do with service politics, personalities, connections, and broader politics rather than battlefield performance.
I think my specific criticism is probably hiding the fact that I broadly agree with the assessment that boldness should be 'trained in' but I am afraid that making it a blanket concept, could lead to unintended consequences. It made me thinking about the SSBN commander (himself a typical Rickover's product) in Tom Clancy 'The Sum of All Fears' that was showing off aggressiveness to impress Admiral Mancuso to get career points.
I am writing too much if I have to split a reply in two!
Best,
Arrigo
It would appear that we're going to disagree about Kurita so I'll leave it at that. You've offered an alternate view for readers to consider and I'm happy with that so, well done and thanks for contributing.
DeleteYou also raise the issue of how to train for boldness that doesn't become institutional recklessness. I maintain that's fairly easy to do and we do it with other occupations, all the time. For example, we train firefighters to enter burning buildings IF THE BENEFITS OUTWEIGHT THE RISKS IN THEIR JUDGEMENT. We train doctors to treat patients aggressively, IF THE BENEFITS OUTWEIGHT THE RISKS IN THEIR JUDGEMENT. Athletes are trained to be aggressive, IF THE BENEFITS OUTWEIGHT THE RISKS IN THEIR JUDGEMENT. And so on.
The key is judgement and good judgement comes from practicing, over and over. A closely related key is encouraging mistakes (or, at least, not punishing mistakes). In our current military environment, we rarely train (and never realistically) and we've implemented a zero-defect, zero-mistake culture. We have no hope of developing properly aggressive warriors.
That said, the way to develop properly aggressive warriors is quite clear and fairly easy to implement. We just don't want to do it. That will change when our next war comes along - as it did in WWII.