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Wednesday, September 26, 2018

The Definition of Insanity

What’s the definition of insanity?  You know the answer – performing the same set of actions and expecting a different result.

The Navy is looking at the next surface combatant ship, the Future Surface Combatant.  Here’s a description.

Future Surface Combatant refers to a family of systems that includes a large combatant akin to a destroyer, a small combatant like the Littoral Combat Ship or the upcoming frigate program, a large unmanned surface vessel and a medium USV, along with an integrated combat system that will be the common thread linking all the platforms. (1)

So, again, we see a family of ships that will be mutually supporting and supportive of the overall naval effort. 

Navy leadership just recently signed an initial capabilities document for the family of systems, after an effort that began in late 2017 to define what the surface force as a whole would be required to do in the future and therefore how each of the four future platforms could contribute to that overall mission requirement. (1)


So …  a family of ships.  Okay.  Wait …  does that sound a little bit familiar?


SC 21 Family of Ships
If you recall, the 21st Century Surface Combatant (SC 21) program was to have been a family of ships that included a cruiser (CG-21), a destroyer (DD-21) and, later, an arsenal ship. (2)  I’m not going to bore you with a detailed description of the SC 21 program, its many name and scope changes, etc.  Details of the failed program are readily available on the Internet.  Instead, I’ll simply ask, how did that work out?  After many years and much effort and anguish, we got three Zumwalts with no main battery and no mission.



So now we’re going to do it all again?



______________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Navy’s Next Large Surface Combatant Will Draw From DDG-51, DDG-1000 — But Don’t Call it a Destroyer Yet”, Megan Eckstein, 28-Aug-2018,

(2)Wikipedia, “SC-21 (United States)”, retrieved 28-Aug-2018,



18 comments:

  1. Been there, done that, didn't work.

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  2. If at first you don't succeed, fail, fail again.

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  3. The larger ships are to be classified as Ocean Combat Ship (Possibly) or OCS(P) for short.

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  4. Huh. I saw the post title, made the connection, and assumed you were talking about the Columbia class:

    https://navaltoday.com/2017/12/26/immature-technologies-could-endanger-columbia-class-schedule-costs-gao-warns/

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  5. There's a tendency for successful acquisition programs to follow superficially similar unsuccessful ones, like Abrams after MBT-70, Virginia after Seawolf, and F-14 after F-111. After the first program tried to reach too far while burning cash all the way, the subsequent program learned their lesson and delivered a (relatively) affordable and capable platform in bulk. Hopefully we get it right this time.

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    1. Seawolf wasn't a failure like the MBT-70. It was just overbuilt and too expensive.

      The F-111 was'bleeding edge' tech combined with Mcnamara's (may he burn in hell) obsession of 'commonality' that wrecked both the USAF & USN's plans. USAF wanted a replacement for the B-66 & F-105. USN want'ed a LR fleet defense interceptor. That they had to share things made it horrible.

      Sounds familiar doesn't it? The F-35 debacle.

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    2. "tendency for successful acquisition programs to follow superficially similar unsuccessful ones"

      I really don't see this. The Virginia program had nothing in common with Seawolf other than they were both submarines. Even more true for the F-14 and F-111. I know nothing about tank acquisition programs so I can't comment on that.

      Maybe you'd like to explain more specifically how the Virginia and F-14 programs were similar to their predecessors?

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    3. The Virginia and Seawolf programs both had the same goal: Replace the LA class with a faster, quieter, pump-jet sub. It was explicitly described its proponents as a less expensive Seawolf that would give up a little tactical speed for affordability.
      We remember F-111 as a bomber, but most of its design requirements were given by the Navy, not the air force. The Navy wanted it to fill the niche later satisfied by the F-14 as a long range fleet defense interceptor, with variable geometry wings, AN/AWG-9 radar , AIM-54 Phoenix missiles, and TF30 engines, all just the same as the following Tomcat. That's a lot of commonality.

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    4. Granted, there was some degree of commonality in specifications and requirements - there couldn't help but be! The "insanity" premise of the post has more to do with program scope, structure, vision, procurement methodologies, etc. as opposed to specifying the same type of rivets.

      Of course the Virginia had the same goals. Any new submarine would have. Beyond that, the two programs had relatively little in common. The Seawolf program was intended to produce a huge overmatch for the Soviet fleet and money was almost no object. The Virginia was intended as the best submarine that could be AFFORDABLY procured and was intended to be better but not a huge overmatch. Indeed, it's arguable how much better it is than the Los Angeles class. DOT&E reports hint that it is just a fractional improvement. Two very different programs.

      F-14, similar story. The F-14 was conceived as the anti-F-111 program. It was a program intended to be exclusively and exquisitely focused on the Navy's needs rather than some kind of multi-service compromise. Again, aside from both needing wings and engines, there was little in common programatically.

      To some extent, this is a semantics type argument and probably isn't worth much more discussion. If you'd like to have the last word, feel free.

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    5. I was thinking along the same lines as Atlantic Turtle, in that failures (not that Seawolf was really a failure except that it was so expensive no navy, not even the US Navy, could afford series production of them) tended to be followed by more reasonable designs. I'm not sure that applies any more since no one is held accountable, the very few companies left can't be allowed to go under, etc. In other words, the beating will will continue until morale improves. :(

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  6. Well in your 401(k) buy Defense Stocks that do Navy work, because they will get tons of money without having to produce anything that works.

    The type of people running those failed programs are still there, the incentives for everyone involved (the MICC) haven't changed, the only thing that has changed is more money is going to be thrown at the Navy.

    What's that song line?

    "Here we go again..."

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  7. Done that betting on Huntington Ingalls been good so far.

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  8. Be grateful for small mercies, it will not be based on Zumwalt hull and may only incorporate its signature controls and IEP, integrated power system, neither think Congress will now be pressurizing for a nuclear propulsion as they did with the CCG(X) , Navy design was for a 23,000 to 25,000 ton hull with one of the Ford's 100 MW reactors.

    What is happening is the pressure Chinese exerting with their new LSC Renhai /Type 055 cruiser/destroyer class, currently eight known in build, four launched in the last 15 months, the first Nanchang only laid down in 2014, launched 2017 and now on its sea trials, expected to be commissioned 2019, displacement ~13,000+ tons, 180m x 20m & 112VLS with double hanger, makes Navy planned timescale for FSC/LSC build look positively antediluvian.

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    1. We're building frigates and old tech / obsolete Burkes while the Chinese are building 055's at a rapid rate. What's wrong with this picture?

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    2. Sigh. These are the times I dream of a asteroid wiping out D.C. (tears shed and prayers offered for the innocent, but...). There is absolutely no reason in the world other than Congress that we don't have world-competitive shipyards. If famously high-labor-cost Germany can build the world's biggest cruise ship competitively, there's no reason we can't be building naval vessels for the Free(ish) World instead of anxiously wishing from the sidelines. Dammit, there are times I think I understand the despair of those who had the curse of clear vision during the last couple of decades of the Habsburg and Romanov empires. Damn me for a romantic fool, but I think we'll get our s**t together before it's too late, but it won't be pretty, and I fear it'll be our last gasp in the same way that WWII ended the British Empire, though it took a couple of decades to unwind. I hope the world will be as kind to us as it was to Britain, but our home-grown Spartacists make me doubt it.

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    3. The Chinese have the world's largest shipbuilding industry and they now have the tech, will and funding to build the world's largest navy, mention made of a target of 351 ships by 2020/1 and don't think they will be all that many years off in building a large number of aircraft carriers. It will not be too many years before China has the premier world navy.

      This year Congress funds 3 unwanted non-operational LCS ships this year, and procure more amphibious ships, Congress justifies this by pushing Navy to evolve the role played by amphibious ships in the Navy’s 'strategic thinking', pork barrel politics reign supreme. The Navy have wasted/wasting billions on Ford, LCS, Zumwalt, MQ-25 etc., Congress and Navy make good bedfellows.

      (PS recent of example of Navy shooting itself in the foot with concurrency. Ford returned July 15, 2018 to NNS for its year long planned Phase 2 build for completion including installation of its combat systems etc.(Phase 2 build invented by Admirals to avoid breaking the Congress mandated cost cap).

      Included in Phase 2 build was the installation of the remaining 10 of its 11 weapons elevators, these 'advanced' tech elevators with magnetic levitation using electromagnets to float over a guideway are not working, Navy have now had to award new contract September 13, 2018 to FMC for a test "hybrid unit" to be configurable as an upper or lower stage elevator and will require five years of land testing, presuming "hybrid" means they are reverting back to fitting the "old" tech, cables.

      Work is expected to be completed by September 2023 so assuming on completion of successful outcome Navy will have to award contract to for eleven "modified" elevators to install on Ford causing further delays for IOC, due to the disruption caused by cutting and remodelling Ford to be able to fit the new eleven hybrid elevators, installation may cost more than the elevators).

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  9. I still have the popular mechanics magazine talking about rail guns and a fleet of trimarran ships....God I'm old.

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