Here is the relevant portion of ‘W’s comment:
It
feels like the commander [ed.) the Commandant] is setting the Corps up for
disbandment or incorporation into the Army, "naval infantry" and
would become 1 div of specialized infantry like airborne or mountain. Its a sad
way to go, I think it started with the MAGTF. (1)
According to Wikipedia,
The
MAGTF was formalized by the publishing of Marine Corps Order 3120.3 in December
1963 "The Marine Corps in the National Defense, MCDP 1-0". (2)
The MAGTF took the Marines from a specialized force
(amphibious operations) and attempted to turn them into an all-purpose, do
everything, force. It’s not hard to
imagine that the genesis of the concept was budget driven with the idea being
that the more versatile the Corps, the more it would be called on and,
therefore, the more it would be funded.
Unfortunately, the lack of focus led to the Marines being
employed in all manner of situations for which they were not specialized. They became just another army unit.
There was also an enormous opportunity cost associated with
generalization. The generalization and
loss of focus on the core amphibious mission cost the Marines their
institutional knowledge about amphibious assaults as they embarked on a decades
long turn towards purely land warfare.
In recent years, Marine generals have proudly announced that the Marines
are taking the first steps towards relearning amphibious assault.
Relearning?!!!? It
was your core mission. How could you
have lost it? This is a sad commentary
on Marine Corps leadership over the last couple of decades.
The loss of focus also meant that the technology, doctrine,
and tactics of amphibious assault languished or was lost. We wound up with doctrine calling for 25-50+
mile stand off assaults coupled with AAV/ACV landing craft that only had an
effective range of a few miles – a mismatch of colossal proportions, to say the
least. By not maintaining focus on the
core mission, the mission atrophied and was lost.
MAGTF also began the myopic focus on the aviation side of
the Corps to the great detriment of the ground side. Huge, questionable investments were made in
the MV-22 and the F-35 with little or no supporting doctrinal or operational underpinning. Again, it was a budget grab, pure and simple
– an attempt to be all things in all situations instead being proudly
specialized.
The Marines were once something special and respected. Now, they’re just a poor, small copy of the
Air Force and Army. MAGTF destroyed the
Marine Corps.
(1)Navy Matters blog, “Littoral Regiment Combat Team”,
22-Jun-2020, reader comment by Anonymous (‘W’), June 22, 2020
at 11:09 AM
https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2020/06/littoral-regiment-combat-team.html?showComment=1592849365049#c1165100654351769748
(2)Wikipedia, “Marine Air-Ground Task Force”, retrieved 23-Jun-2020,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_Air-Ground_Task_Force
MAGTF is what makes Amphibious operations possible and the concept of adding air and fires to support a ground force is solid. MEU to MEF scalability makes the concept tailorable for different scenarios.
ReplyDeleteFor example, a MEU Battalion with an artillery battery for indirect fire support, a Tank Platoon for direct fire support, UAV section for reconnaissance, Amphibious track company for transportation, and the composite Squadron for air lift is much more capable of conducting amphibious operations than a Battalion with a company of Amphibious tractors.
If the idea was so bad, no one would copy it but
Russians are copying MEUs with Composite Battalions and Chinese are organizing their Brigades around the same concept.
The needed fix is to shrink “A” to make it a “MaGTF” because aviation is a limiting factor. Aviation is expensive, weather limited, limited availability (maintenance and time in station), and its high value does not allow amphibs to get close enough to the beach to launch swimmers.
MAGTF concept is not dead; if just requires some scaling back of aviation and some additional Navy fire support like placing 8” guns back on amphibs and it is back!
Please be sure you understood the central premise of the post. It sounds like maybe you didn't. I have no problem with a balanced MEU. The problem I have is the direction that the formation of the MAGTF took the Marines. It took them away from a specialized sea based force and toward a run of the mill, generic, land army group. It also took them away from a focused assault force and toward a third air force.
DeleteI don't disagree with you one bit about a balanced force. The problem is the mindset that the MAGTF reflects which is 'we'll do everything so that we can get more funding - and we'll give up our identity and core mission to do it'.
By the way, do you see where the MAGTF has taken us? The MAGTF now has no naval gun support, no tanks, and no artillery. How's that balance looking? The Marines have become very light infantry and a third air force, all in pursuit of more budget - which is what the MAGTF began and, hence, the point of the post.
The post is not saying that a balanced force is bad - of course it isn't! It's saying that the mindset behind the MAGTF has taken us down a bad path along which the Corps sold its soul in pursuit of budget.
"If the idea was so bad, no one would copy it but "
They're copying what we once were, not what we are now.
"MAGTF is what makes Amphibious operations possible"
DeleteNo. MAGTF is a land combat force construct. What's needed to make amphibious operations possible is a focus on moving the force ashore from ships (connectors, primarily) and assembling a force optimized for amphibious assaults, not sustained land combat. Amphibious assaults require a different equipment set and different doctrine than land combat.
The aviation element exists to support the amphibious operations and the ground element not act as a stand alone air force. To that end, the aviation element would be better served by operating A-10s as opposed to F-18s and F-35s.
You may argue about what MAGTF is, but what it clearly is not is an amphibious assault concept. As you suggest, we have no reliable connectors from 25-50 miles offshore.
DeleteThe problem with A-10s for the Marines is that you can't operate them off carriers. What Marines really need is a "Marine A-10" that can operate off carriers and that can go ashore with them and operate off short and/or unprepared airstrips. The closest thing to that right now is probably the Harrier. The Marines would probably have been better served to have participated in the second generation Harrier project that got cancelled to pursue the F-35. Come to think of it, the Air Force and Navy would probably have been better served to sever the Marines from the F-35.
But the main thing the Marines need is to refocus. And in terms of equipment, ship-to-shore connectors are probably more in need of upgrading than any aircraft.
Of course I don't mean the actual A-10! I mean a ground support aircraft with many of the characteristics of the A-10. And, that's NOT a Harrier past, present, or future. A Harrier has none of the A-10 characteristics.
DeleteThe desirable A-10 characteristics include two separated engines, heavy cockpit armor, large weapons capacity, great loiter time, good ground sensors, good low speed handling (maybe the Harrier has that, I don't know), redundant flight controls, great inherent lift to compensate for lost flight surfaces, etc. Does any of that sound like a Harrier, no matter how it's upgraded?
Sorry, but that starts to sound like how the Navy drives up the cost of everything. Add this, add that. The A-10 lacks one thing the Marines need. You can't fly it off a carrier. The A-10 was designed without that constraint, and is pretty close to the perfect CAS airplane. But add that constraint and it gets complicated. Maybe you could beef up the undercarriage and add a tailhook and fly it off a carrier, but the 55-foot wingspan means you’d pretty much need an empty flight deck to take one off or land it. And the placement of the engines means that you can’t really fold the wings, so stowage would be a major issue. Maybe you could make enough modifications to make it work, but I don’t know if you would end up with the same capability.
DeleteWithout carrier capability, they are limited to operating within the tactical radius of a suitable airfield, as extended by tankers. The loiter time requirement really comes from its CONOPS. It flies to an area, hangs around, and waits for calls for fire. An aircraft that could be kept closer to the front, and could pop up on demand, wouldn’t need the same loiter requirement.
I didn’t mean to imply that the Harrier was equivalent to an A-10, although there are many observers who say it is the second-best CAS aircraft today. That’s debatable. But I don’t think my main point is debatable—it’s closer to what the Marines need than the F-35. You really couldn’t build a Harrier with twin engines, because if either one fails the airplane would become unbalanced and basically unflyable in takeoff or landing mode.
A "Marine A-10" must be carrier-capable. It would be nice to be able to operate off short or unprepared airstrips so Marines can take it ashore with them early in an assault. It needs to be tough and durable and easily maintained in the field, and it needs to carry as big a weapons load as possible. It doesn't need a huge amount of loiter time if it can be close by and can pop up when there is a threat. Hmm, except for the short field, that sounds a lot like an A-4.
The A-4 was probably the closest thing to a “Marine A-10.” It was the best CAS aircraft of my era, until the A-10 came along. It was single-engine, but it was tough, agile, cheap, easy to maintain in the field, and could carry a whole bunch of weapons for its size.
The closest thing I see to a modern A-4 is the SAAB Gripen. Like the A-4 it is small, tough, cheap to build and operate, easily maintained, handles well low and slow, and can carry a big weapons load for its size. Unlike the A-4, it is capable of Mach 2 and can operate off unimproved strips or off a quarter mile paved strip. SAAB claims that they can build a navalized version with a tail hook, and that it could take off with a full load off a catapult or even over a ski jump. I’d have to see that to believe it, but if it is all true then that sounds like an option for Marines to consider.
Marines have always been niche players. Suppose Marine air decides to make CAS their niche. They don’t really need air superiority. Carrier air can cover that until they solidify their beachhead, and then they can pass it off to Army and AF to push inland. AF doesn’t really like CAS, and has tried repeatedly to get rid of their A-10s. Suppose AF abandons CAS, and the Marines get a “Marine A-10” and become very adept at CAS. I could see a huge role for them there. Of course, that kind of reinforces the “second Army” idea, and Marines would have to fight that, but Navy would support them, and AF doesn’t want Army get fixed wing jets, so the politics would probably work.
What gives the Corps their uniqueness is their ability to combine arms—infantry, artillery, tanks, amphib armor, and air—at a relatively small and mobile unit level, supported by NGFS and air superiority from the sea. They can bring a huge amount of firepower to bear on an objective in a hurry. If they nail CAS, and get back to amphib ops, they’d be a very useful force with a some very unique capabilities.
"that starts to sound like how the Navy drives up the cost of everything. Add this, add that."
DeleteNo, that's how you drive costs down, by having a focused set of requirements for a single task. You drive the cost up by adding unnecessary equipment and functions.
As a reference point, Wiki lists the unit cost of an A-10 as $18M or $46M 'today' (whatever date 'today' was). With modern computerized construction techniques, we should be able to build an A-10-ish for $50M or so - far cheaper than a Hornet or F-35!
"The A-4 was probably the closest thing to a “Marine A-10.”
I think the Skyraider has been the closest thing to an A-10 in terms of ruggedness, reliability, maintainability, weapons load, carrier compatibility, and low speed handling.
"the 55-foot wingspan"
Didn't I just say that I'm not talking about an exact duplicate of the A-10? As far as wingspan, the wings would fold as they do for every navy aircraft.
"55-foot wingspan means you’d pretty much need an empty flight deck to take one off or land it."
?????? You recall that we routinely launch and land E-2 Hawkeyes with 80 ft wingspans, right?
"the placement of the engines means that you can’t really fold the wings,"
Again, not talking about an exact duplicate of an A-10. That aside, have you looked at an overhead view of an A-10? The wings could easily fold up anywhere from around 5 ft out from the fuselage and out to the end of the wing. Check out the frontal view and you can easily see where a wingfold can go - just about anywhere!
Make no mistake, if the A-10 were truly carrier capable, that's the way I would go. But I'm just not sure it is.
Delete"two separated engines, heavy cockpit armor, large weapons capacity, great loiter time, good ground sensors, good low speed handling (maybe the Harrier has that, I don't know), redundant flight controls, great inherent lift to compensate for lost flight surfaces, etc."
"that starts to sound like how the Navy drives up the cost of everything. Add this, add that."
"No, that's how you drive costs down, by having a focused set of requirements for a single task. You drive the cost up by adding unnecessary equipment and functions."
I agree that the A-10 was built for a single purpose and excels at that. But you start to have tradeoffs when you try to make it carrier capable. That's always been a problem for Navy air. I'm not an aeronautical engineer, so I'd leave that to them.
"As a reference point, Wiki lists the unit cost of an A-10 as $18M or $46M 'today' (whatever date 'today' was). With modern computerized construction techniques, we should be able to build an A-10-ish for $50M or so - far cheaper than a Hornet or F-35!"
For reference, militarymachine.com lists 2018 costs as
F-16 $29.1MM
F/A-18 $34.1MM
F-15 $43.1MM
SAAB Gripen $45-55MM
E-18G $74.1MM
F/A-18E/F-$79.8MM
Dassault Rafale $93.6MM
F-35A $94.6MM
Eurofighter Typhoon $105.7MM
F-117 $107.7MM
F-35B $121.8MM
F-35C $122.8MM
F-22 $152MM
That puts, for example, the Gripen right in the range of the A-10. The capabilities are different, but that's where you start talking tradeoffs. For that matter, looking at those costs, I don't see why the Navy didn't look harder at navalized versions of the F-15 and F-16.
The A-1 Skyraider (we called them Spads) was a good airplane for what it did. A-4 had a slightly larger weapons load, obviously faster sortie speed, was also rugged and reliable, and handled pretty well slow and low.
"You recall that we routinely launch and land E-2 Hawkeyes with 80 ft wingspans, right?"
The stall speed on the E-2 is 75 kts. On the A-10 it's 120 kts. That's a fairly significant difference trying to hit a carrier deck.
I do think folding the wings of an A-10 would be a bit more of a challenge than you expect, but that's something that could be tried and evaluated.
There has to be some reason why the Marines haven't adopted the A-10. I don't know what it is, except maybe Marine pilots want to be cowboys instead of bus drivers, just like the AF. Do you?
I still think that if Marine air decided to carve out a niche in CAS, they could do very well. Plus that is much more supportive of amphib assault. And if the Air Force abandoned CAS, they would become pretty much invincible, budget-wise. What do you think about that?
ComNavOps,
DeleteI do think you are kind of quibbling about details and ignoring my larger point.
Suppose Marine air gave up the idea of being a third Air Force, and decided to focus instead on CAS. And suppose the rest of the Corps decided to focus on amphibious assault, with tanks and artillery and amphibious armor in addition to light infantry. And suppose the Navy gave up on building mini-carriers and forcing the Marines to fly to the beach and instead built a fleet of amphibs that could actually run a full-fledged assault, with connectors that would work (which gets a lot easier if the ships can come in closer).
That takes a lot of changes in thinking, but I think that makes more sense. Let the Navy provide air superiority until the beachhead is secure and the Army and AF take over. Let Marine air focus on perfecting CAS, like the Corps focused on perfecting amphibious assault across the Pacific in WWII. And if the AF abandons the A-10, then Marine air becomes invincible in the budget process.
As far as the amphib assault mission, as well as the whole littoral warfare concept, I see potential uses around the first island chain against China, in the eastern Med or Baltic against Russia (which I see as a distinctly less likely possibility than China), or anywhere against a rogue state or terror organization with a coastline. Let airborne handle it if it is inland, let the Marines handle it if it is within 50 miles of the coast. Considering the latter, let Marines take the lead in developing counterinsurgency/anti-terror strategy and tactics. That gives them some essential missions that are a lot more relevant and sensible than what the Commandant is proposing.
"But you start to have tradeoffs when you try to make it carrier capable."
DeleteThere would be NO trade offs. Trade offs means you have to eliminate one or more capabilities to take on others (carrier capability, in this case). There would be NO capability eliminated from an A-10. There would be a few things added like beefing up the landing gear (maybe?), adding an arresting hook, a wing fold, and a modified nose gear but none of those impact the space/weight of any existing capability to the point of requiring their removal.
"The stall speed on the E-2 is 75 kts."
The E-2 is an anomaly due to that giant antenna but that's an aerial handling issue not a deck space issue. We also routinely used to launch/land A-3 Skywarriors with a 73 ft wingspan. A 50+ ft wing would not be a problem.
" On the A-10 it's 120 kts. "
The F-14 carrier approach speed was 125 kts, as I recall. Most aircraft are in the 110-130 kt approach speed, as I recall.
"There has to be some reason why the Marines haven't adopted the A-10. … I still think that if Marine air decided to carve out a niche in CAS,"
The Marine's air element doesn't really want to do ground combat element support. If they did, they would never have acquired the F-35. One can debate the capabilities of the F-35 but ground support is not one of them.
Note that ground support is not the same as CAS, just as AEW is not the same as radar detection (the RN's cobbled together radar helo). Ground support is, as the name suggests, all about aiding the ground element with spotting, force direction, battle guidance, etc. - basically, a ground combat eye-in-the-sky. This is why we had OV-10s and the like flying in Vietnam. One part of ground support is CAS which is where an A-1/4/10 would come in. For whatever reason, the Marines clearly have no interest in ground support and, as evidenced by the F-35, precious little even in CAS. You asked why? I do not know.
So, would the Marines 'carve out a niche in CAS'? All signs say no. Should they 'carve out a niche'? Only if by CAS you really mean ground support. However, that would mean acquiring smaller, cheaper, more basic ('primitive') aircraft and that's the opposite, budget wise, of what the Marines seem to be trying to do.
"Let Marine air focus on perfecting CAS"
DeleteWell, since I see no realistic need for amphibious assaults, it stands to reason that I see no need for Marine CAS. Within your vision, however, it fits but only within the constraints of my previous comment about the difference between ground support and CAS.
"So, would the Marines 'carve out a niche in CAS'? All signs say no. Should they 'carve out a niche'? Only if by CAS you really mean ground support. However, that would mean acquiring smaller, cheaper, more basic ('primitive') aircraft and that's the opposite, budget wise, of what the Marines seem to be trying to do."
DeleteI am fine with your definitions and I agree that is not the way the Marines are going. I think we both agree that the Marines are on the wrong path. I don't see a need for a Marine air superiority capability. The Navy can provide that until they secure the beachhead and turn things over to the Army and AF to move inland.
"Well, since I see no realistic need for amphibious assaults, it stands to reason that I see no need for Marine CAS. Within your vision, however, it fits but only within the constraints of my previous comment about the difference between ground support and CAS."
Well, if there is no need for any kind of amphibious operation, then it is hard to come up with any reason for having the Marines or amphibious ships. I still think you tend to see everything in terms of a peer war with China, and I agree that an amphibious assault of the Chinese mainland, with their A2/AD capability and a billion Chinese waiting for us, is a pretty absurd idea. But I don't agree that we build a force to fight China and that automatically gives us the capability to do whatever we need. I think there are any number of missions that we would never attempt versus mainland China that might well make sense in the first island chain, or in the islands of the eastern Mediterranean, or in the Baltic, or against a rogue nation or terrorist state. And amphibious assault is one of those missions.
As far as no need for amphibious assault, there certainly seem to be a large number of middle-to-large military powers who see the mission as still pretty significant and are spending a lot to develop the capability--China, UK, France, Japan, South Korea, among others. Either they know something you don't or you know something they don't. I won't offer an opinion there.
I think our differences all come down to one thing--I see a need for an amphibious assault capability and you don't. I think we will just have to agree to disagree on that.
Delete" Either they know something you don't or you know something they don't."
DeleteOr, the third alternative is that they have their own needs that are different from ours. China, for example, without a doubt sees a need for amphibious assault against Taiwan, Vietnam, etc. Japan likely sees China as quite possibly seizing some of their islands and having to take them back. And so on. Each country has their own needs. As I look at our needs, I don't see a need but we've been over that.
Bear in mind that we also have capabilities that some of those other countries don't have. For example, where the UK or France might wish to maintain some small (emphasis on small) amphibious (meaning vertical) assault capability for their needs, we could accomplish the same thing with our global Air Force and Army capabilities. We have divisions supposedly on standby for instant global response which obviates the need for small amphibious capability. In other words, we can transport light infantry forces anywhere in the world at a moment's notice (AF/Army) which means we don't need small amphibious forces such as France, UK, and others maintain.
CNO and CDR, you already brought up the appropriate aircraft for the USMC Air Wing - OV10. The OV-10 is LHD capable, very survivable and very maintainable.
DeleteIt is in many ways the LHD’s A-10.
The engines were underpowered and it crashed a lot as a result. Upgrade the engines, give it the avionics to handle precision weapons, and you are in business. With the ability to operate from austere airstrips and carry significant amounts of ordnance, it does the Harrier’s job better and could be used in small FARPs in the South Pacific.
"Or, the third alternative is that they have their own needs that are different from ours. China, for example, without a doubt sees a need for amphibious assault against Taiwan, Vietnam, etc. Japan likely sees China as quite possibly seizing some of their islands and having to take them back. "
DeleteAnd in that context of any difficulty with China, it would likely be in our self-interest 1) to help Japan in that recapture effort, and 2) to try to discourage China from seizing such islands in the first place.
"Bear in mind that we also have capabilities that some of those other countries don't have. For example, where the UK or France might wish to maintain some small (emphasis on small) amphibious (meaning vertical) assault capability for their needs, we could accomplish the same thing with our global Air Force and Army capabilities. We have divisions supposedly on standby for instant global response which obviates the need for small amphibious capability. In other words, we can transport light infantry forces anywhere in the world at a moment's notice (AF/Army) which means we don't need small amphibious forces such as France, UK, and others maintain."
I think both France and England maintain the capability for much more than simply vertical assault.
And we've already discussed ad nauseam the limitations on light infantry. If the Marines are going to be nothing but light infantry, then I can agree with your point, just let airborne do it. But if Marines are going to go back to being a combined arms organization, with tanks, artillery, and amphibious armor in addition to infantry and air, then I see a significant differentiator between them and airborne.
Let's see our points of agreement. One, we both see the Marines as a light infantry being little better than Boy Scouts with BB guns. Two, we don't see any connectors that will permit us to mount an assault with tanks and artillery from 25-50 miles offshore. Three, we think the Commandant's current proposals are stupid. I gather that you resolve the resulting dilemma by concluding that amphibious assaults are not worth the effort. I resolve by saying that both the Navy and the Marines need to change their approach and their equipment in order to perform viable assaults.
"The OV-10 is LHD capable, very survivable and very maintainable.
DeleteIt is in many ways the LHD’s A-10."
The OV-10 is certainly a possible option, at least for the scouting and direction pieces. Some others have suggested the Embraer Tucano. There is also the possibility of using drones for at least some of that work. Whatever we use, we need to use something to do it.
"I gather that you resolve the resulting dilemma by concluding that amphibious assaults are not worth the effort. I resolve by saying that both the Navy and the Marines need to change their approach and their equipment in order to perform viable assaults."
DeleteJust a point of clarification … My view on the lack of need for amphib assault is based on an assessment of strategic and operational needs rather than any assessment of capabilities. Whether we are or not capable of actually conducting an assault is not a factor in my assessment. … Just to be clear.
"My view on the lack of need for amphib assault is based on an assessment of strategic and operational needs rather than any assessment of capabilities."
DeleteUnderstand fully. I interpret what you are saying as it is a capability that we don't need, strategically or tactically, and therefore we should maintain only a minimum capability. I disagree, inasmuch as I see some very likely scenarios--first island chain, eastern Med, Baltic, rogue states, terrorist organizations--where we would need and use the capability, and therefore I think we should focus on having a more well rounded, cost efficient, and effective amphibious assault capability, on both the Marine and the Navy side.
I think we both agree, albeit perhaps for vastly different reasons, that what both the Navy and Marines are doing in this area right now is nonsense.
DeleteActually, the composition and the function of the Marine Corps is defined in US Code Title 10, Section 8063.
ReplyDeleteParagraph a) reads, in part, "The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein."
Paragraph b) reads, "The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces."
Not to say that a division couldn't be the size of a regiment (about 4,000 troops) and called a division (in name only).
The MAGTF is the Marine Corps' version of combined arms warfare. It is their concept of operations to integrate their combat arms, with their sister service, the Navy, to fight an enemy.
You left out the key portion of Title 10 which is the part that basically defines their mission and reason for existence. I'll quote it, in full, for you:
Delete"The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign."
You'll note that it's all about amphibious/naval warfare. Land warfare, other than as it relates to amphibious and naval operations, is not mentioned.
"The MAGTF is the Marine Corps' version of combined arms warfare. It is their concept of operations to integrate their combat arms, with their sister service, the Navy, to fight an enemy."
You've missed the key point, as have the Marines. It is NOT their assignment to assemble a land combat force nor a third air force. Their assignment, their mission, is to provide amphibious combat capability. The MAGTF was conceived to allow land combat operations and has led the Corps down the path to generic army status and away from their core mission which is amphibious/naval in nature.
The Marines have deviated from their core mission and the intent of Congress to try to become a one-stop military force and the MAGTF was the vehicle they conceived to take them there.
You are actually correct that these Divisions and Wings are not all the same. The largest Division and the largest Wing are on the West Coast while the Pacific is practically a skeleton crew that gets regularly augmented by East or West Coast units on rotation.
DeleteIf we expand this analysis, the main purpose of the Wing is assault support and that needs to be scaled to what it supports. The other functions such as CAS, EW, counter air, etc can be better performed by the Navy in support.
The MAGTF emphasized the A part way too much and the G part way not enough. We got the LHA/LHD because they could fly AV-8s and F-35s and V-22s off of them, even though they were terrible surface assault platforms, particularly when they have to stay 25-50 miles offshore.
ReplyDeleteThe idea of, "in the air, on land, or sea," is not bad conceptually. But the sea and land parts were the core mission, and they need rethinking. The Marines need to be an in and out, git 'er done, and move on organization, not a force of occupation. If that means there isn't a role for them in the extended wars in the Mideast, that's a good thing. Instead of getting killed doing something that is not their primary mission, they can relearn and perfect what they need to be able to do.
They need to get back to their roots. A quick, mobile, hard-hitting force that can punch well above their weight, knock out an objective in a hurry, and move on to the next one has considerable utility in the modern world. But a bunch of Boy Scouts with BB guns can't do that mission. They need tanks, artillery, amphibious armor, and close air support--and the first three aren't happening off an LHA/LHD. The Navy needs to provide some ships from which their mission can be accomplished and the Marine Corps needs to realize that air needs to be a complementary part of their mission and not the main driver.
The way the Marines have built the MAGTF is wrong and the way the Navy has built an amphibious force is wrong. Both need to be fixed.
Completely agree with CDR. USMC really should focus on assaults, hit hard like hell, get in and let Army do the rest, get out fast. Putting a platoon on an empty island with 8 ASMs ain't what USMC should be. Army probably better qualified for that mission too. Heavy assault should be main and only USMC mission, everything else is a distraction or duplication of other services.
DeleteSadly, it doesnt look like thats going to be likely. Ive noticed a few Marine units disbanding already, and tank units watching their tanks hauled away... Itll be a whole lot harder to bring those capabilities back then to give them up!!
DeleteUnbelieveable that the Corps and its senior leadership has signed off on this. I understand that they're seemingly rudderless, but to hear no objection to the Commandants fantasies, no rejection of the neutering of the Corps, no "lets do some more wargaming and actual analysis"... Foolish to the extreme, and the damage being done is irreversible...
"If that means there isn't a role for them in the extended wars in the Mideast, that's a good thing."
ReplyDeleteYou are correct, but that would Hurt The Budget, so please never say such words again.
As a teacher of entrepreneurship at a university, one thing I see often is students who want to start a business to cater to everyone, because obviously the more customers I can serve, the more I will sell, right?
ReplyDeleteExcept it doesn't work like that. The people who succeed are the ones who pick a particular niche or segment and focus on being the best they can be at serving that niche or segment. It makes so many strategic and tactical decisions so much easier, not to mention execution.
The Marines are not a business. But they have historically been a niche organization. They get in, hit hard, accomplish the objective, and move on. They don't occupy territory. And they succeeded because they were the very best at that niche. But just like many unfortunate businesses, they got out of that niche and spread themselves too thin, and have lost their niche, and with it their mo-jo.
The MAGTF was a, if not the, start. But I think there have been a few other steps along the way, some taken by the Corps and some by others:
1960s - The Marines became infatuated with the concept of vertical envelopment. Maybe this came from the MAGTF concept, but it was clear to me during my Mid 2/c summer in 1968 that they saw this as the wave of the future. The LPH was the neatest thing since sliced bread.
1960s - Westmoreland sent the Marines north to mountainous I Corps, and gave the Army the riverine Mekong Delta to the south, thereby asking both branches to do what they weren't best at. Westmoreland clearly screwed up Vietnam on so many levels, and certainly had plenty of help in doing so from Washington, but this has always been a real head scratcher for me. I guess he was Army, and felt more comfortable with Army, so he wanted them close.
1970s - The LHAs/LHDs came into the fleet, basically as a extension of the LPH concept. Marine air loved them because they could fly jets (Harriers, now F-35s) off them, but they can't do an assault with armor and artillery from 25-50 miles out.
1980s-2000s- Marines got involved in three Mideast wars where their role ultimately transitioned from quick strike to army of occupation. In Desert Storm, the threat of an amphibious assault kept a lot of Saddam's forces tied down along the coast, making the inland thrust (in which Marines participated) easier. In Afghanistan, Khandahar has been presented as a textbook operation, but the Marine role there was almost entirely as airmobile light infantry. But the near 20-year occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq has transitioned the Marines almost entirely into what they are not--an army of occupation.
What strikes me as quite amazing is that the Marines managed to transition from "in the air, on land or sea," to such a heavy air focus, despite the fact that the only aviator ever to be Commandant was GEN James Amos (2010-2014).
I was always told that the LHD was made with the MEU role in mind since during the 60’s it took too long to lift troops to crisis areas. LHDs do a great job of providing a well rounded MEU package in a low threat environment such as a non-combatant evacuation/ disaster relief / hostage rescue / embassy reinforcements etc.
Delete
DeleteI think the operative words are "low threat environment."
The LHAs/LHDs are great at hauling a lot of Marines and equipment from point A to point B. What they're not so good at is getting them from ship to shore once they get there, particularly in an opposed assault scenario.
" The Marines were once something special and respected. Now, they’re just a poor, small copy of the Air Force and Army. MAGTF destroyed the Marine Corps."
ReplyDeleteHuh. Tell THAT to the Marines!
'1960s - Westmoreland sent the Marines north to mountainous I Corps, and gave the Army the riverine Mekong Delta to the south, thereby asking both branches to do what they weren't best at. Westmoreland clearly screwed up Vietnam on so many levels, and certainly had plenty of help in doing so from Washington, but this has always been a real head scratcher for me. I guess he was Army, and felt more comfortable with Army, so he wanted them close.'
ReplyDeleteI am afraid this too much Sorley koolaid for me to keep silent. Westmoreland did not send the Marines north, Westmoreland did not screw up Vietnam. I suggest solid research rather than reash of bad history. Leaving the second claim that is childish and outside the purview of this blog, the first instead bears scrutiny and offers some worthwhile lessons for the current debate. Various OPLAN drafted by the JCS (32 and 43 series, starting from early 60s, even before MACV was created placed the marines north as a quick reaction force to block a direct cross DMZ attack. This was aligned with the claim that amphibious assault would have allowed them to react quickly and in sufficient strength to deter/repel an invasion. It made eminent sense because the USMC assured to be capable to deploy a full fledged combined arms force faster than the US Army STRATCORPS (that would have been primarily a light infantry force). It made perfect sense. Plans were approved by the JCS before WEstmoreland was even sent to Saigon as Harkins deputy.
When Westmoreland asked for deployment of the 9th MEB it was done because he felt, rightly, Da Nang air base was threathened by a possible cross-DMZ strike. Again it was in line with OPLANs and also supported by General Krulak. Of course once in, the threat was mutifaceted, local rockets attacks at the lower end, and DMZ incursions at the higher end. IT is also worth to note that the majorty of USMC operations were performed in the coastal lowlands of Quang Tri and Thua Thien. A quick scan of the official USMC history should suffice to clarify these misconceptions...
Westmoreland’s competence, or lack thereof, in handling Vietnam is a matter of considerable debate. I come down on the side that he screwed it up badly. I did temper my comments with the statement to the effect that it’s hard to tell how much was Westmoreland and how much came down from on high. I was never on MACV staff but the several people I know who were described it as a pretty dysfunctional place.
DeleteWhat you are saying is that sending the Marines north and the Army south was dictated to Westmoreland by others. I’m fine with accepting that as information that I did not know. I just think it was a mistake to do so. I was also never in the delta, but again I knew many who were. Their accounts suggest that the Army and the Navy never worked well together down there. They basically spoke two different languages. I think a Navy-Marine team would have handled riverine operations more efficiently and effectively.
And yes I realize that not all of I Corps was mountainous and there was a significant coastal plain. Maybe I should not have described it as mountainous, but it was certainly more mountainous than the delta. Bottom line, I just think I Corps was more in the Army’s wheelhouse and the delta made more sense as a Navy-Marine operation. And I wasn’t alone in that opinion. I’ve been in numerous discussions of that very point in O Clubs from Subic to Little Creek.
second part...
ReplyDeleteSaid that the crux of the problem is if the MAGTF and even the Hogaboom Board recommendation were deleterious to amphibious assault. I would say, with some caveats, they were not. First of all the purpose of an amphibious assault is to deploy a mid weight combined arms force in enemy territory to accomplish missions relevant to overall strategic plan. It is worth to note that with the notable exceptions of Tarawa and the Marshalls all other WW2 major amphibious operations resulted in prolonged land campaigns. There is no point to strike a piece of real estate with ground forces if you do not want to hold it. the MAGTF is, in itself, an outgrowth of what the the Corps did successfully in WW2 and it treid to avoid the problems of Watchtower (too little for too much), and Tarawa (mainly lack of joint training, combined arms, integration).
Now the Hogaboom board and the concept of vertical envelopment built also on this, but predicating the availability of sufficient helicopter lift to carry the force outside the limitations of conventional landing. What they did wrong was to assume the availability of machines that took years if ever to materialize, and sufficient technological development in supporting arms to allow air-mobile, survivable, heavy firepower, be it in the form of unconventional approaches (Ontos, Howtar) or gunships. Bascially the idea was to build a combined arms strike force where, using a Soviet maxim 'rotor is to track what track is to hoof'.
Did it work as advertised? No. Verticla envelopment was a chimera as envisioned at start, and it hampered training, tactical doctrine, and integration in a combined arms team. But the strategic approach was and is sound. Amphibious assault is a mean not an end. What makes the mean 'interesting' is its ability to project medium/heavy forces fast enough to be relevant. A Marine division is (at least for now) a much more capable force than an airborne/airmobile/light division. That made the USMC fill a relevant nice.
The reverse of the coin is that filling this nice made the USMC a convenient first responder, and thus can led to protracted ground campaigns. But again saying that the USMC should not involved in protracted land operations makes it even less useful than the assumed shortcomings of the MAGTF.
" The Marines were once something special and respected. Now, they’re just a poor, small copy of the Air Force and Army. MAGTF destroyed the Marine Corps."
This is saying the whole Pacific campaign destroyed the concept of the USMC...
Sorry if I have appeared too caustic/abrasive/antagonistic
Very nice overall comment. Good information. I can't comment on the Vietnam aspects as I'm not a land combat person and have not studied that aspect of the Vietnam war. I accept your description at face value and find it fascinating. Thanks.
Delete"the purpose of an amphibious assault is to deploy a mid weight combined arms force in enemy territory to accomplish missions relevant to overall strategic plan."
I have to disagree with you on this. The purpose of an amphibious assault is to secure an entry point (beach or port) for follow on forces to exploit. Conceptually, the Marines would seize the beach/port and the Army would use the entry point to build up forces to exploit the entry and to pursue whatever the ultimate objective was.
"ability to project medium/heavy forces"
Assuming you're referring to the Marines, I would, again, have to disagree with characterizing them as heavy forces and I would even have to hesitate to classify them as medium forces. A Marine division lacks armored transport (APC/HAPC), lacks an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), lacks self-propelled anti-aircraft vehicles, lacks self-propelled artillery, lacks combat engineering vehicles, lacks systematic mine clearance, etc. In other words, they lack the characteristics of a heavy force. Whether what they have qualifies them as a medium force is debatable. I might classify them as the light end of medium. Of course, all that is before the current dropping of tanks and artillery which renders them light infantry.
The classification of the Marines as light/medium is why they are not suited for sustaining combat beyond the initial entry point seizure.
"saying that the USMC should not involved in protracted land operations makes it even less useful than the assumed shortcomings of the MAGTF. "
By law (Title 10) the Marines should not be extensively involved in land combat. By 'Joint' division of service responsibilities they should not be involved in extensive land combat. By adherence to their main mission they should not be extensively involved in land combat. The problem with being extensively involved in land combat is that it results in the atrophy of the main mission, amphibious operations, which is exactly what happened during the last two decades. The Marines lost their institutional knowledge of amphibious operations which is to say that they lost their reason for existing according to both law and tradition. They are now trying to relearn amphibious operations with no institutional experience to draw on. The land combat cost them their focus and identity. They are not supposed to be a sustained land combat force. That's the responsibility of the Army.
"Sorry if I have appeared too caustic/abrasive/antagonistic"
Argue the idea, not the person and you'll be fine. You have much to offer.
"This is saying the whole Pacific campaign destroyed the concept of the USMC... "
I followed (not necessarily agreed with) your entire comment until this sentence. I don't know what you mean by this. WWII set the pattern for the Marine's future reasons for existence (amphibious operations) which came to be formalized in the Title 10 law. I'm sorry, I'm missing your point on this one. Try again?
Again, good overall discussion whether I agree with every point or not. Good contribution.
Any discussion of the role of the USMC doesn't take place in a vacuum, and as a former army air cavalry scout helicopter pilot, my understanding of the navy and marines is limited. Of course my conclusions are highly influenced by my army experience, but I'll throw my 2 cents in.
ReplyDeleteThe US military is apparently shifting its focus from the war on terror to preparing for future peer fights with countries like China and Russia.
The army's likely battlegrounds are Europe (Poland/ the Baltic States/Ukraine) and the Korean Peninsula.
These are mechanized fights.
The army currently has a lot of light units. Off the top of my head they have:
25th Infantry Div Schofield Barracks Hawaii (reaction force for the Pacific basin)
10th Mountain Div Fort Drum, NY (cold weather)
101st Airborne Div Fort Campbell, KY (helicopter mobile infantry)
82nd Airborne Div Fort Bragg, NC (parachutes then walking)
173rd Airborne Brigade Italy (European theater reaction force, parachutes then walking)
75th Ranger Regiment (three battalions of highly trained light infantry)
Considering that light infantry is almost useless in mechanized warfare, I believe that is an over-commitment to that type of force.
To help alleviate this force mismatch, they could transfer the 10th Mountain Div and its mission to National Guard and Reserve units, and the 25th ID's mission should be filled by a Marine Corps division stationed in Hawaii.
The 173rd, 82nd, 101st, and the Ranger battalions should be able to handle any light infantry needs, at least initially.
A war against China is likely a navy and air force fight with little use for large army units (outside of Korea).
To support this type of naval war, the USMC should take over the primary ground force responsibilities for the Pacific and should be configured as a light infantry and mechanized infantry/armor mix that is amphibious assault capable.
They should be able to force entry via an amphibious assault and then defend that territory against enemy counterattacks until the army takes over the fight.
The Marines should be able to land against opposition, but not against heavy enemy units or without local air and sea superiority (for example, the Normandy landings would have likely have failed against panzer divisions and a strong Luftwaffe presence).
The Marines should have special equipment, like the AAV, to perform the amphibious assault but otherwise should utilize army equipment as much as possible to reduce the costs of acquisition and maintenance.
Why should the Marines redesign heavy tanks, artillery, rifles etc. when the army has already fielded these equipment types?
I would utilize the LHA/LHD ships as CAS aircraft carriers, which would get them far enough away from the coast to be protected. These would carry assault helicopters, attack helicopters, and navalized A-10's.
The only mission that Marine Aviation would have would be CAS with A-10's and attack helicopters and air assault helicopters. All other aviation roles would be provided by the navy (or air force).
I would have some kind of troop transports to get the Marines close enough to shore for the amphibious assault. I'll defer to the more knowledgeable folks here to identify the type of ships these would be and features they should have (like well decks for example).
The navy would need to provide true NGFS from cruisers and battleships.
My belief is that the threat of the US being able to make an amphibious landing ties down a disproportionate amount of a potential enemy's resources and makes the expense of this type of USMC something viable for the US military.
Anonymous,
DeleteGood moments. Generally agree except for one thing.
"LHA/LHD ships as CAS aircraft carriers, which would get them far enough away from the coast to be protected. These would carry assault helicopters, attack helicopters, and navalized A-10's."
You can't operate an A-10 off an LHA/LHD, as currently configured. They don't have cats and they don't have traps. I don't think an A-10 could take off from one without a catapult assist, and I'm quite certain they can't land on one without arresting gear and a tail hook.
That's one of the reasons for the discussion about a carrier-capable "Marine A-10." You might be able to operate an A-10 off a big carrier, and it would be a most useful asset if you could, but you're not going to be able to operate one off an LHA/LHD.
Agree totally that Marine air should focus on CAS. The Navy can provide local air superiority (and medium to long range attack) until such time as a proper airfield can be secured to bring in the AF.
To do the CAS mission, Marines require a "Marine A-10." It needs to be carrier capable (nice but not essential if it is LHA/LHD capable), rugged, good at flying low and slow, and carry a lot of weapons. Other nice to haves would include capable of operating off unprepared strips and/or short paved strips, so the Marines can take them ashore even before they seize a proper airfield (this pretty much inherently would mean LHA/LHD capable), and easily maintained in the field. Stealth is not really a big deal, and if it can stay close to the front and pop up as needed then it doesn't require long legs.
I still see a major niche for Marine air with CAS. The Air Force clearly doesn't want to do it, and tried to get rid of their A-10s. A lot of their maneuvering is clearly budget-driven, so if Marine air became extremely proficient at CAS, they could end up with both the Navy and the Army fighting for them in the budget battles. And Air Force would fight tooth and nail to keep Army from absorbing them, since the AF position is that Army can't have fixed-wing jets. So give up the air superiority and long-range attack missions and focus on CAS.
As far as the amphib mission, that needs some work. The primary problem is lack of ship-to-shore connectors capable of getting tanks and artillery ashore from 25-50 miles out at sea. I think the connector problem can be solved if we have a phib force that we can bring into 3-5 miles offshore. That means you need some small-deck amphibs. I'd go with a mix of smaller LHA/LHD, LPH with a well deck, LPD/LSD, LST, LPA/LKA, and a NGFS frigate. The LHA/LHD would remain offshore and operate the air element, plus carry spares and supplies for extended ops. The rest would operate in close.
Since the Navy doesn't have any gun cruisers or battleships, and is even moving down from 5-inch guns to 57mm popguns, the NGFS is a major shortfall at the current time.
As for the LHAs/LHDs, there are proposals to widen the flight deck, add a cat or two, and incorporate an angled deck with traps for landings. You could end up with something a little smaller than a Midway, maybe about the size of the old Royal Navy Ark Royal (the 1950s/60s one with cats and traps). If you could operate your Marine A-10 off that, you'd have a useful assault carrier, kind of like the CVEs and CVLs of WWII.
"These are mechanized fights."
DeleteAbsolutely!
"The US military is apparently shifting its focus from the war on terror to preparing for future peer fights with countries like China and Russia."
DeleteProblem--We need to be ready for BOTH. We have screwed around in the Mideast for way too long with way too few results, because even with our "focus" on the war on terror, we didn't do it right. IMO there is no way to do limited warfare right, so never fight a war that you don't intend to win. Wars end two ways--you win or you surrender. Fighting without fighting to win is fighting to surrender. At best, you end up in a stalemate for years.
We are going to face peer or near-peer threats from China and possibly Russia (although the latter is declining as a possibility). And we are going to face terror threats from rogue governments and non-governmental terror organizations. So we'd better be able to handle both. Right now, I'm not sure we can handle either.
"there is no way to do limited warfare right, so never fight a war that you don't intend to win."
DeleteI happen to agree 100%. That said, as a philosophical interest, how do you assess and evaluate the Israeli situation where they keep fighting the same conflicts over and over (Hamas and the like)? Are they doing it right? If so, how does this fit with your philosophy? If not, what should they be doing? Their on-going conflict offers valuable lessons for us but we have to draw the right conclusions. So, what are the right conclusions?
As a point of comparison, I think we attempted to do the same kind of Israeli limited engagement with ISIS when, for example, we refused to bomb ISIS oil convoys out of fear of killing 'civilian' drivers. That just led to ISIS being able to fund more killing over a longer period of time. Was that right or wrong on our part and, again, how does it fit (or not) with your philosophy?
I think the fundamental problem with Israel is something that the Israelis and the Palestinians seem to understand intuitively, but nobody else seems to get. There is no viable two-state solution within the present footprint of Israel, because there isn't enough there there to support two nations. You cannot draw a two-state boundary line that works for either side. Before Israel has enough territory to be secure in its borders, the Palestinians run out of enough room to have a viable society and economy.
DeleteTake the pre-1967 borders that have been suggested by some. Israel is 12 miles wide at its narrowest point, and that is indefensible At the same time, the West Bank has no way of transportation to/from the rest of the world, and Gaza at least has a seacoast, but not much else. Plus the two are separated, and that never works well. I defy you to take a pen or pencil and a map and draw lines that work for both.
That reality puts both Israelis and Palestinians into no-win situations. Palestinians have to launch periodic terror attacks, because that is all they can do. And Israel has to retaliate, because it has to.
My solution goes back to something that was on the table in the 1970s. Let Egypt have Suez and east of Suez to 33E. Between 33E and 34E, give the Palestinians a country in their native homeland, Sinai. There's enough oil and tourism there to have a much more viable economy than they can hope to have on the West Bank, and they could have seaports on both the Med and the Red Sea. You'd have to 1) pay Egypt a large sum to make it happen, but because of Egypt's current perilous economic situation that price might not be that high, plus Egypt has been unable to police the area and has kind of lost control of large parts of it, and 2) convince enough Palestinians to move, but naming it Palestine, and playing up the connection with ancient Philistia, and spending some more money on water and power infrastructure could make it a lot more appealing than where they are now. Then Israel gets everything east of 34E, which gives them one side of the Gulf of Aqaba all the way to Sharm al-Shaikh, some oil, and a bigger buffer around Dimona. One thing that could be done with the infrastructure is to put in some sea water desalinization plants, and pumping the excess inland to keep year-round flow in the Wadi al-Arish, and damming the Wadi at a couple of points for flood control and water supply. I think the price to get Egypt to play might be constructing the Qattara Depression project that they want to build. So we are talking some bucks here, but probably the only way to solve the problem in the long run.
If Israel and the Palestinians each have livable homelands, then I think the temperature abates quite a bit. Until then, I don't see a "right" answer for either side. Basically, the West and the Arab world took two groups of people that they considered outcasts, and stuck them together in too small an area of desert, and then are somehow amazed when they don't play well together.
I think the fundamental problem with Israel is something that the Israelis and the Palestinians seem to understand intuitively, but nobody else seems to get. There is no viable two-state solution within the present footprint of Israel, because there isn't enough there there to support two nations. You cannot draw a two-state boundary line that works for either side. Before Israel has enough territory to be secure in its borders, the Palestinians run out of enough room to have a viable society and economy.
DeleteTake the pre-1967 borders that have been suggested by some. Israel is 12 miles wide at its narrowest point, and that is indefensible At the same time, the West Bank has no way of transportation to/from the rest of the world, and Gaza at least has a seacoast, but not much else. Plus the two are separated, and that never works well. I defy you to take a pen or pencil and a map and draw lines that work for both.
That reality puts both Israelis and Palestinians into no-win situations. Palestinians have to launch periodic terror attacks, because that is all they can do. And Israel has to retaliate, because it has to.
My solution goes back to something that was on the table in the 1970s. Let Egypt have Suez and east of Suez to 33E. Between 33E and 34E, give the Palestinians a country in their native homeland, Sinai. There's enough oil and tourism there to have a much more viable economy than they can hope to have on the West Bank, and they could have seaports on both the Med and the Red Sea. You'd have to 1) pay Egypt a large sum to make it happen, but because of Egypt's current perilous economic situation that price might not be that high, plus Egypt has been unable to police the area and has kind of lost control of large parts of it, and 2) convince enough Palestinians to move, but naming it Palestine, and playing up the connection with ancient Philistia, and spending some more money on water and power infrastructure could make it a lot more appealing than where they are now. Then Israel gets everything east of 34E, which gives them one side of the Gulf of Aqaba all the way to Sharm al-Shaikh, some oil, and a bigger buffer around Dimona. One thing that could be done with the infrastructure is to put in some sea water desalinization plants, and pumping the excess inland to keep year-round flow in the Wadi al-Arish, and damming the Wadi at a couple of points for flood control and water supply. I think the price to get Egypt to play might be constructing the Qattara Depression project that they want to build. So we are talking some bucks here, but probably the only way to solve the problem in the long run.
If Israel and the Palestinians each have livable homelands, then I think the temperature abates quite a bit. Until then, I don't see a "right" answer for either side. Basically, the West and the Arab world took two groups of people that they considered outcasts, and stuck them together in too small an area of desert, and then are somehow amazed when they don't play well together.
Umm … okay. You've offered a fairly involved political solution. Not being a political blog, I won't comment on it.
DeleteTo refer back, you offered the following:
"IMO there is no way to do limited warfare right, so never fight a war that you don't intend to win. Wars end two ways--you win or you surrender. Fighting without fighting to win is fighting to surrender. At best, you end up in a stalemate for years."
I then asked,
"how do you assess and evaluate the Israeli situation where they keep fighting the same conflicts over and over"
On the surface, you seem to advocate total war or no war and yet you seem repudiate your philosophy as regards the Israeli situation. Or, perhaps you believe the Israeli conflict to be strategically wrong in implementation and unwinnable in practice?
My concern/wonder with your total war or no war statement is that you seem perfectly willing to abandon it in real world situations like Israel or your containment strategy for China which, at best, would lead to an endless string of Israle-Palestine like conflicts.
So, my overarching question for you is do you really believe in total war or no war or are actually guided by limited, protracted war as you examples suggest. My reason for asking is not to try to catch you in a philosophical trap but to point out that your proposed force structures may not match your real philosophies. If you don't actually have a total war philosophy at heart, then you don't need anywhere near as big a force structure because you don't really intend to fight an all out war.
Again, not trying to 'catch' you at anything, just perhaps nudging your thought process along a bit.
I don't think you are nudging it any, but maybe I should add some clarification on my part.
DeleteAs far as Israel, that is an entirely artificial and externally forced situation. Europe took their outcasts (Jews) and the Arab world took their outcasts (Palestinians) and they threw them together in a little sandbox that is not big enough for the both of them, and now we are somehow surprised that they don't play together well? Inside the sandbox, it seems to me that there are really only two viable solutions--Israel kills all the Palestinians and takes over the entire area, or the Palestinians kill all the Israelis and take over the entire area. There is no viable two-state solution, because there isn’t enough there for two states, but the world is attempting to force on one them. I don't think what Israel is doing makes any sense, and I don't think what the Palestinians are doing makes any sense, but I don't see that either one has any alternative. The only viable solution I see is to get, literally, outside the box. There is absolutely no reason for the USA ever to get placed into that kind of box.
As far as China, our containment strategy against Russia did not lead to an endless string of Israel-Palestine-like conflicts. Maybe you can claim Vietnam, but that was wrong for so many reasons. And if Vietnam had ever been fought to win (and it could have been) we would have gotten a very different result. Simply mine Haiphong in 1966 and see how it would have ended up. We never had the huge confrontation in Europe that both sides feared. In retrospect, that seems as much as anything to be because we overestimated the Soviet capabilities, so we thought they could win, and the Soviets didn't, so they knew they couldn’t. I don't expect a containment strategy with China to lead to an endless string of no-win wars, if we implement it right now. We currently win against China. Maybe not for a lot longer, but for right now we win. And if we make it very clear that we intend to use that capability to impose certain limits on them now, and get them into that mindset, then I think we can continue to avoid war while containing them. The Russians knew that if they invaded western Europe, they would not be fighting a limited war, and that they couldn't win an unlimited war, so they didn't invade western Europe. Right now China is not building PLAN to defeat the USN, it is building PLAN and its entire military to intimidate its neighbors. And so far that's working because we aren't doing anything about it. But while we still can, be the big brother (without the Orwellian implications) that shows up to beat up the bully who steals your lunch money, and the bully will stop.
I think that the absolute very best way to avoid total war is to make it crystal clear that we have a military force that will dominate and destroy you if you try. Be prepared to defeat anybody that tries, and to make sure they know that. That puts a lot of pressure on our geopolitical strategy because with that kind of force, the temptation is going to be to try to make everybody in the world do what we want. And that is the temptation that we must avoid at all costs. If, for example, a foreign leader knows that if he angers us enough, we will come kill him, then guess what, he's probably not going to anger us. If he knows that we will come in, fight to a stalemate, and give him enough money to rebuild his country, he maybe makes a different choice. So if he does something that makes killing him worth the effort, then go in and kill him. If he angers us, but not worth killing him, then let him go or deal with it non-militarily.
And while we are not fighting these winless wars all over, let’s use our military instead to train and get ready to win the peer war that we hope never happens. I think you will agree with at least that part.
I saw a video yesterday talking about the difficulty that China would face doing a military buildup to invade Taiwan without being detected. The only way would be for them to schedule a major naval exercise, attribute the buildup to the exercise, and convert the exercise to an invasion. So keep a CVBG and an ARG in the China Sea, and if China launches a naval exercise have those units follow along and shadow them, and have another CVBG and ARG standing nearby to join them if needed. Would I be willing to shoot over Taiwan? Yes, because China can’t win if we shoot. They can launch cruise missiles, but they can’t win without boots on the ground. Yes, they have a much bigger army than Taiwan has. But having more troops doesn't win the war, unless they can get those troops to Taiwan. And that’s their problem, particularly if we sink their troop transports.
DeleteI would make it clear to every other country that we will respect their citizens' rights to life, liberty, and property, and we expect them to do the same to our citizens. As long as they do that, what they do is their business. Don't do that, and it becomes ours, and we will come kill you.
DeleteComNavOps,
ReplyDeletestarting from the end... I am arguing that the MAGTF had its root basically on the successful experience in WW2, especially in the central pacific area. Here the marines employed tank-infantry-artillery-cas (when the latter worked...) in a reasonable effective manner to secure several islands. Several of them required what could be called extensive land campaign, at times with army support. With the notable (and confused) exception of Guadalcanal, and the clear cut case of Bouganville (with the ANZAC taking over) none of them was just seizing the entry point, but all were characterized by seizing the whole objective. On the latter case Mariannas and Okinawa stand out as exceedingly valuable real estates. If we look at all amphibious assaults and not just the USMC ones, the biggest ones (Sicily, Philippines, Normandy, Salerno) all saw the landing forces continuing their involvement in the whole campaign.
It is worth to note that the US ad British airborne divisions, that were designed for a similar mission (seizing entry points then being replaced) all ended up being involved in prolonged land fight in Normandy and in Holland. For a lot of reason the idea you can replace your assault force it fraught with difficulties (not in the least the fact that no commander is happy to have unit removed...).
Now saying what the Pacific destroyed the USMC was being sarcastic. It made a specific kind of amphibious assault relevant at the strategic level. But basically I do not see any commander, once the marines are ashore waving them off. Once troops are ashore they tend to stick to it to the end of the campaign.
Part of the issue here stems from the perceived AA of the 30s (mainly seizing atoll bases in the central pacific on the road to the Philippines) to the actual post Marshall Islands realities. I think what you envision is a retelling of the Advance Base Force concept rather than the 44-45 period.
Arrigo,
DeleteVery interesting discussion.
"Here the marines employed tank-infantry-artillery-cas (when the latter worked...) in a reasonable effective manner to secure several islands."
I think the point is that the MAGTF has evolved to the point where the tank-artillery (and amphibious armor) portions are becoming irrelevant. It has become so dependent upon the air element that it is losing the ability to deliver the other, and is now withdrawing tanks and artillery from the force structure altogether.
Thinking about it, i almost wonder if the Commandant's comments aren't part temper tantrum, "If this is what you give me to work with, then this is what you're going to get."
"none of them was just seizing the entry point, but all were characterized by seizing the whole objective."
In the cases of the island-hopping, the whole objectives were relatively small, not like a continental land mass. If the Marines' focus is seizing the port and maybe 50-100 miles inland, they've seized the whole island before they can get that far.
"It is worth to note that the US ad British airborne divisions, that were designed for a similar mission (seizing entry points then being replaced) all ended up being involved in prolonged land fight in Normandy and in Holland."
Of course, once you have a bunch of tough fighters at your disposal, you're not going to want to give them up until you get to Berlin.
I think the question if one of focus. If the Marines' primary mission is amphibious assault with the objective of gaining ports, once you have the ports, the commander may well elect to keep the Marines for the duration of a continental campaign. But the primary Marine mission is seizing the immediate objective, the port.
Normandy was really a port seizure mission. We just landed at Normandy because it was determined easier to establish a beachhead in a less defended area and move from there against Cherbourg and Le Havre that to assault them directly. From the time Cherbourg was captured and reopened until the end of WWII, it was the busiest port in the world. Normandy was a huge operation. The Pacific island hops were a large number of smaller engagements, which is more in the Marines' wheelhouse.
Now about the medium/heavy... what was medium and heavy in 1960... and what is medium and heavy now are two different beasts. Differently from what game designer and former Army Intelligence officer Tyrone Bomba argues, WW2 did not delete infantry from armies. If we confine ourselves to the US military the full mechanization process was not completed until Division 86... (and then you have the birth of the light divisions...). In 1960 the bulk of the US Army infantry divisions were still a mixed force. The Big Red One had two M113 battalions, 2 Tank ones, and 6 leg infantry ones. It was a former USAEUR units only recently rotated back to the states. The Marines had the time had divisions organize in a very similar fashion. They had what they believed an effective APC in the LTVP5 (remember the idea at the time was APC as battle taxis). Of course actual combat experience prove the LTVP5 lumbering and reasonably unprotected (sarcasm). But for all purposes, including tank capabilities, artillery, and organic aviation the USMC division of the 60s was, despite the attempts to lighten it to comply with the path set by the Hogaboom board, still medium. Now...
ReplyDeletethat was 1960... in 2020 the Division has not changed really, but its relative weight has. Tanks are M1A1HC so still heavy... there are LAV25 (itself a strange beast) artillery is inline with current conceptions even if all towed, and the 8" have disappeared. The infantry... well it is mounted on lumbering, reasonably unprotected (sarcasm again) APC. Right now they are ot light but neither really medium in common sense terms (but look at the medium forces field by the Army... the Stryker... a decade of playing Combat Mission Shock Force and I have still to really understand the Stryker...). I agree that they need a proper IFV (but that will not happen with Berger), and this is not something only me and you argues, but it was a need Ken Estes identified back in time... but one of the counterargument is that a proper IFV is not needed by an amphibious strike force because it is not needed in the immediate AA area. and despite me being a former trackhead... it made sense. An IFV will not be of any use in the immediate assault anyway if opposed, and irrelevant if unopposed. It will be useful in exploitation, but here is the crux of what it appears is the real meaning of medium force. XX and XXI century dragoons. Move mounted, fight dismounted. Here something like the AAV7 despite is evident shortcomings works well. But then you have seen a penchant by some commanders to keep their infantry mounted for too long... so we are back at square one. AA requires certain compromises in the force structure. Identifying these compromises is the key. But said that I keep my idea that AA is just a mean. If you wed it as an end, its utility become limited, and it also become fixed to specific locales.
I think the Navy and the Marines need to sit down and figure out the whole littoral and amphibious concept together. Right now we have amphibs that can't do amphib ops, littoral combat ships that are of no use in the littorals or anywhere else, and Marines that are abandoning the ability to be Marines.
ReplyDeleteWe need to figure out
1) where we might use littoral or amphib operations (first island chain, eastern Med, Baltic, action against rogue state or terrorist organization),
2) what successful operations would look like, and
3) what we need to accomplish that.
My thought is that if the objective is within 50-100 miles of the coast, we probably use Marines, provided they have a way to get armor and artillery ashore. Further inland, we use airborne. The Marines' advantage is their ability to incorporate armor, artillery, and CAS. If they give those up, then they have no advantage and we might as well use airborne for everything. I can foresee an operation where we use airborne inland simultaneously with an amphibious assault, with the objective that they hook up, in order to force the bad guys to fight two fronts. We kind of did that in Normandy, although the hookups didn't seem to work as well as planned. But all's well that ends well, and for any of its faults, Normandy ended very well.
I am of the opinion that we need
1) something small that packs a lot of punch for the littorals, like a missile patrol boat,
2) some solution to the mine warfare problem,
3) some way to generate adequate NGFS,
4) some solution to the connector problem to get tanks and armor ashore, and
5) some way to direct Marine air toward CAS as their primary, if not sole, mission.
But those are just the opinions of an old gator navy sailor.
Cmdr Chip,
ReplyDeleteyou forgot an important element:
6) a strategy.
One key difference between the interwar or even the 60s and now is that I have never seen any reasoned discussion of warplans, real and mooted, opposed to general debates about nature, character, and revolutions of war. Let's wed ourselves just to the USMC. The Advanced Base Force concept stemmed out of discussion of implementation of War Plan Orange. For all its fault at least the interwar US military was devoting energy to develop and game a potential war with its assumed military adversary. The same was true for the post Korean War period, even if in a less clear cut system. To a certain extent these elements also filtered down to public and political discussion (and was not a bad thing). Now from what I have gleaned (even if I am slowly drifting away from government work for several reasons is plenty of generic/generalist debate, but little serious warplanning and wargaming. I have not yet seen any discussion of proposed military options agaisnt PRC. Yes, people from FCO, DoS, and other similar organizations will say it increase tensions But well, the US Navy had a Plan Red in the interwar period and people knew of its existence. But of course you can argue that the whole idea that as military should prepare for specific military operations runs contrary to the tenet of modern political culture and 'security studies'.
It is worth to note that reaction's to Bywater work often focused on actual miilitary details, and you can argue that it even spurred more debated about cruisers, reaction to the much more far fetched (militarily) recent work of General Shireff... more or less zero. There is something going on military simulation publications (free advertising shot... look at GMT NExt War Series, it is also used by the USMC university and also to Compass 'South China Seas' that has been introduced also to the Army War College). But I see more articles blabbering about revolutions and cyber than discussion about plans.
Once you have plans, you can work the AA and the whole USMC role into them.
"6) a strategy."
DeleteTo be fair to 'CDR Chip', he has a China strategy in mind and has discussed it extensively in other posts and comments. It's not one I agree with but he has one and I'll leave it to him to explain it to you, if we wishes.
More generally, having a coherent geopolitical strategy from which a supporting military strategy is derived has been a constant and fundamental theme of this blog. Without a strategy, all discussions about force structure occur in a vacuum and are of dubious value as they lack relevant context. The US military has substituted technology for strategy.
We have no China-focused War Plan Orange or, if we do, we certainly aren't exercising it! What we're doing is pursuing ever greater levels of technology in the hope that it will prove useful - more useful than a strategy. That's a fool's path.
ComNavOps,
DeleteThanks.
Arrigo,
I was thinking strategy would come first and would kind of drive the first three points I enumerated--where we might conduct littoral or amphibious ops, what a successful op would look like, and what we would need to achieve that.
Since ComNavOps alluded to my strategy, I'll summarize it here. I see three potential trouble spots--WestPac with China, eastern Europe with Russia, and the Mideast with Iran or some other rogue nation or terrorist organization. My basic strategic concept is that we make sure our allies in each region can handle things there, and we keep them from spreading further.
With respect to China, I don't think we can, or should want to, conduct an invasion of the mainland. But I think we are now in Cold War II, and the enemy is China not Russia. So I propose to reprise what we did with the Soviets to win Cold War I. Truman bribed up an alliance to contain Soviet expansion, and later Reagan turned up the heat on their economy and ultimately brought down the Soviet Union. I think we can do the same around the first island chain--Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, and throw in India, Thailand and Vietnam for good measure. The bribe we have to offer them is twofold:
1) We will be moving a lot of industry out of China; bring the medical and other essential stuff home, or at least to NAFTA and divide the cheap consumer goods up among those countries, enough to add about 10% to each of their GDPs.
2) China is building a military, including PLAN, to bully its neighbors into compliance with whatever China wants them to do. It's pure bullying, like the kid who used to beat you up and steal your lunch money on the way to school--until one day your big brother showed up, and then he didn't bully you any more. We can play that big brother role (the only big brother role I am comfortable with) just like we did with NATO. It means we have to plan on keeping a CVBG and an ARG in the China Sea pretty much full time for credibility, but we can do that. Port calls in Subic, Sepanggar, Singapore, Cam Ranh, and, yes, Kaohsiung on a regular basis. Get in China's face just enough for them to know what they can and cannot get away with.
If we control the first island chain through alliances, then we control the supply chain from the Mideast, that provides about 40-50% of China's oil. And since China doesn't have much discretionary oil use, that presents them with a huge problem. If PLAN has to escort tanker convoys from the Mideast, they pretty much run out of assets.
DOD has a strategy and it is impressive, comprehensive, and meticulously crafted: it is the 'budget strategy'!
DeleteLooks some of the stuff Hull and Roosevelt attempted with Japan... but this is not military strategy, it is political grand strategy. We still need a warplan Orange lookalike to have a military sensible approach to implement. Not that I think it should be the first option. And something we tend to forgot is that the JCS had warplans and SIOP for Soviet Union all through he cold war.
ReplyDeleteCMDR Chip approach made eminelty sense (no one said that containment of Japan post 37 and of Soviet Union post 48 was wrong). But it also require a back up military response, if not because we need to assure allies the alliance is not one way. Basically, without resorting to a SIOP approach defeating PRC in the way Japan or Germany were defeated is impossible. To a certain extent it is not total war, but a huge limited war. Something like the original Orange envisioned. As Orange, it is safe to accept that the plan will be reactive, in the sense it will aim to react to PRC crossing the line and threatening US allies or possession. Of course this is akin to say well there weill be a war and we will fight it...
2nd the plan must take into account potential alliances. Basically if PRC gets support if not outright participation of Russia and or Iran, it made a stand off blockade a moot point. Mainland China is certainly out of bounds for logistical reasons. Even if I am not excluding the option of a land campaign in Hainan, or against specific coastal targets. Said that... and being mindful of reply characters constraints, I see the opportunity for strategic/operational AA operation either in Taiwan or Vietnam. Certainly in the former they will be needed at least as a threat to force the diversion of PLAGF assets, and certainly it is the only way to make a meaningful contribution without pre-positioned heavy brigades. Vietnam, well this time the length of the country works in our favor. A realistic AA capability will force diversion of assets to the coasts decreasing the potential numerical disadvantage of the PAVN. The last chap who thought he could finish off a land campaign with at least one flank exposed to the sea was Comrade Kim senior... and was blasted by Peng De Huai. Worst case scenario could be the need to recapture Guam/Okinawa/Philippines, and here landing would be the only way forward.
Of course this flies int he face of all what Berger is doing and also of a lot of new age thinking on security studies... but who cares?
"But it also require a back up military response"
DeleteAbsolutely. We definitely need a War Plan Orange for China. And we need to exercise it enough that we know how to execute it and China knows that we know.
One reason that NATO worked is that we had a war plan for the USSR and we exercised it frequently, on paper and on the ground. A lot of the paper exercises did not end well, in large part because we overestimated what the Soviets had. I know at one time the thinking in NATO was that the Swedes probably had a better military than most of our allies, particularly its air force and if the Swedes came in we would win but if they didn't we'd be in trouble. Fortunately for us, the Soviets realized that even what NATO had would have been enough to give them problems. I remember working on an oil and gas deal for Sakhalin Island, and one of the clients was a Brigadier in the Louisiana National Guard. He came back from a trip to Moscow and said that their infrastructure was so bad that they would spend the first two days overrunning NATO, and the third day turning around and going back to where the army could feed them.
I think it is extremely important not to underestimate China. I don't see any way that we can execute and sustain an invasion of China. I don't think we could get close enough to make it happen until we knocked out their A2/AD capacity, and just the sheer size and numbers would make it a bloodbath.
But realize that they aren't supermen, they have weaknesses, and we can successfully exploit those weaknesses if we do it right. One, they are a bunch of people who really don't like each other. The warlike north doesn't get along with the commercial Yangtze Valley, and neither gets along with the Cantonese south, not to mention Tibet and the Muslim west. Their current plan is to export cheap consumer goods and use the cash to build make-work projects (remember the empty cities) with no economic value, just to keep everybody too busy to revolt. That falls apart if they can't export, obviously. It also falls apart if they can't get enough oil to keep it going. And if PLA has to address massive internal strife, they don’t have a lot left to fight externally. So if we and our allies control the first island chain, we can keep them under tremendous economic pressure. That's the geopolitical strategy.
I’ll leave the war plan to people with better intel than I have.
"if PRC gets support if not outright participation of Russia and or Iran"
DeleteIran, not so much. Alliance with Iran gets oil through the Straits of Hormuz, but not around India or through the Straits of Malacca. Iran is a place that an amphibious assault might well be useful. And they are a bunch of folks who don’t like each other, either.
But Russia, yes. Russia gives China an entirely overland route for everything. Therefore it seems to me that triangulating Russia against China would be a viable geopolitical strategy. We have some leverage there. Since Russia no longer controls the Iron Curtain satellites, its western borders have become a lot harder to defend. The northern Europe plain runs from the Ardennes to the Urals, with very few natural barriers (other than the Russian winter). That lack of natural borders is one reason why Germany has historically been so warlike, and why Poland has moved all over for centuries, depending on where the Russians and Germans (and occasionally, the Swedes) extended their reach.
In the Iron Curtain days, they could anchor their western defense in the Carpathian Alps on the south side and the Baltic on the north, a front of about 300 miles or so. Now they have to defend from Murmansk to Rostov, several thousand miles, and they no longer have the Caucasian mountains to anchor their southern border. Plus, demographics mean that the Russian Army is going to start to run out of 20-year-olds in about 10 more years. If we could lower Putin's fears about invasion from the west—he has them, and they are real—then he could put pressure on China from another direction. If we cut off China’s oil, one of their options would be to invade oil-rich Siberia. I could see Tom Clancy’s Bear and the Dragon scenario where we admit Russia to NATO and help them protect Siberia.
Oh, Point number 6 was not raised against CMDR Chip, but more as a criticism of the current lack of warplans debates in the US government and military establishment.
ReplyDelete'More generally, having a coherent geopolitical strategy from which a supporting military strategy is derived has been a constant and fundamental theme of this blog. Without a strategy, all discussions about force structure occur in a vacuum and are of dubious value as they lack relevant context. The US military has substituted technology for strategy.'
One of the reasons I pop her rather than warisboring or warontherocks... though probably is more the US government and civilian thinkers rather than the us military.
As a newbie among giants, please excuse my simplistic view. I see the Air Force to control the air, Navy to control the seas and Army to control the land.
ReplyDeleteWhat is left, is that place where the land, sea and air meet. Thus, the Marines.
The Marines should not invade China, just like they did not invade Japan. They essentially were a counter-attacking force in WW2 and would be now too. They would take or hold islands and other near-ocean areas. Their air power, artillery and etc. should reflect this, since form follows function.
They are not the Navy, so A-10’s could use dirt strips. Artillery should be mobile. Tanks are great, if they can be brought into rough beaches.
Of course, this is simplistic but maybe common sense can have a place in current thinking.
I feel that the ability to make opposed landings is essential if the Marines are to be something other than extensions of either the Army or Navy, or some shared unit of both.
I think that your understanding of the pre-1963 role[s] of the Corps is a bit lacking.
ReplyDeleteThe Marines were only a "specialized amphibious operations" force as you describe for a relatively brief period during and after WW2. Before that they were doing things like boarding and defending warships (their original mission), defending the Western legations in Beijing from the Boxers, fighting Banana Wars in Nicaragua and Haiti, participating in 1918's Spring Offensive at Belleau Woods and elsewhere, and otherwise acting as a more generalized expeditionary infantry force.
They became a specialized amphibious force in WW2 because that was what the US needed for its island-hopping Pacific Campaign. There has been less need for such specialization since (and no significant contested amphibious assaults since Inchon) and so the Marines once again reverted to their historical role as a general expeditionary force. They incorporated more airpower because they correctly recognized that it was critical to the success of such operations, both for deployment and support.
I believe that if they had remained a specialized amphibious force they would have long since been absorbed into the Army. That simply wouldn't have been enough of a role to justify a separate force.