It’s been reported that China is developing and has test fired a very long range,
hypersonic air-to-air missile (VLRAAM) intended to destroy large, high value
U.S. targets like the P-8 Poseidon and E-2 Hawkeye/E-3 Sentry. According to Popular Science website (1), the
missile’s characteristics are,
Length: 19
ft
Diameter: 13
in
Range: 300
miles
Speed: Mach
6
Guidance: AESA radar with backup IR/EO
Cruise
Altitude: 19 miles
The missile
has been photographed mounted on a J-16 during testing and reportedly uses a high
altitude glide profile to achieve very long ranges.
 |
| VLRAAM on J-16 |
Reportedly,
the Russians have a similar missile, the R-37 (AA-13 Arrow) which is around 14
ft long, 15 inch diameter and has a range of around 200+ miles using a high
altitude glide profile. (3) It is
deployed on MiG-31BM Foxhounds and, possibly, Su-35s. Guidance is both semi-active and active radar
homing. The missile has a 132 lb
fragmentation warhead. It may have
entered production in 2014. (2)
 |
| R-37 Missile |
By
comparison, the U.S. AMRAAM AIM-120D has a range of 90 miles.
For long
range shots, the missile reportedly is launched at high altitude and climbs
even higher to around 100,000 ft where it “glides” for much of the way to the
target.
As we’ve
noted on many occasions, range is a very misleading attribute. Without accurate targeting the longest ranged
missile in the world is useless. This is
why the “carrier killer” ballistic missile is such a hollow threat. In this case, however, the U.S.
The U.S.
Consider
some of the tactical implications of this (see, "Stealth Air To Air Combat Story").
A carrier group used to be able to count on nearly omniscient awareness
for hundreds of miles around the group thanks to the E-2 Hawkeye. If the Hawkeye is rendered a mission kill, or
a real kill, the carrier group’s situational awareness advantage disappears and
may, in fact, default to the enemy with a multitude of surface, subsurface, and
aerial sensors operating in their “home” water and air space.
Since
shooting down an incoming, hypersonic A2A missile cruising at 100,000 ft seems
unlikely, we need to come up with other counters and alternatives.
A purely
passive sensor system would be ideal.
Such technology exists in the form of EO/IR (IRST) but the range is far
too short to functionally replace the couple of hundred mile Hawkeye/AWACS
radar range.
A stealthy
and fast version of the Hawkeye/AWACS would allow the aircraft to shut down its
radar upon detection of an incoming missile and stealthily and rapidly leave
the target area but the aerodynamics of a large radome argue against effective
stealth or speed though, perhaps, enough could be achieved to increase survival
chances. Regardless, this again equates
to a mission kill.
Another alternative would be to distribute the AWACS function to a multitude (swarm?) of drones. The logistics of hosting, launching, and coordinating such a continuous and revolving cast of drones would be daunting (UAV carrier?). Even more challenging would be assembling the individual data streams from each drone into a single, coherent, comprehensive picture. Even this would only be part of the function. The E-2/3 act as battle management nodes and this function would also have to be duplicated. Still, the idea is conceptually feasible.
Another alternative would be to distribute the AWACS function to a multitude (swarm?) of drones. The logistics of hosting, launching, and coordinating such a continuous and revolving cast of drones would be daunting (UAV carrier?). Even more challenging would be assembling the individual data streams from each drone into a single, coherent, comprehensive picture. Even this would only be part of the function. The E-2/3 act as battle management nodes and this function would also have to be duplicated. Still, the idea is conceptually feasible.
The P-3/8
Orion/Poseidon that the Navy is counting so heavily on for broad area maritime
surveillance will be a sitting duck against these kind of hypersonic, long
range missiles. This is one of many
reasons that ComNavOps has been highly critical of Navy surveillance and
targeting plans.
Frankly,
this is a threat that the US
____________________________________
(1)Popular
Science website, “China U.S. 22-Nov-2016 ,
(2)Military
Today website,
(3)Wikipedia,
“R-37 (missile)”,
related is my blog post and its predecessors:
ReplyDeletehttp://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2017/06/a-possible-aew-survivability-solution.html
The first problem with such missiles is that they overfly the field of view of a typical AEW aircraft. Their radar simply doesn't look up that high (and its wavelengths may even be unsuitable for it).
So you may look-and-scoot with multiple ECM-supported AEW on station or if you want a single one you absolutely need to detect that there's a threat at all. You need to 'see' the incoming missile before it activates its own radar in a dive on your AEW aircraft.
Second countermeasure could be to shut off and sprint to outside the missile's footprint, supported by radio datalink jamming (difficult). Hawkeye is slow and AEW helicopters are even slower, so that doesn't work so well.
3rd step would be to reduce the signature (the aircraft could expose some other cross section than its top to the missile's sensor and bet on ECM). That's not going to work with Hawkeye either, nor is the use of many decoys if the missile has a good and fused sensor suite.
The final possibility would be to equip combat aircraft with AEW modules akin to the F-15E's FAST packages - with side-looking AESA antennas, cooling and power supply. A combat aircraft would stand a chance to dodge a huge missile like that with a 9...12 g manoeuvre (12 g is possible if executed by autopilot, 11 g with Libelle suit - the airframe may suffer damages, though).
It's definitely something to be concerned about. As the Popsci article implies, the Chinese are still going to need someone to spot for that missile shoot; for now, at least, fighter-sized radars can't see 300 miles away: to get a shot at that range, the Chinese are either going to need their own AWACS providing targeting data, or they'll need to get their J-20s close enough to get radar picture and datalink back. Or there's always the option of firing missiles in the general direction of the E-2 as a harrassment move, forcing it to go evasive and stop battle management.
ReplyDeleteI don't things are quite as one-sided as you portray. If the Chinese AWACS is in range to detect the E-2, the E-2 is in range to detect it, and send fighters against the Chinese AWACS.* Russian sources credit the E-2 with having longer detection range against bomber-sized targets (i.e. AWACS) vs Russian and other NATO systems: assuming Chinese systems have parity with Russian systems, we're looking at 400 mile detection range for the KJ-2000** and perhaps 250 miles for the smaller KJ-200***. AWACS vs AWACS with their attendant fighters is one way of playing it; there's also the sending of stealth fighters to act as spotters for long-range missile shoots.
On one hand, I think that's validation of sorts of the idea that you can use F-35s as spotters for Super Hornets and Eagles carrying max AAM loads; on the other hand America's lack of a VLAAM is definitely an issue. Currently the only NATO long-range AAM in inventory is the MBDA Meteor, but that's 1) not integrated to the F-35 yet, though the British and other European users intend to do so, and 2) only 320km range, vs the 480km speculated range of the Chinese VLRAAM.
*Of course, this is what the Chinese will also be doing against the E-2. AMRAAM's relatively short range means that the US fighters will need to get much closer to the KJ-2000 to take the shot, which is a definite disadvantage.
**KJ-2000 is stated to have a detection range of 450km, which is par with other AEW systems (E-3, E-2, A-50) for detecting fighter-sized targets. I run with the assumption that it can detect bomber-sized targets at 650km, or 400 miles, on par with the aforementioned systems.
***Given its size and dimensions, the assumption is that that it's on par with the Saab system.
tl;dr summary:
- The VLRAAM's long range and hypersonic speed makes it a legit threat.
- Chinese fighters do not have the radar range to exploit the VLRAAM's maximum range, so they're reliant on AWACS or J-20 to act as spotter and datalink.
- Assuming parity with Russian and American systems, Chinese AEW is probably shorter ranged than E-2, so the E-2 will probably see it first and be able to order fighters against it. However:
- We'll likely see AWACS trying to counter each other with their attendant fighters. The Chinese have the advantage in that the VLRAAM's range - over three times the range of AMRAAM - allows them to shoot and pull back first. Not sure patrolling US fighters in full burn could negate this advantage.
- US side advantage: E-2 will detect KJ-2000 first. Chinese side advantage: J-16 can fire VLRAAM much further and earlier out.
Funnily enough, I think the VLRAAM might not nescessarily affect Poseidon as much. It's a 737 airframe with 737 kinematics, and the 737 is the most common commercial airliner in the world. If the Chinese are being cautious and wanting to avoid accidentally shooting down a civilian airliner, I think it's likely that ROE for P-8 intercepts will call for visual identification. They could, of course, declare that such and such airspace is a free fire zone and they will shoot down any aircraft they see in there, but I dunno, I'm not sure that's likely, not when China has an export-reliant economy and wants to be taken seriously as a great power on the world stage.
Admittedly, this means the Chinese will "only" attack P-8s with "mere" WVR heatseekers. :V
"If the Chinese are being cautious and wanting to avoid accidentally shooting down a civilian airliner"
DeleteThat's hilarious because if there's one thing the Chinese are concerned with, it's world opinion, right?!
"reliant on AWACS or J-20 to act as spotter"
DeleteThey don't need radar contact. The E-2/3 are gigantic radar beacons! The Chinese can launch in purely passive mode from max distance.
"That's hilarious because if there's one thing the Chinese are concerned with, it's world opinion, right?!"
DeleteHence my use of the qualifier "if". :V
Even China has to be concerned with world opinion to a certain extent, and let's be real here, the Chinese are not Saturday morning cartoon villains. They can get away with supporting North Korea's existence as a buffer state, they can get away with bullying smaller countries and engaging in skewed highly beneficial deals in Africa, but a lot of that is going to change if they start shooting down airliners wily-nily (and there's a non-zero chance it might be a Chinese 737 that gets shot down; it's like the Toyota Camry of commercial aviation).
The Chinese want to be a Great Power and a major player on the world stage. They'd really like to be as influential as America - hell, Xi has been positioning himself as a saner world leader than Trump. They think differently than we do, but they're not some chaotic evil mongol horde either.
"They don't need radar contact. The E-2/3 are gigantic radar beacons! The Chinese can launch in purely passive mode from max distance."
I mean, I did say: "Or there's always the option of firing missiles in the general direction of the E-2 as a harrassment move, forcing it to go evasive and stop battle management." More to the point, your own source makes no mention at all of that tactic, which suggests to me that they're not as confident as you are that firing on passive will be as successful as you think.
I'm not as confident as you that homing on the radar emissions of the E-2 is going to be a sure thing; the E-2D's move to an AESA radar with lower emissions vs legacy pulse-doppler radars is precisely to complicate the sort of home on emission targeting you suggest. The physics of how AESA radars work mean that the AESA radar sees further than legacy systems with less emissions, meaning you have to get closer to said radar for it to trip your RWR and passive systems. Of course, the same applies for the Chinese: the KJ-2000 likewise uses an AESA radar, for the same reasons. Sure, VLRAAM has a relatively large AESA seeker head of its own, but missiles left to their own devices for targeting don't always go where they're intended to go.
That said, I totally agree on the E-3. It's a legacy pulse-doppler system: actively radiating will definitely make it a pretty obvious target.
"Even China has to be concerned with world opinion to a certain extent,"
DeleteWhatever extent that is, we haven't found it yet. They've forced down and seized a US electronics plane, seized US underwater drones, ignored UNCLOS tribunal rulings that they are signatories to, built illegal islands, made illegal EEZ and territorial claims, harassed US warships, illegally entered numerous territorial waters, ... I can go on but the point is clear. If China is concerned with international opinion, they haven't shown it yet.
"I'm not as confident as you that homing on the radar emissions of the E-2 is going to be a sure thing;"
DeleteThat's okay. That's why you're here ... to learn.
It's not necessary to "home" on a radar transmission - that would be an anti-radiation missile and there is no indication, yet, that the VLRAAM's exist in that form although it would be a logical development. Instead, the radar beacon serves simply to pinpoint an initial target location. The same could be accmplished by triangulating radio or other emissions although a giant radar beacon is probably a lot easier.
The Air Force has explicitly stated that large, non-stealthy aircraft are not survivable on the modern battlefield. This is a major reason for the cancellation of the JSTARS replacement.
I should note that the UNCLOS rulings actually screwed over China to start with - prior to signing UNCLOS, China had already claimed the Spratlys, and was given to understand that their Spratlys claims would be excepted from UNCLOS. Then there were murmurs of oil under the Spratlys. The UN said UNCLOS superseeded China's earlier claims, and VN and PH and the rest of ASEAN jumped on the Spratlys claiming bandwagon. If I were China, I'd be pissed.
DeleteAlso I feel I should point out that in all of the examples you've given, the Chinese did not escalate towards actually shooting at uninvolved people. Consider the Soviets, and the amount of flak they got over KAL 007, despite the shenanigens they got up to in the Cold War.
And IMO China doesn't lose out *that* much by having a visual ID ROE. It's not like P-8s are going to be able to evade Chinese fighters - even the old outdated Shenyang J-8 is more than a match for a P-8. Plus, it lets them concentrate their VLRAAM stock for use against AWACS (and I'm of the opinion that using AWACS killer VLRAAM on MPAs is ridiculously overkill and not a good utilisation of resources).
"It's not necessary to "home" on a radar transmission - that would be an anti-radiation missile and there is no indication, yet, that the VLRAAM's exist in that form although it would be a logical development. Instead, the radar beacon serves simply to pinpoint an initial target location. The same could be accmplished by triangulating radio or other emissions although a giant radar beacon is probably a lot easier."
DeleteDid you actually read what I wrote? I'm well aware of that. That's the point of moving to AESA radars, because the AESA radar has lower emissions making it harder for you to do the whole "pick up the emissions and figure where the emitter's position is." And let's note that from your source itself and the Chinese infographics, they don't appear confident they can do that themselves - otherwise they wouldn't be investing so much into making that sensor network of theirs.
As for the unsurvivability of large unstealty aircraft, it's a good thing an E-2 is a lot smaller than an E-3! :V The Air Force is quite right, though there's an argument that the unsurvivability of AWACS and J-STARS isn't just due to long-range AWACS killer AAMs, or even fighters, but due to the proliferation of sophisticated long-ranged SAMs and the improvements in IADS: using the 40N6 missile, with a 400km (250 mile) range, the S-400 system makes for a credible long-ranged threat against AWACS and J-STARS; keeping both assets out of range means that you have to keep them so far back they can't manage the air battle or track ground targets, and a proper IADS setup of multiple layers is quite resilient to suppression, especially if you follow the Serbian playbook of using your IADS as a threat in being to cause virtual attrition on strike packages.*
On the other hand the guy making this argument to me was a Russian Army NCO who'd spent his career in SAM regiments, so he _was_ a little biased, I think. :P
*As I recall, something like half of the 6000 or so sorties flow in the Serbian War were SEAD missions, and the Serbs liked using their radars to light up strike packages, spooking them into dropping their ordnance, going evasive and aborting the missions. While no aircraft were actually shot down, the Serbians *were* effective in keeping them from dropping their bombs on Serb forces.
Active homing AAMs are likely capable of passive homing if the emitter is within their own (usually narrow) radar band. Hawkeye's new L band radar should not enable this as active radar homing missiles usually use X-band or some X-band overlapping band, though.
Delete--------------------
AESA has smaller side lobes, but it can still be triangulated if it löooks at multiple spaced ESM in quick succession.
------------------
E-2 is likely less survivable than an E-3. The E-3 is based on a particularly fast (narrow body) airframe (C-135/Boeing 707 series) and is rated at 855 kph. The E-2 has a huge RCS with its propellers (and due to the typical doppler effects it's easily identified) and is rated at 650 kph only.
Speed matters a lot, for the hostile fighter is unlikely to be able to give mid-course updates till the missile is very close. Faster = more ability to manoeuvre away from the predicted point of intercept - the small missile radar may be unable to find the target. This is particularly relevant for a diving AAM profile.
------------------
I agree with the case that long-range SAMs (this includes SM-6) can push back AEW, tankers, EW aircraft and transports to a distance that greatly diminishes their utility. AEW may end up being good for defensive air warfare in a high end ('peer') conflict only. Tankers may end up as inter-ocean deployment enablers and for increase of fuel beyond MTOW (=refuelling a few minutes after take off and climbing).
Here's one of those (not very specific) diagrams on how such extremely long range AAMs approach the target from above:
ReplyDeletehttps://thaimilitaryandasianregion.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/screenshotatuploadcc_1519027088061.png?w=625&h=222
(AUSA has a similar graphic)
Here's a diagram for the field of view of a A-50 AEW&C (~Russian AWACS):
http://www.rufon.org/forum/noua-ordine-mondiala-(nomnwo)/al-treilea-razboi-mondial/?action=dlattach;attach=20021;image
The AEW wouldn't see such a missile combing before it's too late. No low RCS is required at all - it's about the flight profile.
*coming
DeleteHow about scores of MALD and/or MALD-J decoys in the air simulating E-2 emissions ? This would surely complicate the ability to target and and destroy actual E-2's? How good is the F-18 growler?? Can't it also frustrate targeting of E-2's and jam incoming VLAAM's?
ReplyDeleteMALD can almost certainly not emulate the new L-band radar of the E-2 and I highly doubt it's prepared to simulate the varied doppler effect of propellers. It was designed with the likes of B-52, F/A-18 in mind.
DeleteFurthermore, you can only deploy such expendable (single use) decoys when you already have a suspicion that a missile is on its way. That's far from likely.
To me what is worrisome is the general attitude that what has worked for decades and given US and West such superiority over our adversaries will just go on for ever, F-35 will solve all our air defense problems or just do nothing.
ReplyDeleteCould a Russian or Chinese VLRAAM get a mid course data update from their own AWACS or maybe from J20s ahead of firing J20s? What if a future updated VLRAAM comes with dual mode sensor, IR and radar? At that point,even going silent, with a mid course update, could the IR sensor spot an E-2 or E-3 running away? Is it possible to use BOTH modes at the same time? My inclination would be to believe it would be difficult to run away from a VLAAM dual mode seeker, especially for a tanker or a AWACS.
Plus, we are falling into a trap of our own making: we are thinking like WESTERNERS, would China sacrifice a few crews and air-frames to knock out an E-2/E-3? Hell YES!!! Let's not think that everybody else is like us and afraid to lose soldiers/pilots in a war, going after such a prize would be gladly exchanged for some Chinese pilots and jets, there's plenty more where that came from! Just because we wouldn't do it or take that level of casualties TO ACCOMPLISH THAT GOAL, doesn't mean Russia and especially China wouldn't do it!!!!
AS CNO mentioned, AWACS going off air is a mission kill, how well have we be training to fight without an AWACS playing quarterback? AS far as I know, pretty much every Red Flag has an AWACS, when was the last time we trained without one?
Really excellent comment top to bottom. Especially good question about AWACS-less training.
DeleteThere are a couple of options, using my armchair internet knowledge:
ReplyDelete1) SR-72? Mach 3 beast with sensors.
2) Aren't there articles showing planes dropping drones or missiles which give off a radar signature similar to a warplane, so the enemy thinks there are , say, 10 planes in the area, not just one? The P8 should be able to carry these and use them as decoys? Or is this too simplistic?
3) Fighter escort?
4) The F-35 can replace every type of plane and do their work (this is tongue in cheek)
Andrew
#2 was done during the Vietnam War already, such decoys existed since the 50's. Modern air defences should be very difficult to fool like that.
Deletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XSM-73_Goose
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XGAM-71_Buck_Duck
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADM-20_Quail
I'd like to point out that the DOD isn't completely unaware of the issue, and has been developing the LREW missile for a few years now. From what we have on it (literally a line item in 2018 and a piece of released concept art), it seems to be a 2 stage missile capable of fitting inside the bays of an F-22 or F-35. It might be part of the SACM program, as something half the size of an AMRAAM with a theoretical similar range and hit-to-kill would be fairly easy to strap a booster to and turn into a competent long range weapon.
ReplyDeleteIf this is basically the same as another comment I posted I apologize, Blogger seems to have eaten my comment, which included links. If not and anyone wants to see the links I'd be happy to repost them.
Keep an eye on this project for us and give us an update from time to time.
DeleteI will if anything pops up. In all honesty the first we see of it could be an F-35 shooting down a flanker over the SCS.
DeleteTaking the numbers at face value
ReplyDeleteMach 6 is 4500 miles per hour*, 75 miles per minute, for a 300mile shot, that gives us a flight time of 4 minutes
Now 4 minutes doesnt sound like a lot, but it is a lifetime in relative terms.
Ideally, the Chinese fighter will maintain a lock and guide it all the way in, but there will be US fighters intervening, so the Chinese fighter will have to switch off its radar and move around.
The AWACS will hopefully know there is incoming, and have shut off its own radar and be dodging, even an E2 can cover some distance in 30 seconds, when you consider up, down, left right, forwards, backwards.
The Chinese fighter then has to sweep the sky again to find the AWACS and update the missile.
If it waits too long to look again, or takes too long to reacquire, the missile could overshoot or simply lack the fuel to turn to the new target location.
"What if a future updated VLRAAM comes with dual mode sensor, IR and radar? At that point,even going silent, with a mid course update, could the IR sensor spot an E-2 or E-3 running away?"
No
Theres no way a missile travelling at mach 6 is going to be able to use IR.
The Mach 1 capable Storm Shadow has a detachable nose to protect the IR camera.
Even if they tried the same trick on this missile, it would blind itself in a few seconds at such high speeds, or you would need a fast engine for getting there and a slow engine for terminal attack
"Plus, we are falling into a trap of our own making: we are thinking like WESTERNERS, would China sacrifice a few crews and air-frames to knock out an E-2/E-3? Hell YES!!! "
The pilots on these suicide missions might be less agreeable
"1) SR-72? Mach 3 beast with sensors."
No air search radar.
AWACS are optimised to provide persistent, long range radar coverage and command and control.
You could make them fast, semi stealthy, ect, but what do you trim to make room?
"2) Aren't there articles showing planes dropping drones or missiles which give off a radar signature similar to a warplane, so the enemy thinks there are , say, 10 planes in the area, not just one? The P8 should be able to carry these and use them as decoys? Or is this too simplistic?"
Yes, Sort of, Yes
Decoys, are variable.
It depends what you are trying to decoy and what you are prepared to pay.
Historically, radar was pretty dumb, bits of foil to create radar returns and flares to create heat signatures, and radar (and IR) was tricked.
But its getting rather smarter, as we build better radar and better computers to interpret the information, now, a radar see's a cloud of aluminium strips, see's a cloud of aluminium strips and disregards it, focusing on the aircraft behind.
Modern decoys are rather pricey
Trying to hide an AWACS from an AWACS.
*Mach is stupid
"Now 4 minutes doesnt sound like a lot, but it is a lifetime in relative terms."
DeleteThat assumes that the incoming missile is detected and identified the instant it launches and that the target takes instantaneous evasive action. From everything I can gather, missile detection won't occur until much closer, if at all. Some commenters have suggested that the E-2/3 radars can't see at the high altitudes that the missile will cruise/glide at - I don't know whether that's true or not. The point is that detection will likely occur with only a minute's notice or so and target reaction will likely not be instantaneous. It will take some small additional time to recognize and react.
"Ideally, the Chinese fighter will maintain a lock and guide it all the way in"
I've seen nothing that suggests the missile requires all-the-way guidance. In fact, the missile has its own active radar guidance and doesn't require any external guidance although semi-active homing does seem to be an option. Thus, disruption of the "guiding" aircraft is irrelevant.
"The pilots on these suicide missions might be less agreeable"
In the Chinese system, agreement is not required.
Semi-active homing by its very nature requires all the way guidance. The AIMVAL/ACEVAL tests showed that it's possible to defeat SARH missiles by forcing the launch aircraft to make evasive maneuvers and stop guiding the missile.
DeleteI believe the point Domo's trying to make is that even with an active radar homing missile, the missile's onboard seeker is a lot shorter ranged compared to a fighter radar, what more an AWACS, and most ARH AAMs engage the seeker in terminal phase. If the launch aircraft loses lock or stops guiding the missile, the missile is programmed to fly on inertial guidance towards the last known point, wherupon it engages the seeker and attempts to reacquire.
"From everything I can gather, missile detection won't occur until much closer, if at all"
DeleteEvasion will likely occur on detection of the Launcher rather than the missile, although that will have pretty severe impacts on C4I
J16s could force the AWACS to run, or at least hold back, J20s could be stealthy enough to get close enough for a credible K%
"I've seen nothing that suggests the missile requires all-the-way guidance"
Requires, no.
But
The radar on a missile, any missile, is very poor, it simply cant see a target 300miles away, and even if it could, there isnt the power available to run the radar for the entire flight, its only used for the final stages "terminal guidance"
The missile is launched at where the target is expected to be, and when it arrives, activates its own radar and locates and attacks the target.
If possible, the expected location is updated during the flight, "mid flight target update"
So fire the missile towards point A, and then during the flight, tell it actually to go to point B, it then activates its radar, and guides itself to the target.
Highest Accuracy would come from the missile being guided throughout flight by the launch platform, or someone else, but that is rather difficult in a real world situation.
"In the Chinese system, agreement is not required."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Cold_War_pilot_defections
Not to say they will, but pilots, have, can and will mutiny or defect.
"Evasion will likely occur on detection of the Launcher rather than the missile, although that will have pretty severe impacts on C4I"
DeleteWell that would be a very easy mission kill! If the presence of a single J-16 causes every E-2/3 in a 200-300 mile radius to shut down and flee, wow! Given the ubiquity of the J-16 now and in the years to come, our ability to operate E-2/3 in any useful way will be negligible. ... I don't believe that for a moment.
Identifying the specific aircraft type at a range of 200-300 miles is not possible especially given the aircraft's similarity to many other aircraft in terms of size and emissions.
Our foundational battle management aircraft cannot cut and run because of the mere appearance of an aircraft hundreds of miles away. How we'll counter this, I don't know but it won't be like this. If that's our only counter than we can't even engage in combat.
As you note - in a masterpiece of understatement - it will eliminate our command and control capability which is the entire foundation of our air combat theory.
"Not to say they will, but pilots, have, can and will mutiny or defect."
DeleteNot in China! That would just get the pilot and their families killed.
I refer you to the human wave attacks that China launched in the Korean war and the massacres of Chinese citizens in various protests over recent years. Face it, the Chinese simply don't have the same view individual human life that we do. They can and will use suicide tactics if it benefits them. I did a post on attrition warfare and near-suicidal tactics are a significant part of that kind of attrition warfare. We, in the West, need to adjust our thinking about what China and Russia will be willing to do in war.
The UK launched human wave attacks for 4 years in the first world war.
DeleteBloody Omaha
Even at Chosin, only 1/6th of the deployed force was a combat casualty, another 6th none combat casualty, and thats not necessarily dead.
Much more than 30% losses and any army refuses to advance, and they shoot any officer who orders them forwards. Doesn't matter who or where.
Exceptions being already dead, no prisoner, last stand type deals.
High risk and certain death are very different propositions, The Chinese Government might not care about an individual soldiers life, but that individual soldier most certainly cares.
30 pilots might accept only 20 are coming home, 1 pilot is unlikely to accept 1 pilot isn't coming home.
You might get a few, willing to face certain death, if they think its worth it, or even a lot, the Yamato, but as far as they were concerned, they were all that stood between the civilians and an army of Americans intent on raping and murdering every single one of them, see last stand comment above, and the older members of the crew refused to let the younger members take part.
"Much more than 30% losses and any army refuses to advance"
DeleteContradicted by history! The Japanese launched endless suicidal attacks in the face of near 100% casualties. And, yes, the Chinese view America as being an existential threat fully justifying such tactics.
Your view of individual unwillingness to accept death among the Chinese is inspiring but unsupported by historical evidence, as I cited. Feel free to hold on to your happy view but, in the meantime, the US military is going to have to plan to deal with suicidal attacks.
Actually, throughout history forces typically withdrew, ceased attacks or broke outright anywhere between 10 and 30% casualties. The greener the forces, the lower the breaking point. Also, veteran forces tend to become demotivated on the attack quicker, while also tending to be extremely stubborn defenders.
DeleteThere are few exceptions. Some of the exceptions happened in terrain with short lines of sight where the fighting men were not aware of how badly the fight went elsewhere. Japanese fights on small islands are quite irrelevant, for those troops had no option to escape and were heavily indoctrinated for several years of wartime. Their performances in China, Burma and New Guinea are more representative than the much smaller and fewer battles on small islands against the Americans (who tend to grossly overemphasise this part of the war).
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It's remarkable how loss of life-sensitive China as a society has become. This was very much on display after natural disasters, and repeatedly. The one child policy turned the young generation into little princes, far from canon fodder.
Back to the scenario; combat aviation is expected to suffer extreme losses in peer wars, same as tank forces and mechanised infantry. The aircraft of choice for very dangerous missions would not be the stealth fighters, though. Those would very likely be used with finesse, unless they prove to be a technical disappointment and little good for finesse early on. LO fighter pilots might also become more aggressive once the MRAAMs and LRAAMs are expended and they're really down to (possibly old) SRAAMs with IR guidance.
You're applying Western military experience to human wave/suicidal fighting. Non-western militaries have had markedly different experiences. The Russian human wave attacks in WWII suffered enormous losses and kept attacking, using soldiers as fodder. Chinese human wave attacks in Korea suffered massive casualties. Japanese human wave attacks on Guadalcanal (when they did have the option of withdrawing from the island) suffered massive casualties. The Boxer Rebellion in China used human wave attacks sometimes with few or no weapons! The Russo-Japanese war saw Japan conduct human wave attacks with massive casualties. Japanese kamikaze pilots conducted suicide attacks with 100% certainty of death even though they had the "option" of refusing.
DeleteSo, non-Western militaries have certainly had no hesitation to press suicide attacks even in the face of massive casualties.
"Contradicted by history! The Japanese launched endless suicidal attacks in the face of near 100% casualties. And, yes, the Chinese view America as being an existential threat fully justifying such tactics."
DeleteIndeed they did, trapped on an island with no hope of reinforcement or evacuation with an enemy that didnt take prisoners, they fought to the last man.
Human wave attacks work roughly like this
First battalion charges, takes 30% casualties and runs / refuses to advance.
Second battalion is sent in, takes 30% casualties and runs / refuses to advance
Repeat until you win or run out of Battalions.
The 9th was arguably the best fighting force China had, after Chosin, they were pulled off the line for 3 months, and I'm not sure they fought a major battle again?
Even in the Iran-Iraq war Iran rarely suffered more than that magical 30%, they simply fed more and more new units in to the meat grinder, pulling out units that had already been savaged.
In fact, the "Dawn" attacks, rarely hit casualty rates even that high, they attacked with 500,000 men, suffered 50,000 dead, and rotated in another 500,000 men for the next attack.
A million dead isnt the same if you have a population of ten million or a billion
For a very long range air-to-air missile, this mystery missile is unique in appearance.
ReplyDeleteFirst, the control fins appear undersized given its stated length and diameter. Look how big the control fins are on the R-37 missile in the second picture and the R-37 is about 6 feet shorter that Chinese mystery missile. By comparison, our own Phoenix AAM was 13 feet long, 15 inches in diameter with wingspan of 3 feet.
Second, the mystery missile lacks body strakes for lift during flight which increases range. Look at the picture of the R-37 or pictures of our own missiles (e.g., Phoenix, Standard Missile, and ESSM).
Also, keep in mind that this is a leaked picture from the Chinese military. They don't have the plane watchers we have in the United States and elsewhere. And, PopSci, in my opinion, has too many rah-rah click-bait articles on the Russia and Chinese military.
I'm not saying China isn't working on a very long range AAM, but this mystery missile doesn't look like one.
"Also, keep in mind that this is a leaked picture from the Chinese military. They don't have the plane watchers we have in the United States and elsewhere."
DeleteIt's the opposite. They have a huge plane-watching community. The Chinese are proud enough of their planes to not hide them ever, though.
The Chinese websites that I monitor have, thus far, proven to be extremely accurate and incredibly open - in some ways, more so than Western sites. I have zero doubt that the missile exists and has the performance claimed. The Russians are another story. They routinely exaggerate and make false claims.
DeleteAs far as fin size, many modern missiles are moving towards thrust vectoring for maneuvering. I have no idea whether this is the case for the VLRAAM but it demonstrates that old style control fins are not as necessary as they once were. Also, this missile is not intended to match maneuverable fighters - it's intended to hit somewhere near large, clumsy aircraft.
China heavily regulates the Internet and what information their citizens can access. Google is planning to re-launch their search engine with enough censoring filters to appease the Chinese government.
DeleteEven with TVC, the missile as depicted still lacks body strakes or wings to generate lift during flight, as typically found on long range missiles like the Phoenix or SM family of missiles. Maybe this is a mockup and they were left off.
Check out the AIM-132 ASRAAM, as one example of a missile that has little in the way of fins. It is described on Wiki as having "body lift and tail control" - exactly what the Chinese missile appears to have.
DeleteMy interpretation is that at higher speeds the body alone provides sufficient lift. I'm venturing out of my zone here so that may or may not be correct.
However, the Chinese missile appears perfectly plausible and its appearance is a duplicate of the ASRAAM, among others.
Physics-wise, what matters with missile manoeuvres is not some wing profile for overpressure/underpressure (except with cruise missiles). It's mostly about cross section at an angle of attack greater than zero. Strakes only add to this cross section, and in cases like Standard the relatively small strakes provide much less lift than the body itself does. They simply don't add much to the cross section.
Deletehttps://c1.staticflickr.com/3/2507/4037939711_fc5c177f3c_z.jpg
Thrust vectoring only matters as long as the rocket is burning, and without a restartable rocket engine that's usually not the case with very long range missiles. The Chinese may use the pif-paf steering method (as in Aster missile) to control the angle of attack.
From Reference 3, "For compatibility with aircraft that did not have the MiG-31's sophisticated radar, the semi-active seeker was replaced with a variant of the Agat 9B-1388 active seeker;[2] mid-body strakes enhance lift[2] and hence range, and folding tail controls allow semi-conformal carriage[2] on planes that are not as big as the MiG-31."
DeleteEach missile design is unique and you do get lift from the body, but also drag too.
At same this missile is supposed to have an IR/EO system as backup. How well would either work at Mach 6? And, with the radar in the nose, where would you put such a system?
If we are to suspect the claims of a manufacturer about their product, I think it only fair to suspect what a country claims their weapons can do.
There are anti-ship missiles with an additional forward-looking IIR mounted on the side. See Hsiung Feng II. There are also tri-mode seekers which combine IIR and mmW and laser seeker in the nose of an air/ground missile (with small field of view).
DeleteIt's even possible that a radar nose would be detached, and an IIR behind would become the new primary terminal approach sensor.
I don't know which AR/IIR seeker combo will be used in air combat and become a successful technical solution. It appears that such a solution is needed to overcome the many ECM and (D)IRCM that cripple the missiles' probability of hit.
Su-57 was widely derided for lack of certain radar stealth features, but AMRAAMs would almost certainly have had well below 50% pk against it (possibly as low as 5...10%). AIM-9X et cetera would need to be launched in salvoes because the Suchoi was (is?) meant to have two DIRCM (AFAIK).
The next step in Western AAM seekers is to install AESA radars (in improved Meteor, possibly also in MICA 2 - AESA is already in Japan's AMRAAM equivalent). This helps to reduce issues with hostile RWR and ECM, but might fall short of offering a breakthrough for lethality against top fighters. It might not even suffice to defeat towed decoys with the first shot or second.
I should add about the missiles with AESA:
Deletehttp://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2017/03/technological-lag.html
Israeli Stunner has a dual head seeker.
Deletehttps://www.army-technology.com/projects/stunner-terminal-missile-defence-interceptor-israel/
YF-12 flew in the 60s and 2 IR trackers in it's nose next to the radar. If 1960 tech managed to get the IR seekers to look at Mach 3, have a hard time believing USA or China can't get them in 2018/2020 to work....
DeleteYou can actively cool the seeker with climate control, in missiles that's often a Peltier element (not very powerful). Older missiles use chemicals for a short-duration cooling.
DeleteNow keep in mind a YF-12 would have searched for hot Mach 3 bombers, whereas PL-15 would need to look for a warm subsonic target on the background of the possibly warm sea. Totally different IR optics challenges.
In the end, there's no longer-ranged missile with IR seeker that actually works than MICA IR, which has shorter range than AMRAAMs. IRIS-T SL uses a detachable cap because it needs one in dense low atmosphere.
Technologically, is it easy ,no! Is it impossible, probably not. We will start to see more and more dual seekers for numerous reasons. Also, as I said, in the end game engagement, that VLAAM after 300 miles isn't going Mach 6 anymore, it has considerably slowed down by then, so detachable nose cone should be feasible for high speed and then use the IR, not like you need it to work for an hour, maybe a minute or 2?
DeleteLots of great points-counterpoints, so many I had to write down my responses while at the ER with mom, she's out after a waste of a day, ahh, the joys of the US healthcare system, topic for another day!
ReplyDelete1. The missile flying at MACH 6 should be no major problem for a dual seeker head, if necessary to have dual seeker that is. Israeli Python 6 has an IR and supposedly flies MACH 4, STUNNER is also fast. You could use a detachable nose cone for the high speed part and get rid of it for the search part. Plus, no way VLAAM or any missile BTW flies out all the way at maximum speed, most missiles slow way down anyways, especially after 300 miles, it won't be going Mach 6! Actually, as someone else mentioned, you want it to slow down to have more time to search. Im sure some Chinese engineer will out work the problem and find out if it's better to have a bigger unique radar or a dual seeker, maybe it's worth it. My thought was with a mid course update by a Chinese AWACS or stealth drone, some clever software or AI, even a silent US AWACS location probably can be deduced and tell the sensor to start looking, it's just a matter of probabilities. Also, VLAMM is at 100k feet and the target is lot lower at 50k feet, this is happening over SCC, lots of water, not that many locations you can hide in the background....
Stunner ~ Python 6
DeleteStunner has extremely short range, it doesn't heat its nose up much and this can be controlled with simple chemical cooling as in 1960's era IR seeker missiles.
It's altogether different to fly for 300+ km at Mach 3+ and then activate the IIR seeker to find a low contrast target with the surface as background.
Also, short range air target missiles usually have a speed curve similar to this:
http://www.x-plane.org/home/urf/aviation/text/missiles/samspeed.gif
(this shows Crotale NG)
2. Shape of the missile doesn't mean much, we have very little info on it's performance and actual real role. Lots of conjecture and only what little China is releasing. The lack of wings and movable surfaces makes it very modern, most Western AAMs are going away from them too. If the goal is taking down a tanker or an AWACS, how much maneuverability do you need anyways?
ReplyDelete3. IF not going after a AWACS, going after the tankers is almost as good, probably easier too. Brings me to the topic of what happens if we lose a couple of tankers, how long before the tankers stay WAY AWAY from the combat zone and what does that do to our fighters and their range/endurance? Not a real kill but sure complicates how we operate.
ReplyDelete4. If we lose an E-3, I guess we can replace it with other ones from other units, same somewhat for an E-2D, we have some more, not many more BUT what is then the mindset of the US carrier captain? You just lost an E-2D, maybe China chased off another one, do you still stick around with such damage done to your air picture? Do you leave the scene to get it replaced or stick around and risk the carrier? As I asked about USAF, when was the last time we had a Red Flag with no AWACS OR partial use of one, what about USN? Would a Task Force stick around if they lost an E-2C/D or 2? Has that been practiced OR EVEN GAMED PLANNED?
ReplyDeleteI guess an F-35/F-22 could help alleviate some what the problem since they are supposedly huge vacuum cleaners that suck up so much radar data and situational awareness BUT neither one is very good at sharing this info, especially with 4th gen fighters like F-15/F-18s and their pilots aren't trained AWACS radar operators, how much real quarterbacking can they do? Maybe for a few hours, a day or 2 but im sure it would take a toll flying up there for 10 to 12 hours every day like a E-3 crew can and is used to it...
The battle management aspect of the E-2/3 is the key and that is not something that an F-35 pilot can replicate. Heck, it requires entire crews of specialists with intense training to manage an aerial engagement! Does anyone seriously think a single F-35 pilot, busy flying his plane, with a much smaller radar, is going to take the place of E-2/3's and entire crews of specialists?
DeleteI absolutely don't believe the F35/F-22 could replace an Awacs but im sure someone will suggest it.
DeleteThe irony here is that USAF had the same problem but in the 80ties, they need a aircraft that could fly deep behind enemy lines in Europe and track troop movements on the ground.
ReplyDeleteThe little problem here was that the Warsaw Pact had the densest and layered SAM network on the planet.
So Tacit Blue was born.
A stealthy AWACS is a total possibility - price unknown.
Now if only the US had a large missile capable of long range strike against bombers and large enemy aircraft and a aircraft capable of doing it and operating off of a carrier.
ReplyDeleteOh wait we Did.
If only we had a sub hunting aircraft that was capable of operating from a carrier.........oh wait we did...
..................
But seriously is there a reason why we couldn't build a anti missile missile for aircraft like a E-2, Buff, C-130, etc?
The problem with point defense missiles for aircraft is that the aerodynamics and physics make it tricky. It's simpler for a warship: a Burke travels 30 knots, and it has SeaRAM on a trainable mount that can point to where the target is. SM and ESSM are vertical launch that fire up into the air, then turn to point at the target and then go horizontal at the target.
DeleteWith an aircraft, you can't do side firing missiles because the airflow and wings do crazy things and at 300 knots your missile is liable to be beaten against your airframe if you try to kick it out a VLS. The only real way to get things to work is to fire missiles forward but if the incoming missile is behind you, welp, your missile wastes energy turning around to intercept it.
There's work being done into point defense systems for aircraft using lasers, but the usual problems with heat and power generation haven't been solved yet. For now, the best that can be done with lasers is blinding the missile's seeker, but that only works with heatseekers.
What about rear facing missiles?It'd make the most sense from an engagement standpoint, and the A-5 had a somewhat similar layout that worked, if not reliably or very well, though it seems likely that 50+ years of engineering knowledge and infinitely better computer technology should lead to something that isn't a danger to the airframe.
DeleteI recall reading something about rear-facing rockets being tried by the soviets - they tried to fire the rockets out and the airflow flipped them around and the rockets hit the launch aircraft. Then the missile's got to negate the inertia of being fired out an aircraft going forward...
DeleteTheorycrafting here, but what might work is if you have a missile like AMRAAM that's jettisoned for launch; then the missile uses its momentum and lift to glide forward and make a split-S and orient on the incoming missile, and then the rocket motor kicks in. The time needed to do all that might be an issue though.
Northrup Grumman has a patent on "hard-kill" defensive anti-missile missiles. While there are many non-trivial challenges that I could imagine that would be involved in an implementation, at least some people are thinking about it:
Deletehttp://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/15491/northrop-grumman-has-patented-a-kinetic-missile-defense-system-for-stealth-aircraft
You can do it I can think of a couple ways off of the top of my head.
DeleteOh, they had
ReplyDeletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIM-152_AAAM
My question is, why are we assuming such a missile will be semi-active or even active guidance? I know the popular science article says so, but that doesn't make much sense to me. IMO it would be much more logical for such a missile to be a passive anti-radiation type. While such a seeker is not common on an anti-air missile, it is not exactly a novel idea or completely unheard of either. Such a seeker would get rid of the targeting difficulties that people in the comments are talking about. Plus, it would give no indication to the target that something is coming their way at any time, unless they detect the missile launch itself (highly unlikely).
ReplyDeleteAs for counters, they would probably have to rely more on tactical adjustments rather than technological solutions, at least for the time being. Technology wise you might have to go through the daunting task of engaging in a race between increasing radar range vs increasing missile range. Otherwise, perhaps acknowledge the fact that those are bulky platforms anyway that are not going to be able run away, and stuff them full with EW equipment, jammers and towed decoys. The added weight might compromise an E-2 for carrier operations but might be doable for an E-3. Even then, I'd imagine that would still result in a mission kill, but at least the platform would survive. In the near future, perhaps we can start exploring things like anti-air defensive lasers or miniature CIWS-like attachments. But that is still ways off for now.
Again probably the best bet is tactics for now. Most modern air forces in general and Western ones in particular have grown accustomed to fighting with the omnipresence of real time data from an AWACS platform (or ground radar). More training should be given to preforming at least basic patrols (and hopefully more complex missions) without the presence of an AWACS. For AWACS crews themselves perhaps instead of transmitting continually as they do now, they can practice intermittent searching by turning on their radars for a very limited period of time, getting tracks and then shutting off their radar to relocate and search from a different location, update, shut down, relocate, ..etc.
Passive radar seekers don't work well against aircraft in the terminal approach because the aircraft can get away in a few seconds while having the radar switched off.
DeleteA passive mode is thus sensible only for mid-course guidance (not terminal guidance), and only if the relevant wavelengths reach the missile at all (which is not for certain if it flies very high).
Active radar is for terminal guidance, so passive radar homing is no real substitute to passive radar homing in AAMs.
Inertial navigation with occasional radio datalink for target updates is usually trusted as midcourse guidance. You only need to get about a hundred bytes through to the missile every 5...15 seconds or so and the receiver antenna may be directional facing rearwards. That's very hard to jam.
Well yes, of course an anti-radiation missile would lose track if they switch off their radars. But that's the point of using a passive seeker. The target will not know that there is anything in the air headed their way and thus have no incentive to switch off their radar. As I said detecting the launch itself is very difficult and at the distances we are talking about even smoke from the motor exhaust would have ceased by the time the missile comes within visual range.
DeleteIt's not just about switching off. An AESA radar ans imply avoid that vector with its main and side lobes. The seeker would not sense it, particularly not with jamming deployed.
DeleteYou can also have a two-AEW configuration with look & scoot tactic that would totally defeat long range anti-radar missiles.
Incoming missiles can be detected by passive means (IR sensors) even after their rockets burned out; there's not much in the sky as hot as a missile's nose cone that travels at supersonic speed.
Furthermore, passive radar seekers are suckers for towed actively emitting decoys.
"You can also have a two-AEW configuration with look & scoot tactic that would totally defeat long range anti-radar missiles."
DeleteIf the only goal is to fly an AEW aircraft around and not get killed, this might work but the purpose of an AEW aircraft is to manage the aerial battle. That requires staying "on" and lingering. It takes time to build up the situational awareness and control among the AEW operators - not something that can be accmoplished with occasional looks.
"Passive radar seekers don't work well against aircraft in the terminal approach because the aircraft can get away in a few seconds while having the radar switched off."
DeleteAgainst an alerted fighter, maybe. However, the point of passive sensing is to remain undetected. How well a hypersonic missile at very high altitude can be detected is a question with the answers from commenters ranging from easily detected to can't be detected. So, unless the missile can be detected early, the speed is such that shutting down emissions at the last second and attempted to maneuver a large, unmaneuverable aircraft is not likely to succeed.
It all depends at what point the incoming missile can be detected and I'm pretty sure none of us knows where that point is, if at all.
Passive ARMs have a pretty poor success rate against immobile GBAD
DeleteAgainst a fast aircraft with 3 dimensions to hide in.
Imagine, 36 F35s in front silent
Behind them, 100miles, 3 AWACS doing scan and scoot
100 miles behind them, a decoy, or full AWACS screaming it's lungs out.
You might fire at the front three, but once they go quiet and move, your missile chases the back one.
Passive also precludes an indirect flight, you're never going to guess where it's going to be
"Passive ARMs have a pretty poor success rate against immobile GBAD"
DeleteWhat's your source for that statement? From what I've seen, ARMs have been quite effective. The US HARM, for example, seems quite effective.
" That requires staying "on" and lingering. It takes time to build up the situational awareness and control among the AEW operators - not something that can be accmoplished with occasional looks."
DeleteThink 10 seconds on, 20 seconds off, you can work off a 20 second old picture, not 1 minute on 10 minutes off.
"So, unless the missile can be detected early, the speed is such that shutting down emissions at the last second and attempted to maneuver a large, unmaneuverable aircraft is not likely to succeed."
Even in, 10 seconds, an E2 could quite violently change course.
Think of how ships used to avoid torpedo, fairly frequent changes of speed and direction
"What's your source for that statement? From what I've seen, ARMs have been quite effective. The US HARM, for example, seems quite effective."
There was a Serbian Radar that survived somewhere in the region of 100 attacks
HARM added a much faster engagement speed and inertial guidance, you could probably add GPS now, so it would attack last known location, useless in an air battle though,
ALARM added a parachute and second motor to get them on the re ignition.
"you can work off a 20 second old picture"
DeleteNot when attempting to manage aerial combat with planes flying hundreds of mph and engaging in violet maneuvers!
Further, 10 sec on /20 sec off isn't going to get the AEW aircraft significantly out of the missile's flight path and field of vision. If you think you can direct an entire aerial battlefield with a 10/20 scheme then you can certainly guide a missile against such a scheme.
"Even in, 10 seconds, an E2 could quite violently change course."
It can change course but it can't move any great amount relative to an incoming missile! In a sense, the missile doesn't care what the course of the target is, it just needs to know where the target is and getting a look every 20 sec is more than enough to guide on.
"There was a Serbian Radar that survived somewhere in the region of 100 attacks"
DeleteThat's your basis? One example - if the example is even true? Got a link to a source for that?
How about the hundreds of other HARM attacks that have been quite successful?
Make generalized statements based on a body of evidence, not a single example.
the success of HARM depends on the opposition. NATO expended 800 HARMs in Allied Force and got only 2 kills on Serbian mobile launchers - and these were pretty obsolete units to begin with.
Delete"NATO expended 800 HARMs in Allied Force and got only 2 kills on Serbian mobile launchers"
DeleteA few thoughts:
1. Do you have any source for that claim?
2. The Serbs achieved only 2 kills out of 30,000 sorties, as I recall, so NATO's suppression efforts were incredibly successful.
3. HARM does not need to hit a target to be successful. If it forces the target to shut down (as in the Kosovo conflict) it has completely succeeded.
This kind of out-of-context statement is a poor quality comment.
1. NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, by Benjamin S. Lambeth. Also I'd remembered it wrong, the exact number was "at least 743 HARMs expended". I'd remembered that the ratio of HARM to SAM was roughly 1:1 and there had been 815 reported SAM launches. Specific quote from page 111: "Even during the operation's final week, NATO spokesmen conceded that only three of Serbia's approximately 25 known SA-6 mobile batteries had been confirmed destroyed."
Delete2. While the Serbs only achieved 2 kills out of all the NATO sorties, they forced NATO to dedicate 21% of all sorties to SEAD/DEAD missions. You've got lots of strike packages aborting because the SAMs lock on to one aircraft and everyone dumps bombs and goes evasive, and they're bombing high higher, less effective altitude. J-STARS and U-2 got pushed back, flying less than ideal orbits to minimise SAM risk. Losses to SAMs were minimal, but so was the effectiveness of the air campaign, to the point where NATO failed to do serious damage to the Serb ground forces.
Operationally, virtual attrition of a strike package is just as good as actually shooting it down. If you make the strike package drop their bombs and go evasive, they can't drop bombs on you. The Serbs showed that you don't actually _need_ to shoot down enemy aircraft, you just need to shoot enough missiles at them to keep them honest. And you don't need to target the entire strike package: target one aircraft, and the entire strike package are dropping their bombs, going evasive, and aborting the mission.
3. That claim cuts both ways: a SAM does not need to kill its target to be sucessful. If it forces the enemy aircraft to abort its strike mission, it has suceeded. Which was precisely what the Serbians did in Kosovo. The Serbs preserved the bulk of their SAM force, and were able to prevent NATO from doing serious damage to their ground forces. What the Serbs would do is play peekaboo with their launchers: a whole series of mobile SAM launchers scooting and shooting, running and gunning. And it worked: they might have only shot down two aircraft, but they were a continual threat in being that managed to degrade the effectiveness of the air campaign. NATO could have prosecuted attacks on Serb ground forces more thoroughly had they not had to take measures to minimise SAM threat, and if they could have freed up those SEAD sorties: 3,000 strike sorties were flown, add another 4,500 strike sorties to that number, without the constant threat in being from the Serbian IADS...
Basically, NATO was expecting a repeat of Desert Storm: a balls to the wall affair where the Serbs would do like the Iraqis, turning on their IADS and throwing up a wall of misiles in the air. NATO planned to neutralise the Serbian IADS and then spend the rest of the campaign doing strike sorties. But the Serbs didn't do that: they used a gamplan that was counter-intuitive towards what people usually expect of air defenses.
DeleteThe Serbs realised that NATO had more planes than them, and that being a continual threat in being was superior to sacrificing their IADS to chalk up a few meaningless kills. Virtual vs actual attrition.
You have a deeply flawed understanding of the Kosovo conflict. Your biggest misunderstanding is that the Serbian anti-air hide-and-seek system was successful. If its goal was to simply survive then it largely succeeded. If its goal was to achieve military success then it failed utterly. Two kills out of 30,000 sorties is completely, utterly, meaningless. The hide-and-seek method allowed the NATO air forces to roam and operate at will and those forces caused the Serbs to lose the conflict as they were forced to withdraw from the territory. A complete defeat.
DeleteYour next major misunderstanding is the nature of the air campaign. The air campaign was NOT designed to achieve a military victory. It was intended to exert sufficient political pressure to force the Serbs to withdraw - which is what happened. As such, the number one NATO air objective was zero aircraft losses which it very nearly achieved. Thus, there was no real effort made to engage. Instead, the mandate was to turn away if there was any danger at all. This was not an air war, this was a slightly challenging live fire exercise whose guiding principle was "no risk". Serbian anti-air efforts did not force NATO air away, NATO air's mission was zero risk.
Again, 2 kills out of 30,000 sorties indicates a resounding success for HARM!
Don't bother replying. This is a naval blog and I'm not going to waste time debating a conflict you don't understand. I've given you a say and I've replied. That will end this discussion.
Do you think you could do an article on Billy Mitchell and his infamous sinking of target ships off the Carolina coast?
ReplyDeletePossibly. Aside from the purely historical interest, what would be the point of interest that you'd like to see examined?
DeleteI’d like to see how it was an early sign to some that the battleships were on their way out according to some. I’m not of that camp obviously with I believing that battleships aren’t obsolete due to air power. I’d like to see as a person who thinks battleships have a place in the face of modern missiles and air power thoughts on it.
DeleteSpeaking of missiles I’d like to see how they would effect battleship grade armor.
The damage to the amour would be localized to the belt and the adjacent compartments behind it, if its a shaped warhead. The odds of it hitting something critical is low due to the air spaces between amour layers.
DeleteDepends on the type of missile. A P-700 hitting the armor belt would be no joke.
DeleteDio
DeleteThe boss has written extensively on battleships previously
Historically, a battleship could not be quickly repaired or replaced, whereas carrier aircraft were essentially disposable.
A carrier could lose 50 aircraft and be back at it the next day, a battleship that lost a gun turret, propeller, boiler ect was crippled for months, if not until the war's end.
Once hit, especially by a Torpedo, a battleship is drastically slow, at which point it's pretty much doomed, it can't break off and would be nipped to death.
Bismarck took a phenomenal amount of fire to sink, but the battle was lost after the first light torpedo hit.
Even if we rewrote history and it got home, months in dock, longer.
The fighters, replaced by the vast numbers being churned out anyway.
Drastically slow? Ever hear of fast battleships with the later ships able to go 33 knots like most ships? Or a single torpedo is doom? Meet North Carolina who took a long lance torpedo the most powerful torpedo of the war and only lost two knots in top speed 26 knots instead of the 28 knot top speed. Just needed a month to repair and get new equipment installed. And don’t you think by modern standards 50 out of 90 aircraft like on the Nimitz in the modern day or the 100 in the Essex of WW2 is not a good sign.
DeleteBismarck was going to go down either way through a combination of shellfire and torpedos which helped to reduce the Bismarck’s ability to maneuver.
"Ever hear of fast battleships with the later ships able to go 33 knots like most ships?"
DeleteUnsurprisingly yes I have
Do you know how long they could sustain that speed for?
"Meet North Carolina who took a long lance torpedo the most powerful torpedo of the war"
Long Lance was a light air launched torpedo. It was far from "the most powerful", it's utility was it's long range.
"Bismarck was going to go down either way through a combination of shellfire and torpedos which helped to reduce the Bismarck’s ability to maneuver."
Not what I argued.
The first hit sufficiently crippled Bismarck enough to doom it.
How it was finished wasn't the point. Merely that a relatively minor hit caused such harm that the RN had ample opportunity to catch up and overwhelm it.
There was a similar story with an Italian battleship near Greece.
"Long Lance was a light air launched torpedo."
DeleteNo. The Long Lance was the Type 93 with over 1000 lbs of warhead. The Japanese aerial torpedo was the Type 91 which was roughly half the size, weight, and warhead weight.
The Type 93 had a 1080 lb warhead. The US Mk14 had a 643 lb warhead. The German G7e had a 616 lb warhead. So, the Long Lance was, indeed, the most powerful of its time and is more powerful than most torpedoes today.
See, Torpedoes - Then and Now
and Surface Ship Torpedoes
"A carrier could lose 50 aircraft and be back at it the next day"
DeleteOh good grief. I understand you're using a bit of hyperbole to make your point but a carrier that lost 50 aircraft would be out of action until such time as the air wing could be reconstituted - not something that can happen overnight. Spare air wings aren't just sitting around.
Conversely, a battleship that lost a single turret would still have 2/3 of its firepower remaining.
Either way, both the carrier and battleship would be out of action for weeks/months to repair/reconstitute. I get that you're making the point that losing the air wing does not physically damage the carrier and that's valid but let's not go too far overboard!
It's curious and frightening when the official channels aren't addressing topics just like this one. The most I found was a single NAVAIR solicitation:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=402e01e6ff77e19f9a1fcaf6c2c24d51&tab=core&_cview=0
Thanks for the link. I hadn't seen that. Keep an eye on it and let us know if something comes out of it.
DeleteOne thing I wonder is why the US doesn’t work harder at deploying our own very long range AAM (other than the fact the F-35 couldn’t carry one).
ReplyDeleteWe have experimented in the past with using SM-2’s as an air launched anti-radar missile, and of course the Tomcat had the Phoenix.
Imagine if we adapted the SM-6 as not only an AWAC killer but with a dual purpose warhead that would work well against ships. Diving from high altitude, it’s speed could exceed Mach 4.
A 747 has the lift capacity to take a cut-down version of Spy-1 and associated radar systems and still sling a dozen Of these misses under the fuselage. Not stealthy but then the point is to get illuminated then fire at the source of the radar. Or it could even escort an AWACS firing it’s missiles to intercept incoming long range AAM.
This is not as far fetched as it may sound. The Air Force looked at an updated B-1 (B-1R) that could fire 30-50 AMRAAMs.