Let’s briefly remind ourselves of some historical examples
of command and control, good and bad:
Midway
At the time of Midway, the Navy’s carrier force was
committed to battle and the outcome would determine the fate of the Pacific war
for at least the next year. If there was
ever a time for the remote naval commander (Nimitz) to attempt to micro-manage
a battle, this would seem to have been it.
Instead, Nimitz resisted the temptation and issued the following order
to Admiral Spruance, the local commander at Midway:
In
carrying out the task assigned in Operation Plan 29-42 you will be governed by
the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean the
avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces without
good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to
the enemy. (4)
Nimitz offered his local commander generalized guidance and
trusted the commander to act accordingly, using his best judgment. As it turned out, Spruance executed the
mission splendidly. He was aggressive as
needed and also exercised caution as appropriate when he opted to run on the
evening of June 4 to avoid the possibility of a night surface battle with
Japanese battleships.(4)
Nelson at Trafalgar
While Nelson was, of course, present at Trafalgar, he was
remote in the sense that ship to ship communication was very difficult in those
days, bordering on impossible in the heat of battle. Therefore, Nelson briefed his ship captains
on his general plan and intent and then, when the battle began, left each
captain (the local commander, so to speak) to act as they saw fit within the
context of the overall intent. The
result was a brilliant victory.
President Carter’s Hostage
Rescue
President Carter not only exerted a high level of remote
command and control but also planned much of the hostage rescue mission.
…
we had to have six functioning helicopters. So I ordered eight helicopters …
(5)
Carter continued to exert remote command and control right
up to personally making the decision to abort the mission. The result was a dismal failure.
Benghazi Embassy
The 2012 Benghazi embassy disaster was due in large measure
to extreme levels of remote command and control both leading up to the event
and during the actual fighting. Multiple
available response forces were alerted and left holding or told to stand down
while various layers of remote command and control debated about what to
do. For example, from the Wiki write up
of the incident,
By
4:30 p.m. ET, Pentagon officials had informed Defense Secretary Leon Panetta about the attack. The Pentagon ordered an unmanned
aerial vehicle that was in
the air conducting surveillance on militant camps to fly over Benghazi. The
drone arrived at 11:10 p.m. local time (5:10 p.m. ET) and began
providing a video feed to Washington. At 5:41 p.m. ET, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton telephoned CIA Director David Petraeus to coordinate.
In the end, they did nothing and disaster resulted.
Soldier Cams
There is no better example of remote command and control
than the existence and use of individual soldier cams. These represent the epitome of micro-managing
with remote commanders sitting in control centers watching events play out and
issuing orders, often to individual soldiers.
Cold War Carrier
Groups
During the Cold War, as the Soviets and Americans played
naval cat and mouse, US carrier groups doctrinally operated under strict
emissions control (EMCON) with no communications, whatsoever. The local commander was left to execute the
mission as they saw fit. Indeed, one of
the aspects of future war that no one is considering, today, is that in peer
combat, ships will be operating under EMCON, as we did during the Cold War, so
the sooner we learn to get comfortable with local command, the better.
These examples, good and bad, are not intended to be
all-inclusive or to prove or disprove anything.
They are intended simply to illustrate the concept.
It has generally been acknowledged in the US military that
remote command and control does not work and that the local commander should be
left to act as he sees fit. Despite that
historical, institutional wisdom, our current military leaders are working as
hard as they can to do the exact opposite.
The goal of today’s military leaders seems to be to exert control over
every sensor, weapon, and individual in a battle.
Contrary to the current trend of ever greater
micro-management, we need to give local commanders greater leeway and ultimate
command authority. We need to support
local commanders, not command and micro-manage them. We need to revert to ‘commander’s intent’
philosophy and then allow the local commanders to implement the intent as they
see fit.
So, with all that said, what is our current military
leadership actually pushing for? That’s
right … more micro-management. Look at
the current push to produce mega computerized battle management software suites such as those listed below.
- Air Force Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) which seeks to connect all four services’ forces in all five domains of war: air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.(1) This one is the very definition of micro-management on a mega-scale!
- Raytheon Multi-Domain Command & Control (MDC2) concept.(2) A Raytheon graphic of the system actually says, “Battle Manager” (6), as one of its core functions – that’s micro-management of the worst kind.
- Lockheed Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS).(3) The name says it all !
 |
| Lockheed Theater Battle Management System Exercise |
These are the systems being pitched to, and pursued by, the
US military. They are micro-management
taken to the extreme with the system seeing what each individual soldier,
sailor, ship, and aircraft sees and directing the actions of each on a second
by second basis – which, of course, is the Holy Grail of the modern US
military.
 |
| Raytheon Multi-Domain Command and Control |
One final, and overwhelmingly important, aspect of this
discussion is that a future peer war is going to degenerate into local command
despite our best efforts. The combined
effects of cyber attacks on our command and control software and networks, GPS
disruption, communications jamming, sensor disruption and destruction,
satellite destruction, network attacks and hacks, and the inevitable confusion
(‘fog’) of war will conspire to prevent the micro-management we so desperately
want to implement. When that happens,
our local commanders will be left on their own – for the first time in their
careers. Like any first time event, it
will not go well. The local commanders,
being unused to thinking on their own and bereft of guidance from above, will
flounder and make devastatingly fatal mistakes because they will have had no
experience at managing their own battles.
We need to immediately begin exercising local command. We need to construct complex and challenging
exercises, provide the local commanders only ‘commander’s intent’ for guidance,
and then sit back and let them manage their battles. At first, it won’t be pretty. In fact, it will be downright ugly but that’s
the point: to make the mistakes in
peacetime exercises rather than war where the stakes are life and death.
(1)Breaking Defense website, “Air Force
ABMS: One Architecture To Rule Them All? ”, Sydney J. Freedberg,
8-Nov-2019,
https://breakingdefense.com/2019/11/air-force-abms-one-architecture-to-rule-them-all/
(2)Breaking Defense website, “What Multi
Domain C2 May Look Like: Raytheon’s Rick Yuse ”, Colin Clark, 19-Jul-2018,
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/07/exclusive-what-multi-domain-c2-may-look-like-raytheons-rick-yuse/
(4)Naval War College Review, “Deconstructing Nimitz’s
Principle of Calculated Risk”, Vol 68, No. 1, Article 4, Robert C. Rubel, 2015,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1180&=&context=nwc-review&=&sei-redir=1&referer=https%253A%252F%252Fwww.bing.com%252Fsearch%253Fq%253Dmidway%252Borders%252Bbased%252Bon%252Bcalculated%252Brisk%2526form%253DEDGEAR%2526qs%253DPF%2526cvid%253D866ac8a032e44f7fb0b8902dd047e336%2526cc%253DUS%2526setlang%253Den-US%2526PC%253DDCTS#search=%22midway%20orders%20based%20calculated%20risk%22
(5)https://www.thehistoryreader.com/us-history/president-carter-iran-hostage-crisis-attempted-rescue/
Politics, era of 24 hours non-stop news, President CIC.
ReplyDeleteThe pressure is always on to convince the voters that President is the greatest and to ensure his re-election and with todays comm tech giving him the opportunity to micro manage and so cannot resist the temptation to take direct control, the current generation of admirals, generals etc it seems have no trust in their subordinates and afraid of failure if they do not personally take control and willingly agree to micro manage, if successful it will gain massive favorable PR for themselves and President, if a failure just offload responsibility onto their subordinates.
"afraid of failure"
DeleteThey're victims of the zero defects mentality that they, themselves, created.
Back in the early 1980s, as a Naval Reservist I attended a two-week ASW course that was also attended by the CO of the ship that went in to rescue the Mayaguez. He described the experience as a conversation on the Hi-Comm network, "My rudder is right, Mr. President, I'm coming to new course 290." That is no way to run an operation.
ReplyDeleteOne other piece of what I think is collateral damage. The navy doesn't have more admirals than ships (284 versus 290, last I checked) but it's way too close. And I think a lot of that creep at the top either drives, or is driven by, the need to micromanage everything.
Completely concur. In every ship I commanded, there was a fire axe in a case on the Radio Central bulkhead. On the case there was a plaque reading "In case of war, use axe to break radios". Only half kidding. BTW: Most senior officers seeing this smiled.
ReplyDeleteThis reminds me of the movie Aliens, when the LT with 'simulated' experience and soldier cams tried to run the mission remotely. "Game over, man!"
ReplyDeleteYou have to wonder how well this stuff will work in a wartime environment with both jamming and EMCON. My guess is, not very well.
ReplyDeleteI can't say this across the board, but these systems don't appear to be pushing for more micro-management at all. TBMCS, for example, appears to be designed to streamline generation of the ATO, and speed collection and dissemination of more detailed information down the food chain.
ReplyDelete"TBMCS can generate more detailed air tasking orders -- three times the present level of information, providing more detail about targets and the mission, requiring one-third fewer planners and in half the time."
https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2000-10-16-Lockheed-Martins-TBMCS-Command-and-Control-System-for-Air-Combat-Approved-For-U-S-Forces#:~:text=Bringing%20the%20power%20of%20integrated%20information%20technology%20to,expected%20to%20be%20certified%20by%20the%20government%20
The issue of micro-management is less about a particular system, and more about doctrine and training, and commanders having sufficient trust in their subordinates to carry out their intent.
As pointed out in the post, the name says it all. It's the very definition of micro-managing. 'Battle Management' (from the name) IS micro-managing when the battle is managed by someone other than the local commander.
DeleteAn ATO IS micro-managing. When a remote commander specifies what aircraft fly what missions against what targets using what munitions, that IS micro-managing. Now, one can legitimately argue whether the benefits outweigh the drawbacks but there's no arguing that the ATO is micro-managing.
Consider this: when a real war occurs and our comms and under attack, what do you think the chances are of being able to produce and disseminate a daily ATO? We barely managed to do so in Desert Storm when we were completely unhindered. In a peer war, there's no chance of it happening. The sooner we learn how to decentralize the air war, the more effective we'll be in a peer war.
Likely from the same Lockheed source you quoted,
""TBMCS integrates all command and control centers, and provides comprehensive air battle planning and mission execution functionality for all the services," said Terry Drabant, President, Lockheed Martin Mission Systems. "The system gives commanders a high-level system tool to decisively and strategically manage air power."
'Integrating ALL command and control centers'???
'for ALL the services'???
Again, that's the very definition of micro-managing!!!!
Micro-management is the excessive management beyond what is necessary to effectively carry out the task. USAF doctrine is not excessive. It deliberately strikes a balance.
DeleteAs far as I can tell, nothing about TBMCS changes air doctrine. It is just a bunch of data gathering, processing and dissemination tools to speed the execution of existing doctrine. So this system still follows doctrine. Nothing about TBMCS changes any degree of micro-management (or lack thereof) in existing doctrine.
Core to USAF doctrine is this notion of centralized command and distributed execution. Centralized command is necessary to maximize the effectiveness of air power, where there are limited air assets, and tight coordination between separate units is often required. It is very successful and Navy and Marine air fully buy into this doctrine. It is not micro-management.
We do need to have robust backup plans in case these communications are disrupted. But the core value of having centralized command and decentralized execution is not diminished by this risk.
Integrating command and control centers also doesn't change doctrine. It just speeds the execution of existing cross-service doctrine. The Army passes its target nominations and requirements on to the JFACC now. This integration just speeds that process.
"Micro-management is the excessive management beyond what is necessary to effectively carry out the task."
DeleteNo, that is not the definition of micro-managing. Micro-managing is the dictation by remote authority of the specific actions of a local authority.
"nothing about TBMCS changes air doctrine"
Never said it did. What it does is further increase the degree of micro-managing that is already taking place. As you correctly note, AF policy embraces and institutionalizes micro-managing.
"We do need to have robust backup plans in case these communications are disrupted."
You come so close to grasping the problem but fail to see it. If all we ever practice is central command and control, there is no possible way for a local commander to succeed when, in a real war, he suddenly finds himself bereft of the guidance he has been trained to follow. He will have no experience to fall back on. This is a recipe for disaster.
As I noted, this concept is barely justifiable and executable in low end scenarios. It will fail completely when our comms are contested and disrupted.
The AF is all about micro-managing and you acknowledge it! The difference is that you believe it to be a good thing and I believe it to be the root of future failure.
"The AF is all about micro-managing and you acknowledge it! The difference is that you believe it to be a good thing and I believe it to be the root of future failure."
DeleteIt is a good thing, in fact it's vital to the successful use of airpower.
You can't just task a squadron with a simple "go kill this target" mission, and let them work it out. Usually, it's a complex choreography of many assets including tankers, AWACS, EW and intel/recon aircraft, fighter CAP sorties, SEAD/DEAD/EW sorties, ingress/egress routes, CSAR assets, and so on. Some of which starts days or even weeks in advance. All of which is necessary to maximize the chance of success, or to even have any chance of success.
Target packages are developed well in advance with types and expected locations of resistance, types and numbers of weapons needed to defeat the target, as well as aimpoints, and imagery and other intel necessary for the actual strikers to find and hit the target.
Even CAS missions, that normally have somewhat less detailed planning, still require many of these things (e.g. tankers, AWACS location and comms frequencies, CAP sorties, intel sorties, EW/SEAD/DEAD sorties).
This process has been successfully borne out and refined over decades of use dating back to WWII.
Not following it will lead to a lot more failed missions, a lot more shot down aircraft, and far worse utilization of airpower. Probably more fratricide as well, as friendlies "doing their own thing" wander uncoordinated into fighter sweeps.
Networks failing doesn't mean the entire battle management system fails. It just means the inputs and products may be delayed. The actual process of generating and disseminating the ATO can still continue, albeit at a slower pace.
"You can't just task a squadron with a simple "go kill this target" mission, and let them work it out."
DeleteThe AF has created a self-fulfilling prophecy (which you've bought into). By removing control of resources such as tankers from the local commanders, of course the only solution is highly centralized command and control.
On the other hand, if each wing was set up with its own resources and area of responsibility then I would expect local command to work just as well as a theater-wide ATO and better because they'd be more responsive.
ATOs take quite a while to develop, as you point out. Fleeting targets are not serviced well in the centralized ATO methodology. This was demonstrated repeatedly during Desert Storm. Many targets were 'lost' due to the time delays. By definition, the ATO is always running a few to several days behind events on the battlefield.
In contrast, a well resourced local commander can respond instantly to fleeting targets.
In a fast moving peer war, the ATO will be constantly fighting last week's war. The ATO method works, somewhat, against a third world enemy that is essentially fixed in place. I do not expect it to work at all against China - and that's BEFORE we factor in communication problems.
I also note that you haven't addressed how a cut off local commander will function when his ATO doesn't appear on schedule. With no experience to fall back on and ONLY LIMITED RESOURCES under his direct command he'll be helpless and will wind up sitting around waiting for an ATO that may never show up.
You've become a victim of the third world, low end mind set where we have overwhelming superiority in everything. You should give some thought to how we're going to wage a theater wide war against China when they are moving faster than our ATO cycle (remember OODA? they'll be inside our ATO cycle!).
"On the other hand, if each wing was set up with its own resources and area of responsibility then I would expect local command to work just as well as a theater-wide ATO and better because they'd be more responsive."
DeleteDoesn't work. You end up with some wings that are over-resourced and others that are under-resourced. This is just another version of the penny packet problem. Higher commanders can see the big picture and allocate limited resources where they're needed the most.
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0610penny/
"Fleeting targets are not serviced well in the centralized ATO methodology. "
There are built-in inflection points that allow for flexibility in the process. We often re-task aircraft in flight to handle dynamic situations like time-sensitive targets and CAS.
"I also note that you haven't addressed how a cut off local commander will function when his ATO doesn't appear on schedule."
Remember, if networks fail we can actually fly the ATO around, like we did in Desert Storm.
If that too is unavailable, you hope the commander falls back on training, tactics, doctrine and their higher-up's last intent. But chances are, at that point, they are entirely defensive and fighting to survive. I'm not sure if the AF actively teaches this kind of thing. Probably would be worthwhile. Though if they are that cut off, what's the chance they actually have a working airbase left?
Back in the day, with the threat of nuclear war, forward commanders were more likely to have to take their own initiative if they lost all contact and feared the worst.
"You've become a victim of the third world, low end mind set where we have overwhelming superiority in everything. "
The genesis of centralized control and distributed execution dates back to near the beginnings of air power, through WWII and every war we've fought after that. It's a time- and battle-tested method that works. It's a big reason why we have, by far, the best air forces in the world. The Chinese have never used airpower to this extent.
We're better at it than they are. But they do have home field advantage.
"You end up with some wings that are over-resourced and others that are under-resourced."
DeleteThat's poor resource allocation by upper command.
"Higher commanders can see the big picture and allocate limited resources where they're needed the most. "
Then there shouldn't be any wings that are over-resourced and others that are under-resourced. You just contradicted yourself! Competent upper command will ensure that resources are properly allocated which invalidates your first claim. If upper command isn't competent then they have business micro-managing or producing ATOs, do they?!
" We often re-task aircraft in flight to handle dynamic situations like time-sensitive targets and CAS."
We often miss target opportunities. Any comprehensive reading of the Desert Storm books make that quite clear.
"if networks fail we can actually fly the ATO around, like we did in Desert Storm."
You are falling for the US military's habit of assuming the enemy will let us do anything we want. In a China war, I don't think flying ATOs across the Pacific and into war zones will work.
"you hope the commander falls back on training"
What training??? That's the whole point. We don't allow local commanders to command so they have no experience or training to fall back on!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
" if they are that cut off,"
Again, think China war. I can easily imagine Guam being isolated from comms but still having a fully functional air wing and base.
"through WWII"
Only partially correct. The Navy NEVER used any centralized air control. The China theater never used centralized air control until, possibly, late in the war - I'm unsure about that. The Pacific island air bases never used centralized air control.
In fact, the only centralized air control seems to have been the bomber operations in Europe and that's because the bombing campaign was being conducted as a strategic rather than operational effort.
"Then there shouldn't be any wings that are over-resourced and others that are under-resourced. You just contradicted yourself! Competent upper command will ensure that resources are properly allocated which invalidates your first claim. If upper command isn't competent then they have business micro-managing or producing ATOs, do they?!"
DeleteNo. Because there is no "proper allocation". Things can change mission to mission, day to day, moment to moment.
"We often miss target opportunities. Any comprehensive reading of the Desert Storm books make that quite clear."
Desert Storm was nearly 30 years ago. Read more recent books.
"What training??? That's the whole point. We don't allow local commanders to command so they have no experience or training to fall back on!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"
We do allow commanders to command. The ATO is just a template. Commanders deviate from it as needed. If an unexpected battle flares up somewhere, they can draw sorties tasked to other missions from all over the AO to respond to it. This is the flexibility of unity of command.
"Again, think China war. I can easily imagine Guam being isolated from comms but still having a fully functional air wing and base."
So let me get this straight. Guam is cut off, with no comms, but a fully functional air wing and base, but nobody can land there to drop off the ATO? Seems like you're bending yourself into a pretzel to try to come up with a scenario here.
I agree that bases far forward, that might come under significant attack, and could have comms disrupted should have fallback plans and training. But this should be the exception, not the rule.
"Things can change mission to mission, day to day, moment to moment."
DeleteNow you're making the argument for local command!!!!!!!!!
"Desert Storm was nearly 30 years ago. Read more recent books."
And yet you cited AF precedent going back to WWII !!!!!! Which is it? Is there something valuable to be learned from history or not? Pick a position and stick with it.
"Commanders deviate from it as needed."
Not at the local level, they don't! Not if they want to keep their command. I've seen precious little evidence of deviation from the ATO at upper levels over the years. In fact, I can't recall a single instance, ever. To be fair, I don't follow AF matters as closely so it may have happened somewhere, sometime but the overall adherence to the ATO has to be somewhere in the 99% range. It's simply not a flexible instrument.
Well, you've laid out your position and I've responded. Neither will change the other's mind so I'll leave it there. Take the last word, if you wish.
Oops, I'm sorry. I said I would leave the issue but one more thought occurs to me that should factor into your belief in centralized command and that is the fog of war. By that, I'm referring to the inevitable sensor confusion and contradictions that ALWAYS accompany combat. Those sensors can be human eyeballs or the most sophisticated sensors we've been able to create. They'll always be at least partially wrong, incomplete, and contradictory.
DeleteConsider the relatively recent supposed missile attacks on the Burke destroyer off Yemen. We couldn't even verify whether the attacks even happened despite the most sophisticated sensors in the world. One of our ships 'saw' an attack. Other ships in the same immediate area did not.
Recall the Malaysian airline flight that vanished a few years back despite flying in one of the most heavily 'sensored' areas of the world. To this day, we haven't found it.
For sake of discussion, let's say I believe wholeheartedly with you about the need for centralized command and control. The more the better! How do we handle the fog of war when our input becomes scattered, unreliable, contradictory, and confused - and that's on a good day. Remember, the enemy will be doing his best to present us with false targets, camo'ed targets, stealth targets, false signals, and so on. Half of what we 'see' will be false. The other half will be real but confused and contradictory.
Again, let's say I believe in the Holy Air Force and its giant battle management systems. I do! I believe! Say it with me … we believe! Okay, I'll settle down. How do we construct a USEFUL AND EFFECTIVE ATO when our data input (the sensors feeding our system) is so suspect? This is a sincere question that I'm not sure the AF has thought about.
It's one thing to produce an ATO for Desert Storm where we had total, uncontested control of the skies, 24/7 unhindered aerial surveillance, and an enemy who had no capability to disrupt or mislead our sensors but it's another thing to produce an ATO when half our input is wrong.
Now, let's be fair, the local command theory that some misguided people believe in will have no better quality of data upon which to make decisions but he will have the freedom to act quickly and independently to fleeting targets and will likely have a better sense of the local conditions and reality. The US military (some aspects of the AF aside) has always claimed to believe that the local commander always has a better feel for the battle than any remote commander. This 'feel' is what can allow a local commander to still function effectively in the face of poor quality input. The freedom to send an aircraft to check out a suspect report and act on the findings before the target vanishes is vital.
So, my serious question for you, me, and the AF to consider is how do we produce an ATO with significantly suspect data?
This is a lost cause. At least half your counters are just arguing for argument's sake.
DeleteI suggest go read up on how things are done today and how they evolved over time. You clearly haven't.
I'm done. Have a nice day.
Well, that's disappointing. I'd hoped you'd offer your thoughts on how to produce a useful, effective ATO when faced with a peer enemy who won't allow leisurely data collection and a plethora of exposed, fixed targets. Oh well.
DeleteHave a nice day, as well.
I understand if you don't want to discuss it but the sake of other readers, there's yet another potential serious flaw in the ATO process and that's aircraft losses.
DeleteIn Desert Storm we managed to produce a daily ATO through Herculean efforts. One of the things we could absolutely count on was that all of our aircraft were available every day for tasking. What happens when aircraft are being lost on a daily basis and that ATO that we began developing a few days/a week prior and which counted on a known, repeatable number of aircraft suddenly finds itself missing aircraft on a daily, if not hourly basis? The ATO has no ability to adapt that quickly. We're going to find ourselves in the position of issuing tasking orders to non-existent aircraft.
I'm not sure the AF has thought through the ATO process in the face of a peer war.
I understand that you're frustrated trying to defend and explain a flawed system in the face of the inherent contradictions that I've pointed out. That's the thing, though, about trying to defend a belief. If you can't, it means that the belief is likely flawed. If you can, it means you've likely got a solid, viable belief. In this case, the difficulty in defending the ATO process indicates that it's flawed and needs to be re-evaluated.
DeleteAs these ideas and systems grow, it will paralyze local commanders, who will grow accustomed to constant direction. A lack of iniative to chase and destroy fleeing enemy units, retreat from an untenable situation, or even just "taking the shot", will see units and battles lost. The difference between theatre or area commanders having good solid intel on the big picture to make informed decisions, and destroying the autonomy of individual units, is huge, and is a line that shouldnt be crossed.
ReplyDeleteI reckon it's a plot by Master Chiefs to make sure Lieutenant j.g.s aren't allowed to make decisions in the field.
ReplyDeleteWell, there might SOME merit to that hahaha, because one of the most dangerous things afloat is an 0-1/O-2 saying "in my experience..."
DeleteI think you're being to critical of Carter. On the issue of aborting the mission, other reporting shows that Carter asked for the opinion of Colonel Beckwith, the Delta Force leader of the assault element, and Carter agreed with his decision to abort the mission.
ReplyDeleteFrom Air Force Magazine! in 1999, "Kyle informed Vaught of the situation by satellite radio and the task force commander relayed that to Jones and the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, at the Pentagon. When the word got to the White House, Carter asked Brown to get Beckwith’s opinion. Told that Beckwith felt it necessary to abort, Carter said: “Let’s go with his recommendation.”
The same article stated, "Carter then told Jones, “This is a military operation; you will run it. … I don’t want anyone else in this room involved.”"
As for the number of helicopters, from the same article, "Beckwith and Seiffert had agreed that they would need a minimum of six flyable helicopters at Desert One for the mission to continue. Beckwith had asked for 10 helos on the carrier to cover for possible malfunctions, but the Navy claimed they could not store more than eight on the hangar deck."
Carter had his faults, he insisted on using non-lethal weapons as much as possible to avoid civilian casualties which didn't sit well with Delta Force.
Mark Bowden's article in The Atlantic is worth a read too.
You should have included Lyndon Baines Johnson, who micromanaged the Vietnam War from the White House.
When the President is real time conferring with the local commanders, that's the very epitome of micro-managing. Whether Carter's micro-managing made the operation better, worse, or had no effect is a pointless question. The issue is the degree of micro-managing. Even if you want to credit Carter with not harming the operation, his mere 'presence' had to be a severe distraction for the local commanders. That's the absolute best that can be said of the situation.
DeleteThe reality is that Carter, by his own admission, had a great deal of input in the planning of the mission and micro-managed the execution.
"You should have included Lyndon Baines Johnson, who micromanaged the Vietnam War from the White House."
There are no end of examples of micro-managing throughout history and few, if any, turned out well.
"helicopters"
DeleteAs far as the helos are concerned, I quoted Carter's own words from an interview he did. He states that he made the decision and issued the order for 8 helos. If you have a problem with this, take it up with President Carter!
Also, since he acknowledges making the planning decision for the number of helos, does it really seem likely to you that that was the only input he had in the planning? Of course not! He micro-managed the entire planning as well as the execution.
You've either taken Carter's comments out of context or put them in a context to support your post, which is otherwise spot on. Do you think it is possible that Carter ordered 8 helicopters based on the military's advise? And, I've never come across anything that remotely suggests that Carter's management style led the failures at Desert One.
DeleteCarter had his failings, but being a micromanager wasn't one of them.
By his own admission, he absolutely micro-managed the operation. It's not even debatable. As I said, you can debate the impact, positive or negative. I mean, come on, he - and you! - acknowledge that his local commanders were in intimate, real time contact with him. That's called micro-managing! It's the definition of micro-managing.
DeleteI'll refresh your memory of what YOU wrote:
"Told that Beckwith felt it necessary to abort, Carter said: “Let’s go with his recommendation.”
That proves - by your own writing - that Carter had real time contact, held the power of decision, and made the decision (“Let’s go with his recommendation.”). That's micro-managing. That he agreed with the local commander doesn't change the fact that it was micro-managing.
"You've either taken Carter's comments out of context or put them in a context to support your post,"
The post cites the reference. Go read it and see what 'context' you get from it. It's pretty straightforward.
I read your reference and to broaden your knowledge you ought to read the links I provided.
DeleteYou seem to have misunderstood what I wrote. Carter wasn't "in intimate, real time contact with" Beckwith or anyone else in Iran. There was a secure link between the White House and General Vaught's headquarters in Wadi Qena, Egypt. Which is understandable considering the importance and sensitive nature of the mission.
Communications were passed along the chain of command between the White House and the team in Iran. From Bowden's article, "Kyle and the chopper crews said they were ready to proceed with five helicopters, but that would require trimming the assault force by twenty men. Beckwith refused. “We all go or nobody goes,” he said. The question was passed up the chain to Washington, where Secretary of Defense Harold Brown relayed the situation to Brzezinski in the White House. The national-security adviser, who only minutes earlier had been told that all six choppers were refueling and that the mission was proceeding as planned, was stunned. He quickly assessed what he knew, and engaged in a little wishful thinking. He imagined Beckwith, who had been so gung-ho in his visit to the White House, fuming in the desert, eager to proceed but stymied by more-cautious generals in the rear. So he directed Brown to tell the commanders on the ground that if they were prepared to go ahead with only five choppers, they had White House approval. He then left to find Carter."
If Carter micromanged the mission, he wouldn't have relied on so many intermediaries for information or to exert command and control over the mission. Again, there is nothing in the many dozens of books, reports, articles, and research theses, you name it, written on the subject that even remotely suggests that Carter micromanaged this mission or that any of his decisions affected its outcome.
Carter made the decision to abort. That's the definition of micro-managing! How are you not getting this?
DeleteLet me refresh your memory of your own statement,
"other reporting shows that Carter asked for the opinion of Colonel Beckwith, the Delta Force leader of the assault element, and Carter agreed with his decision to abort the mission."
Carter made the decision! How are you not getting this?
Since you read the reference I provided, you apparently now agree with Carter's own words that HE selected the number of helos in the planning. Again, that's micro-managing. How are you not getting this?
Carter aside, you even acknowledge that the mission was micro-managed:
"The question was passed up the chain to Washington, where Secretary of Defense Harold Brown relayed the situation to Brzezinski in the White House."
That's the definition of micro-managing. How are you not getting this?
I've got to hand it to you, you've documented that the mission was micro-managed more thoroughly than I did! How are you not getting this?
"Carter made the decision to abort."
DeleteNot true. Carter, when told about the insufficient number of helicopters to proceed with the mission, agreed with the military's decision to abort the mission.
Maybe this is a case of looking at the same glass of water and coming to two different conclusions about what it means.
The criteria to abort the mission at Desert One was determined as part in the mission planning stage. When that criteria was met at Desert One, the military recommended aborting the mission. Granted, the Air Force thought they could go with 5 helicopters but that have meant going with a smaller assault force, which could have led to failure if they met a determined resistance.
Much has been written on this subject and I have yet to come across anything that criticizes Carter's leadership or decision making process.
My question about Carter's Iran hostage rescue mission has always been this.
DeleteSuppose you don't have the problems in the desert. Suppose you get to Tehran and land and the hostages are right where they are supposed to be, and you get them and you get them loaded on the helos. So everything has gone swimmingly to this point.
Now what? How do you get out of Iran?
https://blog.linksinternational.com/hs-fs/hubfs/micro-management-dilbert-600x181.png?width=600&name=micro-management-dilbert-600x181.png
ReplyDelete(Don McCollor)...Dan Gallery with his WW2 ASW carrier task group in the Atlantic wrote that Adm. Ingersoll would assign an operating area and would pass all information available (without comment or orders). The carrier captain (who was also task group commander) was on his own. He could even leave the operating area if he had good reason...
ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
ReplyDeleteNot sure what I missed... But that ⬆ I hafta disagree with. While there is generally a 'regular' bunch here, newbs and repeat offenders alike can learn a lot here. The sheer volume of work put in, and the knowledge behind it deserves some respect. I dont always agree, but if I cant disprove or sell a different veiwpoint, I sit down and listen. And IF theres some ego involved, well look at the sheer volume of good conversations created over YEARS....!! Itd be hard not be pretty sure of yourself and your ideas at this point, hes earned it....
DeleteAnd as a quick note... Ive spent many an evening reading old posts, and ive noticed a trend in recent months... I seen a lot more "im not sure" or "i could be wrong" from CNO recently... So as far as what you've said, I cant agree....
Delete"I seen a lot more "im not sure"
DeleteIn the early years of the blog, many of the topics were pretty straightforward and factual. As time has passed, the basic topics have been addressed and the topics have become more nuanced and speculative. Obviously, this entails discussion of points that are not demonstrated facts. When this occurs, of course I qualify my statements with "I could be wrong". This allows you, the reader, to assess the degree of authority and confidence to place in the statement and suggests which statements you might want to put some time into researching on your own.
" Ive spent many an evening reading old posts"
No better way to spend an evening!
Wild Goose, I feel so bad for you that CNO is ruthlessly forcing you to come to this blog....and post too!
ReplyDeleteSeriously, my heart goes out to you and your plight.
For the silent audience watching. I have disagreed with some of ComNavOp's conclusions or emphasis in the past. I have done so in a reasoned post, my posts remain, and I have received a courteous and reasoned response. However, I find a lot more to agree with than disagree with on this blog, and I feel it is always worth the read. On the big things I think ComNavOps is very right. Our modern ships are fragile, and there is something very wrong with the current state of naval acquisition in the western democracies, so much so I feel compelled to add to the voices here. ComNavOps is willing to host robust discussion, which is not universal. There is much here worth the read.
ReplyDeleteI would echo your comments, Brendan. ComNavOps and I have disagreed on a number of things, but we agree on precisely the points you listed. I think it is useful to discuss what we should be doing instead of building fragile and too expensive and all too often virtually useless ships. ComNavOps and I have disagreed about what we need to be doing instead. I favor more amphibious capability, and I am more a proponent of Zumwalt's high/low mix concept. But I think the discussions are very useful, and I only wish I felt that those in charge were having similar discussions.
Delete" I only wish I felt that those in charge were having similar discussions."
DeleteI think the crux of this problem is that the Navy doesn't really believe that they will ever be called on to fight a real war. Thus, it really doesn't matter to them what kind of ships or force structure they build. Until very recently, the Navy has refused to acknowledge that China is even a rival let alone an enemy.
Once you acknowledge that you have an enemy, as we did pre-WWII with Japan, then you can begin to wargame and start building a useful force. The USN, even now, doesn't really believe in enemies as witnessed by the lack of war plans (War Plan Orange) and war games. They're more focused on Congressional budget games than wargames.
We need to shift our focus from diversity, gender, green, etc. (which are all Congressional pet programs) to combat. However, until the Navy wholeheartedly commits to recognizing an enemy, nothing will change.
Interestingly, the Marines seem to have wholeheartedly acknowledged China as the enemy although their response has been a disaster. Still, at least they recognize the enemy.
The Army, for some bizarre reason, has acknowledged an enemy, Russia, but it's the wrong enemy! I assume this is because they don't see a role for themselves in a China war.
The Air Force's only enemy is themselves but they don't recognize it.
Comparing the services, I am reminded of a British joke.
DeleteAt a joint services training session, the instructor asked, "What would you do if you found a scorpion in your tent?"
The Royal Navy guy said, "I'd stomp it and kill it."
The British Army guy said, "I'd put on my boots and stomp it to nothing."
The Royal Marine said, "I'd pluck out its stinger and eat it."
The RAF guy said, "I'd call room service and ask why is there a tent in my room."
That's a good one! :)
DeleteSeriously, it is fascinating to observe the various service's responses to China and the world. They clearly demonstrate the different cultures among the services and the way that the services raise and indoctrinate their young.
Instead of an occasional open post, I may have to start an open comedy post!
DeleteIt's hard to fault the individual services when we don't have a grand strategy at the top. I don't know that we've had anything approaching a grand strategy since the Berlin Wall fell. Without a clear objective, the focus shifts to currying favor with congress to win the funding battles.
DeleteThe worst case scenario is fighting Russia and China simultaneously, while dealing with a threat or threats from a rogue nation or terrorist organization. I think we can hedge that diplomatically by triangulating Russia against China. Due to demographics, Putin starts running out of soldiers in about 10 years. If we can hold off Putin’s ambitions until then, he may need us more than we need him. With over a billion Chinese, Xi doesn't really have that problem, although their demographics are not great either. If we can solidify an alliance around the first island chain, and protect them from Chinese conquest/occupation, then over time we can wear down China’s economy. Truman bribed up an alliance to stop Russian expansion in Europe, and Reagan applied pressure to their economy to win Cold War I. I think the same plan can work to beat China in Cold War II, but we need to get high behind it in a hurry or it will be too late. Current service dilly-dallying will kill us.
In planning for the worst case—2 wars plus an asymmetric fight somewhere—I would orient the services as follows:
- Army – continental land wars against peer armies (Russia and China)
- Air Force – strategic bombers and land-based ICBMs, continental air defense, and close air support for Army operations (and if they don’t want the CAS mission, then give it and the A-10s to the Army)
- Navy – submarine ballistic missiles, control of the seas (meaning that we can use them, but enemies can’t), and (with Marines) littoral operations (green water to 50 miles inland) including amphibious operations (target areas first island chain, eastern Med, Baltic)
- Marines – littoral operations (with Navy), asymmetric warfare against rogue nations or terrorist organizations
Then have each service develop war plans to address their assigned pieces of the puzzle, design the force they need to execute those plans, and conduct realistic real-world training to prove or disprove their concepts.
The fleet I would build to accomplish the Navy purpose is slightly different from ComNavOps’s, but includes:
- 12 CVBGs, each with 1 Nimitz and 1 Kitty Hawk; primary mission power projection, secondary mission sea control
- 8 surface action/hunter-killer groups (SAG/HUK), each with 1 big-gun and big-missile battleship and 1 ASW helo carrier, primary mission sea control, secondary mission amphibious assault support
- 12 SSBNs, 50 Virginia VPM SSGNs, 30 smaller SSNs, and 30 AIP submarines; SSNs and SSGNs could join each CVBG and SAG/HUK
- 10 amphibious squadrons of 6 smaller amphibs, each squadron capable of lifting 3200 Marines and equipment, including an infantry battalion, tank company, amphibious armor company, artillery company, and air element
- As the new amphibs come in, convert the LHAs/LHDs to interim Harrier/Lightning Carriers until the Kitty Hawks come in, and convert the San Antonios to ABM ships
- 20 escort squadrons, each consisting of 1 gun cruiser with AAW and UAV/USV/UUV capability, 2 AAW destroyers, 3 GP escorts, and 4 ASW frigates
- 15 coastal/littoral squadrons, each consisting of 2 ASW corvettes, 1 land attack corvette, 1 patrol boat, 2 mine countermeasures ships, and 2 AIP submarines
- Enough auxiliaries to keep the fleet replenished and repaired
I focus on task units rather than individual ships, and try to provide units for every task we may realistically face. That works out to about 600 ships, total, and by mixing top end (high) and cheaper (low) ships, it can be built for about what the Navy is going to spend to get to 355. I believe that force could win any war at sea, and contribute significantly to winning any war ashore, that we are apt to see in the reasonable future.
"the focus shifts to currying favor with congress to win the funding battles."
DeleteIn industry, this would be - and is - a completely understandable and almost reasonable action. One would hope, however, that in the defense of our country, where people serve for reasons of patriotism, honor, and service, that our leaders would aspire to loftier goals than grubbing for funding. Sadly, this appears not to be the case and is, by itself, sufficient justification to fire every flag officer.
"The worst case scenario is fighting Russia and China simultaneously,"
DeleteThis is an example of the kind of strategic thinking, or lack thereof, that I'm constantly pushing in this blog. There is almost zero chance that we will have to fight Russia either singly or in combination with China. Why is there no chance? Because Russia presents zero threat to us. They do not border us. There is no US territory they can seize. They have no ability to significantly impact our economy through military (or other!) means. In short, there's nothing they can do that presents a vital national security threat to us. There's simply no need to engage them.
Well, what if they attack Europe? That's Europe's problem and Europe has more than enough combined military strength to handle Russia.
What if Russia joins China in a war against us? Again, Russia has almost zero ability to wage war against us in the Pacific theater. They just don't have assets with sufficient range to reach us.
Of course, all this is predicated on getting out of that deadweight of NATO and getting Europe to stand on its own.
We need to study, ponder, and recognize the global strategic realities as we consider our own military focus … and we're failing to do that. At least here, on this blog, I'm going to continue to push strategic realities and provide a voice of reason.
To be pedantic : The narrowest distance between mainland Russia and mainland Alaska is approximately 55 miles. However, in the body of water between Alaska and Russia, known as the Bering Strait, there lies two small islands known as Big Diomede and Little Diomede. Interestingly enough, Big Diomede is owned by Russia while Little Diomede is owned by the US. The stretch of water between these two islands is only about 2.5 miles wide and actually freezes over during the winter so you could technically walk from the US to Russia on this seasonal sea ice.
DeleteRussia's demographics give them about 10 more years before finding soldiers, sailors, and airmen for their army, navy, and air force will start to become major problems. If Putin is going to do anything, he has to do it quickly. Given his precarious situation, we may be able to do a lot with triangulating Russia against China.
DeleteMake no mistake, we are in Cold War II, and this time the enemy is China, not Russia. We need a grand strategy that reflects that reality, and we need a military strategy to support that. Right now, we have neither.
I agree that there is a lot of good stuff on this blog but I have also had posts deleted and had further posts blocked in the same manner as Wild Goose. It weakens the overall level of debate in my opinion.
ReplyDeletePosts that meet the Comment Policy stand. Those that don't are deleted. It's as simple as that. If you've had posts deleted then they didn't meet the criteria. My agreement or disagreement is NEVER a factor.
DeleteThe fact that I'm allowing this comment to stand demonstrates a remarkable degree of patience since it violates the Comment Policy by being unproductive and failing to further the discussion of the post topic. I'm allowing this to stand in the hope that it will enlighten you about the Comment Policy. I urge you to read/re-read it and refresh your memory.
Blog management is not a subject for debate. That's my responsibility.
The wise would take this comment as a signal to move on to other topics.
ComNavOps and I have agreed on some things and disagreed on others, and a time or two we've gotten a bit annoyed at each other, but it has always been professional and honest. I'm sorry that some don't see it that way.
DeleteI have considered your words further CDR Chip.
DeleteI don't see provocative questions or statements from a blog author as a problem. In fact, the more I think about naval matters, the more I think we need more people questioning existing assumptions.
I read one of ComNavOps posts and think "That's certainly different", but when I try to disprove him as a thought exercise, I often end up concluding that "I can't prove him wrong". His posts, and his feedback to myself has helped me refine my own thinking on these matters.
ComNavOps has a great deal of knowledge, and his own brand of wisdom, and is willing to engage with random strangers on the internet who show an interest. His time and energy here is a rare gift, and I too am sorry if it is being misinterpreted or misconstrued. Certainly this blog presents a concept of preparing for the next naval war that is more internally coherent than anything else I can see in the public domain.
Brendan,
DeleteYes.
I think ComNavOps does a great service by questioning Navy and Marine decisions, and by providing a forum for others to discuss.
I think it helps all our thinking.
Not sure where this belongs, but I just ran across something called, "U.S. Navy Naval Transformation Roadmap," at https://www.navy.mil/navydata/transformation/trans-toc.html.
ReplyDeleteHas anybody here seen that? Does any of that stuff work?
It strikes me as a lot of bureaucratic rationalization gobbledygook, but maybe it makes sense to somebody.