Memo From the President On Shipbuilding

The Navy is currently a flaming hot mess.  It’s not even debatable and I won’t bother listing all the problems.  President Trump appears to recognize this to an unknown, but significant, degree and has issued a memo calling for various actions to improve naval shipbuilding capabilities and capacities.
 
The memo is a fascinating blend of solid, beneficial concepts and technical and legal challenges.  It also fails to address, or even mention, the root cause of the Navy’s shipbuilding woes.  Let’s take a closer look.
 
The very first sentence recognizes and states the problem (well, one of the problems) quite forcefully and succinctly.
 

The United States Navy has experienced a series of shipbuilding setbacks stemming from overly complex designs and iterative design change procedures …[1]

In plainer terms, it states that the Navy’s ship acquisition process is a steaming pile of crap and, very importantly,  identifies at least a couple of the major contributing factors.  Excellent!
 
It goes on to say,
 

The Department of War shall restore both capacity and competition to the maritime industrial base ,,,[1]

That’s nice but it’s like calling for world peace – a noble goal but pointless without specific, effective actions and none are listed.  Miss America calls for world peace every year but I’m pretty sure it’s still a problem.
 
We then see a vague recognition of part of the problem.
 

It will use proven, reliable, and affordable technologies and ship designs …[1]

This is saying that the days of trying to incorporate non-existent, leap ahead technologies are over.  That’s a great sentiment which I heartily endorse.  Now, ruthlessly enforce it.  However, there is also a potential pitfall here.  If we never incorporate new technology, we’ll never advance.  There needs to be a corresponding directive to make use of one-off prototypes specifically to evaluate and develop new technologies.
 
Now, here’s a stunner.
 

Within 60 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of War, in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, shall provide to the President, … a plan on the required measures to replace the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Weapons Elevators with steam and hydraulic systems for the construction of CVN-81 ...[1]

This has long been one of the President’s pet peeves and he appears to be trying to act on it.  I fully support this but the inertia and incompetence in Navy leadership is not going to take this lying down.  This will be vigorously opposed .  Unless the President has the complete agreement and backing of SecNav and CNO, this will not happen.  A great way to get such agreement and backing is to start firing people until people can be found who are on board with the President.
 
The memo repeatedly calls for foreign involvement in the shipbuilding process, both directly and indirectly.  This is a concept that has some appeal, under certain, limited circumstances, but has a great deal of potential to run afoul of legislative roadblocks.  Beyond that, what the President is calling for has been attempted and resulted in the spectacular failures of the LCS and Constellation.  Repeating a set of actions and expecting a different outcome is the definition of insanity.  This needs to be very carefully thought out and managed and the Navy has emphatically demonstrated they have no such management capability.  Wholesale firings of the existing flag ranks would go a long way to solving this.
 
Another major problem is addressed.
 

The Navy shall not impose iterative design changes upon the original mature parent designs within the above programs implemented pursuant to the plans developed under subsections (a) through (b) of this section. No changes from parent designs shall be made without the approval of the Secretary of War ,,,[1]

This is recognizing the destructive impact of the Navy’s never-ending change orders.  Again, though, the embedded inertia of incompetent leadership will make this nearly impossible to enforce.  Remember , the Constellation was going to a parent design with only minor changes and, yet, before it was cancelled, almost all commonality with the parent design had vanished.  I enthusiastically support this but it will require ruthless enforcement.  My suggestion is that any program manager who proposes a change order be summarily fired.
 
Here’s one of the major challenges that we mentioned above.
 

… for purposes of waiving the general prohibition on Armed Forces shipbuilding in foreign shipyards.[1]

The President is going to find that getting Congress to go along with any attempt to utilize foreign shipyards is going to be poorly received and strongly opposed.  There are also practical concerns with technological security.  Still, under certain circumstances this could be beneficial.  I’d prefer to build up our own shipbuilding capacity rather than rely on foreign involvement.
 
The memo calls for establishing a new public shipyard for maintenance and support.  Challenging but outstanding!
 
Here’s another good idea.
 

… establish a Component Repair Center to receive new and refurbish old components and parts as required by the submarine repair industrial base.[1]

Outstanding!
 
And finally, a major, major action calling for a gutting and rework of NAVSEA.
 

Reforming Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). Within 120 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of War, in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, shall submit to the President, through the Director of OMB and the APNSA, a review of NAVSEA, including recommendations for implementing personnel, organizational, and structural reforms. The objective of these reforms should be to: introduce results‑based accountability for NAVSEA leadership, determined by speed of delivery of vessels and systems; reduce bureaucracy and red tape; eliminate competing priorities among different NAVSEA components, which often result in delayed, cost-prohibitive, or overly complex vessels and systems; and prevent NAVSEA from imposing redesigns or iterative design changes upon original mature parent designs.[1]

This is saying what ComNavOps has been saying for some time – that NAVSEA is a failed organization of total incompetents.  Outstanding, outstanding, outstanding!
 
 
Discussion
 
This memo has lots of good stuff in it and the Navy would be far better off if they can be implemented.  The reality, however, is that any changes will be actively opposed and unless SecDef and SecNav are willing to engage in wholesale firings, most it will never occur. 
 
I’m also dismayed that SecDef Hegseth did not implement all of this on day one of his tenure.  This reinforces my belief that he is a failure, perhaps not as bad as some but certainly a major disappointment.  One could read this memo as a criticism by the President of Hegseth and interpret it as Hegseth failing to the point that the President felt he had to step in and take over.
 
The aspect of all this that the memo failed to address is that the root cause of the Navy’s failures is irredeemably incompetent leadership from the flag officers.  That is what the memo should have led with and the solution is easy – fire them all.  Since Hegseth refuses to engage in wholesale housecleaning, the actions called for in the memo will be vigorously opposed and Trump and Hegseth will have only themselves to blame for their disappointment when this fails to materialize.
 
Let’s hope for the best but the sad reality is that most of this is a fantasy because they won’t take the necessary first step of mass firings.
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Presidential Memo: Rebuilding the United States Navy and America’s Shipbuilding Industrial Base”, staff, 13-Aug-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/08/13/presidential-memo-rebuilding-the-united-states-navy-and-americas-shipbuilding-industrial-base

Don’t Say Nothin’ At All

We were all taught the old saying,

 

“If you can’t say something nice about someone, don’t say anything at all.”

 

Well, given the military’s abysmal record when it comes to acquisition programs, program management, weapon performance, and audits, the Department of Defense has taken that age old saying to heart but modified it to,

 

“If someone can’t say something nice about us, we won’t let them say anything at all.”

 

To that end, the Defense Department has now restricted DOT&E reports, the only source of unbiased testing and reporting due to the endless series of negative findings, year after year.

 

The Department of War restricted public access to 25 years of unclassified weapons testing reports on July 30, moving them to a secure network reserved for personnel with military-issued access credentials.[1]

 

The reports, issued annually by the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), have detailed unclassified effectiveness and maintenance shortcomings in major weapons programs … [1]

Unsatisfied with merely restricting access to the reports, SecDef Hegseth has moved to hugely reduce the DOT&E capabilities and responsibilities.

 

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has cut the test office's staffing to 30 employees from 126 and removed 90 programs from its oversight list this year, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).[1]

 

There is one problem with this and that is that the military’s move appears to be illegal.[2]

 

Williams [Greg Williams, defense policy director with the Project on Government Oversight ] said the 1983 law creating the test office required unclassified annual reports, and a 2011 law directs that such reports be posted online for public access.[1]

 

DOT&E’s own website confirms this [2] and the exact wording of the relevant law appears in the references below.[2]

 

 

Discussion

 

DOT&E has been the only organization forcing the military to test weapon systems and inform the public about the results in an unclassified report.  Without the efforts of DOT&E, the military would skip even more testing than they already do.  For example, the Navy attempted to indefinitely defer shock testing of the USS Ford.  DOT&E worked through Congress to pressure the Navy into performing the tests.

 

The annual DOT&E reports have been the only publicly available source of honest weapon system test result reports for the taxpayer to understand how effectively their money was being spent.

 

DOT&E’s downfall began with the retirement of Dir. Gilmore, who ComNavOps considers one of, if not the, most important and influential men in the military field in the last fifty plus years.  When he left, DOT&E’s new director began watering down the reports into uninformative, pointless pap.  Now, even that is being restricted and unavailable to the public. 

 

DOT&E no longer serves any useful purpose.

 

The military has been embarrassed and humiliated time and again by their own failures and they have finally found a way to prevent that.

 

“If someone can’t say something nice about us, we won’t let them say anything at all.”

 

 

 

_______________________________

 

[1]Newsmax website, “Pentagon Restricts Access to Weapons Test Reports”, Jim Mishler, 5-Aug-2026,

https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/war-department-weapons-reports-restrict/2026/08/05/id/1265159/

 

[2]https://www.dote.osd.mil/

From the DOT&E website,

 

In 1983, Congress established the position of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The Director, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, is the principal official and adviser to the Secretary of War on all DoW matters related to operational (OT&E) and live fire test and evaluation (LFT&E) of DoW systems and services acquired via the Warfighting Acquisition System.

 

Pursuant to Sections 139, 4171, 4172, and 4231 of Title 10, U.S.C., Section 223 of Public Law 117-81, DoDD 5141.02, and DoDI 5000.98, the DOT&E:

• Develops and updates policies and guidance for OT&E and LFT&E.
• Designates select DoW programs for OT&E and LFT&E oversight and publishes and manages the T&E Oversight List.
• Oversees, reviews, and independently reports on all OT&E and LFT&E activities and resources for programs on the T&E Oversight List.
• Assesses the adequacy of and approves OT&E and LFT&E strategies and plans in support of all acquisition decisions. This includes the alternative LFT&E strategies required in support of waivers from full-up system-level (FUSL) testing.
• Approves the adequacy of the multi-domain operational environment, threats, and targets used in LFT&E and OT&E.
• Observes OT&E and LFT&E to evaluate compliance with approved strategies and plans.
• Conducts an independent analysis of test data from across the acquisition life cycle and M&S results and in support of acquisition decisions; submits, as applicable, reports on the adequacy of LFT&E and OT&E and evaluations of operational effectiveness, suitability, survivability, and lethality to the: OSW, Joint Staff, DoW Components, and Congressional defense committees.
• Submits a publicly releasable Annual Report to Congress summarizing key OT&E and LFT&E activities planned, executed, or reported on within the fiscal year, and related challenges.
• In coordination with the DoW Component heads, defines strategic initiatives needed to update policy and meet future OT&E and LFT&E requirements.

 

Following is an exact recording of the relevant law:

 

10 U.S. Code § 139, Section (h)

 

(1)The Director shall prepare an annual report summarizing the operational test and evaluation activities (including live fire testing activities) of the Department of Defense during the preceding fiscal year.

(2)Each such report shall be submitted concurrently to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Secretaries of the military departments, and the Congress not later than January 31 of each year.

(3)If the Director submits the report to Congress in a classified or controlled unclassified form, the Director shall concurrently submit to Congress a version of the report that is unclassified and does not require safeguarding or dissemination controls.

Failure on a Grand Scale

The Navy has announced the retirement of VAdm. Jim Downey.  Consider this excerpt, reported by USNI News website.
 

The dual-hatted Naval Sea Systems Command [ed. 2023-present] and Portfolio Acquisition Executive Industrial Operations Vice Adm. Jim Downey retired last week, the Navy announced.
 
Downey commissioned into the Navy in 1987 after graduating from the State University of New York. He’s a career surface warfare officer and prior to Naval Sea Systems Command, he served as the PEO Aircraft Carriers [ed. 2019-2023] led the Navy Regional Maintenance Center [ed. 2016-2019] and was the program manager for the Zumwalt guided-missile destroyer program.[1][emphasis added]

Can you think of any bigger failures than the pathetic performance of NavSea, the Navy’s toxic relations with industry, the sad state of our carriers and the abortion that is the Ford class, the Navy’s horrific maintenance performance, or the abysmal failure that is the Zumwalt program?
 
Downey not only failed spectacularly but was spectacularly rewarded for doing so with one prominent position after another!
 
What’s wrong with the Navy?  Well, this man and his career would be the poster child for it.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “NAVSEA Commander Downey Retires, 2 Admirals Take Over Roles in Interim”, Sam LaGrone, 10-Aug-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/08/10/navsea-commander-downey-retires-2-admirals-take-over-roles-in-interim

Who Needs a Navy When You’ve Got a P-8 Poseidon?

The Navy (and the US military) have received yet another miracle of technology from industry.  Boeing and Northrop Grumman have now simulated (they didn’t actually do anything but simulation is good enough – reality is never an issue) teaming between a manned P-8A Poseidon and unmanned MQ-4C Triton.[1]
 

Boeing and Northrop Grumman successfully simulated teaming between a manned P-8A Poseidon and unmanned MQ-4C Triton … [1]
 
The P-8A cued the Triton transit to a specific area. After receiving the request, the Triton autonomously planned and executed a transit to the area, employed sensors per the tasking, processed findings onboard, and reported results back to the P-8A Poseidon.[1]

So, the unmanned Triton flew to a waypoint and sent telemetry back?  Truly, the stuff of miracle and legend.  I’ve never even heard of “waypoints” … well, except for back in the 1970’s when that was just a routine capability … but to do that in a simulation instead of for real like we’ve done for decades is just a stunning achievement.  How do they come up with this stuff?
 
What does this miraculous development mean for the US?
 

Jane Bishop, vice president and general manager, global surveillance division, Northrop Grumman: “MQ-4C Triton and P-8A are the backbone of the U.S. Navy’s maritime patrol and reconnaissance force, delivering complementary capabilities unmatched by any other platforms. … Our commitment to pushing the boundaries of advanced technology ensures that the U.S. and allied nations operators maintain an unparalleled edge against evolving maritime threats.”[1]

“Unparalleled edge” !!!!  No other country in the world has the ability to fly waypoints and transmit data.  We are light years more advanced than anyone else.
 
This highlights the wonders of the P-8 Poseidon. 

The P-8A Poseidon is the world’s most advanced multi-mission maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft that provides anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and search and rescue mission capabilities.[1]

So, …
 

• ASW
• ASuW
• ISR
• S&R

 

Why do we even need a Navy?  Half a dozen P-8s should suffice to win any war.

 
 

____________________________________

Just out of idle curiosity, is anyone getting tired of these constant announcements about miraculous technologies that have actually existed for decades?  To paraphrase:  Those that can, do. Those that can’t take old technologies and pretend they’re new.
 
I wonder how much we paid to simulate waypoints and data transmission?

____________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Boeing and Northrop Grumman Successfully Simulate P-8A Poseidon and MQ-4C Triton Teaming”, Staff, 6-Aug-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/08/boeing-and-northrop-grumman-successfully-simulate-p-8a-poseidon-and-mq-4c-triton-teaming/

F-35 Congressional Testimony

The following is testimony provided June 23, 2026, on the F-35 aircraft program presented to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Airland.  Testimony provided by U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Gregory Masiello, Program Executive Officer F-35 Lightning II Joint Program Office.[1]
 
Here are some illuminating quotes from the transcript.[1]
 
As you know, the readiness rates are abysmal.  Here’s a major reason why.
 

Gen. Masiello:  In this session, I think I can say one of our challenges, and you talked about it, is if I have over 1,300 operational aircraft out there.  I believe we have set and enabled a sustainment system for about 700 to 800.  So, there is our challenge in readiness. [p.10]

So, the military has sized the sustainment effort for only half the existing aircraft?????!  How are people not being fired on a daily basis?
 
As a result of the sustainment issues, readiness is in the toilet and the toilet is at the bottom of a deep pit.  Rather than acknowledge the problem, firing people, and then fixing the problem, the military is still engaged in accounting games trying to make it look less bad than it is.
 

Senator Kelly: Thank you.  So, the GAO [ed. Government Accountability Office]  FMC [ed. Full Mission Capable] rate is they said 25 percent.· Your office claims it's 56 percent. [p.18]

It’s 25% and even that is overestimated!
 
As a reminder, there are two sets of mission capable measurements:
 

• Mission Capable (MC) – The aircraft can perform at least one task.  Basically, this means the aircraft can get off the ground.
• Full Mission Capable (FMC) – The aircraft can perform any of its combat mission tasks.  This is what every aircraft should be.

 
One of the problems is low expectations.
 

Gen. Masiello:  We have a North Star for 80 percent MC across the entirety of the fleet, and we need to figure out how to do that. [p.11]

So, general, you’ve set a pathetically low MC standard (only 80% are even rated to be able to get off the ground) that you can’t meet and have no idea how to even achieve that low standard.  Wow.  How are people not being fired on a daily basis?
 

That's about as ready as it gets.

Sadly, these kinds of problems are not unique to the F-35 program.  For example, the Navy is building carriers and ballistic submarines without the dry dock capacity to support their maintenance.
 
Where is SecDef Hegseth?  How can he read this kind of testimony and not fire everyone connected to the program?  Hegseth has been a major disappointment and his lack of action is why this kind of problem persists across the military.

To be fair, how can Congress hear this and not fire people?
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Testimony on the F-35 Aircraft Program”, staff, 1-Jul-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/07/01/testimony-on-the-f-35-aircraft-program

Iran War Status

Time for a quick Iran war status update.
 
As we’ve discussed many times on this blog, what are the requirements to actually win a war?
 

• Clear Objective and End State – This is mandatory before the first shot is fired.  If you don’t have a crystal clear objective/end state then you are guaranteed to fail.
• Total Commitment – In it to win it or don’t get in it.  Half measures have never won a war and lead, inevitably, to failure.
• Centers of Gravity – You can’t formulate an effective political or military strategy if you don’t correctly identify the enemy’s center(s) of gravity, meaning the “things” that are absolutely vital to the enemy and represent both the enemy’s strengths and vulnerabilities.  Every center of gravity is simultaneously a strength and, because it can be destroyed, a vulnerability.

With those basic requirements in mind, let’s check the status of the Iran war.
 
 
Objectives and End State
 
Although there has never been a formal, public listing of our objectives, certain objectives have clearly emerged.  They are:
 

• Decapitate Iranian leadership, meaning, kill the mullahs.  This has been achieved.  The leadership role has passed to (or been taken by) the Iranian military (IRGC).  We clearly failed to anticipate that this would happen.
• Destroy Iran’s nuclear capability forever.  This appears to have been totally or largely achieved based on the few public reports we have.
• Eliminate Iran’s ability to strike neighboring countries.  This has not been achieved although Iran’s strike capabilities have been severely degraded.  They are no longer capable of launching hundreds of missiles and are now reduced to a few launches at a time.
• Eliminate Iran as a functioning, rogue nation.  This has been partially achieved as Iran’s Navy has been destroyed, missile production has been severely degraded, missile stockpiles have been significantly reduced, Iran’s air force is non-existent, and Iran’s financial wherewithal has been crippled, all of which significantly reduce, but have not eliminated, Iran’s ability to export terrorism.

 
Total Commitment
 
At the start of hostilities, it seemed that the US was fully committed to the listed objectives.  Certainly, we were using significant portions of our military might.  However, after a few weeks, the force commitment declined sharply and became sporadic demonstrating that we were not fully committed.  A plausible, alternate explanation is that our weapon stockpiles have been reduced to levels that preclude additional, significant expenditures while maintaining an “adequate” reserve for dealing with China.
 
 
Centers of Gravity
 
Iran has a few readily apparent centers of gravity that should have been prioritized in any war.
 
Leadership – Iran was run by the dictatorial mullahs, as opposed to the people, and that group determined the country’s goals and objectives.  Eliminating them was vital.  This was achieved but the assumption of power by the IRGC was not anticipated and an adjustment should have been made when it became apparent what was happening.  For unknown reasons, the US has declined to go after the IRGC leadership in any significant manner.
 
Nuclear – Iran’s main world wide bargaining power stemmed from its nuclear threat.  Without a doubt, this had to be eliminated.  Without a nuclear threat, Iran is a severe nuisance but not an existential threat to anyone.  This was the true source of Iran’s geopolitical power.  It has been largely or totally eliminated.
 
Strait of Hormuz – Along with its nuclear threat, control of the strait was another source of geopolitical power for Iran and the importance of control of the strait was painfully obvious to all.  The US failure to quickly and thoroughly establish control is inexplicable and the continued failure to establish control is even more baffling.
 
Finance – Though of a somewhat lesser degree, Iran’s financial resources represented a source of power and great vulnerability.  The US has imposed sanctions and degraded Iran’s financial resources and access to an extent but has stopped well short of total financial war.  Much more could be done, as evidenced by the periodic announcement of additional sanctions.  Obviously, if additional sanctions can be imposed then that means that financial combat options were left unused which is inexplicable.
 
Financial combat is one of the overlooked “domains” of modern regional war.  It can be devastating and the US has the ability to pretty much totally isolate and “starve” Iran financially but, for inexplicable reasons, has opted not to do so.
 
 
Discussion
 
We see, then, that the US has recognized a couple of Iran’s centers of gravity while missing/ignoring or only partially acting on a couple others.  This points back to the war requirement of total commitment.  It is clear that the US is not completely invested in winning this war and, thus, has worked itself into a stalemate despite achieving some goals and inflicting a great deal of damage.  Unless the situation changes drastically, the cost of this war will continue to rise while the gains stagnate.  This is what happens when you enter a war without total commitment and a clear vision of the desired end state.  To be fair, I suspect that the Administration did have a clear vision of the end state but it did not match reality and now we are floundering.  We have overwhelming strength but no clear idea how to best use it.
 
As I have posted in the past, failure to pursue a war to total victory inevitably leads to having to refight the war down the road.  Disappointingly, it seems we are firmly on that path.
 
 
Note:  This is purely a military assessment and we will not be discussing the political aspects and I will not tolerate personal attacks on President Trump.  Discuss his military policies, if you wish, but refrain from personal attacks.  You are warned.
 

Light Amphibious Warship / Landing Ship Medium Update

As you know, the key to the Marines idiotic missile sniping (and ASW!) concept is the Light Amphibious Warship, now being called a Landing Ship Medium (some admiral-wannabe probably got another star for that reclassification!) in the latest churn which attempts to look like progress.  The LAW/LSM is already a few years late as the Marines have already stood up their littoral regiments (they haven’t explained how they’ll transport those Marines since the LAW/LSM does not yet exist).
 
The Navy has seemed reluctant to embrace the Marine’s concept and has slow-walked the LAW/LSM program, as noted in the GAO annual report.[1]
 

… after years of delays and affordability concerns, the Navy shifted to a two-block acquisition strategy in December 2024 that reduces requirements for the ships in the first block and defers pursuit of a ship that will fully meet requirements to a later block.[1]

So, the Navy is going to purchase ships that they know will not meet the requirements?  Do you know what a ship that can’t meet the requirements is called?  That’s right, it’s a reef, paperweight, target drone, LCS, embarrassment .
 
Is the Navy at least moving quickly on the Block 2 version that fully meets the requirements?
 

… program officials said they have yet to start planning the details of the transition to the second block, such as the timing of the transition or the requirements of the next block.[1]

They haven’t even defined the requirements, yet? 
 
I can’t see anything going wrong with this program.
 
 
 
___________________________________

 
[1]Government Accountability Office, "Weapon Systems Annual Assessment", Jul 2026, p.144

Stupidity Served on an Unmanned Platter

It seems as if the wonders of unmanned technology never cease.  New, miraculous accomplishments are happening every day.  In the latest development, unmanned boats can now resupply US Navy ships at sea. 
 

As part of the ongoing Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2026 naval exercises, a Splash Industries Typhoon Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) successfully landed in the well deck of the Wasp-class Landing Helicopter Dock USS Essex (LHD-2), marking the first instance of a USV performing an underway replenishment for a larger, crewed vessel.[1]

Amazing!  Outstanding!  This means the fleet can stay at sea indefinitely, being resupplied eternally by unmanned boats!
 
Now, take a look at the boat that was used in the RimPac exercise as seen in this photo from manufacturer Splash Industries on a Linkedin site.[2]
 

Replenishment at Sea - one suitcase at a time!

Despite my earlier enthusiasm, do you note anything interesting about the boat and its cargo?  That’s right, the boat is about the size of a rowboat and the cargo was a suitcase.
 
Is this someone’s idea of the future of at sea replenishment ?  - a suitcase at a time?  Someone thinks we’re going to resupply the fleet one suitcase at a time delivered by tiny boats?  Was this a joke?  Is it April Fool's?
 
It’s one thing to tinker around with technology for its own sake.  That’s a minor, cheap, zero-impact foray into pure science.  Doesn’t hurt anything.  Doesn’t cost anything.  However, it’s a completely different scenario when that pointless playing around ties up major US amphibious warships, wastes the time and resources of crews, and leads to false expectations.
 
If you want to play with your tiny, remote controlled, unmanned boat in the bay near your house and have it drive up onto someone’s boat ramp … go ahead.  You’re wasting your time but who cares and you’ll have a fun day at the beach.   However, when you tie up amphibious ships, waste sailors time, and cost the taxpayer money then you need to stop and whoever authorized this for the Navy needs to be fired.
 
Splash Industries, you took an oversized kid’s remote control boat, tied a box to it, and drove it up a ramp just like we did as kids when we drove our remote controlled boat up onto the beach.  Congratulations.  You’ve reinvented a technology that kids have played with for decades and somehow got some idiot in the Navy to sponsor you.
 
Note:  the video of the boat beaching itself on the ship’s ramp is widely available on the Internet if you want to see it.  It appears the boat may have missed the intended ramp point but I can’t be positive.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Typhoon USV Completes First-Ever At-Sea Resupply with USS Essex”, Ethan Gossrow, 16-Jul-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/07/typhoon-usv-uss-essex-at-sea-resupply/
 
[2]https://www.linkedin.com/posts/splashindustries_rimpac2026-activity-7481404591633485824-aoDy

Book Review – The Sixth Battle

Have you wondered what a modern carrier battle would look like?  Of course you have!  Well, wonder no longer.  The Sixth Battle [1] describes the clash between Russian carrier task forces and a US carrier (fictional Forrestal class complete with ... yes! ... Tomcats!) isolated off the southeastern coast of Africa against the setting of a Russian sponsored invasion of South Africa. 
 
The geopolitical situation is nicely setup without being tedious and boring and offers solid context.  The land battle is described with engaging detail and personal interest but the focus of the book is on the naval battle with the Russian carriers (Kiev and Kuznetsov classes) attempting to support the invasion with land attacks while simultaneously preventing the badly outnumbered American carrier from interfering.  The Russian plan to isolate the US carrier group from reinforcement is brilliant and quite plausible as are the American attempts to respond.  In the end, the plot comes down to the battle between the Russian naval and land based aviation and the American carrier group and is told with a fantastic combination of suspense, realism, and detail.
 
Along the way, the plot presents scenarios involving chemical/nerve gas warfare and the use of tactical nukes in anti-submarine warfare.  The tactical nuke scenario, in particular, draws the reader into the debate and gives a feeling for the complexities of the decision making involved as well as the tactical considerations and methodology of employment.  I know we have readers who are firmly convinced that tactical nukes should be used and this offers a window into that scenario.
 
Anti-ship strike scenes assemble and make clear all the factors that go into a strike and how they fit together.  Essentially, they merge all the aspects discussed on this blog, and which so many people struggle to understand, into clear, detailed, riveting descriptions.
 
One can’t help but come away with a profound understanding of why carriers should operate in groups of four.  The sheer number of aircraft required to carry out a strike is daunting and the relegation of so many aircraft to supporting roles (CAP, BarCAP, tanking, EW, etc.) which results in shockingly meager “full” strikes of only a dozen or so aircraft hammers home the very small size of a single carrier air wing.  Of course, today’s downsized air wings have even fewer aircraft available for actual strike action.  Disturbingly, today’s carriers could not possibly execute the actions described in the book.
 
The book also offers a clear feel for the vast operating area of the oceans when conducting naval/carrier warfare and the difficulties in finding and engaging a surface group – another aspect that blog readers often struggle to comprehend.
 
Yet another key facet of the book is that it grants an appreciation for the force multiplication value of tactics as opposed to the pure evaluation of individual weapons as so many of today’s naval observers and analysts tend to do.  The reader comes to understand that people and tactics rank ahead of weapon specifications in importance to overall combat effectiveness.
 
The value of EMCON and electronic warfare is quite evident in both the detection efforts and the actual strikes and demonstrates how it all ties together in the overall maneuvering, tactics, and combat.
 
The role of Tomahawk carrying ships such as the Burkes is noteworthy and, again, emphasizes the need for large escort groups and the value of tactical flexibility that numbers grant.
 
To summarize, in addition to being a hugely entertaining and believable story, the author presents what amounts to a primer on naval battle and carrier warfare.  This book should be required reading for followers of this blog. 
 
The book is very well researched and offers great detail without becoming tedious.  A perfect balance between detail and story telling.
 
Read it!
 

 

 
______________________________

 
[1]Tillman, Barrett, The Sixth Battle, Bantam Books, 1992, ISBN 0-553-29402-8

GAO Report Tidbits

The annual Government Accountability Office weapons assessment report is out and here are some the lowlights.

AARGM-ER – The anti-radiation missile is experiencing production delays.
 

The AARGM-ER program continues to experience production delays. The program reported that the delays were related to missile qualification, hardware capability, and software problems discovered during testing.[1]

That’s what you get from concurrency.
 
As GAO notes,
 

We found that starting production before demonstrating a system will work as intended—which the Navy did—increases the risk of discovering deficiencies that require costly, time-intensive rework.[1]

Does the Navy have a regulation against doing anything smart?  It certainly seems so.
 
 
Ford Class – The class is a money pit;  a black hole of finances.
 

CVN 79 costs have increased by over $1.5 billion since 2021. Further, since last year, CVN 80 and 81 costs increased $500 million and $1.2 billion, respectively. The program began lead ship construction before completing design and implemented design changes on CVN 79 during its construction—out of line with our leading shipbuilding practices. According to officials, changes resulted, in part, from installing immature technologies that required further development.[1]

The Navy continues to demonstrate their inability to learn any lessons.
 

The Navy delayed planned delivery of CVN 79 by almost 2 years, until March 2027, since last year. Program officials attributed this delay to continued challenges with an elevator subsystem and a landing subsystem.[1]

Elevators and the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) are the same problems the Ford encountered and the Navy went ahead and installed the problematic equipment on the succeeding ships and are now surprised that they’re causing delays.
 
GAO now reports that the unit cost for the carriers is over $16B [1] and that’s with a LOT of buried and deferred costs since the Ford is still not fully operational.  The true cost is likely around $20B each.
 
 
Burke Flt III – Delays plague the program.
 

According to Navy estimates from June 2025, the first 13 follow-on DDG 51 ships are now up to 55 months behind schedule compared with up to 41 months, as we found in our last review. Further, cumulative delays across these ships grew from 323 months to 414 months since last year … [1]

Here’s an interesting aspect of ship costs that no one considers:
 

Additionally, the DDG 51 program office has invested nearly $1 billion since fiscal year 2021 in infrastructure initiatives at both shipyards.[1]

Thus, the cost of Burkes is the unit cost PLUS infrastructure money donated to the shipbuilder.  You won’t see that reported in any explanation of the ship cost.
 
 
F-18 IRST – The IRST program is an unmitigated disaster.
 

DOD and Navy independent testers assessed that IRST was neither operationally effective nor suitable based on test results, due in part to poor reliability. … Navy testers recommended that IRST continue to be introduced to the fleet, despite their findings.[1]

????  It’s not operationally effective or suitable so let’s send it to the Fleet???  I don’t even know how to comment on the level of stupidity demonstrated by this.
 
 
MQ-25 Unmanned Tanker - Attempting to explain significant cost estimation errors,
 

Program officials stated that due to the fixed-price nature of the development contract, they did not previously have access to data showing the actual cost of building the aircraft.[1]

Wait … the Navy entered into a contract without actual cost data?  If you were writing a farcical comedy, you couldn’t make this stuff up.
 
 
ORCA Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) - Attempting to explain software delays, the Navy stated,
 

… the Navy has reported that it did not have any licenses for data rights or visibility into the ORCA software and was reliant on the contractor to make changes to the software.[1]

This has been a recurring problem that we’ve highlighted and some people still refuse to believe it.  The Navy, far too often, does not have access to product data or software rights.
 
 
Columbia SSBN -  Columbia is falling behind schedule.
 

SSBN 826, the lead ship, is at least 18 months behind its contracted delivery date as of July 2025.[1]

Virginia SSN – The Navy keeps assuring us that the submarine shortfall will be mitigated by producing 2-3 subs per year.  However,
 

The [Virginia] construction rate has generally stabilized, with shipbuilders working at a one-per-year pace as of June 2025—half the rate of the Navy’s two per year goal.[1]
 
While the Navy received delivery of two Block IV submarines in 2025, both were over 3 years late.[1]
 
The projected delivery dates for the first 10 Block V submarines continue to worsen, slipping by an average of almost 3 years since original contract award.[1]

 
 
Conclusion
 
The level of stupidity and the demonstrated lack of responsibility and integrity evidenced by these findings is mind-numbing.  Where is SecDef Hegseth?  Does he not read these reports?  He should be firing people by the truckload.  He is every bit as culpable as every other moron associated with these programs.

 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Government Accountability Office, "Weapon Systems Annual Assessment", Jul 2026, p.144

Flower Class Corvette

The Flower class corvette was the epitome of a single purpose vessel (to be fair, most ships were in WWII).  It was designed and built to provide coastal convoy escort, specifically, anti-U-boat protection although it later proved adaptable to open ocean convoy escort thanks to its impressive range for its size.  While not designed or intended to hunt and kill U-boats, the class nevertheless managed to sink some fifty U-boats. 
 
 
Design Concept
 
It’s important to understand the ship’s intended role.  It was a convoy ASW escort.  Its responsibility was to deliver convoy ships not sink U-boats.  In other words, was designed to ensure that convoy ships arrived safely.  It was not designed to go hunt and kill U-boats.  The designers recognized that a mission kill, meaning forcing a U-boat to break off an attack, was just as good as a kill in that it delivered convoy ships safely to port.  Thus, the designers, wisely, didn’t try to load every known ASW weapon and sensor onto the ship.  That would have increased the size, cost, and complexity of the ship resulting in far fewer vessels being built which would have defeated the purpose of the class.  It is vitally important to recognize this concept:  greater individual ship capability would have negatively impacted the overarching goal of getting convoys safely to port.  We have completely lost sight of this balance between mission intent and individual ship design.  By insisting on building uber-capable Burkes (to the dubious extent that they still are) we’ve been forced to give up building true destroyers, frigates, and corvettes thus hurting our overall naval capability.
 

 
Another vital consideration for the designers was that trying to fit the ultimate, top-of-the-line ASW gear on every ship would have resulted in ASW equipment shortages for every other ship class.  In a time of war, resources (meaning weapons and sensors) are limited.  Maximum ASW fits for Flower class ships would have been a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul.  We have completely lost sight of this concept today.  By only building high end Burkes we have ensured that we will be unable to outfit any other ship type (of which we have none!) in a time of war.
 
 
Design Specifics
 

• ASW fit sufficient for its task but no more than that which contributed to its affordability
• Buildable at small shipyards
• Affordable in large numbers (394 ships built)
• Good range at 3,500 nm at its cruising speed of 12 kts;  compare to a Burke with a range of 4,400 nm at its cruising speed of 20 kts
• Commercial machinery operable by reserve and merchant sailors
• Sufficient speed (16 kts) for its purpose
• Built to the minimum requirements not the maximum

 
What would a modern Flower class ship look like?  In other words, what would a modern, low end, affordable in numbers, minimally capable ASW corvette look like without advanced radars, high speed, helo hangar/flight deck, dozens of VLS, etc. look like?  Well, here’s a few characteristics:
 

• Moderate stealth shaping (no exotic coatings)
• 1x 76 mm Super Rapid STRALES/DART
• 2x Mk32 Triple Torpedo Launchers
• 2x RBU
• VDS
• Hull mounted, small, multi-frequency sonar
• SQR-20 Multi-function towed array
• Acoustic isolation
• Low end radar
• 18 kt top speed
• 5,000 nm range
• 1x CIWS/SeaRAM/RAM

 
Discussion
 
The Flower class was built not to kill submarines (though they managed to kill some fifty U-boats!) but to accomplish a mission which was the safe delivery of merchant ships to port and it filled that purpose admirably.  Given the mission, the designers recognized that a mission kill was just as good as an actual kill and cost a lot less money thus allowing the class to be built in large numbers across numerous yards.  The large numbers of vessels contributed to the mission success.  Mere presence achieved mission kills since submarines will go far out their way to avoid detection and this occurs whether the surface ship even knows the submarine is present or not.  In other words, presence equals mission kill which makes simple presence (numbers) a weapon in itself!  We need to re-learn those design lessons and re-embrace the low end, single purpose ship suitably updated and adapted to modern warfare. 

MEKO A-200 Frigate Cost

Just a quick note ... For those of you who continue to believe that foreign shipbuilders can build naval vessels faster and cheaper than US builders, here’s a data point.  The newly specified MEKO A-200 frigates for the German navy will reportedly cost $1.9B(USD) each for four ships and you can bet your soul that cost will increase as work actually commences.  We’re looking at a $2 - $2.5B frigate!  Yikes!

Constellation Frigate Update

As you know, the Navy has terminated the Constellation frigate program with only the first two ships possibly being completed and even that now appears to be unlikely, according to the most recent GAO annual weapons assessment report.[1]
 

According to senior Navy officials, these two ships are under review for potential termination.  ... These officials further stated that in March 2026, the Navy directed its shipbuilder to pause ordering material for FFG 62 and FFG 63 to evaluate its necessity as those ships remain under review.[1]

With the continuation of the two remaining ships under review and the shipbuilder having been directed to stop ordering materials, the conclusion seems inescapable:  the two ships will be terminated.
 
Why does this kind of debacle continue to happen to the Navy?  The Navy knowingly continues to commit programmatic suicide by failing to follow best practices.
 

As we previously reported, the Navy had obligated over $3.4 billion to construct six ships before completing the frigate’s basic and functional design—an approach counter to shipbuilding leading practices.[1]

The Navy paid for a ship that didn’t even have a design.  Who could have anticipated anything would go wrong with that?
 
What went wrong?
 

The extent of design changes exceeded the original expectation of conducting limited design changes on the parent design.[1]

This tells me the Navy is incompetent on an almost unimaginable scale and failed to do their homework before committing.  How has no one been fired over this?
 
As weight growth became an issue, the Navy’s response was hilariously stupid.
 

Concurrently, the Navy and shipbuilder have evaluated weight savings opportunities, including removing redundant systems, removing primer from steel plating, and reducing firefighting system capacity, among other things.[1]

What could possibly go wrong by removing redundant systems (a vital element of combat survivability), removing primer from steel (of course the paint will stick without primer … won’t it??), and reducing firefighting capacity (every damage control effort in history has depended on firefighting – did the Navy learn nothing from the 202 fire aboard USS Bonhomme Richard?)? 
 
Eliminate primer and reduce firefighting?  Come on.  I couldn’t even sell that as an April Fools joke.
 
There’s stupid and then there’s Navy stupid which is just a whole ‘nother level of stupid.  How has no one been fired for even considering these changes?
 
I can only conclude that one of the requirements of for attaining flag rank is to undergo a lobotomy and a pretty extensive one, at that.  Either that or they’re all Chinese agents.  Nothing else can explain the non-stop parade of stupid ideas and decisions spewing forth from Navy leadership.

__________________________________

[1]Government Accountability Office, "Weapon Systems Annual Assessment", Jul 2026, p.144

"Existing Design With Only Minor Modification" Trap

More and more, the Western naval ship acquisition world is reverting to ‘existing designs with only minor modifications’ instead of new ship designs.  This is due to fear rather than combat requirements: fear of runaway costs, fear of schedule delays, fear of bad publicity and criticism, fear of innovation, etc.  Fear.  The Western naval world is acquiring ships as a reaction to fear of their own ineptitude. 
 
Instead of honestly and objectively assessing the reasons for acquisition failures and fixing the problems, Western navies have opted for the perceived path of safety over that of combat effectiveness.
 
The latest victim is Germany which has cancelled its F126 frigate acquisition program. 
 

The German Ministry of Defense has decided to discontinue the construction of six F126-class frigates …[1]
 
According to the BMVg, Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS), the company initially contracted as the prime contractor, was unable to meet the agreed-upon time and budget constraints.[1]

The program began around 2015, depending on what one considers the starting point, and the first production contract was issued in 2020.  Lead ship delivery had been delayed until 2032 and costs were ballooning.
 
Burned by the failure and afraid of a repeat, Germany has opted to proceed with an existing design, the MEKO A-200 frigate.
 

Instead of planning a new ship, the decision was made to use a readily available, off-the-shelf vessel with only minor modifications.[1]

On a side note, this is yet another bit of evidence that the widespread belief among American naval observers that other countries can produce quality ships, on time, on or under budget, and cheaper than US shipbuilders is false.  But, I digress …
 
So, what is the problem with using an existing design with only minor modifications?
 
There are multiple problems:
 
The “minor modifications” never happens.  The existing design gets heavily modified, commonality disappears, and the costs balloon while the schedule slips.  The US Constellation program was a prime example of this.
 
Far more serious, though, is the trap that existing designs present.  If one never builds new designs, how do ships ever get better?  At some point, you have to move to a new design in order to incorporate new technology.  There’s a reason we’re not still building sailing ships.  Yes, you can upgrade individual pieces of equipment (though limited by ship’s utilities capacity, internal volume, weight margins, etc.) but you can’t improve or change the basic ship.  No amount of equipment upgrades could turn a Burke into a Visby-level stealth ship.  If you want a Visby-level stealth warship – and you do! – it’s got to be a new design.
 
Given the several year (or decade+)  build time for a modern naval vessel, even if the parent design was adequate when the program began, it will be obsolete by the time it enters service.  Of course, existing designs are not adequate.  Consider the MEKO A-200 that Germany now intends to acquire.  The original MEKO 200 design dates back to 1987 and even the MEKO A-200 dates back to 2001, making it already a 25 year old design which will be 30+ years old by the time the ships enter service.  Is a 30+ yr old design really what you want for your most modern, front line surface warship?
 
Take a look at the MEKO A-200.  It’s not particularly stealthy which is the major survival requirement for the modern battlefield.  Its electrical capacity for the perpetually ‘just around the corner’ lasers and rail guns is inadequate.  And so on.
 
Consider the US National Security Cutter (NSC) which is to be the basis for the next iteration of the Navy’s attempt at procuring a frigate.  The design dates back to the late 1990’s and is not even built to combat standards.  Assuming the project isn’t cancelled, the Navy is going to accept frigates whose base design is going to be around 40 years old by the time they enter service!  The NSC meets none of the requirements for success on the modern naval battlefield and yet the Navy has turned to them out of desperation and fear – fear of yet another ship acquisition fiasco.  We’re not designing for combat;  we’re designing for programmatic and career safety and public relations.
 
We cannot successfully build new designs until we objectively and honestly figure out why we keep failing.  Just to save Western navies decades of study, I’ll tell you why we keep failing:
 

• CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS
• Change Orders

 
There you have it, Western navies.  I’ve done your job for you.  Now, go build a new ship that actually belongs on the modern battlefield.
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Germany is cancelling the F126 frigate project and procuring eight MEKO frigates”, Staff, 24-Jun-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/06/germany-is-cancelling-the-f126-frigate-project-and-procuring-eight-meko-frigates/

Air Force Follows Navy Playbook for A-10

You probably know that the Air Force has attempted to kill the A-10 Warthog, the best close air support aircraft ever built, for many years now but has been repeatedly thwarted by Congress.
 
The Navy faced a similar situation with the Ticonderoga class cruisers.  They attempted to early retire them, multiple times, only to be thwarted by Congress.  The Navy’s solution was to agree to a blatantly bogus “modernization” program which, in reality, was a way to remove funding for the cruisers while they literally rotted pier side until the Navy could claim that they could no longer be economically upgraded.
 
Like the Navy, the Air Force has, yet again, been prevented by Congress from retiring the A-10 but, ignoring the intent of Congress, has settled on the tactic of simply no longer funding the operation, maintenance, and support of the A-10.  As Redstate website reports,
 

… by the end of this year, the A-10 will be without depot support, without a training pipeline, without weapons-school instruction, and without operational-test capacity.[1]

With no funding for support, the aircraft  will rapidly fall into unflyable status.  The Air Force will have, technically, kept the A-10 but will have achieved practical retirement.
 
Congress should fire every Air Force general and withhold all Air Force funding until A-10 support is restored.
 
The military seems to feel it is above the will of Congress.  It is past time for Congress to re-exert its authority.
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “Act Now: Fund A-10 Warthog or Lose Combat Power Forever”,  Ward Clark, 24-Jun-2026,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2026/06/24/act-now-fund-a-10-warthog-or-lose-combat-power-forever-n2203670

ASROC or Helicopters?

Helicopters are generally recognized as the best ASW platform above the surface; another submarine being the best ASW platform below the surface, of course.  Unfortunately, this leads to the widespread mindset that every ship must have helos embarked for ASW.
 
The problem with the concept of helos on every ship is that the aviation element of a ship is shockingly expensive.  A helo needs a flight deck (something on the order of 80ft x 50ft), hangar (another 80ft x 50 ft), dedicated weapon magazines, fuel storage, maintenance shops and parts storage, pilot and maintainer berthing (and food, water, etc.).  The extra 160ft x 50ft of ship size means more power is needed to move the ship which means bigger engines which requires more ship size which …  You get the idea.

Another problem is that helos are only sporadically available, being notorious for needing maintenance at inconvenient times.
 
Sure, there’s a penalty to be paid for putting helos on every ship but, really, what’s the alternative since we need ASW?  Well, one alternative is ASROC (anti-submarine rocket).  ASROC began back when submarines still had to get fairly close to their target in order to attack.  Today, submarines can attack with torpedoes or missiles from far beyond ASROC range (vertical launch ASROC has a range of around 12 nm). What’s needed is a much longer range ASROC, perhaps on the order of a hundred miles.  Given that we have thousand mile cruise missiles I can’t see any problem with developing a hundred mile ASROC. 
 
In the past, ASROC used arm launchers, box launchers, and common VLS cells.  The flexibility in launch mechanism means that some kind of suitable launcher can be placed on any ship tasked with ASW.
 

A long range ASROC would offer a viable alternative to the incredibly expensive helicopter on every ship.  Note that this does not mean we don’t need ASW helicopters.  We do!  We just don’t need them on every ASW ship.  Helicopters should be reserved for true destroyers (of which there are none in the world), ASW carriers, and, perhaps, a specialized convoy escort frigate.  They should not be on corvettes, general purpose frigates, and cruisers (meaning Burke/Zumwalt “destroyers”).  Want to build a cheaper Burke?  Eliminate the helicopter!