While ComNavOps view is obviously correct, most military
observers continue to cling to the misguided belief that forward presence
equates to deterrence.
The Stimson Center (non-partisan US policy think tank) has
now come out with an analysis showing that forward presence has little or no
deterrent effect (2) – exactly as ComNavOps has long stated. They analyzed 100 events since the end of the
Cold War and found that the number of forces forward deployed in a trouble spot
had no deterrent effect but that the movement of new forces into the region
did.
As Breaking Defense website sums up,
The
Stimson Center recently completed an analysis of more than 100 events since the
end of the Cold War, when the US used the armed forces to coerce another
country without resorting to actual war. For example: US leaders have sent
aircraft carriers into the Persian Gulf to convince Iran to change its
behavior, and held frequent military exercises with South Korea to demonstrate
US resolve to the North. One key finding of the Stimson research is that,
during a crisis, moving new forces into the region does significantly increase
the chance that an adversary will back down. But the number of troops,
aircraft, and ships already in the region prior to a crisis had no impact on
the outcome.
The
statistics show that permanent deployments are seen by our adversaries as part
of the woodwork – factors that can be discounted when judging America’s
seriousness. What caught the attention of the decision-makers the U.S. was
trying to coerce was the demonstration of resolve when additional American
forces are put at risk. Moreover, it was the fact of moving forces — not the
types of forces moved –that mattered. (1)
For example, the Stimson analysis shows exactly what
ComNavOps has noted about Russia’s behavior:
…
the temporary deployment of US ground and land-based air forces to Eastern
Europe in recent years seems to have put Russia’s threats to move beyond
Ukraine on hold, at least temporarily, whereas the 30,000 troops based
primarily in Germany did not seem to have been noticed. (1)
Stimson also noted that firepower trumps other forms of
coercion.
Unlike
other forms of escalation – such as economic sanctions, which may be
interpreted as signs of weakness — adding firepower is what got the attention
of potential adversaries. (1)
This finding simply reflects basic human behavior. Our enemies are enemies because they are
evil, corrupt, dictatorial bullies. They
are not rational human beings. They
function at an animal level of stimulus and response. They display classic playground bully
behavior that every school kid understands but which our government leaders on
both sides of the aisle have forgotten.
Bullies respect and respond to physical pain which means firepower AND
THE WILLINGNESS TO USE IT. So, yes,
economic sanctions and the like are seen as weakness, not strength. Only the threat of physical harm is effective
and that can only be effective if it is occasionally (or regularly!) applied.
To be fair, the article notes that forward deployments may
serve purposes other than deterrence.
Permanent
troop deployments overseas do serve many purposes. They seem to reassure allies
about our security commitment, and that has value. (1)
An example of forward presence that serves a larger,
positive purpose that is divorced from deterrence would be Guam. Assuming we’re willing to seriously defend it
- and there’s currently no evidence that we are – the base serves as a forward
staging area rather than as a deterrent.
As a forward staging area it has value and is worth maintaining even
though it clearly has no deterrent value.
Consider the Stimson findings in light of ComNavOps’ calls
for ending deployments and removing our military from Europe, among other
similar recommendations. It is clear
that our forward presence accomplishes nothing as far as deterrence is
concerned. We need to bring our forces
home and spend our time training, maintaining, and executing missions. Some of those missions may well be exactly
the kind of rapid movements into a trouble spot that the Stimson analysis
suggests actually produces positive results.
We also need to begin applying force on a more regular and
consistent basis so that force movements are treated as threats to be taken
seriously rather than just empty posturing.
Note: The Stimson
analysis is available as a book length treatise and I have not obtained it or
read it. I’ve only seen the Breaking
Defense website article on it. Thus,
I’ve been unable to analyze the analysis.
(1)Breaking Defense website, “Fast
Deployments Deter Better Than Bases: Stimson ”, Barry Blechman,
7-Aug-2020,
https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/fast-deployments-deter-better-than-bases-stimson/?_ga=2.29636351.1577885854.1596477103-1757035925.1542652267
(2)”Military
Coercion and US Foreign Policy”, co-edited by Melanie Sisson, James
Siebens, and Barry Blechman, ISBN 9780367459963, Published May 13, 2020 by
Routledge
I don't think it is quite as black and white as you said.
ReplyDelete2 examples:
Forward presence in Europe ie in West Germany I think helped stop the Soviet block moving westwards.
The decision by the UK to remove it's Antarctic patrol ship gave the Argentinians the impression we did not have the will to keep the Falklands.
In both cases it is our perceived resolve by our potential enemy we would fight ( or not) that was important.
"I don't think it is quite as black and white as you said."
DeleteWithout knowing the inner thought process of the actors involved, it's impossible to say with 100% certainty who was, or was not, deterred. Therefore, I look at the overall pattern and when I do, I see Iran, China, Russia, and NKorea absolutely unfazed for our forward presence. That's pretty overwhelming evidence.
Can there be some example, somewhere in history, where forward presence proved effective? Sure, but isolated examples don't disprove the overall premise.
To address your specific examples, I don't think our presence in WGermany deterred the Soviets at all. The post-Soviet evidence strongly suggests that they never had any plans or desire to invade the rest of Europe unless they felt imminently threatened. So, they were not deterred, they just had no desire.
Regarding the UK and Argentina, if a single Antarctic patrol ship was what was deterring an entire country from seizing the Falklands, the UK needs to build more of those patrol ships because they must have been AWESOME! Build some extra and sell one to the US so that we can use it to deter China!
Perceived resolve is completely valid and it is also completely different from forward presence. The US has a great deal of forward presence, right now, but no resolve.
Neither of your examples is persuasive especially in the face of the overwhelming evidence of Iran, China, Russia, and NK not being deterred by our presence.
"Therefore, I look at the overall pattern and when I do, I see Iran, China, Russia, and NKorea absolutely unfazed for our forward presence. "
DeleteChina hasn't invaded Taiwan. NK hasn't re-invaded South Korea. Russia has only sent "little green men" into its neighbors (for the most part).
You seem to expect forward presence to be a magical cure-all that prevents all aggression. It's clearly not. But to say these aggressive nations are "unfazed" by our forward presence exceeds the available evidence. At best, they have taken our presence into account and adjusted their actions accordingly. But, if true, this means our presence has had an effect.
I don't have access to the report, and don't plan on spending $40, so I can't comment on the actual contents.
"China hasn't invaded Taiwan."
DeleteWow, that's some first class delusional thinking, there!
China has seized our EP-3, seized our UUV, seized illegal territory, built illegal islands, ignored UNCLOS rulings, fouled Navy ship operations, engaged in wholesale cyber attacks on us, engaged in massive intellectual property theft, ordered us out of the South China Sea, seized the entire South China Sea in a fait accompli, declared illegal EEZs and ADIZs, and … well, I can go on listing this stuff all day but, yeah, I'd call that unfazed by our presence. They haven't invaded Taiwan because they don't yet have the capability to do so, not because we sail a few ships around the area.
Russia has invaded and forcibly seized Crimea, is conducting a proxy invasion and annexation of Ukraine, has violated various arms control treaties, routinely harasses our military forces in an unsafe manner, has developed new nuclear weapons, and … Yeah, I'd say they're unfazed by our presence.
Iran has mined international ships, seized ships, exports terrorism, shot down US drones, attacked US bases, developed nuclear materials in violation of treaty, and … Yeah, I'd say they're unfazed by our presence.
NKorea has sunk SK ships, conducted penetrations of SK territory, launched dozens of missiles into international waters and Japanese territorial waters, continues to develop ballistic missiles, and … Yeah, I'd say they're unfazed by our presence.
Some things are debatable but forward presence being useless as a deterrent really isn't one of them.
So apparently you do expect forward presence to be the magical cure-all for any and all aggression, and if it isn't, it's "useless".
DeleteThat's naive. It's a just tool in the toolbox.
"So apparently you do expect forward presence to be the magical cure-all for any and all aggression, and if it isn't, it's "useless". "
Delete??????? Huh? Did you read the post? My position is the exact opposite - that forward presence has NO deterrent effect. You need to reread the post and comments. You're confused.
I read the post. That's exactly what you're saying. You listed litany of minor aggressive actions around the world as your justification to declare forward presence entirely "useless".
DeleteBut these types of minor actions are exactly what you would expect from countries that WERE deterred from taking major action. They will look for cracks, and creases and push low-level aggression around the edges.
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/art4.html#:~:text=Deterrence%20by%20denial%20means%20persuading,to%20achieve%20his%20operational%20objectives.
"Deterrence by denial means persuading the enemy not to attack by convincing him that his attack will be defeated - that is, that he will not be able to achieve his operational objectives."
Expecting 30,000 troops in Germany to deter Russia, when they're a thousand miles and several countries away from Ukraine, seems a bit ridiculous in my opinion.
"But these types of minor actions are exactly what you would expect from countries that WERE deterred from taking major action."
DeleteYou consider annexing countries, invading countries, seizing US military assets, seizing disputed territory, trespassing into other country's territorial waters, shooting down US military assets, etc. to be "minor action"????!! Wow, I … wow.
Basically, you're saying that because some country didn't launch a global war, they were deterred????? Wow.
I'm going to leave this one and move on!
Wow!
Yes, I consider those minor compared to a shooting war between nuclear powers. Really this kind of thing, and worse, happened all the time during the Cold War.
DeleteThis really isn't that hard to understand.
DETERRENCE ISN'T BINARY.
Someone may be deterred from starting a major war, or triggering NATO Article 1, but not deterred from grabbing an uninhabited, disputed island, or sending little green men into a neighboring country, or even regular troops into a non-aligned neighbor that used to be under their sphere of control.
And for forward presence to deter, it has to be credible enough to deny the enemy their goals. 30,000 troops in German obviously wasn't credible enough to deter Russia from invading a neutral country over a thousand miles away. A carrier battle group based in Japan, that has to cover the entire Pacific, obviously isn't credible to deter constant, low-level aggression in the SCS, also over a thousand miles away.
That's like asking beat cops in Tampa to deter crime in Philly, and being shocked when they don't.
Off topic but I thought you'd want to hear about it. Military.com is reporting that the Navy suspects arson in the Bonhomme Richard fire.
ReplyDeleteIf forward deployments accomplish anything, they may shore up relations with allies. It's easier to say you can count on us when you can see us.
ReplyDeleteOf course, maybe we got them depending on us too much. When we talk of pulling troops out of Europe, all of a sudden we are "destroying NATO." I think we should have done that long ago, and forced our "allies" to do more to defend themselves. Right now may not be the optimum time to withdraw, with Putin and the Russians making warlike noises occasionally.
My experience working with NATO was that we always had to sort of walk around on eggshells to keep from offending someone. And that was harder to do than it should have been, because the egos we were dealing with were pretty outlandish.
Since it is the apparent escalation of new forces into a region that ultimately serves as deterrent, is it not then the case that it's not so much that forward basing is intrinsically not a deterrent, but rather that the forwatd based forces are insufficient in size to act as a timely deterrent by themselves.
ReplyDeleteClearly you can't forward base larfe forces everywhere, but in one or two locations they still then might be sufficient to deter aggressors,if stationed in sufficient strength.
Clearly, there is not enough value in 'tripwire forces then.
Still though, presumably even small forwarx deployed units generate useful infrastructure that creates transfer points that in turn allow for more rapid build up of large forces where required?
You're conflating multiple issues.
DeleteDeterrence - There is zero evidence that forward presence produces deterrence.
Staging - This is a potentially useful function of a forward base but that is not necessarily the same as forward presence. Guam, for example, is a forward base but is not geographically a forward presence except in the most overarching view since it is a thousand miles from the first island chain area of operations.
"but in one or two locations they still then might be sufficient to deter aggressors,if stationed in sufficient strength."
You just read the post, right? The evidence pretty clearly contradicts your statement. If you still believe it to be true then you fall into the same category as most of our political and military leaders who believe it despite the evidence to the contrary. That would be a shame.
Forward presence isnt a deterrent, because its not realistic to maintain enough conventional forces somewhere to do so. These forces would have to be large/capable enough to not only be surviveable on day one, but have the combat power to go on the offensive on day two. For instance, having four complete CVBGs homeported in Japan would be a reasonable deterrent. Due to geography and the potential modern version of Pearl Harbor, that's neither the best example, nor a good idea, but you get the concept. If a forward force doesnt have the ability to not only blunt an enemys initial offensive, but even potentially roll it back on its own, its not a deterrent.
ReplyDeleteWhen additional forces are sent somewhere, thats a statement of political intent. That works with lesser countries such as Iran, who might talk a big game, knows the realities of taking on actual combat with the US. But open war with a peer nation is different, and any forward forces are just additional speed bumps that will be planned for at the beginning, leaving us to nearly start from scratch in theatre on day two...
"Forward presence isnt a deterrent,"
DeleteWhich leads to the questions I keep asking: why is the Navy conducting endless forward deployments? Why do we have troops in Europe? Why are we sailing in the South China Sea? Why do we have forces in the Middle East?
The reason we still have forward deployed forces is because nobody wants to look weak. Leaving looks weak. We stay because it's easier for the decision makers to keep doing the same thing. Change is risky.
DeleteOne could make an argument based on this study that it's not the presence of forward deployed forces that matter, it's CHANGES in those forces. Adding forces gave some adversaries pause. Removing forces might embolden adversaries.
Don't get me wrong - I completely agree with you. We need to end these forward deployments and focus on training/maintenance/readiness. But how we do this, in a way that doesn't embolden adversaries, matters.
"CHANGES ... Removing forces might embolden adversaries."
DeleteThat's a perfectly logical conclusion that might even be valid. One way to remove forces is to do so gradually (10% per year for 10 years, for example). Another approach would be to remove forces but publicize and conduct rapid return/reinforcement exercises (REFORGER, for example).
Good comment.
The $1000 question!! To be fair, forward deployments, troops in Europe, PG presence and SCS appearances all have different histories and future implications that have to be looked at individually. Some could be ended tomorrow with minimal impact, others not so much. Each has its own military and political implications that require their own discussion.
DeleteThe troops in Europe issue is easiest for me. Bring em home!! Russia isnt that much of a threat. It wasnt even in the Soviet years in retrospect. The NATO nations need to, and can handle their own affairs...
The PG issue, and Iran is somthing that other local nations should be policing, with EU/Nato presence as well. With the recent pro-Iranian/anti-American sentiment in the UN, this is another place to walk away from. We arent reliant on Arab oil anymore. So short of American ships being targeted in the Gulf, we need not be there. If we ever have to return, itd be to do a "Praying Mantis II", but 100-fold so they wouldnt be a threat again for at least a generation.
Now, the SCS is obviously somthing more serious. But, is forward basing in Japan wise? And while cost and maintenance demands are often cited, is it truly saving anything? Doesn't it risk the Pearl Harbor scenario? What does it gain besides a show of support for Taiwan, and even then, not being sufficiently powerful to be a true deterrent, just risks those units needlessly. Clearly China is the future threat, and reorienting sizeable numbers from other theatres and having a huge surge potential from the west coast and Hawaii is a better answer. Shifting one or more CVBGs to Pacflt, and pulling the Reagan back to Pearl would show our focus and intent, while minimizing DayOne risk.
Changing the topic a bit. this is an article in todays papers that sums up Australia's attitude to the CCP and China. https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/the-china-strategy-australia-prepared-to-play-the-long-game-20200828-p55qbe.html.
ReplyDeletePS The Chinese Deputy Ambassador said (I saw it on the TV news) Australia is like Brutus and China is like Julius Caesar and we have stabbed China with our calls for an investigation into Sars-Cov-2 origins.
From the article;
"In truth, China doesn't care about the United States in the sense that it knows it can never control its actions as a major power. But Beijing wants to make an example of Australia to send a message to other middle powers thinking about countering its growing assertiveness. Australia was the first to ban Chinese telecom giant Huawei from next-generation networks, first to enact foreign interference laws and ahead of the curve on blocking foreign investment in critical national infrastructure."
I think that a lot depends on what you do with that presence. If they just sit there, that's not going to deter anyone. If the presence is aggressive, then that has more a deterrent effect. The enemy has to know that not only can you wipe them out, you actually might do it. So, constantly infringe their territory, plant surveillance devices everywhere (and let some be found), aggressively use social media etc to undermine their leadership, interfere with elections publicly (where they have them), provoke incidents and make sure you win.
ReplyDeleteChina, Iran, North Korea etc aren't afraid of the USA because they don't think the USA has any balls. Where are the air strikes on Iranian nuclear reactors? Where are the mines in North Korean harbours and bombs on rail links to China? Where are the US Marines to enforce the UN rejection of Chinese claims in the Spratly Islands? What do these guys have to do before the USA reacts? Take a dump on the Resolute desk during a live Presidential address?
When the Roman Republic conducted diplomacy they did not posture.
ReplyDeleteThe Republic did not even have standing army per say; but when they delivered an ultimatum it was definitive. The Legions would not show up tomorrow, they might not even be 'recruited' until the better part of a year had passed.
But when Rome decided to move, her army moved with horrifying purpose. The Legions would absolutely wreck everything in their path, every last surviving enemy was put to the sword or enslaved, everything of value tallied then carried off, and they would salt the earth.
You did not screw around with the Romans.
GAB
As the Stimson Center found, changes in the forward presence had meaningful impacts, but permanent basing was generally of little use. Exercises like Defender 2020 and concepts like Mattis' Dynamic Force Employment seem tailor made to threaten "changes" without necessarily leading to permanency.
ReplyDeleteThat said, as the Stimson Center found, US forward presence can be beneficial to interoperability with allies and as a re-assurance. The question is what is the right mixture of forces to serve THAT purpose. I don't think we have it right right now.
I think a big factor is whether the presence is sufficient to indicate that we mean business. 30,000 troops in Germany would not be enough to stop the Russians if they invaded. They would really be no more than a trip wire. Every REFORGER exercise reiterated painfully that whatever the numbers, they didn't have enough beans or bullets to hang on very long, and any supplies from the USA would probably take too long to get there to do any good. I thought fewer people with more prepositioned supplies made more sense.
ReplyDeleteI would pull back from Western Europe, Japan, and Okinawa (and probably South Korea) and consolidate forces on soil that we control that is close enough to make a difference. In the Pacific, Guam is obvious, but make it clear that we can and will defend it. Europe is a bit more difficult, since there is no US soil there, but keep a presence somewhere like Rota, Naples, Holy Loch, or Faslane, and deploy from there to the Med and northern Europe. In the Indian Ocean, our safest base would be Diego Garcia, although that is a bit far from the Gulf.
I propose pulling back permanent presence, but having frequent and significant forward deployments. We won't leave US troops there as sitting ducks, but we will be able to get a bunch there in a hurry if you get uppity, and we will prove that with regular deployments of a size sufficient to worry you. I'd have a CVBG (and remember, my idea of a CVBG is a Nimitz and a Kitty Hawk) and an ARG (with my idea of an enlarged MEU--infantry, tanks, artillery, amphibious armor, and air) in or around the South China Sea all the time, with another of each and a SAG/HUK group (my battlecarrier and an ASW helo carrier) and a significant MPPF in Guam or closer to back them up. China had a cow when we put two carriers into the SCS. We change the regional calculus significantly if we make that the default position going forward.
I get that we aren't going to assault the Chinese mainland with a MEU. But with a two-carrier CVBG in the area, China would have a difficult time mounting an offensive against anywhere in the first island chain except possibly Taiwan, and they would need a much larger phib lift capacity than they currently have (30-35,000) to mount a credible offensive against Taiwan.
To be a credible presence force, that CVBG and ARG can't just steam around as "presence" assets. They have to do a lot more than useless FONOPS operations. Nothing overtly threatening, but enough to make it clear that we are going to be there, and you are going to have to deal with us. Engage actively with the allied forces in the area--Japan, India, Australia, and (we would hope) Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea, and possibly even Taiwan. ComNavOps, you are big on training rather than deployments. I'm talking about deployments as being intense training periods, not just sailing to and fro.
There would be some port visits--Subic, Sepanggar, Jakarta, Singapore, Cam Ranh, and even Kaohsiung. Kaohsiung raises some interesting questions. If China denies our visiting Hong Kong, we just do Kaohsiung instead. Since we haven't been there since 1979 we would have to break it in slowly. Send a couple of ships first, then start doing one here, two there, and build it up.
I think we need to make nations around the first island chain our allies, and then build up interoperability and re-assurance. China openly states that taking over the first island chain--and potentially the second--is their objective. Make it clear in no uncertain terms that preventing precisely that is our objective. Make it equally clear that we have no designs on mainland China, but short of that we will defend our interests and help defend our allies in the region. There have been some rumblings in the press that Australia is doubting our resolve to help them against China. If things are truly reaching that point, then we need a major restatement of resolve in the region.
What this suggests to me is that when we have a region of concern, the more sensible strategy, rather than forward deployment in the region, is to keep significant forces close to the region, where they can be deployed to the region in a hurry as a show of force as needed. A rule might be to try to keep them at the closest point of USA-controlled soil.
ReplyDeleteIn WestPac this would mean pulling back from Japan and Okinawa (and probably South Korea) to Guam, with frequent forward deployments from there. In the Indian Ocean, I would suppose we could do something similar by calling Diego Garcia USA soil. That's a bit far from the Gulf, but still close enough to get there fairly quickly if needed. There's no real USA soil in Europe, but number one, Russia is not really the threat to invade that it once was, and number two, we could keep forces far enough away from any Russian front in places like Naples or Rota or somewhere in the UK, and still get them there pretty quickly.
I read an interesting analysis of Russia's amphibious CONOPS the other day (wish I could remember where). Anyway, the author's conclusion is that Russia's amphibious concept is derived from their situation as a land-based power. In that context, the role of amphibs is to reinforce the army's flanks. Tis would suggest that sea control of the Mediterranean and North Seas would put a serious damper on their amphib plans. By the way, whatever happened to the Sixth Fleet? It seems a very tiny sliver of what it used to be, as exposed by incidents such as Benghazi.
This proposed approach is kind of what the Brits did in the "Pax Britannia" era. They didn't have large standing troop garrisons overseas, but the RN dominated the seas and could--and did--make a statement whenever and wherever needed.
I do think forming alliances around the first island chain and creating a "no can go" region for China is important going forward. I think China's ambitions get seriously dented if they can't take over and dominate the cain. The key is probably Indonesia. With Indonesia on our side, China really has no way to import oil from the Mideast. Malaysia is almost as important to that objective. And of course, India and Australia and Japan, but we are already working on alliances there.
Implementing this first island chain strategy would require frequent and significant deployments to the area. From Guam, that's not an overbearing prospect.
ComNavOps, you probably will disagree, but I think what this approach does is to identify a mission for amphibious forces.
The real question for a first island chain strategy is whether Taiwan is a hill that we are wiling to fight for, and how hard? I think for now we want to create the impression that it is, but a final decision would require intel data that I don't have.